Framework for building synergies of the traditional and formal political adjudicatory institutions in conflict resolution in north-western Ghana

Abstract The global spread of conflict is unimaginable, and Africa is especially plagued with this conundrum. In the West African sub-region, traditional and formal (inherited/western) adjudicatory institutions operate independently of each other in the same environment irrespective of the fact that both institutions function to create an ordered society for the same group of persons. Evidence shows that efforts made over the years to integrate the operations of the two institutions in the context of conflict resolution in Ghana have proven unsuccessful. The aim of this paper is to proffer an appropriate framework that could enable the traditional and western adjudicatory institutions to build synergies to resolve conflicts. Data was collected using in-depth interviews with key informants and FGDs. Using a qualitative research design approach, 27 respondents including chiefs, tengandem (earth priests), and technocrats (practicing lawyers, court administrators, Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice) working in western adjudicatory institutions were contacted and interviewed. The thematic analytical approach was used to analyse data. The results revealed that the traditional and western adjudicatory institutions have not been able to build synergies to resolve conflicts due to mistrust, lack of capacity and recognition of traditional actors, and the power play between the two adjudicatory institutions. The study concludes by recommending a hybrid regime where the two adjudicatory institutions could come together to resolve conflicts.


Introduction
Conflicts, in recent times, have resulted in high costs to countries and regional bodies because the social and economic impacts are unimaginable.Besides the human cost and general destruction during periods of conflicts, the magnitude of their aftermath include the fact that state structures have to be rebuilt, legal institutions and police forces have to be reconstituted, political institutions and electoral processes have to be re-established, industrial and agricultural activities have to be re-launched, communication and transport systems have to be reconstructed, schools have to be re-opened, and so on (Brown et al., 2001).The global spread of conflict is unimaginable, and Africa is especially plagued with this conundrum.Within the West African sub-region, many of the countries, with the exception of Ghana, have experienced prolonged conflicts and wars.Therefore, after returning to democratic rule in 1992, Ghana headed sub-regional bodies that included the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to promote peace in Africa.This positive development informed Tsikata and Wayo (2004) who opined that Ghana's role as head of ECOWAS in the last few years has made it a popular avenue for peace talks and accords, thus burnishing its image as a peaceful island in a troubled region.
Despite the above positive view of Ghana within and internationally, the contradiction therein is that there have been several conflicts recorded in the country since independence.Some of the conflicts have remained unresolved as more continue to occur.These intermittent conflicts are often either intra-ethnic or inter-ethnic in nature, and the reasons for this development include intergenerational interest in common pool resources, especially land, chieftaincy rights, politics, religion, and other related issues.Retrospective studies indicate that conflicts have been recorded in all parts of Ghana, although some were and are non-violent (Oquaye, 1995;Tsikata & Wayo, 2004).Tsikata and Wayo (2004) demonstrated in their work that there are several longstanding inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic disputes among various communities across Ghana.Some of the conflicts have become intractable and difficult to resolve using the formal adjudicatory system alone.Moreover, local knowledge systems in conflict prevention that could have complemented the formal/western approaches at the community level have been ignored.To validate this position, Aryee's (1995) paper on conflict resolution and grievance redressing mechanisms in Ghana argued that the ethnic and chieftaincy disputes that have plagued some parts of Ghana could largely be attributed to either the poor performance of the formal and informal conflict resolution mechanisms or their inadequacy at the District level (Oquaye, 1995).
Therefore, this work is meant to explore an appropriate hybrid way of preventing and resolving communal conflicts within the framework of both formal and traditional approaches.The intellectual drive for this work is stimulated by the fact that in the midst of the mediation/settlement roles played by the law courts and the Houses of Chiefs, respectively, in Ghana, a good number of the conflicts have not ended and new ones continue to erupt.Indeed, there is a lack of conscious integration between the traditional and formal political adjudicatory institutions in conflict resolution, although they have the potential to combine efforts to resolve conflicts.In this respect, Swenson (2018) noted of the potential of the two adjudicatory institutions to combine efforts is amplified by the relationship between state and non-state justice mechanisms, which is a sevenstage spectrum of increasing state acceptance of the validity of adjudicative power by the nonstate justice system.To fill in the gap in literature, the study sought to examine how traditional and modern/western institutions can harmonise synergies to resolve recurrent communal conflicts, particularly in the Nandom Traditional Area in Ghana.The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the literature syntheses comprise the theory of legal pluralism in the context of traditional and western institutional conflict resolution, institutional governance and conflict resolution, and traditional conflict and western conflict resolution mechanisms.Other sections of the paper include the study area and methods, result and discussions, conclusion and policy recommendations of the study.

