ABSTRACT
ABSTRACT
Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi is one of the most important spiritual fathers of the ideology and movement that has come to be known as Salafi-jihadism. Based on primary source materials produced by al-Maqdisi and other important relevant actors at different times and places, this article shows how he developed the ideas that have influenced his disciples and protégés, most prominently Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the founder of Al Qaeda in Iraq and “godfather” of the Islamic State, and Turki al-Binali, the Islamic State's current Grand Mufti. It also explains how and why, in later years, his disciples turned against him and, despite his repeated efforts, refused to allow him to play the role of the “critical friend,” much less regain control of the movement. The article seeks to expose the intra-jihadist frictions and debates involving al-Maqdisi during different times and contexts, especially the more recent ones between him and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Indeed, it becomes obvious how al-Maqdisi has been trying to regain his lost influence and relevance among the most radical strands within his chosen movement for years. What this shows is that, amidst the fast-changing environment in which Salafi-jihadism has evolved, praxis trumps theory, and a reputation of steadfastness, zealousness, and unwavering convictions matter more to prospective radicals than a reputation of religious knowledge and scholarship.
Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi is arguably the main spiritual father of the radical ideology known as Salafi-jihadism, to which terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) subscribe.1 This is due to the fact that, during the 1980s, he was among the first to reinterpret, reconstruct, and develop a set of central ideas that joined the main benchmarks of the Salafi-jihadist ideology, most prominent among his contributions being the idea of al-wala’ wa al-bara’ (loyalty and disavowal) and its link to the principle of takfir (excommunication). What he did not realize at this juncture was that he was unleashing a Pandora's Box of potent and dangerous ideas that would, in subsequent decades, run away from him and acquire a life of their own.
The fact that two main influential players in the trajectory and ongoing development of the Salafi-jihadist current were al-Maqdisi's past disciples—the founder of ISIL, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and ISIL's top religious cleric Turki al-Binali—only serves to confirm his centrality and importance. In a letter addressed to the “faithful among those who travelled to the land of jihad in Syria,” al-Maqdisi wrote in the summer of 2014, affirming his position in the Salafi-jihadist thought:
What urged me to write [this letter] is the trust and burden that I bear upon my shoulders, since you, and many like you, have been brought up on an approach/path (manhaj) that I am one of its most prominent preachers, and have studied on writings, the most famous among which are mine, and still read publications, the most notable among which are mine. Only an arrogant person can deny or reject that.2
Another sign of al-Maqdisi's contribution and far-reaching influence came from one of ISIL's top religious officials, most probably identifiable as Turki al-Binali. In correspondence with al-Maqdisi, regarding the latter's attempt at arbitration between ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), al-Binali wrote that unlike JN, which used to “prohibit the circulation of your [al-Maqdisi's] books for fear of losing popular support, ISIL adopts the printing of your books and letters.”3 He went on to claim that he had never entered an ISIL headquarters without finding one of al-Maqdisi's books or treatises.4
In June 2014, al-Maqdisi was released from prison in Jordan after serving a five-year sentence.5 But in October he was detained again for three months before being released in early 2015, likely as a reward for the failed attempt he made to mediate between the Jordanian government and ISIL to secure the release of the Jordanian pilot Mu'ath al-Kasasbah in exchange for Sajidah al-Rishawi, the Al Qaeda suicide attacker who had failed to detonate her explosive belt in an Amman hotel in 2005.6
This failed mediation caused a huge rift between the true spiritual father of Salafi-jihadism and the latest incarnation of the movement, the so-called Islamic State. Capturing the acrimonious debate between al-Maqdisi and ISIL clerics—even though the latter are few in number, ISIL relies heavily on past works of Salafi-jihadist ideologues including al-Maqdisi himself—shows that even radical ideas can mutate, transform, and radicalize even further. After all, while “[T]he rigidity of the Islamic State's ideology stands out even in a jihadi landscape marked by rigidity,”7 it was al-Maqdisi himself who, according to his own confession, was “their [ISIL] sheikh who taught them the concept of tawhid (monotheism or the oneness of God).”8
As we shall discuss later, elements within the movement, which arguably owe al-Maqdisi their spark of life, have taken a more virulent twist and spiralled out of his control. Whereas al-Maqdisi excommunicates the tawaghit (despot) rulers because they all “fight against the religion of Allah,”9 the neo-radicals who rebelled against him took his idea and understanding of al-wala’ wa al-bara’ to its furthermost logical conclusion, by requiring the excommunication of all despotic representatives, officials, supporters, and even those who fail to excommunicate any of the above.10
This article, relying on primary source materials produced by Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi and other important actors who either influenced him or had been influenced by him at different times and places, is able to highlight an important point. It is the fact that al-Maqdisi, despite his immense contribution to the development of Salafi-jihadist thought, tried and failed twice to regain intellectual control over the jihadi movement. The first was when his former disciple Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi rebelled against him and refused to heed his advice. The second, and central contribution of this article, came almost a decade later, when ISIL spurned him, refusing to consider him as a critical friend with whom they would want to play.
While utilizing the work of those who have written extensively about the ideology and influence of Abu Mohmmad al-Maqdisi,11 this article builds on their work by exposing the intra-jihadist frictions and debates that have involved him before, during, and after the ascendancy of ISIL, most interesting and original is that between him and his former disciple and current ISIL top religious cleric Turki al-Binali. Moreover, understanding such disputes and differences can prove useful from a counter-extremism point of view, as we shall discuss later. However, let us first set the background by discussing how al-Maqdisi developed and reinterpreted the hallmarks of Salafi-jihadism: the ideas of al-wala’ wa al-bara’ and takfir.
Al-Maqdisi's Destructive Legacy
Regarding al-Maqdisi's contribution, he himself explained the main pillars of Salafi-jihadist thought or ideology nicely by stating that “[T]he main priority of this current is calling people to tawhid.”12 The second and most dangerous pillar, however, is al-wala’ wa al-bara’. As he elaborates:
The first duty upon al-muwahhid [the monotheist] is to disavow and disbelieve in the scattered gods and the many names that are being worshiped other than God, which in the past took the form of stones and primitive idols, and in our time are the rulers and legislators and their man-made laws and legislations. While the tawhid, which we spoke of, entails al-bara’ (disavowal) and disbelief in these man-made laws and scattered idols, one of its most trustworthy ties is the subject of al-wala’ wa al-bara’, which requires the disavowal of the authors of these laws and regulations and the people who are applying them.13
The third and last pillar of the Salafi-jihadist current, according to al-Maqdisi, is jihad.14 In many of his writings, he refers to jihad as the “highest rank” of showing al-bara’ (disavowal) and enmity by “striving to demise al-nuzum al-taghutiyya (the tyrannical or idolatrous regimes) and fighting its servants until the religion is all to God.”15
However, it would be extremely inaccurate and overly simplistic to claim that al-Maqdisi was influenced in his theorization by Salafism alone. Two specific notions, elaborated by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood figure Sayyid Qutb, had a profound impact on Salafi-jihadist thought as a whole and influenced the writings of its main ideologues, including al-Maqdisi.16 The first is the idea that Muslim-majority societies live in a jahiliyya state (pre-Islamic obliviousness) and, second, the idea of al-hakimiyyah (the sovereignty of God and his laws alone).17 In his landmark book, In the Shadows of the Qur'an, Qutb asserted:
People, at any time and place, either rule according to Allah's Law (shari'a)—in its totality—accept it and surrender to it completely, in which case they are in Allah's religion; or rule according to man-made laws, in any way or form, and accept them, in which case they are in a state of jahiliyya and in the religion of whomever they rule according to his law, and not in any case in Allah's religion.18
It is not hard to see how later theorists, such as al-Maqdisi, have built on Qutb's views to reach the excommunication of all Muslim governments. Al-Maqdisi, in his reply to a question asking his opinion on the writings of Sayyid Qutb, was full of praise, calling him “the mujahid sheikh, the respected author and our esteemed teacher … the likes of him in our time are few, and all who tread this path [the path al-Maqdisi is treading] are in the debt of Sayyid.”19
Moreover, the interplay between doctrinal Salafism and Muslim Brotherhood political Islamist activism is well-documented by several researchers.20 The product of this hybridization was the so-called haraki (activist/revolutionary) Salafism, which manifested itself in the Sahwa movement that started in the 1970s and gained momentum during the 1980s and 1990s.21 In an interview with al-Quds al-Arabi, the founder of the Sururi current (the most famous and dominant current within the Sahwa movement), Mohammad Surur Zain al-Abidin (who died in November 2016), highlighted the revolutionary aspect that his thought introduced by declaring that it “transformed Salafism from one worldview to another [and] destroyed the myth of wali al-amr [the central obligation in the Scholastic/traditional Salafism to obey the ruler] and the obligation to respect them.”22
While al-Maqdisi was instrumental in the creation of a new strand of thought—the Salafi-jihadist thought—he was indebted, as he confessed, to Mohammad Surur for his influence during his early years of religiosity, as Surur was the first to teach him the tawhid book.23 Moreover, according to his own words, al-Maqdisi grew up in and was part of a “salafi haraki [activist] current that occupied a middle ground between the ikhwani [Muslim Brotherhood] current, and the ilmi [scholastic] Salafi current.”24
However, while neither Sayyid Qutb nor the main ideologues and leaders of the activist/revolutionary strand of Salafism—such as Mohammad Surur, Mohammad Qutb (Sayyid's brother), Abdullah Azzam, and, later, Salman al-Awdah and Safar al-Hawali in Saudi Arabia—excommunicate the rulers and call for taking up of arms against them, Mohammad Abdul Salam Faraj, the Egyptian Tanzim al-Jihad ideologue and author of the 1980 tract, Jihad: The Absent Obligation,25 and Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi, the most important ideologue of Salafi-jihadism, most certainly did.
