https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4527-8626
ABSTRACT
This article comparatively examines the Armenian and Azerbaijani narratives of victory in the First and Second Karabakh Wars, respectively. Drawing on the speeches, addresses and statements by the Armenian and Azerbaijani leadership, it unpacks what meaning the two countries ascribed to their victories. Azerbaijan has developed a complex narrative which includes the definition of several enemies, personalization and extensive symbolization of the victory along with an insulting, demonizing and dehumanizing language in regardto Armenia(ns), the Armenian leadership and army, as well as an assertive and uncompromising attitude towards conflict resolution and the future of Armenia–Azerbaijan relations. Lacking any of these elements, the Armenian narrative has been quite simple, stressing the need of a compromise-based, peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and describing the victory as existentially important and a watershed development in Armenia’s history.
Introduction
The Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) conflict takes its roots in the beginning of the twentieth century. The first major clashes between Armenians and Caucasian Tatars (as Azerbaijanis were called by that time) occurred in 1905–1907 in many areas across Transcaucasia which was part of the Russian Empire.Footnote1 Karabakh, a mountainous area populated mostly by ethnic Armenians, became one of several regions over which Armenia and Azerbaijan engaged in a war after declaring independence in 1918. The political status of the region was forcibly fixed after the Russian Red Army occupied Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1920. More specifically, in 1921 the Soviet authorities decided to establish the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in part of Karabakh, turning it into an enclave within Soviet Azerbaijan.Footnote2 Although the Soviet rule stopped Armenia and Azerbaijan from going to war for around 70 years, it did not settle the conflict, but transformed it. In this period, Baku continued its policy of Azerbaijanization in Nagorno-Karabakh by inter alia repressive, demographic, social-economic, cultural, institutional means.Footnote3 The decline of the Soviet Union and subsequent declaration of independence by Armenia and Azerbaijan opened a new page in the history of the conflict, eventually leading to Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence and the First Karabakh War (1991–1994) which resulted in Azerbaijan’s defeat.Footnote4 After 1994, Yerevan and Baku were locked into enduring rivalry.Footnote5 Since 2014, the intensity and magnitude of violence increased, as exemplified during the escalation in 2014–2015 and the April War in 2016.Footnote6 In 2020, the conflict witnessed the largest military escalation since 1994, namely the 44-day war which resulted in the occupation of most of Nagorno-Karabakh’s territory by Azerbaijan.
After the end of the 44-day war, President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev declared that the conflict was over.Footnote7 However, the post-war developments demonstrate that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not only a far from peaceful resolution but also has witnessed even more violence and with greater frequency. In May and November 2021, Azerbaijan attacked and occupied parts of the territory of Armenia and in September 2022 launched a large-scale attack, occupying even more areas.Footnote8 In December 2022, Baku imposed a complete blockade on Nagorno-Karabakh which led to a humanitarian catastrophe. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a large-scale attack on Nagorno-Karabakh, fully occupying and entirely cleansing it from the Armenian population.Footnote9 Azerbaijan uses coercive policy to not only occupy new territories, but also to compel Armenia to make new concessions.Footnote10 Indicative of Azerbaijan’s militant behaviour is also the narrative Baku has developed about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, particularly the 44-day war in 2020. Narratives are usually developed over a long period of time and demonstrate states’ long-term strategy and intentions regarding particular issues. Therefore, studying official narratives and discourses is instrumental in understanding the probability of peace or war in ethno-territorial conflicts.
The discursive aspect of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has already attracted some attention among scholars. Sahakyan demonstrates how Ilham Aliyev has implemented a campaign of dehumanization and toxification of Armenians.Footnote11 In another article, Sahakyan examines the frames Armenian, Azerbaijani and Turkish leaders used to develop their narratives about the conflict.Footnote12 She argues that Armenia used the frames of ‘democracy vs. autocracy’ and regional cooperation, while Azerbaijan used those of Islamic solidarity, Turkic heritage and multiculturalism. Narratives have been studied also in the pre-war literature. For instance, Tokluoglu argues that the Azerbaijani political discourse has centered around inter alia stereotyping and perceiving Armenians in a negative way.Footnote13 Atanesyan contended that media could possibly play a role in creating alternative narratives about the conflict, but given the authoritarian nature of the Azerbaijani political system, this scenario is more possible in Armenia, than in Azerbaijan.Footnote14 In this research, I focus on the study of narratives of victory. This article aims to answer the following research question: what kind of victory narratives did Armenia and Azerbaijan develop and how do they compare?
To compare the narratives, I analysed around 60 statements, addresses and speeches by Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders. In Armenia’s case, it includes the period from the end of the First Karabakh War in 1994 until the beginning of the 44-day war in 2020. For the period between 1994 and 2018, I studied statements, addresses and speeches by presidents Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, and for the period between 2018 and 2020 – by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan as in 2018 Armenia became a parliamentary republic. In Azerbaijan’s case, the analysis includes statements, addresses and speeches by President Ilham Aliyev since the end of the 44-day war in November 2020. In both cases, the choice is limited to those ones that were made either in Nagorno-Karabakh or on occasions that were somehow connected to the conflict or the war, e.g. military parades and exercises, visits to military bases, conflict-related commemorative days.Footnote15
The article consists of three major parts. The first section unpacks Azerbaijan’s narrative of victory by examining how Ilham Aliyev a) explained Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 war, b) defined and depicted the enemy, c), aimed to fill the concept of victory with material and non-material symbols, and d) saw the future of the conflict resolution and Yerevan-Baku relations. This section is divided into four sub-sections with each one addressing one of the four questions, respectively. The second section examines Armenia’s narrative of victory and is structured in the following way. The first sub-section studies how the Armenian leadership depicted Azerbaijan and diagnosed the nature of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the second one examines Yerevan’s views on the future of the conflict and its resolution. The third part explains the reasons of the stark contrast between two narratives. The final section summarizes the results of the comparative analysis.
