The roles and consequences of foreign involvement in Nigeria’s internal violent conflicts

Abstract Nigeria has suffered several cases of violent conflicts since its political independence from Britain in 1960. Prominent among these were the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), herdsmen-farmers clashes and Boko-Haram insurgency. Unfortunately, extant studies on Nigeria’s violent conflicts have focused mainly on the internal dynamics of these conflicts to the neglect of the significant roles played by foreign actors. It is this gap that this paper aims to fill. It is the position of this paper that the escalation, prolongation and massive destruction occasioned by these conflicts were largely as a result of the activities of foreign actors. The paper interrogates the various means of foreign interventions and their motives, and identifies their pervasive consequences to include wanton destruction of lives and property, rude demographic rearrangements, massive corruption, economic stagnation among others. Using historical methodology, this qualitative research is anchored on both primary and secondary sources including relevant extant literature, news media and independent reports and government documents. The paper concludes that in addition to the involvement of foreign actors, some of the conflicts were encouraged by local elements who benefitted from the situation. Among others, this paper recommends election of purposeful and patriotic leaders and adoption of early-warning early-response system.


Introduction
Swanstrom and Weissman (2005, p. 1) are of the view that conflict is one of the inevitable outcomes of human inter-personal and inter-group relationships. 1 The prospects of its occurrence increase with the corporate existence of heterogeneous groups which have divergent interests and differing ideas on actualizing such interests.Nigeria as a political entity is essentially a British colonial creation.The territory is a product of the merger of villages, towns, chiefdoms, kingdoms and empires that were conquered by Britain between the middle of the 19th century and 1910.Consequently, at the attainment of independence in 1960, Nigeria comprised over three hundred ethnic groups, most of which had little or no cultural affinity or similar worldview (Uchendu & Eyeh, 2022, p. 123). 2 Rather than work to harness the richness in these diversities for unity, national growth and development, the country's postcolonial political leaders poorly managed the state of affairs to the point of intermittent acrimonious relationship amongst some of the constituent groups.This, in addition to other factors, gave rise to some of the violent conflicts that prompted foreign interventions in the country's internal matters.Hence, since the country's independence from Britain, it has witnessed several cases of violent conflicts which resulted in the destruction of lives and property.Among the conflicts which attracted international attention and intervention were the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), the ongoing herdsmen-farmers crises and Boko Haram insurgency.
The focus of this paper is on these three major violent conflicts which caused not only heavy casualties in their prosecution but also attracted various forms of international attention and involvement.It aims to examine the roles, reasons for and manifestations of foreign involvement in Nigeria's violent conflicts as well as analyze the consequences of such involvement.Even though a number of studies have been conducted on the aforementioned conflicts, emphasis has largely been on the general causes, course and other related internal dynamics surrounding them.In all of these scarcely has there been a focus on the roles of foreign actors in the conflicts.The authors posit that foreign involvement in Nigeria's internal violent conflicts has done a lot of damage to the country, from which bruises it is still smarting.Even though a few of these interventions (especially by non-state actors) appeared to have been humanitarian in nature (for example Catholic Caritas, International Committee of the Red Cross, Joint Church Aid and World Council of Churches, during the Nigerian Civil War), they still inadvertently served to prolong the conflicts.
It must be pointed out that some Nigerian leaders could not be held guiltless for the outbreak of the conflicts that necessitated foreign interventions.As captured in this paper, some of them, through their actions and inactions, helped stoke the conflicts and then capitalized on these foreign interventions for personal aggrandizement.Indeed, foreign involvement was key to either the escalation or de-escalation of the conflicts and understanding same; thus, the need to study the modes of these interventions and their consequences.The pervasive devastating effects of these interventions cut across the entire country and indeed every aspect of life in Nigeria, and have continued to date.This paper is an initial step toward comprehending the military and nonmilitary roles played by foreign state and non-state actors in Nigeria's internal conflicts.The various forms of foreign interventions and the motivations for such interventions are also analyzed.Effects of international involvements in Nigeria's internal violent conflicts had on the country are subsequently examined.The paper shall conclude with recommendations on how to deal with internal security challenges so that they do not escalate to such dangerous heights as to necessitate possible interventions of foreign state and non-state actors.

Conceptual and Theoretical clarification
Presently we explain the basic concepts in the context that they are used in this paper and the theoretical framework upon which explanation for the foreign intervention, escalation and prolongation are given.

Conflict
Conflict may be explained as the result of rival interests that involve scarce resources, goal divergence, disharmony, disagreement and frustration.According to Swanstrom and Weissman  (2005), it may not necessarily be defined in terms of violence, hostility or use of physical force but may include incompatibility or differences in issue position. 3As human beings are products of varied social agents and influences, they are bound to, sometimes, hold different views on issues.Their interests and goals and means of accomplishing these may also vary.Such settings can lead to conflicts.In a heterogeneous country like Nigeria with increasing cosmopolitan communities, cases of conflicts occasioned by the scenario described above are not few.