Al-Maqdisi's views regarding takfir and rebellion against the ruler in his 1984 Millat Ibrahim mirrored Faraj, but, unlike Faraj, he linked his theorization to the principle of tawhid. This is not to say that Faraj had no bearing on al-Maqdisi's intellectual evolution. Indeed, the second most prominent section of the latter's Minbar (pulpit) al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad website appears to be named after Faraj's book.
It is thus obvious that many Salafi-jihadist ideas and concepts have their roots in the ideology of political Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and the theorization of some of the main clerics of jihadi organizations that developed during the persecution eras of the Egyptian and Syrian presidents Jamal Abdul Nasir and Hafiz al-Asad. Despite this fact, however, al-Maqdisi made a concerted effort to articulate his ideas and concepts in a predominantly Salafi language and to present himself and his current as heirs of the early eighteenth-century reformist mission, known as Wahhabism, which was led by sheikh Mohammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab and culminated in the establishment of the first Saudi state. The following section explores briefly the way in which al-Maqdisi attempted to do this and the rationale behind his decision.
Al-Maqdisi's Saudization of the Takfiri Ideology
Acknowledging both the status and significance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as home of the two Holy Mosques and the fact that its scholars and clerics were very influential and respected throughout the Muslim world, radical Salafi-jihadist ideologues knew early on that if they were to stand any chance of making inroads in Saudi Arabia, which they consider as the ultimate prize, they would have to attack the Saudi state's claim to Islamic legitimacy and to discredit its religious scholars and establishment. The first, and main, radical ideologue to tackle this task was Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi. By articulating his message and ideas in a Wahhabi religious discourse—through the selective utilization of some of the most radical statements and fatwas of some of the early Imams of the Najdi mission, without regard to their own specific temporal and spatial contexts—and by attacking the modern official religious scholars and accusing them of being ulama’ sultan (ruler's scholars), he tried to ensure that his message would resonate and have a receptive audience in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Muslim world.
What Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi has done is the Saudization of the radical takfiri ideology. What is ironic is that he tapped into the heritage of a Salafism that preaches political acquiescence and quietism in order to formulate a message that preaches the complete opposite. He managed to do so through the powerful effects of selectivity, appropriation, and repurposing. As Dr. Abdulrahman al-Hadlag, the director general of the Ideological Security Directorate at the Saudi Ministry of Interior, explained:
When the intellectual leaders or ideologues in Afghanistan saw that the thousands of Saudis, who came back [from Afghanistan during the late 1980s], were not convinced and did not accept the idea of takfir (excommunication) as it was laid down, they resorted to a smart method. They came up with Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who wrote a book called The Obvious Proofs of the Saudi State Infidelity in order to convince the Saudis [of the radical takfiri ideology] … [al-Maqdisi] dug into our books, such as the books of the Imams of the Najdi Mission and others, not to search for the truth, but to lure our youth by saying that such a line of thought is present in your heritage.26
Furthermore, al-Maqdisi was knowledgeable and familiar with the tribal mentality and mindset in the Gulf, in general, and Saudi in particular, as evident from the earlier versions of his books, the Obvious Proofs of the Saudi State Infidelity and Millat Ibrahim, where he called himself al-Otaibi, which is one of the largest and well-known tribes in the Arabian Peninsula, in order to delude the Saudi public into thinking that he was not an outsider, but one of them, and to ensure resonance of his message inside the Kingdom and the Arabian Peninsula.27
In his 1989 The Obvious Proofs book, referring to the few Saudis who were influenced by the radical takfiri ideology that they encountered in Afghanistan during the 1980s, and confirming that there was a conscious strategy to infiltrate those youths and turn them against their rulers, scholars, and societies, al-Maqdisi wrote:
Here are the waves of youth, trained on weapons and explosives, returning after they had benefited since they came out of the walls of the [Arabian] Peninsula and come into contact and mixed with their brethren preachers from around the globe. … The thought of “takfir (excommunication) and fighting the government and all of those who have championed, supported and been loyal to it” has spread among trained young people, who returned from Afghanistan, like wildfire. And here are the waves of young people returning with dozens of books exposing the tughat (despotic rulers) of al-Saud.28
With regard to the discrediting of the official religious scholars and institution, al-Maqdisi wrote that they are
an institution for sedating, hypnotizing and deceiving the public, and giving a legitimizing character to all what the government does as long as these scholars are in its bosom, since people trust, look up, and imitate them. … The existence of this class of scholars as a front for the state, especially when some of them have won the lead in fiqh (jurisprudence) or other sciences of religion and have students who fill their study circles and sessions, proves and confirms in the minds of people what this malignant state is spreading or claiming, that it is the protector of Islam and Muslims, and other lies and nonsense.29
In short, as Hegghammer correctly writes, “[T]he Obvious Proofs represented the first socio-revolutionary treatise articulated in Wahhabi religious discourse and was thus particularly flammable in the kingdom.”30 However, while the book primarily referenced the Saudi rulers intending to influence the Saudi masses, its hazard lies in the fact that it, along with Millat Ibrahim, laid the groundwork and developed an understanding of what makes any Muslim ruler an apostate. Attacks aimed at harming and discrediting the reputation and standing of the Saudi official senior scholars and the scholastic/traditional (quietest) Salafi strand of thought as a whole, continued unabated with the leaders of Al Qaeda and every radical Salafi-jihadist group since then.31
Nonetheless, the Salafi-jihadist terrain has seen many dramatic developments, changes, and splits since that time. The remaining part of this article will investigate and look into such developments, with a continuing focus on the role and relevance of Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi.
