The securitisation of terrorism in Ethiopia: An old practice in a New discourse

Abstract This study examines the securitisation of terrorism in Ethiopia with the objective of demystifying the way anti-terrorist legislation and counterterrorism discourse have been used to legitimise state terror in the country. To achieve this, the study adopts Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a method to analyse the data obtained from written and spoken texts. The analysis reveals that terrorism, defined as the threat or use of violence against non-combatants for political ends, has been endemic in Ethiopia. However, the narrative of terrorism as an existential threat to Ethiopia emerged immediately after the contested election of 2005. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)-led government imported the Western counterterrorism discourse and officially adopted anti-terrorist legislation with the intention of disciplining the heightened political opposition and stifling critical voices that questioned its legitimacy in the aftermath of the election. Finally, it argues that the rebranding of terrorism as an existential threat to Ethiopia and the consequent adoption of anti-terrorist legislation are political strategies aimed at maintaining the ruling minority’s grip on political power by legitimising state terrorism in the country.


Introduction
Securitisation is the act of shifting an issue outside the realm of conventional politics into the realm of an emergency politics by presenting the issue as an existential threat to some referent object (Balzacq, 2011;Buzan et al., 1998;Waever, 1998).For an issue to count a security issue, it has to be staged as an existential threat to a certain referent object by the right authority under felicity condition.Felicity conditions, according to Balzacq, include: (1) presenting an existential threat as legitimating the use of extraordinary measures to deal with the threat; (2) the securitising actor should be in a position of authority with a good political and social capital; and lastly (3) the objects associated with the issue should bear historical connotations of harm, threat, and danger (Balzacq, 2011, p. 5).Framing an issue as an existential threat in this way, when successful, gives the actor the legitimacy to claim a special right to employ an extraordinary method to deal with the "threat" (Buzan et al., 1998).
The history of terrorism stretches back to the ancient world (Chaliand & Blin, 2007).However, its status as an existential threat and a global issue of high concern is a recent development.The 9/11 attack by the Wahhabist Islamist group, al-Qaeda, against the USA brought the discourse of terrorism to the stage of high politics, making it the most crucial foreign policy agenda, issue for alliance and antagonism, instrument for political mobilisation, and centre of academic debate and inquiry (Jackson, 2005;Law, 2015).The US administration, hence, constructed a new reality where terrorism is framed as an existential threat to the American democracy, freedom, way of life, and civilisation that needs extra-constitutional measures to deal with (Jackson, 2005).Recognising this securitisation move, the United Nations Security Council (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, 2001 called upon all member states to join the global campaign against terrorism. Ethiopia's securitisation move officially began in 2006 with its intervention to Somalia (Yihdego, 2007).The country declared war on the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) of Somalia under the guise of "fighting terrorism" and supporting the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (Allo, 2010).Materialising its securitisation move, Ethiopia adopted its first Anti-Terrorist Proclamation (ATP) No. 652 and instituted a special Anti-Terrorism Task Force including Prosecutors, Police, and Intelligence personnel (Anti-Terrorist Proclamation No 652 2009).The proclamation was amended in 2020 following the introduction of the 2018 political reform in the country, and replaced by the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes Proclamation (PSTCP) No. 1176.
Studies and human rights reports show that the securitisation move followed the designation and re-designation of political forces as terrorist and non-terrorist organizations, respectively.It also witnessed unprecedented terrorism charges and detentions of opposition politicians, civil society organisers, human rights defenders, and other independent critical voices (Amnesty International, 2011;Hailemariam, 2020;Human Rights Watch, 2018;Jalata, 2017;Kibret, 2017;Yohannes, 2014).Empirical evidences revealed liberty restrictions and human rights abuses in the country, however, did not analyse the hidden political intention behind the securitisation move.This study, therefore, examines the securitisation of terrorism in Ethiopia with the objective of demystifying the way anti-terrorist legislations and counterterrorism discourse have been used to legitimise state terror in the country.

Terrorism in the history of modern Ethiopia
Terrorism as the use or threat of violence against non-combatants for political ends has been a customary practice throughout the political history of Modern Ethiopia (Bulatovic, 1993;Gnogno, 1985;Zewde, 2001).Historical accounts show that "terror as a strategy" has been at the centre of individuals' and groups' struggle to assume or maintain state power (Gnogno, 1985;Zewde, 2001).For instance, Emperor Tewodros II, the man accredited for establishing modern Ethiopia, in his way to end the so-called era of Princes (Zamana-Masafent in Amharic) and in his quest to maintain the monopoly over imperial power has used terror marked by the amputation of limbs as a policy of conquest against the people of Wollo and Showa (Zewde, 2001, p. 30).His successor Yohannes IV has also employed a similar policy of terror, but in a different context, against the Muslims of Wollo who resisted forced conversion into Orthodox Christianity (Zewde, 2001, pp. 48-49).
