Bandits’ Struggle for Survival and its Humanitarian Impacts in Zamfara State, Nigeria

Abstract Over time, the conflict between farmers and herdsmen has intensified and transformed into banditry in Zamfara state. While literature underscores the causational and transformational issues, how desperate attempts of the bandits to survive led to fierce upsurges in attacks in the state has not been extensively explored. Hence, this paper examines the bandits’ desperation for survival and its impacts on the state. The paper adopts constructionist thematic analysis, and explanatory sequential methods was applied while presenting and analyzing the data from secondary sources and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). Predicated on eco-survivalism, the bandits’ desperate attempts to survive were due to the competing challenge from the vigilantes and the government to eliminate them and their source of illegitimate wealth. They created more ferocious reinvigoration to accomplish their survival goals. It has upscaled deterioration in the attacks and the humanitarian crises in the state. Many lives were lost, kidnapping skyrocketed, and more properties were destroyed, with appalling human displacements. The consequences were a significant drop in agricultural production and loss of livelihood sources, increased health challenges, and the devastating proliferation of out-of-school children. This paper suggests a gradual confidence building through effective security governance for the bandits interested in reducing their desperation while rehabilitating their livelihood sources to ensure peaceful coexistence.


Introduction
Banditry has caused apparent unquantifiable damage to both life and properties in northern Nigeria (Okoli & Ogayi, 2018). The horrible effects of banditry on political and socioeconomic sectors depend on the internecine attacks by bandits and counterattacks from the vigilantes. Many states affected by banditry in northwestern Nigeria struggled to avoid the damaging roles of banditry, especially loss of lives, kidnappings, and property destruction. Some states have strong institutions capable of reducing the impacts of internecine attacks. In contrast, others, such as Zamfara, have relatively weak institutions that could not exercise meaningful control over the spread of banditry in the state. Scholars often investigated the damaging roles of banditry, especially in north-central and northwest regions (Okoli & Atelhe, 2014;Okoli & Ugwu, 2019). However, they concentrated on the causational factors while emphasizing the role of ecological factors and farmers-herdsmen conflict that drive militancy (Okoli & Ogayi, 2018). Another focus of the literature revolves around the damaging role and opportunities the ungoverned spaces provide to the bandits (Ojo, 2020;Okoli & Abubakar, 2021) and conclude that ungoverned spaces, political injustices, and weak judicial system are detrimental to the regions' developmental efforts (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2022;Sackflame & Omitola, 2022).
However, previous literature has recognized that today's security challenge is unprecedented in Nigeria's history; neither banditry nor the related problem of farmer-herder rivalries are recent developments. The northwest region of the country has long been a trans-Saharan trade route, making it a desirable area for intending criminals. Consequently, the decision of Lord Lugard to combine northern and southern Nigeria in 1914 was partially motivated by the desire to stop bandits' activity in the northern region (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2022). Despite that, the region's continuous impoverishment kept soaring, while insecurity increasingly impacts with severe consequences leading to one of the biggest protracted humanitarian crises in the country.
Zamfara state has been suffering internecine attacks by bandits for years. However, these attacks continue to become a global concern, especially looking at the impacts of bandits' desperation for survival that led to fierce upsurges in attacks in the state. Consequently, this paper examines the bandits' desperation for survival and its impacts on the state. The study adopts an eco-survivalist framework to examine the bandits' desperation for survival, as exemplified by the upsurge in their attacks. On this note, previous literature emphasized the changing pattern of eco-violence (Olumba, 2022;Olumba et al., 2022) and the suspected alliance of bandits with insurgents in this region (Barnett et al., 2022;Ojewale, 2021;Ojo, 2020;Ojo et al., 2023;Okoli & Nwangwu, 2022). The findings of these papers indicate that the mutual exchange of technical information, access to military-grade weapons, and connections among bandits and insurgent groups in the region has led to an increase in the sophistication of the bandits and an increase in their adverse effects on innocent civilians and the government.
By considering banditry as an eco-survivalist struggle that amounts to intense desperation for survival, we can better comprehend why the state is experiencing soaring death fatalities and immeasurable damages, such as high kidnapping incidences, large destruction of properties, and massive displacements of people. Rather than restricting our arguments to criminality (Osasona, 2023) and mutual exchanges between bandits and insurgents  alone, this paper extended the argument by specifically identifying the desperation for survival as the cause of the surge in the bandits' internecine attacks and the increasing humanitarian crisis in the state. Only recently, data from Zamfara State Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs (2022) reveals an almost 196% increase in death fatalities between 2011 and 2018 and a 1498% increase in the rate of kidnappings for ransom in the same period. In addition, the report of the Center for Democratic Development and Training (CEDDERT) equally reveals the dislocation and migration of pastoralists and farmers, leading to a sharp drop in animal and grain production, with a 227% rise in the price of maize alone (Mohammed et al., 2016). Therefore, this paper examines the bandits' desperation for survival, exemplified by the upsurge in internecine attacks and its impacts on the state. We used FGDs and sequential explanatory methods to address the study's pertinent objective. Accordingly, subsequent sections discuss the conceptual clarification, theoretical premise, and the emergence of banditry in the state. The next section presents the methodology, followed by findings and discussions. The last section concludes the paper with suggestions for further research.

The concept of Banditry in Nigeria
Scholars have consistently debated the term banditry, what it is, and how it impacts humanity. However, the first generation of debates primarily focused on Eric Hobsbawm's "social banditry" (Kheng, 1985). They focused more on defining bandits' character and capability to challenge the state and its institutions. Despite that, there seemed to be varying degrees of conceptualizations that have constituted even more challenges than solving the previous ones. To this end, conceptualizing banditry within the context of this paper would no doubt create a better framework for understanding its consequences for effective analysis purposes. Thus, this section explores the concept of banditry and focuses specifically on the experience of northwestern Nigeria.
