Rebuilding trust

This MRP is a case study of the Algonquin Regiment’s capabilities to rapidly reconstruct their ranks during periods of extreme casualty loss, between late July and early October 1944. During this time, the Algonquin Regiment, like many other Canadian infantry battalions, experienced a continuous turnover of men due to high casualty rates resulting from the hard fighting in northwest Europe. Although the Algonquins suffered substantial losses from all ranks, they were able to reassemble their companies with new replacements in order to continue their offensive operations. This research argues that previous historical interpretations critical of both Canadian battle performance and the replacement system are challenged by the experiences of the Algonquin Regiment. The MRP calls into question long-standing notions concerning ‘primary group loyalty’ as the key to understanding both unit moral and battle performance. In doing so, this study reinforces the more recent interpretation centred on ‘swift trust’ as a more applicable lens through which to view the experiences, successes and failures of this single infantry battalion. The principal question that this MRP answers is how reinforcements in the Algonquin Regiment influenced overall battle performances during the late summer and early fall of 1944. Acknowledgments I would first like to begin by acknowledging the traditional Anishnaabeg territory that Nipissing University stands on today. Next, I would like to give my sincere appreciation and recognition to the faculty members of Nipissing University, especially those that I had the pleasure to learn from and get to know. I would like to thank you all for guiding me here with your much appreciated comments and recommendations. Also, I would like to acknowledge the support of my family, friends and peers. Their support and encouragement helped me get through the struggles of this past year. Furthermore, I would like to extend a kind thank you to my committee and examiners. Thank you Dr. Earl, Mr. Robert Catsburg, and Dr. Brian Thorn. I am very grateful of you all and I want to thank each of you for taking the time to review and assist me in the development of my research project. Finally, last but not least, I would like to give my greatest appreciation to my supervisor Dr. Stephen Connor. I want to thank you for everything that you have done for me over the past year. I will be forever grateful for all the help and advice that you have given me in order to make this project come to life. You have not only been a great supervisor, but also a great friend. This MRP is dedicated to all Second World War servicemen of the Algonquin Regiment, especially those replacements, who have not yet been fully recognized by Canadian military history, nor by our collective memories. Your sacrifices will never be forgotten.


Introduction
On the night of 8 August 1944, Major Keith Stirling's D Company received their orders to make a strong attack down from Caen towards the city Falaise to capture Hill 195. Throughout the night, the Algonquins faced small arms fire, but they were able to push forward with the tanks of the British Colombia Regiment leading the way. As the sun came up and the infantry and tank squadrons lost the cover of darkness, D Company ran into heavy enemy resistance as they were ordered to hold their position until the tanks cleared the area. However, German artillery and tanks made short work of them, destroying all but two. Major Stirling and his men took up a defensive position as they tried to make contact with the rest of the squadron. Without any result, the men were stranded, while being continuously shelled by enemy tank and mortar fire. As nightfall came, the casualties continued to accumulate. The surviving Algonquins were driven back and withdrew to the nearest town of Bretteville-Le-Rabet. By this time, the men were exhausted, having had no sleep and little food remaining. Casualties were horrendous, especially given that this was the Algonquin Regiment's first large offensive. Major Stirling, like many other Algonquins undoubtedly thought, where do we go on from here. 2 This MRP is a case study of the Algonquin Regiment between late July and October 1944 and considers three main areas: the impact of battle, casualties and replacements during the battalion's first 90 days in northwest Europe. This MRP argues that previous historical interpretations critical of both Canadian battle performance and the replacement system are long-standing notions concerning 'primary group loyalty' as the key to understanding both unit moral and battle performance. In doing so, this study reinforces the more recent interpretation centred on 'swift trust' as a more applicable lens through which to view the experiences, successes and failures of this single infantry battalion. The principal question that this MRP answers is how reinforcements in the Algonquin Regiment influenced overall battle performances during the late summer and early fall of 1944.