Emperor Menelik II, in his southward conquest [expansion] to "regain" the "historic Ethiopia," followed a carrot and stick approach.In [t]his conquest, Menelik, on the one hand welcomed the kingdoms and people who opted for peaceful submission, and on the other hand employed a policy of terror against kingdoms and people who resisted his conquest and unification agenda (Bulatovic, 1993).In the period after the Italian occupation (1936)(1937)(1938)(1939)(1940)(1941), the restored Emperor Haile Selassie has employed terrorist methods to quell peasant rebellions from Raya-Azebo, Bale, and Gojjam against his "divinely ordained" feudal order (Asrat, 2014;Zewde, 2001).
The Dergue regime from to 1976-1978 has officially declared "red terror" campaign to terrify the population and eliminate dissent, especially people suspected of their membership to the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and later for being sympathisers of the All Ethiopia Socialist Movement (MEISON in its Amharic abbreviation).In this "red terror" campaign, although the exact number of victims is not yet known, tens of thousands were killed without due process.According to Tiruneh in one day, 6 th of May, 1977, over a thousand youths were executed and their bodies were left in the street and ravaged by hyenas (Tiruneh, 1993).The reign of Dergue is thus depicted by Ethiopian history professor Bahru Zewde as "the heavy and dark winter of terror" (Zewde, 2001, p. 229).
The EPRDF is another group that came to power through "blood and iron" in 1991.The front, where the TPLF is first among equals, waged a seventeen-year war to end the Dergue regime (Berhe, 2004).During the struggle against Dergue, inter alia, the claim of the TPLF was the right to self-determination aimed at establishing an independent republic of Tigray (Berhe, 2004).However, after assuming state power in 1991, the EPRDF became intolerant of political pluralism and dissent and engaged in massive human rights violations (Jalata, 2015;Kassa, 2014;Kibret, 2017).The regime practiced repressions, politically motivated killings, disappearances, torture, and detention without trial (Amnesty International, 2011;Human Rights Watch, 2013, 2018).The EPRDF employed terrorist methods like maiming, fixing large containers filled with water to the testicles of men, and inserting poles into the vaginas of women who were convicted of an affiliation to, inter alia, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and Ginbot-7 Movement for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy (Ginbot 7) (Berhanu, 2018;Jalata, 2017).

The rebranding of terrorism as an existential threat
The narrative of terrorism as an existential threat dominates the political, academic, and media discourse since 9/11 (Wolfendale, 2016).The narrative depicts modern terrorism as an unprecedented phenomenon (Jackson, 2005).Modern terrorism was framed as a threat to civilisation and liberal democratic values, something that may swallow civilised liberal democratic values at some point, and so on by mostly Western politicians and scholars (Michaelsen, 2012).Thus, the fight against terrorism was portrayed as the struggle to death over values (2005).This narrative informed states the need for extra-judicial measures to deal with the "terrorist threat" (Romaniuk et al., 2017).The rationale behind this move is that securitisation gives states the legitimacy to claim a special right to use emergency power to deal with the 'threat (Buzan et al., 1998).Thus, most authoritarian regimes exploited the opportunity to normalise human rights abuses and liberty restrictions (Meisels, 2008;Neal, 2009;Romaniuk et al., 2017).
The EPRDF-led government started to frame terrorism as an existential threat to Ethiopia in 2006 when the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) from Somalia declared Jihad against Ethiopia (González, 2013).The EPRDF-led government successfully framed "terrorist groups" from Somalia as existential threats to the security of Ethiopia.The regime used the Somalian irredentist claim and the resultant historic animosity between the two nations as a felicitous condition to its securitisation project (Allo, 2010;González, 2013;Ingiriis, 2018).Ethiopia, finally, crossed the border of Somalia under the guise of combatting terrorism in 2006.
