Perspectives on REDD+ finances from donor to the developing countries: experience from Japan

ABSTRACT Understanding challenges for future Results-Based Payment (RBP) of the REDD+ are crucial to the REDD+ policymakers. So, there was a question of what will be the challenges and measures of going ahead to the RBP of REDD+. The primary objective of this study is to consider the REDD+ finances emphasizing private investment and finding the challenges and measures of future financing to the REDD+ program in developing countries. As a specific instance, it outlines and makes arguments on how developing countries, using Bangladesh as a case, can go ahead of REDD+ implementation with finances from private investors from developed countries. The study finds that most forest carbon investment has been taken place in the voluntary carbon market as part of corporate social responsibility (CSR) as well as philanthropic contribution. It also finds the demands of REDD+ credits uncertain in the market due to the lack of security of the funding. Japanese companies and researchers suggested a fair democratic system, stable and improving legal system, low corruption, improved national forest governance in the developing countries for their possible private investment for REDD+. The study will be useful for REDD+ practitioners and policymakers in developing countries and Bangladesh, in particular.


Introduction
Both readiness and implementation of REDD+ require finances, which include implementation of the policies and measures (PAMs) to generate REDD+ results (Streck, 2012). Each REDD+ beneficiary country should have a comprehensive financing plan for REDD+, which covers both investment and result-based finance (Streck & Parker, 2012). A thorough analysis of drivers, comprehensive financial and economic assessments of potential PAMs, and the preparation of a National Strategy/Action Plan (NS/AP) having broader stakeholder ownership, clearly support a high quality integrated financial plan (UN-REDD, 2019a). The REDD+ investment finance does not come from international sources alone but also from government budgets or other domestic sources (Streck, 2012). Attention to investment finance only from international sources can slow down the process of results-based finance (UN-REDD, 2016a). Mobilization of international support is comfortable if all existing initiatives get fund through Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other financial sources. It needs better coordination among different stakeholders at the national level in this mobilization, for which each REDD+ country should develop a fund management model. A useful fund management model needs a good knowledge of the structure and implementation process of PAMs.
As REDD+ is the globally accepted intervention to curb deforestation and forest degradation, understanding these finance sources is essential. Streck and Parker (2012), and Parker et al. (2009) find that potential financing sources for REDD+ can be both public and private sector finance. However, private finance is expected to be a valuable new source of REDD+ finance. Currently, the major REDD+ donor countries are Norway, Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America (Schroeder et al., 2020). While the most donor countries mostly supported readiness programs, policy support, and demonstration projects, Norway has entered into bilateral agreements for results-based payment (Streck, 2012). It is also evident that the early implementation of REDD+ activities endures a delay and discrepancy in the disbursement of funds (Creed & Nakhooda, 2011). The previous study finds the allocation and approval of USD 446 million out of a vast pledge to some particular countries by 2011 (Nakhooda et al., 2011).
Japan is amongst the few donor countries from Asia, which has already contributed to the different REDD+ programs, sustainable development, and green growth as a whole (Holroyd, 2014;Kim, 2012). The country mostly supported readiness programs, policy development, and demonstration projects. Up to 2011, Japan donated USD 18.8 million against a pledge of USD 3,604 million, which is only 0.52% of the pledges made (Streck, 2012). As Japan, an industrialized and Annex I 1 country, ratified the Kyoto Protocol and committed to contributing to the mitigation of global climate change. It is expected that Japan would have many investments in the REDD+ implementation in the developing country. So, this study takes its attempts to understand the "willingness to investment" in REDD+ programs by Japanese companies in Asian developing countries. Bangladesh, on the other hand, a REDD+ beneficiary country and still in the position of Phase I of the REDD+ activities (UN-REDD, 2019a). The country should go through Phase II and Phase III for RBP. The study considered Bangladesh as a representative developing/REDD+ beneficiary country which can receive benefits from the REDD+ program.