Al-Maqdisi Frankenstein: Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi as the Monster
To gain a better understanding of the current situation, we must once again go back in history. The relationship between al-Maqdisi and Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, both Jordanians, goes back to the early 1990s Afghanistan. During that time, al-Zarqawi was hired as a correspondent for the jihadist magazine al-Bunyan al-Marsus (The Impenetrable Edifice) solely because of a reference from al-Maqdisi, who was a well-regarded cleric at the time.32 When al-Zarqawi returned to Jordan in 1992, he was enlisted by al-Maqdisi in the latter's Jordanian terrorist cell, known as Bay'at al-Imam (the Pledge of the Imam), and both were arrested in March 1994.33 Al-Maqdisi's influence on the Islamic State's founder, al-Zarqawi, cannot be overstated. In an interview with CNN Arabic in May 2015, al-Maqdisi described their intimate relationship and how al-Zarqawi was keen and eager to receive and read everything al-Maqdisi writes when both were in prison between 1994 and 1999.34 He also wrote in 2004 that al-Zarqawi “used to follow most of [my] fatwas and advices when [we] were both in prison because of [his] trust in [my] creed, writings and choices.”35 However, already while in prison, al-Zarqawi had started to build up a reputation of leadership through brutality and decisiveness and assumed the amarah (leadership) from his former mentor and scholarly teacher.36
However, the rift and division within the Salafi-jihadist camp became public and apparent after the 1999 prison release of al-Maqdisi and his pupil and protégée Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and the subsequent relocation of al-Zarqawi to Afghanistan. According to Al Qaeda's Egyptian strategist Mohammad Makkawi, better known as Sayf al-Adil, who met with al-Zarqawi in Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi had some extreme views, which resulted in disagreements between him and some other Al Qaeda members in the bayt al-dhiyafah (hospitality house) in Kandahar where he first arrived.37 Nonetheless, after a meeting with bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, Sayf al-Adil was tasked with dealing with the case of al-Zarqawi, and he managed to encourage his acquiescence and bring him into the fold by offering him the supervision of a new camp in Herat without requiring a complete bay'ah (oath of allegiance), but only “cooperation and coordination to serve the common goals.”38
Following the destruction of the so-called Islamic emirate in Afghanistan in 2001, al-Zarqawi fled to Iran, from which he decided to move to Iraq in anticipation of the American invasion and “in order to play an important role in the confrontation and resistance.”39 In Iraq, al-Zarqawi founded Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and started a new wave of savagery and violence that plunged the country into sectarian bloodshed and chaos. It is important to mention here that al-Zarqawi's new more virulent convictions were partly the result of his encounter in Afghanistan, during the Taliban rule, with the obscure Egyptian jihadi ideologue Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir, also known as Abdul Rahman al-Ali, who had a huge influence on him.40 In his letter Al-Zarqawi as I Knew him, the former member of AQI's religious committee, Maysarah al-Ghareeb, writes,
Our sheikh, al-Zarqawi, used to love, commend, and respect his sheikh, Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir—may Allah free him from his captivity—and wish that he comes to Iraq. Every piece of evidence available indicates that if he had come to Iraq, [al-Zarqawi] would have put him in charge of the sharia (religious) council.41
According to Leah Farrall and the long-time Taliban strategist Mustafa Hamid, also known as Abu Waleed al-Masri, al-Muhajir, who was head of the religious institute at the Khaldan training camp in Afghanistan at the height of his extremism, was an outspoken critic of Al Qaeda and the Taliban because he viewed the Taliban as too accommodating.42 In 2001, after the same defeat in Afghanistan, al-Muhajir also fled to Iran where, unlike al-Zarqawi, he remained for much of a decade, until reports emerged following the onset of the “Arab Spring” in 2011 that Iranian authorities had expelled him and he was back in his home county, Egypt.43 No news or updates on or from him have appeared since then.
Al-Muhajir's most famous book, known as The Jurisprudence of Blood, was reprinted in the late summer of 2014 by ISIL's official printing house, al-Himma Library, under the name Issues in the Jurisprudence of Jihad. A quote from al-Zarqawi's response to al-Maqdisi back in 2005 (discussed in context below) was incorporated in the preface of the ISIL reprint.44 Use of this quote is testament to the ideological sea-change that al-Zarqawi went through as a result of his encounter and exposure to al-Muhajir's views and ideas, especially regarding the issue of suicide operations, which was one of the main issues of contention between him and his former mentor al-Maqdisi:
When we [al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi] were released from prison [in 1999] and I [al-Zarqawi] went to Afghanistan again, I met with shaikh Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir. A conversation ensued between us on the ruling of martyrdom-seeking operations. The shaikh was of the view that they are permissible. I read his valuable research on the issue and listened to many of his recordings. Eventually, Allah opened my heart to his position so that not only did I come to see them as permissible, but as desirable, too.45
While al-Muhajir's life story is shrouded in mystery, his impact lived well beyond al-Zarqawi, to the point that it would be hard to imagine ISIL using suicide tactics in the way it does today had it not been for his contribution and theorization. It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article to investigate his views and ideas in more depth.
Al-Zarqawi Comes into His Own
While in Iraq, al-Zarqawi chose a name for the group he formed in 2003, the Al Qaeda's Tawhid and Jihad Group, similar to the name of al-Maqdisi's Internet website, Minbar of Tawhid and Jihad, which had been already running for years. Despite this, the disciple started to rebel against his former teacher and mentor, and, as we shall see, it would become increasingly hard for al-Maqdisi to rein him in or exert influence over him. Yet, despite physical separation, al-Maqdisi made his first effort to resume his position of intellectual leadership and guidance. Al-Zarqawi's actions in Iraq prompted al-Maqdisi to write him a letter of munasarah (support) and munasaha (advice) in 2004.46 Even though the main language of the letter was not incendiary or disrespectful,47 al-Maqdisi rebuked al-Zarqawi on three main counts.
First, he criticized his indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians, as, according to him, “the mistake of leaving a thousand infidels is smaller/lesser than the mistake of spilling drops of the blood of one Muslim” even if he is ‘asi [sinful] or fajir [miscreant].48 Second, he chastised his excessive use of suicide bombings, as “they are means that the mujahid can resort to under [conditions of] necessities only” and should not be turned into “traditional means of combat.”49 Third, he rebuked al-Zarqawi's diversion of the battle away from “the occupier and his lackeys” to focus instead on “Shia mosques.”50 This issue, namely the priority of focus between the near (especially the Shi'a) and the far enemy, continues to be one of the central differences between Al Qaeda and ISIL nowadays.51
Later in the summer of 2005, al-Maqdisi reiterated his main criticisms of al-Zarqawi during an interview with the Al-Jazeera TV channel.52 Both the letter and the interview prompted al-Zarqawi, in July 2005, to issue a statement in which he responded vehemently to al-Maqdisi's points of contention, trying to distance himself from his former scholar and mentor. After admitting his huge debt to al-Maqdisi for teaching him the details of tawhid and that he used to believe in much of what al-Maqdisi believed in, he went on to qualify that by stating:
It must be known that my following of him was due to my belief that what he writes in his letters is consistent with the Qur'an and Sunnah. It was not just blind imitation. … Just as I benefited from sheikh Abu Muhammad [al-Maqdisi]—may Allah reward him—I have also benefited from other ‘ulama (scholars). This does not mean that I adhere to everything al-Maqdisi says, for he does not have a monopoly over [religious] knowledge, and not everything he says is correct and must be followed, particularly in relation to matters of ijtihad53 and current/new events.54
After defending his position and choices, and refuting al-Maqdisi's claims, al-Zarqawi concluded his statement with a rather conciliatory note, by claiming that “there is not a monotheist alive that does not owe gratitude to the sheikh [al-Maqdisi] … and if it was not for the seriousness of what the sheikh said, and the effects it would have on the jihad and the mujahideen, this reply would not have been written.”55
Defending al-Zarqawi's lack of scholastic erudition in comparison to al-Maqdisi, a radical under the pseudonym of al-Ghareeb al-Muhajir wrote in a long forum post, in 2009, “[W]e do not care about what gets written and composed on theoretical jihad, as the Islamic library has been killed by the abundance of fat and obese books on its shelves. What we want is what has been said and done regarding practical jihad on the ground.”56 This praxis-based over knowledge-based influence and authority that characterized al-Zarqawi earlier, and continues to characterize ISIL messaging and narrative today, can help explain, at least partially, why they increasingly appeal to past criminals and find resonance in petty criminal networks.57
The Critical Friend: Al-Maqdisi and His Relationship with ISIL
The divide and polemic battle between the two camps within the radical Salafi-jihadist current continued unabated following the death of al-Zarqawi in 2006 and the release of al-Maqdisi from prison in 2008.58 However, it only became very discernable and extremely vicious when the fighting started between Al Qaeda's JN—which later became Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS) and then, more recently, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—and ISIL—currently the Islamic State (IS)—at the beginning of 2014. The old language of leniency and compassion that al-Maqdisi used in his rebukes of his old pupil al-Zarqawi have been replaced with more direct, personal attacks.