Available literature indicates that the concept of banditry has long been studied. Scholars have had different exchanges regarding the bandits and what they do. Bandits have been identified with several names depending on the context within which they were placed. For instance, initially, bandits were considered primitive rebels (Hobsbawm, 1959) and were also identified as bandits due to operational changes within social class relationships (Hobsbawm, 1981). Consequently, bandits were identified as members of a particular social class working antagonistically with another opposing class, especially elites (Kheng, 1985). Hobsbawm was originally the first to use "social banditry" in describing the activities of the bandits (Seal, 2014). This was done based on Robin Hood's acts of banditry, where he collected from the rich and handover to the masses (Kheng, 1985). Hence, social banditry attracted the support and romanticization of the bandits, where beneficiaries supported banditry due to their gains from the bandits (Seal, 2014). However, even though scholars have identified such cases of banditry as mythical and almost hypothetical (Kheng, 1985), new research sets challenged the romanticization of the bandits in different literature globally.
On the other hand, modern bandits in Africa, especially in South Africa (Malherbe, 1982) and the Horn of Africa (Mburu, 1999), act differently, unlike the social bandits. They are groups whose fundamentals have been on the apparent quest for resources and power (Uka & Ahamefula, 2022). Similar to that are bandits operating in northern Nigeria. Equally, bandits in northwestern Nigeria owe their genesis to eco-violence (Abdullahi, 2019), materialism (Okaneme & Ushie, 2022), and criminality (Osasona, 2023). Their activities reflect desperation and a quest for resources and power (Ojo, 2020;Uka & Ahamefula, 2022). Nonetheless, scholars have assessed banditry within Nigeria's context (Aina, 2022). Bandits' identity and why they were designated terrorists in 2021 (Osasona, 2021) have equally been examined. However, from the contextualization of many scholars, there seemed to be more emphasis on the farmers-herdsmen conflict and other political and socioeconomic variables. Hence, multiple perspectives were developed while responding to questions bothering banditry in Nigeria's most affected regions-northwest and north-central (Okoli & Ogayi, 2018).
The literature demonstrates many attempts by scholars to understand the notions of bandits and banditry in northern Nigeria. Many themes have been drawn from their characterizations of banditry; from farmers-herdsmen conflict, Fulani militancy (Okoli & Ogayi, 2018), Fulani terrorists (Akpor-Robaro & Lanre-Babalola, 2018), a more dynamic "crimelords" (Okoli & Abubakar, 2021), to a "motorcycle bandits" (Ejiofor, 2021). However, with a theoretical emphasis on eco-violence, each idea reflects distinct contextual realities  that resulted from the multilayered experiences prompted by the interrelatedness of the social and politico-economic variables. Most contributors, such as Odigbo (2019), Bamidele (2019), and Nnabugwu (2018), contextualized banditry as a fight between farmers and herdsmen especially looking at the age-long antagonism between the two socio-economic groups. In a more intensive examination, Okoli and Ogayi (2018) modestly criticized that due to disregarding the conflict's deadly nature. They argued, however, that it goes beyond the typical farmers-herdsmen dispute and, therefore, cannot be characterized by socio-economic condition only.
Based on empirical data demonstrating the use of prominent contemporary military weapons (Ojo, 2020), scholars such as Okoli and Ogayi (2018) offered an alternative perspective that sees banditry as a "Fulani Militancy" as opposed to a "farmers-herdsmen conflict." However, they were the first to consider this dimension . In addition, George et al. (2021) consider banditry as a land use conflict, while SBM Intelligence (2015) viewed it as a "herder-settler" struggle. In a related move, banditry was presented as an act committed by crimelords that developed from its distinctive socio-criminal dialectics (Okoli & Abubakar, 2021) and has extended beyond farmers-herdsmen conflict and Fulani militancy to increasingly active organized crime in the area (Olajode & Nebeife, 2023). According to the report of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2021), the bandits appeared brazen, well-organized, and advanced in their illegal activities. They frighten the locals, villagers, and farmers into submission against their will by violence and murder. Even though they fight primarily for personal gain, bandits stoked public support by taking advantage of political resentments, notably of pastoralists (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2022).
On this note, banditry appears to be an organized crime (Osasona, 2023) committed by gangs who intimidate, evict, murder, and destroy property while committing other crimes (Ojo et al., 2023), that jeopardize the region's peace and tranquillity. It entails the violence or use of weapons (or any other tool of force, coercion, or violence), including the use of terrorism (Aina, 2022) to deprive individuals of their material possessions (Okoli & Abubakar, 2021). They also taxed the people and appointed "de facto sovereigns" to further their cause (Barnett, 2021). By their character, bandits appeared desperate (Charles, 2022) in their struggles with the competing groups in the state and, by extension, the region. In addition, bandits work in separate groups which are neither unified nor have established hierarchies. These gangs do not share much besides the opportunity for robbery, rivalry among groups, and territorial disputes. These organized criminals operate in rural areas, and their bases are deep in forests, making them excellent hiding places (Osasona, 2021). Therefore, this paper believes that bandits "remain an assortment of non-ideologically but economically driven organized criminal [groups] gangs involved in large-scale cattle theft, sexual violence, extortion rackets, kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, pillage, and targeting road users in the Nigerian North-West" (Osasona, 2023, p. 749). Moreso, they operate using a loose, opportunistic, adaptable, and flexible network in response to changing security circumstances; members are chosen for their operational skills and knowledge. However, there is kinship in terms of ethnicity, language, and culture among the bandits' groups, and this common affinity serves as the foundation for how these groups interact with one another and with larger communities (Osasona, 2023).