The theory of legal pluralism
There are pluralistic ethnic and clan groups and societies in Africa with multiple norms, values, religions, and interests over resources, power, and recognition, among others.In view of this, conflicts have become commonplace in Africa, and the Ghanaian societal milieu.These conflicts have gone through resolution processes but these have failed, and they have largely been attributed to either the poor performance of formal or informal conflict resolution mechanisms; hence, the question of the reliability of the normative legal system (Aryee, 1995;Oquaye, 1995).In view of this, this paper applies the Theory of Legal Pluralism as part of the legal anthropological archetype in the resolution of conflicts, its outcome implication in contemporary times and policy options for an alternative path that can be more cooperative and complementary in the resolution of conflicts.Legal pluralism, according to Vanderlinden (1971), refers to a situation in which people could choose from among more than one co-existing set of rules.In the view of Benda-Beckmann et al., it denotes the co-existence of multiple (sub-)legal systems within one state, as against the colonial legal centralism of the state courts, which makes it impossible for people to have options to other non-state courts for their grievances to be addressed.Hooker (1975) similarly asserts that legal pluralism is the existence of multiple systems of legal obligation within the confines of the state.This implies that multiple laws are existent in a state and are recognized as such by the state law as is the case in Ghana.
The 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution, Article 270 (1) & (2) guarantees chieftaincy and traditional institutions that were in existence before the promulgation of the constitution, and in those provisions, traditional authority is recognized and empowered (Brobbey, 2008).Moreover, the Chieftaincy Act 2008, Act 759 C.I. 27/72, National and Regional House of Chiefs, Rules C.I. 798/ 72 and Traditional Council Regulations empower the institution to facilitate for community members to nominate or choose their chiefs, and the working thereof.It is equally observed that legal pluralism thrives through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, arbitration agreements, and international treaty organizations (Swenson, 2018) as practiced in several countries in the world including Ghana.All these attempts are to draw a parallel state-centric opinion of law that belittles customary and other alternative laws.However, robust legal pluralism challenges the state's claim to a monopoly on legitimate resolution of legal disputes as well as the ideal of uniform application of the law.It enables participants to select dispute resolution forums based on accessibility, efficiency, legitimacy, jurisdiction, and cost, as well as the state and non-state systems' respective abilities to make binding decisions and sanction individuals that choose other systems (Swenson, 2018).The role of legal pluralism is vital in conflict and post-conflict settings; and as existed particularly in the developing world, an estimated 80% to 90% of disputes are handled outside of the state justice system (Albrecht & Kyed, 2010).
As relevant as the theory is to the recognition of multiple courts in the legal continuum that grant society choices relative to issues of settlement, legal pluralism has posed enormous challenges in the field of jurisprudence despite the fact that in many jurisdictions the state constitution recognizes ample methods of dispute resolution.For instance, in an era of combative legal pluralism, state and non-state systems are overtly hostile to one another.Where the normative underpinnings of the respective legal systems are not even tacitly accepted, the state and nonstate justice sectors seek explicitly to undermine, discredit, supplant, and-ideally-destroy the other (Swenson, 2018).Clearly, the dual system competes for relevance to the extent that the nonstate actors become subservient to the overbearing authority of the state.This often brews deep tension between state and non-state legal systems, especially where legal norms and procedures diverge significantly (Tamanaha, 2008).
Therefore, in the realm of legal plurality, the lack of a legal framework is herein considered as a consequence not of a judicial or institutional vacuum, [but] a result of overcharged legal order.To overcome the weaknesses associated with the competing institutional laws, there is the need for the traditional and western adjudicatory institutions to maintain their normative legitimate strengths and overcome their weaknesses through an incorporated binary legislative framework that permits both to resolve conflicts in both a cooperative and complementary manner.The different institutional realms in resolving conflicts in the context of normative legal opinions, particularly in the developing world with its associated challenges for the way forward, informed the adoption of the Theory of Legal Pluralism for this study.

Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms
Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanism is a social capital defined as the capability of social norms and customs to hold members of a group together by effectively facilitating the terms of their relationship and sustainably facilitating collective action for achieving mutually beneficial ends (Fred-Mensah, 2005).In this respect, Mengisteab (2003) asserts that, many African institutions of governance have valuable characteristics that can inform the development of culturally relevant institutions of democratic governance in contemporary Africa and have a rich tradition of political, economic, and social institutions that dealt with the allocation of resources, lawmaking, and social control.The strength of the traditional political institutions in Africa encompasses conflict management and resolution functions.However, the traditional [endogenous] conflict resolution process is subject to cultural diversity because across the length and breadth of Africa, multiple distinct ethnic groups have their unique ways and methods of resolving disputes.For example, the Gacaca court is an indigenous court system among Tutsis in Rwanda that is employed to settle communal conflicts among community members.The success of the Gacaca process is predicated on "truth-telling" by crime doers and subsequent minimal punishment or total forgiveness.As part of looking for a holistic reconciliation and reintegration of factions, Gacaca was used to try alleged perpetrators after the Rwanda genocide in 1994.This traditional approach helped opponents forgive one another, although criminals in the Rwanda conflict were sought by the International Court of Justice.In this respect, the traditional leaders in Africa have, on many occasions, discharged themselves creditably in solving conflicts that could not have been settled using the formal approach (Blench et al., 2006).
However, the challenge in such state and non-state formal organisations sponsoring indigenous structures and leadership for conflict resolution is the debasement and western influence on the inherent cultural values that facilitate the easy dispensation of justice among the local people.For instance, there has been a mistaken interpretation of traditional legal concepts or the supersession of indigenous [resolution] by English legal concepts as occurred in the case of customary arbitration, which influenced legal development and led to distortions with far-reaching consequences (Allott, 1998;Elombi, 1993;Schmid, 2001).The immunity of the traditionally laced approach to conflict resolution is not guaranteed as a result of hard handiness, manipulation, abuse, clan favouritism, wrong conviction, and political influence.Zartman (2000) observed that the relevance and applicability of traditional strategies have been greatly disenabled by the politicization, corruption, and abuse of traditional structures, especially traditional rulership, which have steadily delegitimized conflict management built around them in the eyes of many and reduced confidence in their efficacy.This unfortunate development denies people natural justice-"audi alteram partem" rule or fair hearing postulates.As succinctly observed, a person charged with a criminal offence shall be informed immediately of the nature of the offence against him in a language that he understands and in detail; be given adequate time to prepare his defence; be allowed to defend himself before the court in an individual capacity, or by a lawyer; to cross-examine witnesses; to examine witnesses called by him; and be entitled to an interpreter (Mensah, 2022;Fourth Republican Constitution of Ghana, 19(2)).These ingredients of fair hearing are either not found and/or codified for reference's sake in customary laws in Ghana.
Notwithstanding these pitfalls, it is possible to infer that these formal organisations have noticed the value of the local institutions in conflict resolution due to the fact that the resolution methods are unique, informal, communal, restorative, spiritual, context-specific, and diverse, apart from being integrated into life experiences.Indeed, Miles (2003) observed that "the most important context of chiefly mutational work today is the interaction of the global with the local in political culture, in law and legal pluralism, and in society as a whole" all in an attempt to bring order and harmony among his "subjects".Furthermore, the use of endogenous methods of conflict resolution reflects the centrality of the community from which the fundamental needs of members are satisfied (Karbo & Mutisi, 2008).
There are examples in Africa that show practical results that these methodologies have produced.Taking Ghana into consideration, all the established traditional authorities in Ghana have, in one way or the other, resolved conflicts to the extent that His Royal Majesty Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, Asantehene (Ashanti King), in his keynote address at the Fourth African Development Forum in Addis Ababa on 12 October 2004, pointed out that: We have sat in council with chiefs, sub-chiefs and elders and dispensed justice to the satisfaction of all.Applying the norms of customary law, recognized under the 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution of Ghana, the king or chief settles all disputes that come before him.In the past five years, following an appeal I made to all concerned, nearly five hundred cases that would otherwise be still sitting in the books of western law courts and dragging on intractably have been settled amicably before my traditional court.These were land, chieftaincy succession, criminal and civil cases.Peace has returned to communities whose development was halted, and families have been reunited in several instances.(Economic Commission for Africa Conference Report, 2007) It is absolutely true that the Asante Kingdom is one of the perfectly structured and respected traditional institutions in Africa.This development has placed the Asantehene in a good stead to dispense justice without any dissensions, and lessons can be drawn from it.Going by this, our kings and chiefs are very powerful and will remain relevant to collaborate effectively with the formal political institutions to promote peace, provided they are protected by the state government.