Understanding challenges for future RBP of the REDD+ are crucial to the REDD+ policymakers. So, there was a question of what will be the challenges and measures of going ahead to the RBP of REDD+ in the developing countries, and in Bangladesh, in particular. To scrutinize the REDD + financing, present scenarios of "Private investment on REDD+," "Results-based finance of REDD+," "REDD+ funds: Pledges and realities" were developed. After that, it evaluated the situation of Bangladesh in the REDD+ process for future REDD+ implementation. It argued the challenges of receiving finance for REDD+ in this paper. For a specific case, the study had a survey from Japan, a donor country, to ascertain its roles for financing to REDD+ program in developing countries, and in Bangladesh, in particular. Presently there is no such study found to make a bridge over this knowledge gap. This study will make a bridge over this gap. The results of this study will help Bangladesh make an efficient transition towards Phase II and Phase III for RBP.

Data sources and study methods
The study attempted to understand the roles of Japan, a major donor country from Asia, for its financing to the developing country, particularly Bangladesh. Bangladesh is a densely populated country suffering from severe forest loss and degradation, which will potentially receive benefits from the REDD+ implementation. So this study considered Bangladesh as a representative REDD+ beneficiary country. The study explored the implications of policy for REDD+ finances, private investment, Results-based finances for REDD+, and its nearest links to the REDD+ from June 2018 to February 2019. Data on private investments on REDD+, results-based payment/finance, REDD+ funds, and Bangladesh in the process of REDD+ were collected from authoritative sources, i.e., the UN-REDD program in Bangladesh, Bangladesh forest department, and scientific peer-reviewed articles. Scopus and ISI web of knowledge (Clarivate, 2019) was used to review the most recent data. It collected data on REDD+ and climate change from the recent web-pages of UN-REDD (UN-REDD, 2019b), UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2019) and IGES (Institute for Global Environmental Strategies) (IGES, 2019). The perceived knowledge of REDD+ projects being implemented or completed as a pilot study in the different developing countries was related to the situation of Bangladesh.
The study assumes that Japan would have many investments in the REDD+ implementation in the developing country. So, this study attempted to know the "willingness to investment" in REDD+ programs in developing countries. For this specific instance, the study followed a survey method. It used semistructured questionnaires to collect respondents' views on REDD+ finances and related issues in Japan. The study considered the Japanese companies and Japanese researchers as respondents. It selected the companies from all manufacturing industries in the Japanese top 500 companies (TOPIX500) as they were deemed to be possible private investors on the REDD+ program. The list was in the first section of the Tokyo Stock exchange (JEG, 2019). Since no specific database for/on REDD+ researches and researcher in Japan exist, the study selected Japanese researchers based on their scientific/ published work which is available on the internet.
The questionnaires were sent to respondents (entrepreneurs and researchers) via the Japanese Postal Service in mid-January with an anticipated return date of 15 February 2019. The study collected both qualitative and quantitative data. Data were analyzed in the SPSS software (version 24). The data and information gathered from different sources were processed to show the status of private investments on REDD+, RBP, Japan's investment to REDD+ and REDD+ pledges. Moreover, synthesis has been made on the implementation of the UN-REDD national program in Bangladesh and the uncertainties and challenges of REDD+ implementation in Bangladesh.

Private investments on REDD+
Halving the deforestation in many developing countries, it estimated that the opportunity cost ranged from USD 17 billion to 33 billion per year based on the different circumstances and capabilities of the nations (Eliasch, 2012;G.E. Kindermann et al., 2006;G. Kindermann et al., 2008;Simula, 2010;Tavoni et al., 2007;White et al., 2011). Streck and Parker (2012), and Parker et al. (2009) find that potential sources of finances for REDD+ can be both public sector finance and private sector finance ( Figure 1). The public sector finances can be related to auctioning an emission allowance or a financial transaction tax, which is also known as market-linked finance. Besides, it can allocate from the budgetary sources, which can be called budgetary finance. The present study synthesizes that private finance can be suitable through direct investment in emission reductions. Both the voluntary and compliance market can regulate it. It can go indirectly, investing in the sectors which drive deforestation and forest degradation, i.e., agriculture or infrastructure sector.
However, including all direct and indirect private finance, USD 8.7 billion was predicted by the year 2020, while the public finance is covering both marketlinked and budgetary finance; it predicts USD 30.485 billion by the year 2020 ( Figure 1). Although plenty of private investments is moving for the forestry sector (forests, industries, trade) in many developing countries, only minimal funding goes to the climate change mitigation activities by forests (Streck, 2012). It estimates that the total foreign direct investment in the forest sector is USD 5 billion per year. It is almost five times the amount of official development assistance allocated for sustainable forest management (Tomaselli, 2006). There are also a few carbon market incentives to support REDD+. So, it is not getting a place in the compliance market for its credit (Barron & McDermott, 2015).
