ABSTRACT
The U.S. and its Arctic allies are facing a strategic dilemma in the Arctic. With Russia having a predominance of cold weather capable forces and bases inside the Arctic Circle, and with China showing greater economic and military interest in the region, in tandem with Russia, the U.S. is failing to compete around the North Pole. However, for the United States to project effectively military force in the harsh Arctic environment, numerous lessons about polar warfare need to be relearned by the American military. This article provides context on the issues of Arctic operations, presents five historical case studies of military operations in the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions, and identifies how to improve U.S. military capabilities for polar warfare.
Introduction
The strategic importance of the Arctic was forgotten by the U.S. military after the fall of the Soviet Union. However, a resurgent Russia is changing threat perceptions around the Arctic. Russia increased its Arctic military activities beginning in 2007 when they symbolically planted a Russian titanium flag underwater at the North Pole to signal the Arctic as a priority “with Vladimir Putin's vision of restoring Russia's status as a great power.”Footnote1 The 2008 invasion of Georgia further signalled Russia’s return to its imperial tendencies. Russia owns 53% of Arctic coastline and climatic reductions in sea ice has facilitated a growing presence.Footnote2 Seven of Russia’s eleven ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are located on the Kola Peninsula, inside the Arctic Circle.Footnote3 Russia has invested heavily in its Arctic military capabilities—reopening “50 previously closed Soviet-era posts” and investing in new capabilities like hypersonic missiles and “nuclear-powered undersea drones.”Footnote4
Similarly, a rising China declared itself a “near-Arctic state”Footnote5 in its 2018 Arctic Strategy.Footnote6 China has acted on this ambition by investing heavily in infrastructure, assets, and various projects in the Arctic Circle region,Footnote7 with an emphasis on energy and minerals.Footnote8 A Brookings Institute report argues that China has serious “aspirations to become a polar great power” and notes that Beijing has sent 33 high-level diplomats to the region, joined numerous Arctic organisations, invested in icebreaker fleets, and has sent its navy independently into the region in both 2015 and 2021.Footnote9
As the Russian war in Ukraine drags on, sanctions are leading Moscow to become more dependent on Beijing for trade, finance, and war matériel. Growing Chinese-Russian collaboration includes a Chinese-Russian Polar Silk Road and the shipping of oil through Russian controlled Arctic routes.Footnote10 As Russia loses political and diplomatic influence in the region due to its suspension by the Arctic Council in 2022, China is filling that void through various attempts to establish itself as an Arctic player “to bend the established order to its liking.”Footnote11 For instance, China and Russia signed a maritime law agreement that established joint coast guard patrols in the Arctic.Footnote12 On the surface such a deal would seem beneficial, however, the Chinese Coast Guard is notorious for bullying neighbouring navies and fishing vessels in the South China Sea as “Beijing’s patrol vessels often resemble warships.”Footnote13 Whether Beijing and Moscow’s maritime law agreement will lead to similar activities remains to be seen.
Increasing strategic focus on the Arctic in national security discussions is the result of two factors. First, as anthropogenic climate change accelerates in the Arctic, which was previously locked in permanent pack ice, the area is now becoming more accessible for economic and military purposes. Second, growing Arctic distrust is pitting the West (and NATO) against Russia and China, with growing strategic competition leading to China and Russia increasingly performing more economic, military, and supposed scientific activities in the Arctic. In response, the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) has a dedicated section on how the U.S. must “Maintain a Peaceful Arctic” due to Chinese and Russian activities and investments in the region.Footnote14
The American origins of modern Arctic concerns can be traced back to a 1948 U.S. Naval War College “Polar Operations” lecture. In remarks given by Rear Admiral R.H. Cruzen, he stated “there is a general realization by civilian as well as military personnel, of the present and future strategic importance of the north polar area.”Footnote15 The value of Cruzen’s lecture, based on his naval experience in the Arctic and Antarctic, was the identification of the numerous challenges facing military forces operating in a cold weather environment and how the U.S. was not prepared for a potential conflict in the Arctic. Whilst Cruzen had little impact in fielding U.S. forces capable of conducting “polar warfare,” his lessons about cold weather degrading military capabilities remain.
As China and Russia challenge the liberal rules-based order, such as illegal claims to certain economic exclusion zones (EEZs), their Arctic behaviour is reshaping laws, rules, and norms of that region in their favour. Growing military investments and bellicose postures by Beijing and Moscow in the Arctic means that Washington and its Arctic allies will need to invest in cold weather capabilities and train to fight and win in the region. Changes in the Arctic’s physical environment coupled with increased geopolitical tension and competition between the U.S., China, and Russia (and their respective allies and partners) is creating an increasingly volatile environment that requires a thorough analysis of the military capabilities needed for successful polar operations. This article pushes back against scholars that advocate for the peaceful co-operation of Arctic exceptionalism and other academics that contend Russia is only pursuing a soft power strategy in the Arctic.Footnote16 The reality is that Russia has focused on increasing hard power in the Arctic since Vladimir Putin came to power. Even after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia continues to build up its Arctic military presence despite major combat losses.Footnote17
This essay begins by describing the context of harsh Arctic conditions and the historical rationale for Russian interest in the region. The second section illustrates the challenges of polar warfare, by utilising five historical case studies of military operations in the Arctic Circle and sub-Arctic zones. The lessons learned from these historical cases inform the third section on how joint forces can be successful in future Arctic operations. Finally, the article concludes with an emphasis on how polar warfare needs to be normalised in the American military – and how the U.S. can improve its Arctic capabilities by training and exercising with the other Arctic-nations who all happen to be members of NATO after the ascension of Finland and Sweden to the treaty.
Contextualisation of an Arctic battlespace
There are multiple definitions for the Arctic region including the area above the Arctic Circle. There is the 10°C July isotherm line (area where the average temperature does not exceed 10°C in July), the tree line boundary, the area defined in Annex 1 of the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Co-operation, and the area defined by the United States Arctic Research and Policy and Act.Footnote18 This essay utilises a combination of these regions to describe polar warfare capabilities.
The Arctic is undergoing rapid environmental change. The NOAA 2022 Arctic Report Card notes that, “The last seven years are collectively the warmest seven years on record [in the Arctic],” and the region is trending to warm at twice the rate compared to other regions.Footnote19 Unchecked, by 2030 such warming will lead to an unprecedented ice-free Arctic Ocean during the summer.Footnote20 The Arctic, an area once considered an almost impenetrable barrier, is increasingly accessible. The 2020 U.S. Air Force Arctic Strategy best summed these changes: “The Arctic’s capacity as a strategic buffer is eroding,” becoming a potential “avenue of threat to the homeland” due to increased maritime access.Footnote21
If the Arctic is warming, why does it require a special capabilities analysis? If the region is no longer going to be covered in permanent pack ice, what makes it unique? Despite such changes, the Arctic will remain a challenging environment for military forces. Some of these Arctic challenges include: remoteness, lack of infrastructure (e.g. domain awareness, transportation, ports, communications, weather forecasting, etc.), and ionospheric effects impeding communications.Footnote22 Polar nights (24 h of night) and Polar days (24 h of light) can impede military operations, eroding key advantages.Footnote23 Given the lowest temperature ever recorded in the Arctic was −69.6°C, without proper insulation and heating systems, diesel gelling occurs at −12°C and jet fuels such as Jet A and JP-8 freeze at −40°C and −47°C respectively. Whilst winterised diesel and Jet B have freezing points of −40°C and −60°C correspondingly, their usage causes performance and maintenance issues. Finally, there are PNT (position, navigation, timing) challenges in the Arctic due to limited satellite coverage and lower accuracy of magnetic and gyro-compasses.