During this time, the Algonquin Regiment, like many other Canadian infantry battalions in northwest Europe, experienced a continuous turnover of men, due to high casualty rates resulting from the hard fighting in the Normandy campaign. Although the Algonquins suffered substantial losses from all ranks, they were able to reassemble their companies with new replacements in order to continue their offensive operations. This question is important because popular belief holds that soldier battle performance during the Second World War can be correlated with primary group cohesion. Ultimately this means, the tighter the group, the better the performance. Men fought on not because they had to, but rather because they felt compelled to preserve the special bond of their unit. This myth is perpetuated in many popular depictions of war, especially throughout the story of "Easy Company" in Steven Spielberg's acclaimed miniseries Band of Brothers. 3 There is certainly some truth to the argument that soldiers fought for the men beside them in order to preserve the special relationships of one another. However, this model does not hold up for many units, whether allied or enemy, because of the heavy losses. Men had little time to The miniseries Band of Brothers was based on the book Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th 3 Regiment, 101st Airborne: From Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest, by Stephen E. Ambrose. bond when the killed and wounded were regularly replaced with new reinforcements. Simply, by the fall of 1944, primary group cohesion could not be sustained because of the constant flow and need for new reinforcements. Therefore, the Algonquin Regiment's campaign in Normandy, Belgium, and Holland, will serve as case studies to explore the ways in which battle performances were in fact affected by different kinds of cohesion, or by other factors beyond primary group dynamics. The primary objective of this MRP is to compare the close-knit Algonquin Regiment's battle performances with the performances of the reinforcements who resupplied the regiment. In doing so, this study will try to uncover if and how the Algonquin Regiment performed any differently.
This MRP engages with key secondary sources focused primarily on battle performance, unit morale and cohesiveness and the Canadian Armies replacement system. One of the most influential sources is the book Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939Regiment, -1945 G.L. Cassidy. The archival source base for this study is a wide range of wartime documents.
Canadian military and archival records such as newspapers, personal messages, and general orders will be used in order to understand the struggles, judgements and reputations of replacements. Another significant volume of sources is the battle statistics and questionnaires, especially from the RG24 Volume 10,450 records of Library and Archives Canada (LAC). Other documents such as brigade wastage rates, divisional censorship and field return reports, are all useful in uncovering data regarding both casualties and reinforcements. Lastly, the most important source for this project is the LAC's collection of war diaries that contain vital information regarding the daily activities ranging from the divisional level, down to the front-line battalions. In particular, this research uses The Algonquin Regiment War Diary from the RG 24 textual records volume 15,000 of LAC.
This MRP is composed of 5 main sections. In the first, I consider the historiography and methodologies utilized by previous historians asking similar questions. The next segment, Chapter One, provides a description of the components and makeup of a Canadian infantry battalion during the Second World War. Chapter Two introduces the Algonquin Regiment and provides a short regimental history before it came into action in July 1944. Chapter Three examines the first month of battle in August 1944, and provides an analysis on the Algonquin's battle performances, group cohesion and reinforcement situation. Lastly, Chapter Four studies the regiment's battle performances during the month of September 1944 in order to reveal the effects of introducing reinforcements within the ranks.

Literature Review
This MRP engages two significant types of historiography. First, as the basis of this research is focused on the Algonquin Regiment, it is necessary to review the previous literature on the Canadian Army's involvement in northwest Europe. Second the historiography regarding infantry reinforcement and battle performance is engaged.
The first wave of literature on the Canadian campaign in northwestern Europe was the initial reports and summaries of Canadian battlefield experiences. The most notable figure who commenced the written works on Canadian battlefront participation was Colonel Charles Perry Stacey, the official historian of the Canadian Army during the Second World War. He was tasked by the Canadian military to collect information from the front-line in order to create a Canadian recollection of the war. Through the use of operational records, reports, and experiences, Stacey created The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. This official 4 history approached the Canadian events in northwest Europe in a summarized and outlined manner. Therefore, his works summarized the war and its operational events. Stacey generalized and made assumptions about the Canadian Army's combat performances. He describes the Canadian Army as a maturing and experienced fighting force, but he also believed that the quality of the Canadian Army was not as effective as other allies. Although Stacey noted some 5 of the Canadian Army's courageous fighting qualities, he still believed that Canadians lacked C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume 4 competence and leadership at the front. Therefore, the Canadian Army in the official history was 6 regarded as a triumphant and feared force, but it was also described as an ineffective force with many weaknesses.