Unpacking the Azerbaijani narrative of victory
To begin with, Azerbaijan has developed its narrative victory in an extensive and complex way. The average length of Ilham Aliyev’s addresses, made on the occasion of Victory Day and Armed Forces Day, was 3031 words.Footnote16 In these addresses, Aliyev not only speaks about the 2020 war and Azerbaijan’s victory but also puts them in the context of a number of domestic, regional and international issues which will be discussed below.
Narrating the reasons of victory
In his addresses and statements, Ilham Aliyev went to great lengths to explain in detail how Azerbaijan achieved victory. First of all, he developed a personalized narrative of victory trying to highlight his personal role as the president who led the country to victory through roughly 20 years and to portray himself as a staunch defender of Azerbaijan’s national interests. Aliyev started his statements and addresses by referring to his pre-2020 belief and statements that Azerbaijan would take control of Nagorno-Karabakh one day. In one of his speeches, he stated that
Exactly 20 years ago, the people of Azerbaijan showed great confidence in me by electing me the President in the elections. At that time, I addressed my people and promised that I would defend the national interests of the Azerbaijani people and the Azerbaijani state and that I would protect the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. I took an oath with my hand on the Constitution and the Holy Quran. I am glad that all the promises I made during the last 20 years and all the tasks I set before myself have been fulfilled.Footnote17
He often portrayed himself as not only the decision-maker who took responsibility for key decisions during the war and who knows ‘what, when and how to do’,Footnote18 but also as a leader who withstood the alleged international pressure on Baku and whom the Azerbaijani society trusted. On the day Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan signed the statement that ended the 44-day war, Aliyev said that
The letters to me say, Commander-in-Chief, go on! We support you, go forward, don’t stop, and so I did. I did not stop. […] After the war started, I said that many, almost all politicians involved in this [Nagorno-Karabakh] issue, kept saying that there was no military solution to this conflict. What was I saying? I said there was! I was often criticized. […] They told us to stop. I said I would not stop. No-one can stop me.Footnote19
Following this narrative, since 2020 the Azerbaijani leadership started calling Ilham Aliyev ‘Victorious Commander-in-Chief’.Footnote20 Similarly, when Ilham Aliyev raised his fist in one of his addresses to demonstrate power and victory in the war, his gesture became the official name of the Azerbaijani military operation (codenamed ‘Iron Fist’) and a symbol of victory.Footnote21
The personalization of the narrative of victory was not limited to Ilham Aliyev, but also his father and the third President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev whose personality cult has long been developed in the Azerbaijani society. Although Heydar Aliyev’s presidency ended in 2003, Ilham Aliyev repeatedly argued that it was his father who laid the groundwork for the future victory by bringing the country on the development path and reforming the army.Footnote22 To demonstrate this, Heydar Aliyev’s name was symbolically connected with construction projects that the Azerbaijani government launched in Nagorno-Karabakh after the 44-day war. For instance, the launching ceremony of the construction of the second (in 2023) and third residential complexes (in 2024) in Shushi was held on Heydar Aliyev’s birthday.Footnote23
In addition to that, in numerous speeches Ilham Aliyev argued that the victory was the result of the Azerbaijani government’s long-term policies in many areas. Together with army-building, he outlined three major policy areas: a) economy, b) diplomacy and c) youth. The President of Azerbaijan stated that starting the war in 2020 would be impossible without having an economic power, necessary for funding Baku’s war preparations. Diplomacy was deemed important in terms of increasing Azerbaijan’s influence in international politics, advertising the Azerbaijani interpretation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and attracting international support to Azerbaijan. The third point concerned Baku’s youth policy which aimed at preparing the young generation for war and winning their support for a military solution to the conflict.Footnote24 Stressing government policies were indirect manifestations of personalized narrative of victory, as since 1993 those policies were designed and implemented by the Aliyev family.
Defining and describing the enemy
Central to the study of narratives of victory is examining who, according to the belligerents, the enemy is and how it is depicted or described. It might seem that in all conflicts that have two parties, the enemy should be obvious, but leaders of states develop narratives of victory that do not necessarily follow this logic. As the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict shows, adding this point to the analysis is important for nuanced understanding of conflict dynamics and resolution.