Theoretical premise: eco-survivalism and the emergence of Banditry in Zamfara State
This section explores the banditry phenomena, using eco-survivalism as its analytical framework. Two reasons motivated us to use eco-survivalism; to demonstrate how the long-running farmersherdsmen conflict gave rise to banditry and to illustrate how the desperate attempts of the bandits to survive led to fierce upsurges in attacks in Zamfara state. It is important to note that most theories that attempted to explain the backdrop of conflict did so in terms of either rivalry for dominance or supremacy or conflict over scarce resources (A. Mohammed & Baba, 2018). To fill this gap, Okoli and Atelhe (2014) and Okoli and Ogayi (2018) highlighted the analytical relevance of eco-survivalism in understanding the increasing militancy in the farmers-herdsmen conflict. Moreso, Rufa'i (2019) shows its significance in studying the Fulani knowledge system in the context of the farmer-herder conflict. Overall conclusions from these papers show that the perceived threat to survival heightens the desperation that determines the attacks' procedures and results.
Furthermore, it is essential to comprehend the bandits' individual and group worldviews to understand their survival instincts fully. Records have shown that most bandits are Fulani (Ejiofor, 2021;Obi & Iwuoha, 2023;Osasona, 2023;Saminu et al., 2022). A typical Fulani man draws his survival beliefs from land and its associated resources (Rufa'i, 2019). Consequently, life is meaningless without cattle, and the animals' ability to survive depends significantly on the land and its resources (Abbass, 2012;Rufa'i, 2019). On this note, Okoli and Atelhe (2014) argue that, The manifest militant posture of the Fulani pastoralists must be understood with reference to their individual and collective worldviews vis-á-vis group subsistence and survival; that has a lot to do with pastoralism. For the average Fulani-herdsman, pastoralism is a way of living, which is reckoned with as a mark of common heritage. In effect, any threat to his herd amounts to a threat, not only to his survival but also to his common destiny. (p,80) As a result, to protect his common destiny, he can go to any length, including bloodshed (Rufa'i, 2019). It is clear that most herders who have lost their herds have turned to cattle rustling and other types of criminal activity, including banditry (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2022; International Crisis Group, 2020). Therefore, given the connection of banditry to the farmersherdsmen conflict, an analytical extrapolation of eco-survivalism as applied in this study presents a better framework to analyze the bandits' desperation for survival, exemplified by their internecine attacks in the state. In addition, the theory is a more encompassing position of eco-violence (Okoli & Ogayi, 2018). It suggests that conflicts worsen because the contending party resorts to ever-more forceful tactics to achieve its objectives, in contrast to eco-violence, which holds that struggle over dwindling ecological resources breeds violent conflict (Oladosu et al., 2022). Furthermore, it depicts a growing tide of a life-or-death struggle to survive in a challenging environment that is visibly unfriendly to collective sustainable living (Okoli & Ogayi, 2018). Therefore, the critical analytical question that this study answers is how bandits react to shocks occasioned by threats to their activities in Zamfara state.
Various reports have shown that banditry emerged in an environment enmeshed in ecoviolence, with a low-scale conflict between farmers and herdsmen (International Crisis Group, 2020). The conflict grew over time, leading to massive deaths, migration, and loss of livelihood in the region. Records have shown that the conflict was originally due to the long-running competition over land and water resources between primarily Fulani herders and Hausa farmers, who eventually formed armed organizations (bandits and vigilantes, respectively) for protection (International Crisis Group, 2020). In addition, the further decline in rainfall and "scarcity" of pastures and arable land escalated it. Since rainfall has decreased over time, there is less water available, which puts strain on the land and causes intense disputes involving herders and farmers whose survival and livelihoods depend on access to land (Suleiman, 2019).
Furthermore, government corruption in allocating land titles expanded the conflict (Barnett, 2021). Various reports indicate that important lands, herding places, including the 37 gazetted and ungazetted grazing reserves belonging to herders and the Fulani, were taken over through connivance between politicians, traditional leaders, police, and some judicial officers (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2022; Zamfara State Government, 2019). This action makes pastoralists even more vulnerable and constrained without access to grazing land throughout the state. As a result, several Fulani hamlets in Zamfara state were compelled to relocate, for example, from Dansadau and Maradun toward the Zurmi axes (Ojo et al., 2023).
Additionally, the herders and Fulani have historically been the target of extortion by dishonest district traditional leaders, farmers, and police, as well as a flawed legal system (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2022; International Crisis Group, 2020; Ojo et al., 2023). These circumstances created and radicalized a dispersed community of poor, destitute, and disgruntled pastoralists (Ojo et al., 2023). Consequently, they became cattle rustlers and, in conjunction with farmers, limited the innocent pastoralists' ability to advance socio-economically (Ejiofor, 2021). Hence, the herders from northern Nigeria moved forcefully southward (SBM Intelligence, 2015) to cushion the effects of environmental and socio-political extortions to save their herds and livelihood. However, the radicalized and disgruntled pastoralists become stranded with only criminal options.
