The Senkaku Islands Dispute: Four Reasons of the Chinese Offensive - A Japanese View

ABSTRACT This article introduced China’s four reasons of offensive to the Senkaku Islands: the first reason China’s natural resources demand; the second reason historical issues with Japan that have some relationship to Chinese people’s wartime memories; the third reason the Senkaku Islands Dispute as a tool of Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s internal power struggle; the fourth reason the Senkaku Islands Dispute as a tool of CCP for China’s national integration. Some reasons of Chinese offensive have been intertwined with each other, though the first reason is the main issue and the origin of the Senkaku Islands Dispute. It seems that other three reasons are supportive reasons for the natural resources demand, and byproducts of the dispute between Japan and China. The author discusses the occurrence and changes of these four reasons and concludes that the third and fourth reasons will be more troublesome than the others because they are unpredictable.


Introduction 1
China's maritime adventurism in the East and South China Seas has lately attracted considerable attention. Fifty percent of China's claimed jurisdictional waters are competing with neighboring countries in the East Asia. 2 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has named People's Republic of China (PRC) as a maritime power in the 18 th Party Congress in 2012 (People's daily Online in Japanese, November 12 2012), and the PRC challenges Japan, the U.S. A., and the ASEAN countries. What happens in the East China Sea? China takes the maritime offensive against Japan. The authordefines the word "offensive" not only the military means, but also the political, legal, economic, and psychological means to oppress the competitor. 3 If so, the Chinese maritime offensive against Japan includes not only the actual maritime conflict in the East China Sea, but also the natural resources demand at the disputed waters, anti-Japan demonstration inside and outside of China, the sovereignty assertion in relevant to historical issues with Japan, CCP's internal power struggle, and China's national integration policy.

Basic information of the geographic and historical facts of the Senkaku Islands
The Senkaku Islands are composed of five islands -Uotsurijima Island (3.6 km 2 , Figure  1 Koichi Sato). 9 The basic information on Senkaku islands is from the homepage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. Accessed January 2, 2014. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html.
km northwest of Ishigakijima Island, and they are also about 170 km from Taiwan, though they are 330 km from the Chinese mainland. If the Japanese fishermen use the fishing boat from Ishigakijima Island, it takes 5~7 hours. 10 If the Chinese government dispatches their patrol vessels from the mainland China, it takes two days. 11 Uotsurijima Island is the biggest island (363 meters above sea level), and it has some mountain streams (freshwater resources). 12 Some Japanese universities such as Ryukyu   10 Nakayama, Chugoku ga Mimi wo Fusagu Senkakushoto no Futsugo na Shinjitsu, 52. 11 Author's interview from the Japan Coast Guard Officer on November 21 2012. 12 Takara,Senkaku Kenkyu Jo,237. The geological features of the Uotsurijima Island are quite different from the South China Sea Islands. Many of South China Sea Islands and their maritime features are composed of coral reef, but the geological bases of the Uotsurijima Island are Conglomeratic sandstone and Andesite. 20 The coral reef attached surface of these rocks. That was a reason why building a wharf was a tough job for the fishermen. Koga's men set dynamite in the crevasse of the coastal rock, and they blasted it. 21 So that they could expand the crevasse and build a small wharf. 22 The sea area surrounding the Senkaku Islands has been a good fishing ground until now, though few Okinawa fishermen had the power boats and cold storages in the 1890s. 23 Koga's company Koga Shoten could almost monopolize the fish catch in the Senkaku Islands, because they have enough money to construct the plant for dried bonito and fishermen's houses in Senkaku Islands. They concentrated the dried bonito production for the markets of Osaka and Kobe. 24 The Senkaku Islands had a population of 248 (99 houses) in 1909, and Okinawa Mainichi Shimbun, an Okinawan newspaper reported that dried bonito produced in Senkaku Islands are almost 50% of the dried bonito production in Okinawa prefecture in 1910. 25 Koga's fishery business was successful, though it was stopped because of the shortage of the fuel for fishing boats during the World War II, and the Senkaku Islands became the uninhabited islands during the postwar period. 26 Koga's family maintained the ownership of Uotsurijima Island, Kitakojima Island, Minamikojima Island, and Kubajima Island, though the U. S. navy rented Kubajima Island and state-owned Taishojima Island for shooting targets. 27 Koga's family sold four of the Senkaku Islands to Kunioki Kurihara, an estate-owner in Saitama Prefecture in April 1978. 28 The Japanese fishermen's activities in the Senkaku sea area continued, and Ishigaki City Mayor Yoshitaka Nakayama stated that the total amount of fish catch in 1978 reached 1.5 billion yen. 29 The Senkaku Islands attracted attention after the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) of the United Nations conducted an academic survey in the autumn of 1968, which indicated the possibility of the existence of petroleum resources in the East China Sea. 30 China and Taiwan (ROC) suddenly began to claim the Senkaku Islands as their own territory. Taiwan asserted that Diaoyotai Lieyu (Senkaku Islands' Taiwan name) belonged to Taiwan on April 20 1971. 31 China asserted that Diaoyu Islands belonged to China on December 30 1971. 32 If so, the energy (oil) resource issue may have been a main factor of contention at first.

China's natural resources demand
The Chinese population showed an increase of 585 million people, 4.5 times of that of the Japanese population, from 1967 to 2010, 33 and so China badly needed the energy resources and protein, though almost all of the profitable oil fields in the land area had already been developed, and rice crop production was a primary job for the land space. 34 The Chinese government pursued the marine resources of the East and South China Seas. That is the reason why China claims the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea Islands.