Violent Conflict
A violent conflict is the type that involves at least two parties which use physical force in an attempt to resolve competing claims or interests.These conflicting parties may be state or nonstate actors (Frere & Willen, 2015). 4Violent conflicts are often categorized using different factors.Among these is the number of deaths they cause per year.As such, the number often cited to differentiate a violent conflict from a non-violent one is 25 conflict-related deaths per year (Wallensteen & Axell, 1994). 5By implication, any conflict which does not result in up to 25 battlerelated fatalities in one year is not recognized as a violent conflict.As shall be shown, in some cases, each of the conflicts examined in this paper resulted in scores (and in some others thousands) of battle-related deaths.

Internationalization of Conflicts
According to Okorie (2018, p. 66), internationalization of conflict describes the concept of internal (domestic, intrastate) hostility which is made international. 6Kraus (2017, p. 25) further points out that this is a process through which an explicit and conscious decision is made by a party in a conflict to involve international actors in any phase of a domestic conflict including periods of hostilities or negotiation. 7By implication foreign actors intervene either on invitation or otherwise.The aforementioned writers further acknowledge that international involvement in local conflicts can come in various ways such as diplomatic or active military support (in the form of training, provision of weapons or active fighting force).Okorie (2018, p. 66) has also affirmed that Africa accounted for about 85 percent of all the violent conflicts that affected the world between 1945 and 2015, while the average for the rest of the world stood at 15 percent. 8Nigeria contributed to this figure with all the conflicts discussed in this paper culpable.Weber (2023) describes Military Industrial Complex (MIC) as a network of individuals and institutions involved in the production of weapons and military technologies. 9The author also states that MIC in a country generally wants to mobilize political support for continued or increased military spending by the national government.Former American President, Dwight Eisenhower, has been given credit for coining the concept of Military Industrial Complex.In his farewell address as president on 17 January 1961, Eisenhower had drawn attention to the growing influence of the military establishment and the arms industry whose influence needed to be checked to avoid what he perceived as rise of misplaced power by the Military Industrial Complex (Albertson, 1963). 10He had also warned that the United States must consciously work against the acquisition of unwarranted influence by the MIC, the composition of which included members of Congress (from districts dependent on military industries), the Defence Department (along with the military services), and private military contractors.Eisenhower was of the view that they tended to promote policies that might not be in the country's best interest.

Military Industrial Complex
It should be recalled that at the time of Eisenhower's speech, the Cold War was on and there was the tendency to overemphasize threats to justify high levels of military spending.However, MIC as a concept has evolved to mean coalition of vested interest groups within the state, defence industry and political organs which could lead to decisions being taken which were not in the interest of the state national security but in the best interest of the members of the coalition.MIC has also been criticised because it can lead to political corruption and needless defence expenditure by government (Nzeribe & Imam, 2018, p. 74). 11 is believed that the MIC tends to be a catalyst for conflicts and wars and would continue to instigate same, where necessary, for the industry and all the coalition of beneficiaries to continue to reap from such situations.It should be noted that as states often engage in processes of securing or achieving the goals of their national interests at all times, the coalition in MIC often cite national interest as a factor for their decisions and actions.This system aptly captures the situation in Nigeria with regards to the acquisition of weapons by the state for its security agencies in their battle with belligerents.As this paper shall demonstrate, the activities of local MIC (in Nigeria), led to corruption in the process of acquisition of weapons especially in the war against Boko Haram where billions of dollars have been committed with no commensurate result.

Internal conflicts in Nigeria that elicited International involvement
All the warring factions in Nigeria's violent conflicts discussed in this paper engaged foreign elements in prosecuting their wars with devastating effects on the country.For a better understanding of subsequent discussion, it would be pertinent at this juncture to take a brief background look at the conflicts that this study focused on and the belligerents.

Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970)
Causes of the Nigerian Civil War are not the focus of this paper.However, suffice it to say that this war which lasted between July 1967 and January 1970 was the most devastating violent conflict in the country's history especially with respect to casualties.The conflict was between the secessionist Eastern Region (but actually the Igbo, the dominant ethnic group in the region) and the rest of the country which was under the control of the Federal Government of Nigeria (hereafter referred to as FGN).The war led to the death of estimated 3 million people most of who were civilians who died in Biafra, the name by which the secessionist region had declared its independence (Heerten  & Dirk Moses, 2014, p. 169). 12is was the first major conflict since Nigeria's independence in which the country virtually allowed the international community to intervene.This internally generated conflict acquired international significance in a number of ways.It was one of the first wars to be fought under the searchlight of international television and press coverage.The latter beamed to international audiences images of Biafran children, suffering from kwashiorkor and dying in increasing numbers (Venter, 2015, p. 41). 13This state of affairs had probably been aggravated by a comment made by Obafemi Awolowo, then Nigeria's Minister of Finance, on 28 July 1969 to the effect that "all is fair in war, and starvation is one of the weapons of war.I don't see why we should feed our enemies fat in order for them to fight harder" (Venter, 2015). 14The military of the FGN had blockaded Biafra and held up food aid from reaching non-combatant civilians especially women and children.Furthermore, it should be noted that it was the devastating conditions of the war that led to the evolution of the now world-acclaimed Medicines San Frontierre (Doctors without borders).When the military conflict began on 6 July 1967, Gowon (military Head of State) and his generals envisaged a brief "police action" but were surprised when the fighting lasted longer than 30 months.Had Gowon's military action in Biafra resulted in a quick success, the conflict would no doubt have remained internal.It was Biafra's resistance and the persistence of the FGN however, that gave the international community time to mobilize and intervene in the struggle (Rothchild,  1997, p. 3). 15