Furthermore, between 2011 and 2014, a new trend emerged with an upsurge in violence between pastoralists-associated militias (bandits) and farmers backed by the vigilantes. The crisis has been worsened by the growth of dangerous criminal gangs thriving in an area overrun with weapons (International Crisis Group, 2020). In addition, the availability of ungoverned spaces (Ojo, 2020), mining opportunities, drug abuse, informants, criminality, and many others have contributed to the escalation of the banditry (Ojo et al., 2023). The impact of this trend has widened the gap between socioeconomic groups leading to the ethnicization of the conflict (Saminu et al., 2022). These groups consist primarily of farmers, pastoralists, Fulani, and Hausa communities. However, the line between the two groups remains practically blurred (Barnett, 2021).
Nonetheless, as the conflict intensifies, Hausa and Fulani sides develop gangs to protect themselves and their communities. On the one hand, the Hausa communities mobilized "Yan Sa Kai" or volunteer guards (subsequently called vigilantes) to protect their villages. The groups became a source of insecurity by using crude, locally manufactured arms against Fulani communities. Vigilantes indiscriminately arrested and tortured many innocent and suspected Fulani, confiscated their herds, and sometimes killed them in public places such as markets (Barje, 2021;Daily Trust, 2021a;International Crisis Group, 2020). On the other hand, the Fulani communities formed various militia groups called "Yan-bindiga" to protect their cattle and avenge vigilante atrocities in return (International Crisis Group, 2020). Furthermore, the "Yan-bindiga" (subsequently called bandits) continued to generate funds for more advanced military weapons through contributions and kidnapping for ransom (International Crisis Group, 2020), including cattle rustling (Olaniyan & Yahaya, 2016). Most weapons (rocketpropelled grenades, gun rounds, Ak 47s, and anti-aircraft rifles) were procured mainly from local and international agents-mostly from Turkey (Bagnetto, 2020;Conflict Amarment Research, 2020). Bandits, however, continued to attack vigilantes, predominantly Hausa communities, and other groups they perceived as rivals, including Fulani, who declined to support their operations (Barje, 2021;International Crisis Group, 2020). Nonetheless, as the vigilantes engaged in more horrific jungle justice (Tar & Bala, 2023), bandits continued to engage in a more gory and horrific killing spree and raids in the Hausa communities (Barje, 2021). Similarly, other farming communities supported vigilantes by stockpiling more weapons to protect themselves in anticipation of bandits' attacks (Daily Trust, 2021a). Hence, the bandits became desperate for their activities (Charles, 2022).
Knowing the challenges they often face, at the point of negotiation, the bandits asked for peace (Altine, 2019). They demanded a government ban on the vigilantes, which the Zamfara state government readily accepted in anticipation of the bandits' reciprocal withdrawal (Anka, 2020). Despite that, bandits attacked and raided villages continuously (Punch Newspaper, 2020). Drawing from eco-survivalism, bandits' desperation for survival becomes necessary due to the fear of impending annihilation from multiple fronts. As the intensity of the fight increases, the bandits increase their demands and desperation for survival. In addition, this desperation for survival depicts the current reality where bandits and vigilantes desperately engaged in a perpetual conflict with severe consequences for innocent communities. It leads to ferocious rivalry and a desperate fight for survival. Conflict, consequently, becomes unavoidably a struggle for existence (Okoli & Atelhe, 2014). Furthermore, the bandits' sense of fear has grown over time due to escalating attacks on them and the Fulani, the criminalization of the entire Fulani population (Saminu et al., 2022), and the looming danger to the bandits' illegal sources of income (ransom from kidnapping and mining) (Bello, 2022;Onireti, 2022;Osumah & Aghedo, 2011). To overcome the fear, bandits reportedly extended hands to Boko Haram (Ayitogo, 2022) and Ansaru (Bitrus, 2022) terrorist groups for collaboration. Through this collaboration, the bandits increased their desperation by launching multiple attacks on innocent citizens and the government. For example, they attacked military formations and airports and kidnaped school children (Ojo et al., 2023), a train in Kaduna (Muhammad, 2022), and shot down a military helicopter in Zamfara (Daily Trust, 2021b). This trend indicates the bandits' emerging sophistication and capabilities (Ojo et al., 2023). The bandits claimed that the purpose of this trend was to draw the government's attention to accept their demands (Anka, 2022). In addition, they repeatedly urged the government to revoke the vigilantes' permits and remove its troops from their communities so Fulani could live peacefully (Anka, 2022;Isenyo, 2022).
More interestingly, bandits admitted that feelings of ethnic solidarity, a need for self-defense, and economic opportunism served as their driving forces (Barnett, 2021). As a result, they continued to kill innocent villagers and vigilantes (Anka, 2022). In this regard, they ransacked and plundered many villages, resulting in horrifying casualties, such as major injuries, deaths, property destruction, and appalling displacements. For instance, in one incident, bandit attacks in Zamfara displaced about 10,000 persons and caused an estimated 200 fatalities (Aljazeera, 2022). Although the bandits have gathered more strength, the vigilantes continuously challenge the bandits' incursion (Anka, 2020). The vigilantes sometimes burnt down Fulani settlements and forced them to flee into the forests (International Crisis Group, 2020). Their persistent collusion with the bandits, misrepresentation of harmless Fulani as criminals based on race, and persecution throughout the state continued to attract heavy casualties on the vigilante members and the innocent villagers (Centre for Democracy and Development, 2022).
