The foreign policy of post-Mubarak Egypt and the strengthening of relations with Saudi Arabia: balancing between economic vulnerability and regional and regime security

Introduction

When an institutional or regime change occurs in the world, studies of the relationship between foreign and domestic policy do not usually focus on the external behaviour of the states. In the specific case of Egypt, after the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, analyses of the political changes in the country have primarily focused on the study of internal processes, paying less attention to the influence of these changes on the country's foreign policy. The circular nature of the recent Egyptian process of political transformation, including the 2011 regime change and the subsequent counter-revolutionary restoration, makes it easier to observe strategic reorganisations and to evaluate the scope of change – and continuity – in the domain of foreign policy. This includes the series of adjustments and readjustments towards the Arab neighbours made between 2011 and 2016, with special attention to the relations between post-Mubarak Egypt and the Arab Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have traditionally maintained mutually beneficial bilateral relations in which a mix of Egypt's economic dependence and shared security concerns – preserving the stability of the Gulf and Middle East countries and containing Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and Hezbollah in exchange for financial assistance – has led them to act pragmatically and overcome their differences.

This chapter argues that, in the period immediately following the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak and during the presidency of the Islamist Mohamed Morsi, there were some tensions between the needs associated with the country's economic dependence and the preferred regional alliances of the new political elites. Yet, with Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's accession to power there was a new convergence of objectives regarding Egypt's economy and regional and regime security which explains the consolidation and upsurge in relations with Saudi Arabia despite important occasional differences. Using the foreign policy analysis (FPA) framework underpinning all the contributions to this special issue, this article examines how the political transformations that took place in Egypt beginning in 2011 have affected its foreign policy, focusing on three areas: first, contextual factors or determinants at three levels of analysis (global, regional/sub-regional and domestic); second, the domestic sphere and changes in decision-making processes in a context where, basically, those taking power have maintained centralisation and opacity, although actors have emerged who could be expected to implement ‘new foreign agendas’ and periods of cohabitation in the exercise of power have occurred between apparently very different political players; and third, the foreign policy behaviour resulting from all of these factors. This is followed by a case study concerning the sub-regional (neighbourhood) level of analysis, which discusses Egypt-Saudi Arabia relations between 2014 and 2016.

Economic subordination and sub-regional security concerns

This section analyses the limitations imposed by Egypt's economic weakness and dependence, and how they restricted the margin for action in foreign policy for the country's successive governments after the fall of Mubarak, both internationally and on a regional and domestic level. At international level, the political transformation process that began in 2011 in many Arab countries took place in a period of global economic crisis that had started in 2007. Despite its important natural resources, including oil and gas, Egypt is a semi-rentier economy, dependent on foreign energy, the export of agriculture and manufactured goods, foreign investment – mainly from the United States and Arab Gulf countries – and above all tourism. Therefore, the country's economic situation was quite directly affected by the global economic and financial crisis (Hernando de Larramendi and Fernández-Molina Citation2016, 246).

Beginning in late 2006, a number of sectoral strikes were held to demand salary increases and the right to create independent unions. The most important of these, backed by textile sector workers in the Delta region city of Mahalla al-Kubra, were first mounted in December 2006 and then resumed in 2008 with the creation of the April 6 Youth Movement opposition group (Azaola Citation2010, 160; Lampridi-Kemou and Azaola Citation2013, 136). The levels of economic growth in 2008, which could be viewed very positively from a macroeconomic point of view, clashed with increasingly higher unemployment and poverty rates (21.6% for poverty) as a consequence of the implementation of widespread privatisation and austerity measures (ESCWA Citation2013, 6). Egypt had a two-tier social and economic system, with a minority having access to the most competent services and a majority living in inhumane conditions (Gumede Citation2016, 176). In this climate of growing inequality and social discontent – aggravated by repeated cases of police abuse and the grooming of Hosni Mubarak's son, Gamal, to be his successor – the revolution of 25 January 2011 broke out, with the president removed from his post 18 days later. During the months immediately afterwards, a situation of political instability developed, with a system of economic and energy dependency that placed the country in a vulnerable position. This would become a key factor in Egyptian foreign policy between 2011 and 2016, during which time the country continued to recognise the importance of maintaining stability and balancing its economic and political interests in this area (Bahi Citation2016, 164).

As currency reserves to pay for public spending gradually became exhausted and in an effort to prevent the depreciation of the pound, the Egyptian authorities turned to financial assistance from the United States, multilateral financial institutions – a long-standing tradition – as well as progressively from the Arab Gulf countries, most specifically Saudi Arabia, maintaining foreign relations based on pragmatism and flexibility. The Mubarak regime had already capitalised on the management and clientelist redistribution of foreign aid since the 1990s (Lampridi-Kemou and Azaola Citation2013, 128).

During the first 18 months after the fall of Mubarak, during which the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took control of the country – a period that also witnessed an asymmetrical cohabitation between the army and the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood (Hernando de Larramendi Citation2013, 83) – Egypt received a total of 2300 million dollars from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait (Dunne Citation2014). This financial and political support from the Gulf monarchies was nothing new. In fact, financial assistance from these countries – particularly Saudi Arabia – to preserve Egypt's economic stability in exchange for containing Islamist forces and maintaining stability in the region had steady during previous decades, even under the regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser despite the latter's ideological differences with the conservative Arab Gulf monarchies (Sons and Wiese Citation2015, 23). Considering that Egypt is a middle-income country, official financial assistance from these states has been traditionally offered in the form of loans. The only real novelty concerned the case of Qatar, which only became a leading economic player in the Egyptian market after Mubarak's ouster and the Muslim Brotherhood's arrival to power in 2012 (Sons and Wiese Citation2015, 23).