The second wave of historiography of the Canadian participation in the war took an even further perspective regarding combat performances in northwest Europe. Essentially, many historians began rethinking C.P. Stacey's notions and reconsidering them at the operational level.
These historians began using different methodologies such as personal accounts and memoirs of the war, in addition to previously used documents. By developing these operational case studies, it brought forward a new approach to studying the Canadian war effort. This provided the historiography of the Canadian war effort with a better understanding of its micro-level developments.
A source belonging to this body of literature is Tug of War: The Canadian Victory That Opened Antwerp by Denis and Shelagh Whitaker. This book examines the Canadian Infantry and Armoured Divisions who were tasked with the assignment of clearing the port of Antwerp. Denis Whitaker was a Lieutenant-Colonel during the war, he uses his own recollections and those of others through interviews to describe the battles near Antwerp. This work is one of the first and most influential to be very critical of the various inefficiencies Allied and Canadians had that resulted in errors, but it also began to shed light on the capabilities and the courageousness of the Canadians. This source is valuable not only because it brings forward the operational mistakes that the Canadian battalions endured, but it also introduces the effectiveness of the Canadian C.P. Stacey Stationary, 1960, 363. forces in northwest Europe. This source and many others alike throughout this historiographical wave used a more specific case study approach to further explore the previous set narratives and notions of the Canadian participation in the Second World War.
The next generation of historians took a completely different perspective. This era of literature is the foundational basis of research and ideology for this MRP project. During this wave of literature, historians began to combine both the initial narratives of the war and the case study approach, with a new set of questions about Canadian participation in northwest Europe.
The main focus of this historiography was to uncover the previously set notions on the ineffective performances of the Canadian Army. Ultimately, this brought forward a large amount of work that contradicted these beliefs and demonstrated just how successful and effective the Canadian Army was at the operational level. Therefore, this wave marked an end of the grandnarrative period because it began challenging previous assumptions set by past historians. Therefore, Copp argues that the Canadian Army's achievements in Normandy were greatly underrated and that the effectiveness of the Germans greatly exaggerated. Through the use of 9 operational records, interviews and other new evidence such as battle and intelligence performance reports, Copp is able to reconsider the effectiveness of the operations carried out by the Canadian soldiers. As a result, he argued that the considerable amount of casualties from the Canadian Army was a result of heavier fighting and closer enemy contact, rather than the previous assumption of operational battle failure.
Finally, the current wave of historiography being explored has moved away from the conventional elements of examining the battlefield. Traditional operational military historians largely reviewed operational history at its largest scale, but this new stream of historiography has considered battle operations at a micro-level. Thus, these works have begun challenging the common understandings of the war by studying human behaviours and social elements of frontline soldiers. One of the most influential historians of this research is Robert Engen and his book Army, 1943Army, -1945. He specializes on topics such as Canadian soldiers combat motivations and behaviours during battle. This approach to studying motivations and behaviours will be applied in this research project in order to uncover the effectiveness and reliability of the Algonquin Regiment's reinforcements in battle.

Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian
Unlike past studies on the lowest levels of tactical operations, such as S.L.A. Marshall

Methodology
In order to understand the interpretive method that will be used for the subject of this paper, this chapter will be structured into two separate segments. The first will briefly examine the historiography of previous methodologies used to better understand the theory behind the topic of battle performances, and the second part will develop the type of constructed approach that this MRP will be using going forward.
