From Obligation to Action: Advancing Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

ABSTRACT As entry into force approaches, the time has come to start planning for the First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Guided by the treaty’s goal of eliminating the “catastrophic humanitarian consequences” of nuclear weapons, the 1MSP should address not only the TPNW’s provisions to prevent future detonations, but also its positive obligations to respond to the suffering caused by past use and testing. This commentary examines the meeting’s role in turning the TPNW’s articles on victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance into action. It highlights the 1MSP’s significance, proposes an effective structure, and examines the substance of its discussions and outcome documents. In all of these areas, the 1MSP can draw on humanitarian disarmament precedent while adapting it to the nuclear weapons context. By making the positive obligations a long-term priority and creating a framework for maximizing their impact, the 1MSP will pave the way for fully realizing the TPNW’s humanitarian purpose.

Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons; first meeting of states parties; environmental remediation; victim assistance; international cooperation; humanitarian disarmament As the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) approaches its entry into force on January 22, 2021, the time has come to start planning for its First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP). Adopted at the United Nations in 2017, the TPNW is a groundbreaking instrument that applies a humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament (Docherty 2018). Guided by the treaty's goal of eliminating the "catastrophic humanitarian consequences" of nuclear weapons (TPNW, preamble), the 1MSP should address not only the TPNW's provisions to prevent future detonations, but also its positive obligations to respond to the suffering caused by past use and testing.
To inform the work of the 1MSP, this commentary examines the meeting's role in turning the TPNW's articles on victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance into action. It highlights the significance of the 1MSP, proposes an effective structure it can adopt, and examines the substance its discussions and outcome documents should cover. In all of these areas, the 1MSP can draw on humanitarian disarmament precedent while adapting it to the nuclear weapons context. This commentary concludes that states parties should seize the opportunity presented by the 1MSP to make the positive obligations a long-term priority and create a framework for fully realizing the TPNW's humanitarian purpose.

The TPNW's Positive Obligations
The TPNW complements its ban on nuclear weapons-related activities with three positive obligations that advance its humanitarian objectives by addressing existing harm. Article 6(1) obliges affected states parties to provide a range of assistance to victims of the use and testing of nuclear weapons. Article 6(2) mandates that states parties contaminated by use and testing "take necessary and appropriate measures" to remediate the environment. Finally, Article 7 makes victim assistance and environmental remediation a shared responsibility of all states parties through international cooperation and assistance requirements.
Such positive obligations, which are groundbreaking provisions for a nuclear weapons treaty, originated in humanitarian disarmament law. Humanitarian disarmament seeks to reduce arms-inflicted human and environmental harm through a combination of preventive and remedial measures (ACCPI (Harvard Law School Armed Conflict & Civilian Protection Initiative) n.d.). The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), which exemplify this approach to governing weapons, pair absolute prohibitions to avert future harm with remedial measures to address the harm already done (Mine Ban Treaty, Articles 1, 5, 6(3); CCM, Articles 1, 4, 5). Those treaties significantly influenced the inclusion and language of the positive obligations in the TPNW, the most recent humanitarian disarmament treaty (Docherty 2018, 179-80). Given the parallels, the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions can now inform the structure and substance of the TPNW's 1MSP. States, international organizations, and civil society should look at how their counterparts dealt with the positive obligations at those treaties' 1MSPs and adapt the models of those meetings to the nuclear weapons context.