Boko Haram Insurgency
Boko Haram was founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, a Yobe State born Salafis Muslim Cleric.Salafism is the idea that the most genuine and true Islam is found in the examples of the early, virtuous generations of Muslims, known as the Salaf, who were believed to be closest to the Prophet Muhammad in both time and proximity (Hamid & Dar Friday, 2016). 16It had its headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno State, North East Nigeria (Okorie, 2018, p. 77). 17The group did not only advocate for the Islamization of law and society in Borno, it was also opposed to western ideals, particularly western education.A radical dissident faction led by Abubakar Shekau launched several attacks around Borno and Yobe States in North East Nigeria in 2003-2004.However, mainstream Boko Haram did not switch from proselytism to warfare until 2009, after the killing of its leader in police custody (Reeve, 2014, p. 1). 18On July 30 of the same year, Boko Haram declared war on the state of Nigeria with Islamization of the entire country as its primary aim (Okorie, 2018). 19bsequent activities of the group led to several fatalities, fear, destruction and high level of insecurity especially in two of the country's six geopolitical zones -(North East and North Central) and at some point, Abuja, the federal capital.This insurgency which should have been nipped in the bud by the police was allowed to fester until it escalated to a full blown military operation.Despite the reluctance of the FGN to accept the international classification of Boko Haram as a terrorist group, the latter's activities have spilled into neighboring countries of Chad, Niger Republic and Cameroon.This escalation was in no small measure facilitated by the group's affiliation with other like-minded international groups such as al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab from which it obtained various forms of support.

Herdsmen-farmers crises
At the root of the crises raging across the country between the nomadic herdsmen and settled farmers is the struggle for land or access to it.The nomadic herdsmen, largely from northern Nigeria are mostly of the Fulani ethnic group.They believe they should have unhindered access to all land and pasture in the country to graze their cattle, irrespective of location.Settled farmers on the other hand are bent on protecting their ancestral lands and farms which they have invested so much in and which, in most cases, are their only means of livelihood (Eyeh, 2020, p. 22). 20It is this deep-rooted clash of interests that percolated into a new threat to the country's security.
By the middle of 2018, killings attributed to herdsmen were estimated at more than 3,000.These killings had been going on in various parts of the country until they reached a macabre level in 2016 when more than 500 people in Agatu community in Benue State were killed and their farmlands occupied by militant herdsmen (Eyeh, 2020). 21According to Amnesty International, on the whole, the herdsmen attacked farmers in Abuja, the federal capital and at least 21 of the 36 states of the country (Amnesty International, 2018). 22stitute for Economics and Peace had placed Nigerian Fulani herdsmen militants as the fourth most deadly terror group in the world (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017).23 Theophilus Danjuma, a retired Army General and a former Minister of Defense, alleged there were attempts at ethnic cleansing by the herdsmen of areas they attacked (Eyeh, 2020).24 President Muhammadu Buhari had on one occasion stated that the militant herdsmen and other such groups in Nigeria accessed some of their hardware from across Nigeria's borders with Niger Republic and Chad, as a result of breakdown of central authority in Libya (Ogundipe, 2018).25 Similarly, Buhari laid further credence to the international dimensions of the herdsmen-farmers clashes in Nigeria when he claimed that the Fulani herdsmen attacking farmers across the country with sophisticated weapons were not actually Nigerians.While exonerating Nigerian herders as only stick-wielding, he asserted that the AK-47-wielding herders were from other parts of Africa (Sunday, 2021).26 His pledge to hold the latter to account remained unfulfilled as their attacks did not only continue but expanded to other geographical zones of the country.

Internationalization of Nigeria's local conflicts
International involvement in prima facie internal conflicts is a global phenomenon.The scale and mode of involvement are determined by the issues at stake.Internal warring factions (whether government or non-state actors within the state) could sometimes seek external assistance from the international community and supranational organizations.This was also applicable in Nigeria.Hermann and Kegley (2001, p. 237) acknowledge that foreign intervention in internal violent conflicts of states is one of the most pressing issues in contemporary world. 27 Pearson (1974,  p. 260) has observed that interventions of state actors in foreign conflicts, in which the continued existence of an established government is threatened by a group in that state, tend to be favorably disposed toward the government of the state. 28Even though this assertion might hold true in some cases, this study shows that it was not always the case in Nigeria especially during the country's civil war.International interventions in Nigeria's internal conflicts came in various forms and sometimes vacillated between differing positions, each of which was influenced by conflicting reasons.However, it should be noted that the positions of state actors were always determined by their national interests.Here, we examine the modes of foreign interventions in Nigeria's internal conflicts and motives for same.