The move was domestically institutionalised in the aftermath of the 2005 contested election through ATP 652 in 2009 (Kassa, 2013;Kibret, 2017).The adoption of the ATP followed terrorism charges against opposition politicians and critical voices, and the designation of the OLF, ONLF and Ginbot 7 as terrorist organisations (Yohannes, 2014).The terrorist designation, inter alia, remains perplexing at least for two reasons.First, the demands presented by the ethno-nationalist political forces and the social democratic Ginbot-7 are morally and constitutionally justified.According to Article 39 of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution, all ethnic communities in the country bear the right to self-determination including secession, which even cannot be suspended during a state of emergency (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution, 1995, Art. 39;93(4c)).Second, the resort to armed struggle is a customary practice throughout the political history of modern Ethiopia.The case of the EPRDF-led government, in this regard, presents no peculiarity from its predecessors as far as its blood and iron approach to power is concerned.The 1995 constitution is argued to be a unilaterally written party document [manifesto] rather than a legitimate binding social contract founded upon the consent of the governed (Vaughan, 2003).Moreover, the EPRDF-led government where the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) was first among equals or its successor where the Oromo Prosperity Party is viewed as the godfather of the Prosperity Party (PP)-led government fail to secure legitimacy being the government of the people, for the people, by the people.This psycho-political condition serves as a justification to challenge the self-proclaimed "constitutional regimes" of the post 1991 Ethiopia through armed struggle.

Institutionalising the discourse: legitimising repression?
The counterterrorist discourse of the EPRDF-led government got an institutional framework with the ATP in 2009.The preamble of the ATP states that its objective was "to protect the rights of the people to live in peace, freedom, and security at all times, from the threat of terrorism".The proclamation, thus, instituted a special Anti-Terrorism Task Force including Prosecutors, Police, Intelligence personnel, and the National Anti-Terrorism Coordinating Committee as part of the government's general counterterrorism policies (Anti-Terrorist Proclamation No 652, 2009).The ATP is claimed to be a direct-copy of the Terrorism Act of the UK with a strict adherence to the international human rights law.Therefore, the following sections make first order (immanent) critique aimed at exposing internal contradictions and second-order critique aimed at the examination of the external intertextuality of the legislations.

The 'terrorist acts' in the ATP and the place of rights and liberties
In its preamble, as mentioned above, the ATP claims that its objective was to protect the right of people to live in peace, freedom, and security.Despite this noble ambition, the proclamation carries stipulations that contradict with its proclaimed objective.Self-contradiction begins with Article 3 of the law that defined [listed] terrorist acts in a broad and intentionally vague wording: Whosoever or a group intending to advance a political, religious, or ideological cause by coercing the government, intimidating the public or section of the public, or destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or social institutionsof the country: (e) Causes damage to natural resources, environmental, cultural, or historical heritages; (f) Endangers, seizes, or puts under control, causes serious interference or disruption of any public service.
(g) Threatens to commit any of the acts stipulated under sub-articles (1) to ( 6) of this article are punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 15 years to life or with death.
The stipulation also criminalises planning, preparation, conspiracy, incitement, and attempt of terrorist acts (Article 4); rendering support to terrorism (Article 5); encouraging terrorism (Article 6); participation in a terrorist organisation (Article 7); possessing or using property for terrorist acts (Article 8); possessing and dealing with proceeds of terrorist acts (Article 9); inducing or threatening witness or destroying evidence (Article 10); false threat of terrorist acts (Article 11); and failure to disclose terrorist acts (Article 12).
This definition, inter alia, fails to distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence.What distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence is its instrumentality and the indiscriminate targeting of non-combatants, among others.The "person" denotes any person irrespective of his position or occupation.The statement "causes a person's death or serious bodily harm" extends the acts of terrorism to acts perpetrated against security forces and armed combatants.Thus, the "terrorist acts" definition categorises, for example, violence perpetrated against combatants as acts of terrorism.This generalisation brings together any political violence to the domain of terrorism and conflates terrorism with insurgent violence (Ünal, 2016).