Overall, the effects of the upsurge in bandits' attacks have been immeasurable. More recently, many villagers without direct connections to the conflict (Ojo et al., 2023) have lost their lives due to bandits' desperation for survival. More death fatalities are being recorded daily, a rising kidnapping for ransom, and immeasurable loss in private and public properties. While innocent villages have been displaced, innocent herders were equally displaced from their original areas. The report of the Center for Democratic Development and Training (CEDDERT) has demonstrated that, for instance, in the Dan Sadau district of Zamfara state in 2016, over 90% of pastoralists left the region, farmers equally left, resulting in a 45% decrease in grain production and a 227% increase in the price of maize alone (A. S. Mohammed et al., 2016). Therefore, the bandits' sophistication reflects their desperation for survival. Both government and the military responded to eliminate the bandits. In eco-survivalism, each group works toward an eco-survivalist goal to prevent collapse (Katz-Rosene and Szwarc, 2022) and ensure living, even if unhealthy. Therefore, it could be argued that bandits' desperate need to survive amid escalating tension with vigilantes and the government was the driving force behind the possession of the massive advanced military equipment and collaboration with terrorist groups. They use the weapons to execute devastating raids on villages to strike fear into the hearts of competing groups, especially vigilantes.

Methodology
Since 2011, banditry in Zamfara state has escalated, with bandits becoming more aggressive and desperate for survival. Being the epicenter of banditry, the state is located in Nigeria's northwest, and it shares borders from different locations with Sokoto State to the North, Niger, and Kaduna States to the South, Kebbi State to the West, and Katsina State to the East (Chafe, 2016). The state has recorded the highest humanitarian crises because it is the most affected in the region (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2022). The humanitarian crises were due to the excessive struggles of life and death between bandits and the vigilante groups that emerged from the two most prominent ethnic groups in the state (Hausa and Fulani). Historically, Hausa and Fulani have constituted the demographic majority in the state. The state's population presently stands at 4,515,427 based on the 2016 estimation (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2022), spread across the 14 local government areas. Zamfara state has many dense, light forests and reserves covering about 265,375 hc (Butler, 2014). In addition, the socioeconomic occupations of the people in the state are agriculture consisting of farming and pastoralism (Mohammed et al., 2016). The agricultural and economic potentials (Mohammad Anka, 2017) have been challenged by environmental degradation and population explosion, leading to the protracted farmers-herdsmen conflict, which has turned to banditry.
We conducted Focus Groups Discussions (FGDs) to generate more primary data. The FGDs were conducted with few identified victims (IDPs) within Gusau-the state's capital. However, despite the availability of IDP Camps, most IDPs have integrated with the host communities, constituting even more difficulty in accessing them in their exact location (ACAPS, 2023;IOM, 2022). Nonetheless, two focus group discussions (FGDs) were held all in Gusau, with 15 participants (for the two sessions) purposively drawn from IDPs living in Makaranta Camp Mada and those living in the host communities, with the help of recruited assistants living in the area.
Due to access issues, the FGDs were held outside the camp in a community nearby in Gusau. The first FGD was conducted with 5 available Women participants who consented to the discussion on 8 June 2022, while the second FGD was conducted with 10 Men participants who consented to the discussion on 22nd March, 2023. During the discussion, the women participants arrived at the venue with their children as requested. All participants asked to be kept anonymous in the report for confidential purposes. In addition, throughout the FGDs sessions, participants were asked questions about their socioeconomic conditions before and after the emergence of banditry in the state. Although the participants did not provide statistical evidence to support their claims, we still referred to their statements for their importance. Agriculture, health issues, education, and livelihood sources were thoroughly discussed. The discussions were, however, conducted in Hausa-the local language the participants could speak with. The information generated from the FGDs were transcribed into the English language by the first author. Furthermore, the analysis themes related to the areas affected by bandits' desperation, as exemplified by their internecine attacks deductively generated.
This study adopts an explanatory sequential method for data presentation and analysis. Hence, data from the Zamfara State Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs was first presented to indicate the severity of the impact of banditry on death fatalities, kidnapped and displaced persons, and destroyed properties. Findings from this data were supported by evidence from documentary materials, newspapers, published articles, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) reports. Furthermore, results from Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were also used to explain the humanitarian impacts of banditry in the state. However, the FGDs were equally supported by reports from government and NGOs, newspapers, television broadcasts, and well-researched literature.
Therefore, the study deductively analyzed the data using a constructionist thematic analysis. However, "a constructionist method . . . examines the ways in which events, realities, meanings, experiences and so on are the effects of a range of discourses operating within society" (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 81). Similarly, instead of the prevalence, the emphasis throughout the FGDs was placed on keywords when developing the themes. Charts and figures were also used to show trends in the state's death fatalities, kidnapping, property damage, and displacement rates and their humanitarian impacts.

Findings and discussion
This section discusses the findings of the study. The findings were divided into two subsections. It discusses the death fatalities, the kidnapping for ransom, property destruction, and the displacement of people as indicated in Tables 1-4, and the humanitarian impacts of banditry on agriculture and livelihoods, children's education, and the health sector in the second subsection.

The death fatalities in the state
The study found that between 2015 and 2022, bandits' desperation, as manifested in their internecine attacks, resulted in numerous deaths in Zamfara state. The death fatalities were caused mainly by the bandits' desperation for survival. In addition, the killings emerged through raids. However, the deaths consist of vigilantes. Hence, Table 1 shows the overall death fatalities across the 14 local government areas of the state, albeit to varying degrees.
The Table 1 indicates the total number of people killed by the bandits in the state from 2015 to 2022. The number of casualties has risen to about 9,490 people. However, in 2015, banditry did not reach its critical stage. As a result, the number of people killed stood at 697 victims. In 2016, bandits increased their activities in the state, which saw an increase to about 931 people killed. In 2017, banditry was going out of hand, with about 1,954 people killed in the state. According to the table, banditry peaked in 2018, and the number of people killed rose to about 2,063 victims. In 2019, the number of people killed dropped to 1,184 victims. The number of people killed in 2020 decreased to about 1,036 victims. In 2021, the number of people killed increased to 1,248 victims. Lastly, the number of people killed in 2022 dropped drastically to about 377 victims in the state. Below is a chart indicating the annual patterns of killings from 2015 to 2022.