The main question that this research seeks to answer is how did the reinforcements affect battle performances of the Algonquin regiment during the late summer and early fall of 1944. Therefore, the main assumption of this study will examine the ways in which the new supply of replacements affected the operations of the Algonquin Regiment. This MRP examines this question because of previous notions and the popular beliefs that assumed that soldier battle performances during the Second World War were correlated with primary group cohesion. It has been argued that this 'Band of Brothers' style of soldier cohesion is what made Allied battle performances successful. This means that infantry soldiers fought on to preserve the special bond and unity of their unit. Historians in the past have argued that soldiers fight for the men beside them in order to preserve the special relationships of one another. However, primary group cohesion of original regimental members could not be the case for the Algonquins because of the constant flow and need for new reinforcements. For these reasons, the Algonquin Regiment's campaign in northwest Europe will be used as a case study to see if and how the battle performances were in fact affected by different models of cohesion or any other incidences.
One of the first historians to begin asking questions about infantry soldier combat motivations and performances was John Ellis. In his book, The Sharp End: The Fighting Man in World War II, Ellis took an in-depth look inside the everyday life of an Allied infantryman during the Second World War. Specifically, he investigated the reasons why infantrymen of the Allied forces were able to overcome constant stress and never ending battle. Ultimately, Ellis used 14 first-hand accounts and war-time documents to develop an understanding of how an Allied soldier's attitude, discipline, and morale remained generally stable during periods of extreme disarray. In the end, he argued that a front-line soldier did not fight so much for politics and patriotism, rather a soldier relied on their fraternity of comrades within their units who were sharing the same experience and suffering that they were. Therefore, Ellis is one of the first 15 historians that argued on behalf of primary group cohesion. An Allied soldier on the front-line of the war was "forced to look only to his immediate circle for support and understanding, for any meaning in the chaos around him." 16 The next wave of historians who approached combat motivations and battle performances was done by authors such as Omar Bartov and Martin van Crevald. In van Crevald's book, Fighting Power: German andU.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945, he compared the maintenance of combat efficiency between the U.S. and German infantry soldiers. Ultimately, he concluded that average German soldiers did not fight for social prestige, nor their beliefs in Nazi ideology, even though it was not completely ruled out. Rather, they fought for some of the same reasons as Similarly, Bartov in his book Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich, examined the attitudes of the German Army in an attempt to gauge the degree in which the Wehrmacht constituted an integral part of state and society in the Third Reich. Bartov used a 18 very similar approach to this question as Ellis and van Crevald had previously had. He used soldier family letters, war diaries, and German military reports to understand the primary group cohesion within the German Army. Bartov believed that German Army policy throughout the war promoted cohesion amongst the front-line soldiers. The Wehrmacht method installed a sense of esprit de corps among the men by raising battalions and regiments on a regional basis to make linguistic and cultural affinities between the men. Therefore, Bartov argued that German 19 soldiers were highly motivated by the organization of primary groups, and that the destruction of these groups had severe impacts to the organizational disintegration of the army. Nevertheless, 20 German soldiers became victims of 'Hitler's war ideologies' and in order to survive, they needed to rely on their bonds formed within primary group cohesion.
Based on these past methods of approaching the history of soldier performances and attitudes on the battlefield, these theories all encompassed the same general notion that soldiers Martin van Crevald, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939. 17 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982 questionnaires, censorship reports, and statistical records from war documents to uncover the battlefield behaviours of Canadian infantrymen. Fundamentally, Engen's book examined the 23 reasons why Canadian infantrymen behaved in such ways that they did, particularly in light of extreme adversity. Engen's conclusion is that primary group cohesion could not have been a 24 factor in the battle performances of the Canadian troops. He argued that soldiers were willing to fight, with or without being a part of a regiment because, "While the regimental 'family' could be a source of inspiration and pride, high casualty rates among infantrymen, coupled with a reinforcement system that was forced to send replacements to regiments with increasing disregard for regional distinctiveness, made regimental identification difficult to sustain." 25 Therefore, a form of Swift Trust had to have taken shape for many of the infantry regiments of the Canadian Army. Not only did this research deny the primary group cohesion model within the Canadian infantry regiments, but it also illustrated how Canadian infantrymen remained efficient and successful during times of extreme casualties. It has been made evident in past literature of the Canadian participation in northwest Europe that Canadian infantrymen were generally perceived as inefficient. Thus, this book and its unique approach to rejecting these previous notions is the reason why it is the primary driving force behind this MRP.
