A roadmap for ESIA policy change in Ethiopia should address wide-ranging governance reforms

Rule of law

Prior to the Environmental Impact Assessment Proclamation (Proc. No. 299/), project proponents in Ethiopia were only required to undertake ESIA on a voluntary basis (e.g. if it was required as a condition of international financing). The mandate of the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) was narrow and did not include ESIAs. The legal framework of the Environmental Policy (Citation1997) was the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Citation1995) wherein the rights to inclusive sustainable development and a clean and healthy environment were enshrined (Articles 43, 44 and 92 of the Constitution).

It was the Environmental Impact Assessment Proclamation (Proc. No. 299/) that institutionalized environmental protection in the country, making EIA a mandatory legal prerequisite for the implementation of major development projects, programmes, and plans (Section 3 (1) of the Environmental Impact Assessment Proclamation,). The EPA, too, was re-established as an independent institution by the Environmental Organs Establishment Proclamation (No. 295/), with a mandate to regulate and monitor all activities in the country that have an impact on the environment.

Yet, despite the subsequent introduction of related proclamations, amendments, guidelines, and policies, this research found that legislative ambiguities persist in Ethiopian resource governance. Many of the legislations and policies are antiquated and fragmented, failing to establish distinct roles and responsibilities at the federal, regional, and local levels. For example, under Parts two and three of the Environmental Organs Establishment Proclamation (No. 295/), reference is consistently made to any ‘competent agency’ defined in Part one as ‘any federal or regional government organ entrusted by law with a responsibility related to the subject specified in the provisions where the term is used.’ This broad definition of a ‘competent agency’ makes the roles and responsibilities of the federal and regional governments in the ESIA policy process unclear. A further example of the need for updated ESIA legislation is that both Proc. (No. 295/) and (Proc. No. 299/) refer to the EPA, which no longer exists. Discrepancies such as these featured frequently in the proclamations analyzed. This, coupled with the fragmented nature of the legislative and policy framework, make it difficult for persons unfamiliar with the ESIA governance space in the country to gain a holistic understanding of the processes in place.

Additionally, at the time this research was undertaken, there was a memorandum delegating responsibilities of the EPA (now known as the Environment, Forests, and Climate Change Commission (EFCCC)) to the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP). This raised questions regarding the extent to which environmental governance is impartial and robust. It is counterintuitive that the MoMP, tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that mining development helps increase Ethiopia’s GDP, is also responsible for approving the environmental feasibility of such activity and resolving issues raised within the ESIA process. However, as of July 2020, by way of a government letter (MoMP, communication to EFCCC, July 2020)Footnote¹ the authority for approving ESIAs for mining projects has been transferred back to the EFCCC, whereas the MoMP is still responsible for monitoring and compliance.

Evidence from other jurisdictions highlights the importance of a specialized agency or board responsible for ESIA – otherwise, conflicting goals and mandates of ministers and agencies can impact the effectiveness and perceived independence of the process (Solano Citation2013; Sander Citation2016). A single window system can have the potential to oversimplify ESIA processes such that detrimental environmental and social effects are not adequately mitigated (Urrutia and Avilés Citation2015). The proclamations relevant to ESIA policy in Ethiopia would benefit from being updated and consolidated to clarify the division of powers and roles and responsibilities of the Federal and State governments as they pertain to ESIA policy. This is in the mutual interest of all stakeholders in the ESIA process, especially foreign investors. Legislative ambiguity also hinders the ability of citizens to hold the government to account, while jurisdictional ambiguity in matters pertaining to ESIA policies weakens the ESIA policy process.

Accountability

Results of the interviews and literature review also revealed a lack of monitoring and compliance mechanisms within the ESIA process. Although laws such as the Environmental Impact Assessment Proclamation indicate that monitoring shall be done by either the EFCCC or a regional environmental agency, it is unclear under which circumstances either authority is responsible, what protocols are used, and what work is undertaken (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Citation2002). A clearer demarcation of responsibilities would allow for improved accountability in policies and processes.