Energy resources
A geophysical survey was conducted in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea between October 12 and November 29 1968 aboard R/V F. V. HUNT. 35 Joint participation of scientists from the ROC, the Republic of Korea, and Japan with American scientists was provided through ECAFE. The ECAFE report in May 1969 describes, "Sediments beneath the continental shelf and in the Yellow Sea are believed to have great potential as oil and gas reservoirs. An area several times larger than Taiwan lies north of that island with sediment thickness exceeding 2 km, and perhaps reaching the 9 km thickness that underlies Taiwan.
Most of these sediments are believed to be Neogene in age, the same as the oil-producing strata on the island." 36 This report caused the sensation in East Asia, and Okinawa Reversion in 1972 was also published by the Heads of the United States and Japan in November 1969. Okinawa Reversion meant the transference on Okinawa administration from the United States to Japan. The oil resource report and the administrative transference moved China and Taiwan to begin the ownership competition of the Senkaku Islands, though the ECAFE report was based on an elementary seismic reflection with a 30,000joule sparker, and not based on the full-scale investigation and boring.
The Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka asked the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai what they should do about the Senkaku Islands at the first Japan-China Summit Meeting in Beijing in September 1972. Zhou Enlai answered, "I don't want to talk about the Senkaku Islands, this time. It is not good to discuss this now. It became an issue because of the oil out there. If there wasn't oil, neither Taiwan nor the United States would make this an issue." 37 If so, it is right to say that the energy issue is the origin of the Senkaku Dispute.
The latest technology of the marine resources' investigation gave the pessimistic prediction of the oil and gas deposit in the East China Sea, too. The Japanese government estimated the deposit of oil and gas in the Japanese area of the East China Sea (the Eastern side of the median line between Japan and China: Figure 5) to be 500 million 33 Ajia Keizai Kenkyusho, Ajia Doko Nenpo 1971, 98;Ajia Keizai Kenkyusho, Ajia Doko Nenpo 2011, 131. 34  kiloliters (0.425 billion tons: 1ton = 1.176 kiloliters) in 1994. 38 The Chinese oil specialist also shows the pessimistic data. Dan Hougun reported that two-thirds of the Chinese offshore oil production proceeded in the Bohai Sea area, and one-third proceeded in the  South China Sea, and the production in the East China Sea was said to be less than 0.01%. 39 The Chinese offshore oil and gas production in 2010 was said to be beyond 50 million tons, and it is about 10% of the total Chinese oil consumption. 40 China's annual consumption of oil quantity is so huge, and we understand that currently we cannot expect too much for the oil deposit in the East China Sea.

Fishery resources
There was no major fishery incident caused by the Chinese fishermen in the East China Sea until April 1978 (see fifth part) because of their poor fishing technology and equipment. 41 In February 1979, a nationwide work forum on aquatic products was held in Beijing in which the direction, mission, and policy for accelerating the development of China's aquatic production industry were laid down. 42 The Chinese government adopted the responsibility system to step up agricultural production, and it introduced the system to fishermen as well.
The fishing equipment including boats and nets improved, and the appearance of Chinese fishing boats in the East China Sea become every day affair. The Chinese fishery statistics reported that the total fish catch was 14.98 million tons in 1999, and it was decreased to 13.28 million tons in 2016 (see Table 1). The total quantity of the marine fish farming exceeded the  39 Dan, "Chugoku no Kaiyo Kaihatsu Senryaku," 82-83. It is said that the gas deposit is much bigger than the oil deposit in the East China Sea. 40 Dan, "Chugoku no Kaiyo Kaihatsu Senryaku," 82-83, author's interview with the Japanese oil specialist on June 7 2013. 41 Song, "China's Ocean Policy," 983-998. 42 Ibid. total quantity of the fish catch in 2006. The Chinese population in 1999 was 1,257.86 million, and it increased to 1,382.71 million in 2016. 43 We are sure that China's per capita fish catch quantity in a year decreased from 11.9 kg in 1999 to 9.6 kg in 2016.
The Japanese fishery statistics reported that the total fish catch was 3.92 million tons in 2004, and it decreased to 2.93 million tons in 2016 (see Table 2). The total quantity of the marine fish catches always exceeded the total quantity of the marine fish farming from 2004 to 2016. The Japanese population in 2004 was 127.73 million, and it decreased to 126.96 million in 2016. 44 Japan's per capita fish catch quantity in a year decreased from 30.6 kg in 2004 to 23.0 kg in 2016. We can understand that the per capita marine fish catch in Japan is bigger than the per capita marine fish catch in China. Further, we shall take notice of the fact that both marine fish catches in China and Japan are declining in these 13 years (see Tables 1 & Table 2). 45 In 2016, China's total quantity of its marine fish catch was 13.28 million tons, while the total quantity of its marine fish farming production was 19.63 million tons (see Table 3). The  total quantity of its freshwater catch was 2.31 million tons, and its total freshwater fish farming production was 31.79 million tons. To compare, that same year, Japan's total quantity of marine fish catch was 2.93 million tons, and its total quantity of marine fish farming was 1.03 million tons. The total quantity of Japan's freshwater catch was 0.03 million tons, and its total freshwater fish farming production was 0.04 million tons. China's total fishery production quantity in 2016 was 69.01 million tons, and Japan's total fishery production quantity in the same year was 4.36 million tons; Japan's total fishery production quantity was just 6.31% of that of China's. We can easily understand the hugeness of the China's appetite for the fishery production. The statistics also show the massiveness of the quantity of China's fresh water fish farming. It occupies 46.0% of the Chinese total fishery production, in comparison with Japan's 0.9%. These data let us guess at the serious pollution damage done to Chinese coastal waters for marine fish farming. China's Ocean Development Report supported our guess. It reported on the severe marine pollution in the Chinese coastal areas including the South and East China Seas, especially the sea area at the mouth of the Zhu Jiang (Pearl River) in 2009. 46 It reported that there are sedimentations of cadmium, copper, petroleum oil waste, arsenic, dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane, and polychlorinated biphenyl on the seabed of Chinese coastal areas. 47 Red tides were reported 82 times in China in 2007, including 60 times in the East China Sea. 48 A recent report disclosed the grade of the contamination and the quantity of the contaminant, too. China's Ocean Development Report 2014 reported a part of the details (see Table 4). China's Ocean Development Report 2017 also reported that the coastal waters' pollution was still serious. 49 If the Chinese government fails in the prevention of marine and river pollution in the future, China's coastal waters will soon die. Chinese fishing boats would go fishing in the East and South China Seas to cover the huge demand of fishery products, and this is the reason that China has a deep attachment to the Senkaku Islands and their sea areas. The conflicts of Chinese fishing boats and CCG's patrol vessels with those of Japan and the ASEAN countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, would escalate.