On the other hand, criminalising acts such as planning, preparation, incitement, rendering support to terrorism, and encouraging terrorism, among others, carry a broader and vague meaning, and remain subject to politically motivated interpretations.For instance, in most circumstances, planning and preparation can be mental activities and a matter of thought.From this perspective, criminalising such activities would mean an attempt to control the mental activity of a human person.The "incitement" and "encouraging" statements also convey another politically motivated meaning.Inciting or encouraging people or a group to resist tyranny and in favour of democracy and human rights could be interpreted as an act of terrorism.The "encouragement" statement is a more illogical and other regarding action.If someone understands a writer's or publisher's statement or work as "encouraging terrorism" then by the legislation that writer or publisher commits terrorist act.In this regard, the terrorism charge against an Ethiopian journalist and human rights defender Eskinder Nega shows the political motive behind the "encouragement" clause.Eskinder was charged with terrorism as a result of his political analysis of the Arab Spring and its possible spillover effect on Ethiopia, and for wishing the Ethiopian new year 2012 to be the year of justice, freedom, and democracy.The new year wish was interpreted by the EPRDF officials as "encouraging terrorism" (Amnesty International, 2011).Similarly, the opposition politician Andualem Arage's New Year Wish that called for the end of tyranny was also interpreted as a speech inciting and encouraging terrorism (Amnesty International, 2011).The "rendering support for terrorism" statement, in this context, would also be used to criminalise a naive and innocent individual who provided a drinking water to a "suspect terrorist." The overly broad, intentionally vague and politically contemplated listing of "terrorist acts" left a loophole against political pluralism and the free exercise of political rights and civil liberties (Kibret, 2017;Workneh, 2019).For instance, [serious] damage to property, natural resources, environment, and cultural or historical heritage are defined [listed] as acts of terrorism.This definition [listing] includes property crimes and the disruption of public services, for example, committed without any intent to cause serious bodily injury, death, or hostage takings as terrorist acts.The stipulation also labels demonstrations, non-violent movements, and minor acts of violence committed in the form of political protest or activism, which for instance, closed the traffic flow or a strike that resulted in disruption of public services as "terrorist acts" punishable by 15 years to life or death.
The proclamation under Article 6 listed what it described as "direct or indirect encouragement of terrorism" as a "terrorist act."Although "encouragement of terrorism" had not been given a precise definition, the article stated that: Whosoever publishes or causes the publication of a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation, or instigation of an act of terrorism . . . is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 10 to 20 years.This stipulation criminalises political speeches, debates, and other statements which are deemed to be "encouraging terrorism" or if it was understood by someone as "encouraging" terrorism.This subjective political project violates the right to freedom of expression and thought overtly.A publication in favour of democracy, freedom, or equality, but understood by someone or the political cadre as encouraging or inducing terrorism, would expose the speaker or writer to the terrorist charge as per the stipulation.Moreover, freedom of expression and press has been an essential foundation of a democratic society.Apart from being the embodiment of individual liberty, these freedoms promote people's right to information and enable the discovery of truth, and support the endeavour to have an open and transparent government (Foster, 2011).These freedoms may be restricted when it is believed that the exercise of such freedoms will infringe on the right of other individuals, public morality, or national security (Foster, 2011).Contrary to this normative justification, the contemplated use of such a broad and vague statements with the possibility for subjective interpretation in a state where the ruling elite is determined to maintain its grip on power at any cost, would mean a deliberate political project against human rights and democracy.Empirical evidences, in this regard, show that these broad and vague statements were used against journalists, bloggers, and civil society organisers that are critical of the EPRDF-led government and its policies (Kassa, 2017;Yohannes, 2014).The terrorism files against Eskinder Nega, Reeyot Alemu, Elias Kifle (editor of the Ethiopian Review), Woubshet Taye (Deputy Editor of the Awramba Times Newspaper), Mesfin Negash, and Abiye Tekle-Mariam (Writers to the independent news website, Addis Neger), and the Zone-9 bloggers immediately after the adoption of the ATP show that the individuals did not use their freedom of expression to the extent that infringes on the right of other individuals, or against public morality or in a way that poses threat to national security (Kassa, 2017;Yohannes, 2014).Since criticising the government and its officials for their undemocratic practices and bad human rights records does not fit to the acts that infringe on the individual, liberty, public morality, or national security.
The Proclamation also gives broad power to Police and Intelligence Personnel against individuals, groups, and media.For instance, Article 14 of the Proclamation gives the National Intelligence and Security Service to: According to this stipulation, the National Intelligence and Security Service may conduct electronic surveillance on telephone and Internet communications of any individual or organisation.Articles 17 and 18 also give the Police a broader power to conduct both covert and overt searches with no regard for confidential information, which is against privacy rights recognised by domestic and international human rights instruments.Police was also empowered to arrest anyone suspected of committing a terrorist act without a warrant.
The proclamation under Article 29 stipulates procedures for proscribing terrorist organisations.The House of People's Representatives was given the power to proscribe and de-proscribe terrorist organisations upon submission by the "government".The law-making organ in parliamentary systems is mostly dominated by a party that secured a majority seat in the house.Thus, in parliamentary systems, there is no strict separation of power, checks, and balances among the three organs of the government (Persson et al., 1996).In most cases, members of the executive committee are members of the law-making organ.In this context, it is inarguable that the political interest of the executive committee-the party with majority seats in parliament-is reflected in parliamentary decisions.It can be inferred from this that decisions passed by parliaments are more political in nature and lack a legal flavour.In the case of Ethiopia, where 98% of the seats in parliament were dominated by the EPRDF, it would be naive to think that the process of proscribing contenders of the ruling party and government by itself would be free of political intentions.Article 29, which gave the power of proscribing organisations as terrorist organisations, subjects the proscription to political interests and transgresses the normative understanding that the legality of an association shall be ascertained by a judiciary organ.