Significance of the 1MSP
The first meeting of states parties of any disarmament treaty sets the stage for turning legal obligations into concrete actions. Recognizing the significance of the Mine Ban Treaty's 1999 1MSP in Maputo, Mozambique, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said, "[Its] results . . . will lay the ground for the treaty's implementation in the years to come," and Mozambique's foreign minister declared it would "build a very strong commitment for the implementation of the Convention in letter and spirit." 1 Speakers at the 1MSP of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, held in 2010 in Vientiane, Laos, specified how the meeting could advance realization of the treaty's provisions. They saw the meeting as an opportunity to assess the current situation, develop plans for operationalization and monitoring, and "take important decisions on the Convention's architecture" (ICRC 2010;United Nations 2010). Given the symbolic, practical, and precedential value of these meetings, TPNW states parties should dedicate a substantial portion of the 1MSP's work to the treaty's positive obligations.
Article 8 of the TPNW, obliging states parties to convene within one year of entry into force and regularly thereafter, allows for the 1MSP to take up the positive obligations. The article requires states parties to consider and make decisions regarding the "application or implementation" of the treaty's provisions, which include Articles 6 and 7. Unlike comparable articles in the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions (Mine Ban Treaty, Article 11; CCM, Article 11), TPNW Article 8 does not specifically reference the positive obligations, but its generality leaves room to address them. Indeed, the absence of a specific reference makes it even more important that participants ensure victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance are a significant part of the 1MSP's work.
Making the positive obligations a core topic of the 1MSP would give the provisions symbolic weight. States parties can signal that implementing these components of the treaty should be a priority now and in the future. The TPNW's positive obligations are sometimes overshadowed by its prohibitions, which were the initial impetus for the instrument. The 1MSP should make clear that a comprehensive response to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons demands remedial as well as preventive measures.
The 1MSP also provides an opportunity to develop practical guidelines for implementation that facilitate compliance with the positive obligations. Setting clear standards for action always helps bridge law and practice, but it is especially important in this context. While prohibitions simply require states parties to refrain from certain activities, positive obligations necessitate well-planned affirmative actions. Furthermore, assisting victims of and remediating the environment affected by the use and testing of nuclear weapons are complex undertakings. In pursuing these activities, states parties can build on standards that have emerged from the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions. They must, however, adapt them to the distinctive characteristics of nuclear weapons, including the weapons' long-lasting and transboundary consequences.
Finally, addressing the positive obligations at the 1MSP would lay the foundation for future work. By evaluating existing harm and identifying steps to address it, the 1MSP would set a baseline against which to measure progress. Discussions at the 1MSP would create an expectation of continued work at later MSPs, which serve a "supervisory" role that helps ensure states parties meet their treaty obligations (Hayashi 2012, 337).

Structure of the 1MSP
To maximize the impact of the TPNW's 1MSP, states parties should look to humanitarian disarmament precedent. The 1MSPs of the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions addressed clearance, victim assistance, and international cooperation and assistance both during the meetings themselves and in the written products that they generated. TPNW states parties should similarly engage with the positive obligations in discussions and outcome documents. This section will propose a structure for the 1MSP while the following section will examine its substance in more detail.

Discussions
States parties should use their discussions at the TPNW's 1MSP to underscore the value of the positive obligations and elaborate on their meaning. Victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance should appear as separate topics on the agenda to emphasize their importance and provide ample opportunity for exchange. In their general statements and remarks under the dedicated agenda items, speakers should reaffirm the positive obligations' critical role in fulfilling the humanitarian objectives of the treaty, present their understandings of the provisions, and identify ways to act on them.
The meeting should also encourage active participation by diverse states and other actors. States parties should take advantage of the practical, legal, and field-based expertise of international organizations and civil society groups. They should hear reports on nuclear weapons' ongoing impacts and programs that are currently or have been in place to address them. Survivors in particular should testify to the suffering they have experienced, articulate their current needs, and explain how victim assistance and environmental remediation measures can best respond.
The 1MSPs of the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions provide precedent for foregrounding the remedial measures of a disarmament treaty. Both meetings held separate sessions on victim assistance, clearance of contaminated areas, and international cooperation and assistance, and they encouraged a range of participants to speak (MBT 1MSP 1999, para. 22;CCM 1MSP 2010a, para. 15). Presenters at the opening ceremony of the Mine Ban Treaty's 1MSP highlighted clearance and victim assistance as core elements of the treaty. The president of the Mozambique described victim assistance as "one of the major concerns of the international community," even though it is referenced only in a paragraph in the treaty's international cooperation and assistance article (Chissano 1999). The ICRC stated: "[I]n communities throughout the world people await tangible results in the form of cleared fields, unhindered travel, physical rehabilitation and socio-economic re-integration. Progress in achieving their goals and preventing the laying of new mines will be the scale against which the success of our actions will be measured" (ICRC 1999). At the 1MSP of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, an opening film entitled "Vision into Action" similarly highlighted the remedial measures 2 , and ICRC's Christine Beerli said, "We are here today to ensure that the lives of communities, victims and survivors are improved through risk reduction, the clearance of contaminated land, medical care, rehabilitation, psycho-social support and economic opportunities" (ICRC 2010).