The Japan-China fisheries agreement was made on November 11 1997. 50 The agreement divides the East China Sea into five sections, namely, Japanese and Chinese respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), Japan-China Intermediate Zone, Japan- China Provisional Measures Zone, and Zone South of Latitude 27 North ( Figure 5). Japan and China decide each partner's quantity of fish catches in their respective EEZs. The Japanese and Chinese fishermen can freely operate in Japan-China Intermediate Zone. Japan and China cooperate on the management of the fish catch in Japan-China Provisional Measures Zone, and there is no regulation on fish catch in the sea area surrounding Senkaku Islands: South of Latitude 27 North, because Japan and China have not yet settled the territorial issues of the Senkaku Islands. 51 The Chinese fishing boats rush to the Senkaku Sea Areas. The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) only drives out or detains the Chinese fishing boats when the Chinese fishing boats enter the territorial waters of Senkaku Islands. If Japan will leave the free operation of these Chinese fishermen in the sea area of the Senkaku Islands, the fishery resource will be drained in the near future. The Japanese and Chinese governments should cooperate on the management and maintenance of fishery resource in the sea area of Senkaku Islands, and both nations should alleviate the environmental degradation of the East China Sea.

Historical issues of the Senkaku islands
China has begun to suggest two historical reasons to claim the Senkaku Islands after the publication of ECAFE report in 1969. We understand that these historical reasons are to defend and support China's natural resources demand. First, China asserts that the Senkaku Islands had been part of Taiwan, which was deprived by Japan at the Treaty of Shimonoseki at the end of the First Japan-China War in 1895. Second, China asserts that the Senkaku Islands have belonged to China since ancient times. China uses these two reasons, denounces Japan, and urges Japan to resolve the issue through negotiations.

The Senkaku Islands as part of Taiwan?
The Chinese claims that the Senkaku Islands had been part of Taiwan, which were seized by Japan as a result of the First Japan-China War. The then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi's comment at the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 28 2012 was provocative. He said, "The moves taken by Japan are totally illegal and invalid. They can in no way change the historical fact that Japan stole the Diaoyu Island and affiliated islands and that China has sovereignty over them." 52 Japan then exercised its right to reply. The then Japan's Deputy U. N. Ambassador, Kazuo Kodama, restated Tokyo's position that no sovereignty dispute existed and that Japan began surveying the islands a decade before deciding to incorporate them in 1895, and there exists no evidence that the islands belonging to China. 53 He said, "It has only been since the 1970s that the government of China and the Taiwanese authorities began making their assertions on territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. Before then they did not express any objections." 51 A former senior officer of Japan Coast Guard, interview by author, Tokyo, October 3 2016. 52 Quinn and Eckert, "U.S. call for 'cool heads' in China-Japan island disputes goes unheeded," Reuters, September 28, 2012, Accessed May 15, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-japan-usa/u-s-call-for-cool-heads-in-chinajapan-island-dispute-goes-unheeded-idUSBRE88Q1ZL20120928. 53 Ibid.
Which is right? There are many pieces of evidence that support Japan's point. First, when shipwrecked fishermen from the ROC were washed ashore on a Uotsurijima Island in 1919 and were rescued by Japanese citizens who lived on Ishigakijima Island, the Chinese government sent four letters of gratitude to the Ishigakijima Islanders including Zenji Koga, stating in no unclear terms that the Senkaku Islands were Japanese territory. 54 Two of them are preserved in Yaeyama Museum in Ishigaki City (Ryukyushimpo, November 28 2010). A letter ( Figure 6) was addressed to the then Ishigaki Village Mayor Zensa Toyokawa and other letter was addressed to the then Ishigaki village official Sonban Tamayose.
