Report of Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA) 2018

ABSTRACT The Panel on Peace and Security of Northeast Asia (PSNA) was established in November 2016 in order to facilitate “political processes, through timely policy recommendations and public engagement, to create a NEA-NWFZ as part of establishing peace and security in the region” (PSNA Mission Statement. 20 November 2016. http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/psna). The Panel consists of 17 members from 8 countries (Australia, China, Germany, Japan, Mongolia, the Republic of Korea, the UK and the US) with four co-chairs (Peter Hayes, Michael Hamel-Green, Chung-in Moon [acting co-chair, Yansoo Hwang] and Masao Tomonaga) (PSNA Members. http://www.recna.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/recna/psna-members). PSNA held its third meeting in Moscow, Russia, on 31 May–1 June 2018. This report contains two sections: (1) summary of the discussion at the third PSNA meeting and (2) comments from the co-chairs. While the contents of this report are based on the PSNA activities, the authors are responsible for the contents.

Special Session: "Global Perspectives and Russia's Foreign Policy" Keynote Speech by Mr Alexey Drobimin, Deputy Director of Foreign Policy Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Government At this Special Session, Mr Alexey Drobimin, Deputy Director of Foreign Policy Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Government, gave an excellent keynote speech on Russian foreign policy. After outlining basic policies of various areas, he referred to the five important nuclear issues; first is nuclear disarmament and its relationship with the US, second is Iran and Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), third is the DPRK issue, fourth is Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and finally the Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapon (TPNW). Especially, he expressed his concern over the latest US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and its decision to withdraw from the JCPOA. Meanwhile, he welcomed the recent developments on DPRK nuclear issues but emphasized that Russia would not seek "regime change" with putting more emphasis on stability and the need for multilateral talks among the countries in the region including Russia. For the TPNW, Russia shared its goal, but the approach is different and emphasized that as long as the threats exist, it would be a mistake to prohibit nuclear weapons without solving security situation.
In response, Mr Kensuke Yoshida of the Japanese Embassy in Russia made a brief comment on Japan's basic positions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues, especially he agreed with Russia on the DPRK nuclear issues. He also emphasized the need for dialogs between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states.
Session 1: "Need for Changes in Nuclear Doctrines of Nuclear Weapons States" Presentations There were two presentations (one from Russia [Lt-Gen(ret.) Evgeny Buzhinsky] and the other from China [Gen. Zhenqiang Pan]) and one comment from Russia (Mr Andrey Malyugin). All three speakers expressed their concerns over the latest US NPR. In particular, its explicit willingness to use nuclear weapons in nonnuclear weapon conflicts was a source of major concern. Meanwhile, Russia also stressed its need to have tactical nuclear weapons although there is a generic concern that tactical nuclear weapons exchange could escalate to global nuclear war. A presentation from China stressed that all NWS must change its doctrine to "reduce the role of nuclear weapons" in its security policy. Besides, the Chinese presentation emphasized the need for "vision" of nuclear-weapon-free-world and supported the initiative to promote Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ). Finally, it was noted that the future of nuclear strategy might become much more complex due to advancement in military technologies, such as cyber, space and robot.

Discussion
One comment was made on the vulnerability of the Command and Control system of nuclear weapons. There was also a discussion on the need for nuclear weapon modernization and new doctrines to allow limited use of nuclear weapons. There were also comments on mutual distrust, risk of nuclear terrorism and importance of no first use of nuclear weapons. In addition, there were opinions to renew negotiations between the US and Russia on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).  -Jung Suh]). While Russian presentations expressed their concerns over US Missile Defense programs, claiming that the role of nuclear weapons should be limited to deterrence and no action to harm such policy should be introduced. Meanwhile, analysis given by the US presentation suggests that these are overreactions. Its presentation reminded the participants of two important facts about the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD); 1. Exo-atmospheric interception is easily countermeasured and 2. Strategic defenses can provoke an offense-defense arms race. Prof. von Hippel emphasized the need to reeducate policy makers on those "basic facts" about BMD. A presentation by Dr Suh from Japan focused on the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system deployed in South Korea and possibly in Japan. Dr Suh stressed that deployment of the THAAD system has triggered a series of countermeasures by North Korea as well as China and Russia, saying that THAAD has a potential not only to undermine the strategic balance between the US and Russia as well as China but also to drive an arms race in Northeast Asia to an unprecedentedly dangerous level. He also warned that Japan too is directly contributing to the global and regional strategic instability through the deployment of THAAD radar and co-development of a more advanced missile defense system with the US.