However, this was not always the case. At the onset of the division and conflict between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIL, al-Maqdisi remained silent and made several attempts at conciliation between the two. It was only in May 2014, more than a year after the announcement by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi that the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) had absorbed JN under its wing and created ISIL in April 2013, that al-Maqdisi decided to publicly attack ISIL and make clear his position toward them due to their apparent refusal to submit to arbitration. After repeated correspondence with the leaders and religious officials of ISIL, al-Maqdisi issued a statement in which he claimed to have been dismayed by their “continuous evasion, lies and slanders,” which made him decide that there is no point anymore in remaining silent or “waiting, procrastinating or delaying [his statement].”59 He even apologized to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al Qaeda, for his delay, in a separate letter entitled Repelling the Arrows of the Villains from the Senior Luminaries, stating that his position should have been clear from day one. However, the delay was because of an attempt to heal the rift through secret counsels and advices, which would have been in the interest of the Syrian jihad.60 In the statement, which he hoped would “withdraw the cover of legitimacy from this ingrate organization,” al-Maqdisi declared that ISIL is an organization that “deviated from the right path, rebelled/transgressed against the mujahedeen, has a tendency towards extremism, and been implicated in the shedding of protected blood.”61
Al-Maqdisi's statement prompted another disciple and student of his, the young and arguably the only prominent and most influential ISIL cleric, the former Bahraini national Turki al-Binali, to respond with a long treatise entitled My Former Sheikh: This is Farewell between You and I. In its introduction, al-Binali explained how disappointed he was in his mentor's position and that, even though he used to love al-Maqdisi greatly, “the truth” kicked that love out of his heart.62 Al-Binali claimed to have sent al-Maqdisi three previous letters, in one of which he wrote, “I swear to God my beloved sheikh, I have never been eager to clarify the truth to someone as I am to you … yes you, my sheikh, or have you forgotten the bond that was between us.”63
He then went on to contest al-Maqdisi's arguments in two sections and twelve points. Nonetheless, the main points in al-Binali's response are essentially three. First, he explained why ISIL has refused to submit to al-Maqdisi's initiative and viewed it as bid'a (innovation). According to him, there is a difference between the term initiative and the term arbitration, as initiatives can be for arbitration, mediation or adjudication, each of which has its own terms and conditions. Since al-Maqdisi did not define or disclose the details of his initiative and, as a result, there is no way for them to know whether it is “compatible with shari'a” or not, they regard it as bid'a.64 Interestingly, while the following is an analogy with a difference, the early Khawarij during the time of the fourth Caliph Ali bin Abi Talib have also refused to accept or submit to his initiative of arbitration, under the excuse that the judge is only God, not man.65 Second, al-Binali argued forcefully that ISIL is in fact a state and, as such, cannot and should not submit to “any other [independent] bodies, courts or groups under the pretext of neutrality or being a third party.”66 “Judiciary needs enforcement mechanisms, and enforcement needs power and authority, and all that is existent in the Islamic State,” he argued.67
As the third main and most important point, al-Binali contended that, as opposed to what al-Maqdisi claimed, ISIL is the true heir of bin Laden's and al-Zarqawi's legacies. According to him, ISIL's manhaj (approach/path) is the same as al-Zarqawi's who made Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, the former ISIL spokesman, the amir (ruler) of the city of Hadaytha in Iraq and foretold the establishment of the Islamic State months before his death.68 It is also the same as “the manhaj of the sheikh of the mujahideen Osama bin Laden who supported the Islamic State and praised its leadership.”69 He ended his argument on this point with a very sarcastic tone, stating that “this is the history we know, oh sheikh of the minbar,” in reference to the name of al-Maqdisi's website and in mockery of his mere theoretical knowledge and virtual lack of any actual fighting experience. He went on to state that history will not forget al-Maqdisi's attacks on al-Zarqawi, nor the latter's response. Therefore, al-Binali asks, which of the two teams is more worthy of the statement “climbing on the shoulders of heroes,” of which al-Maqdisi had accused ISIL?70 Al-Binali concluded his treatise by quoting a famous poem, substituting the word “brothers” for “sheikhs” to fit his meaning,
My sheikhs (scholars) whom I believed to be shields,
They were so, but for the enemies,
And I believed them to be pointed arrows,
They were so, but in my heart.71
Another response from ISIL to al-Maqdisi's 2014 statement came from Abu Mu'ath al-Ansari, who castigated al-Maqdisi for his “transcending and superior language” as if he was “the legal guardian of jihad.”72 He went on to sarcastically ask al-Maqdisi, “[H]as the State [ISIL] been founded upon your permission, derived its legitimacy from you, or fought in your path, in order for you to withdraw the legitimacy from it?”73
Yet, even after that, al-Maqdisi still tried to strike a conciliatory tone. Less than four months after his initial statement that sought to strip ISIL of its “legitimacy,” and following President Obama's announcement of a global coalition to fight ISIL, he issued another statement of munasaha and munasara, reminiscent of his earlier munasara and munasaha to al-Zarqawi back in 2004,74 in which he warned Muslims in general, and the mujahedeen specifically, against “rejoicing over the crusaders' and apostates' targeting of ISIL and its soldiers, as no sane Muslim, knowledgeable of the enemies' plots, with sound al-wala’ wa al-bara’ would rejoice at that.”75 He argued that while the focus is on ISIL today, it will be on al-Nusra tomorrow and on “each faction that raises the banner of tawhid” after that. He went on to urge Muslims to “be clear, and not be ashamed or shy away from announcing their support of Muslims whoever they are, even if by prayers, against the crusaders and apostates.”76
In the same month of September 2014, al-Maqdisi made his second attempt at taking intellectual leadership in support of ISIL. He criticized harshly the Saudi sheikh Sa'ad al-Shathry, after the latter accused ISIL leaders of being “atheist Ba'thists” whose main aim is to fight Islam and destroy it from within.77 After he made his case in defense of ISIL against this “aggression,” reaffirming in the process his excommunication of tawaghit and enmity toward their ulama’ (clerics/scholars), however, al-Maqdisi tried to appeal to the supporters and followers of ISIL by requesting that “they should distinguish between the rulers' scholars (ulama’ al-salateen), who are truly their enemies, and their own former scholars [himself], whom they have disobeyed, demonized and accused of treason.”78
There are two main differences between these two groups of scholars, al-Maqdisi reasoned. The first is that “when the mujahideens' scholars criticize a group, an organization or a behaviour, they do so in order to protect the reverence of Islam and guard jihad against distortion.” In contrast, when the ruler's scholars do so they “seek the satisfaction of a ruler or a state.”79 The second difference is that when the former group speaks out, they pay dearly with their lives, freedoms, and the rights and freedoms of their families. However, when the latter group of scholars, officials, or lay academics speaks out, their words get published and broadcasted everywhere and they are rewarded handsomely with money and high positions.80 This was clearly a desperate attempt by al-Maqdisi to win over the hearts of ISIL followers.