Second, China asserts that the Cairo declaration of 1943 said territory acquired by Japan from Qing Dynasty "shall be restored to the Republic of China (ROC), and Japan later accepted the 1945 Potsdam Declaration, which called for implementation of the Cairo Declaration, therefore, the Senkaku Islands belong to China" (Asahi Shimbun, September 27 2012). The Japanese have two logics to rebuff this argument. Firstly, the ROC government never recognized the Senkaku Islands as their territories as aforementioned. Secondly, the Japanese government uses the legal logic. The Japanese government document said, "the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration were documents that stipulated the basic postwar settlement policy of the Allied powers." 55 It says as follows: There is no evidence that shows that the Allied powers, including the ROC, recognized that the Senkaku Islands were included among "the islands appertaining to Formosa (Taiwan)" as stated in the Cairo Declaration in these declarations. In any event, the disposition of territories as a result of a war is ultimately settled by international agreement such as peace treaties. In the case of World War II, the San Francisco Peace Treaty legally defined the territory of Japan after war. Neither "the Cairo Declaration nor the Potsdam Declaration had the ultimate legal validity on the treatment of Japanese Territory." Further, the then PRC leaders also never recognized the Senkaku Islands as part of the deprived Chinese territories from Japan. Both ROC and PRC were not invited to the San Francisco Peace Conference on September 8 1951 because of the issues of Chinese representation. But they had some chances to assert the sphere of the deprived Chinese territories. The then Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai asserted that "the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, and the Pratas Islands (the South China Sea Islands) were the China's territories, though he never mentioned the Senkaku Islands" on August 15 1951. 56 He also refused the efficiency of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the statement on September 8 1951, though he never mentioned the Senkaku Islands. 57 Third, an article of People's Daily dated January 8 1953 introduced that "the Ryukyu Islands which consist of seven groups of islands: the Senkaku Islands, the Sakishima Islands, the Daito Islands, the Okinawa Islands, the Oshima Islands, the Tokara Islands, and the Osumi Islands," indicating that China (PRC) recognized the Senkaku Islands as part of Okinawa. 58 It is clear that China did not recognize the Senkaku Islands as part of Taiwan in 1953. The Chinese maps and Taiwanese maps before 1971 also described the Islands as the Senkaku Islands, and they did not use the Chinese name Diaoyu Islands. 59 Fourth, Taiwan's territorial status itself was unclear among the party cadre of the CCP before the end of World War II. At its Second Congress in 1922, the CCP called for the unification of China, but did not mention Taiwan as part of the territory to be included within its borders. 60 In an interview with Edgar Snow in 1936, Mao Zedong made the same point more explicitly. Likening Taiwan to Korea, Mao said that both territories should become independent states following the defeat of Japan, rather than being reattached to China. 61 However, the CCP's policy toward the island changed after the relocation of the Nationalists to Taiwan in 1949. The CCP began to call the reunification of Taiwan with the rest of China.

The Senkaku Islands have belonged to China since ancient times?
The Chinese government officials always assert that the Senkaku Islands have belonged to China since ancient times, 62 though the PRC's territory is not equivalent to many of the ancient Middle Kingdoms. The descriptions of the uninhabited islands and rocks in the old maps are not effective evidence for the territorial claim, either. 63  countries including Ryukyu Kingdom (Okinawa). Their records several times described the Senkaku Islands as the navigational guide from the old Chinese Dynasty to Ryukyu in the premodern days, though there were no evidence that the Chinese citizens' life in the islands. 64 According to the study of Chen Kan's Personal Record of the Ming Dynasty's Envoy to Ryukyu (Shiliuqiulu), the crew of envoy's vessel, a kind of Junk, needed the pilot, or a pilot boat of Ryukyu Kingdom, because the Chinese crew were not familiar with the navigation to Ryukyu through the Senkaku Islands. 65 Professor Sakae Midorima, author of the study, concluded that personal record of Chen Kan is not suitable for the evidence of Chinese sovereignty, though the PRC government utilizes it as the evidence. 66 The historical statistics support Midorima's conclusion. The Chinese envoys' vessels went to Ryukyu Kingdom 22 times from 1372 to 1866 for the enthronements' approvals, and the Ryukyu's tributary trade missions visited China 171 times in Ming Dynasty's period from 1372 to 1644. 67 The Ming Dynasty prohibited its people from ocean trade with foreign countries (Kaikin in Japanese: Haijin in Chinese), and they did not have many chances of navigation to the Senkaku Islands. 68 Two Chinese scholars, Li Guoqiang and Zhang Haipeng, published the provocative article in People's Daily (People's Daily, May 8 2013). They asserted that Okinawa's territorial status had not been defined, and they said that China could begin the revision of not only the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Senkaku Islands, but also the Ryukyu annexation process of 1872-1879. It seemed to be a kind of "Restore Ryukyu" movement with the Chinese expansionist emotion. 69 The Japanese government made a protest to the Chinese government about this issue, and the two authors explained their assertion as the refutation against Prime Minister Abe's "irresponsible comments" on the Sino-Japanese historical issues (Asahi Shimbun, May 29 2013). Some Japanese analysts suggest that their logic is a kind of "three warfares ." 70 Li Guoqiang and Zhang Haipeng said, "Regarding this article, we had no instruction from any Chinese government's bureaus. Further, we are surprised to hear the protest from the Japanese government, because we know Japan is a democratic country and anti-governmental opinions should be accepted" (Asahi Shimbun, May 29 2013). Several Japanese government officers consider that their logic of "Ryukyu as TBD (to be decided) Attribution" are relevant to the Chinese government's will to instigate the Ryukyu Independence Movement in Okinawa and to divide the Japanese public opinion. 71 It may be in accordance with the "three warfare" logic. The Japanese think that these Chinese works are not successful, because many Okinawan people complained about the concentration of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa to the Japanese Central Government, though they still consider themselves as the Japanese nation. 72 The Chinese government and Chinese academics might overestimate the cultural and historical influences of the premodern middle kingdom to Okinawa. 73 We should state, "if China has the confidence on legal grounds for their claim on the East China Sea or Okinawa, the Chinese government should bring suits against the Japanese government for settlement at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)." We only can settle the issues of territories peacefully on the basis of modern international laws including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982. It seems that China has no will to bring suits against Japan for settlement at the ITLOS. It means that China is unable to find an effective legal move.