Western conflict resolution mechanisms
As part of good governance within the context of democracy, states are mandated to provide security, peace, and justice to their citizens.In pursuance of this, institutions of trust are by law created to provide such invaluable services.Considering the numerous contested interests that people and groups in Africa have, many of them rely on these institutions of trust to resolve such interests.This point is well made by Annan (2013) to the effect that the majority of the population relies on the state to provide social justice and peace through its formal institutions such as the police, military, parliament, the judiciary, and other law enforcement organisations.
Notwithstanding the above, it is important to make the point that apart from the judiciary that constitutionally has the power to adjudicate and resolve conflicts, many of the formal institutions only exercise preventive powers.In many instances, ad hoc commissions and committees are set up to ascertain the facts in the conflict between contending parties, but the outcomes of such inquiries are not necessarily binding.The judiciary, as a conflict resolution institution, however, has been able to overcome the non-compliance with the outcomes of commissions and committees of inquiry since the refusal to obey the outcome of court proceedings amounts to contempt of court.
Again, putting Ghana in context, for over two decades, the judiciary has used the courts to settle disputes, although many of the outcomes have been a zero-sum scenario, leaving other parties unhappy.An example is the 2012 presidential election petition in which President John Dramani Mahama was declared the winner of the election against the NPP Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo irrespective of the voting irregularities.This weakness is overcome through the reliance on the general provisions of the Courts Act 1993 (Act 459) that allow the promotion of out-of-court settlements, and as part of ensuring quick resolution of disputes and the promotion of sustainable peace, the ADR Act, 2010 (Act 798), which has its background in customary law, empowers the courts to facilitate conflict resolution processes.It is, therefore, important to explore how this opportunity has been exploited in Nandom to resolve communal conflicts.

Methods and materials
The study was conducted in eight communities in the Nandom Municipal Area (see Figure 1).The Nandom Municipal Assembly was first created as a Municipal Area out of the then Lawra Municipal Area in 2012 through LI 2102 as part of government's efforts to bring development and governance to the doorsteps of its citizens (elevated to Municipal Status on 14 February 2020, through LI 2102).The Municipal Area is bounded to the East and South by the Lambussie and Lawra Municipal Areas, respectively, and to the North and West by the Republic of Burkina Faso.The 88 predominantly rural communities that constitute the Municipal Area and are located in four Town and Area Councils-Nandom Town Council, Ko, Puffien, and Baselble Area Councils-are spread over a total landmass of 404.6 square km.The landmass represents 3.1% of the region's total land area.According to a Ghana Statistical Service report (2021), the population of Nandom stand as 51,328.An estimated 86% of the Municipal Area's population live in rural areas.The population density of approximately 114 per square kilometre makes the Municipality the most densely populated settlement in the Upper West Region.This makes the area prone to land conflicts because of its limited supply.

Study design
The study adopted a qualitative approach to research using key informant interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) in four communities.Qualitative study seeks to understand people's experiences from within and holds that research can never be objectively done from the outside (Stake, 1995).The case study is of particular importance in this study because it grants the researchers an opportunity to do an in-depth analysis of the traditional and western forms of conflict resolution and the synergies therefrom (Hartley, 2004;Stake, 1995;Yin, 2009;Zainal Abiddin, 2007).The case study approach has again helped elucidate the perceived interest of the various stakeholders (traditional and western institutions) in the municipality and the need for stakeholder collaboration for sustainable conflict resolution and management.