Some interviewees expressed concern regarding an absence of ESIA compliance monitoring. Although enforcement of ESIA legislations and policies were raised as being important, this was reported to rarely occur in practice due to constraints in judicial access, as well as weak judicial enforcement measures. The federal government has delegated authority for ESIA to regional bureaus for Ethiopian corporations working in industrial and construction mineral extraction, yet regional bureaus emphasized that they cannot effectively conduct their responsibilities without improved capacity, expertise, and training, and in many cases regional authorities are not monitoring at all once a license is given.

Insufficient national pollution regulation and improper implementation of existing regulations were also identified as issues. In 2003, the EPA prepared non-binding ambient guidelines for air, surface water, groundwater, and noise in the review of ESIAs. These included the Integrated Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Guidelines Water Supply, 2004 and the Waste Handling and Disposal Guidelines, 1997. These guidelines were intended to ensure that the Environment and Community Development Directorate (ECDD) authorities consider water supply, wastewater, and local waste issues associated with project development in all sectors. These guidelines became binding in 2008 and were constrained to industrial effluent limits for air and water pollutants (Krueger et al. Citation2012). In practice, these guidelines for air or water pollution are rarely followed.

Furthermore, there is a lack of any regulatory standards on the use of mercury or cyanide in mining, which imposes health risks on already water-scarce communities. Mining corporations interviewed identified an absence of regulation to prohibit dumping mining waste and effluent into rivers – an issue that is important to address if Ethiopia seeks to develop larger scale and potentially higher-impact mining projects.

Skills and human resources, which refers to the number of people equipped with skills and training in the ESIA process and the quality of that training, was one of the most frequently identified issues. While interviewees from both the government and private sector often mentioned the need for additional training of government employees, government employees also emphasized the need for better certification for consultants. The challenges faced by government employees in compliance monitoring is exacerbated by the fact that there is no laboratory in Ethiopia with the ability to assess trace-level heavy metals in water – meaning that the government is unable to determine if companies are complying with the effluent regulations set within environmental certificates issued upon permitting. Interviewees reflected that the ‘main challenge is that we only see physical observations, but not the impacts to water,’ due to a lack of access to necessary water quality testing equipment. Some interviewees acknowledged that they often do not have access to reliable data, also reflecting a need for training and hiring in data collection.

Participation

The legislative requirement for public participation in the ESIA process is that the relevant authority ‘must make the environmental impact study (EIS) report available to the public and solicit comments on it’ (Section 15 (1), Environmental Impact Assessment Proclamation). Furthermore, all comments received, particularly from affected local communities, must be incorporated into the Environmental Impact Study report and evaluated during the authority review process (Section 15 (2), Environmental Impact Assessment Proclamation). However, limitations of the current legislation are that: (1) the legislation does not specify a timeframe for public comment (the overall timeline for reviewing the ESIA and deciding is only 15 days, leaving little time for public participation), and (2) there is a lack of clarity regarding how the comments from community members should be incorporated into decision-making processes. The proclamation also lacks clarity about the mechanisms through which community members should receive feedback on comments submitted.

Furthermore, the process for seeking community input (i.e. through providing a public version of the EIS report prior to approval) does not ensure an inclusive process for public participation. For example, the EIA Procedural Guidelines of 2003 (Section 5) mandate that public consultation must be undertaken during the scoping phase of a new project. However, interviews revealed that there is a dearth of effective channels for public consultation or community participation on important decisions regarding the community’s own development course.

The EIA proclamation does allow for a grievance redressal mechanism whereby persons dissatisfied with the authorization of a project may submit their respective grievances to the relevant authority and are entitled to a decision within 30 days of the grievance notice (Section 17, Environmental Impact Assessment Proclamation). However, since the ‘relevant authority’ is the ECDD based in the MoMP, this presents a conflict of interest because it is the same ministry responsible for mining development. Additionally, there are no set standards or guidelines on how such grievances are addressed nor are there provisions to make the process more transparent.

Our interviews with ESIA consultants revealed that most of the concerns raised by communities during the ESIA process in Ethiopia were related to inadequate compensation, particularly due to loss of land or other resources. The government is supposed to compensate people as soon as possible for such losses. This, unfortunately, does not happen the way it should. ‘The main challenge is that the local compensation is very delayed. Because of that delay, the community raises different issues which creates conflict,’ said an interviewee. According to respondents, the practice of garnering goodwill or consent often involves proponents working to compensate communities until they agree, or governments wrongly concluding that a given regulatory process was appropriately followed, so long as minimal requirements such as that of the community development fund are met. Rarely is compensation calculated bearing in mind the holistic implications of mining operations on communities, their way of life, or preferred livelihoods. Yet, at the same time, the system is open to abuse because there is no basis for expropriation claims and as such, people may move into areas where they may be entitled to compensation. The lack of an appeal process for community compensation was also glaring.

