The Unipolar Torment: Analysing grand strategic overstretch of the United States

Abstract The article aspired to probe the versatility of narratives prevailing in the American academia regarding the formulation and articulation of the U.S. grand strategy based on the structure and nature of the international system. A set of scholars dominating policy making circles have long trumpeted the aspects of American Exceptionalism and the messianic role to project liberal values using both interventionism and non-interventionism. On the other hand, scholars belonging to the Realist tradition and its various schools of thought have negated such claims and called for the adoption of a Realist grand strategy. The article remained focused in exploring the prevalent nature of the international system and the outreach and overreach of American global power. It found the post-Cold War strategy of preponderance as the early traces of global overstretch and among the chief elements in the increasingly stagnant or perhaps declining American global power. The article also proposed a few guidelines in formulating a grand strategy capable of minimizing the grand strategic overstretch.


Introduction
The Fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1989 signalled the demise of the Soviet Union, and subsequently, the world witnessed the end of the Cold War.The watershed moment in history brought structural changes, transforming the international system from clear bipolarity to vague unipolarity.The end of Cold War was interpreted as a permanent change in the international system and the Liberal scholar Krauthammer adamantly predicted "The center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States" (Krauthammer, 1990, p. 23).On the other hand, Krauthammer's "unipolar moment" was contended by Realist scholar Layne as "unipolar illusion" and logically predicted the rise of new great powers (Layne, 1993, pp. 5-51).Just before it, Fukuyama borrowed a few ideas from German philosopher Friedrich Hegel and went a bit further while proclaiming its End of History thesis (Cohen, 2001 −41;, pp. 39;Fukuyama, 1992).However, long before such individuals, a German general and war theorist named as Carl von Clausewitz emphasized that "Peace does not often reign everywhere in Europe, and never throughout the whole world" (von Clausewitz, 1989, p. 122); and also, established an adage that "In war the result is never final" (von Clausewitz, 1989, p. 80).In retrospect, according to Clausewitz, the Cold War was a war in general terms, and its end led to a period of intense security competition.Thus, it is not ambitious to assume that the outcome of the "long peace" 1 could be regarded as the long era of struggle for powerwhich eventually we are witnessing in the contemporary times.
There exists a good old axiom that "great power comes with great responsibility".The dictum is a powerful instrument which has time and again reflected its relevance in the world politics.It helps the powerful state in sustaining its great power status, and by the virtue of responsible conduct, it diminishes the political dimensions and psychologically induced feelings of fear inflicted on the weak and vulnerable.However, the strategy of preponderance and considering "every nook and cranny of the globe" to be "of great strategic significance" (Mearsheimer, 2014a(Mearsheimer, , 2014b, p. 9), p. 9), the great power experiences overstretch (Posen, 2014, p. xii).The latter phenomenon, though, has experienced by number of great powers, results in an ostensible stagnation or perhaps a decline in power and prestige.Resultantly, it opens the window of opportunity for other powers to emerge and becoming peer or near peer-competitors.
In contemporary times, the global power stature of the United States (U.S.) is almost undeniable.Its history is equated with the history of the world and its military sophistication and economic power are nearly unmatched.Its foreign policy along with security and defence is a major field of study in various fields of Political Science and International Relations.The operations its armed forces conducted during its War of Independence and ever since are enduring sources of learning, almost globally.However, apart from the few mentioned certain glowing credentials and historical exceptional characteristics, a rich yet intense debate is visible in its foreign policy circles regarding America's grand strategy in the twenty-first century.The grand strategy fundamentally helps great powers in identifying and assessing potential threats and prioritizing accordingly.The term which Captain Basil Henry Liddell Hart coined, keeps on resonating its relevance endlessly 2 ; however, its formulation and articulation remain the epicentre in deciding the effectiveness of a great power.
Hitherto, besides the primacy of U.S. power and prestige, the contemporary international structure is rapidly moving towards an unbalanced multipolarity (Baig, 2019b, pp. 373-374).The intense security competition between the ruling U.S. and the rising China is giving impetus to the resurging Russia. 3One can safely hypothesise that in the prevalent times, no great power equates the power of other great power; nonetheless, "at the same time, no power will be powerful enough to overpower the other" (Baig, 2022(Baig, , pp. 1095(Baig, -1096)).This structural change triggers one to think about the primacy of the U.S. global power and its growing inability to compel others to do its will (von Clausewitz, 1989, p. 75).I argue and this article likely will demonstrate that the chief reason behind such a quagmire is the eroding U.S. global power, primarily due to pursuing a grand strategy pivoted upon liberal hegemony.The latter involves deploying its armed forces endlessly, fighting unnecessary wars, and leading towards grand strategic overstretch.
The article mainly focuses the U.S. grand strategy after the Second World War.At that time, the international system was in a transition phase where it moved from the end of the Second World War to the initiation of the Cold War.The international structure was bipolar, the U.S. was leading the free world, and an intense security competition between the U.S. and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) was raging from East Asia to South America (Lacey, 2016, pp. 511-542).The United Kingdom (U.K.), France, Japan, and Republic of China were all exhausted and the Soviet occupation of the East Germany and its ideology-driven expansionist policies empowered the U.S. grand strategy.

An overview of the study and methodology
The article takes a structural, yet theoretical approach in understanding the grand strategic overstretch of the U.S. It argues the falsely perceived and tremendously overblown Washington-led "Unipolar Moment" spearheaded by the Liberal scholars and Neo-Conservatives, 4 have had resulted in overcommitment and overreach.It cites that the theory offers three basic things "describing reality and generating the historical and practical knowledge needed to resolve problems" and helping in conceiving "the changing dimensions and limits of power structures" (Griffiths et al., 2008, p. vii).The article draws the Realist tradition, more importantly the structural theoretical approach, in explaining the overstretch faced by the contemporary U.S. It argues the Liberal "Unipolar Moment" as "Unipolar Torment" that has embroiled America in a giant whirlpool and significantly swirling its global sway.
This analytical and explanatory study mostly relied on secondary data, generally gathered from the academic community; however, primary data were also considered.The study was conducted mainly by focusing on two research questions.
(1) What is the post-Second World War U.S. grand strategy and how and why it is resulting in the grand strategic overstretch, while eroding the U.S. global power and resulting in China's rise and Russian resurgence?