This research paper uses the Algonquin Regiment as a case study within Engen's theory.
The case study will borrow and test Engen's approaches by applying it to the context of the Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army, 1943Army, -1945  Algonquins. Like most Canadian regiments, the Algonquin regiment raised their battalions regionally, meaning that most soldiers had come from the military district in order to help them possess a local identity. Most of the Algonquin's came from both North Bay and Timmins 26 districts at the beginning, but by the end of August 1944, this proved no longer to be the case.
With extreme casualties came new reinforcements, who were no longer a part of the original group's cohesion. Therefore, this MRP will be testing this method to uncover if and how the battle performances were affected by these new relationships between reinforcements. The Swift Trust Theory will be used as the basis of this research project in order to reveal the effects of fighting alongside unfamiliar faces within the Algonquin Regiment. Additionally, the most significant aspect of this new theory is that it is rejecting previous assumptions, while bringing forward new features of Canadian infantrymen that historians have just begun to consider.
The foundations of this study will be mainly examining the months of August, into early October 1944 in order to reveal the improvised and readjusted battalion of the Algonquin Regiment. By analyzing this time period, it will expose the underlying evolution of the Algonquin Regiment. The regiment made its first appearance in northwest Europe at the very end of July 1944, but by the end of August, the infantry battalion had completely progressed with new replacements that changed the Algonquins into a completely 'new regiment.' New faces replaced old one's, and almost all of the men within the Algonquin's soon became men with no background or ties to the regiment. This is where Robert Engen's Swift Trust approach will come in the analysis of the evidence, as it will reveal how new replacements had to believe in Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army, 1943 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2016), 43.
themselves and had to trust in the training of strangers. Thus, this MRP will be asking some of 27 the same questions deriving from the 'grandfathers' of this approach, such as Ellis, Bartov, and van Creveld, while incorporating Engen, the 'father figure' of this project, into the methods of proceeding the case of the Algonquin Regiment.
Additionally, it is also important to mention that my approach for analyzing the Algonquin's performance in the fall of 1944 will also differ from Engen's methodology to also incorporate Arthur Gullachsen's method of studying reinforcements. In his Phd thesis, An Army  ", Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository,(2016, 251. evidence to further illustrate the combat performances of the Algonquin Regiment. Also, this will provide a regimental level history of the Canadian replacement system within the greater scope of the Canadian Second World War historiography. Therefore, my approach to this regimental level of history will integrate both Engen's theory of group cohesion with Gullachsen's approach of studying reinforcements to test their respective conclusions on the case of the Algonquin Regiment.

Chapter One Canadian Infantry Battalion at War
In January 1943, the Algonquins became part of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division (4CAD). This formation, previously an infantry division, was reconstructed to be an armoured division by Canadian high command. During the campaign in North Africa, the Allies learned 30 from their mistakes and noticed that they lacked the cooperation between tank and infantry units on the battlefield. Shortcomings and deficiencies between tank and infantry units brought  Regiment, 1939 Highway Book Shop, 1990), 44.
4th Canadian Armoured Division Order of Battle (OOB). 31 (ORs). Smaller than a usual infantry battalion from an infantry division, the Algonquins and the 32 rest of the infantry units within the 4CAD made up for their numbers in armoured vehicles and light-weaponry among the supporting armed platoons. These battalions were divided into three distinct Echelons. "F" Echelon consisted of combat companies of the battalion which were located on the front-lines. These soldiers formed the 'tip of the spear' and were deployed to close with and destroy the enemy. "A" Echelon, generally located a several miles behind "F" Echelon, held the transports, supplies, and spare equipment of the battalion. Lastly, "B" Echelon which came under divisional control, held Battalion Headquarters (HQ), medical staff, and Left out of Battle personnel (LOB). These were the three components which organized and functioned 33 within an infantry battalion.