Global warming does not spell the end of extreme weather in the Arctic, rather, the term “global weirding” may more accurately describe Arctic impacts.Footnote24 There will continue to be extreme weather events, including extreme cold and sea ice for the foreseeable future – and difficult to forecast – as global weirding inserts additional uncertainty into already weak Arctic weather models. A warming Arctic will require troops to be prepared for major temperature oscillations.Footnote25 Melting permafrost, along with variable sea ice, will create multi-domain challenges for military operations. Given the many Arctic challenges, military commanders with Arctic-mindedness are needed for properly conducting operations in this harsh, cold, and remote environment.
Strategic consideration of the Arctic Ocean and Northern Sea Route (NSR) first dates back to 1897 when Admiral Stepan Makarov suggested to the Russian Naval Minister the idea of moving their naval fleet to the Pacific via the Arctic Ocean.Footnote26 He was ultimately ignored but his suggestion prior to the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) shaped how the NSR would be framed in future Russian strategic thinking about the Arctic. To this day, Russian strategic thinking on the Arctic and the NSR is still framed by this conflict.Footnote27
In 1904, Russian forces occupied Port Arthur (now the city of Lushun, China) and was later attacked by the Japanese Empire.Footnote28 This led to the Russian Empire placing Admiral Zinovy Rozhdestvensky in command of what would become Russia’s 2nd Pacific Squadron—a new unit created with ships stationed in the Baltics.Footnote29 This 2nd Pacific Squadron was tasked with an extraordinary “10-month voyage via the Cape of Good Hope, coaling at sea, or wherever neutral governments could be persuaded to allow the squadron to rendezvous with German colliers.”Footnote30 The voyage to engage the Japanese military ended in complete disaster, losing all ships: 7 sunk and 4 captured.Footnote31 The humiliating defeat led to an erroneous Russian conviction that the time and distance involved in the voyage degraded the ability of the 2nd Pacific Squadron. Russian leadership came to believe that they would have succeeded if their naval forces had taken the shorter NSR.Footnote32 This perception fuelled the Tsar’s government into taking tangible action. The Arctic Ocean Hydrographic Expedition (1910-1915) explored most of the NSR and discovered new territories.Footnote33
Ultimately, the NSR remains a remote and dangerous route, even today. Weather, icing, lack of infrastructure, sporadic monitoring, and minimal search-and-rescue capabilities, plagues the route. Had the 2nd Pacific Squadron taken the NSR in 1904, they likely would have encountered these issues, hindering their combat effectiveness. Regardless, perceptions about the Arctic and NSR, informs how Moscow currently views the region as a pillar of its strategic outlook.
Historical military operations in the Arctic (1918–1945)
Historically, few military operations have had an Arctic element. Studying past polar warfare provides military planners with a template of best practices for operating in the High North.Footnote34 While environmental conditions are changing in the Arctic, many of the challenges faced in past Arctic conflicts will continue to impede future military activities. Such lessons serve as a guide to understanding a modern “capabilities-based” assessment of what Arctic investments are needed today—including “access, mobility, support infrastructure, domain awareness, and communications.”Footnote35
American expeditionary force: Siberia & North Russia (1918–1920)
In 1917, Russia experienced two revolutions—the February overthrow of the Tsar and then the October installation of the Bolsheviks. The October Revolution allowed Russian leaders to finalise a separate peace with Germany. This peace concerned the Allies, because it allowed the Germans to shift soldiers from the eastern front to the western front, while gaining access to Russian war matériel.Footnote36 Thus, the U.S. reluctantly joined the intervention to protect Allied supplies in Russia.Footnote37 Approximately 5,000 American troops were deployed to Arkhangelsk and 8,000 were sent to Vladivostok.Footnote38
The Americans, with the Allies, faced logistical challenges during the Russian intervention. Allied forces were spread “across hundreds of miles of swampy marshes and thick forests” and had supply lines that were stretched from England to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk and then on land the distance from New York City to St. Louis.Footnote39 The overland supply lines were also subject to attack and had to be defended. Additionally, warm temperatures affected roads making them impassable in the spring.Footnote40 Wheeled motorised transport also “proved unreliable” and troops on both sides used small sleighs pulled by ponies.Footnote41
American troops found that their cold weather gear, particularly their shoes, were ill-suited for Arctic conditions.Footnote42 Many soldiers traded with locals or plundered dead Bolsheviks for proper footwear.Footnote43 Allied troops learned that skis were the most effective device for mobility, but required training to be effectively employed in combat.Footnote44 Additionally, the extreme cold degraded weapon oil, causing weapons to freeze.Footnote45 A lack of winter camouflage and cold weather gear undermined field operations. For example, Allied forces tried snowshoes designed for a different type of snow and failed. Finally, the environment favoured defence. Attackers were degraded due to increased exposure to frost and windchill, exhaustion from moving in deep snow, lack of concealment, logistical problems, and reduced ability for rapid assaults.Footnote46
Winter War: USSR invades Finland (1939-1940)
Josef Stalin, ever suspicious of allies and foes, invaded Finland. Stalin had an especially dim view of Finland, given his memories of them hosting Russian anti-communist White forces and the British Navy that attacked Bolshevik forces stationed in the Baltics.Footnote47 Additionally, Stalin was concerned with British interest in nickel in the Finnish Petsamo region and German interests in iron ore deposits in northern Sweden.Footnote48 The geography of the region led to a legitimate concern about the Soviet ability to defend Leningrad, whose outskirts were only thirty-two kilometres from the Finnish border.Footnote49 These perceptions led Stalin to invade Finland across a 900-mile front starting on November 30, 1939. Soviet forces initially used a heavily mechanised force, including hundreds of tanks, while Finland fielded only a few dozen obsolete tanks.
The array of the invading forces stretched from south of Lake Ladoga to Petsamo, and was fought entirely in the High North during winter.Footnote50 Yet the 900-mile front had varied terrain. Approximately a third of the front was above the Arctic Circle: an area that transitions from sub-Arctic forests to a treeless tundra.Footnote51 The remaining area was sub-Arctic barren lands with most of the battle area lacking road networks.Footnote52
One would expect both the Soviet and Finnish armies to be prepared for polar warfare, but they were not. The Finnish Army lacked modern equipment, but its troops knew how to fight in the harsh sub-Arctic territories. The Soviets, whilst better equipped with modern weapons, were woefully unprepared. First, they were unable to conduct operations in snow. Soviet forces eventually painted their tanks white – to match the environment – only after being repulsed at the Mannerheim Line. Similarly, Soviet forces had some ski equipment, but lacked training and were expected to master ski-based combat in their free time.Footnote53
Making matters worse, many Soviet divisions entered combat with old, inaccurate maps and carried modern weapons unsuited for fighting the Finnish army on their terrain.Footnote54 Soviet planners were ordered to utilise supply planning factors for a twelve-day operation at most.Footnote55 Thus, the Finns performed better during the short Winter War.