Sampling and data collection procedures
The study was conducted in eight communities in the Nandom Municipality.The eight communities were selected based on three criteria: 1) proximity to the municipality; 2) possible resource use conflict; and 3) functional traditional authorities and formal institutions that support in the resolution of conflicts.Based on these criteria, eight communities were purposively selected out of 88 communities for the study across the four zones (Nandom Town Council, Ko, Puffien, and Baselble Area Councils) in the municipality.The interest in the traditional and western institutions in the study is to ensure more balanced responses that will support the study.Their participation in the study provides in-depth information on the need for multiple actors in conflict resolution.The study used a stakeholder purposive sampling approach to select 27 respondents from the traditional institutional leaders (chiefs, tengandem) and from technocrats working in western adjudicatory institutions that are of particular importance to the study.The in-depth interview approach was used to collect information from eight practicing lawyers, two court administrators, the Director of Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), eight chiefs, and eight tengandem from the study communities.Boyce and Neale ( 2006) described the in-depth interview as a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intensive individual interviews with a small number of respondents to explore their perspectives on a particular phenomenon, which in this case is the hybrid of traditional and western conflict resolution in the Nandom Municipality.The in-depth interviews are centred on respondents' perspectives on the traditional and formal/western political adjudicatory institutions in order to harmonise mechanisms by which recurrent communal conflicts are resolved, particularly in Nandom Traditional Area in Ghana.FGDs were also conducted in the four politicl ones with saaaaaaaame traaaditionaal leaders with their elders to enrich the data collected.To assist in the data collection, field assistants were trained to support in the data collection processes.All the field assistants used for the data collection were first-degree holders and were very familiar with the research etiquettes.
For ethical consideration, the authors obtained informed consent from each participant before the interview.In addition, all participants were informed about the context of the study and the anonymous nature of information given.

Sources of data
Data were obtained from diverse sources for the study.Of particular importance to the study was the information obtained from the traditional institutional leaders (chiefs, tengandem) and technocrats working in formal adjudicatory institutions. .

Data analyses
The study adopted the thematic approach to qualitative data analysis (Attride Stirling, 2001) with emphasis on narrative data analysis.To implement this approach, responses from the respondents, which were audio recorded, were transcribed by the second and the third authors.Transcriptions, together with field notes that were compiled by the authors during the fieldwork, were independently read by each of the authors thoroughly.The independent reading of the transcripts helped the individual authors familiarize themselves with the transcripts for codes and themes identification (Braun & Clarke, 2016).Again, the individual readings helped identify individual codes and themes, which were put together for assessment and final identification of codes and themes.To ensure credibility, reliability, validity, and accuracy of the study that reflects the responses given by respondents during the study, validation was done with the respondents in eight communities.The purpose of the validation was to build trustworthiness between the researchers and the respondents on the dynamics of collaborative conflict resolution among stakeholders.

Introduction
From the study, the formal institutional adjudicatory system and that of the informal adjudicatory system operate independently of each other and the harmony needed between them to resolve conflicts in a holistic manner is not strong enough.To overcome this gap, there is an absolute need to engender institutional integration for the two institutions to complement one another for sustainable conflict resolution.For sustainable resolution of communal conflicts, there is a need

Score Ranks
That the modern court sees the traditional courts as inferior 8 1st That the traditional institutions see the modern court as a threat to their powers 6 2nd That the 4th Republican constitution of Ghana has contributed to the operational separation of the institutions 5 3rd That social change has contributed to less familiarity with traditional modes of conflict resolution and a preference for modern courts conflict resolution

4th
Traditional leaders are unwilling to work with the modern court due to alleged hidden personal interests

4th
That there is no framework developed to facilitate the integration 2 6th Source: Field Survey, 2022.
to advocate for partnership between the western and indigenous courts as evidenced by Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) (Awedoba, 2010).This study sought to achieve the required partnership objective through the review of existing policies in Ghana that have created space for the adjudicatory institutions to function, and by constructing the ideal framework required for synergy building between the two institutions to operate side by side.