It is also said that some Chinese and Taiwanese scholars asserted that the Senkaku Islands were the Diaoyutai Lieyu (Diaoyutai Islands) in the old Chinese book Taihaishichalu. 74 Associate Professor Nozomu Ishi of Nagasaki Junshin Catholic University found the Taiwan government geographic materials which identified that Diaoyutai Islands were the islands which were located due Southeast of Taiwan. The Senkaku Islands are located due northeast of Taiwan, and so Diaoyutai Islands seemed to be the different islands. We also shall confirm the island name: "Diaoyutai" is a common noun, or a proper noun. If it is a common noun, Diaoyutai means just a fishing spot, and there may be some other Diaoyutais in China and Taiwan. 75

The Senkaku Islands dispute as a tool of CCP's internal power struggle
The delegation of the Japan-China Friendship Association visited China, and they met the then Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping on October 3 1974. 76 Deng Xiaoping told the head of Japanese delegation, Mr. Hisao Kuroda, a Japanese Diet member of the House of Councilors that, "we should promote the negotiation of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty though some logistical agreements are still in the process. The Senkaku Islands Dispute should be shelved, because if we insist on solving this issue, we cannot solve it forever." The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs never admitted that they accepted the suggestion of Deng to shelve the Senkaku Islands Dispute, because the Japanese foreign ministry considered that China could not claim the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, historically and legally, as aforementioned. But, anyway, Japan agreed not to negotiate the Senkaku Islands Dispute with China as a pre-condition of the peace and friendship treaty.
One hundred eight Chinese fishing boats suddenly entered the sea area of the Senkaku Islands on April 12 1978, early in the morning, and 16 of them entered the Japanese territorial waters (Asahi Shimbun, April 13 1978). 77 The JCG patrol vessel "Yaeyama" (350 tons) warned these fishing boats to leave the Japanese territorial waters, but nine Chinese fishing boats besieged "Yaeyama" and showed the JCG crew the wooden board with Chinese characters "This is Chinese territory, we have a right to navigate and fish" (Asahi Shimbun, April 13 1978). A part of the boats installed machineguns, and the crew drew the cabin wall and plates with the slogan: "Diaoyu Island is the Chinese territory, we never permit any foreigner's invasion" to the JCG patrol vessels (Figures 7-10). The PLA navy base at Yantai and the PLA navy port at Amoi controlled these vessels by the ship radio. The JCG dispatched three patrol vessels including "Yaeyama" to the Senkaku sea areas, and they ordered the Chinese fishing boats to leave the Japanese territorial waters (Asahi Shimbun, evening paper, April 13 1978). The Japanese government asked the Chinese government through the Japanese Embassy in Beijing to withdraw the fishing boats from the Senkaku sea areas in the morning on April 14 1978(Asahi Shimbun, evening paper, April 14 1978. The total number of the Chinese fishing boats which illegally entered the Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands from April 12 to May 14 is 357, and 123 fishing boats did the illegal fishing in the sea areas of the Senkaku Islands. 78 Many of these fishing boats armed with machineguns and automatic rifles and some of the Chinese crew aimed at "Yaeyama" with the automatic rifles (Asahi Shimbun, April 15 1978). The Japanese government was embarrassed by their behaviors because Vice-Premier Deng said that China had no intention to suggest the issues of Senkaku Islands   began to return to China, though a small number of them continued to come and enter the Senkaku territorial waters intermittently until May 14 1978. 79 The incident was beyond the international common sense, and the Japanese people could not understand China's inside story until June 22 1978. A Hong Kong newspaper Mingbao reported the contents of the wall newspapers posted on the wall of the building in Shanghai City, and it was translated and reported in Japan by Asahi Shimbun (Asahi Shimbun, June 23 1978). It suggested the internal power struggle among the CCP senior cadre on their policy toward Japan and the Senkaku Islands, and the fishing boats' crew were maritime militias, though they did not wear military uniforms. The Asahi Shimbun (June 23 1978) says as follows: There was a fishermen and islands meteorological reporters' meeting in Shanghai in April 1978, and Chen Jinhua: Vice Chairman of the Shanghai City Revolutionary Committee, denounced the Soviet Russia and Japan that deprived the Chinese people of their marine resources. He also stressed that the Chinese people had been persecuted by the Imperial Japanese navy. We understand that Chen Jinhua used the two reasons of offensive: the natural resources demand and historical disputes with Japan for political agitation. In response to his leadership, the meeting decided the slogan: Develop Ocean, Increase Marine Production, and Defend China against Invasion!" The Fishery bureau of Shanghai City ordered the fishing boats' crew to go to the sea areas of Senkaku Islands northwest 90 miles, and they instructed by radio, "Diaoyu Islands are China's territories. If anyone attack Chinese fishing in the Chinese territories, you should make a counterattack.