(2) What are the implications of grand strategic overstretch and does the U.S. need a grand strategy pivoted upon realist principles?

American Exceptionalism and Liberal arguments
Former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's "calling for a cause" provided a unique framework, yet a powerful narrative in the nation's history that is driving the U.S. grand strategy, especially after the Second World War (Layne, 2006 −133;, pp. 118;Stiergerwald, 1999, pp. 79-99).It was best manifested in his speech outlining "Fourteen Points" before the joint session of Congress on 8 January 1919, that was interpreted as "Allied cause" (Slavicek, 2010, pp. 32-34).However, previously, Wilson was cautioned due to the German Zimmerman Telegram, and later, made a strong case by saying that "it would be a crime against civilization for us to go in" (Slavicek, 2010, pp. 27-28) in entering the Great War in aftermath of the sinking of HMS Lusitania on 7 May 1915.The incident resulted in the deaths of 128 Americans (Strachan, 2014, p. 238;Tucker, 2013, p. 83).Wilson's arguments resonated time and again, and more importantly, the post-Second World War era shadowed the calling.It followed a grand strategy pivoted upon Wilson's exceptional beliefs and expanded liberal hegemony (Walt, 2018, p. 8).The American Exceptionalism reached climax during the Cold War, when Washington committed its armed forces globally in fighting the "Red Threat".However, in the post-Cold War era with the proclamation of the New World Order, American Exceptionalist beliefs trumpeted even more and called for an enhanced and renewed commitment in spreading liberal values, using force.
Conceptually, American Exceptionalism is a doctrine that mainly comprises of two strands: i) America as an exceptional political entity (Global Exceptionalism) and ii) America as a missionary state (Messianic Exceptionalism) (Desai, 2014 −16;, pp. 14;McCrisken, 2003, p. 2).However, Baig argued that a third strand of American Exceptionalism also exists that revolves around the concept of having an exceptional armed force that is mandated by God to fight the evil (Baig, 2018).However, under such a doctrine, the Liberals viewed the U.S. as an exemplary nation, which has the divine mission to spread liberal values, and most importantly, democracy as the universally accepted political system.The exceptionalist belief cites John Winthrops's notion of 1630 regarding America "as a city upon a hill" (McCrisken, 2003, p. 9) that has a predominant Christian population, for which the God carved a New Jerusalem (Bacevich, 2005, p. 122;Grant, 2012, p. 39).Such beliefs were championed by John O'Sullivan's Manifest Destiny in the 1840s.Sullivan, a journalist by profession, in his article "Annexation" published in July-August 1845 issue of The United States Magazine and Democratic Review, advocated in favour of the annexation and acquisition of Texas and asserted that the "fulfilment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions" (Mountjoy, 2009, pp. 9-10).This idea was a cornerstone to defend and justify the annexations of Texas-Oregon dispute with the British and war with Mexico in 1846 (Mountjoy, 2009, pp. 11-13).Sullivan's use of the word "providence" points fingers towards the concept and idea being deeply religious.However, Mountjoy highlighted three main aspects of Manifest Destiny, i.e., "the special virtues of the American people and their institutions; their mission to redeem and remake the world in the image of America; and the American destiny under God to accomplish this sublime task" (Mountjoy, 2009, p. 13).Stuart put it quite right when it argued that "Manifest Destiny implied not simply territorial growth, but sanctified ideology and institutions" (Stuart, 1988, p. 85).The Manifest Destiny was defined as "in essence the doctrine that one nation has a preeminent social worth, a distinctively lofty mission, and consequently, unique rights in the application of moral principles" (McCrisken, 2003, p. 12).However, William Spanos argued that Indians and Native Americans were removed and obliterated under the premise of Manifest Destiny-since it was "White Man's Burden" to expand Westward (Spanos, 2008, p. 12).Similarly, Gilmore while citing Hietala and Pease called Manifest Destiny as a controversial policy that justified the use of atomic bombs against Japan and a pretext to consider it being exempted from the bindings of the international law (Gilmore, 2014(Gilmore, , p. 2432)).
Later, in the twenty-first century, the younger President Bush emphasized on American unique character that it is not merely bigger or powerful but an exception with a holder and preacher of freedom and liberty with moral superiority.He called American nation to be the beacon of light in the dark world (George W. Bush: Inaugural Address, 2005).Similarly, Neo-conservatives Kaplan and Kristol argued that "American Internationalism" has its roots in American Exceptionalism that is the unique framework that is reflected in U.S. foreign policy behaviour (Kaplan & Kristol, 2003, pp. 126-127).The Liberal scholars greatly pivoted their beliefs and arguments in the exceptional character of America and envisaged a unique place for it among the nations.For them, laissezfaire, i.e., the free-market economy and capitalism, were the best economic system, and liberal democracy with free and transparent institutions were to serve as the acceptable political system.Their love for institutions called for the establishment of international institutions which could ensure peace.Other liberal values includeing equality, justice, and freedom of individual rights are among the creed of such a philosophical position.
However, other philosophical positions tend not to deny the significance of such great ideals regarding political and economic systems; nonetheless, there exists a steep departure on the articulation of such philosophies in the formulation of grand strategy and the exercise of foreign policy.

The Realists and U.S. foreign policy
Late Realist scholar Robert Gilpin noted in 1981 that "the fundamental nature of international relations has not changed over the millennia.International relations continue to be a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy" (Gilpin, 1981, p. 7). 5 Gilpin lamented the post-Cold War criticism on Realism by arguing that "political realism has come under increasing attack from many political liberals" (Gilpin, 1996, p. 3).Mearsheimer bewailed the post-Cold War international structure and preferred the bipolar world order that brought the longest peace in history, particularly in Europe (Mearsheimer, 1990b).Snyder argued that "In liberal democracies, realism is the theory that everyone loves to hate" (Snyder, 2004, p. 55). 6The severe criticism American Realists garner is due to their determination in upholding the national interest and formulating the grand strategy and pursuing the foreign policy from a realistic standpoint (Gilpin, 1996 −26;, pp. 3;Legro & Moravcsik, 1999 −55;, pp. 5;Wolfowitz, 2009).Let us now take a brief detour on Realism by outlining its very basic tenets.