The Proclamation under Article 25 lists the conditions under which an organisation can be designated as a terrorist organisation.According to this provision: Any organisation shall be proscribed as terrorist organisation if it directly or indirectly commits acts of terrorism, prepares to commit acts of terrorism, supports or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise involved in terrorism.This provision can be questioned at both theoretical and practical levels.The "terrorist acts" definition that listed damages to natural resources, environmental, cultural, or historical heritages, and serious interference or disruption of public service as "terrorist acts", among others, subject political movements to the "terrorist" proscriptions.Moreover, freedom of association, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, and the right to privacy, all of which are curtailed by this proclamation, are central to democratic political processes, the absence of which makes democratic politics inconceivable.The free exercise of civil liberties and political rights remains an alpha and omega of democratic politics.Thus, systematically curtailing the free exercise of these rights and liberties would justify the use of violence or terror as an instrument to secure these rights and liberties back.Moreover, the definition of violence perpetrated against combatants and violence perpetrated against non-combatants in the domain of "terrorist acts" denies a political personality to insurgent groups with legitimate demand.

Prevention and suppression of terrorism crimes proclamation: a new wine in old bottles?
The PSTCP No. 1176 is a new anti-terrorist legislation that replaced ATP No. 652 following the 2018 political reform in the country.The new leadership boldly admitted that the EPRDF-led government practiced state terrorism.The Reformist Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in a rare and candid admission, disclosed before the parliament that the security institutions of the country committed torture and other inhuman and degrading treatments against citizens.He said verbatim: "we had been torturing, causing bodily harms, and even putting inmates in dark prison cells; these were terrorist acts committed by us."He further argued that terrorism is not just an act of trying to forcefully overthrow a government; the government's [EPRDF's] unconstitutional use of force to stay in power should also be considered terrorism (Abiy, 2018, June 28).
The preamble of the PSTCP states that the old proclamation had substantive and enforcement loopholes that produced a negative effect on the rights and freedoms of citizens within the previous proclamation.The proclamation, hence, justifies the need for a law that enables adequate protection of rights and freedoms of individuals and the prevalence of accountability of law enforcement bodies.This law, as its predecessor did, stresses the seriousness of the terrorist threat to the peace and security of Ethiopia and the international community in its preamble (Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes Proclamation 1176, 2020).

The 'terrorist acts' in the PSTCP and the place of rights and liberties
The PSTCP, in its preamble, points to the seriousness of the terrorist threat to Ethiopia and the international community and asserts that the government [PP-led government] is responsible for maintaining the peace and security of the country."The country," a term mostly understood as an area of land with particular physical features and associated with particular people, is in most cases different from the state-which is a highly organised political institution (Collin, 2004).The proclamation, unlike the ATP that made its referent people at least in theory, refrains from clearly stating its security referent object.Hence, the PSTCP continues to define terrorist acts as: Whosoever, with the intention of advancing political, religious, or ideological causes for terrorising, spreading fear among the public or section of the public, or coercing or compelling the government, foreign government, or international organisation: In this definition, inter alia, the tautological description that states . . .whosoever, with the intention of advancing political, religious, or ideological causes for terrorising . . .makes a logical fallacy.
Terrorism has never been an end objective of any individual, a group or an organization.It is only a tactic employed to achieve even sometimes democratic or emancipatory objectives.Terrorising or terrorism as a tactic may be employed with the intention of advancing political, religious, or ideological causes but not advancing political, religious, or ideological causes for terrorising (Romaniuk et al., 2017).
The proclamation criminalises intimidation to commit terrorist acts (Article 5), planning, and preparation for the commission of terrorist acts (Article 6), conspiracy to carry out terrorist acts (Article 7), false threat of terrorist acts (Article 8), rendering support (Article 9), incitement (Article 10), and possessing property associated with terrorism crime, among others.Moreover, a serious obstruction of public or social services is a terrorist act as stipulated under Article 3(e).In this regard, a statement calling for a strike by, for instance, an opposition politician or a statement that warns the government of the possible danger of upheaval, or a likelihood of revolution, may be interpreted as intimidation to commit terrorist acts.