Al-Maqdisi's hopes of appealing to ISIL, however, came crashing down soon after that. The real turning point in the relationship between al-Maqdisi and ISIL—who are, as Abu Basir al-Tartousi claims, his “disobedient sons”81—was ISIL's refusal to heed his advice and release the Jordanian pilot al-Kasasbah, even though, as his leaked audio messages during the negotiations reveal, he extended them an olive branch, almost apologized for his earlier remarks and for being too hard on them, and even promised, if they would accept the swap of prisoners, to commend and praise them publically.82 Talking about his failed mediation, al-Maqdisi explained how he tried to convince ISIL to seize the opportunity, broaden their understanding of victory, and not be so short-sighted as to view it only in terms of killing and burning.83 In the leaked audio of his conversation with an ISIL shar'i (religious cleric) regarding the issue, al-Maqdisi said,
We [al-Maqdisi] have not retreated from [the ideas contained in] Millat Ibrahim book, and have not untangled what we have woven, but these events require a vision that discerns which of the religious maqasid [purposes] and masalih [interests] are greater than others so as to prioritize.84
In a TV interview following the release by ISIL of the clip of al-Kasasbah's burning in a cage, al-Maqdisi was obviously hurt and angry that they lied, stalled, and manipulated him. Talking about their method of killing, al-Maqdisi stated that “they prioritize and give primacy to the words of Ibn Taymiyyah, taken out of their contexts, over the words of the Prophet [pbuh], and claim that this is Salafi-jihadism! Salafi-jihadism is completely innocent of these behaviours.”85 When asked about his opinion of their “caliphate,” he claimed (taking a different tack on the Ba'thist legacy),
There are amongst them newcomers to Islam who, until a very short while ago, were Ba'thists killing and torturing Muslims, and now leaders in the “caliphate”! What kind of caliphate is this! … The issue is not about labels but about facts. … They tingle the emotions of the youths and seduce them. It was my concern for those youths, and my desire to make them understand [the deviations of ISIL] that made me speak to/about them [ISIL] kindly in past. … They [ISIL] have distorted the jihadi current and did it a great disservice. … No way can a mujahid be a liar, and I bear witness that they have lied to me, stalled and prevaricated me.86
It is hard not to see the irony in al-Maqdisi's comments, as what he accused ISIL of doing, especially the taking of words and statements of past scholars that agree with their viewpoints out of context, is very much similar to what he himself has done. Also, it was a mere four months ago when he lambasted sheikh al-Shathry for suggesting that the top leaders of ISIL are atheist Ba'thists, yet, now, al-Maqdisi seems to have come to the same conclusion.
Nonetheless, despite it appearing as a lost cause, al-Maqdisi seems to have not lost all hope of appealing to and influencing some ISIL followers, supporters, and clerics yet. This can be inferred from the fact that his discourse toward them still seems more lenient than that of other Salafi-jihadist ideologues such as Ibrahim al-Siba'i, Tariq Abdul Halim, and even Abu Qutadah al-Filastini.87 For instance, while Abu Qutadah called ISIL's fighters, clerics, and leaders Khawarij and “the dogs of the inhabitants of hellfire,”88 al-Maqdisi refused to classify them as such, writing:
I know that disputes between some of the factions in the Levantine arena and the organization of the state [ISIL] are not about religion, but are either about worldly matters or resulting from the orders, directives, and wishes of the supporting masters. I do not like my name being thrown in this dirty game, and therefore, opted for not giving them something they can use in this dirty war of theirs. … [I do not want my] fatwa to be used in achieving the wishes of the tawaghit (despots), the Cross worshipers behind them, and those who seek to eradicate them [ISIL] in this stage so as to make it easier to eradicate Jabhat al-Nusra after that and similar factions who refuse to obey the wishes of the enemies of jihad.89
Among the other points that he raised in his June 2015 statement to explain the rationale behind his abstention from calling ISIL “Khawarij” was the fact that his abstention does not mean his endorsement or approval of them, and, despite his abstention, he did not deny or oppose their designation as such by other “well-versed scholars such as Abu Qutadah.”90 He then asserted forcefully that he holds such an opinion despite the continuous attacks directed toward him from ISIL members and supporters, which shows that his positions are neither “reactions, nor dictates of governments. … My decision is independent and not influenced by either the pressures of the enemies of the organization of the state [ISIL], or the lies, fabrications and falsehoods of it,” he affirmed.91
There are plenty of other instances during the recent few years, from which it can be inferred that al-Maqdisi has been trying to walk the middle ground and present himself to ISIL members, followers, and supporters as a critical friend. For example, in February 2014, the leader of JN, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, gave ISIL a limit of five days to resort to religious courts following their killing of al-Zawahiri's representative and envoy, Abu Khaled al-Suri; in response, al-Maqdisi called on al-Julani to cancel that timeframe, while al-Filistini supported it.92 In another instance, when the official spokesman of ISIL, Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, was killed on 30 August 2016, al-Maqdisi tweeted that no sane man would gloat over something, death, all of us would go through and warned again against rejoicing over the Crusader's attack on a Muslim “as that contradicts the bond of al-wala’ (loyalty).”93
Moreover, in September 2016, he issued a fatwa proclaiming the “apostasy” of all factions and participants in the “Euphrates Shield” operation to liberate Jarabulus from ISIL, except for the people of Jarabulus itself.94 When asked whether that includes the Ahrar al-Sham group, he replied by claiming that participants from Ahrar al-Sham in the operation are also residents of Jarabulus.95 As a result, al-Maqdisi has been accused by some, such as the former top religious official of JN, Abu Mariyya al-Qahtani, of causing discord and harming the cause of jihad in Syria by his statements that extremists are happy to hear.96
It is clear that al-Maqdisi, once again, was unsuccessful in his attempt to rein in the renegade elements within his chosen current, as foreshadowed in my introduction. He obviously wanted to play the role of the critical friend and remain relevant, but ISIL will not let him. Just as al-Zarqawi did before, ISIL spurned al-Maqdisi, yet in a more harsh and unsympathetic fashion.
Conclusion
By rebuking al-Zarqawi's actions more than a decade ago and, more recently, trying to play a conciliatory role between the different warring jihadi factions in Syria and presenting himself as a critical friend to ISIL, al-Maqdisi always had the maximization of his appeal and the maintenance of his relevance within his movement in mind. his recent positions and rhetoric has to be understood in light of this strong desire to remain relevant and influential within a current that he believes, rightly so, owes a great deal of its formation and existence to him and has been going through major transformations and developments in recent years. However, his plans did not work out, as neither al-Zarqawi nor al-Binali nor ISIL allowed him to assume that role or challenge their rise and ascendancy. As we have seen, he tried and failed twice over the last 15 years to regain intellectual control of the movement he set in motion, but it ran away from him. Here sits an old and increasingly irrelevant man, who unleashed a Pandora's Box of dangerous ideas and concepts that took a life of their own, causing widespread havoc and suffering.