Within the Algonquins and the rest of the Canadian infantry battalions, there were three main sections that each played an essential role in combat. First, the elements of a Headquarters (HQ), consisted of the commanding officer, his Second-in-Command, Adjutant and Intelligence officer, as well as the attached medical officer. There were also ORs within HQ who acted mostly as drivers, batmen, orderlies and over twenty stretcher bearers. The sniper units were 34 Seminar 1: "'You're in the Army now!': The Canadian Army at War, 1944War, -1945  The largest component of a Canadian infantry battalion encompassed the four Rifle Companies at the 'sharp end.' This is where the bulk of the men were deployed and composed the backbone of an infantry battalion. Overall, the infantry battalion consisted of four companies (coy) "A," "B," "C," and "D," each commanded by a Company HQ most often led by a Major, with a Captain as his Second-in-Command. Each Company consisted of three platoons designed by number. Each of these platoons also consisted of a Platoon HQ, which was managed by a platoon commander, a sergeant and two ORs. In turn, a platoon maintained three sections of 41 riflemen, which each encompassed around ten soldiers. Like many other infantry battalions, this is how the Algonquin Regiment was assembled. However, it is their regimental history and culture that differed them from other Canadian battalions.
Seminar 1: "'You're in the Army now!': The Canadian Army at War, 1944War, -1945 Chapter Two The Algonquin Regiment, 1939Regiment, -1944 This chapter examines the mobilization of the Algonquin Regiment as an infantry battalion and how the unit's group cohesion began collectively shaping itself throughout the years leading up to deployment in Normandy. Creating a sense of regimental identity is one of the main factors that went into building a common soldier's identity. As a unit raised and recruited initially in northern Ontario, the Regiment nurtured its unique character connected both to its remoteness but also notions of a 'northern identity.' This sense of projecting a rugged 42 northern identity shaped the regiment's own identification and sense of distinctiveness. The Algonquin Regiment took pride in its northern roots and reflected in its iconography such by a bull moose on the regimental crest as a symbol of the region and the Ojibwa phrase "Ne-Kah-Ne-Tah," which loosely translates as "We Lead, Others Follow," as the unit's motto. Therefore, 43 the regiment symbolism reinforced and developed members' sense of their own unique identities of northern Ontario, symbolically shaped offering emotive energy to be drawn from both notions of remoteness and Indigenous history. Thus, as a collective , the Algonquins continued to strengthen bonds supported by an underlying shared perception of a specific northern identity. In short, as these men of the Algonquin Regiment mostly originated in northern Ontario, they also had many years to connect with one another and for a common group identity to evolve .
In the summer of 1944, the Algonquins received word from divisional commander, ranks of a once 'northern' regiment. How will the Algonquin's battle performances be considered given that the month of August 1944 proved to be one of hardship and despair for the regiment?
Based on the records and statistical data used for this study, the battle performance of the  Certainly, the Algonquin Regiment struggled at times throughout the month of August, but it also had many achievements. For instance, during Operation Tractable, the infantry battalions of the 4CAD were responsible for taking a crossing point at Damblainville, but heavy opposition led to a change in order to switch the crossing attempt to the left in order to cross the Dives River at

A Regenerated Battalion: Fighting towards the Scheldt Estuary, September-October 1944
As the British Second Army broke through the German defensive line at the Seine, and had the Germans on the run north towards the Low Countries, the Algonquins and the rest of the 4CAD were tasked to protect the western flank along the coast. Unlike Normandy, this new terrain along the coast mainly consisted of dikes, marshes, and swamp lands. Instead of favouring tanks and artillery, this new geography advantaged the infantry. As ever the terrain gave every advantage to the defenders. Enemy infantry benefitted from the seemingly endless levees and polders near the coast, perfect cover for German machine gun nests and snipers. 149 First Canadian Army's new task turned to driving ahead with the 'utmost energy' towards the port city of Antwerp. In terms of grand strategy, Antwerp was of the greatest importance. The The question now is if the battle performances of the Algonquin Regiment were in any way shaped or impacted by the eventual inclusion of replacements.