Finnish forces developed “motti” tactics: a form of manoeuvre that emphasised ambushes and other attacks in favourable wilderness terrain. Motti translated into enveloping small portions of Soviet forces by rapidly re-orienting their force in encirclements, piecemealing them. Also, the Finns massed their ski-borne infantry against Soviet forces that prevented them from using their superior firepower and armour. Finnish troops exploited Soviet forces in heavily forested terrain (especially north of the Karelian isthmus), and ambushed predictable routes along roadways. Ski-equipped Finnish troops exploited knowledge of local terrain to their benefit.Footnote56
The Winter War demonstrated Finnish Arctic warfare excellence due to effective training, equipment, preparation, and logistical support.Footnote57 This included specialised cold weather clothing and equipment. Such specialised gear requires training. Knowing when to wear certain garments, and when not, can cause overheating. Russian forces that were given skis immediately prior to deployment in Finland were unable to integrate unfamiliar gear.Footnote58 Weapons required specialised lubricants to prevent freezing and winter clothing had to be properly camouflaged according to each localised environment.Footnote59 Logistical support was critical; requiring both additional planning and specialised capabilities. For instance, troops fighting during winter required a fifty percent increase of supplies relative to summer operations, as additional food and medical supplies were needed in cold weather.Footnote60
Mobility also requires special focus—the ability to move through deep snow, ice, thick forested areas, and tundra. Modernisation is also important, as Finland found itself outgunned at the start of the war, and could not match Soviet equipment counts by war’s end; the lucky coincidence of a poorly-trained adversary and generally favourable terrain for light infantry defence helped the Finns survive a much stronger enemy “on paper.”Footnote61 Decentralised command that allowed for “bottom-up” decision-making allowed the Finns to adapt quickly to battlefield conditions, taking advantage of local conditions.Footnote62 Even though Finland lost about 12 percent of its territory; to include most of Karelia, due to the 1940 peace treaty favourable to the Soviet Union, Finland would have lost much more territory had it not been for their fierce Arctic defences.
World War II military operations in Finland, Norway, and Russia (1940–1945)
The Winter War was watched by other leaders with interest, particularly Hitler and his general staff who concluded that the Red Army was poorly led and could be easily defeated.Footnote63 The Winter War also highlighted allied interest in ScandinaviaFootnote64—which would result in Hitler’s invasion of Norway.Footnote65 In this context, the Finns were eager to exact revenge on the USSR, and supported Germany against the Soviets.
During World War II, Arctic battles (1940-1945) were fought across Norway, Finland, and Northern Russia. The German invasion of Norway was relatively normal on land with few issues encountered, except the British attack on Trondheim that was hindered by snow.Footnote66 At sea, the German navy lost 3 cruisers, 10 destroyers, and 4 U-boats.Footnote67 Norway had to be garrisoned, costing the Germans significant resources.Footnote68 Hitler’s Barbarossa Campaign would illustrate issues with polar warfare.
The Finnish-German alliance began with Finland allowing the Germans to use their transport network in support of the invasion of Norway.Footnote69 By December of 1940, Hitler approved the Directive 21 plan to invade the USSR with Finnish support. Ironically, the Finns were not informed of the plan.Footnote70 The final plan, Operation Barbarossa, called for the occupation of Petsamo and the isolation of the Kola peninsula followed by an eventual attack on Murmansk from the south. The ultimate goal was to establish an occupation of the Western USSR from Arkhangelsk to Astrakhan (the A-A line).
Hitler’s commanding general for Mountain Corps Norway was pessimistic about Arctic fighting, “There has never been a war fought in the high north … The region is unsuited to military operations. There are no roads and these would have to be constructed before any advance could take place.”Footnote71 Hitler added pressure to the situation with his insistence on securing Murmansk. Mann and Jörgensen best describe the situation facing General Dietl to excel in the harsh, barren conditions “from the Finnish border to Murmansk,” with winter temperatures as low as −50°C and the short summers that created huge swamps “filled with clouds of mosquitos.”Footnote72
Numerous blunders ensured a German failure. Some of these were classical failures of military strategy, like the decision to split the German Lapland Army in the high north with some attacking Petasamo, another portion attacking Salla, and the final portion charged with cutting the railway to Murmansk. With soldiers needed for Norway’s occupation, German forces lacked the requisite mass for each of these manoeuvres.Footnote73
Other Germany military failures were more specific to the Arctic environment. First, logistics in the Arctic are an order of magnitude more difficult than in the lower latitudes. Waldemar Erfurth, a German Lieutenant General who served in Finland, penned in his prison cell that “The German troops which were sent to Finland during World War II were not prepared for the special difficulties they encountered in combat in that trackless wilderness, in the endless virgin forests, and during the long arctic night.”Footnote74 Erfurth also identified the difficulty of mobility in the Arctic, noting that seasonal transitions greatly restricted mobility due to mud.Footnote75 Railway capacity was also limited, and only extended to Narvik and Rovaniemi.Footnote76 The inadequate capacity of the roads and railways meant using pack mules, making Blitzkrieg impossible to sustain.Footnote77
The Germans also attempted a summer offensive in the summer of 1942. Operation Polar Fox focused on taking Salla to sever the railway with Murmansk. The Germans learned that summer in the Arctic also brought miserable conditions for military forces with 24 h of light, temperatures around 26°C, forests prone to fires lit by munitions, and ravenous mosquitos.Footnote78 The High North theatre became a stalemate until the Soviets conducted the 1944 Petsamo-Kirkenes Offensive.
The failure of German forces stemmed from their underestimation of their enemy and the Arctic environment. This combination was a fatal miscalculation. As General Erfurth wrote after the war, “In many respects warfare in the Arctic follows rules of its own. The German High Command did not realise this fact until after the war was in progress.”Footnote79 The Germans were unable to use Blitzkrieg concepts across the tundra and their troops were unprepared for the terrain. This coupled with difficult logistics resulted in undersupplied German troops. Meanwhile, interior Soviet defensive lines and protected railways ensured continuous logistical support to their forces. Additionally, the division of forces across the theatre prevented the German military from massing enough forces to make a breakthrough. Footnote80 Finally, the German way of war was not organised properly for Arctic warfare, as they were heavily dependent on logistics, mechanised infantry, and armour. Lighter, ski-equipped troops were needed if Blitzkrieg-like operations were to be successfully employed.Footnote81 Likewise, German and Soviet forces learned that High North terrain was not ideal for tanks, which meant tanks were confined to roads, reducing their tactical advantage.Footnote82
Aleutian Islands campaign (1942–1943)
The Aleutian Islands of Attu and Kiska Island were attacked and seized by the Japanese Army in June of 1942, following a raid on Alaska’s Dutch Harbor. The Japanese invasion had four primary objectives: (1) hampering American-Soviet military collaboration, (2) interdicting regional Lend-Lease supply routes, (3) shielding the northern region of Japan, and (4) occupying important parts of the island chain to threaten attacks against the U.S. and USSR.Footnote83
The Japanese invasion was unopposed and shocked Americans.Footnote84 The U.S. response eventually led to 400,000 troops being stationed in Alaska.Footnote85 After the islands of Attu and Kiska were occupied, the Allies conducted persistent aerial bombardments until the islands were retaken.Footnote86 The Allied command decided to attack Attu first on May 11, 1943, bypassing the more heavily fortified Kiska.Footnote87 The operations to retake Attu and Kiska were also significant for their number of casualties with the battle for Attu being only second to Iwo Jima for its casualty ratio of 71 Americans killed or wounded to every 100 Japanese personnel.Footnote88 The campaign for the Aleutians served as a test bed for the American island-hopping strategy in the Pacific, such as bypassing and isolating more fortified areas.Footnote89 The Attu campaign commenced on May 11, 1943, Operation Landcrab, was far more costly that it should have been, requiring 15,000 troops to defeat a force of 3,000.Footnote90 Later, Operation Cottage which began on August 15, 1943, sent 34,400 American and Canadian troops and 100 ships against the then deserted-Kiska (the Japanese had evacuated undetected).Footnote91 The Aleutian campaign was complete after the island of Kiska was found to be free of Japanese occupiers on August 24, 1943.Footnote92
Pisano argues that allied success in the Aleutian campaign was not due to “proper joint warfighting execution,” rather “luck, chance, and courageous tactical Servicemembers are due the credit for the ultimate victory.”Footnote93 Broadly, there were numerous struggles in the Aleutian Islands. First, the Allies lacked unity of command. The Army and Navy were not united under a single battlefield commander and the lines of command stretched back to Admiral Nimitz in Hawaii and General DeWitt in San Francisco—not an ideal situation for co-ordination, or battlefield awareness.Footnote94 Additionally, a lack of unifying guidance meant the ineffective use of forces, particularly air forces. Finally, a lack of infrastructure and the harsh operating environment degraded manoeuvre due to navigation and communications issues.Footnote95
The Aleutian campaign illustrates how Allied forces failed at intelligence, logistics, and training for the Arctic environment. Allied forces had inadequate maps and were unfamiliar “with the terrain,” which “severely limited their effectiveness.”Footnote96 Mechanised vehicles were quickly rendered useless, unable to traverse muskeg, “a bog consisting of a soupy mixture of water, decaying vegetation, and dark volcanic ash.”Footnote97 During Operation Landcrab, the Arctic environment caused numerous non-combat injuries, with only 44% of the 3,829 casualties due to combat. Most were “severe cold injuries including trench foot, frostbite, and gangrene.”Footnote98 Magnetic anomalies and Arctic weather also led to increased aircraft losses with the Allies losing six aircraft in accidents for every one lost in combat.Footnote99 Many of these non-combat casualties were preventable with training and preparation for the Arctic environment. The Allies botched logistics because they did not understand Arctic conditions.Footnote100 Logistics were hampered by both weather and terrain, leaving troops without the critical equipment they needed. Finally, the terrain forced most supplies to be moved on foot, which further reduced combat effectiveness.