Most forest carbon investment has taken place in the voluntary carbon market, which is driven mainly by socially responsible and philanthropic investors (Davies & Patenaude, 2011) (Figure 2). Seemingly, forests are attractive and appealing for carbon investments under appropriate standards, providing several co-benefits (e.g., forest conservation and poverty reduction).
The literature review shows that REDD+ will positively change the scale of forest carbon investment along with the type of investors. It seems that private investments will surpass over public finance in the REDD+ implementation in the future. However, REDD+ financing needs to overcome political barriers and reach an international agreement (Davies & Patenaude, 2011;Hogarth, 2012). Nevertheless, attracting sustainable, large-scale private investments and directing them to the most needed places are challenging.

Results-Based Payment/Finance (RBP) of REDD+
Nowadays, the discussion of REDD+ financing is critical in many policy dialogues (Sunderlin et al., 2015). Results-Based Payment/Finance (RBP) of REDD+ was the central discussion in the Paris Agreement (COP21) held in December 2015 (Wong et al., 2016).  The Green Climate Fund (GCF) has been an essential multilateral donor body under the United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to provide financial resources for REDD + in its RBP. It also expects to play a role in implementing the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDCs). The prerequisites of the RBP based REDD+ program are as below (Chhatre et al., 2012). 1. A national strategy and action plan; 2. Forest Reference Emission Level (FREL)/Forest Reference Level (FRL), 3. National Forest Monitoring System (NFMS), 4. Safeguards Information System (SIS), and 5. Measuring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV).
The RBP of REDD+ is surrounded by the following questions, i.e., i. How can it achieve adequate, predictable, and effective REDD+ finance?; ii. What activities can qualify "performance" in REDD+? and iii. How can non-carbon benefits integrate and safeguard under an RBP mechanism? For the design of an RBP that is effective, efficient, and equitable, understanding variation in costs and deforestation levels, who is bearing the costs of REDD+, is critical to know. A study, including 22 subnational REDD+ pilot projects and programs in six countries, found that stakeholder institutions closely could involve the implementation of REDD+ . It also subsidized the subnational level government Institutions (Wong et al., 2016). It finds that 84% of stakeholder institutions at the subnational level are incurring higher costs than the benefit they receive from the REDD+ program. However, many of these costs are not financial . Unclear tenure rights possess barriers in recognizing and compensating costs. In the 22 subnational REDD+ pilot projects, it finds that only 9 out of 21 sites have clear legal tenure, which associates with land uses that have the highest financial opportunity cost .
Developing a reporting schedule that enables payments based both on the time profile of costs and performance is necessary for ex-ante payments for policy performance (Brockhaus et al., 2017;Halimanjaya, 2015). It suggests that some level of advanced payment to cover some of the costs is essential to incentivize participation of the poor (Loft et al., 2014;Tjajadi et al., 2015). However, this upfront payment may give non-performance signals to the buyer or donor. On the contrary, an ex-post results-based payment may lead to a high-rate of non-participation in low-income countries (Wong et al., 2016). For financing certainty and predictability, both upfront and ex-post results-based payments in the same project can be useful in some cases (Angelsen, 2013). However, it needs clear performance criteria and credible reference levels (Brockhaus et al., 2017). An independent review mechanism requires avoiding bias in fixing reference levels. It should also ensure additionality.
Payments for policy performance will need negotiated and mutually agreed metrics or indicators which are context-specific and relevant to the institutional-political process (Brancalion et al., 2017). A cash-on-delivery model for REDD+ can increase cost-efficiency, effectiveness and improve governance of the recipient countries in a condition of well-defined and agreed upon targeted outcomes (Jakob et al., 2015;Savedoff, 2016). It finds from a study of 13 countries that the three countries accessed performance-based finance for REDD+ in advance more quickly in implementing policy reforms than the others (Brockhaus et al., 2017;Halimanjaya, 2015).