The initial promise from the Arab Gulf countries of 10 billion dollars was welcome, according to the first provisional government appointed by the army and presided over by Essam Sharaf, as a regional alternative with fewer conditions than the 3 billion dollar loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that was refused in June 2011. This rejection was seen as a symbolic rupture with the unpopular economic policies of the earlier period (Hernando de Larramendi and Fernández-Molina Citation2016, 247). However, as an example of the flexibility and u-turns with which the Egyptian authorities acted, the Kamal Ganzouri government re-established negotiations with the IMF a few months later in the face of growing financial predicaments and, on this occasion, it was the Muslim Brotherhood and its recently legalised political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), that rejected the deal in the newly elected parliament (Hernando de Larramendi and Fernández-Molina Citation2016, 247).

Shortly after becoming president of the country after winning the June 2012 election, Islamist Mohamed Morsi would provide yet another example of the pragmatism that characterised the Muslim Brotherhood in their exercise of power. Hostage to the country's urgent economic needs, the country requested a loan of 4.8 billion dollars from the IMF that did not materialise in the end (Hernando de Larramendi and Fernández-Molina Citation2016, 247). Over time, this decision showed that, in spite of the country's political polarisation, the army and Muslim Brotherhood were not such different political actors, but rather two ideologically conservative groups that opted for neoliberal economic policies, were both financially dependent on foreign groups and countries, and both had authoritarian tendencies in the exercise of power.

Mohamed Morsi's accession to power did not result in a radical reorientation of foreign policy as might have been expected of an Islamist president, but it did relatively change regional alliances, with Qatar and Turkey becoming Egypt's new preferred partners in the Middle East. The IMF loan was requested at the same time that the main financial and political support of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar, promised to provide the country with nearly 8 billion dollars in loans and soft credits, although this entire amount was not disbursed eventually. Such a degree of economic and ideological dependence on Qatar was highly criticised by the public and even mocked in the Egyptian media (Middle East Online Citation2013). Gradually, Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood was rejected as representing foreign interference in the country's domestic affairs and an undignified attempt to wrest the role of regional leader from Egypt (Monier and Ranko Citation2014, 72).

The big injection of funds from the Arab Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia came after Morsi's fall in July 2013 and the accession of military officer Abdul Fattah al-Sisi to power. The most conservative governments in the Middle East, led by Saudi Arabia, which were regaining influence in the region's foreign affairs, provided the Egyptian military regime with not only political but also financial support. In the first months of al-Sisi's term, two elements characterised the country's short-term foreign policy: the fight against the Muslim Brotherhood and extremist groups based in the Sinai and an almost exclusive economic dependence on Saudi Arabia (Dunne Citation2014). Both elements were interconnected by a convergence of traditional interests between the Egyptian army and the Arab Gulf countries. President al-Sisi needed the financial support of these monarchies to revive the Egyptian economy and reinforce his own position against the Muslim Brotherhood, while Saudi Arabia and its allies needed al-Sisi to defeat and prevent the spread of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region.

In early 2014, the government backed by the Armed Forces had received 12 billion dollars from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the form of different types of aid, i.e. cash, oil, financing for projects and deposits in the Central Bank of Egypt to support the Egyptian pound (Dunne Citation2014). The country was also expecting additional assistance to support the government and minimise the energy crisis in the country. Saudi Arabia and the UAE injected together between 25 and 41.5 billion dollars in 2014–2015 (Sailer Citation2016, 7). In March 2015, in the context of the Egypt Economic Development Conference, a large conference of investors interested in Egypt held in the resort city of Sharm el-Sheikh, the same Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE reaffirmed their intention to assist the Egyptian president, each promising an additional 4 billion dollars in investments and deposits in the Central Bank of Egypt (Georgy and Kalin Citation2015). Even Oman confirmed a donation of 500 million dollars for the next five years. The Egyptian authorities took advantage of this conference to announce one of their megaprojects: the construction of a new administrative capital south of Cairo where all official buildings, both national and international, were to be moved at an estimated price of 40,000 million dollars. The first company hired to carry out this project had ties to the Emirate magnate Mohamed Alabbar (Middle East Eye Citation2015). Not incidentally, the conference was also attended by US Secretary of State John Kerry, who expressed his support for al-Sisi in his fight against terrorism in a speech that emphasised that ‘there is absolutely no question that the emergence of a strong, prosperous, democratic Egypt is critical for the development of a strong and prosperous region’ (U.S. Department of State Citation2015).

In addition to these traditional Arab Gulf partners, two other external powers with prominent economic motivations forcefully emerged in the international context of North African foreign policies between 2011 and 2016, i.e. China (Horesh Citation2016) and Russia. Chinese construction companies decided in 2016 to invest nearly 45 billion dollars in the megaproject for a new administrative and financial capital (Osborne Citation2016). Russia, in turn, took advantage of the temporary freeze of United States military aid after al-Sisi took power to offer itself as a financial ally, particularly with regard to the military. In 2014, the two countries signed an arms agreement for 3.5 billion dollars in addition to a plan to train Egyptian soldiers in Russian academies and carry out joint exercises in the Mediterranean (Bender and Kelley Citation2015). Both Vladimir Putin and al-Sisi visited Cairo and Moscow respectively and repeatedly between 2014 and 2016. During a meeting in Moscow in August 2015, they spoke of the possibility of creating a ‘free trade zone between Egypt and the Eurasian Economic Union’ and confirmed Russian participation of some 25 billion dollars in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Egypt (Al Jazeera Citation2015; Egyptian Streets Citation2016).

At sub-regional level, Egyptian foreign policy has continued to focus on security questions as its priority. It has followed a securitisation approach in emphasising a rhetoric of existential threats coming from the country's borders or nearby areas (Bahi Citation2016, 162). The security focus reveals a traditional way of understanding security as a priority in domestic and foreign policy, which also promotes a top-down military strategy that prioritises the army as the only institution capable of safeguarding security against, in this case, the threat of Islamism (Bahi Citation2016, 162). Hosni Mubarak designed Egypt's regional leadership on the basis of guaranteeing regional stability against the Islamist threat and al-Sisi has also exploited this as a way to solidify Egyptian foreign policy. This discourse revolving around the will to establish an independent foreign policy and reinforce Egypt's role in the region has been the one used by Egyptian security forces backed by the army (Monier and Ranko Citation2014, 74). Al-Sisi recovered this traditional Egyptian foreign policy doctrine and adapted it to the regional challenges of the time (Bahi Citation2016, 163).

