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Articles

Atomic Leverage: Compellence with Nuclear Latency

Pages 517-544
Published online: 08 May 2017
 
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ABSTRACT

Nuclear proliferation is not a binary outcome with uniform consequences, but instead spans a continuum of latent capacity to produce nuclear weapons. At various thresholds of technical development, some countries leverage nuclear latency to practice coercive diplomacy. How and when does nuclear technology provide a challenger with the most effective means to extract concessions in world politics? This article claims that compellence with nuclear latency puts a challenger on the horns of a credibility dilemma between demonstrating resolve and signaling restraint, and identifies a sweet spot for reaching an optimal bargain where the proliferation threat is credible while the assurance costs of revealing intent are low. Historical studies of South Korea, Japan, and North Korea validate this Goldilocks principle and find that it consistently reflects the ability to produce fissile material. Contrary to conventional wisdom about proliferation, nuclear technology generates political effects long before a country acquires nuclear weapons.

Acknowledgments

This article benefited from comments on earlier versions by James Acton, George Anzelon, Austin Carson, Toby Dalton, Alex Downes, Daniel Jacobs, Matthew Kroenig, Matthew Fuhrmann, Erik Gartzke, Charles Glaser, Jeffrey Knopf, Alex Montgomery, Nicholas Miller, Neil Narang, Jonathan Pearl, George Perkovich, Brian Radzinsky, Brad Roberts, Grant Schneider, Todd Sechser, Doug Shaw, Adam Stulberg, Jane Vaynman, George Quester, numerous government officials, two outstanding anonymous reviewers and the editors at Security Studies, as well as participants at the May 2016 Nuclear Policy Talk at the Elliott School of International Affairs, the 2016 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Nuclear Crossroads Initiative, the 2015 US Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium, and especially the 2015 Nuclear Studies Research Initiative retreat in Virginia.

Funding

The Stanton Foundation provided generous funding for the author to complete this research as a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace from 2015 until 2016.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Tristan A. Volpe

Tristan A. Volpe is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Prior to Carnegie, Volpe was a Lawrence Scholar at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory from 2013 to 2015.

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