Two vital points must be highlighted here. First, al-Zarqawi's words in 2005, as well as the narrative of ISIL in recent years, underline clearly a point that has always been true, and manifested itself repeatedly: practical necessities and developments on the ground can shape, change, and transform theoretical notions and conceptions in ways that were previously unimagined. As Shiraz Maher correctly notes in his book, “[I]deologies are frequently pulled in new directions when transitioning from theory to practice, being shaped by context, time and setting.”97 However, the danger arises when religiously unqualified individuals take it on themselves to assume the role of mujtahids (those who reinterpret the scripture in order to keep it relevant and fresh in changing contexts) and, in the process, start to “arrange the contours of the ideology as they see fit.”98 The result then becomes the adaptation and mutation of religion and religious concepts and principles to suit the mujtahid's orientation, worldview, and reality, instead of vice versa. Ironically, as Lacroix points out, this is exactly what radicals have been accusing Muslim liberals of doing for a long time, albeit for a different purpose.99
The second point, one that is closely related to the previous one, is that in contexts of persecution and perceived threats and dangers to the community, a reputation of devout piety, unwavering steadfastness, and uncompromising zeal matters much more to many followers than a reputation of scholarship or superior religious learning. This was true more than a decade ago in the initial confrontation between al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi, and it still holds true today in the battle for leadership of the Salafi-jihadist movement between Al Qaeda and ISIL. Through the publication of lengthy books and treatises, Al Qaeda's leaders and ideologues, such as al-Maqdisi, have always tried to anchor their theorization and understanding in religious language and jurisprudence.100 ISIL leaders, in contrast, treading the path of their founder al-Zarqawi, have little regard for religious knowledge and have not exerted much effort in trying to position themselves within any current. To them, praxis trumps theory, and jihad and actual fighting is “the supreme expression of both devotion and religious understanding.”101
Bearing these points in mind, frictions and divisions within the jihadist movement, as the ones mentioned in this article, as well as defections from it, can be utilized as an important policy to counter the extremist ideology and the appeal of radical jihadist groups. Learned “state” scholars have come to be viewed negatively by members of the jihadist community as a result of a long and concerted effort by extremists to discredit and spurn them. Therefore, highlighting and utilizing these disputes and arguments between members of the same jihadist community carry the potential of shattering the myth of a utopian and coherent jihadist existence, and sowing doubt in the hearts and minds of actual or potential recruits who have already shunned other learned “state” scholars.
Notes
1. He is Isam bin Muhammad bin Tahir al-Barqawi, a Palestinian-Jordanian Salafi-jihadist ideologue, who was born in the village of Burqa in Palestine in 1959, moved to Kuwait three or four years later, and lived there until he finished high school. He had a huge influence on Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the ISIL founder, in 2004, when it was known as Al Qaeda in Iraq, and was imprisoned with him from 1994 until 1999. For a full biography see his own page in Arabic [all items in Arabic, indicated as (Ar.), are translated by the author, unless otherwise indicated] on: www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_65.html [this site, and for all citations hereafter, was accessed in late 2016 or early 2017; some have a date embedded in the url, while others have a date listed]. For more on al-Maqdisi's role and influence see: Joas Wagemakers, Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
2. Abu Mohammad Al-Maqdisi, “Risalah ila al-Sadiqin Mimman Nafaru ila Ardh al-Jihad fi Souria” (A Letter to the Faithful among Those who Travelled to the Land of Jihad in Syria), (Ar.), 22 August 2014. Available at www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_7667.html
3. Cited in Abu Mohammad Al-Maqdisi, “Bayan Hal “al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham” wa al-Mawqif al-Wajib Tijahaha” [A Statement on the State of the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant” and the Mandatory Position Towards it], (Ar.), 26 May 2014. Available at www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_14380.html
4. Ibid.
5. Areej Abuqundairi, “Jordan Releases Anti-ISIL Salafi Leader,” Al-Jazeera, 17 June 2014. Available at www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/jordan-releases-anti-isil-salafi-leader-2014617121457552506.html
6. Hadeel Ghaboun, “al-ifraj ‘an Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi Muna'thir Al-Salafiyya Al-Jihadiyya fi Al-Urdun wa Man'i Muhakamatuh” [Releasing Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi the Salafi-Jihadi Ideologue in Jordan and Preventing his Trial], (Ar.), CNN Arabic, 5 February 2015. Available at arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2015/02/05/jordan-jihadi-abu-mohamad-al-maqdisi-released
7. Hassan Hassan, The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016). Available at carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/13/sectarianism-of-islamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context-pub-63746
8. A picture of the Twitter post in which al-Maqdisi made this claim is available at Abdulzahra al-Athari, “Risalat Nush wa Irshad Abu Mohammad Al-Maqdisi” (A Message of Advice and Guidance from Abu Mohammad al-Magdisi), Islamion.com, (Ar.), 10 May 2015. Available at http://bit.ly/2fWSjHh. More evidence of al-Maqdisi's influence on ISIL is the fact that, in the first issue of its magazine Dabiq, they featured an article on his work in Millat Ibrahim, although without crediting him or mentioning his name. The Dabiq issue is available at media.clarionproject.org/files/09-2014/isis-isil-islamic-state-magazine-Issue-1-the-return-of-khilafah.pdf
9. Abu Mohammad Al-Maqdisi, “Shubhat I'thar Tawaghit al-Hukm Biljahl wa al-Ikrah” (The Misconception of Excusing the Despot Rulers on the Basis of Ignorance and Coercion), (Ar.), (n.d.), available at www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_4776.html
10. The first radical group to reach this level of extremism was the Group Islamique Armée [Armed Islamic Group] (GIA) in Algeria during the 1990s who, eventually, argued that the whole of the Algerian society should be considered “apostate.” See: Shane Drennan, “Constructing Takfir: From Abdullah Azzam to Djamel Zitouni,” in CTC Sentinel 1(7) (2008). Available at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol1Iss7-Art61.pdf. With regard to ISIL see for instance the following YouTube clip showing members of the terrorist group excommunicating even their fellow Salafi-jihadists, Al Qaeda's Jabhat al-Nusra (JN): www.youtube.com/watch?v=KPItGMz1T1M (Ar.).
11. Joas Wagemakers, Quietist Jihadi; “The Transformation of a Radical Concept: al-wala’ wa al-bara’ in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi” in Roel Meijer, ed., Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement (London: Hurts & Company, 2009), pp. 81–106; and “In Search of ‘Lions and Hawks’: Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi's Palestinian Identity,” Die Welt des Islam 53(3–4) (2013), pp. 388–415; Eli Alshech, “The Doctrinal Crisis within the Salafi-Jihadi Ranks and the Emergence of Neo-Takfirism: A Historical and Doctrinal Analysis,” Islamic Law and Society 21(4) (2014), pp. 419–452.
12. Al-Asr electronic magazine's interview with Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi in 1426 A.H. (2005 C.E.), (Ar.), is available at www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_19743.html
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya fe Kufr al-Dawla al-Saudiyya [The Obvious Proofs of the Infidelity of the Saudi State], (Ar.), 2nd ed., 1421 A.H., p. 130. Available at www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_65.html. A similar phrase can also be found in Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, Millat Ibrahim wa da'wat al-‘anbiya’ wa al-mursalin [The Religion of Abraham and the Mission of Prophets and Messengers], (Ar.), 1984. Available at www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_20383.html
16. Although Sayyid Qutb was credited for popularizing these two concepts, the first to theorize about them was the sub-Indian jurist Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi whose writings influenced Qutb greatly. See Asyraf Hj. Rahman and Nooraihan Ali, “The Influence of Al-Mawdudi and The Jama'at Al Islami Movement on Sayyid Qutb Writings,” in World Journal of Islamic History and Civilization 2(4) (2012), pp. 232–236.