Since 2011, one of the primary sub-regional security challenges has been the deteriorating security situation on the Sinai Peninsula. The outbreak of the revolution and the partial withdrawal of security forces created a some power vacuum that allowed for more criminal activity like pipeline sabotage, clashes between Bedouin tribes and violent confrontations with the police, as well as greater radicalisation of violent Islamist organisations (Hernando de Larramendi and Fernández-Molina Citation2016, 249). This instability in the Sinai directly affected Israeli-Egyptian relations and the 1979 peace treaty between the two countries, whose annex stipulates the gradual demilitarisation of the peninsula. A pragmatic desire to revise this point, without threatening the treaty as a whole, was shared by those who came into power in the months immediately after Mubarak's removal: the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), presided over by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi (defence minister under Mubarak for 20 years), and the successive governments of Essam Sharaf and Kamal Ganzouri. The SCAF hastily announced that Egypt would uphold all of its signed international agreements, including the Camp David Agreement and the bilateral Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, reassuring both Israel and the US and ensuring the North American annual military assistance of 1.3 billion dollars linked to these agreements (Hernando de Larramendi and Fernández-Molina Citation2016, 254; Shama Citation2014, 215). This entailed controlling the Sinai Peninsula and safeguarding security. In the climate of uncertainty that characterised this so-called transition period and the priority given to more urgent domestic matters, this also meant that the strategic interests of the military elites leading the country continued to be practically the same as those of their predecessors (Shama Citation2014, 217). In the year after Mubarak's fall, relations between the SCAF and the Obama administration reflected the traditional combination of public tension and unwavering strategic cooperation (Brownlee Citation2012, 153).

Consistent with this pragmatism, which was primarily focused on preserving the security of the unstable Sinai Peninsula, after the election of Mohamed Morsi in June 2012, the Islamist government reiterated its intention to uphold the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and its refusal to repeal it, not even proposing to amend the security clauses to allow a greater presence of Egyptian troops in the Sinai (Shama Citation2014, 227). Security and intelligence cooperation between Egypt and Israel did not decrease under the Islamist government, which indirectly reassured the US. Thus, the triangular relationship with Israel and the US that had formed the basis of Egyptian foreign policy since the Camp David Accords were signed was maintained (Tawil Citation2014, 625). However, the lack of an iron fist policy on Morsi's part to handle the increased violence in the area – where armed Islamist groups continued to kidnap Egyptian soldiers and arms trafficking from Libya on its way to Gaza was crossing through tunnels in Rafah – caused a deterioration in the relationship between the Islamist president and the army, one of the many factors that led to Morsi's ouster in July 2013 (Aziz Citation2013).

When al-Sisi took power, his government immediately applied hard-line policies to stop the terrorist attacks in the Sinai. After the murder of 33 Egyptian soldiers in this territory in October 2014, the president declared a three-month state of emergency and curfew in the zone, closed the Rafah pass and ordered the deployment of special military forces (tanks and Apache helicopters) to create a no man's land next to the border with Gaza in order to control the trafficking of arms and people (BBC Citation2014). A few weeks after Morsi was overthrown, al-Sisi convinced Israel of the need to deploy Egyptian military battalions on the peninsula to protect the Sinai from jihadist groups, a move that went against the stipulations in the annex to the 1979 peace treaty (Cohen Citation2013). This gesture indicated a tightening of security relations between Egypt and Israel and boosted Israeli confidence in the Egyptian president (Bahi Citation2016, 163).

Another sticking point since 2011 has been the border with Libya, where internal chaos after the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi has fostered the illegal trafficking of arms, people and narcotics, in addition to oil smuggling. Despite the closure of the Libyan borders with its neighbours to the south and the agreement reached with Algeria and Tunisia to jointly patrol their respective border areas, in mid-2014 the increase in violence and power vacuum created a scenario that could be described as a civil war. After the anti-Islamist military offensive launched by Libyan General Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi (without the authorisation of the central government, which interpreted the move as an attempted coup d’état), al-Sisi backed UAE airstrikes against Islamic State (IS) targets in eastern Libya in February 2015 in retaliation for the beheading of 21 Coptic Christian workers by the terrorist organisation, a sign of support for Haftar's faction of the army (BBC Citation2015). Faced with two rival governments, each claiming to have authority in Libya in early 2015, Cairo deemed the group based in Tobruk as the legitimate one, consistent with its domestic strategy of taking a hard line against Islamist organisations, whether political Islam or jihadists. Parallel to its rhetorical discourse supporting a political solution with dialogue between the different Libyan factions – in February 2017, meetings were held in Cairo between the different Libyan factions and at the end of the month in Tunis, the Tunisian, Algerian and Egyptian foreign affairs ministers signed a six-point declaration supporting political reconciliation in Libya and rejecting military or political intervention in Libyan domestic affairs (Yehia Citation2017) – Cairo has opted for a security strategy of fighting IS and rejecting dialogue with political Islam, showing clear support for General Haftar (Mühlberger Citation2016, 100). In February 2015, Egypt called for a United Nations resolution allowing for international military intervention in Libya, trying to gain support for military intervention in the country. After that appeal was rejected, Egypt made an offer at the 26th Arab League Summit held in Sharm el-Sheikh to lead an Arab military coalition (an idea that was dismissed by Saudi Arabia), but as of late 2016, no such joint Arab taskforce had materialised (Bahi Citation2016, 160; Mühlberger Citation2016, 110).