Niu Haiteng, the deputy head of the Chinese maritime militias gave his crew orders for preparation for combat against the Japanese and told them, "Defend Chinese territories at the risk of your lives! We are pleased to make the world bright with our Figure 10. A Chinese Fishing Boat with the Slogan "Diaoyu Island is the Chinese territory, we never permit any foreigner's invasion" on the cabin wall (Photo: Japan Coast Guard). 79 The 11 th Maritime Security District, Current Situation of the Maritime Security, July 9, 1979. blood." The Chinese maritime militias' spirits soared, and they shouted, "Let the Japanese see the Chinese People's Tradition of Anti-Imperialist Struggle!" They were willing to collide into the Japanese gunboats by their wooden fishing boats. But the CCP Shanghai branch suddenly ordered them to withdraw and leave the Senkaku sea areas immediately, and they had no choice to return to China.
Late Nobuyuki Sugimoto, a Japanese diplomat, asserted that the militias were brought up by the Gang of Four led by Jiang Qing, wife of Chairman Mao, and he guessed that the internal power struggle of CCP was caused by the remnants of the Gang of Four against Deng Xiaoping, an initiator of Japan-China Peace and Friendship treaty, though there was no convincing evidence. 80 Professor Akio Takahara made a thorough investigation of the situation in 1978 and finally concluded that the internal power struggle of the CCP was caused by the sect of the PLA navy: Admiral Su Zhenhua against Deng Xiaoping. 81 A missile destroyer of the South Fleet of PLA navy was blown up and sank in the beginning of April 1978, and Deng strictly criticized the leaders of the PLA navy, and Admiral Su, the first commissar of the PLA navy, expressed his disapproval of Deng's criticism to the then paramount leader Hua Guofeng, and he had an impression that Hua sympathized with the PLA navy leaders' disapproval against Deng. Admiral Su immediately dispatched his sect's members including Chen Jinhua 82 to Shanghai City to instigate the maritime militias: the crew of the fishing boats, and they appeared in the sea areas of Senkaku Islands to disturb Deng's proposal of the Japan-China cooperation. They were persuaded by the CCP leaders by radio, and the fishing boats withdrew from the Senkaku waters in the evening of April 16 1978.
The Japan-China Summit Meeting between Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping was held on October 25 1978 for the conclusion of the Peace and Friendship Treaty between Japan and the PRC. 83 Vice Premier Deng stated: "There exist a variety of disputes between our two countries; for example, there is the dispute of what is called the Diaoyu Islands in China, and the Senkaku Islands in Japan. At this time, there's no need to raise subjects like this at a meeting like ours. As I expressed this to Minister for Foreign Affairs: Sunao Sonoda in Beijing, there's probably insufficient wisdom to resolve the dispute in our generation, but with the next generation likely to be savvier than us, they will probably be able to find some resolution to the dispute. It is essential to look at this dispute with a broad perspective." Deng won the power struggle against Hua in the end of 1978, and no more maritime militias appeared in the Senkaku Sea areas until 2000s. Anyway, it was clear that the Senkaku Islands Dispute became a tool of the CCP's internal power struggle, and we can safely say, this is a dangerous byproduct of it.
It was the first time that the Chinese maritime militias appeared in the sea areas of the Senkaku Islands. It was said that the Chinese maritime militias were established under the strong influence of "People's War" theory of Chairman Mao in late 1950s. 84 The PLA navy 80 Sugimoto,Daichi no Hokoh,[63][64] Takahara,"Gendai Chugokushi No Saikentou," 36. 82 Chen Jinhua was one of the close comrades of Admiral Su. Chen and Su's relation was described in "Sirenbang" Yudangfumieqian, Zhongyang Gongzuo Zhankai Yichang ezhan" [Central Work Committee fought a tough fight against the gang of four], Renminwang, May 10, 2012. Accessed January 2, 2019. http://history.people.com.cn/BIG5/ 205396/17853342.html. 83 Senkaku islands Q&A, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010. html. 84 The Chinese Red Army's militia was established in 1940, and once abolished, though it was revitalized as the PLA's assistance force in 1957. Ueda,"Minpei,[406][407][408]and Hiramatsu,Yomigaeru Zhugoku Kaigun,[56][57][58][59][60][61][62][63][64][65] was established in April 1950, and its first commander Xiao Jingguang planned to construct the modern navy with the support of Soviet Russia, but Chairman Mao preferred the naval strategy of the maritime guerrilla warfare with the small gunboats and torpedo boats. 85 The Chinese maritime militias were established as the assistant force for the PLA navy's maritime guerrilla warfare, and they were the product of Chairman Mao's "People's War" theory. China's militias were defined in its military service law: article 36 & 37. 86 The number of maritime militias was unknown. Professor Satoshi Amako quoted Chinese source, and he stated the number of Chinese militias to be 8 million in 2011. 87 Other Japanese source estimated the number of maritime militias to be 300,000 in 2016 (Sankei Shimbun, August 17 2016). Captain Katsuya Yamamoto described that "the maritime militias are recruited from the fishermen, the islanders, shipping agents, port servicemen. 88 The militias on duty shall wear the military uniforms with militia's emblem: MB (abbreviation of Ming Bing)." 89 The maritime militias got the basic training for weapons operation, logistics, reconnaissance, civil-engineering, espionage activities, and so on. 90 If China utilizes the maritime militias again and many times for the maritime offensive against Japan in the East China Sea, it will be a difficult issue for the Japanese government, because the activities of the maritime militias are the grey-zone operations between war and peace.