In his narrative of victory, Ilham Aliyev framed the 2020 war as not simply a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but a war where Azerbaijan fought several enemies. He made a distinction between Armenia as a state and the Armenian diaspora, considering both enemies that Azerbaijan fought during the 44-day war.Footnote25 Without any specification, the President of Azerbaijan claimed that Azerbaijan was at war also with ‘Armenia’s patrons’Footnote26 who have supported Yerevan and put pressure on Baku.Footnote27 These statements are in line with Aliyev’s other point, where he has long questioned Armenia’s independence and described it as a state that is fully controlled by other countries, a point that was also included in the narrative of victory .Footnote28 Aliyev argued that Azerbaijan faces not only external but also internal enemies. He targeted two opposition parties, the Azerbaijani Popular Front Party and the Musavat Party, accusing them of opposing and undermining the victory and supporting Armenia.Footnote29
The Azerbaijani narrative of victory characterised Armenia in extremely negative ways. To begin with, it contained highly offensive and Armenophobic language constantly describing the end of the 2020 war as Armenia’s ‘act of capitulation’,Footnote30 which Aliyev called ‘the proudest event’ in his life,Footnote31 or a moment when Azerbaijan ‘broke the enemy’s back and crushed the enemy’s head’,Footnote32 forcing it to ‘kneel’.Footnote33 Sahakyan has already studied how Azerbaijan dehumanized Armenia as a state and a nation.Footnote34 I explicate this argument by locating it in the context of the narrative of victory and demonstrating that this narrative targets not only the Armenian nation in general but also the Armenian leadership and army. In his addresses Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan has ‘destroyed’ Armenia which ‘will live forever with the imprint of a defeated nation and state’Footnote35 and with ‘a bowed head’.Footnote36 He called Armenia a ‘hated’, ‘loathsome’,Footnote37 ‘despised’,Footnote38 ‘contemptible enemy’ that does not deserve a humane treatment.Footnote39
The same language was applied with regards to Armenian leaders and Armed Forces. In his post-war speeches and addresses, related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Aliyev very often mentioned all Armenian leaders who he has ex officio met and negotiated with – Robert Kocharyan, Serzh Sargsyan and Nikol Pashinyan. He compared Kocharyan and Sargsyan with rabbits that ‘fled’ Nagorno-Karabakh during the 2020 war.Footnote40 When commenting about Armenia’s signing of the trilateral statement in 2020, Aliyev said that Pashinyan hid ‘like a mouse’ and signed the document ‘in tears’.Footnote41 Perhaps the most illustrating example of this wording is Aliyev’s speech in the village of Mataghis, Nagorno-Karabakh, where he described Sargsyan in the following way:
I did not call him Serzhik Sarkisyan to belittle him, but because that is his real name and surname. We have this information in our archives. His birth certificate and his Komsomol ID state that his name is Serzhik Sarkisyan. Then he changed it to Serzh Sarkisyan, as if Serzh is more acceptable. This man has been known throughout his life as a thief, criminal, fraudster, traitor, and deserter. […] The “general” who sold “soldier’s stew” and is already burning in hell, Serzhik’s right-hand man, shows the true face of the Armenian army and that of Serzhik. […] It was Kocharyan who took Serzhik by the ear and took him from one office to ano[t]her. […] What Pashinyan did is another matter, but we have defeated Serzhik, brought him to his knees, broke his back.Footnote42
The President of Azerbaijan called Armenian Armed Forces ‘an army of 10,000 deserters’Footnote43 that ‘is trembling’ when hearing about the Azerbaijani Special Forces.Footnote44 He repeatedly claimed that Azerbaijan ‘broke the back’ of the Armenian army.Footnote45
Extensive symbolization of the victory
Since Ilham Aliyev intended to capitalize on the victory, he decided to narrate the victory not in abstract terms, but by making it omnipresent and highly visible for the Azerbaijani society. The government started to create a variety of symbols which would remind of the victory in the 2020 war. To accomplish this task, it relied on two strategies: ‘calendarization’ and visualization of the victory.
The first strategy aimed to inscribe the victory into the calendar so that Azerbaijani society could celebrate major developments of the 2020 war every year and follow the state-engineered narrative of victory in the long-term perspective. For example, the Azerbaijani government established the 8th of November, the day the Azerbaijani army captured Shushi, as Victory Day and the 27th of September, the day the 2020 war started, as Remembrance Day .Footnote46 Besides, the days Azerbaijan occupied towns in Nagorno-Karabakh were officially established as ‘city days’.Footnote47
The second strategy intended to give the victory some physical ‘shape’ and, thus, keep the memory of war alive. The Azerbaijani government erected monuments of ‘Iron fist’ in different regions of Nagorno-Karabakh.Footnote48 This step served not only visualization but also personalization of the narrative of victory. In April 2021, the Military Trophies Park was opened in Baku to display the Armenian military equipment that the Azerbaijani army captured during the war.Footnote49 Baku embarked on a massive project of building ‘patriotic war memorial complexes’, ‘occupation museums’ and ‘victory museums’ in different towns and military units.Footnote50 In addition to architectural initiatives, infrastructure projects were also instrumentalized for that purpose. The Azerbaijani government built a new road connecting the southern lowlands of Nagorno-Karabakh to Shushi and named it the ‘Victory Road’.Footnote51 The visualization strategy also contained a cultural element as demonstrated by the government’s decision to grant Shushi the status of the cultural capital of Azerbaijan.Footnote52
The victory and the prospects of conflict resolution