17. Khalid al-Mushawih, Al-tayyarat al-deeniyya fe al-saudiyya: min al-salafiyya ila jihadiyyat al-Qaeda wa ma baynahuma min tayyarat [Religious Currents in Saudi: from Salafism to al-Qaeda's jihadism and the Currents in between], (Ar.), Beirut: al-Intishar al-Arabi, 2011, p. 27; and Hassan, The Sectarianism of the Islamic State, pp. 6–9. For more on the two concepts see: John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
18. Sayyid Qutb, “Fi ‘Dhilal Al-Qur'an: Surat Al-Ma'idah” [In the Shadows of the Qur'an: Surat Al-Ma'idah], (Ar.), p. 114. Available at www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_34.html
19. Abu Mohammad Al-Maqdisi, Ma Ra'yik Fema Katabahu Sayyid Qutb Rahimahu Allah [What is your Opinion of the Writings of Sayyid Qutb May Peace Be upon Him], (Ar.), (n.d.). Available at www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_9093.html
20. Al-Mushawih, Al-tayyarat al-deeniyya fe al-saudiyya, p. 100; Stephane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Hassan Hassan, The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016). Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/13/sectarianism-of-islamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context-pub-63746
21. It is a grave mistake to view Salafism as one homogenous body of thought. Various schools of Islamic thought have over the years influenced and been influenced by the Salafi doctrine. In general, there are three “Salafi” currents, in the loose sense of the term, on the scene now, and within each of them are further splits and divisions. These are, in the chronological order in which they came to existence, the traditional or scholastic Salafism (al-Salafiyya al-‘ilmiyya) best epitomized by the official Saudi senior scholars and religious establishment; the activist or revolutionary Salafism (al-Salafiyya al-harakiyya) best epitomized by the Sahwa and sururi movement; and the Salafi-jihadism (al-Salafiyya al-jihadiyya) best epitomized by Al Qaeda and ISIL. For more details, see: Hassan, The Sectarianism of the Islamic State; Abdullah K. al-Saud, Religious Radicalization and Violence in Saudi Arabia, Ph.D. thesis, King's College London, 2012.
22. Cited in Hassan, The Sectarianism of the Islamic State, p. 7.
23. See the following Twitter posts from Al-Maqdisi's own Twitter account, available at https://twitter.com/lmaqdese/status/797394715566080001 and https://twitter.com/lmaqdese/status/797291144094826496, 12 November 2016.
24. Interview with Abu Mohammad Al-Maqdisi on CNN Arabic, 24 May 2015. Available at http://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2015/05/24/me-240515-maqdisi-intv-p1#autoplay
25. Mohammad Abdul Salam Faraj, The Absent Obligation, 1st ed., edited and annotated by Abu Umamah (Birmingham: Maktabah Al Ansaar Publications, 2000). Available at https://ebooks.worldofislam.info/ebooks/Jihad/The%20Absent%20Obligation.pdf
26. Interview in Arabic with the author in 2010, trans. author.
27. Interview with the author in 2010; see also “A Palestinian who Grew up in Kuwait, Loved Juhaiman, Excommunicated Saudi, Brought up al-Zarqawi, and Espoused the First Generation of Saudi Terrorists,” (Ar.), al-Sharq al-Awsat, 7 July 2005. Available at http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?article=310381&issueno=9718#.WCtI1ZOLT-Y
28. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya fe Kufr al-Dawla al-Saudiyya [The Obvious Proofs of the Saudi State Infidelity], (Ar.), 2nd ed., 1421H, p. 215. Available at www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_65.html
29. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, al-Kawashif al-Jaliyya, p. 219.
30. Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 47.
31. See for instance: Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Ibn baz bayn al-haqiqa wa al-wahm” [Ibn Baz between Reality and Illusion], 1995. Available at www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_873.html; and Osama bin Laden,”risalah ila al-Saikh Abdulaziz Ibn Baz” [A Letter to Sheikh Abdulaziz Ibn Baz], 1995. Available at www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_867.html; and “Man Hum ‘Ulama’ al-Islam” [Who are the Scholars of Islam], al-Islah, Issue 33, 28 October 1996. Available at www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_878.html
32. Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York: Regan Arts, 2015), pp. 6–8.
33. Ibid.
34. See the interview, available at http://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2015/05/26/me-270515-maqdisi-intv-p2#autoplay
35. Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi, “Al-Zarqawi: Munasara wa Munasaha” (Al-Zarqawi: Support and Advice), 2004, published at: www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_7930.html
36. Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, p. 10. While in prison in Jordan, al-Maqdisi assumed the amarah (leadership) of the imprisoned jihadi community for four months, only to concede it to al-Zarqawi after that due to the latter's “strength of personality” and leadership capabilities. For al-Maqdisi's own account of what happened, see the following Arabic transcript of his 2005 interview with Al-Jazeera channe, available at http://bit.ly/2joJFmY. This story and many other interesting episodes that happened in prison and demonstrate the point made above were relayed in a letter entitled Kayfa Khathala Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi (Isam al-Barqawi) al-Shaykh abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi [How Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi Let Down Shaikh Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi], written by Jihad al–Gashah, a previous prisoner with both during the late 1990s. A transcript of the letter is available at http://bit.ly/2fnFvtA For an English translation of the most important parts of the letter see: Alshech, “The Doctrinal Crisis,” pp. 429–430.
37. Mohammad Makkawi, “Sayf al-Adil Yakshif Tafaseel Rihlat al-Rajul al-Shabah min Afghanistan ila al-Iraq” [Sayf al-Adil Reveals the Details of the Ghost Man's Journey from Afghanistan to Iraq: The Secret World of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi], Al–Arabiya, 26 May 2005. Available at www.alarabiya.net/articles/2005/05/26/13404.html
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. For more on al-Muhajir see: Charlie Winter and Abdullah K. al-Saud, “The Obscure Theologian who Shaped ISIS,” The Atlantic, 4 December 2016. Available at www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/12/isis-muhajir-syria/509399/
41. Maysarah Al-Ghareeb, “Al–Zarqawi Kama ‘Ariftuh” [Al-Zarqawi as I Knew Him], (Ar.), 2007. Available at http://dorarmouba3tara.blogspot.co.uk/2014/10/5_19.html
42. Mustafa Hamid and Leah Farrall, The Arabs at War in Afghanistan (London: Hurst, 2015), p. 229.
43. Kevin Jackson, “Abu Mus'ab al Zarqawi under Influence: One Mentor?,” All Eyes on Jihadism, 15 May 2012,. Available at https://alleyesonjihadism.wordpress.com/2012/05/15/abu-musab-al-zarqawi-under-influence-one-mentor/
44. Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir, Masa'il fi Fiqh al-Jiahd [Issues in the Jurisprudence of Jihad], (Ar.), al-Himma Library Publication, 1435 A.H.
45. Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, “Bayan wa Taw'dheeh lima Atharahu al-Shaykh al-Maqdisi fi Liqa'hi ma’ Qanat al-Jazeera” [Statement and Clarification on What Shaikh al-Maqdisi Raised in his Interview with al-Jazeera Channel], (Ar.), 12 July 2005. Available at http://ak-ma.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/blog-post_9.html
46. Al-Maqdisi, “Al-Zarqawi: Munasara wa Munasaha.”
47. In his CNN Arabic interview in 2015, al-Maqdisi claimed that there was no dispute between him and al-Zarqawi. The “advices” he gave to al-Zarqawi were “directives from a sheikh to a student who is close and dear to him.” The interview is available at http://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2015/05/26/me-270515-maqdisi-intv-p2#autoplay
48. Al-Maqdisi, “Al-Zarqawi: Munasara wa Munasaha.”
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Hassan, The Sectarianism of the Islamic State, p. 9.