An opaque and centralised decision-making with a cohabitation parenthesis

This section analyses the continuance of centralisation and opacity in foreign policy decision-making processes by Egypt's successive governments and the cohabitation period in the exercise of power between apparently very different political forces. As in all North African countries, the foreign policy decision-making process in post-Mubarak Egypt has continued to be quite opaque. From Gamal Abdel Nasser to Anwar Sadat and then under Mubarak, Egyptian foreign policy has traditionally been a prerogative of the president and his closest collaborators; all three leaders centralised and personalised the process of formulating foreign policy (Hillal Dessouki Citation2008, 182). Any consultations the president might make regarding foreign policy with the country's elites or professionals in the field were a matter of personal choice, and any influence these consultants might have depended on their personal relationship with the president (Hinnebusch and Shama Citation2014, 82).

The Egyptian foreign policy bureaucracy may not have had legislators, but the country's foreign service has had a long tradition of excellence and enjoys a good reputation among Arab countries. Career diplomats were recruited after passing competitive exams and were prepared at the Egyptian Diplomatic Institute (Hinnebusch and Shama Citation2014, 84). The foreign affairs ministers in recent decades have largely come from the diplomatic corps instead of the political elite, which has professionalised the foreign service, and its ministers and the holders of high posts like minister of foreign affairs have been given positions of responsibility in international institutions, most notably in the Arab League. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for instance, was Secretary-General of the UN from 1992 to 1996, while Amr Moussa served as Secretary-General of the Arab League from 2001 to 2011 (Bahi Citation2016, 171). The first foreign affairs minister from the post-Mubarak period, the diplomat Nabil Elaraby, was appointed Secretary-General of the Arab League from 2011 to 2016, followed by Ahmed Aboul Gheit, the last minister of foreign affairs proposed by Mubarak, who took Elaraby's position in July 2016.

After Mubarak's ouster, there was a so-called transition period, which witnessed what has been termed a ‘cohabitation’ in the exercise of power between the Armed Forces and the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. The SCAF guided this transition process between February 2011 and August 2012, during which time the main foreign policy and security lines established by the previous regime were maintained. The SCAF, headed by Field Marshal Tantawi, and its members were conservative in this respect and had no intention of taking unnecessary risks; relations with Iran, Israel and the United States, for example, did not alter in any way (Shama Citation2014, 215). The connection between the army and Egyptian foreign policy is undeniable. In Egypt, the army has historically been privileged as the only institution capable of safeguarding the security of the country (Bahi Citation2016, 172). For decades, its officials have participated in designing both foreign policy and defence, using the nationalist argument that cites Egyptian military support in the wars against Israel in 1948, 1956 and 1967 and during what was considered the victorious 1973 war. After Amr Moussa stepped down as minister of foreign affairs in 2001 to become Secretary-General of the Arab League, the ministry was pushed into the background and the General Intelligence Service took over the leading role in the key foreign policy matters of security and the fight against terrorism (Hernando de Larramendi and Fernández-Molina Citation2016, 254). Its director, General Omar Suleiman, was widely seen as President Mubarak's most important advisor – indeed, he was appointed to the vice presidency ten days before Mubarak's fall – and the main contact in Cairo for foreign governments (Grimm and Roll Citation2012, 2).

With Mubarak's ouster, the army – through the SCAF and Tantawi – tried to ensure its influence in key areas before executive power was transferred to the civilians. For the first 18 months, a type of marriage of convenience was forged between the army and the Muslim Brotherhood (Shama Citation2014, 223). In August 2012, the recently elected Islamist President Mohamed Morsi established a new cabinet and distanced himself from the SCAF and Tantawi, replacing him with the director of military intelligence, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who also assumed the defence portfolio (Hernando de Larramendi Citation2013, 87).

Between August 2012 and June 2013, relations between the Muslim Brotherhood – and its political wing the FJP – and the army were becoming strained and progressively deteriorating. While Kamel Ganzouri's minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohamed Kamel Amr, continued to hold that position, Morsi appointed the experienced diplomat Rifa’a al-Tahtawi as presidential chief of staff. Al-Tahtawi had been stationed in Tehran and Tripoli and maintained close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, a characteristic of the Islamist presidency. The foreign policy agenda was set by both Tahtawi and by prominent figures from the Muslim Brotherhood and FJP like Essam el-Haddad, the president's senior advisor for foreign relations and international cooperation, whose influence overshadowed the foreign minister and extended the overlap between the state institutions and organisational activities (Shama Citation2014, 231), and Hassan Malek, who was responsible for business affairs and private sector relations. Both men enjoyed a close relationship with Khairat al-Shater, deputy supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood and one of the brains behind the organisation (Grimm and Roll Citation2012, 2–3).

However, despite the unquestionable influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, foreign policy under Morsi was not so much Islamist beyond some symbolic gestures. In reality, there were few substantial changes with respect to the Mubarak period due, fundamentally, to economic factors. Just as under Mubarak during his final years, the ministry of foreign affairs did not occupy a central position in the decision-making process and Morsi was front and centre in the attempt to promote Egypt as a regional leader on the international stage. The military intelligence services continued to play a key role in dialogue with Israel, while Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood leaders talked with Hamas. This division of labour made it possible to reinforce the country's international image and calm the fears of the American and Israeli administrations. In this respect, the role played by Morsi in negotiating the Gaza crisis in November 2012 – when he sent his prime minister, Hisham Qandil, to Gaza in a historical gesture – was decisive (Hernando de Larramendi and Fernández-Molina Citation2016, 255, 264; Monier and Ranko Citation2014, 70; Shama Citation2014, 228). Additionally, because Morsi could show that cooperation with Israel regarding security had not sustained any damage, the impact of critics in his own party, the Muslim Brotherhood and public opinion was limited. Despite his verbal boycott of Israel – Morsi did not mention the country in any of his speeches – and the withdrawal of the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv, Morsi did allow the tunnels connecting Rafah with Gaza to be demolished and they remained closed (Hernando de Larramendi Citation2013, 87–88). In October 2012 Morsi rejected a proposal from Hamas to create a free trade zone between Egypt and Gaza, fearing that free circulation between the two sides would intensify insecurity in the Sinai (Grimm and Roll Citation2012, 3). In other words, the fight against terrorist activities in the Sinai continued to be coordinated with Israel, and the Armed Forces maintained their autonomy regarding questions that affected national security.