Allied Arctic convoys of World War II (1941–1945)
The 1941 Lend-Lease Act provided U.S. material support to Allies. In June of 1941, Winston Churchill encouraged the Allies to “give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people.”Footnote101 Between August 1941 and May 1945, approximately 22.7% of all Lend-Lease supplies were delivered via the perilous NSR.Footnote102 Crews had to contend with U-boats, Arctic weather, and the Luftwaffe. Losses were high, as 85 ships were sunk out of the 400 ships that made 1,400 NSR trips.Footnote103 Moreover, during these convoys, the British Royal Navy lost 16 ships and the German fleet lost a battleship (Tirpitz), one battlecruiser (Scharnhorst), three destroyers, and 30 U-boats.Footnote104
Stalin placed great importance on the Arctic convoys. He insisted on the NSR route for its “speed and reliability.”Footnote105 The British Admiralty on the other hand tried “to convince both sides that the Arctic route was fraught with peril, since its close proximity to the German facilities in Norway was bound to mean high casualties.”Footnote106 Ultimately, Churchill decided the convoys needed to be supported to reassure Stalin of both Allied support and resolve. The decision led to convoys sailing without the required naval escorts.Footnote107
The Arctic convoys had two primary results. First, the Arctic convoy decision was based on political realities. As Evans asserts, keeping “the Soviet Union in the war began to outweigh any considerations to the contrary, and, far too often, military sense was sacrificed to political expediency.”Footnote108 The political motive made strategic military sense as well, as Allied logistics enabled 1944 Russian advances.Footnote109 Additionally, the convoys played an offensive strategic role as well.Footnote110 By 1944, the convoys fought their way through, forcing a battle of attrition on the Germans.Footnote111 This led the Germans to station additional assets in the High North.Footnote112 Mann and Jörgensen note that, “During the second half of 1944, 159 ships left for Russia, and all arrived safely; 100 set out for home, and only two were lost. The Germans lost nine U-boats.”Footnote113
Icebreakers also played a role in supporting Arctic convoys by keeping Soviet ports open.Footnote114 One icebreaker, the Soviet vessel Krasin, even shot down two German planes.Footnote115 Yet, icebreakers were lacking, which forced the Allies to contend with the “cruel Arctic ice,” forcing convoys to sail within range of the Luftwaffe in Scandinavia.Footnote116
Arctic conditions created numerous issues for convoys. First, the build-up of ice on the structure of the ships, increased the risk of capsizing.Footnote117 Evans writes that climatic conditions led to significant atmospheric interference, which caused delays and signal errors, and the misinterpretation, or non-receival of some orders.Footnote118 Ships also suffered navigational issues due to North Pole proximity and bad weather prevented celestial navigation.Footnote119 The ships also needed “special lubricants, with particularly refined oils, strengthened bows to deal with the heavy seas, and steel propellers” to “cope with the pack ice.”Footnote120 Finally, dangerous sea ice meant these convoys had to travel closer to Scandinavia, increasing the risk of German attack.Footnote121
Arctic region military lessons
As seen in each case study, most military forces were unprepared and unequipped to properly conduct operations in the High North (except for Finnish forces). From logistical issues to navigational problems, forces conducting Arctic warfare and manoeuvre struggled due to the unique environment adding extra burdens and issues that highlighted the need to property train and equip forces to be able to fight and win in the High North. The next section builds on these lessons to illustrate how modern joint forces can excel in the region.
Making capable joint forces for polar warfare
In October 2018, the United States deployed the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group to Arctic waters for Operation Trident Juncture.Footnote122 Two of the group’s three ships suffered damage due to rough sea conditions in the Arctic and were forced to return to Iceland.Footnote123 In 2022, the HMS Prince of Wales experienced similarly harsh conditions during Operation Cold Response. A Facebook post from March 28, 2022 shows the flight deck covered in snow and ice—completely unusable for flight operations.Footnote124 The exercise served as a starting point for the British Navy’s return to Arctic waters and the Norwegian Liaison Officer aboard the Prince of Wales noted that, “The next time a Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier sails into these waters, they will be more ready and prepared, using the reports and operations that Prince of Wales has covered.”Footnote125
This section uses the five previously discussed historical case studies as a guide to future operations in the Arctic. What are the common lessons learned that are still applicable today? How can future cold weather operations be improved? What experiences can the U.S. and its allies avoid relearning?
Polar warfare is separate from mountain operations
Mountain troops in World War II were unprepared for Arctic operations. Pasi Tuunainen asserts German Mountain Jaegers failed to perform their operational task in the “summer, let alone the winter,” during Operation Barbarossa.Footnote126 Likewise, German Lieutenant General Waldemar Erfurth, wrote that “the trains of the mountain troops were much too bulky and cumbersome for the conditions prevailing in Finland.”Footnote127 Later, in the 1950s, a group of twenty ex-Finnish officers worked with the U.S. military, training soldiers and Marines. These retired Finnish personnel focused on revising U.S. military cold weather and Arctic manuals and tried “to argue that Arctic operations are separate from mountain operations, and that troops should receive special training for these.”Footnote128
Today, the American military retains a joint polar and mountain warfare training concept, despite Finnish advice. The U.S. Army’s Leader's Book for Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations contains only nine references to the Arctic in its 132 pages.Footnote129 The Army Techniques Publications 3-90.97 (Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations) only mentions the Arctic 73 times versus 832 mentions of the word mountain.Footnote130 Likewise, the U.S. Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Operations publication mentions the word mountain 943 times versus just ten mentions of the word Arctic.Footnote131
The Arctic is a challenging environment, requiring specialised training with niche equipment. The U.S. Armed Forces need to develop collectively a joint publication dedicated to Arctic warfare. Additionally, the services should separate mountain and Arctic training as distinct areas, much as the tropics are separate from the desert. Each branch also needs to dedicate time to Arctic military training, as it is difficult to maintain polar warfare competency.
Mobility
The Arctic provides severe challenges for mobility. In winter, light infantry forces cannot manoeuvre effectively without skis on unimproved surfaces. The use of dedicated snow vehicles (e.g. BV-206) and snowmobiles massively adds to this capability for moving longer distances, conducting medical evacuations, and resupply operations. Despite Finland, Norway, and Sweden’s extensive operational experience manoeuvring in the Arctic, the United States and many of its NATO allies have limited experience, resources, and systems for Arctic operations. Traditional wheeled and armoured forces can become stuck in snow and muddy terrain. Armoured formations are also threatened by ski-borne light infantry who can move quickly with anti-tank weapons and exploit snow drifts for cover, or conceal their movements in wooded terrain when operating in lower sections of the Arctic containing trees.