Reality, rationality, and realism
In the real world, where states compete for relative gains needs a foreign policy pivoted upon reality, and Realism serves the reality as it approaches policy with reality being an independent variable.Reality shapes the course of events, not the other way around.Realism invokes rationality that is the best possible way of dealing with reality.Rationality dictates decision-makers in taking certain decisions which help in achieving strategic objectives.And for achieving strategic objectives, rationality prevents in considering every nook and cranny of the globe to be of strategic importance.
For Mearsheimer states behave rationally and argued "great powers are rational actors" as both "fear each other" (Mearsheimer, 2001b, pp. 31-32).On the other hand, Waltz doubted the rational behaviour of states (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 22).However, I believe that in our times, states like North Korea behaves rationally and adopts a well-calculated course of action that ensures its survival.Apart from its intercontinental ballistic missiles and enormous cyber warfare capabilities (Baig, 2019a, pp. 219-248), it refrains from taking certain measures which could deny Pyongyang of the undying Chinese support.The same goes for Iran, which suffered Operation Praying Mantis and the sinking of its frigate Sahand in 1988 at the American hands, nonetheless, did not launch full-scale attacks against the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf (El-Shazly, 1998, p. 176).However, in 2000, Liberal calls for dismantling Al-Qaeda resulted in suicide attack on USS Cole, resulting in the deaths of 17 American sailors (Roskin, 2016, p. 8).The weak states and violent Actors Other Than State (AOTSs) are also rational actors, as they fear disproportionate reprisal, and mount their actions rationally (McCormick, 2003, p. 481).It is to be remembered here that Classical Realist scholar Machiavelli stressed the importance of mercenaries and in the contemporary times the AOTSs are behaving like mercenaries (Mallett & Shaw, 2014, pp. 75-85).Their allegiance lies with the highest bidder.However, while "spreading the liberal values and democracy curse" prevalent in Liberal foreign missions, the violent AOTSs launched calculated attacks at American forces driven by a tremendous amount of fear, of losing their ideology-driven way of life and (Braguinsky & Yavlinsky, 2000, Chapter 9).

Liberal and realist views on nationalism
The duality of nationalism prevailing in liberal democratic countries was highlighted, and it was argued that openly democratic and pluralistic countries having liberal values as their core agenda -promote civil-values oriented nationalism.Nevertheless, the authors maintained that where migrants are considered intolerable-a more aggressive form of nationalism is likely to be adopted by the host country (Gal et al., 2010, p. xvi).These arguments attest the importance and value of nationalism even in the liberal democracies (van Evera, 1994, pp. 5-39).
Liberal scholars view nationalism as a negative ideology that invokes inward approach of a given nation and that is greatly based on the feelings of hatred for others.They believe that nationalism is a sense of being superior of having distinct race, colour, faith, religion, etc, in relation to others.However, on the other hand Realists regard nationalism in high value (Mearsheimer, 2011).Mearsheimer noted that "Nationalism is probably the most powerful political ideology in the world, and it glorifies the state" (Mearsheimer, 2001b, p. 365).It declared it to be the "conqueror's problem" as "nationalism makes it hard to subdue and manipulate the people in defeated states" (Mearsheimer, 2001b, p. 148).For Realists, state and its survival is of supreme value and only a nation-state that is coherent and vibrant, could have better chances of survival (Kostagiannis, 2018 −155;, pp. 150;Mearsheimer, 2011).Also, such a nation-state could have better demographic power and likely will effectively mobilise the latent power. 7  Apart from many, one important mistake that American Liberal hegemony made in calculating and launching its "spreading liberal values and democracy curse" was underestimating the spirit of nationalism in the so-called uncivilized world.For instance, America greatly ignored the element of nationalism in its drive to Korea in 1950.Later, it catastrophically repeated the same undervaluing of nationalism in Vietnam.After the Cold War, the Liberal foreign policy overlooked Chinese nationalism.A continuous drive remained visible in demonizing the "China Threat" and inviting the President Lee to deliver a speech at the Cornell University (America) hypothesizing the political independence of Taiwan.The aforementioned incidents were among the foolish attempts which were made while ignoring the Chinese nationalism and helped Beijing becoming stronger (Chen, 2017, p. 12;Cole, 2017, p. 86).
Liberalism favours the establishment of international institutions and organizations since the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944(The Bretton Woods Conference, 1944, 2023).It is pertinent here to note that China is the largest beneficiary of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its growing military capabilities are the direct consequence of such a trade imbalance.China's advantages over the U.S. led Washington to impose tariffs on Chinese goods (Baig, 2023, pp. 1-27).On the same pattern, the Liberal hegemony triggered Moscow's realpolitik-driven nationalistic fervour and helped Russia in annexing Crimea.In the meantime, America's utmost desire of removing Assad and installing democracy in Syria, provided Kremlin with its first offshore military base in the strategically vital Middle East (Mearsheimer, 2014c(Mearsheimer, , pp. 1-12, 2014c)).Also, such actions resulted in bringing the like-minded nations like China, Russia, Iran, and Syria closer and caused AOTSs like Hezbollah and Hamas to become stronger. 8

The U.S. grand strategy post-cold war: explaining the Unipolar Torment
The Liberal scholars along with Neo-Conservatives momentously celebrated the establishment of a unipolar world.Not only they trumpeted the latter but also interpreted it as the truest attestation and perfect manifestation of the doctrine called American Exceptionalism.This spearheaded revelling of chivalry triggered fear in China, as it recovered from the Tiananmen Square in June 1989 and considered itself as the "default adversary" of the U.S.After burying the "Red Threat", the Liberals and Neoconservatives turned their guns towards former allies including Saddam Hussein, Afghan Mujahideen, and started building a compelling case against rising China.In 2000, such scholars including Kagan, Kristol, and Wolfowitz called for an action against China, Iran, and North Korea.They also lauded Israel, Asian Allies, and the European partners in maintaining the Liberal hegemony of the U.S (Kagan & Kristol, 2000, pp. 47-110, 111-240).Contending such views, Realists asserted Israel as a "strategic liability" (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007, pp. 49-77).Later, Kaplan and Kristol declared Saddam as "tyrannical;" the latter previously remained a liked person by the Liberal community including Donald Rumsfeld, a former Special Envoy to the Middle East.These individuals, especially Wolfowitz, who is remembered for his fame as the leader-member of the Blue Team or "Team B," brought American strategic commitments to such lengths that it started to experience overreach and overstretch (Kaplan & Kristol, 2003, p. 138).These men manufactured the Bush Doctrine and introduced the concept of "pre-emptive war" (Selden, 2016, pp. 1-10).Mearsheimer noted that after Saddam's removal, a Shia-dominated government was installed in Iraq that "strengthened Iran's position in the Middle East" (Mearsheimer, 2014a(Mearsheimer, , 2014b, p. 15), p. 15).