Beginning in November 2012, however, against the backdrop of a political crisis resulting from a constitutional declaration that concentrated all state powers in the presidency, relations with the army began to deteriorate (Monier and Ranko Citation2014, 67). On the domestic front, the army's calls for dialogue with the opposition were not well received by the Muslim Brotherhood. Neither did the army share the strategy applied in the Sinai to combat terrorism, which it viewed as soft. Then two events occurred related to foreign policy that crossed the red line. The first was diplomatic rapprochement with Iran. For the first time since the 1979 Islamic revolution, the Egyptian and Iranian presidents visited Tehran and Cairo respectively (BBC Citation2013; Londoño Citation2012). They announced the resumption of commercial flights between the two countries, an initiative that was suspended in the end due to pressure from Salafist sectors, which considered any reconciliation with the Iranian Shiite regime intolerable and a threat to national security. The second event – and the one that caused the greatest distrust among the army – was the cessation of diplomatic relations with the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which Morsi announced unilaterally in June 2013 at the National Conference for the Support of the Syrian Revolution, where the Egyptian president called for a jihad against the ‘Syrian sectarian regime’ (Hernando de Larramendi Citation2013, 88–89). The Egyptian army interpreted this gesture as a serious threat to national security, while alarm bells went off in Saudi Arabia and, especially, the UAE.

In this context of regional unrest, a lack of consensus between political forces, polarisation and increasing violence, in addition to the growing unrest in the Armed Forces, general discontent and a loss of popular support for the president, a number of demonstrations were held on 30 June 2013 to demand Morsi's resignation and new elections. Given Morsi's refusal to leave his position and with violence spreading across the country, the army one again presented itself as the guarantor of stability, recouping political control four days later in the figure of General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, then minister of defence. Adly Mansour, president of the Supreme Constitutional Council, became acting president.

The constitution approved in January 2014 maintained the central role of the army in the Egyptian political system. In May of that year, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was elected president of the republic almost without opposition, winning 98% of the votes, which reinforced the centralisation of the decision-making process in foreign relations, security and defence. As al-Sisi had left his position at the head of the defence department as well as the presidency of the SCAF to run for president, Sedki Sobhy was appointed minister in his stead and the diplomat Sameh Shoukry, ambassador to the United States from 2008 to 2012 and friend of President Barak Obama, was selected to head foreign affairs.

A predictable foreign policy behaviour: adaptation and pragmatism

This section discusses the largely predictable foreign policy behaviour maintained by the successive Egyptian governments after Mubarak's ouster focusing on the evolution of the adaptation policies implemented vis-à-vis the Arab region between 2011 and 2016. Generally speaking, and as is the case with other North African countries, there were no surprising changes in Egypt's foreign policy agenda and priority objectives either immediately after Mubarak's overthrow in February 2011 or during any of the successive governments, due, primarily, to economic factors. The desire in post-Mubarak Egypt for new regional leadership compared with other Arab states like Saudi Arabia and non-Arab states like Turkey and Iran was a mere reflection of an idea about the country's historical role at home and abroad (Hernando de Larramendi and Fernández-Molina Citation2016, 258). Since Egypt was readmitted into the Arab League in 1989, its regional policies had focused on preventing the emergence of a regional challenge based on four pillars: a strong alliance with the United States; Egypt's role as a mediator between the Israelis and Palestinians; the promotion of Arab nationalism as a way to weaken the regional influence of Turkey and Iran; and maintaining a special relationship with Saudi Arabia to help Egypt with its financial difficulties (El-Labbad Citation2014, 82). These four pillars remained in place during the post-revolutionary period under the SCAF. In foreign policy, then, the Mubarak era carried on, with some minor changes in form and content.

Neither economic factors nor democratic regression suggest that Egypt will be able to lead the region in the short term. Egyptian foreign policy continues to move in opposite directions: one adheres to the idea of independence from foreign powers, presented as a question of national dignity, while the second submerges the country in a web of economic dependency from which it cannot escape (Bahi Citation2016, 175). Egypt appears to manipulate regional affairs to detract both domestic and foreign attention from its security, political, economic and social problems, and adopting an active foreign policy to obtain regional power amidst such terrible domestic conditions does not seem prudent (Sayigh Citation2015). Not even the presidency of Islamist Mohamed Morsi in June 2012 produced a radical realignment or change at either regional or international level. From the outset, both the president himself and the leaders of his party indicated that they were committed to the international treaties signed by Egypt, including those with Israel. Indeed, in a speech by President Morsi to the UN General Assembly in September 2012, he made it clear that there would be no fundamental changes in Egyptian foreign policy (Hernando de Larramendi and Fernández-Molina Citation2016, 259).

This foreign policy behaviour seems to have been based on a combination of pragmatism and prudence. Between 2011 and 2016 Egyptian foreign policy included a series of adaptive moves in the Arab region in parallel to political transformations on the domestic front. When the Islamists came into power, priorities changed and there was a relative reshaping of strategic alliances with regional partners. Qatar and Turkey, which had not hitherto played a particularly important role in Egyptian foreign policy, came to the fore as staunch defenders of the Islamist government, providing both financial and ideological support. When Morsi was overthrown one year later, relations with these two countries deteriorated severely, while traditional alliances with countries that strongly opposed the Muslim Brotherhood like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait re-emerged.