52. The whole interview is available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=ORT0MS4wrXA. And an Arabic transcript of the interview is available at the following Al-Jazeera website link (Ar.): http://bit.ly/2joJFmY
53. Ijtihad is the making of a decision in Islamic law (Sharia) by personal effort, independently of any school (math'hab) of jurisprudence (figh) in cases that lack clear and authoritative ruling in the scripture and in which there was disagreement between the various law schools and scholars. A mujtahid is an Islamic scholar who is competent to interpret Sharia by ijtihad.
54. Al-Zarqawi, “Bayan wa Taw'dheeh lima Atharahu.” For more details and analysis see Alshech, “The Doctrinal Crisis.”
55. Ibid.
56. Al-Ghareeb al-Muhajir, “Haqiqat al-Khilaf bayna al-Shaykh al-Maqdisi wa Warathat al-Zarqawi huwa al-Jihad fi Sabeel Allah” [The Fact of the Dispute between Shaikh al-Maqdisi and the Heirs of al-Zarqawi is the Jihad in the Path of Allah], (Ar.), 2009. Available at www.jihadica.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/6-the-truth-about-the-differences-between-shaykh-al-maqdisi-and-the-heirs-of-al-zarqawi.pdf
57. For more on the link between terrorist and criminal networks see: Rajan Basra, Peter R. Neumann,and Claudia Brunner, Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime–Terror Nexus, ICSR Report, 2016. The full report is available at http://bit.ly/2dUjrt8; Also see: Alshech, “The Doctrinal Crisis,” pp. 432–433.
58. For an insightful rundown of the debate during that period, and the main jurisprudential distinctions between al-Maqdisi's Salafi-jihadism and, what the author called the “Neo-Takfirism,” see: Alshech, “The Doctrinal Crisis,” pp. 433–449.
59. Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi, Bayan Hal “al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham.”
60. Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi, “Sadd Siham al-Lli'am ‘an al-Akabir al-A'alam” [Repelling the Arrows of the Villains from the Senior Luminaries], (Ar.). Available at www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_36609.html
61. Al-Maqdisi, Bayan Hal “al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham.”
62. Turki al-Binali, “Shaikhi al-Asbaq: Hatha Firaq Bayni wa Baynak” [My Former Sheikh: This is Farewell Between You and I], (Ar.), 31 May 2014. Available at https://justpaste.it/Turky1
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. For a detailed account on the origins and story of the early Khawarij see: “How the Khawarij Came into Existence,” al-Islam.org. Available at www.al-islam.org/polarization-around-character-ali-ibn-abi-talib-ayatullah-murtadha-mutahhari/how-khawarij-came
66. Al-Binali, “Shaikhi al-Asbaq.”
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Abu Mu'ath al-Ansari, “Al-Rad ‘ala Bayan al-Maqdisi” [A Response to al-Maqdisi's Statement], (Ar.), 26 May 2014. Available at https://justpaste.it/fmuu
73. Ibid.
74. Al-Maqdisi, “Al-Zarqawi: Munasara wa Munasaha.”
75. Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi, “Munasaha lil'uqala’ min Ansar al-Dawla … wa Munasara laha dh'd al-Salebiyin wa al-Murtaddin” (Advice to the Wise among the Supporters of ISIL, and Support of it against the Crusaders and the Apostates), (Ar.), 7 September 2014. Available at www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_7677.html
76. Ibid.
77. Sheikh Sa'ad al-Shathry's comments were in an interview with al-Majd TV Channel in the summer of 2014. The whole interview is available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=7qZPpoH9axU
78. Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi, “Awradaha Sa'ad wa Sa'ad Mushtamil … Ma Hakatha ya Sa'ad Turad al-Ibil” [O Sa'ad, This is not the Way Camels should be Brought to Drink], (Ar.), 3 September 2014. Available at www.ilmway.com/site/maqdis/MS_14488.html
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Mu'ayyad Bajis, “Al-Tartousi: al-Dawa'ish Abna’ al-Maqdisi wa al-Akhir Yarud bi ‘Unf” [Al-Tartousi: Daesh are the Sons of al-Maqdisi and the Latter Replies Violently], (Ar.), Arabi 21, 30 August 2015. Available at http://bit.ly/2eOn9WC
82. The leaked audio recording, (Ar.), of al-Maqdisi's attempted negotiations with ISIL is available at YouTube: www.youtube.com/watch?v=LJgfYXe8IbM
83. Al-Maqdisi's interview with CNN Arabic, (Ar.). Available at http://arabic.cnn.com/middleeast/2015/06/27/me-270615-maqdisi-jordanian-pilot#autoplay
84. The leaked audio recording, (Ar.), of al-Maqdisi's attempted negotiations with ISIL is available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=LJgfYXe8IbM
85. The whole interview, “Liqa’ Hasri li Qanat Ru'ya Ma’ Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi” [An Exclusive Interview for Ru'ya Channel with Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi], (Ar.). Available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=vVzKyMiZcgY
86. Ibid.
87. See the statement issued by both al-Siba'i and Abdul Halim entitled: The Truth about the Organization of the State under the Leadership of Ibrahim bin Awwad: Description of the Organization and the Truth about its Doctrines, (Ar.), Al-Hidaya.com, 26 August 2014. Available at http://alhidaya.net/node/3497
88. Abu Qutadah al-Filastini, “Risalah ila Ahl al-Jihad wa Muhibbieh” [A Letter to the People and Lovers of Jihad], (Ar.), April 2014. Available at https://justpaste.it/f9ij
89. Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi, “Limatha lam ‘Usammihim Hatta al-‘An Khawarij Raghm anna Feehim man hum Aswa’ mina al-Khawarij” [Why Did I Not Name them Khawarij until Now Even Though There are amongst them Some who are Worse than Khawarij], (Ar.), Jihadica, Ramadan, 1436 A.H. (June/July 2015). Available at www.jihadica.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/limadha-lam-usammihim.pdf
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. See “al-Maqdisi Yad'u Al-Julani li Il'gha’ Muhlat Tandheem al-Dawla” and “‘Abu Qutadah Yhajim Tandheem al-Dawla wa Yu'ayyid Muhlat al-Nusra” [al-Maqdisi Calls on al-Julani to Cancel the Timeframe of the “Organization of the State”] and [Abu Qutadah Attacks “the Organization of the State” and Supports Al-Nusra's Timeframe], Al-Jazeera, 2 March 2014 and 27 February 2014. Available at http://bit.ly/2fUymBA and http://bit.ly/2gCbOKe
93. See al-Maqdisi's tweet on 31 August 2016, available at https://twitter.com/lmaqdese/status/770922185540108290
94. “Al-Maqdisi Yasif al-Musharikin fi ‘Dir’ al-Furat’ fi Jarabulus bi al-Murtaddin” [al-Maqdisi Proclaims that Participants in the “Euphrates Shield” in Jarabulus are Apostates], (Ar.), Ahram, 10 September 2016. Available at http://arabi.ahram.org.eg/NewsQ/92231.aspx
95. Ibid.
96. “Abu Mariyya al-Qahtani Yashun Hujouman ‘Anifan ‘ala al-Maqdisi” [Abu Mariyya al-Qahtani Mounts a Violent Attack on al-Maqdisi], (Ar.), Arabi 21, 17 October 2016. Available at http://bit.ly/2gbzLEz. Since then, however, al-Maqdisi's relationship with the latest incarnation of Syria's Al Qaeda affiliate, HTS, took a turn for the worse. See Cole Bunzel, “Diluting Jihad: Tahrir al-Sham and the Concerns of Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi,” Jihadica, 29 March 2017. Available at http://www.jihadica.com/diluting-jihad/
97. Maher, Salafi-Jihadism, pp. 207–208.
98. Ibid.
99. Lacroix, Awakening Islam, pp. 246–253.
100. Maher, Salafi-Jihadism, p. 210.
101. Brian H. Fishman, The Master Plan: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the Jihadi Strategy for Final Victory (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2014), p. 51.