An indispensable part of the Azerbaijani narrative of victory is Baku’s interpretation of the post-war status of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and vision regarding the possibility of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. After the end of the 2020 war, Ilham Aliyev repeatedly claimed that the conflict is over and that Nagorno-Karabakh does not even exist as a territorial entity.Footnote53
The Azerbaijani narrative of victory demonstrated that Baku’s perceptions about the nature of Armenia–Azerbaijan relations and the prospects of conflict resolution have undergone a significant transformation. Baku’s behaviour had been assertive and bellicose before the 44-day war, but the magnitude increased even more in the post-war period. Azerbaijan started to frame the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as asymmetric, positioning itself as the superior country and treating Armenia as the inferior one. The President of Azerbaijan ruled out any compromise solution with Armenia, insisting that Yerevan unconditionally accept Baku’s terms for peace. More specifically, Aliyev said that
‘While Armenia has legal independence, albeit not de facto, and while the concept of Armenia’s borders is still accepted in a certain sense - they must accept our terms. If they don’t want delimitation, then there will be no delimitation. If anything happens there, the border will be where we say it should be. They know that we can do it. No one will help them, not the retired French policemen from Europe, not others, not anyone else’.Footnote54
Thus, the Azerbaijani leadership intended to capitalize on its military victory to achieve diplomatic superiority which is why it called accepting its own terms the only chance for Armenia ‘to live comfortably on an area of 29,000 square kilometers’.Footnote55 On the verbal level, Azerbaijan tried to coerce Armenia into accepting the demands in two major ways. First, Aliyev threatened to use military force saying that ‘Armenia must fully understand that we can complete any military task, and no one can stop us’,Footnote56 that ‘Armenia should not forget the lessons of the Second Karabakh War’Footnote57 and that the Azerbaijani army is capable of starting military operations on the territory of Armenia proper.Footnote58 Second, he claimed that after the 2020 war Azerbaijan has become the dominant state in the region, therefore it does not make sense for Armenia to resist. Aliyev argued that
After the Second Karabakh War, we had to further back up our military victory on the political and diplomatic levels. After the Second Karabakh War, we shaped the agenda in the region. Today, the processes in the region are still unfolding based on our proposals. […] Today, we have further consolidated our glorious Victory on the political and diplomatic level. Today, we have a say in the region.Footnote59
Azerbaijan used specific developments in the post-war negotiations between Yerevan and Baku to back up its narrative of victory. Commenting on Armenia’s decision to hand over some areas in the Tavush region to Azerbaijan, Aliyev declared that the delimitation and demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border is taking place on Azerbaijani terms which ‘is the way it should be’ and that ‘it will be like this from now on’.Footnote60 He himself stated that the victory in the war made this whole rhetorical transformation possible.Footnote61
Unpacking the Armenian narrative of victory
Unlike Azerbaijan, the Armenian leadership developed the narrative of victory in a concise and simple way. The narrative has been consistent throughout the Ter-Petrosyan, Kocharyan, Sargsyan and Pashinyan administrations. The annual addresses on Victory and Peace Day and Army Day consisted on the average of 288 words, more than ten times less than the Azerbaijani ones.Footnote62 Armenia constructed its narrative of victory in a completely different way as it did not share any of the pillars that the Azerbaijani narrative lies upon. The Armenian leadership neither ‘calendarized’, nor visualized the victory. Although Ter-Petrosyan was a key figure in the Karabakh movement in late 1980s and later the President of Armenia and Kocharyan and Sargsyan played an essential role in the command of military operations during the First Karabakh War, none of them attempted to personalize the victory.
Describing the enemy and the nature of the conflict
In their addresses and speeches, Armenian leaders did not target Azerbaijan as a country or individual Azerbaijani presidents with dehumanizing, demonizing or offensive wording. They were even reluctant to use the word ‘enemy’ and, instead, preferred to refer to Azerbaijan as ‘adversary’ or ‘opponent’Footnote63 and to Azerbaijanis as a nation that Armenians respect.Footnote64 When explaining the victory in the First Karabakh War, the Armenian leadership focused more on defining the nature of the conflict.
The narrative framed the First Karabakh War and the conflict itself as asymmetric. Sargsyan argued that Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh were fighting an asymmetric war because of the disbalance in material power in Azerbaijan’s favor.Footnote65 The Armenian leadership has repeatedly stated that in early 1990s Armenia fought an imposed warFootnote66 which in its nature was a struggle for freedom.Footnote67 Therefore, the soldiers who participated in the First Karabakh War are called ‘freedom-fighters’Footnote68 and those who protected Armenia’s borders in the post-war period – ‘primary guarantors’ of the freedom.Footnote69
The central meaning attached to the narrative is the existential importance of the victory. All four Armenian leaders contended that Armenia’s victory in the First Karabakh War and subsequent protection of the line of contact aimed to not only protect Nagorno-Karabakh’s right to self-determination but also guarantee the physical security of the Armenian population. The war has been characterized as a struggle or a battle for existenceFootnote70 and Victory and Peace Day as ‘the day of deliverance and freedom’.Footnote71 More specifically, the Armenian leadership viewed the victory as not simply liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh’s territory, but also genocide prevention. As Sargsyan stated
On May 9 of 1992, we were once again in the trenches of justice and freedom fighting against national discrimination and genocide.