Weapons Supply
Nigeria is not an acclaimed military weapons manufacturer.Therefore, most of the sophisticated weapons used in Nigeria's internal conflicts came into the country from external sources.In some cases these became subjects of international politics and furtherance of national interests.Interestingly, these cut across the above cited conflicts.For instance, during the Nigerian civil war, several countries sold or supplied weapons and other military hardware to the belligerents.According to Cronje (1972, p. 58), Britain's arms exports to Nigeria (FGN) increased from UK£76,846 in 1966, which was the last pre-war year, to an incredible UK£11,895,903 in 1969. 29British arms supplies made up 79.19 percent of Nigeria's imports in 1968 and a remarkable 97.36 percent in 1969 (Smith, 2018, p. 141). 30The British support for the Federal Military Government (FMG) was partly for its national economic interests.It feared that secession by the Eastern Region would have threatened the security of its 3,500 citizens in the Eastern Region and put investments at risk, especially in the oil industry (Young, 2003). 31Shell-British Petroleum was a major investor in Nigeria, and over a tenth of British oil import came from Nigeria (Smith, 2018). 32Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was second to Britain in terms of arms supplied to the FMG, providing them with MiG-17 fighters, Ilyushin bombers and long-range howitzers (Rothchild, 1997, p. 49). 33milarly, after subtly rebuffing Israeli overtures with regards to sale of arms to Nigeria, the latter was compelled to turn to the former for assistance in 1968.The FMG's arms-procurement committee, led by Aminu Kano, asked Israel for large quantities of 7.62 caliber ammunition, 81 mm mortars and ordnance, 75 mm rockets and 250 pound bombs (Levey, 2018, p. 184). 34Thus by mid 1968, Israel was selling ordnance to Nigeria.Citing sources in the American Embassy in Tel Aviv, Levey (2018) affirmed that Israeli military sales to the FMG during the civil war reached $500,000. 35Both USSR and Israeli enthusiasm to supply weapons to the FMG was for two main reasons.In the first place, at independence in 1960, Nigeria had not shown any keen interest in diplomatic relationship with both.Therefore, they saw this as an opportunity to make in-road into Nigeria, the most populous African country and a huge potential market for them.Secondly, for USSR, Nigeria could be another potential socialist ideological ally.
Secessionist Biafra also received arms from foreign powers in its struggle to achieve independence.Portugal allowed arms dealers to operate in its territory and used Portuguese-controlled Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tomé to smuggle military hardware to the insurgents (Rothchild, 1997). 36zechoslovakia also provided arms to Biafra, motivated by the possibility of securing oil concessions from Biafra if the secession-attempt was successful (West Africa, 1968). 37France shipped weapons to Biafra, which had severe shortages of not only heavy weapons, but also small arms and ammunition (Griffin, 2018). 38Achebe (2012, p. 102) argued that some Africanists believed that French action was partly motivated by their intention to weaken Ghana and diminish Nigeria as a regional power thereby whittling down Britain's sphere of influence in West Africa. 39rdsmen attacks have been with destructive AK-47 rifles which they brazenly display as they trek with their cattle (Eyeh, 2020). 40Those weapons are not made in Nigeria, and their sources are a major concern to observers.Weapons used by Boko Haram and herdsmen in their attacks against the military and unarmed settled communities respectively are foreign made.Some of them are believed to be spill-over from Libya's conflict.Boko Haram also received funding from a consortium of international terrorist organizations with al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda as the major financiers.Some of these funds were obviously deployed toward the acquisition of more sophisticated weapons (Okorie, 2018). 41These are discussed later in this paper.
A study by a London-based research group, Conflict Armament Research (CAR), published in 2020, revealed that weapons used in the farmers/herders conflict in North-West Nigeria came from the same source as those used by al-Qaeda in Mali and other Sahel countries (Sanni, 2020). 42The report titled "Nigeria's Herder-Farmer Conflict," focused its major findings on Kaduna, Katsina and Zamfara States in Nigeria.Mike Lewis, head of investigative arms research for CAR and author of the report said that researchers found the arms amongst herders to be the same as those used in an attack by an al Qaeda-aligned group in Mopti, central Mali.The report also indicated that sophisticated arms were also being smuggled from Turkey into Nigeria.The import of this report is that Fulani herdsmen attacks in Nigeria are being partly perpetrated with weapons acquired from international arms dealers.

Diplomatic Intervention
This mode of international intervention appeared more pronounced during the Nigerian civil war.For instance, several countries in Africa were sympathetic toward the Biafran cause, however only four of them (Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Gabon and Zambia) and then Haiti, a Caribbean Island country, went a step further to recognize Biafra in 1968.President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast criticized the indifference of the rest of the world toward the killing which took place in Biafra (Rothchild, 1997). 43Julius Nyerere of Tanzania surmised that the Igbo felt that secession was their only defense against perceived threat of extermination that they faced in Nigeria (Nyerere,  1965). 44The Organization of African Unity's (OAU) principle of non-interference in memberstates internal affairs appeared to have guided its initial response of indifference to the civil war.However, coming under pressure from the United States, Britain and other European countries which ostensibly maintained a declared policy of neutrality in the conflict, OAU constituted a Consultative Committee of four heads of state and government made up of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia (Chairperson), Presidents Hamani Diori of Niger, Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon and Lieutenant General Joseph Ankrah of Ghana.After a series of meetings (in Addis Ababa and Algiers) and consultations with the Consultative Committee in April 1969, OAU appealed to Biafran leaders to co-operate with the FMG to end the conflict.The term "cooperate" could have been interpreted to mean surrender, so there was little surprise when the appeal was quickly dismissed by the Biafran leadership as biased.Joseph Ankrah of Ghana also mediated between both belligerents with the aim of a negotiated resolution of the schism between them (FGN and the secessionist Eastern Region/Biafra).
Probably with the exception of the effort of Ankrah of Ghana, most of the diplomatic interventions in Nigeria's internal conflicts were clearly determined by individual countries' interests rather than a sincere wish to bring about a permanent solution to them.For example, the reasons behind OAU's position were not farfetched.Some of the leaders were concerned about the impact of a possible successful Biafra on separatist and secessionist agitations within their own countries.The suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth did not bring about a solution to the problem.Rather, the immediate post-suspension period witnessed a proliferation of militant groups and radicalization of their activities.