On the international stage, policies towards the European Union underwent a moment of initial paralysis after Mubarak's ouster in the face of domestic instability. In fact, when the EU opened the debate on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) in December 2011 to improve trade conditions with the countries with which it had bilateral association agreements (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan), the Egyptian authorities expressed that they did not wish to enter into formal negotiations with the EU until they had an elected government (Hernando de Larramendi and Fernández-Molina Citation2016, 261). After Morsi was elected in 2012, the European institutions went to great lengths to show their support for the first elected post-Mubarak president, with economic cooperation once again and unsurprisingly becoming the primary foundation for good relations with the Egyptian administration (Pinfari Citation2013, 3). President Morsi sought international recognition and presented himself as an intermediary with both the US and the EU, as shown by his visit to Brussels in September 2012 (Pinfari Citation2013, 2). The European institutions were receptive to these normalisation gestures and showed their own commitment to promoting bilateral cooperation by establishing the EU-Egypt Task Force two months after this visit. However, Morsi's constitutional declaration concentrating the powers of the state in the presidency two days later set off alarm bells, leading the European Parliament to call for a freeze on EU assistance to Egypt (Fernández-Molina Citation2017; Pinfari Citation2013, 4). When Morsi was overthrown in the summer of 2013 and replaced by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, EU positions polarised, and some of the institution's highest members became mediators between the deposed president and the new authorities in the country (Fernández-Molina Citation2017). Since then, reactions from Europe seem to indicate that the temptation to support strong rulers in the region has resurfaced to the detriment of fully democratic processes (Pinfari Citation2013; Azaola and González Citation2017).

With the United States, the successive governments since 2011 have acted with the same pragmatism. This attitude has been due, firstly, to the need for international recognition of the country's leaders, both Morsi and al-Sisi, and secondly, to challenging economic factors. Even the Islamist government of Morsi and the FJP, despite its brief one-year term, was open to acting as a valid intermediary with the United States administration from the outset, despite the anti-American discourse used with followers during campaign stops. Despite some initial concerns, the United States accepted this intermediation at the highest level (Shama Citation2014, 227). When moments of tension arose between Washington and Cairo, such as after the attacks on the United States embassy in the Egyptian capital in September 2012 in response to the broadcast of the video The Innocence of Muslims, the political response from the Islamist authorities was, firstly, to push for the investigations that the US wanted and step up the fight against terrorism, and secondly, to condemn blasphemy and put a stop to criticism of the Prophet as requested by the Muslim Brotherhood and, most particularly, the Salafist sectors, which were becoming increasingly present in the public space (Hernando de Larramendi and Fernández-Molina Citation2016, 263). Another period of tension occurred in December 2011 when the Ministry of International Cooperation promoted a campaign against pro-democracy NGOs, arguing that they were receiving illegal funds and working without permits; four of these were American and 43 foreign aid workers were put on trial and finally were able to leave the country and were judged and sentenced in absentia in June 2013 (English Ahram Citation2013). This case jeopardised the 1300 million dollars that Egypt receives from the US on an annual basis. In the end, the money was delivered due to the exceptional national security situation and what Senator John McCain called the ‘constructive role’ played by the Muslim Brotherhood in resolving the crisis (Shama Citation2014, 228).

After Morsi was removed from power in July 2013 with the Armed Forces playing a leading role, the interim government immediately sought recognition from the EU and US (the question of the 1300 million dollars in annual aid from the US was up in the air again). To that end, the Egyptian ministry of foreign affairs embarked upon a diplomatic campaign to win international recognition for al-Sisi, obscuring the sentences meted out in the country for violent actions. They also reached out to their African neighbours, which had suspended Egypt as a member of the African Union for a year, although the country was reinstated in June 2014. The country's sources of support were clear: Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait, primarily (Monier and Ranko Citation2014, 71).

Israel, of course, was relieved to see al-Sisi take power with his relentless fight against Islamist forces and since that point, Egyptian-Israeli relations have become closer, not only on a diplomatic, security and strategic level, but on an economic level as well (Hassanein Citation2016). This progressive rapprochement took place despite the fact that in his first speech as president, Al-Sisi declared that he would ‘work to achieve the independence of Palestine with its capital in East Jerusalem’ (Soliman Citation2016). Like Morsi, President al-Sisi had his own mediation moment in the Israel-Gaza conflict in the summer of 2014, in an effort to obtain the recognition of, fundamentally, the United States, which was keeping part of its military aid frozen. In general, however, given that Hamas was a brother organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood, against which al-Sisi had so relentlessly fought, the new president has been inclined towards the Israeli side (Hernando de Larramendi and Fernández-Molina Citation2016, 266).

The civil war in Syria has also been used by various Arab regimes to gain legitimacy in the fight against terrorism. Egypt has actively presented itself, like Saudi Arabia, as a promoter of a new regional security doctrine based on a joint military force. Al-Sisi has stressed his support for the coalition against IS led by the United States, emphasising the connection between this terrorist organisation and the armed groups in the Sinai and on the border with Libya, both targets of his country's own anti-terrorist campaign. In other words, the fight against IS has served to justify repressive policies in Egypt itself against the Muslim Brotherhood – declared a terrorist organisation by the Egyptian government in December 2013 – in order to secure greater backing from the Arab Gulf countries, although tensions with Saudi Arabia over Egypt's role in Syria and its near lack of involvement in the campaign against Yemen, among other things, have been growing since mid-2015. Finally, Egypt also wants to regain international recognition from both the EU and US (Helmy Citation2014).

Strengthening Egypt-Saudi relations

The Egypt-Saudi case study provides an example of how Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's accession to power ushered in a new convergence of foreign policy objectives regarding economics, sub-regional security and domestic regime security, which explains the strengthening and improvement of relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Political and financial support from the Arab Gulf countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, have increased over the last five years in a regional context of shared strategic and security interests, despite occasional moments of confrontation.

The political transformation processes that began in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 with the electoral success of Islamist groups were perceived as real threats by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In both countries, Muslim Brotherhood activities had been banned in the 1990s, and these monarchies feared that in the context of regional political transformation, sectors of their populations would be influenced by Islamist ideology and would rebel against their governments. On the opposite side of the spectrum was Qatar, which supported the Islamist organisation and saw an opportunity to extend its regional and international influence in the group's electoral victory (Sailer Citation2016, 2). Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have been engaged in a competition to lead politics in the region in the context of the war in Syria, the deteriorating situation in Iraq, the appearance of new actors like IS and Iran's new leading role, while also trying to maintain their own autonomy (Hamdan al-Alkim Citation2011, 132–148). This inter-regional competition has led the countries to more obviously interfere in the domestic affairs of other Arab countries like Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Egypt, fundamentally through providing financial resources, but also through direct military action (Amirah and Fernández Citation2015).