The wars started by such group of individuals have brought the U.S. to such a position, that now it is fighting China over trade and tariffs, like some feeble state that could no longer compete and sustain on its own.By embroiling America with the messianic mission to installing democracies worldwide and fighting unnecessary wars, 9 the Liberal hegemony has greatly turned America into a consumer economy, rather being a manufacturing economy. 10The U.S. military planners time and again show grave concerns over North Korea's Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and no longer feel secure.This is not the America that George Washington envisaged-former U.S. Army General Clark argued that America was forged in war (Clark (Ret) (2018, pp. 3-13); however, great powers wage wars for strategic interests, not for the sake of garnering redundant hatred and spreading democracy. 11 Although, democracy is much likely to serve as a superior political system for great powers which need strong institutions and the rule of law in maintaining and sustaining such a stature.However, authoritarian political systems such as in China, where the People's Liberation Army (PLA) belongs not to the state, but its loyalty lies with the Communist Party of China (CPC); it could sustain its political independence and rise to the stature of a great power (Li, 2012, pp. 295-296).The political system is solely an internal affair of any given state, and it has little or no relevance with its relations with the U.S. If that's not the case, then why the U.S. has maintained close relations with the Arab monarchs which have shown very little regard for liberal values in their domestic dealings. 12  I argue that the "Torment" (overstretch) America experiences today is the product of foreign policy based on Liberal and Neoconservative orientation. 13It is not the responsibility of American policy makers, mandated by the Providence to spread liberal values by overthrowing authoritarian regimes, mostly using force, or by transforming Russian and Chinese political systems by making them "more like us" and adopting such a desperate approach (Deudney & Ikenberry, 2009 −62;, pp. 39;Mastanduno, 2019, pp. 479-504).Quite contrary to their creed in spreading democracy, historically speaking, Liberal foreign policies installed puppet regimes in Latin America and unconditionally supported tyrannical monarchs in the Middle East and elsewhere (Walt, 2018, p. 9).Those regimes not only horrendously mutilated "liberal values" in their territories, but also contributed negatively towards American interests.For instance, dictatorships in Pakistan were greatly supported by Liberal foreign policies; however, those leaders were neither just nor did spread democracy.Also, although Bin Laden was not a regime, yet he was erected under Liberals; nonetheless, he and his relentless followers i.e., the Islamic State fighters are still haunting and hunting American interests, almost globally.
Moreover, Fareed Zakaria made a compelling argument i.e. "rise of the rest" (Zakaria, 2008).However, it is vital to understand why the "rest" felt to "rise" in the first place.Is it the "Torment" faced by American global presence and the unintended consequences of the strategy of preponderance, Liberal hegemony, or the assessment made by Layne when it predicted the rise of other great powers?Alternatively, there can be number of other explanations as well in explaining the predicament.
Lately, the Obama Administration unsuccessfully tried removing Assad in Syria.However, this strategy unprecedentedly backfired and Russia started establishing its first offshore naval and air bases in the regions of Latakia and Tartuos, in late 2015.The "spreading of liberal values and democracy curse" looming over U.S. foreign policy, resulted in a strategic misstep.That said, Russia has gained an operational laboratory in putting to test its every new and advanced weapon system.As, Kremlin deployed its Su-34 and the most advanced Su-57 Felon fifth-generation aircraft, T-14 Armata, and T-90 Main Battle Tanks, Uran-9 Unmanned Combat Ground Vehicle (UCGV), Pantsir-S1 close air defence, and S-400 Triumf long range anti-air systems.Russia also fired several Kalibr cruise missiles from its vessels in the Caspian Sea at Islamic State targets in a remarkable show of force (Lyons, 2015;Thornton, 2018, pp. 30-38).
Realists pay significant heed and learn from history.It is to be remembered that Hitler successfully used Spanish Civil War (1936)(1937)(1938)(1939) in testing its Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers along with the deadly Blitzkrieg doctrine (Zaloga, 2010, pp. 4-5).A few years later, the experiences gained, were refined and helped Germany in overpowering the entire Europe (Baig & Iqbal, 2018, pp. 1-31).Notably, since the Russian intervention in Syria in September 2015, Putin's been calling the shots and has found a new informal strategic ally i.e., Turkey's Erdogan.It is not strange that Turkey preferred Russian S-400 anti-air systems, in relation to the U.S.-led multi-nation F-35 program, which Ankara was a part of.It is important to ponder upon that, how Putin demagnetised a NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) member?The unsuccessful military coup in Turkey in July 2016 was perceived by Erdogan as a clandestine U.S. attempt in bringing liberal democracy to Turkey, and he accused U.S. Central Command General Joseph Votel of "siding with coup plotters" (Harvey, 2016).Previously, the U.S. military presence in Turkey during the Cold War generated dissatisfaction among many Turks and militant organizations such as the Turkish People's Liberation Army (THKO) and Turkish People's Liberation Front (THKP-C), even conducted armed struggle (Holmes, 2014, pp. 82-94).It is worth mentioning, that it is the same Turkey that demanded inclusion in NATO in 1951 for security concerns, and later, in February 1952, the Turkish Grand National Assembly joined unanimously "by a vote of 404 to 0, with one abstention" (Holmes, 2014, p. 49;Váli, 1971, p. 126).However, the unnecessary stationing of troops and strategic overstretch culminated in 2003, when almost 80 percent Turkish people opined negatively regarding U.S. military presence in Turkey (Holmes, 2014, p. 182;Uslu et al., 2005, pp. 90-98).