The Figure 1 demonstrates the annual patterns of bandits killing in Zamfara state from 2015 to 2022. The pattern has a significant characteristic that shows four fluctuated zones. The pattern indicates a steady increase in killings between 2015 and 2018. This was due to a lack of government capacity or political will to deal with the situation (C. Okoli, 2019). It has created more opportunities for the bandits. However, records show a decreasing pattern of killings between 2018 and 2020. Shreds of evidence have indicated a massive deployment of military forces due to the 2019 general elections (Adetayo, 2018). The government provided all it could to ensure that the elections were successful (Punch Newspapers, 2019). However, after the elections, the number began to soar slightly in 2021. Records have shown that a number of policies introduced in 2021 have cumulatively reduced the killings. One major policy shift at this time was declaring the bandits as terrorists, which allowed the federal government to use higher-order military hardware. Hence, according to Nigeria's Terrorism (Prevention) Proscription Order Notice 2021 : Notice is hereby given that by Order of the Federal High Court Abuja, in suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/ 1370/2021 dated 25 th November, 2021 as per the schedule to this Notice, the Activities of Yan Bindiga Group, Yan Ta'adda Group and other similar group in Nigeria are declared to be terrorism and illegal in any part of Nigeria, especially in the North-West and North-Central Regions of Nigeria and are proscribed, pursuant to Section 1 and 2 of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2021. (p, A507) However, bandits were labeled terrorists due to the widespread possession of weaponry and increased internecine attacks on military installations and airports capable of carrying out lethal operations (Ojo et al., 2023). For instance, when the bandits attacked a train in Kaduna, many people died, some were injured, and many more were kidnapped (Muhammad, 2022). This occurred as bandits fought to defend their sources of income and secure the release of their commanders and family members (Isenyo, 2022), all in a renewed effort to ensure their existence at all costs. As a result, bandits continued to kill while expanding kidnapping sources. According to records, bandits were paid nearly eight hundred million Naira to free seven hostages from the train attack (Isenyo, 2022).

The kidnapping for Ransom cases in the state
The study found that bandits' desperation for survival, exemplified by the increased internecine attacks in Zamfara state, led to a massive kidnapping for ransom. In addition, between 2015 and 2022, bandits kidnapped thousands of people in the state. Thus, Table 2 shows the overall incidences of kidnapping for ransom across the 14 local government areas of the state, albeit to varying degrees.  The Table 2  The Figure 2 indicates the annual patterns of kidnapping by bandits in Zamfara state from 2015 to 2022. One major characteristic of the chart is that it indicates erratic movement. For instance, there was a steady increase in kidnapping for ransom in the state between 2015 and 2019. This indicates that bandits have accumulated large amounts of money from kidnapping due to its high value in the state. Reports show bandits have generated about N13.667bn (Odeniyi, 2022). However, the number decreased after the 2019 elections when the new government introduced new dialogue policies to resolve the conflict (Premiumtimes, 2020). However, when the dialogue failed, the bandits increased their attacks (Anka, 2020). Subsequently, the number increased between 2020 and 2021. Furthermore, records have shown that, as new policies such as terrorism declaration, more military deployments, and network stoppage were rolled out by the federal and state governments in 2021, kidnapping activities started decreasing drastically until 2022, as indicated on the chart. However, there was more property destruction across the state.

The property destruction in the state
The study found that, between 2015 and 2022, bandits' desperation for survival, exemplified by their raids and internecine attacks in Zamfara state, caused massive destruction of properties. Table 3 shows the overall destruction of properties across the 14 local government areas of the state. However, figures indicate varying degrees. The properties destroyed include private and public buildings, motors, motorcycles and bicycles, local food Silos, commodities and belongings of people and the state, etc.    Figure 3 that the bandits have ceased to destroy more properties, probably for two reasons. Firstly, most people in the affected rural areas have vacated the villages and are displaced, especially in urban places. Secondly, the government has increased its operational capacity and zeal to deal with the menace of banditry in the state (The Guardian, 2021). As a result, bandits were pushed away from the state, leaving them with little capacity to attack the soft targets across the state's rural areas. One major impact of property destruction is an increased displacement of people whose houses have been burnt down by the bandits.

The displacements of people
The study found that, between 2009 and 2022, bandits' desperation, as exemplified by their intense struggle for survival caused massive displacements in Zamfara state. However, Table 4 shows the overall displacements in the state. In addition, the displacement has skyrocketed the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) staying in official and outside camps. However, Figure 4 indicates the distribution of internally displaced persons caused by bandits' desperation for survival in the state. The displacement has affected four categories. The first category consisted of the male adults (the households) whose number reached about 100,433 victims. The second category affected consists of female adults, with about 137,815 victims. The data above demonstrates that female adults were affected more than male adults. However, the third category consists of male children, with about 216,975 victims. In contrast, the fourth  category has about 264,892 victims. Obviously, the data shows that, in the last two categories, more female children have been affected than male children, while many people have been thrown into an immeasurable humanitarian condition in the state.