The Chinese National Integration and its relevance to the Senkaku Islands dispute
It is said that Sun Wen, a symbolic leader of the Chinese Revolution in the beginning of the twentieth century, lamented the difficulty of Chinese national integration and said, "the Chinese are like a sum of sand on the tray, it will disperse when we grasp it." 91 The difficulty of the Chinese national integration is still a big issue in the Post-Cold War Era. Originally, the Chinese have been classified into several dialect groups. All the groups have utilized the Chinese characters, though they have different pronunciations of the Chinese characters among them. That is the reason that the ROC and PRC have utilized mandarin: standard Chinese as a lingua franca for the national integration. The PRC has used the mandarin and socialist policy as the tools for the Chinese national integration after the civil war in 1940.
The PRC's national integration policy seems to be rather successful for the time being, though it has a long way for the completion, and many peripheral integration issues such as the Guangdongnese issue, Hong Kong Chinese issue, Taiwanese issue, and the ethnic Chinese issues in the world are left. 92 The Guangdongnese attached importance to their Guangdongnese dialect, and they protested against the abolishment of Guangdongnese dialect program of Guangzhou TV in July 2010 (Yazhou Zhoukan, August 8 2010). The Hong Kong Chinese attach importance not only to Guangdongnese dialect but also to English. 93 They share the anti-communist feeling and the historical background of British Colony.
The Hong Kong Chinese had long enjoyed the laissez-faire economic policy under the British Authority from 1842 to 1997. They hated communist China and some of them had a strong political intention of the autonomy: Gangren Zhigang (Hong kongnese Administration of Hong Kong), though many Hong Kong Chinese were the businessmen who were investing China. 94 The PRC government recognized the effect of the direct investment of Hong Kong Chinese to PRC's economic development. It has permitted Hong Kong, the status of the Special Administrative Region in 1997, though it has never permitted the full democratization of the Hong Kong government. Some Hong Kong Chinese emigrated from Hong Kong to the foreign countries at the Chinese political turbulence such as the Tiananmen Square Incident in June 1989. 95 If so, we can safely say that the Hong Kong Chinese are the fence-sitters on the psychological border of the PRC (Figure 11). Hong Kong residents' political orientations are still various and fragmental. The Taiwan Chinese composition is more complicated. More than 80% of the Taiwan Chinese population is indigenous people. 96 They attached importance to their Taiwanese dialect, and they shared the historical background of the Japanese Colony, and they had no experience of the twenty century's Chinese National Revolution. They prefer Taiwan independence. The other Taiwan Chinese (about 13%) are the Nationalist Party member mainlanders and their offsprings. They attached importance to the Mandarin, and they controlled the ROC government in Taiwan from 1949 to 1988. The indigenous Taiwan Chinese and the mainlanders have shared the anti-communist feeling, though their relations had been not fraternal until the democratization of presidential election in 1996. 97 The first indigenous Taiwan President Lee Tenghui (1988-2000 paid great effort for democratization and political integration. 98 He created the concept Xintaiwanren (New Taiwanese) for the rapprochement between indigenous Taiwan Chinese and the mainlanders, though his policy had some taste of pro-independence. 99 Some indigenous Taiwan Chinese maintain a political dream of Taiwan independence until now, though they never declare it clearly. If Taiwan declares independence from China, the PRC government would open a civil war, because the PRC government asserts Taiwan as a part of China. We can safely say that some Taiwan Chinese prefer independent Taiwan, some prefer the ROC, and many of them keep quiet, so the Taiwan Chinese are the fencesitters on the psychological border of the Political Chinese (see Figure 11).
The ethnic Chinese 100 in the world may divide into two categories, firstly, overseas Chinese (華僑), some of them maintain the nationality of PRC or ROC, and some of them are stateless. Most of them speak the mandarin or its dialects. We can safely say they are culturally still Chinese. Secondly, the Chinese citizens of the foreign nationality (華人), such as the Singaporean Chinese, the Malaysian Chinese, or the Thai Chinese, some of them are localized and mixed with local ethnic groups because of the inter-marriage, and many of them have no knowledge of mandarin. Two categories' distinction is rather ambiguous, because they often have been related to each other by blood, though we can safely say that the ethnic Chinese are Chinese businessmen: economic Chinese. We can understand the multilayered structure of Chinese identity ( Figure 11).
The Chinese government always aims at utilizing these "various Chinese" for the promotion of the patriotism and national integration policy for the PRC government. The anti-Japanese sentiment based on the memories of Japan-China War and the territorial issues of the Senkaku Islands are the precious resources for these purposes. 101 For instance, 53.6% of the Hong Kong Chinese blamed the wartime Japanese responsibility, and 82.4% of the Hong Kong Chinese believed that the sovereignty of the 96  Senkaku Islands belonged to the PRC, though more than 49.1% of them did not trust the PRC government in 1995. 102 The Japanese nationalist political party Nihon Seinen-sha 103 built lighthouse at Uotsurijima Island in August 1978 and rebuilt the broken lighthouse in 1988, and it made the PRC and ROC government angry. 104 Taiwan army secretly ordered its parachute troop to establish the special platoon to destroy the lighthouse built by Nihon Seinen-sha and raise the ROC flag at Uotsurojima Island in October 1990 (Asahi Shimbun, December 5 2012, Yazhou Zhoukan, November 11 2012). The Taiwan army code-named their operation Exercise Hanjiang (Chinese Territory) and trained 45 soldiers for landing operation from the hovering helicopters. Forty-five soldiers were all mainlanders' off-springs. They were ordered to drop from 3 m height (Asahi Shimbun, December 5 2012). 105 But this was not the order of the then President Lee Tenghui. Finally, President Lee knew the plan of the secret operation of the army, and he ordered to stop it. We are not sure that who ordered Exercise Hanjiang. Some reporters guessed that it was the then Prime Minister Hao Bocun, though he keps silence. Prime Minister Hao Bocun had been a General of ROC Army and was born in Jiangsu province in 1919, so his mainlander's identity may be different from the indigenous Taiwanese President Lee Tenghui. 106 Nihon Seinen-sha built the lighthouse at Kitakojima Island in July 1996, and they rebuilt the broken one in September 1996. The PRC government made a protest to the Japanese government about these activities and let Zhongguo Minjian Paodiao Lianhehui (the China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands) establish on September 8 1996 in China. 107 Paodiao Xingdong Weiyuanhui (the Action Committee for Defending The Diaoyu Islands) in Hong Kong and some similar entity in Taiwan were also established in September 1996. 108 The PRC government did not permit the China Federation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands to navigate to the Senkaku Islands, though Hong Kong and Taiwan activists succeeded in landing Uotsurijima Island in October 1996, after the drowning of David Chan Yuk-cheung. 109 The PRC government attitude toward the Senkaku Islands was rather moderate and restrained in 1996.