Being rational, defence equipment buyers closely monitor the operational efficacy of weapon systems, and do not yield their buying preferences to some fancy advertisements and manoeuvres conducted in highly controlled environments.Putin's advanced weapons circus in Syria, attracted international attention and countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, and Iran showed considerable interest in Russian armaments.Notably, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan have historically remained American defence industry buyer.The unsuccessful pursuance of Liberal hegemony likely will drastically affect the weapons and armaments industry of the U.S.

Unipolar Torment (moment) and three geopolitical changes
Hal Brands noted that the dawn of the "unipolar moment" brought three significant changes including, i) the Fall of the Berlin Wall and downfall of Communism in Eastern Europe, ii) the Persian Gulf War, and iii) collapse of the Soviet Union.It maintained that each of these three changes "shattered old certainties and arrangements, and each created new opportunities and dangers" (Brands, 2016, p. 275).Let us now consider each three events and their respective catastrophic aftermath.
First, the downfall of Communism in Eastern Europe prompted the "spreading the liberal values and democracy curse" in the U.S. foreign policy.Apart from that, the U.S. started sanitizing the former Communist republics by swallowing them into NATO.Mearsheimer argued that great powers inherit some offensive military capabilities.That said, Russia time and again used "some" of its offensive military capabilities in Abkhazia, Georgia, South Ossetia, and more recently by annexing Crimea in March 2014.The Eastern Europe is still practically under Russia's shadow and Moscow-led CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) is aimed to ensure that.Contemporarily, Russia's European enclave of Kaliningrad is a nightmare to Western Europe, and Putin's allies in Belarus and Hungary are keeping the Suwalki Gap a constantly terrifying dream for the NATO.The question arises that what strategic objectives has America gained so far by the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe?Second, almost happening at the same time, the Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm exhibited remarkable use of modern technology in overpowering Iraq.The latter possessed one of the strongest armed forces in the Middle East.Before that, Iraq was a key U.S.-ally against Iran, and Washington supplied Baghdad with military hardware in containing Tehran.Baghdad also acted as a bulwark against Tehran and fought for almost eight years i.e., the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988(Tucker, 2015, pp. 565-566).The operation against Iraq in 1991 was primarily aimed against a former formidable ally against Iran that could have helped the U.S. in containing Iran and the ideology-driven Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).In other words, the attack on Iraq destroyed an enemy that never existed and resulted in the rise of strategic problems, for instance the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Stern & Berger, 2015, pp. 13-30).
Though, the Persian Gulf is of vital strategic value to the U.S. interests; nonetheless, the invasion of Iraq somehow appeased Saddam's ideological rivals i.e., Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and helped Baathist Syria and Russia getting closer.Undoubtedly, the unilateral invasion that was opposed by Germany and France, created dissatisfaction among allies and helped spread the Iranian revolutionary influence.Mearsheimer favoured the existence of two great powers in a region, so both can focus on each other (Mearsheimer, 2001b, p. 42), so that the U.S. could effectively pursue offshore balancing.The destruction of Iraqi military hardware stretching from Desert Storm to Operation Iraqi Freedom 14 disturbed the balance of power in the region and provided an opportunity to the violent AOTSs to rise.Had Iraq's military not destroyed, America could have used Baghdad in some future endeavours to contain Tel Aviv, as Mearsheimer and Walt declared Israel to be a strategic liability-contributing towards American global overstretch.Walt noted in 1985 that Israel, apart from being the "most dependent on American support" pursues an "independent" foreign policy, contrary to the interests of Washington (Walt, 1985, p. 40).
Finally, the disintegration of Soviet Union shattered the most important certainty i.e. the demise of the bipolar world that was lamented by Mearsheimer (Mearsheimer, 1990b).As, for Realists, history suggests that bipolar world order is more stable and peaceful, as compared to balanced multipolarity and the war prone unbalanced multipolarity. 15Currently, the world is moving towards multipolarity, where the lesser poles will try and balance the relatively superior poles by forming formal and informal alliances.Such arrangements do not necessarily mean the order is transforming towards unbalanced multipolarity, yet provided the emergence of new alliances and alignments, more likely towards balanced multipolarity.However, uncertainty looms over the intentions of emerging great powers, as states can never be certain about the intentions of other states and anarchy gives impetus to such endeavours (Mearsheimer, 2001b, pp. 29-36).
I argue that a remarkable great power with hegemonic stature and "exalted position" could only become a status quo power, provided it follows a foreign policy pivoted upon Realist principles.Unlike the U.S., that achieved a significant level of global power, but engaged and overcommitted itself in unnecessary wars and entangled its massive horns in some strategically less important bushes under two Bush Administrations and in between Clinton Administration, 16 and later Obama Administration.These Liberal administrations seemed so addicted in civilizing the world using force that put American power off-balance.Resultantly, the Obama Administration initiated the Third Offset Strategy and the Asia Pivot Policy to effectively assert U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region (Simón, 2016, pp. 417-445).Which means that "spreading liberal values and democracy curse" greatly deviated America from focusing its attention on the three regions of vital strategic value i.e.Europe, North-East Asia, and the Persian Gulf (Mearsheimer, 2014a(Mearsheimer, , 2014b, pp. 12-13), pp. 12-13).