Road and rail operations are significantly impeded in the Arctic. Existing networks are limited, and well-mapped. The scarcity of available routes presents ample opportunities for ambush tactics, fires, and counter-mobility obstacles. These tactics lead to increased use of dismounted small units manoeuvre, which is physically challenging in harsh conditions, and potentially deadly for undertrained and underequipped forces. Arctic mobility is not only challenging during the winter. In spring, Arctic areas melt into mud, swamps, and ponds, making some areas near-impassable. Footnote132
Individual soldiers have to carry more supplies in the Arctic in order to sustain operations, further increasing the difficulty of maintaining mobility. Individual cold weather gear becomes a significant addition to the burden on each soldier compared to the requirements of temperate zone operations. Cold weather significantly decreases battery life, and everything from radios, night-vision, and thermal-sight batteries must be carried in increased quantities; not only to account for diminished battery life, but also increased hours of operations for some systems (e.g. night-vision) during extremely long winter nights.Footnote133 As Canadian troops learned during Cold War exercises, they were unable to “haul their own equipment and survival gear and still be expected to fight. Problematically, combat operations in isolated cold areas of the coast would be dependent upon a single road at best and on a mountain track at worst.”Footnote134
The Winter War, American expeditionary operations in Siberia and Arkhangelsk, and the Aleutian Islands campaign, all demonstrated the challenges of trying to manoeuvre in Arctic conditions. None of these case studies depict a successful adaptation to the Arctic, while successes were limited by a failure to prepare for Arctic manoeuvre beforehand. Combat power was lost to the environment through cold weather injuries, exertion, and tactical failures due to limited mobility. Arctic requirements for special equipment and training requirements, as well as its inherent physical danger, present hazards that cannot be mitigated by forces under fire if it lacks the equipment and training to operate effectively. To be effective, a joint force will have to be resourced with cold weather equipment and training, as opposed to attempting ad hoc proficiency.
Logistics
The historical cases presented all highlight the extreme difficulty of providing logistical support around the Arctic. Items such as fuel, lubricants, and water storage require modifications to sustain operations. Additionally, the amount of material that troops need just to survive increases exponentially in an Arctic environment.
Wiedemann and Schultz assert that “the biggest challenge” is “providing water in subzero temperatures.”Footnote135 Water storage requires tactical shelters with heat sources to ensure that water does not freeze.Footnote136 Water also requires special handling at the tactical level from carrying canteens upside down (water freezes from top to bottom) to carrying canteens inside cold weather coats to prevent freezing.
Petroleum, oils, and lubricants also require special consideration in polar weather. Wiedemann and Schultz detail how, “Having an entire brigade periodically idling all of its vehicles and running heaters constantly in every tent can increase bulk fuel consumption substantially.”Footnote137 Besides the gelling of diesel and fuels, freezing impacts other lubricants and other components, such as LCD screens freezing at −20°C. Thus, the Arctic environment creates compounding issues for the operations of most modern weapon systems.
Intelligence, domain awareness, and communications
Given the lack of infrastructure and difficulty in sustaining intelligence collecting mechanisms, the Arctic region has remained a challenging environment for all military forces operating in the region for over a century. Even with the growing presence of satellites orbiting in the vicinity of the North Pole, most satellites in a geosynchronous orbit struggle to provide coverage above 75°–80° north.Footnote138 Worse, high frequency radio transmissions are easily disrupted by ionospheric impacts, making command and control even more difficult. In such a challenging communication environment, electronic warfare becomes more effective to deny, degrade, and disrupt command and control and PNT.
Achieving multi-domain awareness across the Arctic is problematic in the collection of intelligence and the facilitating of communications. Such challenges have led to the U.S. Army pledging to the establishment of a Multi-Domain Task Force for the Arctic. However, the U.S. Army continues to stall in the formation of this Arctic-focused unit despite its commitment to do so in a 2021 strategic document.Footnote139 Without an emphasis on dedicated resources for Arctic-awareness, the American military will struggle with polar warfare capabilities. Bridging this domain gap will require alternative collection means. This could take the form of the integration of data from Coast Guard and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) vessels and allied and partner militaries with a presence in the Arctic, and the utilisation of data from private vessels and commercial ships.Footnote140 Until robust resources and assets are dedicated to Arctic-awareness, the U.S. military will struggle to operate effectively in the region.
Impact of polar day and polar night
Military operations both on land and at sea during World War II demonstrated the difficulties of dealing with extreme periods of daylight and night. German forces in the high north dealt with scorching heat in the summer, forest fires lit by artillery, and swarms of stinging insects.Footnote141 The Polar night also impacted military operations both on land and at sea. At sea, the Polar night brought with it incredibly harsh weather, but it was “safer than summer” because the “bad weather prevented German reconnaissance aircraft” from operating; whilst on land the winter with its Polar night proved to be more conducive to offensive operations due to both the enhanced mobility provided by the frozen terrain, as well the enhanced concealment offered by the darkness.Footnote142
Modern warfare assumes 24-hour operations. Grau notes that “A fundamental concept of contemporary conventional war under nuclear-threatened conditions is that combat will continue uninterrupted.”Footnote143 Thus, American forces, along with its allies and partners, must be able to fight during all conditions. During Polar days, forces will need to better camouflage and conceal movements.Footnote144 Polar nights also come with challenges for modern military forces including complicating “orientation, the conduct of accurate fire, limit the effectiveness of weapons at their maximum range of fires, and influences the use of aviation.”Footnote145 Finally, Polar days and nights will impact the circadian rhythm of troops, reducing their readiness and effectiveness.
Given the challenges of Polar days and nights, military forces will require persistent and deliberate training during both cycles to acclimate to the unique environment while learning to survive, fight, and win in the Arctic. These forces will need specific equipment designed for Arctic operations during both summer and winter including camouflage, sensors, and night-vision devices.
Controlling Arctic sea lines of communication
Over the last century, the importance of the Arctic Ocean and adjacent waterways has grown. Estimates indicate trillions of dollars’ worth of resources in the Arctic.Footnote146 Climate change makes it easier to access these areas, creating Arctic competition where neighbouring nations and even China are scrambling to extract resources. Additionally, the opening of the sea for maritime trade has increased the importance of securing the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) via the Arctic region.Footnote147 However, geography continues to shape human interactions and that reality is no different in the Arctic region. Increased accessibility and maritime chokepoints increase SLOC importance. The two primary maritime chokepoints are the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GUIK) gap that extends to the northern coast of Canada’s Arctic region and the Bearing Strait in-between Alaska and the Russian Federation. The GUIK gap can be extended to include Norway’s northern coastline and Norway’s Svalbard Islands. Therefore, the NATO members can influence Arctic SLOCs. However, they face increased competition from Russia’s growing Arctic military capabilities and China’s expanded interests to operate in the region.Footnote148
In 2017, China participated in a Russian military exercise in the Baltic Sea demonstrating its power projection capability near the North Sea to access the Arctic.Footnote149 China and Russia have conducted multiple naval exercises near Alaska since 2015.Footnote150 Growing collaboration between these two countries in the Arctic comes at a time where the U.S. only has two icebreakers, while China has three and Russia has 46. The American Navy “is materially and operationally underprepared” to operate in the Arctic relative to its Cold War capabilities.Footnote151
Unity of command in the Arctic
The Aleutian Islands campaign demonstrated the need for unity of command in the Arctic environment with its bifurcated command structure. A lack of unity of command contributed to issues with battlefield awareness. Unity of command is even more important with the global shift towards a multipolar world where the Arctic will increasingly become another geopolitical chess piece that powers will compete for. Unity of effort must be considered now to plan meticulously, rehearse, and if necessary, conduct military operations in the Arctic.Footnote152
The Canadian Armed Forces established Joint Task Force North (JTF-N) in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, Canada. JTF-N consists of over 300 personnel who are responsible for defending Canada’s extensive Arctic region.Footnote153 Despite common U.S.-Canadian interests, they have different approaches to Arctic security and their levels of commitment.Footnote154 Given that the Arctic is a seam between various combatant commands and allies and partners, this presents an opportunity for increased co-operation. For instance, the United Kingdom recently published an Arctic strategy that highlights its collaborative relationship with the U.S. and regional Arctic nations such as Norway, Sweden, and Finland.Footnote155 Additionally, the UK leads a Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) that operates in the European Arctic region with Denmark, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Sweden.Footnote156 It would be prudent to expand this JEF into a broader Arctic defence initiative to ensure that NATO forces are capable of operating and responding to a crisis in the Arctic.