Similar to the previous chapter, the battle performances of the Algonquins will be revisited in order to expose their undervalued efforts. However, rather than reviewing the battalion in action without any reinforcements, this chapter will assess their operations with them in order to reveal if the Algonquin Regiment benefitted from continuous supplies of replacements. One of the most significant engagements to reconsider is Moerkerke. Although the Algonquins failed to achieve their objective and suffered terrible casualties, their battlefield performance must be considered in wider terms than either the specific shortcomings of the unit's platoon leadership or indeed the riflemen themselves. Quite simply, the failure of the Other deficiencies increased the casualties sustained at Moerkerke. In addition to the failed recce patrols, air support before and during the attack proved useless. The day before the night-time assault, air photographs were misleading as they did not locate the approximate Germans strength and existing German defences. Further, in the midst of the assault, air power 176 failed to provide any support. In the early morning, when the infantrymen were running short on ammunition, Lt-Col Bradburn even tried to call for ammunition to be dropped by parachute.
However, no planes were available. Perhaps most challenging was the actual canal crossing 177 itself and proved the hardest obstacles to overcome during the entire attack. In order to get over the obstacles and into enemy territory, the Algonquins had to paddle across the first canal, then heave the assault crafts up and over the near vertical climb to reach the dyke between the two canals. The banks rose to nearly 18 metres, and the companies were required to navigate them under constant enemy fire and shelling. 178 Once across, men had to scramble up the final bank, in plain sight of the German forces, a nearly impossible task for soldiers already tired even before they got to the battlefield. Of 179 course, the assault also needed a steady supply of munitions as well as the casualty evacuation meaning that the assault required multiple crossings, in both directions. Several attempts were made at 0930 and again at 1130, to ferry ammunition across the canals, but all the attempts failed At one point, the air photographs indicated an area of the canals that was inundated, but there 176 was actually none at the time of the crossing. The last major factor contributing to the failure was a breakdown in communications. It was discovered after the attack that there was a German sympathizer communicating with the enemy and telling them the positions of the Algonquins through a wireless set. As a result, the 182 Algonquin's Command Post was continually shelled, no matter how often it moved. In total, it moved three times, the first two buildings were left in flames, and the third building also the Letters home certainly expressed the hard work and long hours that they had to endure. Some 185 of the drivers were so tired that they kept falling asleep at the wheel. It was not until 4 186 September that the battalion finally had the chance to take a break and reorganize, for the first time in over a month. Although the Algonquin's ranks were depleted, their spirit was not shattered. Most of the men willingly accepted their sacrifices and struggles as an essential of victory. This is evident in the mindset of their commander. In his own personal message, Lt. Col

R.A. Bradburn stated:
When the struggle was in its most critical stage there were some who had doubts as to whether we would win through. But you and I have no doubts -not one; we knew that so long as we did our duty all would be well; and today, all is well. 187 Clearly the Algonquins were exhausted from previous operations which certainly impacted the morale of some men, but overall the unit remained a cohesive fighting unit.
The role of newly arriving reinforcements also played a large part in bolstering morale. the required reinforcements were still inadequate. These numbers demonstrate two important realities: The Algonquins struggled to refill their ranks and at times of high casualty rates throughout August and early September, and reinforcements were rarely at the front. Therefore, the notion that new reinforcements caused higher casualty rates seems implausible in the case of Algonquins.