Mercenaries, Logistics and Training
The use of mercenaries in armed conflicts is not new.Mercenaries are believed to possess qualities or experience that may be lacking among the regular belligerents and consequently add value to their employers.In the Nigerian civil war, both sides clearly employed the services of mercenaries.On the side of FMG, they extensively used Egyptian and Eastern European pilots to fly their war aircraft.A ready example was Ares Klootwyk who flew MiG-17 for the Nigerian forces (Venter,  2015). 45The latter were also known to have had Soviet military advisers in their ranks.Likewise, Biafra had a number of mercenaries within its ranks as well.For example, Jan Zumbach helped organize and then commanded the Biafra Air Force, flying the Douglas B-26 Invader (Venter,  2015). 46It is no longer hidden that many of the Fulani herdsmen attacking and pillaging the farms and homesteads of settled communities are foreigners.This much was confirmed by some prominent politicians including a serving Governor of Kaduna State, Nasir El-Rufai.The killers whom he claimed were foreigners had been traced to their countries of origin-Niger Republique, Cameroon, Chad, Mali and Senegal.According to him it was from these countries that they had seasonally migrated to southern Kaduna in search of pasture for their herd (Vanguard, 2016). 47lated to the above were the training and logistics support provided by the mercenaries and groups to aid their allies in conflicts as highlighted above.Many of the mercenaries were believed to be better experienced than their local counterparts, and were not only given commanding positions but also provided some training in the course of their stay.In the Nigerian civil war, both sides were known to have received some form of training from the mercenaries that came to fight for them.Indeed, the role of the South African Army in helping Colonel Ojukwu with the formation, training and deployment of his own Special Forces Unit remain shrouded in secrecy (Venter,  2015). 48Israel also assisted Biafra in a number of ways including financial support.According to Levey (2018, p. 187), Mossad (Israel's external security agency) in 1968 twice transferred to Biafra through Zurich, the sum of $100,000. 49Their counterparts also had Soviet military advisers in their ranks.
Boko Haram has continued to receive support from internationally recognized terrorist groups.Some of its members have received training in Somalia and Afghanistan.Financial support has also come from these groups, such as Islamic State (IS), Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab.According to McCoy (2014), sources of funds for Boko Haram include al-Qaeda and other groups in the Middle East. 50he terrorist group reportedly received its initial funding from Osama bin Laden in 2002.In that year, the latter sent an aide, Mohammed Ali, to Nigeria to share $3 million in local currency among a number of Salafis groups in the country 51 from which Boko Haram benefitted (Lake, 2017).The same source also highlighted the US State Department's announcement of a $7 million reward for Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau in 2013 as an acknowledgement of reported links between Boko Haram and al Qaeda's affiliates based in Yemen, North Africa and Somalia.
In another case of brazen confidence, Boko Haram claimed it shot down a Nigerian Air Force (NAF) Alpha jet (NAF 475) which went missing on 31 March 2021 with two crew members.While Edward Gabkwet, spokesman for NAF, admitted the aircraft went missing while on a mission against Boko Haram, the latter released a video as evidence that it actually shot down the plane (Ayitogo, 2021). 52It may be necessary to call to memory that Nigeria under President Buhari's government had paid $496 million to the US for twelve A-29 Super Tucano military aircraft.It took delivery of the first batch of six on 22 July 2021 and the final batch of another six in October of the same year (Daily Nigerian, 2021). 53There has been no reported case of any of these newly acquired aircraft being shot down by Boko Haram.However, to any concerned observer, the fact that the insurgent group has not been routed completely as touted and consequently expected, prior to the arrival of the Tucano aircraft, is still a mystery.

Humanitarian Interventions
War situations often lead to shortages in the supply of basic needs such as food, medicine and safe drinking water.Nigeria civil war was no exception.However, secessionist Biafra was the area hard-hit by this reality with the FMG's superior firepower and sea blockade of the area.The statement by Obafemi Awololo about starvation being a legitimate weapon of war against the people of secessionist Biafra, as highlighted earlier, readily comes to mind.Besides, a rather ominous threat in August 1968 by Colonel Benjamin Adekunle, a top commander in Nigerian army, sent danger signals to observers of the war that genocide was unfolding in Biafra.Adekunle had asserted that "I want to prevent even one Ibo (sic) having one piece to eat before their capitulation.We shoot at everything that moves" (Smith, 2018, p. 141). 54ubsequent television and press images of starving Biafran children dying in large numbers largely from kwashiorkor, spurred governments, individuals and groups to action to stem the tide.So was initiated humanitarian effort by various groups such as Caritas, International Committee of the Red Cross, Joint Church Aid and World Council of Churches.There were also some individuals like Hank Wharton and Count Gustaf Ericsson von Rosen who, despite threats posed by patrolling federal aircraft and anti-aircraft fire, flew nightly relief flights from Sao Tomé and Fernando Po to land on a widened stretch of road in the jungle in secessionist Biafra (Venter, 2015). 55