Outcome Documents
At the conclusion of the TPNW's 1MSP, states parties should adopt at least three outcome documents -a final report, a declaration, and an action plan -each of which should address the treaty's positive obligations.

Final Report
Following the model of most multilateral disarmament meetings, the TPNW's 1MSP should generate a final report that presents states parties' decisions. In this report, the 1MSP should establish working groups focused on individual positive obligations. Such bodies would be particularly helpful given the complexity and novelty of the victim assistance and environmental remediation obligations in the nuclear weapons context. They would provide a forum for more in-depth study than is possible in an MSP and promote timely implementation of obligations that can have a significant humanitarian impact on the ground.
The 1MSPs of the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions adopted a similar and highly successful architecture for ongoing work. The final report from the Mine Ban Treaty's Maputo meeting created "standing committees of experts," including ones dedicated to "mine clearance" and "victim assistance, socio-economic reintegration and mine awareness" (MBT 1MSP 1999, para. 25). Convened during intersessional meetings, these committees involved states, international organizations, and civil society and were "designed to promote and develop practical measures to realize the objectives of the treaty and to mobilize the resources necessary." 3 Since the 1MSP, the committees have heard reports on progress and problems, encouraged the exchange of best practices, advanced planning and implementation, generated funding for mine action, and maintained the treaty's momentum (Eaton 2008, 130). The final document from the 1MSP of the Convention on Cluster Munitions set up a comparable intersessional work program to discuss, inter alia, "victim assistance," "clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants and risk reduction education," and "cooperation and assistance" (CCM 1MSP 2010a, para. 22).

Declaration
The 1MSP of the TPNW should also produce a declaration that explicitly addresses the positive obligations. The declaration should present the obligations as priorities and politically commit states parties to implement them. The 1999 Maputo Declaration of the Mine Ban Treaty and 2010 Vientiane Declaration of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, both of which addressed clearance, victim assistance, and international cooperation and assistance, serve as models that a TPNW declaration could follow. In the former, participants pledged not only to work toward the eradication of antipersonnel landmines, but also to "clear mined areas and thus free the land from its deadly bondage," and "to assist the victims to reclaim their lives." 4 The declaration called on those who could offer assistance to help mine-affected countries "meet the enormous challenges of humanitarian mine action," and provide support for victim assistance and mine awareness education 5 . The commitments laid out in the Vientiane Declaration included "accelerat[ing] progress on clearance . . ., expand[ing] the coverage of services for victims and survivors and increas[ing] the level of resources provided for these tasks." 6 These goals are equally applicable to the TPNW.
Other participants at the 1MSP may also produce declarations. Two such declarations were placed in the record of the Vientiane MSP: one from survivors and one from youth. Each foregrounded victim assistance and clearance. The Survivors' Declaration urged states parties to tailor victim assistance to the "needs and demands" of survivors, "mobilize adequate resources," and "translate your commitments into real changes in the lives of survivors." It further urged states to "clear the land of this hazardous litter, so it ceases to victimize" (CCM 1MSP 2010b). The Vientiane Youth Declaration "call[ed] on all states to secure the rights of those injured by cluster munitions and anyone with a disability who may still suffer from discrimination, as well as increase capacity for UXO clearance" (CCM 1MSP 2010c). Survivors and youth groups played a significant role in the creation of the TPNW, and their voices will remain important in the treaty's implementation phase.