Conclusion
During a recent U.S. military engagement alongside the Finnish Army, one Finnish soldier joked about cold weather operations: “to be equipped with snow machines and skis is ideal, to be in snowshoes is marginal, and to be in boots is hopeless.”Footnote157 This joke for the U.S. lands differently. The United States lacks Arctic military preparedness and is somewhere between the category of “marginal” and “hopeless” when it comes to current polar warfare capabilities. Besides the icebreaker gap, many American naval vessels cannot operate in Arctic waters in winter due to a lack of heating capabilities and/or weak hull strength.
Given the numerous issues associated with conducting military operations in and around the Arctic Circle, the U.S. military and its allies and partners need to relearn numerous lessons from previous cold weather military operations. These Arctic lessons include a need for: polar warfare training and cold weather equipment, dedicated Arctic war-fighting doctrine, joint operations and interoperability, mobility designed for Arctic conditions, planning for increased and unique logistics needs, the importance of intelligence and Arctic domain awareness, command and control, unique polar weather issues to include Polar days and nights, controlling Arctic SLOCs, and the critical necessity of unity of command. Overcoming many of these Polar warfare challenges will require the deliberate education and development of Arctic-minded leaders alongside collaboration with allies and partners to foster enhanced cold weather war-fighting capabilities across the spectrum.
Disclosure statement
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Military, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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Notes on contributors
Jeremy M. McKenzie
Lieutenant Commander Jeremy M. McKenzie is a retired U.S. Coast Guard officer and aviator. His last military assignment was at the U.S. Coast Guard’s Centre for Arctic Study and Policy, where he was a researcher. He previously served as an Army aviator and has a Master of Public Policy from Brown University as well as a Master of Social Science from Syracuse University.
Chad M. Pillai
Colonel Chad M. Pillai is a senior U.S. Army Strategist who has served in a variety of assignments in the U.S., Europe, Middle East, and Asia. He earned his Master in International Public Policy from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
Ryan R. Duffy
Major Ryan R. Duffy is an active-duty Army infantry Major who has served primarily in Europe. He has served in Light, Stryker, and Armoured formations. His most recent assignment is at U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) where he has worked on campaign and contingency planning.
Jahara Matisek
Lieutenant Colonel Jahara Matisek, PhD, is an active-duty U.S. Air Force command pilot serving as a Military Professor at the U.S. Naval War College and is a Research Fellow with the European Resilience Initiative Centre. He has over 3,700 h of flight time and was previously an Associate Professor in the Military and Strategic Studies department at the U.S. Air Force Academy.
Notes
1 Heather A. Conley, Matthew Melino, and Jon B. Alterman, ‘The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence’, CSIS, March 26, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence.
2 ‘The Russian Federation’, Arctic Council, 2023, https://arctic-council.org/about/states/russian-federation/.
3 ‘Russia Submarine Capabilities’, The Nuclear Threat Initiative, March 6, 2023, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russia-submarine-capabilities/; ‘Strategic Fleet’, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, August 7, 2021, https://russianforces.org/navy/.
4 Conley, Melino, and Alterman, ‘The Ice Curtain.’
5 It is important to note that the idea of China being a near Arctic State can be seen as early as 2012, when some Chinese academics used the term at a workshop entitled ‘Chinese and Nordic Cooperation on Arctic Developments’ that was held in China and organised by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the China Center for Contemporary World Studies.
6 Ties Dams, Louise van Schaik, and Adája Stoetman, ‘Presence before Power: Why China Became a near-Arctic State’, Clingendael Institute, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24677.5.
7 Note, there is considerable variability in the estimates of Chinese investments in the Arctic. One recent Congressional report asserted that China has invested over $90 billion, others argue that it has been far less.
8 ‘China Regional Snapshot: Arctic’, Committee on Foreign Affairs, October 25, 2022, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-regional-snapshot-arctic/.
9 Rush Doshi, Alexis Dale-Huang, and Gaoqi Zhang, ‘Northern Expedition: China’s Arctic Activities and Ambitions’, Brookings Institute, April 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/northern-expedition-chinas-arctic-activities-and-ambitions/; ‘Coast Guard Crews Remain Vigilant during Operations in the Arctic Region’, U.S. Coast Guard, https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCG/bulletins/2f100cd (accessed April 16, 2024); Hilde-Gunn Bye, ‘US Coast Guard Ships Encountered Chinese Warships Near the Aleutians’, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/us-coast-guard-ships-encountered-chinese-warships-near-aleutians (accessed April 16, 2024); Sam LaGrone, ‘Chinese Warships Made ‘Innocent Passage’ Through U.S. Territorial Waters off Alaska’, USNI News, September 3, 2015, https://news.usni.org/2015/09/03/chinese-warships-made-innocent-passage-through-u-s-territorial-waters-off-alaska.
10 Anu Sharma, ‘China’s Polar Silk Road: Implications for the Arctic Region’, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, October 25, 2021, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2820750/chinas-polar-silk-road-implications-for-the-arctic-region/; Austin Ramzy, ‘China Is Gaining Long-Coveted Role in Arctic, as Russia Yields’, The Wall Street Journal, October 2, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/world/china-is-gaining-long-coveted-role-in-arctic-as-russia-yields-f5397315.
11 Doug Irving, ‘What Does China's Arctic Presence Mean to the United States?’, The RAND Blog, December 29, 2022, https://www.rand.org/blog/rand-review/2022/12/what-does-chinas-arctic-presence-mean-to-the-us.html.
12 Thomas Nilsen, ‘Russia’s Coast Guard cooperation with China is a big step, Arctic security expert says’, The Barents Observer, April 28, 2023, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/04/russias-arctic-coast-guard-cooperation-china-big-step-expert.
13 Damien Cave, ‘China Creates a Coast Guard Like no Other, Seeking Supremacy in Asian Seas’, The New York Times, June 12, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/12/world/asia/china-coast-guard.html.
14 ‘National Security Strategy’ (The White House, October 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf.
15 R. H. Cruzen, ‘Polar Operations: Lecture delivered October 6, 1948’, Naval War College Information Service for Officers, 1, no. 4 (1949): 1–15.
16 Beverly Kay Crawford, ‘Explaining Arctic peace: A human heritage perspective’, International Relations 35, no. 3 (2021): 469–88; Valery Konyshev and Alexander Sergunin, ‘Is Russia a revisionist military power in the Arctic?’ Defense & Security Analysis 30, no. 4 (2014): 323–35.
17 Nick Paton Walsh and Sarah Dean, ‘Russia’s militarization of the Arctic shows no sign of slowing down’, CNN, December 22, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/21/europe/russia-arctic-military-intl/index.html.