International Coalition
The Nigerian security forces have continued to encounter difficulties fighting Boko Haram.The situation degenerated to such extent that by 2019 there were open calls for Nigeria to engage the services of foreign mercenaries to decisively route the insurgents.Expectedly, the National Security Adviser to President Muhammadu Buhari, (Babagana Mungono) dismissed these calls as unnecessary (Nigerian Television Authority, 2021). 56e seeming intractability of the Boko Haram crisis in North East Nigeria and the spill-over effects of its activities into Cameroon, Niger Republic and Chad necessitated a multinational approach to tackling the problem.This led to the formation of multinational military task force against Boko Haram by the above-mentioned countries and Nigeria.Despite the formation of this coalition, Boko Haram still managed to continue its activities.However, it was the latter's seizure of the Multinational Joint Task Force (JTF) base at Baga in Nigeria in 2015 that further escalated the conflict and compelled the Chadian together with Nigerien troops to cross into Nigeria on 8 March 2015 to route them.It is also worthy of note that the ding dong trend which has almost turned the conflict into a war of attrition has persisted because of provision of weapons by international actors.The latter, together with their corrupt Nigerian collaborators involved in the arms procurement, could not care less if the violence continued or not.The issue here is that as long as the conflict persisted, more weapons would be required which served their economic interest.The issue of corruption is further discussed in the next section of this paper.

Effects of Internationalization of violent conflicts in Nigeria
Foreign involvement in violent conflicts in Nigeria has no doubt left in its wake the following consequences.

Loss of Lives
Death is an indisputable consequence of violent conflicts.In Nigeria, all the discussed conflicts, claimed several lives.Estimates for the civil war ranged between 1 million and 3 million fatalities.According to Global Terrorism Index report, Boko Haram killed 5,478 people in 2015 alone down from 7,000 it killed in 2014 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017, p. 50). 57Between 2011 and the end of 2019, the group's insurgency had caused over 37,500 battle associated deaths and over 19,000 deaths from acts of terrorism mostly in Nigeria (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2020, p. 16). 58The same report rated Nigeria's Fulani herdsmen as the 4 th most deadly terror group in the world and stated that Fulani herdsmen undertook more attacks and were responsible for more deaths than Boko Haram since 2016.In 2019, Fulani extremists were responsible for 26 per cent of terror-related deaths in Nigeria at 325 fatalities.A total of 111 attacks were linked to Fulani herdsmen with over 59 of them being armed assaults (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2020, p. 16). 59In 2020 another report categorized Nigeria as the third most terrorized country in the world with Boko Haram and the Fulani Herdsmen militia as the two groups officially recognized internationally as terrorist groups in Nigeria (Reporters, 2020). 60The trauma persists as the ding-dong affair between the Nigerian military and the Boko Haram continued into 2021.All the violent groups received (and some continue to receive) all kinds of support to continue to perpetrate the dastardly acts.

Corruption
"The arms trade is uniquely and disproportionately infected with corruption" (Fenstein et al., 2011, 13) 61 The arms sector, especially international deals, tend to be shrouded in secrecy, which makes it difficult to access accurate figures and values of weapons sales.However, estimates indicate that roughly 50% of all bribes worldwide are tied to arms deals.Considering the enormous circulation of military equipment worldwide, the result is that very substantial amounts of financial resources end up at unknown destinations in offshore bank accounts.In fact, bribery is often regarded as an integral part of arms deals, with "commissions" constituting between 10% and 50% of the value of the actual transaction (Henriksson, 2007, p. 3). 62th the above in mind, it would be necessary at this point to note that one recurring decimal in the course of the Nigerian military prosecution of the war against insurgency and terrorism, is the problem of lack of weapons and general military hardware.The Federal Government has continued to make incremental budgetary provisions for the Ministry of Defense especially since the outbreak of Boko Haram insurgency, yet complaints of inadequate weapons persist.Further reports have it that the Nigerian military has been fighting Boko Haram with obsolete equipment, the purchase of some of which dated back to the government of erstwhile civilian president, Shehu Shagari, who was in power between 1979 and 1983.The situation raised the question of what use the budgeted allocations for military hardware had been put to over the years.In January 2016, a few months after President Muhammadu Buhari was sworn into office, he ordered the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to investigate a scandal involving companies and individuals implicated in the procurement of two non-recommended and not-air-worthy helicopters at the cost of more than US$136 million instead of US$30 million each (Nwabughiogu, 2016). 63Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) posited that between 2000 and 2020 Nigeria's defense budget and military spending amounted to US$29.39 billion (Macrotrends, 2023). 64It should also be noted that the government of the erstwhile president Goodluck Jonathan had, in the twilight period of its life (September 2014), received approval from the country's upper legislative body, the Senate, to obtain an external loan of US$1 billion primarily for the continued prosecution of the war on terror (Times, 2014). 65In the same vein, The Guardian reported that Nigeria's Minister of Finance, Zainab Ahmed, in June 2021, revealed that Nigeria intended to borrow N722.53 billion (US$1.76 billion) to fund the fight against insecurity (Jimoh & Okwe, 2021). 66 is disheartening that after committing such huge resources to the fight against insurgency and terrorism, there don't seem to be much to show for it.The stories had remained those of inadequate weapons and unduly delayed (and sometimes unpaid) personnel allowances.Sequel to the above scenario, allegations and accusations of corruption have been leveled against some members of the top echelons of the military and other high-ranking government officials.As aptly captured by Ladan-Baki (2016, 2), "monies allocated to the security agencies found its (sic) way into the pockets of army generals, friends of government and other government officials." 67Citing the London-based The Economist, Sahara Reporters attributed Nigeria's inability to deal with its insecurity challenges to the plundering of the country's combat resources by its military chiefs (Reporters, 2021). 68Even though the military headquarters denied the allegations of corruption, they also failed to provide a rational explanation for the dearth of sophisticated weapons and the consequent abysmal showing of the well-trained Nigerian military against the insurgent groups.The allegations continued to mount.There has also not been an internal inquiry by the military to ascertain the true situation of things.Rather, it has continued to dismiss such allegations as the handiwork of the enemies of the military.