Factors Influencing/affecting institutional integration in conflict resolution
For the successful resolution of conflicts and to have absolute peace and order as observed from the framework constructed, the traditional and formal institutions are required to build synergies by leveraging their relative strengths for integration and working towards eliminating their respective system outliers.This expectation from the study is, however, unrealistic.Through an in-depth interview, the 27 study respondents identified six impeding factors responsible for the nonintegration of the traditional and formal institutions in the resolution of conflicts.In addition, the interviewees were asked to rank the six identified impeding factors and interesting results emerged as shown in Table 1 (below).
From the rankings in Table 1, the respondents ranked the modern courts as superior to the traditional courts.This was affirmed by Ko Naa, who intimated that; the formal adjudicatory institutions see themselves more important than the informal courts because of all the attention they get from the government to enable them function as expected.
It was also observed that the majority of the chiefs were unlettered and generally view lawyers and judges as a group of people who belong to privileged positions of the society and whose actions are rarely questioned by the traditional institutions.By probing further, it was revealed that an inferiority complex exists with the informal courts vis-à-vis the modern courts due to the fact that traditional leaders do not need to have formal education to manage the adjudicatory structures.In-depth interview with a Regional staff of CHRAJ and a lawyer indicated that the traditional adjudicatory processes are slippery grounds for many law practitioners in Ghana because they are not taught in the law schools and the procedure at that level is not known.
As posited by Ntsebeza (2003), the authority is bestowed upon traditional leaders to shepherd traditional communities against unorthodox and orthodox sieges directed at destroying African nations.In this vein, traditional leaders are leaders in charge of the lives of the people and the safety of the nation.They are leaders who rule and govern their societies on the basis of traditional practices and the values of their respective societies.
Hence, for the fear of threats to their powers to govern their subjects as tradition demands, traditional leaders, as reported from group discussions in Puffien and Nandom Township, had very strong views objecting to merging with the formal adjudicatory institutions.This is an obvious expectation from the chiefs because, within the context of culture and tradition, the chiefs have enormous powers that are not shared or challenged.Integrating these powers with that of actors in the formal realm implies that aspects of their powers will either be done away with or shared, which ultimately will lead to their loss of absolute control over their subjects.However, the fear of the chiefs relative to the potential threats to their powers is addressed in Article 270 (1) and (2) of the Fourth Republican Constitution of Ghana, except that the majority of them are not aware of such provisions.
In Ghana, chieftaincy and the sanctity of the traditional political institution, as established by customary law, is guaranteed in Article 270 (1) and (2) of the same constitution as follows: it takes away the power of the government or parliament to control chiefs or reduce the dignity or honour of chiefs.It confirms the existence of chieftaincy as an institution.(Brobbey, 2008) Respondents identified the Fourth (4th) 1992 Republican constitution of Ghana as contributing to the operational separation of the institutions.In an in-depth interview with the Paramount Chief of Nandom, he indicated that Article 270 of the Constitution of Ghana made provisions for customary laws and the establishment of the Regional Houses of Chiefs, but fell short of demonstrating how the institution could be supported to develop its judiciary system.Nonetheless, a literature search and observation from the adjudicatory processes at the National House of Chiefs, Regional House of Chiefs, and the Traditional Councils shows that each of the levels has a judiciary committee with some members who are legally minded and are in charge of the adjudication of disputes.The response from a divisional chief from Baselble community was that, "the constitution contains too much colonial literature as against our traditional value".To validate these opinions from the Chiefs, reference was made to the Constitution to confirm that less emphasis was placed on traditional governance.For instance, the Constitution only made a strong provision for the institution of chieftaincy.Article 270 (1) states that "the institution of chieftaincy, together with its traditional council as established by customary law and usage, is hereby guaranteed".
Continuing from there, Article 273 (1) states that: The National House of Chiefs shall have appellate jurisdiction in any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy which has been determined by the Regional House of Chiefs in a region, from which appellate jurisdiction there shall be an appeal to the Supreme Court, with the leave of the National House of Chiefs or the Supreme Court.
From Article 270 to 277, all the clauses and sub-clauses concentrated on the sanctity of the chieftaincy institution without touching on the judiciary process within the context of the traditional and cultural dictates and worldviews of the people.Responses from lawyers in the judiciary system and academia agreed that the Constitution does not contain generic basic laws for the traditional court procedures and practices of Ghanaians.It is clear that the Fourth (4th) 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana is the major regulatory reference document governing every Ghanaian.However, in the context of this study, there is a lacuna identified in the document because it failed to spell out in ensuing chapters, clauses, and sub-clauses how to integrate the operations of traditional and formal adjudicatory institutions in conflict resolution.
It emerged from FGDs with elders in four study communities that social change contributed to there being less familiarity with traditional modes of conflict resolution with more preference for modern courts' conflict resolution mechanisms.The study revealed that Ghanaians have a taste for foreign cultures to the detriment of their own culture, and this trend has contributed to the non-familiarity with the Ghanaian traditional practices.In support of the effect of social change on the traditional practice vis-a-vis conflict resolution, FGD participants in Baselbe zone unanimously agreed that; the crave for wealth by the youth, modernization, western education and the uncultured immoral lifestyles and corrupted attitudes of the elders in recent times have contributed greatly towards children's refusal to listen to their parents.They further stressed that, these shortfalls have also led to elders no longer meeting to discuss pertinent issues of the community or even their households.This view concurs with that of Kariuki (2015, p. 19) in that, "modernity has had its fair share of negative impacts on African justice systems.In pre-colonial period, elders were the rich and wealthiest people as they held land and livestock.Their wealth and respect enabled them to be independent during dispute resolution processes.However, in modern societies, younger people have accumulated wealth, and in most cases, older people rely on the younger people.This has enabled dispute resolution by elders to be affected by bribery, corruption and favouritism".Some of the specific modern trends identified by discussants across the study communities as impediments to the progressive transformation of culture and its integration with the formal institutions, among others, include the western educational influence on the mind set of Ghanaians, which makes them see their own traditional practices as outmoded.To such people, the best place for one to seek justice is the courtroom where there is a judge, defending lawyers and prosecutors.They believe the influence of foreign religions has also led to the people seeing the traditional religion and its spiritual methodologies in conflict resolution as outmoded/archaic and evil.These views agree with that of Radar and Karimi (2008) that, "the emergence and appreciation of modern civilization has greatly diminished the role and credibility of customary law.More and more people are turning to modern formal courts in solving their problems".Radar et al. further contend that, "The educated elite, Christians, Muslims and town dwellers regard customary law as archaic and barbaric and argue that it should be discarded.Such kind of thinking has greatly diminished the credibility and relevance of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in the present day Samburu community" in North-East Kenya (Radar & Karimi, 2008) In addition, there is a clear existence of over-bearing powers of the formal court system over the traditional courts.In many cases, the rulings of the traditional courts are set aside by the formal courts.This notion is consistent with that of Pimentel (2010) that "when it is appealed [cases], the very structure of appeals formally and officially asserts state dominance over customary law . . . .This feature of the Superior State Approach inevitably undermines the dignity that many of these institutions deserve; simultaneously depriving them of their relevance in the communities they serve" (Pimentel, 2010).Besides, the Fourth Republican Constitution of Ghana debarred the traditional courts from handling criminal cases, and traditional leaders are unwilling to work with modern courts due to perceived personal hidden interests.
In-depth interviews with the traditional leaders pointed to the fact that in many cases, traditional mechanisms in conflict resolution requires sacrificing to the gods, invoking the spirit of the dead and curses, among others.In their view, "strangers" are not supposed to witness some of these processes.Besides that, practitioners within the formal realm are likely to accuse them of human rights violation, and as noted by Pimentel, traditional law and traditional values, in many cultures, violate modern and otherwise widely accepted principles of [Human Rights] gender equality or child protection (Pimentel, 2010).Hence, they could easily be branded as human rights violators and satanic if they operated together.To avoid such clashes of procedures, they prefer to work separately from the formal institutions.
Further interviews with some legal practitioners revealed that some traditional leaders are not willing to have a merger since they see their role in conflict resolution as a source of income and power and will want to protect it.Even though the views of the traditional leaders appeared weird, that is part of the traditional system, and unfortunately, this very system, according to some of the interviewees, is a closed one so you can only get to know the details of the practices if you are an "insider".Some of these reasons advanced for the separation, means that there cannot be selective integration of functions until such a time as a framework of full integration is agreed upon.
Another factor raised was the lack of a jurisprudential framework developed to facilitate the operational integration of the two institutions.Having a functional integration requires broad stakeholder discourses to develop an acceptable framework to that effect.In that respect, a divisional chief interviewed in Ko has called for a review of Ghana's 1992 4th Republican Constitution to create the enabling environment through an amendment for the two systems to be integrated.
An equally important factor impeding the possible integration as observed among the traditional leaders (Chiefs and Tengandem) interviewed was illiteracy.The findings indicated that the formal realm of adjudication involves educated experts who are able to explain and analyse the law according to its letter and spirit.This is in contrast to the traditional setting, which is dominated by people with no formal education and chiefs whose judgments are often based on common sense and not strictly based on the dictates of their cultural values.The observed lack of formal education among actors in the traditional institutions was similarly addressed by Knierzinger (2011) who observed that, "Throughout Africa, large numbers of people who are active actors in the [Traditional] political struggle, in the political institutions and so forth are [were] illiterate or barely educated" (Hagan, 1995).
Besides the education aspect, the lack of knowledge transfer of the traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution into the mainstream architecture of Ghana's Judiciary Service is another impeding factor.From the perspective of the lawyers interviewed, the traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution within customary law have not been codified to be mainstreamed due to lack of expertise at the local level and "non-certification of traditional legal practitioners" to facilitate this process.
These findings correspond with Joke's (2011) opinion that "customary laws used in the adjudication of cases are seldom codified and are flexible enough to allow elders the possibility of adjusting rulings in order to accommodate particular circumstances" (Joke, 2011).This void implies that reference to precedents and practices of customary law and adjudication is absent, making the combined resolution of cases impossible.In addition, both key informants from the traditional and formal realms acknowledged that rampant chieftaincy conflicts will make it difficult to have a sustained institutional integration with the view that such conflicts reduce the authority of affected chiefs, which will naturally render them impotent.
Although majority of the key informants acknowledged that combining the efforts of the two institutions could yield more positive results, it was a surprise to note from legal luminary respondents that bringing the institutions together now was not feasible unless the Fourth Republican Constitution of Ghana, the Courts Act 1993 (Act 459), Chieftaincy Act 2009, and other relevant regulations are reviewed to make room for the integration.A direct question was asked of the lawyers, namely: Do you think judges in court and traditional leaders should combine their operations to resolve conflicts?Varied views were expressed by lawyers, including differences in procedures and processes, which make it extremely difficult to have judges and chiefs working together to resolve conflicts.Expertise and competences equally differ.To them, "interpreting the law is not simple reasoning but requires deeper and technical analysis of the law and in procedure".This finding agrees with that of Roberts and Palmer (2005) that, "with the ideals of formal justice systems, which include independent and technically correct decisions, expert professional skill, impartial judges, fair procedures and the observance of due process" are critical elements in the interpretation of the law.These elements, however, are absent in the traditional court procedures, and it is apt to make the point that the absence of these elements gives traditional leaders the flexibility to handle cases in different circumstances geared towards correcting perpetrators of disharmony in society, and mending the relationship of persons in dispute.
Some of the conflicts that arise are complex and require some formal training to enable one to resolve the issues.Unfortunately, there is no institution for the training of traditional judges/ lawyers and "no certification of traditional legal practitioners" exists to facilitate this process.In addition, except for Section 55 of the Courts Act, the current legal framework does not make adequate provision for the joint operation of the judges and traditional chiefs in conflict resolution.
Other reasons given against the functional integration of the institutions were that there will be a problem as to which authority (law) to be used, that is, whether the traditional laws or the formal ones and which one should be superior to the other.The chief of Baselble added that, "working together with the formal courts will reduce their authority and that chiefs are also considered as opinion leaders in the community, and their voices are traditionally sacrosanct and must be obeyed".His fears are as a result of the "emergence and appreciation of modern civilization [which] has greatly diminished the role and credibility of customary law.More and more people are turning to modern formal courts in solving their problems" (Radar & Karimi, 2008).For them to be roped into a secular society to work with actors in a formal institution will erode this very sanctity bestowed on them and may get them entangled in conflict of interest situations that will impede their impartiality with their community members.
Considering the views of actors in both formal and informal institutions, it is obvious that each has good reasons why they should continue to operate independently of each other.The two institutions could complement, ignore, or frustrate each other.However, the fact that they recognise the potential benefits that could accrue if they combine their efforts implies that it is possible to create the necessary enabling environment for their functional integration to promote sustained peace.