Security of funding is necessary because, without stable and sufficient funding, REDD+ cannot impact on the opportunity costs of forest conservation rather than deforestation and land-use change. So many pilot projects on REDD+ implemented across tropics since 2007 experience awful results on results-based payments of getting no such an attraction by the local landholders due to unstable REDD+ financing Simonet et al., 2015). The Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), in its analysis of 23 REDD+ programs in six countries, finds that only four projects could sell their carbon credits. The other programs were dependent on inconsistent public and philanthropic funding sources (Sunderlin et al., 2015).
The establishment and reporting of SIS trigger the RBP. The SIS should be effective in monitoring issues of social equity and environmental outcomes. It needs the use of mixed methods at multiple scales and indicators relevant to local realities. The SIS does not only support more equitable outcomes, but it can also structure to manage risks (e.g., non-legitimacy of participatory processes) to the delivery of carbon emissions reductions. Other experiences and indicators can be useful to manage this risk (Wong et al., 2016). The REDD+ countries should confirm seven safeguards and develop a national level of SIS. It can admonish and regularly report on the social and environmental impacts of REDD+ within the country (Duchelle & Jagger, 2014). It will choose the minimum safeguard requirements or have generic indicators in the SIS to lower the costs of monitoring and reporting for accessing RBP (Menton et al., 2014). In the SIS, social performance covers respect for knowledge and the rights of indigenous people and local stakeholders and enhancement of other social benefits. In contrast, environmental performance covers promoting biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services provision (Wong et al., 2016).

REDD+ funds: pledges and realities
The donor countries pledged a good deal of REDD+ finance since 2009. In 2011, the pledges increased from USD 3.5 billion to 4.17 billion for fast-start financing (Streck, 2012). Bilateral donations share two-thirds of all the international supported REDD+ funds (Streck, 2012). Multilateral funds cover the second most international source of funds for REDD+ (Streck, 2012). These funds are the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) Readiness Fund, FCPF Carbon Fund, UN-REDD Fund, Forest Investment Program (FIP) Fund, Congo Basin Forest Fund, and Green Climate Fund. The FIP shares the most substantial pledges, USD 578 million, and the UN-REDD Programme, the lowest, USD 151 million (Streck, 2012) (Figure 3). Figure 4 shows the pledges and the actual donations by some donor countries for REDD+ in developing countries (Streck, 2012). The drivers and factors behind this delay and discrepancy are lack of institutions and policies, a mismatch of donor requirements and recipient needs, and a multitude of institutional, legal, political, and economic barriers (Clark et al., 2018;Streck & Parker, 2012).

Perspectives on REDD+ finances to the developing countries
The study considered the responses of 278 companies and 16 REDD+ researchers. About 67% of researchers and 17% of companies stated that when investment for REDD+ match with the policy of the company, they might go for investment (Table 1). Some other companies, 6%, opined that simplification of the credit transfer, straight-forward and well-perceived benefits, and the status of a popular REDD+ program might influence them for investing. About 11% of companies reported that if their local affiliates seem logical, they will go for investment. However, 33% of companies and 67% of researchers opined that there were some national barriers for REDD+ investment. It reported Japanese culture and lack of knowledge of the developing countries as barriers. They also reported a lack of proper regulations and sound explanations for the community. The complexity of the procedures for bilateral credits and the transparency of verification in the partner countries are the barriers, they also mentioned. This system is a transaction between a Japanese company and the partner country. If an intermediary trading company pooling credits intervene in the Japanese side, it can work better, they opined. Setting up an opportunity where investors and developing countries can share their issues is essential.
The questionnaire survey indicated that there are some sorts of barriers in developing countries, as mentioned by 6% of companies and 67% of researchers. Japanese companies thought that it was a barrier to the developing countries to acquire technologies that can quantitatively calculate and verify the amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) absorption/emission avoidance. The researchers suggested a fair democratic  system, a stable and improving legal system, low corruption in the developing countries for REDD+ investment. They also emphasized an excellent balance between economic development and environmental conservation. It mentioned that the forest governance issue was important. They suggested improved national forest governance and dissemination of MRV institutions in the partner countries.
The stages of the REDD+ program was also crucial for investment. About 6% and 22% of companies wanted to invest at the piloting stage and final implementation stage, respectively, which was supported by 33% of researchers. The same researchers also mentioned that the Japanese companies for their investment could offer both stages.
The study did not find any company for solely private investment. About one-third of the companies, 28%, felt interest in public-private investment.