Transparency

As mentioned in the previous section, Article 15.1 of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act states that the government shall make the EIA report ‘accessible to the public and solicit comments on it’ (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Citation2002).

However, from an online review of government websites, public access to information was found to be lacking as the research team was unable to obtain any ESIAs in online format. Seven (35%) interviewees raised the need for further transparency in the ESIA process in Ethiopia, indicating that transparency is good for investor confidence. Interestingly, many industry representatives claimed they were committed to meeting higher standards of transparency than the government requires. This was especially important for foreign-headquartered companies that are publicly traded on the stock exchanges in their respective countries, as these countries often require a relatively high degree of transparency for a corporation to be publicly listed. These representatives also claimed to post their impact assessments publicly, although online searches did not yield any results.

Rule of law: development of a specialized authority for ESIA evaluation

To address the potential conflicting goals and mandates of the ECDD in Ethiopia, which is currently responsible for mining approvals, community consultation and grievance redressal, it may be beneficial to establish a specialized ESIA agency under a Ministry of Environment (currently the EFCCC) with the sole and exclusive authority of managing the ESIA policy process (screening; scoping; public consultation; evaluation and assessment of ESIA; licensing and decision-making), which is institutionally separate from monitoring and compliance responsibilities within the Ministry of Mines.Footnote² A specialized agency would minimize conflict of interest that inevitably exists in a self-regulated mining ministry. Relevant lessons can be drawn from Peru, Ghana, and Chile as summarized below.

Until the end of 2015, Peru’s approach to ESIA was based on a sectoral approach. Like Ethiopia, independent ministries were responsible for the assessment and approval of projects within their own sectors, which led to a perceived conflict of interest for policymakers mandated to develop the economy of their sector while ensuring minimal effect on the environment. This conflict led to a lack of public trust in the decision-making process (SENACE Citation2018). Recognizing the issues that the governance structure was generating within communities and companies, the government established Peru’s Environmental Licensing Agency (SENACE, for its abbreviation in Spanish), attached to the Ministry of Environment, which is mandated with the authority to assess and approve major projects throughout Peru (SENACE Citation2018). Six ministers with different mandates lead the Directive Council of SENACE, which limits the authority’s ability to change norms and adapt (Merino Citation2018). An independent body, the Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement (OEFA) under the National Environmental Assessment and Oversight Service (SINEFA), enforces environmental legislation through auditing and supervision. The Ministry of Environment (MINAM) is responsible for monitoring land-use planning by regional governments.

Like Peru, Ghana also has an authority separate from the Ministries, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which regulates both ESIAs and environmental permitting. The Environmental Assessment and Audit Department of the Environmental Compliance and Enforcement division (within the EPA) is mainly responsible for the ESIA related functions specifically (Steinhauer, Citation2019a). Cross-sectoral ESIA Technical Review Committees are set up at the national level and in all the 10 regions to support the EPA in the ESIA process (African Development Bank Citation2009). The EPA has 12 regional EPA offices which serve as field operators of the Agency. In relation to ESIA, they have the mandate at regional levels for screening and regional review of ESIAs (African Development Bank Citation2009. Regional EPAs also have a role in compliance monitoring, approval of annual environmental reports and verification of environmental management plans. EIAs for large-scale projects and high priority projects are under the responsibility of the Environmental Assessment and Audit Department of the EPA, though. Regional EPA offices are then mainly involved in the EIA process through public participation and monitoring activities (Steinhauer, Citation2019a).

Environmental assessments in Chile are conducted by the Environmental Assessment Service (SEA) in accordance with the environmental impact assessment system. In Chile, the SEA grants the EIA permit, known in Chile as an RCA or Resolución de Calificación Ambiental (Urrutia and Avilés Citation2015). The SEA is also responsible for promoting and facilitating public participation in the EIA process. Although the SEA issues EIA permits, there are other agencies and governmental bodies involved in the decision-making process. These include the Environmental Superintendent, the Ministry of Environment, and the Environmental Courts. The SEA and Environmental Superintendent report to the Ministry of Environment (Urrutia and Avilés Citation2015). The Environmental Superintendence is a separate governmental body from the SEA, responsible for monitoring, compliance, and enforcement of terms and conditions agreed upon in the approval of an RCA/EIA permit (Gajardo Citation2014).