When Islamist President Mohamed Morsi was overthrown in July 2013 and replaced by military-backed Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, this produced a convergence of interests between the Egyptian army and Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Egypt urgently needed financial assistance from these monarchies to revive the economy, which was continuing to weaken, and to strengthen al-Sisi's position against the Muslim Brotherhood. The Arab Gulf countries, in exchange, needed al-Sisi to defeat the Muslim Brotherhood and stop the group from expanding in the region. A significant injection of funds from Saudi Arabia had inevitable repercussions on the foreign policy decisions made in Cairo which – at least at first – did not differ significantly from the positions set forth in Riyadh. For example, in the case of Syria, al-Sisi distanced himself from Morsi's position, expressing his intention not to support jihad in that country and to impose strong restrictions on the Syrian refugees arriving in Egypt (Hearst Citation2015). During the campaign for the presidential election in May 2014, al-Sisi went so far as to declare that ‘military intervention to protect the Gulf States is part of the Egyptian army's doctrine’ (Mandour Citation2016).

However, differences between the two countries began to emerge when the new king of Saudi Arabia, Salman bin Abdulaziz, appeared on the political stage after the death of his brother King Abdullah in January 2015, making changes to both foreign affairs and defence (Bult Citation2015). The new monarch inaugurated a regional foreign policy that was supposedly emancipated from the American ‘protector’, a doctrine baptised the ‘Salman doctrine’ in response to the ‘Obama doctrine’ (Dazi-Héni Citation2016, 239; Kéchichian Citation2016, 262–263). From a financial and religious soft power, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE have moved on to a hybrid interventionism that combines unilateral or multilateral military action with financial and humanitarian aid (Dazi-Héni Citation2016, 237). This change in strategy on the part of Saudi Arabia seems to be a demonstration – to both the country's Sunni allies and its own population – of its regional power at a time of instability in the area as well as an attempt to detract attention from domestic socioeconomic problems at a time when petroleum prices have been dropping rapidly (Sons and Wiese Citation2015, 7–9).

The Saudi decision to intervene militarily in Yemen in March 2015, the beginning of a change in the country's priorities, produced disagreements and moments of tension in Egypt-Saudi relations that intensified over the course of 2016. At the request of Yemeni President Abu Rabbu Mansour Hadi – and justified by the need to stop the advances of the Houthi (Shiite) community – a coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched a military intervention in Yemen on 25 March 2015: Operation Decisive Storm. The coalition includes the GCC countries (except for Oman) in addition to Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Sudan (and initially Pakistan, although its parliament voted against participation in the end). The coalition has also been able to count on the ‘logistical and intelligence support’ of the US and Turkey (AFP Citation2015).

Through the foreign affairs minister, Sameh Shoukry, on 26 March the Egyptian authorities announced their political and military support for the campaign in Yemen, sending four warships to the coast of Aden, without clarifying whether they would deploy land troops (Wehrey Citation2015). This decision generated a debate among Egyptians that reflected their opposition to their army's participation in the military intervention, recalling the disastrous result of the 1962 Egyptian invasion of Yemen when, after five years of combat, 10,000 soldiers lost their lives (El Sharnoubi Citation2015). President al-Sisi was forced to respond to the critics, ensuring them that he cared about ‘every drop of blood and every son of this country’ and noting that the circumstances were not comparable (Malsin Citation2016). After a meeting with the SCAF and in a clear gesture to reassure his Saudi associates, he also stated that ‘Egypt will not abandon its brothers in the Gulf’ (Egyptian Streets Citation2015).

However, Egypt has not made a definitive decision about either land operations or greater involvement in Yemen and al-Sisi has maintained an ambiguous position that has been a source of tension for his Saudi partners. In January 2016, the Egyptian National Security Council agreed to extend the country's participation for one more year, but this collaboration seems more symbolic than real and has not addressed Saudi Arabia's wishes (Mandour Citation2016). For al-Sisi, a committed alliance with the Saudi monarchy would entail not only sending land troops – a price too high to pay given public opinion – but also damaging Egypt's relations with other countries who oppose the coalition like Russia and China, with whom ties cannot be broken for economic reasons. It would also limit the country's options with regard to other regional matters like the war in Syria and the future of Bashar al-Assad, and force the country to reconsider its relations with Turkey and Qatar, which support both the anti-Assad forces and the coalition in Yemen, and to reduce pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood, a red line for al-Sisi (Bahi Citation2016, 160; Sailer Citation2016, 1–3).

The Saudi response to what was considered weak Egyptian involvement was to dismiss al-Sisi's proposal at the Arab summit in Sharm El Sheikh – held just after airstrikes began in Yemen – to create a joint Arab military taskforce under the auspices of the Arab League to combat terrorism, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. As long as Egypt did not commit to greater involvement in Yemen, its proposal for an Egypt-led joint force was of no interest to Saudi Arabia, which also saw the proposal as a way to extend the country's regional influence (Noll and Roll Citation2015, 1–2). In light of this situation, Saudi Arabia began to reassess its unconditional economic support for Egypt during 2015. The combination of low petroleum prices (which had fallen nearly 65%), the expenses of the war in Yemen, and the lack of progress with regard to security, economics and finances in Egypt led the Saudis to reconsider assistance, except in emergency situations. The Egyptian authorities, however, once more showing the pragmatism that has characterised many of the country's foreign policy decisions, agreed to join a military coalition of almost 37 Arab and Muslim countries launched in December 2015 by Saudi Arabia to fight terrorism, the so-called Sunni Bloc (Jenkins Citation2016). Shortly after Egypt agreed to participate in this alliance, Riyadh announced an aid package to Egypt to supply its oil needs for five years with an additional 8000 million dollars in investment plans (Halawa Citation2016).