Discussion
There was a discussion about who is driving the arms race in Northeast Asia. Even if DRPK stopped and dismantled its nuclear programs, it may not end the arms race in the region, as the tension between the US and China may continue due to the deployment of THAAD system and development of advanced missile defense system by Japan and the US. While it was also argued that the US was simply reacting to Chinese military expansion in the region, so-called "security dilemma" (measures to reduce external threats may increase the possibility of arms race) was the main problem of regional tension.  -in Moon]) and two commenters from Japan (Prof. Seiji Endo and Dr Jae-Jung Suh). This session was the most heated and the longest session in the entire workshop.
Russian presentations mostly focused on the differences in approaches to the DPRK nuclear issues between the US and Russia. The main difference is, according to the presentations by Russian experts, that the US demands "non-conditional" denuclearization by the DPRK, but Russians believe that DPRK will not give up nuclear arms unless the US also guarantees security and the end of military threats against DPRK. Both Dr Zhebin and Dr Ivashentsov stressed the need to establish a regional scheme to discuss security issues unlike Western Europe. Dr Pakhalina also argued that confidence-building measures in Europe can be a good example for Northeast Asia, saying that loss of confidence is the main source of arms race.
Dr Sigal from the US outlined the possible denuclearization process, saying that step-by-step approach is the best way to move forward. He argued that the first step is the declaration of the number of nuclear weapons and the quantity of fissile materials produced/stockpiled by DPRK and verification of such declaration might start. But he emphasized that "reciprocal commitment" for the Peace Treaty is very important. He also stressed that reciprocal inspection of North and South Korea is also important. Dr Sigal also supported the concept of NEA-NWFZ as it would provide a multilateral legal framework for denuclearization.
Dr Umebayashi emphasized that all regional parties should share the common goals of denuclearization of Korean Peninsular and the end of the Korean War. He argued that the common goals should include not only "denuclearization of Korean Peninsular" but also non-aggression agreement, mutual phased disarmament and pursuit of a peace treaty to end the Korean War. Once bilateral agreements are reached, he argued, the next step should be to make those common goals more solid and firm through multilateralization, such as six party talks held in the past negotiation. Dr Umebayashi also emphasized the important roles of the United Nations and of civil society as a monitor and mediator of the current process, as a non-biased and reliable organization.
Prof. Moon first outlined the significance of the Panmunjon Summit between the DPRK and ROK, saying that this was a great success as a confidence-building measure to reduce tensions and to end hostile relationship. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, he argued, is the final stage of the whole process. However, he cautioned that there are numerous hurdles to achieve such peaceful relationship since hostility against the North still exists in the region.
For comments, Prof. Endo reconfirms the importance of confidence-building measures. He also suggested that sharing the vision of the future is needed as it would help the current positive atmosphere to survive. He also said that the root cause of "driving for arms race" is "fear". This is not necessarily unique to DPRK, but all countries in the region. Prof. Endo referred to the concept of the East Asian community which was once proposed by is not politically viable in Japan now. He noted that we may need such a positive proposal or concept, and he welcomed the unilateral initiative if multilateral negotiation may face obstacles in the future. Prof. Suh suggested that Panmunjom Declaration could end the Cold War in the region. He also suggested that the two Koreas may need to find new ways to manage the border.

Discussion
There was a discussion between Russian and the US participants that there are differences in approaches towards the DPRK issue. Russian participants argued that Russia respects the DPRK regime, while the US demands not only denuclearization but also regime change. But US participants argued that the regime change was never a part of the US government policy. Russian participant also argued that a military option is not a part of Russian's policy, while the US insists that all options (including military option) are on the table. Other participant agreed that military option should not be a part of the policy mix, and a regional confidence scheme is needed in the region to avoid future conflicts (as in Europe). Dr Cotta-Ramusino summarized the importance of NPT but also identified the threats to the NPT such as the recent US decision to withdraw from the JCPOA which may generate serious problems for the NPT and the Middle East. He also pointed out the weakness of NPT, whose credibility may face challenges as recommendations of the final documents adopted by the Review conferences have not been implemented fully, which led to the lack of credibility of the entire NPT process. But he supported the TPNW and emphasized that TPNW can strengthen the NPT. He also pointed out that TPNW now prohibits NNWS to host nuclear weapons and so-called "nuclear sharing" which should be considered as "unacceptable" in the future.