Nihon Seinen-sha member landed Uotsurijima Island with Shinto priest on April 20 in 2000, and they built a small shrine Senkaku Jinja (Senkaku Shrine). 110 113 The Chinese demonstrators burned Hinomaru (Japanese national flag) in front of the Japanese Embassy on March 25 2004 (Asahi Shimbun AERA, April 12 2004). The PRC government also tolerated the anti-Japanese demonstrations at the Chinese cities including Beijing and Shanghai in April 2005, and it led to the riots and tumults. 114 Twelve thousand Hong Kong Chinese joined the anti-Japanese demonstration too. 115 The Chinese government asserted that the Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni Shrine and the issues of the inspection of history textbook caused the violent demonstration and the destructions of Japanese shops. It is safe to say that the Chinese government utilizes the Senkaku Islands Dispute as one of the tools to mobilize the Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment, and it gives the Japanese government psychological pressure. Further, the Chinese government tries to utilize this Chinese sentiment for CCP's authorization and China's national integration policy toward the various Chinese. If so, this is another byproduct of the Senkaku Islands Dispute.

Concluding remarks
This article introduced China's four reasons of offensives to the Senkaku Islands: the first reason China's natural resources demand, the second reason historical disputes with Japan which has some relationship to Chinese people's war-time memories, the third reason the Senkaku Islands Dispute as a tool of CCP's internal power struggle, and the fourth reason; the Senkaku Islands Dispute as a tool of CCP for China's national integration. Some reasons of Chinese offensive have been intertwined each other, and they may compose the structure of the Sino-Japanese Dispute on the Senkaku Islands, though the first reason natural resources demand is the main issue and the origin of the Senkaku Islands Dispute. The other reasons are to support the first reason or byproducts of the Senkaku Islands Dispute. Are there any changes in these reasons? Are there any materials to alleviate the tense of the dispute? We shall consider these two points in the last part.
First, China's natural resources demand, especially energy resources demand, is huge as mentioned in Part 3.1, and this is the origin of the Senkaku Islands dispute between Japan and China in the late 1960s. The Chinese government deploys the mobile offshore drilling units (rigs) in the East China Sea, and it is said that China operates 14 wellhead platforms near the median line in 2018. 116 But the production represents Chunxiao oil and gas field beside the median line. " 123 It seems that they were afraid of Japanese intervention to the China's oil and gas project. Some foreign reporters suggested that the Fujian trawler's captain who collided his trawler into the JCG patrol vessels in September 2010 (Figure 12) was the Chinese maritime militia, and the scholars of the U.S. Naval War College supported this supposition, though the captain did not wear military uniform. 124 If so, it is possible that the Fujian trawler's collision incident with the JCG patrol vessels in the sea area of Senkaku Islands in September 2010 125 was planned by the PLA senior officers to suspend the Japan-China joint  development project led by President Hu. Further, this incident was a start of the current "CCG vessels' patrol" in the sea area of the Senkaku Islands. 126 President Xi Jinping's Maritime Power Slogan may add fuel to the anti-Japanese flame too. 127 Fourth, the Senkaku Islands Dispute is a tool of CCP for China's national integration. As the authorexplained in Part 6, China's national integration is still not yet completed. The CCP is likely to utilize anti-Japanese sentiment of the nation for the national integration and authorization of the CCP. The Senkaku Islands Dispute is a convenient tool for it. If so, it may become a tool of CCP for China's national integration, again and many times in the future, and it is possible that the Senkaku Islands Dispute will lead to be big and unpredictable issue. We may not know whether the Chinese government can control the violent anti-Japanese demonstrators in the Chinese cities or not. 128 The third and fourth reasons are the byproducts of the Senkaku disputes, though they will give the Japanese relentless troubles for long.
We cannot compromise our sovereignty of the Senkaku Island. If so, what the Japanese can do for the alleviation of the tense of the Sino-Japanese dispute? If Japan-China agreement on the joint development of the energy resources, the joint development of the fish farming, and the cooperation for preventing marine pollution, are reached, it is ideal, but it may take time to obtain the concrete results. The current efforts for the confidence-building measures (CBMs) between Japan Self-Defense Force and the PLA, and the CBMs between the JCG and CCG are urgent tasks (Yomiuri Shimbun, May10, 4). 129 The Japanese government shall publicize the JCG's search and rescue operation for the Chinese fishermen in the East China Sea too. It is said that JCG rescues some 100 Chinese fishermen every year. 130 The JCG is not the enemy of Chinese fishermen!