18 ‘Arctic Region’, Arctic Centre, 2023, https://www.arcticcentre.org/EN/arcticregion; Super, Arctic Definitions Combined, April 2016, https://arcticportal.org/maps/download/arctic-definitions/2426-arctic-definitions; ‘Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation: Nonbinding Illustrative Map’, U.S. Department of State, April 12, 2019, https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/arctic-sci-agree.pdf; Alison Gaylord, ‘Arctic Boundary as Defined by the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA)’, U.S. Arctic Research Commission, May 27, 2009, https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/ARPA_Polar_150dpi.jpg.
19 M. L. Druckenmiller, R. L. Thoman, and T. A. Moon, ‘Arctic Report Card 2022: Executive Summary’, NOAA Technical Report, 2022, https://doi.org/10.25923/YJX6-R184.
20 National Strategy for the Arctic Region (Washington, DC: The White House, October 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf.
21 Air Force Arctic Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, July 21, 2020), https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/2020SAF/July/ArcticStrategy.pdf.
22 Abbie Tingstad and Scott Savitz, ‘U.S. Military May Need to Invest More in Arctic Capabilities’, RAND, February 10, 2022, https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/02/us-military-may-need-to-invest-more-in-arctic-capabilities.html.
23 Lester W. Grau, ‘Polar Nights, White Nights, and Normal Days and Nights: Arctic Ground Target Identification and Engagement’, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, October 3, 2022, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3171069/polar-nights-white-nights-and-normal-days-and-nights-arctic-ground-target-ident/.
24 Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Global Weirding Is Here’, The New York Times, February 17, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/opinion/17friedman.html.
25 Fiona Harvey and Fiona Harvey Environment correspondent, ‘Heatwaves at Both of Earth’s Poles Alarm Climate Scientists’, The Guardian, March 20, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/mar/20/heatwaves-at-both-of-earth-poles-alarm-climate-scientists.
26 Severnogo Ledovitogo Okeana, ‘The Russo-Japanese War and the Potential Military and Strategic Importance of the Northern Sea Route’, Chapter 15 in: From Northeast Passage to Northern Sea Route, Jens Petter Nielsen and Edwin Okhuizen, eds. (Boston: Brill, 2022), 241–54, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004521841_020.
27 Author #1, Fieldwork, Russia, 2016.
28 Konstantin Pleshakov, The Tsar’s Last Armada: The Epic Journey to the Battle of Tsushima (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
29 Ibid.
30 William Barr, ‘A Tsarist Attempt at Opening the Northern Sea Route: The Arctic Ocean Hydrographic Expedition, 1910–1915’, Polarforschung 45, no. 1 (1975): 51–64.
31 Pleshakov, The Tsar’s Last Armada.
32 Barr, ‘A Tsarist Attempt at Opening the Northern Sea Route; Peter Kikkert and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, ‘The Militarization of the Arctic to 1990’, Chapter 30 in: The Palgrave handbook of Arctic policy and politics, ed. Ken S. Coates and Carin Holroyd (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 487–505.
33 Kikkert and Lackenbauer.
34 Smaller World War Two manoeuvres at Spitsbergen (Operation Zitronella) and Greenland are omitted because they were smaller niche military operations not requiring combat.
35 Tingstad and Savitz, ‘U.S. Military May Need to Invest More in Arctic Capabilities.’
36 George F. Kennan, ‘American Troops in Russia: The True Record’, The Atlantic, January 1, 1959, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1959/01/american-troops-in-russia-the-true-record/640121/.
37 Alexander F. Barnes and Cassandra J. Rhodes, ‘The Polar Bear Expedition: The U.S. Intervention in Northern Russia’, Army Sustainment, April 2012, https://alu.army.mil/alog/2012/marapr12/PDF/The%20Polar%20Bear%20Expedition%20The%20U.S.%20Intervention%20in%20Northern%20Russia,%201918–1919.pdf; John W. Long, ‘American Intervention in Russia: The North Russian Expedition, 1918–19’, Diplomatic History 6, no. 1 (1982): 45–67.
38 Roderick A. Hosler, ‘The American Intervention in North Russia, 1918–1919’, The Army Historical Foundation, 2023, https://armyhistory.org/the-american-intervention-in-north-russia-1918-1919/.
39 Barnes and Rhodes, ‘The Polar Bear Expedition.’
40 Hosler, ‘The American Intervention in North Russia, 1918–1919.’
41 Allen F. Chew, ‘Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies’, Leavenworth Papers 5, December 1981, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/chew.pdf.
42 Barnes and Rhodes, ‘The Polar Bear Expedition’; Chew, ‘Fighting the Russians in Winter.’
43 Ibid.
44 Chew, ‘Fighting the Russians in Winter.’
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 William R. Trotter, A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939–1940 (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 2000), 7.
48 Ibid., 7.
49 Ibid., 8.
50 Ibid., 49.
51 Pasi Tuunainen, ‘New Approaches to the Study of Arctic Warfare’, Nordia Geographical Publications 43, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 88.
52 Ibid., 89.
53 Trotter, A Frozen Hell, 37.
54 Ibid., 37.
55 Vesa Nenye et. al., Finland at War: The Winter War 1939–40 (Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2012), 95.
56 Ibid., 108–9.
57 Tuunainen, ‘New Approaches to the Study of Arctic Warfare’, 89.
58 Vesa Nenye et. al., Finland at War, 149.
59 Tuunainen, ‘New Approaches to the Study of Arctic Warfare’, 90–91.
60 Ibid., 90.
61 Nenye et. al., Finland at War, 108–9.
62 Tuunainen, ‘New Approaches to the Study of Arctic Warfare’, 95.
63 Waldemar Erfurth, Warfare in the Far North (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1951), 20; Chris Mann and Christer Jörgensen, Hitler’s Arctic War: The German Campaigns in Norway, Finland and the USSR 1940–1945 (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2016), 31.
64 The Nazis were aware that the British and the French had considered intervening in the conflict. See Mann and Jörgensen, 31.
65 Mann and Jörgensen, 31.
66 Ibid., 57.
67 Ibid., 61.
68 The Norwegian people were not friendly to the German invasion, hence the Germans had to keep a large contingent of troops garrisoned in Norway to pacify the local population. See Mann and Jörgensen, 61.
69 Ibid., 67.
70 Ibid., 68.
71 Ibid., 70.
72 Ibid., 71.
73 Ibid., 72.
74 Erfurth, Warfare in the Far North, 1.
75 Ibid., 7.
76 Ibid., 12.
77 Mann and Jörgensen, Hitler’s Arctic War, 83.
78 Ibid., 88.
79 Erfurth, Warfare in the Far North, 1.
80 Ibid., 7.
81 Ibid., 8.
82 Mann and Jörgensen, Hitler’s Arctic War, 177.
83 Jessica D. Pisano, ‘Remembering the ‘Forgotten War’: The Joint Operations Flaws of the Aleutian Campaign’, Joint Force Quarterly 104 (2022): 103–14.
84 ‘Battle of the Aleutian Islands’, History, June 30, 2020, https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/battle-of-the-aleutian-islands.
85 Pisano, ‘Remembering the ‘Forgotten War,’’ 104.
86 Ibid., 105.
87 Ibid., 105; Jeremy Easley, ‘The Aleutian Islands Campaign: The Strengths and Weaknesses of its Planning Process and Execution’, Monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2014), 3, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA612209.pdf.