Existing regulations in Ghana that enable functional synergy building
An in-depth interview with informant legal practitioners and the Paramount of Nandom Naa, Naa (Dr.) Imoro Puobe Chiir VIII on existing regulations that enable the Traditional and Western spheres of adjudication to build synergy for conflict resolution revealed some compelling laws and rules in Ghana that support the two institutions to function side by side.These laws and practices commonly identified by the key informants include the following: (1) The 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana that contains some of the underlisted (2) Chieftaincy Act of 2009.
(3) Courts Act 1993 (Act 459) as amended.Decisions of Superior Courts that allow the promotion of out-of-court settlements.Also, Section 39(c) of the Act integrating the judicial committees of the National, Regional, and Traditional Councils as part of the lower courts of Ghana.
(4) ADR Act 2010 (Act 798), which is an effective mechanism for the resolution of cases outside of the normal courts without each of the parties involved having the feeling that they have lost it all.The ADR mechanism recognises the key role played by traditional leaders in dispute resolution.Its procedures are, therefore, amenable to traditional knowledge systems and application in conflict resolution (6) The rule of natural justice with audi alteram partem Rule (fair hearing etc.) and emo judex in causa sua (prevention of any individual, court, or tribunal from making a decision on a case that is essentially their own) as main tenets.These tenets in law take into consideration the right to counsel of one's choice; principles of fairness, equity, and equality; protection from discrimination on grounds of gender, ethnic origin, social, and economic status, etc.
• The right to counsel of one's choice.
• Principles of fairness, equity, and equality.
• Protection from discrimination on grounds of gender, ethnic origin, social and economic status, etc.
They indicated that although the above regulations exist, in practice they lamented that their invocation is dependent on circumstances.Each of the courts recommends cases to each other as alternative means for resolution as a matter of convenience and not as consciously planned to have the two courts function together.Therefore, no legal framework has been created since the dawn of judicial pluralistic jurisprudence in Ghana, as is the case with all the four Republican Constitutions facilitating for the formal and informal courts to operate together.