The stipulation that criminalises planning and preparation for the commission of terrorist acts also remains open to political manipulation.This stipulation intends to criminalise a mental activity or thought, which is a state of thinking.The stipulation does not include methods and mechanisms by which to engineer whether someone is planning to commit terrorist act or not.The "rendering support" clause criminalises, inter alia, the provision of technical, counselling, or professional support.In this regard, a scholar of terrorism studies engaged in researching successful terrorist tactics would indirectly provide professional assistance to terrorist groups.Therefore, from this point of view, the "rendering professional support" clause could be used against scholars and scientists apart from its possible application against political opposition and critical voices in service of the power interest of the ruling minority.
The legislation also criminalises the publication, production, distribution, selling, and storing of statements, writings, or images deemed by someone as intended to incite terrorist acts.For instance, Galtung's idea of structural violence, in this regard, may be presented by the political entrepreneur as inciting [encouraging] terrorist acts against those who exploit and control the means of production or those who dominate the structure.
In general, the above definition of "terrorist acts," although claimed to avoid the overly broad and vague definition presented in the ATP, persists with ostensibly salient changes.As is the case with the ATP, the proclamation extends "terrorist acts" to attacks perpetrated against combatants.The statements-"causing serious bodily harm to a person" and "endangers the life a person" brings the "terrorist acts" issue to include attacks perpetrated against both combatants and noncombatants.This definition fails to conform to the 2004 United Nations Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change definition of terrorism [terrorist acts], where it is conceptualised as an attack perpetrated against civilians or non-combatants (United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004).The definition also contradicts with the USA State Department's definition of terrorism that conceptualised the violence in terms of a premeditated violence against non-combatants (Schmid, 2011, p. 44).
In the definition, among others, " . . .compelling the government" for political, ideological, or religious causes' is also labelled as a "terrorist act".This remains unclear and imprecise as far as the statement "seriously obstructing public or social service" is concerned.Compelling or pressuring a government to do or abstain from carrying out a certain task through a [serious] strike or any other non-violent means has been a norm and manifestation of a functioning democracy since the evolution of democratic governance (Poper, 2013).From this point of view, categorising the practice of compelling or pressuring government as a "terrorist act" would mean the official divorce against the fundamental principle of popular sovereignty.
The PSTCP, unlike the ATP, which unconditionally labelled damages to property, natural resource, environment, and the obstruction of public or social service as "terrorist acts," stipulates exceptions to the obstruction of public service caused by a strike when the obstruction is related to the institution or profession of the strikers or if the obstruction of public service happens while exercising rights recognised by law such as demonstration, assembly and similar rights.However, this stipulation leaves a new loophole by placing perplexing statements subject to political decisions.For instance, framing whether a certain obstruction of public or social service is caused while exercising rights recognised by law remains subject to political decisions.The exception clause leaves the exercise of rights recognised by the constitution subject to arbitrary framing by the government and its agents.The obstruction of public or social service as a result of demonstrations or assembly against the government or its interest may, in this regard, be labelled as "terrorist acts," while obstruction of public or social service as a result of demonstrations in support for the government are acknowledged as rights recognised by the law.
The PSTCP has also replaced ATP's vaguely worded stipulation of "encouragement of terrorism" with a specific political language "incitement"; however, it criminalises freedom of expression and expression in a more politically contemplated stipulation under Article 10(2): Whosoever in clear manner incites by statement, writing, using image or by any other conduct to cause the commission of any acts [terrorist acts], or publish, produce, communicate, distribute, store, sell, or make available to the public through any means anything with substance of such kind shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for three to seven years, provided that the crime was attempted or committed.
The "incitement" clause, although specific and clear when compared to the "encouragement of terrorism" clause, it remains problematic as far as freedom of expression and thought is concerned.Freedom of expression is a fundamental right essential for the enjoyment of a wide range of human rights and is recognised by international human rights instruments (Foster, 2011).The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), for example, states under Article 19 that: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also affirms Freedom of Speech in similar words under Article 19(2): Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
The right of thought, opinion, and expression has also been emphasised under Article 29 of the 1995 FDRE Constitution.Article 29 (2) of the constitution stipulates that: Everyone has the right to freedom of expression without any interference.This right shall include the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any media of his choice.