In summary, an analysis of ESIA review and approval processes across other case study jurisdictions reveals that at the time of conducting this research in December 2019, Ethiopia had a much higher potential for perceived conflicts of interest because the ministry responsible for mining approvals (Ministry of Mining and Petroleum) was also responsible for ESIA approval and enforcement. In July 2020, based on correspondence with our local partners in Ethiopia, the ESIA approval authority was transferred to the EFCCC. Further separating these responsibilities, namely monitoring and compliance, into a separate agency could further improve public trust in the ESIA process. In addition to this change, there may also be opportunities to learn from Peru and Yukon wherein a decentralized ESIA policy process has been adopted for smaller scale projects, with some decisions being made at the district level to improve engagement with community contexts (Castroa et al. Citation2014; Darling et al. Citation2018).

Accountability: development of a specialized agency for ESIA monitoring and compliance

Ensuring that legislative requirements are complied with through effective monitoring and enforcement was identified as a significant challenge for all jurisdictions studied in this research (Chile, Peru, Ghana, and Canada (Yukon and B.C.)), including those in both low- and high-income countries. Even if an ESIA process is well established, inclusive, and thorough, its effectiveness can be undermined by a lack of adherence to conditions, compliance, and monitoring. In the Latin American context, governments often lack the capacity to implement effective compliance measures (OECD, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Citation2017). Various jurisdictions also struggle with a lack of enforcement, or the proponent’s responsibility for compliance undermines accountability, as seen in Ghana and other countries in West Africa (Appiah-Opoku and Bryan Citation2013). Consultation agreement obligations lack compliance and enforcement in Peru (Merino Citation2018), which was also a common theme in Ghana (Emmanuel et al. Citation2018). In a federal system, regional governments often have unclear compliance obligations (Solano Citation2013). Due to limited capacity, governments often resort to a single entity responsible for both the ESIA assessment and ESIA monitoring. However, research has shown that integrated authorities commonly prioritize assessment over compliance monitoring given a limited budget and political pressures (Haddock Citation2010).

In other jurisdictions with a history of large-scale mining, an independent monitoring and compliance authority was identified as a leading practice to improve the enforcement of environmental certificate conditions (McQuilken Citation2016). Peru, Ghana, and Chile are all examples of jurisdictions with separate compliance monitoring agencies. An independent federal body is responsible for enforcing environmental legislation in Peru (although improved coordination with regional bodies would be a benefit) (OECD, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Citation2017). In Chile, the Environmental Superintendent is an independent compliance entity that contributes to improved enforcement of conditions; similarly, follow-up is delegated to the Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Network in Ghana.

Establishing a separate and independent compliance and monitoring authority would offer an opportunity for Ethiopia to ensure that mining development projects comply with the conditions set by the environmental certificate, provided that the regional governments have the capacity to implement conditions (Haddock Citation2010; McQuilken Citation2016). Despite the human and financial resources required, evidence suggests that a separate monitoring and compliance authority would improve the implementation of conditions overall.

The compliance monitoring process was found to be similar throughout jurisdictions. Usually, an environmental certificate outlines the conditions that must be followed for the proponent to proceed with the project and to obtain their legislative license to operate. Proponents are often responsible for conducting compliance checks to ensure that they are meeting conditions should the authority conduct a randomized compliance audit (Appiah-Opoku and Bryan Citation2013). In Yukon, conditions are recommended by the assessment authority and decided on by the decision-maker, the Minister responsible for the ESIA (Koivurova et al. Citation2016).

However, some jurisdictions have also tested a variety of novel monitoring mechanisms, which often require minimal government resources or capacity. For example, participatory environmental monitoring committees are used in Peru to involve communities and improve monitoring capacity, and often include traditional or local knowledge (Himley Citation2014; Emmanuel et al. Citation2018). Exploration into such practices could also be beneficial for Ethiopia. Ensuring that diverse geographical attributes are accommodated within follow-up design must also be prioritised (Jha-Thakur et al. Citation2009). Improving accountability mechanisms for long-term project outcomes is critical to good ESIA and remains a gap in many jurisdictions.