With the liberation of Shushi, not only Stepanakert avoided physical annihilation, but also Artsakh, as well as Armenia and Armenians’ future in the broad sense.Footnote72
The Armenian narrative of victory framed the conflict as Armenia’s continuous fight for genocide prevention as the threat did not fade away with the end of the First Karabakh War. In 2013, Sargsyan argued that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue ‘is a matter of life and death in the most direct sense of these words’ and that the Azerbaijani Armed Forces are an ‘army which pays wages to the murderers’,Footnote73 ready to exterminate Karabakh Armenians.Footnote74 Therefore, in his address to the Armenian Army in Nagorno-Karabakh, Sargsyan equaled protecting the border with preventing a new genocide against Armenians.Footnote75
The point on genocide prevention was often placed in the historical context, more specifically the Armenian Genocide. Until 1918, Armenians did not have an independent state for several centuries and were partitioned among the Russian, Persian and Ottoman Empires. The Armenian narrative of victory viewed the lack of independence as lack of necessary means to prevent the Ottoman Empire from committing genocide against the Armenian nation. As Sargsyan put it:
Creation and development of the Armenian Army is a historic achievement which became a reality right before our eyes. Loss of statehood and consequent absence of the army made us pay dearly many times – from the Middle Ages to 1915, and later, in Sumgait, Kirovabad, and Baku.Footnote76
The trauma of the Armenian Genocide has had an overwhelming impact on the Armenian national identity, and when Soviet Azerbaijan organized pogroms of the Armenian population in late 1980s and early 1990s, it revived the Armenian collective memory. In one of his addresses, Sargsyan explained the connection between the collective memory and the First Karabakh War in the following way:
Hideous events, which had taken place in Sumgait, Baku, and other places in Azerbaijan, awaked our historic memory with the blood-chilling pictures of massacres and forced deportations. Formed spontaneously but deeply consciously the voluntary movement and first units of volunteers had become the axis on which the glorious and victorious structure – the Armenian Army would rise.Footnote77
This point was not only put in the context of the collective trauma but often regarded as part of the clash of values. The Armenian leadership described the conflict as Armenians’ struggle for universal values and protection of human rights, tolerance and altruism.Footnote78
When explaining the importance of Armenia’s victory in the war, the Armenian leadership framed it as a watershed development that turned the tide of Armenia’s history in two major ways. First, it was viewed as key to the realization of the Armenian dream of restoring independence that had been lost for centuries. Second, due to the victory, Armenia was capable of guaranteeing the physical security of the Armenian population.Footnote79 Therefore, the victory symbolized a new mentality which was collectively embodied in ‘the Armenian who learned the lesson’ and will stop any new extermination attempt.Footnote80 For instance, Armenian leaders declared that with the victory in the First Karabakh War Armenia will never suffer another genocide again.Footnote81
The victory and the prospects of conflict resolution
The Armenian narrative of victory developed a dovish and compromise-oriented view on conflict resolution. To begin with, in their addresses Armenian leaders have repeatedly pointed out the importance of preserving peace.Footnote82 They stated that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should have an exclusively peaceful resolution.Footnote83 Preserving peace was depicted as ‘the greatest victory’,Footnote84 ‘the mother of all blessings of the world’Footnote85 or ‘the greatest value’.Footnote86 It is worth noting that Azerbaijan named the holiday Victory Day, while in Armenia it is called Victory and Peace Day. The Armenian narrative of victory discussed this issue from the regional perspective as well. The Armenian leadership contended that the Armenian Armed Forces guarantee peace, stability and regional balance in the South Caucasus.Footnote87
In their addresses, the Armenian leadership stressed the idea of concluding a negotiated peace, i.e. a peace that would be reached via diplomatic means and on the basis of reciprocity and genuine commitment to the peace process. The Armenian narrative highlighted the importance of building mutual trust and preparing the Armenian and Azerbaijani societies for peace and reconciliation.Footnote88 Armenia acknowledged that conflict resolution should be based on compromise where both Armenia and Azerbaijan’s interests should be taken into account.Footnote89
Understanding the motives behind the narratives
The comparative analysis unveils that, as summarized in , the Armenian and Azerbaijani narratives lie at opposite ends of the continuum, as the first one is defensive and the second one – offensive. This raises a question why two small nations, comparable in terms of their military and economic power, have developed such different narratives. In Armenia’s case, it can be explained by two major reasons. First, the Armenian narrative bears the imprint of Armenia’s sensitivity to issues related to survival which was strongly affected by the Armenian Genocide and refuelled by Azerbaijan’s behaviour since 1980s onwards. Second, the narrative was a function of the intention of Armenia’s leadership to prevent a full-scale military escalation and openness to the idea of peaceful coexistence with Azerbaijan.
Table 1. Comparative overview of Armenian and Azerbaijani narratives of victory.
Since the Azerbaijani narrative of victory is more complex, additional reasons are needed to explain why Baku has developed it in this particular way. First of all, Azerbaijan is not interested in a negotiated, compromise-based conflict resolution and peaceful coexistence. Instead, Baku intends to maximize its power at the cost of minimizing that of Armenia, by even going as far as committing an ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh. Second, the narrative of victory nurtures Armenophobic sentiments among the Azerbaijani public, a campaign that Aliyevs have engineered for decades.Footnote90 Third, given the autocratic regime in Azerbaijan, the narrative aims to boost the image and legitimacy of Ilham and Heydar Aliyevs in the Azerbaijani society as the statesmen who made the victory possible. Fourth, it intends to be not only the dominant but also the omnipresent narrative in Azerbaijan which will galvanize public support for Baku’s bellicose and warmongering attitude towards Armenia.