The ICCPR and FDRE Constitution clearly indicated the circumstances by which Freedom of Expression can be restricted to some extent.For example, the FDRE Constitution puts limitations on the Freedom of Speech when a speech is deemed to impinge on the well-being of the youth and the honour and reputation of individuals.This prohibition does not necessarily reflect the "incitement" clause under the PSTCP.Moreover, one cannot think of democracy and civilised political dialogue in a country where freedom of thought, expression, and opinion are censored and restricted by law.
The PSTCP, like its predecessor, gives the power of proscribing and de-proscribing [terrorist] organisations to the House of People's Representatives upon the recommendation and approval of the Federal Attorney General and the Council of Ministers, respectively.The puzzle here is that the proclamation gives the executive organ immunity to keep recommendations for proscription confidential.Even under circumstances where the House of People's Representatives are unable to pass resolutions based on the general information provided, some members of the parliament may be selected to look into the confidential matter with an obligation imposed upon them to keep the issue confidential as per article 20 and 22 of the proclamation.This practice runs the risk of false outcomes and jeopardises the right to access information and the customary legal and normative principle of equal treatment.
The Proclamation, under Article 19, lists conditions for proscribing an organisation as a terrorist organisation.According to this stipulation, an organisation may be proscribed as a terrorist organisation if: (a) It operates by carrying terrorist crimes as its objective; or (b) The management or decision-making body of the organisation practices or officially accepts the crime or leads its operation.
(c) Crime defines the organisation through its operation and conduct, or most of its employees carry out its activities with knowledge of the crime.
The proclamation asserts that "the House of People's Representatives may undertake the act of proscribing a 'terrorist' without requiring prosecution or punishment of an organisation in court of law" (Article 18(3)).This bold assertion, despite its overt transgression of judicial jurisdiction, supports the argument that the terrorist proscription serves the power interest of the ruling minority (Hailemariam, 2020;Workneh, 2019).
This legislation also provides broad power to the Intelligence Personnel and Police Forces.Police is empowered to conduct a warrantless "surprise search" upon permission from the Commissioner General of the Federal Police Commission and employs special investigation techniques including: (a) Intercepting or conducting surveillance on postal, letter, telephone, fax, radio, internet, and other electronic device exchanges or communicates with a person suspected of terrorism.
(b) Conducting surveillance or installing camera, audio or video recording devices.
(c) Infiltrating and collaborating the suspect's group and follow up their activities.
This provision goes far against individual, group, and organisational privacy.In doing so, it violates both the international human rights stipulations and domestic constitutional principles.
Empowering the Intelligence Institutions and the Police Force against individuals, groups, and organisations contradicts the stated objective of the proclamation per se and general counterterrorism policies.It would be fallacious to argue that the legislation that veiled freedom of thought, speech, expression, movement, and association stands to protect the security of people against the threat of terrorism.In general, it can be argued that the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes Proclamation is a "new wine in old bottles," by which the government traded its responsibility to protect the rights, liberty, and security of people for its narrow and selfish power interest.

Changes and continuities
The ATP and PSTCP, inter alia, used the term "person" which was/is précised as a "physical or juridical person" and a "Natural Person or Juridical Person", respectively.The term "person" is thus intended to denote both combatants and non-combatants.Both proclamations conceptualised "terrorist acts" in terms of threat of violence or violence [damage] perpetrated against a person [combatant and non-combatant], among others.The overly broad and vague definitions under both proclamations extend "terrorist acts" to include property crimes, damage to natural resources and the environment, and obstruction of public services.Although the PSTCP introduced minor changes, it also played a politically contemplated semantic game.However, these semantic games are poorly sophisticated.For instance, the expression "whosoever, with the intention of advancing political, religious, or ideological causes for terrorising . . ." fails to objectively conceptualise "terrorism" or "terrorist act."No "terrorist" or "terrorist group" has its objective as "terrorising"; rather "terrorising" is the tactic adopted in pursuit of certain political, ideological or religious interest (Romaniuk et al., 2017).
According to the ATP, for instance, [whosoever] endangers, seizes, or puts under control, causes serious interference or disruption of any public service, commits terrorism, is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 15 years to life or death.Public Service is précised under Article 2(7) as electronic, information communication, transport, finance, public utility, infrastructure, or other similar institutions or systems established to give public service.In this context, worker strikes, temporary obstruction of public buses, and serious damage to police cars or bill boards with a political message during public demonstrations intending to advance political or ideological causes by coercing government are also acts of terrorism, thus punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 15 years to life or death.This stipulation curtails the free exercise of people's democratic rights.The PSCTP also stresses on a similar provision: [whosoever] "seriously obstructs public or social services" intending to advance political or ideological cause by compelling government is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 10 years to 18 years.The PSTCP, however, provides an exception under Article 4 in the following manner: Obstruction of public service caused by a strike is related to the institution or profession of the strikers or exercising rights recognised by law such as demonstration, assembly, and similar rights shall not be deemed to be a terrorist act.