Action Plan
Finally, the TPNW's 1MSP should agree on an action plan that provides detailed guidance for implementation of the treaty's obligations and sets goals states parties should achieve within a set period of time. The action plan should cover all of the treaty's obligations, including those related to victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance (Bolton 2017, 19-20). While the Mine Ban Treaty did not issue an action plan until its First Review Conference, states parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions chose to adopt one at the 1MSP in keeping with the meeting's theme: "vision into action." 7 Such plans expedite progress by mapping out implementation steps immediately rather than waiting five years for a review conference.
The Vientiane Action Plan sought to "translat[e] the legal obligations of States Parties into concrete actions" by outlining mechanisms and milestones 8 . According to the document: "to ensure effective and timely implementation of the provisions [of the Convention on Cluster Munitions], . . . [t]he Plan sets out concrete and measurable steps, actions and targets to be completed within specific time periods and defines roles and responsibilities." While not legally binding, the action plan demonstrated states parties' "commitment to the rapid implementation of the Convention," served as a "priority list," and provided a "tool to monitor implementation progress." 9 To achieve its goals, the Vientiane Action Plan unpacked the convention's obligations, providing more detail on operationalization and, in some places, proposing deadlines for achieving them. For example, while the Convention on Cluster Munitions simply requires states parties to "conduct risk reduction education," Action #17 explains how they should tailor such education programs to the needs of participants and integrate them into "schools, community-based programs and public information campaigns." 10 Actions #12 and 13 aim to expedite clearance by setting a one-year deadline for identifying contaminated areas and developing a national plan 11 . Some actions items build on the convention's obligations but describe activities the instrument does not specifically 7 Vientiane Declaration, para. 3 (CCM 1MSP 2010a, Annex I, 6-8). 8 Vientiane Declaration, para. 3 (CCM 1MSP 2010a, Annex I, 6-8); Vientiane Action Plan, paras. 2-3 (CCM 1MSP 2010a, Annex II, 9-16). 9 Vientiane Declaration, paras. 2-3 (CCM 1MSP 2010a, Annex I, 6-8). 10 CCM, Article 4(2)(e); Vientiane Action Plan, para. 9, Action #17 (CCM 1MSP 2010a, Annex II, 9-16). 11 Vientiane Action Plan, para. 9, Actions #12-13 (CCM 1MSP 2010a, Annex II, 9-16).
require. Action #25, for example, seeks to improve victim assistance programs by calling for a "review of the availability, accessibility and quality of services" and "immediate action to increase availability and accessibility of services also in remote and rural areas." 12 The TPNW's first action plan should similarly elaborate and expand on the treaty's obligations and, where appropriate, set a timetable for their completion.

Substance of the 1MSP
The impact of the TPNW's 1MSP depends not only on its structure, but also on the substance of its discussions and documents. States parties should use the meeting to create a framework for implementing the treaty's victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance obligations. In some areas, states parties can draw from the precedent of the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions. In others, they will have to make adjustments for the distinctive characteristics of nuclear weapons. In the end, the 1MSP should agree on practical steps for implementation, follow several guiding principles, tailor their interpretations of the positive obligations to the nuclear weapons context, and show that realization of these humanitarian provisions is feasible (IHRC-CEOBS 2020) 13 .

Practical Steps
The TPNW's 1MSP can look to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to identify practical steps for implementation of the positive obligations. Although TPNW Article 6(1) on victim assistance does not address these steps, its language draws heavily from Article 5(1) of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. That convention enumerates implementation measures in Article 5(2) and can provide a basis for a TPNW action plan. The action plan should commit affected states parties to assessing the harm to be addressed and prioritizing assistance to be provided. It should also call on those states to develop national victim assistance plans, appoint a government focal point, create a budget, and adopt relevant legal and administrative measures. These steps would lay the foundation for immediate and long-term victim assistance and increase coordination and accountability. Given that such actions are both manageable and important, the action plan could impose a deadline, ideally the 2MSP, for completion.
The 1MSP's action plan should similarly commit states parties to adopting practical steps for environmental remediation. Building on Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, affected states parties to the TPNW should begin by assessing the extent and nature of contamination and identifying priority areas for remediation. They should adopt national plans and dedicate funding for the process. As with victim assistance, selecting focal points and promulgating laws and regulations would further increase the effectiveness of an environmental remediation program. Finally, affected states parties should design a mechanism by which to monitor nuclear contamination and progress in remediating it. The TPNW's first action plan could set a deadline, preferably the 2MSP, for completing these foundational steps.
To implement Article 7, the 1MSP should address the practicalities of international cooperation and assistance, which is crucial to fulfillment of the other positive obligations. TPNW states parties can again look to Convention on Cluster Munitions precedent for guidance. Using the Vientiane Action Plan as a model, TPNW donor states should agree to support affected states as they develop the national plans discussed above and to respond in a timely manner to requests for assistance 14 . Donor and affected states parties should work together to develop a "specific and effective framework to discuss assistance and international cooperation issues in order to identify needs and mobilise resources as well as to allow other States to present lessons learned and good practices." 15 States parties should also coordinate with international and nongovernmental actors who work in the areas of victim assistance and environmental remediation.