The researchers, 33%, confirmed this state. About 11% of companies expected their investmentbenefit was only GHG emission reduction contribution, which 67% of researchers confirmed (Table  1). In the program management of the REDD+, validation of data by a third party, credit guarantee by a third party, and full transparent activity in the REDD+ were the expectation by the 6%, 6%, and 17% companies, respectively. About 67% of researchers validated it. About 6% of companies expected the involvement of the local community, Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private authority along with the government in the REDD+ program. The respondents suggested an improved governance structure that can accept a wide range of finance and investment.
Most of the companies would like to invest in Asian countries. The particular countries mentioned were

Bangladesh in the REDD+ process and its challenges
Bangladesh emits a scanty of greenhouse gas in comparison to the global scale. The Agricultural sector shares the most substantial contribution (39%) of greenhouse gas ( (FAO, 2017). Having this considerable deforestation rate, Bangladesh had the rationality to adopt an action of REDD+, which expects to generate emission reduction units and other non-carbon benefits. In this context, Bangladesh went for a REDD+ readiness program supported by the UN-REDD multilateral funding body. Thus, Bangladesh became a UN-REDD partner country in 2010. The UN-REDD is a multilateral donor body under the United Nations collaborative program which supports nationally led REDD+ initiatives in 65 developing countries (UN-REDD, 2016b). Since 2008, the UN-REDD program has been working with the roles of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). It is supporting the developing countries for building technical capacities and upgrading and updating its resources to fulfill the requirements of Results-Based Payment (RBP). These are all for readiness before actual implementation. In the process of REDD+ readiness, the UN-REDD program has three phases. Phase I deals with national strategies or action plans, policies and measures, and capacity building. Phase II incorporates the implementation of these plans, policies, and measures by piloting the program adopting the necessary changes. Phase III goes for RBP if it can measure emission reduction or enhancement of carbon, report, and verify against the benchmark. This phage III can provide the payment after the Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) generated ( Figure 5). However, Bangladesh is still in Phase I.
After being an UN-REDD country in 2010, Bangladesh formed a REDD technical committee. In 2011, she formed a national REDD+ steering committee and established the REDD+ cell, and appointed REDD+ focal point. UNDP and FAO were involved with government initiatives to draft the REDD+ roadmap ( Figure 6). In 2012, UNDP and FAO submitted the draft REDD+ Roadmap to MoEF (Ministry of Environment, Forests). Moreover, at this moment, the Roadmap was approved by the National REDD+ Steering Committee. After the UN-REDD Policy Board approved the REDD+ Preparation Proposal  Lack of transparency, accountability, and integrity are the influencing factor of corruption in deforestation and forest degradation in Bangladesh (Rahman, 2018;TI, 2012). Other underlying drivers of deforestation and forest degradation are an excessive collection of forest products, trafficking of logs out of reserve forests, forest wildlife poaching, land-grabs by powerful actors, and illegal encroachment of forests (Jayathilake et al., 2021;Salam et al., 1999;TI, 2012).
Comparing the efficiency parameter of fiscal spending in the organization managing REDD+, the study found that there were some efforts of internal controls and external auditing to the fiscal spending. However, they were insufficient because of the inefficiency and low bureaucratic quality of the forest department. Indeed, there is a lack of transparency and accountability in public accounting and auditing, enhancing the corruption in the public offices (Ehsan, 2008;TI, 2012;TIB, 2008;WB, 2007). A study in Indonesia shows that regional politicians, government officials, and people in business are involved with corruption by using their discretion over the budgetary allocations, contracts at the center of government, and other assets at their disposal (Palmer, 2005).
The critical regulating forest resource in Bangladesh is The Forest Act, 1927, which deals with the conservation and protection of governmentowned forests as well as some private forests. This act also deals with "Social Forestry," which aims creation and sustainable management of plantation forests by local communities. It was also evident that the government of Bangladesh takes steps to establish the "REDD+ Stakeholders Forum" with the non-government sector for a consultation to increase public awareness on REDD+ (UN-REDD (2019b).