Why strategic overstretch: analysis and afterthought
On 4 July 1821, John Quincy Adams established the foundations of future American grand strategy by arguing that it "goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy."The American Founding Fathers envisaged a progressive U.S. and "the well-wisher to the freedom and independence" and a "champion and vindicator only of her own" (Edel, 2014, p. 162;Renehan, 2007, pp. 50-51).However, before the start of the Second World War, the U.S. military installations in Shanghai and Beijing were attacked by Imperial Japan between December 8-11, 1941.Such bases were referred by Appleman as "a classic strategy of non-colonial imperial expansion" (Chun & Gerrard, 2006, p. 6;Williams, 1972, pp. 50-52).Moreover, quite contrary to the grand strategic guidelines, since the Second World War, the U.S. committed its armed forces almost globally (Walt, 2018, pp. 3-22).By stationing its troops in the West Germany and Europe along with United States Forces Japan (USFJ) in Japan, under the command of the then United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).Almost immediately the war, the U.S. engaged in the Korean War for almost three brutal years and still the United States Forces Korea (USFK) are still stationed in South Korea guarding the heavily defended Demilitarised Zone (DMZ).The Soviets and Chinese embroiled the U.S. in a bloodletting strategy in the Vietnam War for almost two decades; nonetheless, the Communist Forces overpowered Americans in April 1975 and unified Vietnam.With Soviet attack on Afghanistan in 1979, it militarily assisted the Mujahideen and Pakistan.In the meantime, it actively committed its armed forces in fighting anti-American elements and conducted Operation Eagle Claw in Iran (1980( ), engaged Libyans (1981( -1989)), executed Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada (1989), underwent Operation Just Cause in Panama (1989)(1990), and continuously engaged Iran in the Persian Gulf during the 1980s (Crist, 2001 −16;, pp. 15;Lewis, 2018, p. 312;Lookingbill, 2013, p. 350;Ratner, 1984 −63;, pp. 59;Thompson, 2002 −14;, pp. 7;Tucker, 2011, p. 554).However, with the Soviet demise, it accelerated the strategy of preponderance and showed a remarkable show of force during Desert Shield and Desert Storm against Iraq (1991).
In retrospect, the post-Second World War period, America conducted operations on a global scale and maintained its effective presence by the virtue of the combined combatant commands.However, such a global presence has greatly diminished American power by experiencing imperial overstretch.Mearsheimer noted that "Overexpanders" continue to expand aims and "are the irrational aggressors who start losing wars yet do not have the good sense to quit when it becomes apparent that they are doomed to lose" (Mearsheimer, 2001b, p. 211).

Forward bases and the limits of power
Harkavy noted that the forward positioning of military bases serves strategic interests in gaining and maintaining access and such endeavours have remained relative in military history (Harkavy, 1982, pp. 14-17).However, it is difficult in defining the term "forward positioning" for a sea power, like America, which is accustomed to the strategy of preponderance.If, to "kick the door down" (Murphy, 2015, pp. 97-107) or knocking at the doors of potential competitors, and the bases surrounding China which "form a giant noose" mean forward positioning, then such provocative, yet immensely expensive initiatives must be abandoned (Pilger, 2016).I argue that sitting at the doors of potential competitors activate their strategic fear receptors, and they start working on a counter strategy.The realists provided a viable logic to understanding the latter phenomenon.John Herz argued that the increased security of one state leads to enhanced insecurity of another state in the presence of mutual hostile relations.Herz referred to it as Security Dilemma (Herz, 1950, pp. 157-180).In the recent past, the best of example of Security Dilemma is the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014 (Mearsheimer, 2014c, pp. 77-89).Similarly, the likelihood of the growing China-Russia alliance is the by-product of such strategies (Allison, 2018;Kendall-Taylor & Shullman, 2019;Liu, 2019).
There are certain limits of power and is a real phenomenon, but not necessarily Realists mastered it, rather they emphasized and favoured it.Mearsheimer himself acknowledged that his arguments are "like a powerful flashlight in a dark room: even though it cannot illuminate every nook and cranny, most of the time it is an excellent tool for navigating through the darkness" (Mearsheimer, 2001b, p. 11).It is an imperative for great powers, particularly the U.S., to realize this reality, the sooner the better.Mearsheimer translated Wilsonianism and American Exceptionalism as anti-realist approaches (Mearsheimer, 1995a, p. 49).Bacevich argued that Senator Robert M. La Follette cautioned that Wilson was "under a pretext of carrying democracy to the rest of the world was actually doing more to undermine and destroy democracy in the U.S. than it will be possible for us as a Nation to repair in a generation" (Bacevich, 2005, p. 14;Unger, 2000, pp. 252-253).Ostensibly, Wilson while upholding the American Exceptionalism and its moral duty to do the God's work being the torchbearer of light-went to the very limits of powers.Christopher Layne averred that "the war on terror, or Iraq's nonexistent weapons of mass destruction.Rather it was a war of hegemony intended to establish U.S. military and ideological dominance in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East" (Layne, 2006, p. 2).
The Liberal illusions deep pivoted in the motivation of "power projection" is more of "power provocation" that provokes America's potential competitors in becoming assertive rivals.Bacevich was right to argue that "the pursuit of military dominance is an illusion" (Bacevich, 2009, p. 171).However, such pursuits have actually eroded American power projection capabilities.Liberals and Realists do not negate the presence of anarchy; however, both differ on its impact on international politics (Grieco, 1988).Likewise, both admit the importance of international institutions; nonetheless, Liberals view such arrangements for the establishment of peace and cooperation; and on the other hand, Realists believe that states increase or maintain their share of world power by such institutions (Mearsheimer, 1995b, pp. 82-93).

What realism offers?
Realism provides guidelines in solving strategic issues and a discerning rationality in differentiating such in the international politics.I argue that for policy makers, particularly political and military, in dealing and overcoming unforeseen or sub-tactical and tactical level issues, Clausewitz provided a viable logic.As, the German war theorist presented two separate, yet closely related approaches for political and military leaders.Clausewitz pointed out that "if the political leader is a man of distinguished intelligence and strength of character, he can always get the military information he needs" (von Clausewitz, 1989, p. 706).He also outlined the virtues and qualities of a successful military leader by calling it as the "Military Genius" and profoundly stressed the importance of courage (von Clausewitz, 1989, pp. 100-112).
I argue that Realism provides grand strategic guidelines for policy makers to devise grand strategy and to pursue the national interest under the framework of such an umbrella.However, as Clausewitz pointed out, I believe that the cognition and intuition of policy makers along with other executioners of the policy, greatly help them in seeing the unforeseen, since for him, "highly developed mental aptitude" (von Clausewitz, 1989, p. 100) mattered a vital position in judging the situation and taking most appropriate decisions in crisis situation.In other words, a rational policy maker, who approaches policy with reality in its mind, could fully benefit from elements such as cognition and intuition.
I believe that the prevalent grand strategy of Liberal hegemony more or less reminisces the theory of Total War, where war is taken as grand strategy and envisages an unending and unlimited spectrum of operations, in spreading liberal values.On the other hand, Realism professes limited war in achieving limited objectives and striking a balance between power and the limits of power.In other words, the rational driven and reality-oriented Realist approach carefully calculates the culminating point of attack and culminating point of victory and sensibly computes "whether to fight, how to fight, and to what ends" (Clark (Ret), 2018, p. 2).