Prolongation of Conflicts
Foreign intervention in the examined violent conflicts led to access to more sophisticated weapons by the belligerents.Food aid also came the way of civilian victims of the conflicts (especially in the Nigerian civil war).However, it should be pointed out that the availability of those (food aid ironically included) served to prolong the conflicts.For instance, in the Nigerian civil war, it would be trite to believe that had secessionist Biafra been denied total access to weapons and food aid, perhaps its resistance would have collapsed much earlier and the region capitulated and consequently saved more lives.The same can be said of all of the other conflicts as well.Access to sophisticated weapons by Fulani herdsmen and Boko Haram militants also helped prolong the conflicts.In fact, as a result of Boko Haram's access to foreign weapons, Nigerian security agencies have remained unable to decisively or conclusively deal with any of the conflicts.The situation is so dire that there is general lack of confidence in the capacity of Nigeria's security agencies to defeat the insurgents.

Underdevelopment of Military Science and Technology
International involvement in Nigeria's conflicts has exposed the country's military's overdependence on imported military hardware to execute its primary mandate and its consequent vulnerabilities when they are not accessed when needed.It should be recalled that in May 2007, then President Olusegun Obasanjo, gave a marching order to the Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) Kaduna, the country's foremost military hardware manufacturing outfit, to ensure that it did not only produce to meet the nation's small arms and ammunition requirements but to also satisfy the demands of the entire West Africa sub-region in that regard before 2018.However, by 2020, there were still complaints by Nigeria's security agencies fighting insurgents of inadequate weapons.Matters were made even worse by grumblings that the quality of weapons made available to them was inferior to those used by groups fighting them.The country is unduly heavily dependent on external sources for both offensive and defensive weapons.Under prevailing circumstances there are concerns about what would become of Nigeria in the event of a major interstate armed conflict between the country and another sovereign state.

Mediocre Leadership
Foreign involvement in Nigeria's internal conflicts and the consequent escalation of same, have exposed the weakness of the country's political leadership.The renowned author, Achebe (1983)  had in his book, The Trouble with Nigeria, blamed the country's woes on failure of leadership. 69Each examined conflict gave early warning signs which a proactive and purposeful leadership should have been able to nip in the bud.The actions and inactions of those in power toward the issues under consideration did not only portray them as inept and incompetent, but also complicit in the tragedy of violence that befell the country subsequently.The political culture in Nigeria portrays a political class which is just concerned with capturing and reveling in political power, while lacking the will to take necessary action.Former head of state, Gowon had opportunities to have addressed the civil war.General Abacha believed in military solution to every conflict (which never worked) while President Jonathan made some move against Boko Haram at the initial stages but baulked when he was accused of ostensibly attacking the North and Muslims.The situation deteriorated beyond imagination under President Muhammadu Buhari and the latter appears confused on what to do next.

Ill-preparedness of Nigeria's Security Agencies
The internationalization of Nigeria's local conflicts exposed the ill-preparedness of the country's security agencies to handle basic security challenges.They allowed security breaches to escalate into major crises such as the deadly herdsmen and Boko Haram conflicts.The Nigerian civil war was no exception.Events leading up to it were quite obvious for even a casual observer to note and for a responsible and responsive government to initiate proactive action.The then Nigeria's head of state, Yakubu Gowon, had sensationally declared that the "operation" against the secessionist Eastern Region would be a police action which would last for 6 days.Without adequate preparation by the military, the optimism that greeted the declaration for a quick resolution of the war waned as the touted 6 days operation ended up a destructive 30-month war.A similar attitude toward the Boko Haram conflict has practically turned the conflict into a war of attrition.Boko Haram has been successfully over-running Nigerian military bases.Herdsmen are still roaming about attacking, killing, pillaging defenseless residents of farming communities across the country while the security agencies seem helpless in reining them in.

Vacillation in Foreign Policy
Involvement of foreign state actors in internal conflicts of others more often than not come with conditions which might infringe on the latter's sovereignty.Either prior to or in the course of receiving such foreign assistance, Nigeria was compelled to take decisions and actions that were contrary to the country's stated foreign policy objectives.An example, as pointed out earlier, was the decision to allow the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), hitherto shunned diplomatically by Nigeria, to build an embassy in Lagos.This was not unconnected to USSR's supply of weapons to the FMG during the Nigerian civil war.A similar scenario played out in the case with Israel, whose relationship with Nigeria warmed after the former sold some weapons to the FMG during the same war.