Conclusion
This research demonstrates the overwhelming contrast between Armenian and Azerbaijani narratives of victory which is rooted in history, type of regime and intentions with regards to the conflict. They differ in terms of complexity, length, used language, content, meanings and nature of the conflict, self-portrayal and portrayal of the enemy. The research findings can be summarized in the following points.
First, Armenian and Azerbaijani narratives of victory differed in the scope of covered issues. The conflict-related addresses, speeches and statements of Armenian leaders have been concise, several and at times more than ten times shorter and covering a narrow range of topics. The Azerbaijani narrative is much more complicated, filling the victory with many elements and meanings. Ilham Aliyev’s addresses, speeches and statements are much longer, demonstrating his eagerness to capitalize on the victory in order to make the governmental narrative of the war and victory an indispensable part of the fabric of the Azerbaijani society.
Second, the Azerbaijani narrative of victory, unlike the Armenian one, was strongly personalized and expressed ‘on the ground’ with different symbols. Ilham Aliyev stressed his and, to some extent, Heydar Aliyev’s role as the key figures who led the country to victory. Ilham Aliyev portrayed himself as the central decision-maker who won the war. Meanwhile, the Armenian narrative did not single out any high-level decision-maker, although most of Armenian presidents have in different capacities engaged in the Karabakh movement or the first war. To reproduce the memory of war and victory, Azerbaijan embarked on ‘calendarization’ and symbolization. The former was implemented by adding war-related commemoration days, while the latter was realized by numerous architectural projects which aimed to symbolize the victory both cognitively and physically.
Third, in the same vein, Armenian and Azerbaijani narratives of victory were completely different in their characterization of the enemy and the nature of the conflict. The Azerbaijani narrative allocated significant space to the construction of enemy image. It used highly offensive, insulting and xenophobic language against Armenia as a country, the Armenian nation, leadership and army. Also, it stated that Azerbaijan fought the 2020 war not only against Armenia, but also the Armenian diaspora and those countries that it claimed supported Armenia. The Armenian narrative of victory did not share that language, best epitomized by Armenia’s preference to call Azerbaijan an adversary, rather than an enemy. The Armenian leadership has focused more on explaining the nature of the conflict and the importance of the victory in the First Karabakh War. They portrayed the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as asymmetric by acknowledging, that Azerbaijan was militarily more powerful, and framing the war and the conflict as Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh’s struggle for freedom. The Armenian narrative consistently conveyed an existential meaning to the victory in the First Karabakh War. Armenia’s leadership argued that the war was a fight for physical survival and prevention of another genocide against Armenians. Therefore, the narrative referred to the Armenian Genocide as a key factor that informed Armenians’ thinking about the nature of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. On the other hand, the victory symbolized an exceptional turn in the history of Armenia in that, after being deprived of statehood for centuries, Armenians were finally and fully capable of guaranteeing their own security.
Fourth, two countries have completely different views about the conflict resolution and the future of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. The Azerbaijani narrative is coercive, militant and not supportive of peaceful resolution. It rules out a compromise solution, refusing to consider Armenia’s interests. With its confidence and assertiveness buttressed by the victory in the 2020 war, Azerbaijan insists on peace talks based exclusively on its own agenda and demands and threatens to start a new war, if Armenia does not agree to them. According to Baku’s narrative of victory, the 44-day war made Azerbaijan an ‘agenda-setter’ in the region. Armenia’s narrative of victory, on the contrary, was dovish. It has stressed the importance of a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, expressing readiness to make concessions and consider Azerbaijan’s interests.
Narratives of victory are indicative of how state leadership perceives and sees the future relationship with the enemy and whether it is interested in conflict resolution, status quo or further escalation. The analysis of the Armenian narrative of victory demonstrates that over 25 years Armenia exercised a defensive posture, focused on de-escalation and a peaceful and consensual conflict resolution. On the other hand, the Azerbaijani narrative of victory indicates an Azerbaijan’s offensive and militant posture that excludes the idea of compromise and peaceful coexistence with Armenians. This, in its turn, suggests that despite its victory in the 2020 war, war continues to be a foreign policy tool for Baku, leaving a lasting and sustainable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan as an impossible scenario for many years to come.
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Erik Davtyan
Erik Davtyan is an Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, Yerevan State University, Armenia. His research interests include small state studies, regional politics in the South Caucasus, theories of international relations and foreign policy analysis. His articles have been published in peer-reviewed journals such as Caucasus Survey, Problems of Post-Communism, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies and Journal of Contemporary European Studies.
Notes
1. Saparov, “Why Autonomy?M,” 288.
2. Ibid, 312–315.
3. Sukiasyan, “Territorial Autonomy and Secession.”
4. Coene, The Caucasus – An Introduction, 146–48.
5. Broers, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
6. Broers, “The Nagorny Karabakh Conflict: Defaulting to War.”
7. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Met with Leadership.”