Guiding Principles
The TPNW's 1MSP should ensure that the positive obligations are implemented in accordance with several overarching principles that originate in international human rights and humanitarian disarmament law. Article 6(1) states that victim assistance must be provided in accordance with international human rights law and "without discrimination." Non-discrimination is a foundational principle of international human rights law, which protects people of regardless of race, sex, religion, age, disability, sexual orientation, or other status (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 2(1); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Article 5(2); Human Rights Council 2011, preamble). According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, assistance providers should also not discriminate among victims or between victims and other persons with disabilities (CCM, Article 5(2)(e)). While environmental remediation and international cooperation are not directed at specific individuals and communities, states parties should avoid discrimination in these areas as well.
Through their discussions and documents, states parties at the 1MSP should also pledge to guarantee inclusivity in the implementation of their positive obligations. In its victim assistance article, the Convention on Cluster Munitions requires states parties to "[c]losely consult with and actively involve cluster munition victims and their representative organizations" (CCM, Article 5(2)(f)). This process, which is applicable to all of the positive obligations, empowers survivors by allowing them to participate in decisions that affect their lives. Inclusivity also strengthens victim assistance and environmental remediation programs because they can take into account victims' expertise regarding the problems at hand and the best way to address them. States parties should actively involve affected individuals and communities in all stages of the planning, implementation, and monitoring of programs.
The 1MSP should further express a commitment to accessibility. As recognized in Action #25 of the Vientiane Action Plan, affected individuals can face difficulties receiving support. Rural people, for example, may not be able to access victim assistance if delivery takes place in distant cities 16 . In addition, they may not understand how to obtain assistance or to protect themselves from contamination if instructions and warnings are not presented in their language and in layperson's terms. Therefore, the 1MSP should recognize the importance of accessibility, and its action plan should enumerate steps to help overcome physical and informational barriers (IHRC-CEOBS 2020, 44-47).
Finally, the 1MSP should ensure the positive obligations are implemented in a transparent manner. While the TPNW does not establish reporting requirements, the Mine Ban Treaty requires updates on clearance, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions obliges states parties to report the status of victim assistance, clearance, and international cooperation and assistance (Mine Ban Treaty, Article 7(1)(f); CCM, Article 7(1)(i, k, n). Regular reporting would provide valuable information to victims, facilitate independent monitoring, and promote accountability. When affected states parties are transparent about their needs and progress, donor states know to whom assistance should be provided and what form it should take. TPNW states parties should commit to transparency reporting in their 1MSP action plan.