The first visit by the new Saudi monarch, Salman bin Abdulaziz, to Cairo in April 2016 was presented as an opportunity to mend fences and reinforce trust between the two countries, which have historically benefitted from each other (Ezzat Citation2016). The visit consolidated the financial injection – set at as high as 20,000 million dollars – in the form of 24 investment plans, including the construction of King Salman University in the southern Sinai, a power plant, new housing, and a bridge over the Red Sea between Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Gresh Citation2016). The most controversial aspect of the visit, seen as another sign of the conditionality of Saudi financial assistance, was the announcement that Egypt would cede control of two islands in the Red Sea, Tiran and Sanafir, to Saudi Arabia. The public response to this decision to hand over these two strategic islands, which are central to Israel's access to the sea, was to see it as an attack on Egyptian sovereignty and national pride and led to the largest demonstrations and street protests since al-Sisi became president (BBC Citation2016). The case was brought to court by the political opposition, where an administrative court declared the agreement and its stipulations invalid in June 2016 (Gresh Citation2016; Said Citation2016). The government appealed and in January 2017, the country's Supreme Administrative Court issued a final decision that confirmed Egyptian sovereignty over the two islands in a historical sentence that declared that ‘the executive branch of the Egyptian government does not have the administrative authority to cede the territory to Saudi Arabia’ (Mada Masr Citation2017).

Egypt-Saudi relations deteriorated throughout 2016. Egypt's positions with respect to Syria and Bashar al-Assad have created another source of conflict between the two countries. In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2016, al-Sisi declared that it was not necessary to destroy the institutions of the Syrian state, while his foreign minister Sameh Shoukry expressed an opinion different to that of Saudi Arabia with respect to the use of armed combat in Syria for the first time (Gresh Citation2016). On 8 October, the Egyptian delegation in the UN Security Council voted in favour of a Russian resolution proposing a ceasefire in Aleppo, which was strongly criticised by the Saudi delegation, while at the same time the Egyptian delegation voted in favour of the French-Saudi proposal to establish a no-fly zone (Ezzidin Citation2016). This contradictory behaviour by the Egyptian diplomats could be interpreted as a desire by the Egyptians to reassure Saudi Arabia while simultaneously tightening relations with Russia, which it sees as a potential international ally (Mandour Citation2016). The Saudi response to the Egyptian position was to suspend deliveries of petroleum to Egypt from Aramco, the Saudi Arabian Oil Company, in defiance of the agreement signed during King Salman's visit to Cairo that promised the delivery of 700,000 tonnes of crude oil a month (Said Citation2016). The pro-regime Egyptian media outlets, which had heretofore been allies and friends with the Wahhabi monarchy, began a nationalist campaign against the Saudi kingdom that even encouraged Egyptians to forgo the pilgrimage to Mecca; the same occurred in the Saudi press and, above all, on Saudi social networks (Gresh Citation2016; Mandour Citation2016).

This situation of rivalry even affected religion and the battle for the legitimacy of the representation of Sunni Islam. At an Islamic conference held in Grozny (Chechnya) in August 2016, attended by an important delegation of Egyptian ulemas and the Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar, Ahmed al-Tayeb (known for his hostility towards Wahhabi positions), a final declaration was approved that did not include Salafists as ‘true Sunni Muslims’, a clear reference to Saudi Wahhabism (Gresh Citation2016). This political-religious attack against Riyadh was countered by the Saudi High Council of Ulemas, who condemned the conference, while the country's press called for the cessation of aid policies for Egypt.

Although such disagreements had been common in previous decades, this new falling-out between two countries that seemed so enamoured of each other in 2014 can be attributed to Egypt's inability to guarantee the regional security of the Gulf – at least to the degree desired by the new Saudi leader – and to prevent Iranian hegemony, whether in Yemen or Syria, as well as to Egypt's wish to cultivate relations with other international players in the region, like the Russians. The Egyptian position in Syria seems closer to that of Moscow than Riyadh. Egypt refused to send ground troops in February 2016 in the coalition led by Saudi Arabia against IS, declaring that this was a question of Saudi sovereignty and was not the responsibility of the coalition. Egyptian diplomacy has backed a negotiated solution that seems to support Assad's position – in December 2016, secretary of the Arab League, Egyptian diplomat and former minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Aboul Gheit declared that Assad should remain in power, declarations that infuriated the Saudi authorities (The New Arab Citation2016), something that the Saudis reject, as it implies the continuance of Iranian hegemony over Syria. For Egypt, on the other hand, this approach means closer relations with Russia and the possibility of obtaining financial aid without such a heavy military demand. Moreover, thanks to the coverage provided by the IMF loan – the largest in its history to a country in the region (12,000 million dollars over three years, the first 2750 million of which were delivered in November 2016) (Núñez Citation2016) – Egypt can now contemplate the idea of not having to depend exclusively on financial injections from the Saudis.

Conclusion

In the period immediately after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 as well as the year during which Islamist Mohamed Morsi was president, there was some disconnection or even collision between the needs imposed by the country's economic dependency and the regional alliances established by the new political elites who came into power. The accession of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi produced a new convergence between economic and security objectives both in the region and for the regime itself and its elite, which explains the strengthening and improvement of relations with Saudi Arabia, despite occasional clashes.

This chapter has shown that the limitations resulting from Egypt's economic dependency and weakness have restricted the foreign policy margin of action for the successive governments after the fall of Mubarak internationally, regionally and internally. The study has also revealed how centralisation and opacity have been constants in the foreign affairs decision-making process under all of these governments and analysed the cohabitation period in the exercise of power between apparently very different political forces. Finally, it investigated the more than predictable behaviour of the successive governments in foreign affairs and the evolution of the adjustment policies adopted by Egyptian diplomacy in the Arab region between 2011 and 2016.