Capacity within ESIA agencies, especially at local levels, is a critical challenge faced by many jurisdictions seeking to implement effective ESIA policies and processes; as was the case with Ethiopia. Inadequate funding can result in agencies building coalitions with international organizations or corporations that may not prioritize the best interests of citizens. If governments do not prioritize ESIA, inadequate capacity of agencies responsible for environmental management will be exacerbated (Tamakloe Citation2000; Environment and Natural Resources Global Practice – Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela Country Management Unit Citation2016; OECD, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Citation2017).

Transparency: public reports and comment periods

Other jurisdictions have used public ESIAs, public hearings, and comment periods to improve transparency and participation. In many other jurisdictions, ESIAs are publicly accessible and available. In Yukon and BC (Canada), ESIAs are made available online during the public engagement phase, and after the project has been approved (BC Environmental Assessment Office Citation2019). In Peru, all documentation is accessible by the public, although citizens must submit a formal request for information (Solano Citation2013). A summary of the EIS is also provided at the regional office and the municipality that is affected by the project. In Chile, the project proponent must publish an extract of the EIA in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of regional or national circulation (Ocampo-Melgar et al. Citation2019).

Public engagement in the form of comment periods are common in other jurisdictions. For example, in BC, it is a ‘general policy requirement’ to have at least one formal comment period (although it is usual practice for the proponent to hold at least two public comment periods). The results of the public comment period are posted publicly (BC Ministry of Environment). Furthermore, in Ghana, a public information program must be initiated by the proponent to fully inform the residents about the potential impacts of the undertaking, while they are gathering data for the assessment (Appah-Sampong Citation2003). In Chile, individuals and organizations have 60 days to comment on the project from the time of the report’s publication, while the time period is 21 days in Ghana.

Publicly available reports and public comment periods ultimately make ESIA reports more accurate and inclusive through a revision process based on feedback. They also usually result in greater acceptance of the final project by local communities, giving the proponent a social license to operate (Hanna Citation2016). Making ESIA reports available online in Ethiopia would bring government policies in line with Article 15.1, and carries a low financial burden, only requiring occasional maintenance of the website, and uploading the reports. Ethiopia could also look at mandating at least one comment period for large-scale mining projects, although the Ministry may see fit to require multiple, depending on the project. A comment period of at least 30 days would give citizens time to hear about the period and form an opinion on the project. To foster a high-capacity and effective system, the proportion of federal spending on environmental governance, peer-reviewed science, and online transparency could also be increased (Environment and Natural Resources Global Practice – Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela Country Management Unit Citation2016) (Barandiaran Citation2015).

The State (i.e. federal government) has a major role to play in community participation, notably through ensuring that communities are adequately informed and consulted, and that their perspectives and decisions are duly considered by companies. Drawing from experience in mining projects in Peru, Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer (Citation2013) point to the importance of the impartiality of the institution in charge of the design and implementation of the consultation process, and the need to reduce power asymmetries through the improvement of negotiation capacities. Actions such as these would also promote partnerships with civil society and the media and move toward greater transparency and better governance overall in the ESIA process.

Participation: community involvement, grievance redressal and compensation

Community participation was the most mentioned theme in interviews in Ethiopia. Ethiopian legislation also lacks guidance regarding how input from community members should be incorporated into decision-making processes. This is problematic because inadequate public input into ESIA processes may prevent identification and subsequent mitigation of social and environmental effects.

Ghana’s ESIA regulation (LI 1652) provides a good example of how the public can be involved throughout each stage of the ESIA process. By way of legislation, and not mere guidelines, the public is enabled to make comments on the scoping report, make field visits, comment on the Environmental Impact Statement and, if a public hearing is deemed necessary, be involved in the public hearing (Steinhauer, Citation2019a).

Public concerns, and in particular those of local residents, are key criteria for the EPA’s screening decision (Section 5, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Citation1999). Any person aggrieved by a decision or action of the EPA may submit a complaint in writing to the Minister within 14 days (Section 27 of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Citation1999). The Minister responsible for environment appoints a panel to hear the appeal and ‘determine the matter within 60 days from the date of reference of any matter by the Minister to it’ (Section 27 of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Citation1999).