88 Pisano, ‘Remembering the ‘Forgotten War’’, 105; Easley, ‘The Aleutian Islands Campaign’, 2.
89 Easley, ‘The Aleutian Islands Campaign’, 3.
90 Pisano, ‘Remembering the ‘Forgotten War’’, 105.
91 Ibid., 105.
92 Ibid., 105.
93 Ibid., 113.
94 Ibid., 105.
95 Ibid., 112.
96 Ibid., 108.
97 Ibid., 107.
98 Ibid., 107.
99 Ibid., 107.
100 Ibid., 112.
101 E. E. Krasnozhenova, S. V. Kulik, and T. V. Lokhova, ‘Arctic Transportation Systems during World War II’, IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science 434, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1315/434/1/012002.
102 Krasnozhenova, Kulik, and Lokhova; Joseph Micallef, ‘The Critical Role of the Arctic Convoys in WWII’, Military, July 15, 2019, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/07/15/critical-role-arctic-convoys-wwii.html.
103 Micallef.
104 Ibid.
105 Mark Llewellyn Evans, Great World War II Battles in the Arctic (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 51.
106 Ibid., 51.
107 Ibid., 52.
108 Ibid., 137.
109 Ibid., 144.
110 Mann and Jörgensen, Hitler’s Arctic War, 152.
111 Ibid., 152.
112 Ibid., 152.
113 Ibid., 152.
114 ‘Bravery and Sacrifice: The Forgotten Sailors of Loch Ewe’, The Scotsman, May 8, 2018, https://www.scotsman.com/news/bravery-and-sacrifice-the-forgotten-sailors-of-loch-ewe-294203.
115 Martin Harris, ‘A Story of a British-Built Russian Icebreaker, Who Took Part in the Arctic Convoys’, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, June 3, 2015, https://blogs.fcdo.gov.uk/martinharris/2015/06/03/a-story-of-a-british-built-russian-icebreaker-who-took-part-in-the-arctic-convoys/.
116 Evans, Great World War II Battles in the Arctic, 2 and 52.
117 Ibid., 2.
118 Ibid., 2.
119 Ibid., 2.
120 Ibid., 2.
121 Ibid., 2.
122 Megan Eckstein, ‘U.S. Amphibs Return to Iceland after Rough Seas cause Damage, Few Minor Injuries’, USNI News, October 24, 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/10/24/amphib-ships-return-to-iceland-after-rough-seas-cause-damage-few-minor-injuries.
123 Ibid.
124 ‘Leonardo AW101/Westland Sea King’, Leonardo AW101/Westland Sea King, March 28, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/AW101SAR/posts/today-the-flight-deck-crew-on-the-aircraft-carrier-hms-prince-of-wales-have-been/4906557299392046/.
125 ‘Royal Navy Carriers Ready for Arctic Role after Prince of Wales’ High North Operation’, https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2022/april/20/20220420-royal-navy-carriers-ready-for-arctic-role-after-prince-of-wales-high-north-operation.
126 Tuunainen, ‘New Approaches to the Study of Arctic Warfare’, 88.
127 Erfurth, Warfare in the Far North, 8.
128 Tuunainen, ‘New Approaches to the Study of Arctic Warfare’, 93.
129 Leader’s Book: Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2020), https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/AWGColdWeatherHB_041720.pdf.
130 ATP 3-90.97: Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2016), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/atp3_90x97.pdf.
131 MCTP 12-10A: Mountain Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 2014), https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCTP%2012-10A%20GN.pdf.
132 Sally Shoop, ‘Decision Support Tools for Mobility Analysis over Snow, Ice, Frozen/Thawing Ground’, Cold Regions Research & Engineering Laboratory (CRREL) Force Projection & Sustainment Branch, May 7, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/08/2002129256/-1/-1/1/190507_MULTILATERAL-CRSE-UNCLAS_SHOOP.PDF
133 Tom Beyerl, ‘The Battery Difference: A Solution to Reducing Soldier Load and Increasing Effectiveness on the Battlefield’, Infantry Magazine, October/March 2014, https://www.moore.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2014/Oct-Mar/Beyerl.html.
134 P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Peter Kikkert, and Kenneth Eyre, ‘Lessons in Arctic Warfare: The Army Experience, 1945–1955’, Chapter 2 in: Canadian Armed Forces Arctic Operations: Lessons Learned, Lost, and Relearned, Adam Lajeunesse and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, eds. (Fredericton, New Brunswick: The Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Peace, 2017), 47–104.
135 Eric Wiedemann and Steven Schultz, ‘Arctic Logistics’, Army Logistician, (November/December 2002): 22–24.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Kjetil Bjørkum, ‘Above the Arctic: Increased Security in the Arctic through Cooperation in Space’, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs (October 2022): 111–23.
139 Andrew Feickert, ‘The Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF)’, Congressional Research Service, August 22, 2023, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11797.pdf.
140 Ryan Burke and Kristen Heiserman, ‘Partnering for Defense: Arctic Domain Awareness’, Real Clear Defense, November 29, 2023, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/11/29/partnering_for_defense_arctic_domain_awareness_995461.html.
141 Mann and Jörgensen, Hitler’s Arctic War, 89.
142 Micallef, ‘The Critical Role of the Arctic Convoys in WWII’; Erfurth, Warfare in the Far North, 7.
143 Grau, ‘Polar Nights, White Nights, and Normal Days and Nights.’
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Raul Pedrozo, ‘Arctic Climate Change and U.S. Accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’, International Law Studies 89, no. 1 (2013): 757–75.
147 Mark Rowe, ‘Arctic Nations Are Squaring up to Exploit the Region’s Rich Natural Resources’, Geographical, August 12, 2022, https://geographical.co.uk/geopolitics/the-world-is-gearing-up-to-mine-the-arctic.
148 Robert C. Rasmussen, ‘An Emerging Strategic Geometry – Thawing Chokepoints and Littorals in the Arctic’, Center for International Maritime Security, June 3, 2020, https://cimsec.org/an-emerging-strategic-geometry-thawing-chokepoints-and-littorals-in-the-arctic/.
149 Magnus Nordenman, ‘China and Russia Joint Sea 2017 Baltic Naval Exercise Highlight New Normal in European Maritime’, USNI News, July 5, 2017, https://news.usni.org/2017/07/05/china-russias-baltic-naval-exercise-highlight-new-normal-european-maritime.
150 Dzirhan Mahadzir, ‘Russian, Chinese Warships Operated Near Alaska, Say Senators’, USNI News, August 6, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/08/06/russian-chinese-warships-operated-near-alaska-say-senators.
151 James G. Foggo and Rachael Gosnell, ‘U.S. Maritime Strategy in the Arctic—Past, Present, and Future’, Naval War College Review 75, no. 3 (2022), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8290&context=nwc-review#:~:text=The%20Navy%20has%20a%20robust,role%20in%20U.S.%20Navy%20operations.
152 Ryan Dean and Michael Lynch, ‘KCIS 2022 Conference Report’, The Kingston Consortium on International Security, 2022, https://www.thekcis.org/conference/kcis-2022/conference-report.
153 ‘Joint Task Force North’, Government of Canada, April 7, 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/conduct/regional-task-force/north.html.
154 Kristofer Bergh, ‘The Arctic Policies of Canada and the United States: Domestic Motives and International Context’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, July 2012, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/insight/SIPRIInsight1201.pdf.
155 Lord Goldsmith, ‘Looking North: The UK and the Arctic. The United Kingdom’s Arctic Policy Framework’, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Policy Paper, February 9, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/looking-north-the-uk-and-the-arctic/looking-north-the-uk-and-the-arctic-the-united-kingdoms-arctic-policy-framework.
156 ‘Joint Expeditionary Force: A New Era of Military Cooperation’, UK Army, March 29, 2023, https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2023/03/joint-expeditionary-force-a-new-era-of-military-cooperation/.
157 Author #3 meeting with Finnish Army Command, March 2, 2023 (Mikkeli, Finland).