June (2nd
On the other hand, Dr Baranovsky claimed that the TPNW is too radical under the current international security environment and argued that "incremental approach" is a better approach. He argued that no NWS or no nuclear-umbrella states will ratify the TPNW, and it would increase the gap between the NWS/ umbrella states and NNWS. Dr Tomonaga stressed the importance of "harmony" between the NPT and TPNW. As a member of Eminent Persons Group (EPG) set up by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, he introduced the summary of recommendations given by the EPG, suggesting that EPG's recommendations may be useful for "bridge-building" between the NWS and the NNWS. He also specifically proposed to hold an international conference between NWS and the NNWS to discuss "nuclear deterrence" issue.
Dr Yoshida also made specific recommendations for Japan to play a meaningful role in nuclear disarmament even if the Japanese government decided not to ratify the TPNW. Such recommendations include (1) victim assistance and environmental remediation (article 6 of the TPNW), (2) peace and disarmament education (Preamble), (3) establishment of a competent international authority for verification of nuclear weapon and programs (article 4) and (4) persuade other "umbrella states" to join these contributions.

Discussion
Both commentators made critical comments on the TPNW and the NPT Review Conference process. In fact, there was a heated discussion on the TPNW. The opponents of the TPNW argued that TPNW does not address the current security threats and there would even be a bigger risk as it may undermine the NPT Review Conference. The proponents of the TPNW argued that we need to understand that the current security threats are not adequately addressed by nuclear weapons and need new security policy not dependent on nuclear deterrence. But both agreed that improvements may be needed to the NPT Review Conference process, and we should help the process to make progress at the next Review Conference. Dr Hayes focused his remarks on nuclear terrorism risks but the ones with the risk of inadvertent nuclear war between nuclear-armed states. He also discussed the potential triggering effect of a non-state nuclear threat or attack on the nuclear conflict-prone relationships swirling around DPRK: the role of social media storms in triggering nuclear early warning systems, fake media, false alerts and losses of control that might arise from new technologies such as artificial intelligence. Finally, he also discussed the increased risk that non-state actors may trigger an inter-state nuclear war and the need for increased transparency and accountability of nuclear-armed states and non-state actors by the creation of a nuclear crimes tribunal, possibly by states party to the TPNW. Dr Oznobishchev discussed nuclear proliferation risks posed by the guarantee of access to civilian nuclear technologies, while lack of progress and problems in nuclear disarmament may have negative implications on the nuclear proliferation and nuclear security issues.

Discussion
Comment from Mr Margoev raised the issue of spent fuel management and posed the question whether reprocessing service and eventually fast reactor may provide a good solution to the spent fuel management. There was a discussion on the benefits/risks of reprocessing, but there was a general agreement that plutonium stockpile should be safely managed and reduced. International management on enrichment was also discussed. Risk of possible attack on civilian nuclear facilities was also a subject of discussion, and possible safety risks of nuclear facilities in DPRK were also a subject of discussion. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program used for Russia after the end of the Cold War could be applied to the DPRK denuclearization process. Electricity grid connection from ROK to DPRK was also suggested as a good confidence-building measure and could contribute to reduce safety risks of nuclear facilities in DPRK.

Concluding Sessions
Dr Michael Hamel-Green, one of co-chairs of PSNA, summarized the discussion and pointed out the following important points.
(1) Now, the TPNW is strongly supported by the NNWS, responsibility of NWS is becoming more important.
(2) New approach may be needed to address DPRK denuclearization process.
(3) New confidence-building measures may be needed between NWS/umbrella states and NNWS. Nuclear-umbrella states should play key roles in filling the gap between NWS and NNWS.