In Peru too, legislations require proponents to involve stakeholders from the very start of the ESIA process (Ministry of Environment of Peru (MINAM) Citation2009). A public hearing is mandated for projects and activities allocated to category III in the screening process and may require a public hearing for projects under category II (Steinhauer, Citation2019b). There is even a specific requirement for participation by peasant communities and indigenous peoples, following the ILO 169 requirements (Law No. 29,785; OHCHR, 2017). Any citizen, public and private organization, or proponent may appeal against the decision on screening, or of the environmental impact assessment study or environmental certification via administrative procedures of appeal (Republic of Peru, Citation2011). The Court of Auditors (Controlaria General) and the Ombudsman of the Environment (Defensoria del Pueblo, Adjuntia de Medio Ambiente) guard state activities related to human rights, human health and the environment (Steinhauer, Citation2019b).

In Chile, Environmental Courts can review and overturn decisions by the Environmental Superintendence (Republic of Chile Citation2012). All environmental court decisions can be further challenged before the Supreme Court by way of special legal remedies subsequent to regular judicial proceedings (Environmental Permits and Impact Assessments in Chile Citation2019). This appeal process allows citizens and proponents to have their issues addressed in an apolitical environment.

An especially concerning aspect related to community participation in Ethiopia is the absence of consent requirements in ESIA legislations. Although many corporations do claim to obtain consent from communities before projects are initiated, this legislative absence proves detrimental to the affected communities’ interests and has the potential to compromise the entire ESIA process. Similarly, federal and regional government employees indicated that they require consent and sign off by a community representative for mining exploration and development projects – yet this requirement is not confirmed by legislation. Resistance, from this perspective, closely relates to the crucial right of communities to decide, either through their own decision mechanism or through a more formalized Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) process, as stated in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), if an extractive project is to go forward or not. As of now, the FPIC process in Ethiopia is still in its infancy stage and is not being prioritized as it could be. Though Ethiopia has not ratified the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples or the International Labour Organisation Convention, it should ensure consent of indigenous communities. Contrastingly, Article 7, section 4 of Chile’s Supreme Decree No. 40/2012, which refers to resettlement and alteration of human groups’ lifestyles and customs, states: ‘Where relocation of human groups belonging to indigenous peoples is considered necessary as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place only with their free and informed consent. Where their consent cannot be obtained, such relocation shall take place only following appropriate procedures, including public inquiries where appropriate, which provide the opportunity for effective representation of the peoples concerned’ (Gajardo Citation2014).

There must be established procedures to ensure grievances at any stage of the project are addressed. It should encompass investigative, determinative and remedial phases of the grievance process. Support to affected people and communities, such that power imbalances do not prevent them from availing themselves of this process, must also be considered. Initiatives to edify communities and workers, by the government or through third party organisations, about grievance redressal mechanisms available to them should be undertaken. There must also be mechanisms whereby compensation can be contested, and related issues addressed.

Limitations

All interviews were completed in the capital of Addis Ababa, and the research team were unable to conduct interviews with community members directly affected by mining projects. Future research would therefore benefit from fieldwork at the community level to validate the findings presented, and to identify other potential improvements to the ESIA policy process. A further limitation of this work is that it has largely focused on ESIA policy as it relates to the large-scale mining (LSM) sector. Given that Ethiopia already has a burgeoning artisanal and small-scale mining (ASSM) sector, it is essential to ensure that ESIA policy adequately considers these potential impacts and ideally seeks to develop harmonious relationships between LSM and ASSM miners in order to prevent major conflicts in the future, as has already been observed in many other jurisdictions globally (Veiga and Fadina Citation2020).

In investigating how to develop a more harmonious LSM/ASSM sector, future research could also broaden the comparative case study analysis to investigate ESIA policies in other jurisdictions. South Africa, Kenya and Mongolia are some examples that would be especially appealing study contexts. However, language barriers created a challenge during the comparative case analysis in this current project, and many of the official government documents to be reviewed were in Amharic or Spanish. These language-related constraints may have impacted our interpretations and findings.

Another limitation is the absence of judicial jurisprudence in relation to some of the issues it raises.