Based on the data above, the overall implication of banditry in Zamfara state has exacerbated difficulties, uncertainties, animosity, and anxiety among various socioeconomic groups. Tables 1-4 above show that between 2015 and 2022, there were about 9,490 death fatalities, 16016 kidnappings, 1,385,625 property losses, and 720,115 displaced individuals in Zamfara state. This confirms findings of C. Okoli and Ogayi (2018), who believe that many people have had various degrees of harm during these violent occurrences, leading to differing degrees of temporary and irreversible chronic health conditions. This issue has resulted in the loss of active and future breadwinners, which worsens material impoverishment in the affected communities.
Additionally, the study reveals that banditry has increased the rate of interrelated humanitarian crises, with people having difficulties accessing basic needs. Data from the FGDs indicates that displaced persons in the state are struggling to access basic needs. For instance, one of the respondents attested that, Even as displaced persons here in Gusau, we are only spared of the killings because we relocated to towns. But it has been difficult for us to feed, educate our children, and get proper health care when they are sick. (FGD/Male/Gusau/2023) This is consistent with the views of Jah et al. (2022) that banditry has sparked a variety of interrelated crises, including human insecurity, increased health issues, a lack of adequate medical facilities, a sharp decline in agricultural output that has resulted in food shortages, and a spike in the proportion of out-of-school children in the state. In addition, due to its closeness with farmers and herdsmen conflict, this finding is also supported by the views of Ide et al. (2023) that changes in the environment endanger human well-being, including the freedom from food, shelter, and health for the most vulnerable individuals and communities and their basic human rights

Impacts on agriculture and livelihoods
The study reveals that, even before the emergence of banditry, eco-violence had already dealt a blow to agriculture in Zamfara state. However, as manifested in the increase in internecine attacks by bandits, the bandits' desperation for survival has also widened the state's agricultural sector performance gap. In addition, respondents among the victims of banditry from the farming communities reported that; In addition, in some villages, such as "Burai" community; The bandits asked us and many other farmers to pay money as a condition to cultivate our farms produce or they would ask us to leave and they will destroy or burn the farms. (FDD/ Male/Gusau/2023) Interestingly, these views are in tandem with the views of Usman and Eyo (2022) that the heinous devastation of human life and property, including livestock and farming assets, has jeopardized the overall agricultural output of the Zamfara state. Furthermore, this is equally consistent with findings of the Center for Democratic Development and Training (CEDDERT) which suggest that pastoralists have lost their herds in some villages, and agricultural production has been reduced by almost 45% (Mohammed et al. 2016).
In addition, the study reveals that the drop in agricultural performance has tempered with food security and supply chain. This is because one of the respondents confirms that, Due to the combined effects of farmers and herdsmen conflicts, and the almost daily attacks by bandits occasioned by their need to send villagers away from their farms, some of our well-known farmers who used to produce enough for their family's annual consumption are now battling to secure their daily meals in Gusau and other places. (FGD/Male/Gusau/2023) Moreso, another respondent recounted that, his "annual grains production was between 300 and 500 bags of rice and now produces nothing due to displacement by bandits" (FGD/Male/Gusau/ 2023). These revelations from the FGDs are consistent with the views of Abdulyakeen (2022) who stated that frequent attacks by bandits have jeopardized agricultural operations, damaged food storage facilities, and interfered with present food supply lines.
Therefore, the burden of the combined consequences of bandits' desperation for survival amid struggles to ensure existence through internecine attacks has spread beyond the Zamfara state to neighbouring states in the northwest. For instance, the cost of agricultural products has increased dramatically, constituting more unbearable living conditions. Findings of the Center for Democratic Development and Training (CEDDERT) show that prices of agricultural staples, such as maize, have increased by almost 227% as a result of the decrease in annual production caused by bandits' internecine attacks (Mohammed et al. 2016), and demand and supply factors (Turk and Thomas, 2023). More recently, according to data from the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics, Zamfara state has increasingly had the highest prices for essential foods in Nigeria, with an annual estimate of 20.94 in 2020 (Izuaka, 2020). Accordingly, the overall implication for Nigeria indicates that "data from the World Food Program (WFP) in November 2022 . . . show that the share of those in stressed food security situations with minimally adequate food consumption is at 34 percent" (Turk and Thomas, 2023, p. 4).

Impacts on children's education
The study reveals that bandits' desperation, as manifested in their horrendous attacks, has severely impacted the education sector in Zamfara state. Most respondents of the FGDs have narrated how the internecine attacks by bandits affected their children's education. Arising from the effects of bandits' desperation for survival amid their internecine attacks, Table 4 shows that about 481,867 children, mostly children of farmers, were displaced from their native residences in the rural areas. One of the respondents recounted that: "Many displaced children do not go to school and have preferred to move along with their mothers on the streets of Gusau to beg for money and food. Even if we want our children to attend school, who will pay for their studies?. (FGD/Female/Gusau/2022) Another respondent-FGD/Male/Gusau/2023-made a similar declaration during the Focus Group Discussions session. In addition, even with the support of the NGOs, some respondents who live in Internally Displaced Camps have attested that; the government has not provided enough school facilities for their children in some camps. (FGD/Female/Gusau/2022) More importantly, records have shown that the available school facilities in rural communities have since been a major target amid bandits' desperation, the quest for survival, and internecine attacks. For instance, the report of UNICEF (2022) shows that bandits have attacked 60 schools, which led to the closure of 168 out of 1,745 primary schools in the state, while about 33,260 children lost the opportunity to continue their education. In addition, when 2 more secondary schools were attacked and teachers and students killed, the Zamfara state government closed down 21 more schools, disrupting the education of about 14,120 secondary school students (Onwuasoanya et al., 2021).