8. Hetq, “May 2021: Azerbaijani Troops Occupied 3,200 hectares”; Harutyunyan, “Azerbaijan’s Military Provocations.”
9. Gzoyan, Chakhmakhchyan, and Meyroyan, “Ethnic Cleansing In Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh).”
10. Ghahriyan, Torosyan, and Harutyunyan, “Azerbaijan’s Power Plays.”
11. Sahakyan, “The Rhetorical Face of Enmity.”
12. Sahakyan, “Framing the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.”
13. Tokluoglu, “The Political Discourse of the Azerbaijani Elite.”
14. Atanesyan, “Media Framing on Armed Conflicts,”; For examples of domestic discussions and differences among politicians in Armenia, see Aravot “Ter-Petrosyan’s Cynicism Is Astonishing.”; and Armenpress “First President Levon Ter-Petrosyan Slams Former Defense Minister’s Karabakh Statement as ‘Nonsense’.”
15. The data includes only speeches, statements and addresses and not, for instance, interviews to media outlets as in the former ones, leaders can communicate and develop their narratives at their preferred length and the way they want, while the latter are structured, limited in time and the range of covered topics.
16. The calculation is based on official English translations of the addresses which were made in 2020–2023 and posted on the website of the Office of the President of Azerbaijan.
17. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Raised the National Flag.’
18. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Message by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan.”
19. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Addressed the Nation.’
20. AZERTAC, “Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry Issues Statement”; Milli Majlis of Azerbaijan, “A Charitable Action”; Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, “President Ilham Aliyev and His Son Heydar Aliyev Visited Air Force Military Facilities”.
21. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “President, Victorious Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev”; and News.az, “Azerbaijan Erects ‘Iron Fist’ Monument.”
22. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Met with Leadership”; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Raised the National Flag.”
23. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Opening Ceremony of the First Residential Complex in Shusha.”
24. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Opening of Military Trophy Park in Baku”; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Message by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan”; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Opening Ceremony of Military Unit in Kalbajar District”; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Event Organized on the Occasion of Victory Day in Shusha”; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Victorious Commander-in-Chief, President Ilham Aliyev Addressed the Nation on the Occasion of the Remembrance Day.”
25. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Gave a Speech.”
26. Ibid.
27. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Military Parade”; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “The Message of Congratulation from Ilham Aliyev”; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Meeting with Representatives of the General Public in Jabrayil”; and Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “President, Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces Ilham Aliyev Made a Speech in Front of Servicemen in Shusha”; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Opening Ceremony of the First Residential Complex in Shusha.”
28. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Met with Leadership”; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Met with People.”
29. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Opening of Military Trophy Park in Baku“; and Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Opening Ceremony of the First Residential Complex in Shusha.”
30. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Victory Parade”; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “President, Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces Ilham Aliyev Made a Speech in Front of Servicemen in Shusha”; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, ‘Speech by Ilham Aliyev during a Trip to Fuzuli District’; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Opening Ceremony of Military Unit in Kalbajar District”; and Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Military Parade.”
31. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Visited Military Unit.”
32. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Victory Parade.”
33. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Meting with the Servicemen in Shusha”; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Victorious Commander-in-Chief, President Ilham Aliyev Addressed the Nation on the Occasion of the Remembrance Day”; and Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Military Parade.”
34. Sahakyan, “The Rhetorical Face of Enmity.”
35. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Met with Leadership.”
36. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Opening of Military Trophy Park in Baku.”
37. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Message by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan.”
38. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev and First Lady.”
39. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Victorious Commander-in-Chief, President Ilham Aliyev Addressed the Nation on the Occasion of the Remembrance Day.”
40. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Opening Ceremony of First Stage.”
41. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Addressed the Nation.”
42. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev in Sugovushan.”
43. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Meeting with Representatives of the General Public in Jabrayil”; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev in Sugovushan”; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Opening of a Military Unit in Hadrut Settlement.”
44. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Visited Military Unit.”
45. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Addressed the Nation”; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Opening Ceremony of Military Unit in Kalbajar District.’
46. Azerbaijani Press Agency, “Azerbaijan Marks Day of Remembrance”
47. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the ‘Lachin City Day’ Festivities.”
48. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “President, Victorious Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev”; News.az, “Azerbaijan Erects ‘Iron Fist’ Monument”; AZERTAC, “Victory Museum and Open Air Occupation Museum.”
49. BBC, “In Pictures.”
50. AZERTAC, “Victory Museum and Open Air Occupation Museum”; AZERTAC, “Patriotic War Memorial Complex”; AZERTAC, “Projects of Occupation and Victory Museums”; Khalilov, “Azerbaijan to Build Memorial Complex.”
51. Trend.az, “Azerbaijan Nearing Completion.”
52. Trend.az, “Shusha Is Officially Cultural Capital of Azerbaijan – Minister.”
53. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Met with Leadership”; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Victorious Commander-in-Chief, President Ilham Aliyev Addressed the Nation on the Occasion of the Remembrance Day”; and Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Opening Ceremony of First Stage.”.
54. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Met with People.”
55. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “The Message of Congratulation from Ilham Aliyev.”
56. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Met with Leadership.”
57. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Event Organized on the Occasion of Victory Day in Shusha.”
58. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev and First Lady.”
59. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Viewed Conditions.”
60. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Opening Ceremony of the First Residential Complex in Shusha.”
61. Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Event Organized on the Occasion of Victory Day in Shusha”; Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Speech by Ilham Aliyev at the Opening Ceremony of First Stage.“
62. The wordcount includes 18 addresses on Victory and Peace Day from 1998 to 2020 and 11 addresses on Army Day from 2005 to 2020. Besides, the content of addresses on Victory and Peace Day is not only about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as on that day Armenia celebrates also the victory over Nazi Germany in 1945.