Militarization of Nigerian Society
The feeling of insecurity engendered by these conflicts that were escalated by foreign intervention has turned Nigeria into a near police-state.Most inter-state, inter-city and in some cases intra-city roads in the country have checkpoints jointly manned by heavily armed personnel of the military, police, and other security agencies, ostensibly to check the movements of potential insurgents, miscreants or "trouble makers."However, rather than assure security, the sight of gun-toting and stern-looking security agents serve to heighten sense of insecurity and engender fear in the people.Many of those checkpoints became illegal "tollgates" where road users were extorted by the security agents.Worse still, there have been reported cases in which many road users who attempted to resist such extortion were not only assaulted but also lost their lives in the process.Therefore, while citizens in transit were afraid of attack by insurgents and bandits, they also had some elements within the security forces to contend with.

Demographic dislocation
Escalation of violent conflicts in Nigeria has led to gross demographic dislocation of the inhabitants of the conflict zones.A typical example was the secessionist Eastern Region of Nigeria prior to and during the civil war.Consequent upon the waves of massacres of some 50,000 mainly Igbo people resident in northern Nigeria between May and October 1966 (which partly catalyzed the Nigerian civil war) many of the survivors were compelled to return to their homeland in Eastern Region of the country.The suddenness of their departure did not give the government of the region room to prepare adequately for them.Therefore, for a while, quite a number of them were internally displaced.As federal forces were closing in the Eastern Region toward the end of the civil war, an estimated 5000 children from that region were air-lifted to Gabon and Ivory Coast for safety.Fifty years after the war most of those "children" have not been accounted for.Regrettably, in the recent past the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nigeria has been increasing, buoyed by the internationalized violent conflicts as discussed in this paper.According to a recent report by Sasu (2022), at the end of 2020 Nigeria, with 2.730 million internally displaced persons, had the third highest number of IDPs in Africa.On the other hand, United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) put the figure at 2.9 million for the same period but in the North Eastern part of the country alone where the activities of Boko Haram and its affiliates have been most intense. 70om the foregoing, it would be germane to infer that Sasu's figures were for the same area as well.However, this could not be the whole story because the herdsmen's ferocious attacks have had similar effects on other parts of the country.For example, Benue State which has particularly borne the brunt of the latter's attacks claims it has 27 IDP camps scattered across the state holding some 2 million people (Duru, 2022). 71

Disruption of economic activities
Wars and threat to life can lead to sudden migration of a large number of people.Demographic dislocation and state of insecurity in Nigeria have adversely affected economic activities of the people.Many farmers have been forced to abandon their farms or what is left of them just to escape the onslaught of armed invaders.The consequent food shortages and high food prices in Nigeria impact negatively on the people.The activities of herdsmen and Boko Haram have left much to be desired in this matter.Quite a number of the IDPs especially in northern Nigeria are farmers.This area is regarded as the food basket of the country.Its large land mass, vegetation and geographical features made it suitable for the production of a variety of grains (beans, sorghum, guinea corn, Bambara nuts etc), vegetables (such as tomatoes, onions, lettuce, carrots, turmeric among so many others), and some tubers like yam and potatoes which are all staples on Nigerian dining tables.Along with their family members, they have been cocooned in the IDP camps for safety and shelter and kept far away from their farms and barely subsist on the meager charity of the government.

Conclusion
This paper established that foreign state and non-state actors were effectively involved in Nigeria's violent local conflicts between 1960 and 2021.The conflicts studied were the Nigerian Civil War, Boko Haram insurgency and Herdsmen-Farmers conflicts.The roles of foreign actors in Nigeria's internal conflicts were diverse and spurred by different interests.Some of the roles as identified included supply of weapons, international military coalition, diplomatic interventions, use of mercenaries, provision of logistics and training and humanitarian activities.Save for the humanitarian acts of organizations like Caritas and the peace moves of General Ankrah of Ghana, all other interventions were apparently for reasons other than the interest of Nigeria.
The paper noted the reasons for foreign actors' interventions to include the weapons that needed to be sold, spheres of influence that needed to be expanded, nurtured or new ones established by the intervening actors.Money that also needed to be made, economic interests that had to be protected, and supremacist foreign religious theocracy must be imposed on Nigerians by various foreign actors.
It also demonstrated that such involvements had a wide range of consequences on the country among which were loss of lives, corruption, demographic dislocation, militarization of society and disruption of economic activities.In spite of the above, successive political leadership of the country should also bear responsibility for the situation.This is because despite early warning signals in each of the conflicts, they did either nothing or too little to nip potentially explosive situations in the bud.

Recommendations
Given the discussions above, the authors make the following suggestions: • Nigerians should endeavor to elect only purposeful and patriotic leaders who would not pursue parochial interests after election but good governance.
• Early Warning, Early Response system in conflict matters in Nigeria should be activated to check potential violent conflict situations.
• Nigeria must take measures to become self-reliant in arms production.
• There should be more emphasis on intelligence gathering on the part of the security agencies.
• All expressed issues of marginalization by groups should be looked into as early as possible.