The "exception" statement creates a new loophole in " . . .a strike and the obstruction are related to the institution or profession of the strikers".This exception clause is not concerned with the strike and obstruction outside the strikers' institution or demonstrators gathered from different institutions and professions with similar objectives.In this regard, although the exception clause made minor revisions, it remained vague and subject to subjective interpretations.
The "incitement" clause within article 4 of the ATP, where it is stated as planning, preparation, conspiracy, incitement, and attempt of terrorist act are criminalised, has been replaced by the "incitement" article, where it is stipulated in a more repressive language that intends to criminalise freedom of expression and press in the following way: Whosoever in clear manner incites by statement, writing, using image, or by any other conduct to cause the commission of any of the acts provided for under Article 3 of this Proclamation or publish, produce, communicate, distribute, store, sell, or make available to the public through any means anything with substance of such kind shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment from three to seven years, provided that the crime was attempted or committed.This article, in a subtle way, criminalises statements, writing, using image, publication, production, communication, distribution, storing, selling, or making available to the public.For instance, a statement or writing inciting workers to strike or hold demonstrations in a way that obstructs public buses or any other social service amounts to terrorist acts.Although such democratic rights are exempted, the exception clause does not precisely address the case of incitement.
The "rendering support" to terrorist clause also introduces a seemingly semantic game change.The ATP, for example, stated "whosoever, knowingly or having reason to know that his deed has the effect of supporting the commission of a terrorist act or a terrorist organisation . . .". On the other hand, the PSTCP stated "Whosoever knowingly supports or assists directly or indirectly the commission of a terrorist act or with the intent to support a terrorist Organisation . . .".These tautological changes between "knowingly" and "having reason to know" is a showcase for the intended political outcome from the legislation.However, this is not to camouflage the change that the PSTCP made with regard to humanitarian aid given by humanitarian organisations engaged in providing aid and a support made by a person who has a legal duty to support others.
The "encouragement of terrorism" clause under the ATP Article 6, for example, stated: Whosoever publishes or causes the publication of a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation, or instigation of an act of terrorism stipulated under Article 3 of this Proclamation is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from10 to 20 years.This stipulation intends to criminalise an individual by what others could understand from her/his publication, other than the message the writer intended to deliver.The article is rather a showcase of how totalitarian regimes exploit anti-terrorism legislation to curtail freedom of expression, thought, and the press.The PSTCP, in this regard, has completely avoided the "encouragement of terrorism" statement.In general, although the PSTCP introduced minor changes, it has included new stipulations with considerable repercussions to the free exercise rights and liberties.

Conclusion
The investigation into the political history has shown that the threat or use of instrumental violence against non-combatants for political ends has been endemic in Ethiopia.Individuals and groups have employed such terrorist methods either in their struggle to ascend to state power or in their attempt to maintain a grip on state power.The EPRDF-led government discursively rebranded this old practice with narratives that framed terrorism as an existential threat to Ethiopia.This securitisation move and the consequent adoption of the ATP were intended to avert heightened opposition and waves of protests that questioned its ideological foundation and legitimacy in the aftermath of the 2005 contested election.The government thus used the ATP to designate contending political forces as terrorist organisations and stifle critical voices.On the other hand, the "reformist" PP-led government introduced minor and politically contemplated amendments with major repercussions for the free exercise of rights and liberties.The PSTCP is argued to be "a new wine in old bottles".In general, the rebranding of terrorism (an old practice) in a new discourse as an existential threat to Ethiopia is a discursive strategy employed to serve the power interests of the ruling minority by legitimising state terrorism in the country.
(a) Causes a person's death or serious bodily injury; (b) This creates serious risks to the safety or health of the public or section of the public.(c) Commits kidnapping or hostage taking; (d) Causes serious damage to property; (a) Intercept or conduct surveillance on the telephone, fax, radio, Internet, electronic, postal, or similar communications of a person suspected of terrorism; (b) Enter into any premise in secret to enforce interception, install, or remove instruments enabling interception, and (c) Install or remove instruments enabling the interception.
(a) Causes serious bodily injury to person; (b) Endangers the life of a person; (c) Commits hostage taking or kidnapping; (d) Causes damage to property, natural resource, or environment; or (e) Seriously obstructs public or social services and is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for 10 years to 18 years.