63. Office of the President of Armenia, “Address by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Army Day”; Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Message by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Army Day”, January 28, 2013; Office of the President of Armenia, “Address by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Independence Day”; Office of the President of Armenia, “Working Visit”; and Ter-Petrossian, Yntrani: Yeluyt’ner, Hodvatsner, Harts’azruycner, 435.
64. Office of the President of Armenia, “Address by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Independence Day.”
65. Office of the President of Armenia, “President Serzh Sargsyan Held a Meeting’; Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Message of the President of Armenia on the Occasion of Nagorno Karabakh Independence Day”; and Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Message by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Army Day,” January 28, 2017.
66. Armenpress, “HH nakhagah Robert K’och’aryani ugherdzy` Haght’anaki ev khaghaghut’yan toni art’iv”; Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Address by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Victory and Peace Day,” September 5, 2009; Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Message by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Army Day,” January 28, 2013; and Office of the President of Armenia, “President Serzh Sargsyan’s Congratulatory Message on Nagorno-Karabakh Independence Day.”
67. Azg, “HH Nakhagah Robert K’och’aryani Shnorhavorakan Ugherdzy”; Armenpress, “HH nakhagah R.K’ocharyani shnorhavorakan ugherdzy Arts’akhi Ankakhut’yan toni art’iv”; Office of the President of Armenia, “President Serzh Sargsyan’s Congratulatory Message on Nagorno-Karabakh Independence Day”; Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Remarks”; Office of the Prime Minister of Armenia, “Congratulatory Message by the Prime Minister.”
68. Office of the President of Armenia, “President Serzh Sargsyan’s Congratulatory Message on Army Day”; Office of the Prime Minister of Armenia, “Today Our Homeland.”
69. Office of the President of Armenia, “Address by Serzh Sargsyan at the Military Parade.”
70. Ter-Petrossian, Yntrani: Yeluyt’ner, Hodvatsner, Harts’azruycner, 537; Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Remarks.”
71. Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Address by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Victory and Peace Day,” May 9, 2013.
72. Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Address by President Serzh Sargsyan on Occasion of Victory and Peace Day.”
73. Sargsyan refers to Ramil Safarov, an officer of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces who murdered a sleeping Armenian officer in his hotel room in Budapest where both were attending a NATO program in 2004. Safarov was imprisoned in Hungary, but years later extradited to Azerbaijan where he was officially pardoned and glorified by the Azerbaijani government. See Asbarez, “Remembering Gurgen Margaryan.”
74. Office of the President of Armenia, “President Serzh Sargsyan Held a Meeting.”
75. Office of the President of Armenia, “Working Visit.”
76. Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Address by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Army Day.”
77. Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Message by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Army Day,” January 28, 2017.
78. Armenpress, “HH nakhagah R.K’ocharyani shnorhavorakan ugherdzy Arts’akhi Ankakhut’yan toni art’iv”; Office of the President of Armenia, “Address by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Independence Day,”; Office of the President of Armenia, “Working Visit.”
79. Office of the President of Armenia, ‘Congratulatory Address by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Independence Day’.
80. Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Address by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Victory and Peace Day,” May 9, 2011.
81. Office of the President of Armenia, “Working Visit, ”“Today Our Homeland.”
82. Ter-Petrossian, Yntrani: Yeluyt’ner, Hodvatsner, Harts’azruycner, 435; Azg, “HH Nakhagah Robert K’ocharyani Shnorhavorakan Ugherdzy Haght’anaki Orva Art’iv”; Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Address by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Victory and Peace Day,” September 5, 2009; and Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Message by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Army Day,” January 28, 2013.
83. Office of the President of Armenia, “President Serzh Sargsyan’s Congratulatory Message on Artsakh Independence Day”; Office of the Prime Minister of Armenia, “Address by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan”; Office of the Prime Minister of Armenia, “Congratulatory Message by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia”; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Robert K’ocharyan”; and Azg, “HH Nakhagah Robert K’ocharyani Shnorhavorakan Ugherdzy Ankakhut’yan Toni Artiv.”
84. Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Address by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Victory and Peace Day,” May 9, 2011.
85. Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Address by President Serzh Sargsyan on Occasion of Victory and Peace Day.”
86. Office of the President of Armenia, “Working Visit.”
87. Armenpress, “HH nakhagah Robert K’ocharyani shnorhavorakan ugherdzy’ Banaki orva art’iv”; Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Speech of the President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Independence Day”; Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Address by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Creation of the Armed Forces of Armenia”; and Office of the President of Armenia, “Address by President Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Independence Day”.
88. Office of the President of Armenia, “Congratulatory Address by the President of the Republic of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan on the Occasion of Independence Day”; Office of the President of Armenia, “President Serzh Sargsyan Held a Meeting”; and Office of the Prime Minister of Armenia, “Nikol Pashinyan, Bako Sahakyan.”
89. Office of the President of Armenia, “Nakhagah Serzh Sargsyani eluyt’y”; Office of the Prime Minister of Armenia, “Nikol Pashinyan, Bako Sahakyan.” Aliyev himself confirmed that Armenia was ready to make concessions during the negotiation process. See Office of the President of Azerbaijan, “Ilham Aliyev Addressed the Nation.”
90. See, for example, NGOs in Armenia and Artsakh, “Report on Xenophobia in Azerbaijan.”
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