Tailored Interpretation
While the TPNW's 1MSP can look to precedent for practical steps and principles, it will have to interpret the treaty's positive obligations in a nuclear weapons context. According to Article 6(1), victim assistance requires "medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support" and measures for "social economic inclusion," but that list is not exhaustive. TPNW states parties have the opportunity to identify and commit to other types of assistance that are particularly relevant for survivors of nuclear weapons use and testing. For example, because nuclear testing has often displaced indigenous peoples, interfering with their way of life and separating them from land with which they are closely tied, states parties should support the efforts of these communities to preserve their cultural traditions (IHRC-CEOBS 2020, 24-26). Victim assistance should also encompass the provision of information about the harms and risks associated with nuclear contamination. Given that radiation is invisible to the naked eye, it can be difficult for laypeople to assess dangers and take appropriate measures to protect themselves without a clear understanding of the issue (IHRC-CEOBS 2020, 24, 27).
The 1MSP should elaborate on the meaning of the TPNW's environmental remediation provision, which is comparatively general. Because the provision was inspired by earlier obligations to clear landmines and cluster munitions, states parties can draw in part from the precedent of the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions (Mine Ban Treaty, Article 5(2); CCM, Article 4(2)). For example, the 1MSP should interpret the obligation to cover measures to minimize exposure, such as marking and fencing of contaminated areas and educating communities about risks they face and how they can protect themselves. The action plan should also note that, in the TPNW context, remediation can involve removing or containing nuclear waste (Article 36 and IHRC 2017, 5-6). A working group established by the final report could study options for implementation in more depth and facilitate the exchange of good practices.
The TPNW's international cooperation and assistance obligation would also benefit from elaboration at the 1MSP. TPNW Article 7 requires all states parties "in a position to do so" to provide "technical, material and financial assistance" to affected states parties. In keeping with an understanding of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the 1MSP should interpret Article 7 to mean that all states parties are in a position to provide some support given the range of forms it may take (Docherty and Moyes 2010, 394). At the same time, the 1MSP's action plan could offer examples of outside support that would be relevant in the nuclear context. Technical assistance, for instance, could entail sharing experiences addressing the health and environmental impacts of radiation, whether from nuclear weapons or nuclear power plants, or sending medical specialists or toxicity experts to train local professionals. Material assistance could include medical equipment, such as machines to screen for cancer, or technology to remediate contaminated environments. Financial assistance could be provided at different levels for any of these activities (IHRC-CEOBS 2020, 40-41).

Assurances of Feasibility
Finally, the 1MSP should recognize the challenges of implementing the positive obligations and strive to allay states parties' concerns about feasibility. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use and testing make victim assistance and environmental remediation daunting endeavors especially for affected states parties who bear primary responsibility for implementation 17 .
The 1MSP should clarify and emphasize the importance of the treaty's framework of shared responsibility. Article 6 must be read in conjunction with Article 7, which spreads the burden of assisting victims and remediating the environment. Article 7 not only gives all states parties the "right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties," but also, as discussed above, requires states parties "in a position to do so" to provide support to help affected states parties meet the positive obligations. In addition, Article 7(6) obliges states parties that have used or tested nuclear weapons to provide "adequate assistance" for victim assistance and environmental remediation to affected states parties. The 1MSP could reaffirm the responsibility of user and testing states parties in their declaration while making clear that those states are not essential to fulfilling the positive obligations. Because every state party should contribute, the positive obligations can be implemented even if the nuclear armed states have not joined the treaty.
The 1MSP could further recognize that affected states parties may implement some of their victim assistance and environmental remediation obligations over time. This principle of "progressive realization" is enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), a cornerstone of international human rights law. While it requires each state to work to the "maximum of its available resources" to meet its ICESCR obligations, it acknowledges that "full realization" of the covenant's rights will be achieved progressively (ICESCR, Article 2(1)). The explicit reference to human rights in TPNW Article 6(1) supports applying progressive realization to the socioeconomic elements of the treaty's victim assistance obligation. Environmental remediation should also be considered an ongoing process. Unlike the clearance articles in the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions, TPNW Article 6(2) does not set a deadline for environmental remediation (Mine Ban Treaty, Article 5(1); CCM, Article 4(1)(b)). It instead obliges states parties to "take necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of [contaminated] areas." Nevertheless, although implementing the positive obligations involves long-term commitments by states parties, the 1MSP's action plan could commit states to adopt interim measures, such as the practical steps discussed above, by a certain date.

Conclusion
While the TPNW's 1MSP has many topics to address, it should devote significant attention to the positive obligations, which have the potential to reduce human suffering and improve the health of the environment. Humanitarian disarmament precedent can facilitate states parties' work by informing the meeting's structure and substance. At the same time, states parties should recognize and respond to the distinctive and often daunting challenges of victim assistance and environmental remediation in the nuclear weapons context. Follow-up measures will be needed to assess the full extent of the problem, develop coordinated and comprehensive implementation strategies, monitor progress, and ensure accountability. A well-planned and thoughtful 1MSP will pave the way for future action and help ensure that the words of the TPNW become effective humanitarian practices.