Policy framework for hybrid conflict resolution
For a hybrid conflict resolution process to be effective, there is the need to have a policy framework that supports it.In the absence of a clear policy framework, the synergy needed to be built around the formal and traditional adjudicatory institutions is absent.Suggestions received from law practitioners and traditional leaders on some of the processes that could lead to a policy framework for hybrid conflict resolution are presented thus: Interviews with lawyers and other key informants: all interviewees unanimously agreed that there is the need for effective engagement with traditional rulers on formal litigation processes for successful adjudication of cases.
As the least and very important gatekeeper, family heads were also identified to be given occasional orientation on conflict resolutions to enable them to settle family disputes successfully.In an interview, an Appeal Court Judge opined that, "the operationalisation of an ADR centre will have to be activated in Nandom and as a functional policy, it needs to be resourced and decentralised from the national level to the local communities and not just left hanging in the law books".As part of the synergy building to firm up the view of this respondent, there is the need "for partnership between the western and indigenous courts as evidenced by Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)" (Odotei & Awedoba, 2006).
It was also suggested that there is a need for the various state actors in conflict resolution to come together to harmonise their efforts in matters of conflict prevention and resolution.Responses among the lawyers and traditional leaders were that currently, the adjudicatory processes at both levels of institutions, particularly the western judicial courts, are affected by political interference.It is, therefore, necessary to develop an operative system to freely work without interference.It was suggested that the operations of the National Peace Council be established in Nandom and other communities to help reduce conflicts, especially the over nine years recurrent ones like that of the Orthodox Muslim impasse of who becomes the next Chief Imam in Nandom.

Towards a framework for building synergy in conflict resolution
From the study, it is obvious that the formal or inherited adjudicatory institution has, over the years, operated independently of the traditional courts.It has also been observed that there have been successes and weaknesses of both institutions with respect to their operations.The Upper West Regional Director of CHRAJ and two private legal practitioners interviewed were of the view that the inability of the traditional and formal courts to come together to resolve conflicts within an acceptable framework in the midst of available legal policies is the reason for the long years of neglect by various governments to equip them to work effectively to guarantee peace.Their position aptly supports the views of Mawire (2008) who holds the view that: Various institutions and instruments have been developed at the local, regional and national levels to regulate and resolve conflicts of various types in Africa.However, they are ineffective to deal with issues related to human rights, democracy, and good governance because of the underdeveloped institutional frameworks and structures, weak early warning systems and risk assessment capacities.
Notwithstanding the operational separations, the study revealed that constitutional and legal policies exist in Ghana that recognise and facilitate the functional relations of the formal and traditional courts towards building synergy to sustainably resolve communal conflicts.However, for a firmer and sustainable synergy to be built for the two levels of institutions to work together, those in legal practice, in particular, suggested that efforts must be made in various regards.
Generally, responses among lawyers indicated that there should be legislation enactment to support the coming together of the binary institutions to adjudicate on communal disputes.The reason being that if there is legislation, it will bind the powers that be to enhance the operation of these two institutions without prejudice or bias.In addition, a body with representatives from all relevant stakeholders needs to be identified to serve with the ADR Centres (panel system in hearing) in a decentralized manner and that they be equipped with the necessary resources to operate.As discovered in the findings, the selection of panel members at the moment appears to be skewed to one side-the literates only, thereby denying the opportunity of a large portion of the populace that perhaps is endowed with traditional ideas and can contribute significantly to the better running of these two institutions.However, not all courts have the ADR practitioners, as was the case in the Nandom District Court.
In an interview with a former Member of Parliament and a lwyer, from Nandom Constituency he intimated that: there was the need to make legal anthropology a core subject in all law schools and faculties.This will enable students and other actors in both traditional and western law systems to learn customary and traditional laws and practices that could guide them in the resolution of conflict.
Counsel to the Upper West Regional House of Chiefs was likewise of the opinion that there was a need to intensify basic training on legal practice for the traditional sector that has not witnessed any formal training on para-legal issues.Many traditional heads, especially in Nandom as observed, adjudicate cases without recourse to the fundamental rights of victims in relation to freedom of speech, aversion to formal courts, appeal, and the like.Source: Author Aasoglenang's Construct (2020).