Inoue et al. (2019) describe that the REDD+ program in the developing countries of South-East Asia faces uncertainties on tenure rights, policy overlapping, heterogeneity, and elite capture and conflicts. It also alerts the lack of proper management in the REDD+ program. These uncertainties can further deteriorate the forest commons rather than strengthening them (Cadman, 2014). While implementing the REDD+ program, it is crucial to confirm the REDD+ triple benefits, i.e., effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. For achieving REDD+ triple benefits in the situation of Bangladesh, Inoue et al. (2019) suggest the following recommendations. It should strengthen tenure and property rights, along with strengthening connectivity with actors both within and between forest user groups, service providers, and government extension services. Constant monitoring and adjusting slowly with variables and feedbacks, such as markets and policies, which can either reinforce or dampen change in the forest socioecological systems, are essential. It should foster complex adaptive systems thinking by accepting unpredictable and acknowledge a multitude of perspectives in the community. There should be an open learning system which can encourage learning from other regional project and countries. It should broaden participation to build trust and shared understanding for enhancing collective action and promote polycentric governance (Berardo & Lubell, 2016;Sunderlin et al., 2015). Sunderlin et al. (2014) studied the challenges of establishing REDD+ for 23 subnational initiatives in six countries (Brazil, Peru, Cameroon, Tanzania, Indonesia, Vietnam). It identifies unclear and unstable tenure and the disadvantageous economies of REDD+ as the most significant challenges faced in moving forward with REDD+. Getting a structural change in national and international political systems can address these challenges (Kameyama et al., 2016;Park et al., 2013). It confirms that the future of REDD+ depends on actors and actions outside the domain of REDD+ (Seymour & Jonah, 2016). Isenberg and Potvin (2010) confirm that indirect links with the replenishment of a REDD+ fund to the market are a promising mechanism that lies in the political will. It mentions that the best financial approach for REDD+ is a flexible REDD+ mechanism with two tracks, i.e., i. market tracts serves as a mitigation option for developed countries and ii. A fund track serves as a mitigation option for developing countries (Isenberg & Potvin, 2010;Strand, 2016).
The study of Clark et al. (2018), suggests that government and policy reform is crucial to have an enabling investment environment and move beyond voluntary commitments. An international convening informational body can synthesize evidence and connect projects and investors to resources. Bridging finance gaps can enhance the cost-effectiveness of projects -monitoring, reporting, and impact assessment (Clark et al., 2018;Peskett et al., 2011).
To unlock the investments for functional ecological infrastructure, Angelstam et al. (2017) find the barriers, including mistrust among actors, inadequate collaborative governance, and integrated planning, as well as unfortunate inclusion of evidence-based knowledge on monitoring of landscape restoration efforts and its social and ecological consequences. To remove the barriers, it needs practicing transdisciplinary knowledge production, enhancing social learning among actors and stakeholders, and advocacy based on improved understanding (Adenle et al., 2017;Angelstam et al., 2017). It proposes a portfolio of place-based actions that could help facilitate unlocking investment for functional ecological infrastructure by prioritizing conservation, management, and restoration through integrated cross-scale, collaborative, and multi-sector spatial planning. It also needs to understand the structural and dynamic socio-ecological systems. It should also identify champions, frame critical messages for different audiences, and share failures and success stories internationally, which can unlock the investment (Angelstam et al., 2017). The barriers and challenges for REDD+ implementation described by Inoue et al.

Conclusion
The study finds some barriers to the developing countries for REDD+ investments. Only socially responsible and philanthropic investors are mainly available for the voluntary carbon market. Still, it is not getting enough responses from the compliance carbon market. The study argued that the REDD+ carbon market is still unpredictable, and its demand and supplies are uncertain. So, the security of funding for REDD+ is not confirmed yet. Furthermore, the lack of institutions and policies, a mismatch of donor requirements and recipients, and a multitude of institutional, legal, political, and economic barriers make a delay and discrepancies of REDD+ funds. As a case, Japanese companies and researchers suggested a fair democratic, stable, and improving legal system, low corruption, improved national forest governance in the developing countries for the attraction of Japanese investments on REDD+ programs. Bangladesh faces the same challenges for REDD+ implementation. Bangladesh should take the challenges of barriers and go ahead to Phase II and Phase III of REDD+ activity. It recommends measures to reduce the barriers and utilize the potential to develop REDD+ projects in Bangladesh. The study will be useful for REDD+ policymakers in developing countries and Bangladesh in particular. It will be useful to climate change mitigation practitioners as well.