However, the combined effects of bandits' desperation for survival, as manifested in the internecine attacks by bandits, led to a persistent decrease in school enrolment and the quality of education in the state. This is consistent with the finding of Birmati et al. (2023), which shows an increased persistent loss in student attendance and rising rates of school withdrawal and dropout in the affected areas. Moreso, most of the respondents confirm that: Due to the financial charges instituted by the schools, our children in this community could not enjoy the opportunity to better their future by attending schools, which is the concern of every displaced mother here. (FGD/Female/Gusau/2022) Therefore, this is consistent with findings of various displacement tracking organizations, such as the IOM (2022), which reported that only about 20% of the displaced children (especially children of farmers) outside camps attend schools in the host communities in Zamfara.

Impacts on the health sector
The study also reveals that bandits' desperation for survival, as manifested in their internecine attacks, has severely harmed the health sector in Zamfara state. The study further indicates that thousands of people, including children, are experiencing the worst health complications in the state due to the destruction of healthcare facilities. This is in tandem with the view of Abdulyakeen (2022), who opines that children's nutritional status has suffered due to insufficient food and medical facilities. However, the lack of money to access available and affordable private healthcare facilities constitutes another major challenge. In this regard, most respondents of the FGDs confirm that: We cannot access healthcare facilities and have had to beg for alms to take care of our health complications, including our children. (FGD/Female/Gusau/2022) However, this is consistent with the findings of the One campaign (2021), which indicates that access to healthcare facilities has been extremely difficult in the state.
Furthermore, the study reveals that health challenges have compounded the victims' vulnerability and constituted a major threat to the lives of those who do not have access to diagnosing facilities, enough drugs, clean water, and nutritional food. This is consistent with the findings of IOM (2022), that the lack of good drinking water and increased open defecation with uncleaned latrines has added to the severe healthcare challenges. The report also confirms that serious health issues such as malaria and fever have become prevalent among the IDPs. On the other hand, in the instance of multiple health challenges, many respondents of the FGDs confirm that: Our children, especially those with severe health complications, such as Sickle Cell Anaemia, could not receive the required care from the available health professionals. Also, we do not have money available, while affordable healthcare nearby does not have doctors and drugs. (FGD/Female/Gusau/2022) Consequently, numerous instances demonstrate how limited access to healthcare services caused by a lack of funds for drugs has caused many IDPs to seek out traditional healers (UNHCR, 2021). However, drawing from the human security dimension, accessible healthcare facilities are a fundamental basic requirement that reduces an obvious threat to people's life. Lack of it increases and, in some cases, worsens their capacity to achieve sustainable freedom of fear and freedom of wants. Therefore, in light of the aforementioned challenges, which include the overcrowded shelters where roughly 20 people reside in a single room and unfinished structures (UNHCR, 2021), the health security of the displaced persons in Zamfara state is categorically at grave risk. However, finding from Targba (2022), confirms that social inclusion and severe gender-based violence have constituted more threats to the security of the IDPs. Many women and children have been sexually assaulted, although this is frequently not reported because of stigmatization and other social concerns (UNHCR, 2021).

Conclusion
This paper examines the bandits' increasingly desperate posture for survival, evidenced by the upsurge in their internecine attacks, which led to one of Nigeria's biggest humanitarian crises in Zamfara state. It emphasizes that the incessant conflict between farmers and herdsmen over environmental scarcities was the root of banditry in Zamfara state. The conflict's ethnicization, the criminalization of Fulani, government actions, unregulated areas, self-defense, and corruption contributed to its escalation. More specifically, the demand for more weaponry and the money obtained through ransom from kidnappings have contributed to its transition to terrorism. Drawing from eco-survivalism, the bandits' desperate attempts to survive were due to the government and vigilantes' competing challenge to eliminate them and their source of illegitimate wealth. The bandits, therefore, created more ferocious reinvigoration to accomplish their survival goals. Additionally, the study used constructionist and explanatory sequential methods for its analysis. Findings show that bandits' desperation for survival, exemplified by their internecine attacks on vigilantes and their communities, has resulted in thousands of deaths, kidnappings, property destruction, and a growing number of displaced persons. It also discovered that bandits' desperation within the broader eco-survivalist stance had enlarged the social divide, worsened food shortages, heightened health issues, and multiplied the number of out-of-school children in the state. The findings were effectively discussed.
Moreso, the findings indicate that eco-survivalism supports the unmistakable link between bandits' desperation for survival and the appalling humanitarian crises in the state. However, the operational consequences indicate that emphasis on farmers-herdsmen and sociopolitical factors could not better describe banditry in the state. The current discovery is relatively important. As such, the bandits' eco-survivalist and desperate posture will continue to threaten security if kept unchecked and unregulated. The government may consider this difficult to mitigate, but, with more collective and effective management of political, ecological, socioeconomic, and criminal challenges by the regulators, the bandits' eco-survivalist posture tends to decline. It will pave the way to expand the government's role in a comprehensive dialogue with all stakeholders based on confidence building and increased security governance. Consequently, this may pave the way for bandits' retreat, in the long run, to accept the reorganization of local economies, pastoralism, farming, and rural dwelling system to reduce criminality. It will, however, allow the return of the displaced persons, which may subsequently reduce overcrowding in the urban population as more healthcare centers will be rehabilitated while children return to schools. Therefore, there are several methodological issues with this paper. The few Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) held were grossly insufficient to generate more discoveries. In addition, this study did not consider the emergence of certain politicians as a reason for the increased activities of bandits in the state. Hence, it constitutes another limitation of the study. We suggest a comprehensive large-scale study comprising bandits, vigilantes, politicians, and local communities to gain more discoveries.