SUSTAINABLE CONFLICT RESOLUTION
The findings from the study further indicated that the position arrived at by well-trained traditional leaders in court must be accepted as good and final judgment.The magistrate in Nandom, however, threw a caution on leaving traditional leaders to determine cases to their finality since the tendency of the abuse of "audi alteram partem" and "nemo judex in causa sua" rules are high at that level.That is to say, fair hearing of parties may not be guaranteed.This affirms Radar and Karimi (2008, p. 80) assertion that, the council of elders of the Samburu community in North-East Kenya meet in their own courts to hear a case and "after listening to the conflicting parties, the elders convene a mini meeting, consult, and agree on the verdict.The decision is announced and blessed and the elders leave the venue immediately.No appeal is tolerated after the sitting.If the offender disregards the court's decision, the elders may curse him or her".
Further findings revealed that there was a need for concise legislation that gives formal recognition to traditional rulers in the adjudication of cases and the acceptance of rulings by other courts except in matters that may be beyond certain levels.From the perspective of the Upper West Regional Director of CHRAJ, the Court's Act 1993 (Act 459) sections 72 and 73, for instance, empowers the courts to encourage and facilitate out-of-court settlements in civil suits and criminal cases, respectively, provided parties are willing to give their consent.However, it is worth noting that not all criminal cases can be granted such settlements.Cases including murder, rape, defilement, narcotics, and the like are examples.A private legal practitioner suggested that the institutional framework to build synergy in conflict resolution should operate in a collaborative and corporative manner devoid of competitive and antagonistic forms and practices.In other words, there must be compliance with all laid down rules and principles, respecting the dignity of all parties and affording each party a fair hearing.
Drawing lessons from the theoretical review and responses from the research respondents with respect to institutional integration for conflict resolution, a Framework for Institutional Synergy Building for Sustainable Conflict Resolution (Figure 2) is adopted to guide the functional operations of the binary adjudicatory institutions.Therefore, the conception of this Conceptual Framework for Synergy Building to resolve conflict is anchored on two major independent spheres, which include the formal system of conflict resolution and the traditional methods with their respective cascading components.The niche of this study, which is expressed in this conceptual framework, is the synergy that the positive variables of both formal and traditional modes of conflict resolution could be harnessed to complement each other.
The sustainable resolution of communal conflicts needs to advocate for partnership between the western and indigenous courts, as evidenced by Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) (Awedoba, 2010).Again, as expressed in the study outcome, to have sustained resolved conflicts in Africa and among the Dagara ethnic groups in Ghana requires synergy building of efforts between the traditional adjudicatory institutions and the formal institutions.Currently, the context for adjudication of cases is uncoordinated and independently adjudicated/resolved by the binary institutions irrespective of the outcomes.
From the study's perspective and in reference to Figure 2, there are two scenario outcomes in both traditional and formal adjudicatory procedures: first, is the Support Systems that lead to successful outcomes that are termed Resolution Motivational Factors; and the second is the System Outliers that contributes to unsuccessful outcomes of conflict resolution, also termed Resolution Demotivational Factors.Building synergy around the support system by the two adjudicatory institutions is expected to overcome the system outliers and lead to sustainable conflict resolution in a collaborative manner.
In sum, the framework consciously attempts to avoid the outliers of the two streams that have been the bane of unsuccessful resolution of communal conflicts in Nandom and many communities in African countries.It offers the opportunity to overcome the weaknesses of the two realms.

Conclusion and policy recommendations
The study concludes that there is separate existence of legal pluralistic institutions in the context of traditional and formal conflict adjudicatory processes and, in that respect, there are several unresolved conflicts that are related to land ownership, chieftaincy, funerals, marriages, and common pool resources despite the many strengths of the traditional and formal institutions.This is due to the inherent impeding operational factors that make it difficult for them to practically function as a whole.Therefore, the interactive resolution of conflicts within a defined framework as depicted in the conceptual framework (Figure 2) enhances sustainable synergy building between the binary institutions and, ultimately, everlasting conflict resolution.Indeed, the sustainability of resolved conflicts will require the combined efforts of the two institutions in a collaborative manner.
On the basis of the conclusion, there is a need for a strong policy shift for both the traditional and formal adjudicatory institutions to operate within an agreed policy framework as suggested above and in tandem with the resolution of communal conflicts.Therefore, as a matter of policy, this requires a review and strengthening of constitutional provisions on traditional conflict resolution by the Attorney General and Minister of Justice to enable the two institutions to work both cooperatively and collaboratively.The study also recommends strengthening human and structural weaknesses that make it impossible for institutional integration and operation.In the light of this, the regulatory law authorities and the legislature should enact deliberate but relevant legislation to support the coming together of the binary institutions to adjudicate on communal disputes.That is to say, where there is legislation, it will compel the powers that be to enhance these two institutions to operate without prejudice or bias, which has been the bane of these adjudicatory bodies, making them unable to bring conflict cases to finality.Again, in view of the study, a panel system in hearings is needed.Both the Judicial Service of the formal institution and the Judiciary Committee of the National House of Chiefs need to facilitate cases before the traditional council(s) and the formal courts to be judged by lawyers from their respective ends.Encouraging and enhancing this kind of integration should be the driving force for synergy building.To achieve this feat, traditional leaders such as chiefs, tengandem, and key elders/ opinion leaders must be given basic formal training on adjudicatory processes to make them more effective and efficient in the dispensation of justice and as part of institutional functional synergy building.There is also the need to intensify para-legal training for the traditional sector to appreciate the practice of law and be able to assist lawyers in court to discharge their duties creditably.As established in the study, almost all the traditional rulers have enough discretionary powers in passing judgement without recourse to the fundamental Human Rights of victims.
Finally, lawyers are unable to collaborate and cooperate with traditional leaders because their respective orientation to the law and adjudication is different.The lawyers are not so much exposed to indigenous knowledge systems of conflict resolution due to differences in customary practices as the traditional rulers who are equally not trained in the formal types of court administration and justice dispensation.To avoid all these challenges, there is the need to expose actors of both institutions to legal anthropology as a core subject in all law schools and faculties.This will enable students and other actors in both traditional and formal law systems to study customary and traditional laws and practices that guide the resolution of conflicts.This initiative is extremely important and requires that all law schools and faculties develop curricula that will afford students the opportunity to study basic customary laws and practices when handling conflict resolution in each given cultural setting.This study outcome could be a reference guide.

Figure
Figure 1.Map of Nandom Municipal showing the study communities.Source: Authors' Construct, 2023.