Certainly, most reinforcements were inexperienced infantrymen, but training and the desperate need for reinforcements among the Algonquin infantry companies, allowed them to of the Algonquins, no wartime evidence suggests that among the leadership or men, such a view was not reflected. Indeed, there were no complaints regarding the lack of quality of the reinforcements, a view reflected more generally in the army. In a battle questionnaire concerning the quality of reinforcements, 60% of junior officers rated their incoming soldiers as of 'high' and 'moderate' quality. Therefore, the combination of proper training, the practice of leaving 228 reinforcements out of battle, and favouring their necessity rather than relative inexperience suggests reinforcements were not only supported but also eased into battle in stages to manage potential deficiencies on the battlefield. Another example of the fighting ability of the newly arrived reinforcements came during a battle at the eastern dyke on the main axis at the Isabella Polder. C and D coy were engaged in hand to hand combat in enemy defended buildings. The casualties were very high. Fresh men had to be sent up to the front-lines to reinforce the platoons of C coy. In total, one officer and 15 ORs joined the coy in combat. For the rest of the day, they were responsible for defending the captured German defences. Their actions were summarized in the war diary, "all were in fine fettle and killing was good." 231 Instances like these illustrate the common 'swift trust' needed for the Algonquins to successfully continue operations. As most of the ranks were refilled throughout September, men had to begin trusting the newly arriving men based on their common training and goals. Rather than fighting to preserve primary group cohesion, the Algonquin's regenerated platoons had to trust their individual training and skills, as much as the ones of the new soldiers beside them.

Conclusion
While commanding a rifle platoon in D Coy, Corporal Ernest Freve from Mattawa, Ontario continued to lead his men although being mortally wounded during the battle at Moerkerke. During the assault, Freve's forward position was directly hit by an enemy shell, which injured himself and three others. It was later described by the men in his platoon that he never once thought about his own life, and refused evacuation from the battle. He continued shouting and encouraging his men even though he knew he was slowly dying. Under constant enemy fire, he continued encouraging his men and shouted until his very last breath, "Never mind me, dig in and get under cover." 233 Instead of criticizing the reinforcement system and blaming them for casualty rates and failed performances, reinforcements should be examined in a way which demonstrates their undervalued effectiveness. Other than the shortages in August and early September, the efforts of the reinforcements were in fact very effective at rebuilding the regiment and the trust of the men.
For one, with the arrival of new reinforcements, the Algonquins were able to efficiently reorganize their platoons. This meant that the regiment was able to regroup and restructure 234 their infantry units after the month long struggle in August. Also, the reinforcements brought stability and reassurance among the original members of the battalion. And finally, the reinforcements performed very-well in battle. Therefore, this study on the performances and effects of the reinforcements provides an impression that the Algonquin Regiment, and the rest of So what does this mean for group cohesion and battle performances amongst the Algonquins? This research project argues that the men among the ranks were ecstatic and relieved to receive new men. After several weeks of endless battles and heavy casualties without any reinforcements, the men were finally reassured when new arrivals began filling the depleted ranks. The original members of the Algonquin Regiment were especially satisfied when the men coming in were battle experienced. But even then, experienced or not, the Algonquins were appreciative of the well-trained men coming in to aid them in battle. Regardless of their 235 background, training, or experience, the Algonquin reinforcements were relied upon by the members who had been dealing with extreme adversity. Therefore, in examining this specific era, this research suggests that the replacement of men through the reinforcement system was one of the largest contributing factors in the growth and efficient evolvement of the regiment in battle.
In connecting a review of the Algonquin reinforcements with the actions of the battalion, this research paper has demonstrated the reasons why and how the reinforcements affected battle performances on the battlefield. Therefore, this MRP also suggests that the incoming reinforcements played one of the most crucial and essential roles in shaping the first building block for recreating soldier cohesion. Not only did these men from new areas with different backgrounds change the overall dynamics of the regiment, but they also brought with them a new during the campaign in northwest Europe is still significant for several reasons. At an operational and battalion level of history, the Algonquin campaign enjoyed great success. Other than the two inevitable breakdowns during Operation Totalize and at Moerkerke, the Algonquins performed very admirably. The regiment was often given important and daunting task that hinged the fate of 4CAD. Also, as previously covered, the Algonquins were often forced to make do without any real considerable reinforcements. For these reason, this case study reveals the importances of reinforcements and group cohesion. Not only does the Algonquin campaign illustrate the effectiveness of the battalion, but also the cooperation of its reinforcements. In a historical sense,