Comments from Co-Chairs
• Comment from Prof. Michael Hamel-Green The June 2018 Moscow PSNA Workshop took place shortly after the historic Panmunjom Summit and Declaration of April 2018 between North Korea's Kim Jongun and South Korea's new president, Moon Jae-in. In the wake of this encouraging development, there was a new degree of optimism at the workshop that the nuclear issues and threats on the Korean Peninsula might finally be addressed in a realistic and constructive waythrough dialog and negotiation rather the dangerous threats and counterthreats exchanged by President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un in the preceding year. The workshop proved exceptionally useful in identifying and discussing some key steps for achieving denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, securing a permanent end to the Korean War and negotiating wider regional frameworks for addressing nuclear, economic and security issues, including the establishment of a regional Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.
The optimism at the workshop was more than borne out in the ensuing June 2018 Trump-Kim Singapore Summit. This followed the unilateral confidence-building steps that both sides had undertaken: North Korean suspension of nuclear and missile testing and US postponement of major US-ROK military exercises near the border with North Korea. While the second February 2019 Trump-Kim Hanoi Summit failed to reach an agreement, in part because of disagreements over the lifting of sanctions, the two sides have continued to affirm their willingness to continue substantive talks. It is significant that shortly after the Hanoi Summit, the US and ROK indicated that they would continue to suspend all major annual military exercises close to the North Korean border, one of the major sources of tension with North Korea over the past decade. Every effort will need to be made by PSNA, the disarmament community and concerned governments to pursue further diplomatic steps and solutions for resolving the Korean Peninsula issues if the windows of the opportunity afforded by the Panmunjom and Singapore Summits are not to be lost.
The workshop also worked on constructive approaches to a number of other nuclear and security challenges and particularly helped to clarify Russian Government positions on many of the relevant issues, including the need for renewed START negotiations. Unfortunately, in recent months, both the US and Russia appear to have retreated in terms of arms control and disarmament. Both governments have made announcements about withdrawing from their bilateral Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty, a move that could reopen global concerns about the risks of nuclear escalation associated with tactical and intermediate-range nuclear weapon deployment.
The workshop also examined the new UN 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), with arguments raised both for and against the new treaty. In the ensuing period, there has been steady progress on signatures and ratifications of the new treaty among non-nuclear-weapon states, with 70 signatures and 22 ratifications as at March 2019. Critics of the treaty, particularly in nuclear weapon states, emphasize that the NPT remains the main forum for negotiating nuclear disarmament. However, fears of an exodus from the NPT as a result of the new treaty have not been borne out: no TPNW signatory states have withdrawn or shown lack of support for the NPT. At the same time, the recent Kashmir crisis between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, and the consequent risk of a South Asian regional nuclear war, has once again exposed the limitations of the NPT as a disarmament negotiation forum since both India and Pakistan are not parties to the NPT. Recent research has indicated that even a limited nuclear war in South Asia, with an exchange of some 100 nuclear weapons, would not only be an unthinkable catastrophe for those within the region but also cause worldwide environmental and climatic impacts on crops that would result in some two billion deaths. All nine of the nuclear weapon states, whether within or outside the NPT, frequently justify nuclear-weapon possessions in terms of protecting their own "security". Yet, when even a "limited" nuclear war will result in an unparalleled global catastrophe, non-nuclear-weapon-states may legitimately ask, as New Zealand asked nuclear weapon states at the 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, "Whose security are you talking about?".

• Comment from Dr Peter Hayes
On the discussion in the Session 3, "Peace and Security for Northeast Asia: Confidence Building in NE Asia", deployment of THAAD system was referred as the main reason of conflict between the US and China. But the major nuclear weapons arms racing is not BMD but land-based IRBM by China and Russia in the Far East and by China, Russia and the United States with SSBNs and their anti-SSBN ASW forces. I do not know if that was discussed, but in real arms race, these forces matter, whereas BMD is all about symbolic politics, not perceived real capabilities to annihilate the other.
Besides, on the same discussion in Session 3, there was a clause that "But US participants argued that the regime change was never a part of the US government policy". This may be applied to a few US participants, including myself, but that elements of the US Government, especially Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Treasury, did launch financial sanctions aimed at destabilizing and changing the regime. Of course, they failed.

Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. Satoshi Hirose was born in 1961. He graduated from International Christian University (BA, MA). He served for the UNDP, Japanese Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, and taught in several universities and colleges. He joined RECNA upon its establishment in 2012 as its Vice Director.