The proposed guidelines for a superior grand strategy
Liberal scholars always aspired in reminiscing and having Friedrich Nietzsche's Übermensch (Superman) (Cohen, 2001, p. 172) at their indispensable disposal that has unmatched power and presenting a formidable, yet long lasting commitment to the U.S. foreign policy in maintaining hegemony.However, their delusional beliefs have brought the U.S. into a labyrinth, where its hegemony and overblown structural unipolarity is no longer a reality. 17Martel noted that a grand strategy is not likely to work when a crisis is looming over (Martel, 2015, p. 340).However, I argue that apart from the transforming and growing unbalanced multipolarity, America is not in a crisis situation, but if Washington kept on its current path for a decade or so, the crisis likely will be here and there will be no Liberal Captain America that could restore the stature.I have assessed five major guidelines for a superior grand strategy, let us now consider them.
First, America should abandon "spreading liberal values and democracy curse".Walt noted in the second-last decade of the Twentieth century, that continuous American interventions in the "developing world drove more Third World regimes to the Soviet side than it attracted to its own, and undermined relations with its other allies as well" (Walt, 1985, p. 38).However, even today, at the end of the second decade of the Twenty-first century, American policy makers have miserably failed in realizing the logic.Contemporarily, the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) along with its continental belts and sea roads, has so far attracted more than 70 sovereign states and international organizations, including the European Union (EU) and NATO members notably France, Germany, and Italy.An overwhelming majority of these states have preferred China, as Beijing is free from the syndrome of "spreading liberal values and democracy curse".Furthermore, the fundamental reason behind such inclination towards China is the perceived dwindling American power.
Second, the U.S. policy makers must redirect the defence budget towards building a second to one naval force, as American peer-competitors have intelligently fielded the cost-effective Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies.For instance, in the Western Pacific, despite having the DF-21 "Guam-killer" ballistic missile, the Chinese PLA has deployed more than 22 types of cruise missiles and their various variants (Gormley et al., 2014 −18, 25-26, 60, 113-116;, pp. 16;Wong, 2018), which are relatively cheap (van Creveld, 2011, pp. 228-229).The U.S. has spent billions, if not trillions of U.S. dollars in developing the anti-air and ballistic missile defence systems including Patriot PAC-3, Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), Arleigh Burke-class guided missiles destroyers armed with sophisticated Aegis ballistic missile defence and Standard missiles, and the world's most expensive Ground-Based Midcourse Defence (GMD) in desperately shielding itself from cruise missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, theatre ballistic missiles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles.However, despite of having the aforementioned unmatched weapon systems, how could have Iran's conventional warhead-tipped ballistic missiles landed on the U.S. bases in Iraq in 2020?Third, in reducing the overstretch, it is an imperative to reduce overseas bases.Today, roughly, the U.S. has "800 military bases in more than 70 countries and territories abroad" and currently, the American military is stationed at bases including South Korea, Japan, Philippines, Guam, Singapore, and so on and so forth (Slater, 2018;Vine, 2015b).Pilger filmed and presented the level of resentment and rage in the people of the Island of Okinawa (Japan) in relation to "32 military installations" and the "resistance" at the Jeju Island (South Korea) on establishing a new American military base (Pilger, 2016).These very forward deployments are falsely believed in containing the peer-competitors.These installations are trillion-dollar burden on the budget each year.These bases trigger enormous fear in competitors and help them in devising relatively cheap counter strategies and opportunities in exploiting the asymmetric advantages.The feared powers could also resort to Mearsheimer's buck-passing strategies and could momentously thicken the fog, resulting in clouded judgements.
From a purely military standpoint, the extremely forward bases reduce the effectiveness of antiballistic missile systems including THAAD and others.These establishments dangerously risk the security of U.S. personnel, their families, and valuable military hardware, while theoretically enhancing the efficacy and confidence of potential competitors in targeting geographically proximate targets of profoundly high value.
have built compelling cases for adopting offshore balancing, and Posen argued for restraint (Posen, 2007 −17,, pp. 7;Posen, 2014, pp. 69-134), as a superior grand strategy.Yet, there exists lacunas in the arguments of Mearsheimer and Walt, which I intend to fill.These scholars, particularly Mearsheimer, apart from calling for minimum forward presence for effective firepower has had paid momentous importance to land power.Mearsheimer argued in 2001 that "Wars are won by big battalions, not by armadas in the air or on the sea.The strongest power is the state with the strongest army."And also exorcised Giulio Douhet (airpower theorist) and Alfred Thayer Mahan (sea power theorist) as "both are wrong" (Mearsheimer, 2001b, p. 84).However, I believe that in accomplishing offshore balancing, America will be needing "1,000-ship navy" (Speller, 2014, p. 186) and a whole bunch of tactical and strategic air assets, which retain superior firepower, could effectively and speedily respond to a crisis situation.By reducing defence spending on continental forces, a priority must be given to the U.S. Navy, to pursue the grand strategy of restraint. 18Quite contrary to the strategic needs, the power projecting capabilities of the U.S. Navy are constantly shrinking, and the Army and Marine Corps were supplied enormously, predominantly in fighting wars in the barren valleys of Afghanistan and haunting deserts of Iraq-civilizing people and to "spread liberal values and democracy curse".In fully materializing offshore balancing and restraint, the U.S. Navy has to be given priority, and the air force has to be given relative preference in relation to the land component.
Fifth, the U.S. policy makers must ensure the safety and security of its cyber infrastructure and domain.The American competitors have considerable capabilities in cunningly exploiting the asymmetric advantage.Although, it was conjectured that the Chinese hackers broke into the American fighter aircraft manufacturer Lockheed Martin and stole the blueprints for U.S.-led multibillion fifth-generation Joint Strike Fighter program F-35 Lightning II (Chapman, 2019 −67, 183-184;, pp. 66;Hallion et al., 2012, pp. 272-275).The Chinese J-20 and J-31 greatly resemble American F-22 and F-35, respectively, in terms of appearance, avionics, performance, and operational capabilities.Also, American military must reduce its dependence on advanced command and control platforms including the C4ISTAR. 19The latter though, provides unparalleled situational awareness and a vital communications instrument.However, the former PLA Colonel Wang Xiangsui (co-author of the controversial Unrestricted Warfare) (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999) intended to exploit American too much reliance on satellites by taking the latter out using anti-satellite missiles 20 and referred them as vulnerable as Achilles Heel (Hoare, 2019).The unmanned and robotic warfare are useful instruments in minimizing the loss of human lives.Nonetheless, the Iranian capture of the U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) spy drone in December 2011 is a threatening example involving perils of using certain technologies in relation to growingly advanced enemies (Blair & Spillius, 2011).Later, Iran reverse engineered the drone and created the armed version known as Saegheh (Lendon, 2014).Conceivably, the cyber warfare capabilities enabled the Iranians in decrypting the secure communications and taking control of the drone.

Concluding remarks
The Liberals and Neo-Conservatives have greatly eroded the grand strategic guidelines of American Founding Fathers, which called for restraint and are relentlessly going abroad in search of monsters to destroy.History reveals that in such a pseudo messianic crusade, they hesitate not in creating monsters and later committing its armed forces in destroying them.The Liberal arguments are like butter in refrigerator, which can retain its taste and shape in a tightly controlled environment, yet could not remain useful otherwise, where bacteria and other microorganisms make it useless.British maritime strategist Sir Julian Corbett argued that "doctrine is the soul of warfare" (Sloan, 2012, p. 243).Conceivably, Liberal arguments and the doctrine of American Exceptionalism are fascinating.However, a doctrine challenging the limits of power could resultantly weaken and subsequently collapse the policy objectives.It inevitably leads to grand strategic overstretch.
Factually, the international system is dynamic and even it is hardly possible for a superpower to permanently put a stop on the emergence of other great powers; devising grand strategies to prevent such occurrences is sheer useless (Tyler, 1992, p. A12;Wohlforth, 1999, p. 5).In hindsight, the post-Cold War three geopolitical changes gigantically triggered fear in the strategic psychology of China, as it started to consider itself as the "default adversary" (Dobbins, 2012, p. 7).Realism emphasizes that great powers are rational actors and fear each other.China is no exception.While still remembering the "Century of Humiliation," the fear greatly stimulated Beijing's perceptions about Washington, and the "unipolar moment" acted as a catalyst in accelerating China's military modernization plans.Arguably, the "China Threat" is the by-product of foreign policy based upon Liberal ideas.
Politically and socially, democracy is a superior political system that inherently demands significantly educated strata of society.Today, every democratic state in the world has substantial amount of educated people, who are politically tolerant and value difference of opinion.Liberal scholars erroneously believed that they achieved the highest form of civilization and their strategy of preponderance by considering every nook and cranny of the globe to be of immense strategic importance to the U.S.However, they are wrong.Waging unnecessary wars to "spread liberal values and democracy curse" cannot ensure anything-but overstretch.Although, the outcome of any war is never permanent.The common examples are Afghanistan, 21 Iraq, and Syria, and other parts of the Middle East, which apart from spending 6.4 trillion U.S. dollars, since 9/11, are unwilling in accepting liberal values and are still unstable (Counting the Cost of US Military Bases around the World, 2020).William Lind cautioned in 2004 that in the war against terror, "we are the weaker, not the stronger party, despite all our firepower and technology" (Lind, 2004, p. 15), alternatively, called for restraint.
On the other hand, the Realist tradition does not have a Captain America, unlike Liberal tradition.Yet, the former offers a sensible, rational, grounded in reality framework, that prepares states in shaping their grand strategy and actions, while approaching reality as an independent variable.Realism emphasizes rationality and reality, which if not best, provides an appropriate course of action.The dire need for the articulation of such realistic doctrines increases enormously in the foreign policy of great powers, as rationality and reality significantly help such powers in maintaining their share of world power and prestige.These doctrines greatly understand the limits of power and prevent states in waging unnecessary wars and pursuing global dominance.Resultantly, such instruments lead towards the attainment of strategic objectives, impede overstretch, and guide the right time in becoming or not becoming the Godzilla.
Surely, the phantasm induced American Exceptionalist beliefs have been circling around a certain stratum of American academia for decades, if not centuries.However, every great power envisioned itself as inherently exceptional in number of ways, including its unique strategic history and struggle for independence.America too is not an exception, as President Clinton declared America as "the indispensable nation" and Secretary Albright argued "If we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation.We stand tall.We see further than other countries into the future" (Bacevich, 2001, p. 94).However, historically speaking, many great powers sacrificed their precious armed forces, forfeited cherished belongings, and experienced overstretch-unsuccessfully pursuing strategic objectives.Nonetheless, over the course of history, it is hard to find a single great power that wilfully entangled itself in a selfproclaimed doctrine pursuing pseudo messianic intentions, of course, none other than America bestowed under Liberal hegemony.
In retrospect, the "Unipolar Moment," and later "Neoconservative Moment" effectively started the eras which I prefer to call as the "Unipolar Torment."It has, and still is unprecedentedly punishing America for its irrational foreign policy behaviour by pursuing Liberal hegemony and adopting the strategy of preponderance.These flawed moments illusionary existed; contemplating about their end is even worse (Ikenberry, 2004, pp. 7-22).The "Unipolar Torment" is haunting America like a ghost, and it will continue to do so, as long as, it is obsessed in civilizing the world.It turned allies into vicious enemies; friends into bitter foes; removed Saddam on false claims and turned the Middle East into a fireball; hatched terrorist outfits; eroded the benign American global image; diminished its economic power; maligned its military; declared the "China Threat" and helped making it a formidable military power and triggered increased favourable environment for its BRI; facilitated Russia in annexing Crimea and helped establishing its military foothold and securing a foreign ally in the Middle East (Syria); and last but not the least, it suffered grand strategic overstretch (Layne, 2006, p. 118).
operations in the Balkans by conducting operations Deny Flight, Allied Force, and Deliberate Force during the late 1990s.In the name of spreading liberal values by force, it removed Slobodan Milosevic, Taliban in 2001, Saddam Hussein in 2003, Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, and unsuccessfully tried to removing Bashar al-Assad in Syria in 2015.It also removed and subsequently eliminated Islamic State's Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi