The March 1st, 1949, general attack: A defining point of recognition of Indonesia’s Sovereignty

Abstract The General Attack of March 1, 1949, conducted by the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia against the Dutch remains an interesting issue in Indonesia today because many of its aspects are yet to be fully revealed. The contemporary issue related to the event is the omission of Lt. Col. Suharto’s name, one of the key leaders in the struggle for independence, in the consideration of Presidential Decree No. 2/2022 concerning the Day of the Enforcement of Sovereignty, while the names of other well-known figures are written in the decree. How does the General Attack of March 1, 1949, relate to the context of the struggle for independence? What was the role of the civilian and military figures involved in the event? To answer these questions, a historical research approach was used by applying critical historical methods that include four stages, namely heuristics, criticism, interpretation, and historiography. The results show that the general attack of March 1, 1949, was an important event in the struggle for independence because it marks the milestone of the achievement of sovereignty on December 27, 1949. Initiated by Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, the attack was approved by General Soedirman and was carried out under Lt. Col. Suharto as Commander of Wehrkreise III—Yogyakarta. The study also observes that despite the controversy surrounding his role in the March 1st Attack, the name of Lt. Col. remains cemented in Indonesia’s history.


PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT
This study investigates the extent to which the General Attack of March 1, 1949, as well as the relationship between the revolutionary military and civilian leaders contributed in the struggle to maintain territorial integrity and the repositioning of the Republic of Indonesia as a sovereign nation on the international stage. It discusses the first and second Dutch's violation of both the Linggajati Treaty and the Renville Treaty when they launched two major military aggressions. The study argues that these two aggressions as well as the Dutch propaganda to portray Indonesia as they colony despite independence led to the General Attack of March 1, 1949. The study also argues that the collaboration between the military leaders and civilian leaders (Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, Sutan Sjahrir, and by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara) reached its peak when the Dutch attacked Yogyakarta and capture and detained both President Soekarno and Vice President Moh Hatta as prisoners of war. The study finally,the study argues that despite the controversy surrounding the role of the Lt. Col. Suharto in the General Attack, his name remains enshrined in history books.

Introduction
The period of maintaining independence (1945)(1946)(1947)(1948)(1949) was not only filled with armed struggle but also with diplomacy between Indonesia and the Netherlands. President Soekarno and Vice President Moh. Hatta agreed with Sutan Sjahrir that the struggle to maintain independence must be resolved through diplomacy. However, the Dutch refused to negotiate with the Soekarno-Hatta Cabinet because they were seen as Japanese collaborators. Related to that condition, the government of the Republic of Indonesia changed its system of government from presidential to parliamentary in line with the appointment of Sutan Sjahrir as prime minister. After officially becoming prime minister, to complete the struggle for independence, Sutan Sjahrir held several negotiations with J. H. van Mook, the Head of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) as well as the Lt Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies. Under Sultan Sjahrir's administration, diplomacy officially became another form of struggle to maintain independence.
Consequently, some of the negotiations resulted in agreements with the Dutch including the Linggajati Treaty and the Renville Treaty. However, these two agreements were later violated by the Dutch as they launched their first military aggression, which resulted in the Renville Agreement, which in turn, was breached by Dutch. This was evidence that the Dutch's sole ambition was to colonize Indonesia as a whole. The violation of the Renville Treaty resulted in a second military attack and control of Yogyakarta by the Dutch despite the courageous defense and protection of both the city and the Palace by Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX from a civilian standpoint. Consequently, President Soekarno and Vice President Moh Hatta were captured and held as prisoners of war.
Civilians played another major role in the struggle to protect and preserve the newly formed nation by establishing in West Sumatra the Emergency (Susanto et al., 2023). While this served as a diversion, a military movement was formed to coordinate guerrilla warfare based on the orders of Commander-in-Chief General Soedirman. In the framework of this guerrilla war, the General Attack of 1 March 1949, was carried out by Lt. Col. Suharto. This general attack led the United Nations to demand that both Indonesia and the Dutch sit back down at the negotiating table. The  negotiations were achieved through the Round Table Conference. From what precedes, it is important to investigate the extent to which the General Attack of 1 March 1949, as well as the relationship between the revolutionary military and civilian leaders contributed in the struggle to maintain territorial integrity and the repositioning of the Republic of Indonesia as a sovereign nation on the international stage. It is worth addressing this question because past events are causality. These issues have been raised by a few scholars in Indonesia as well as overseas. Pratama (2023) argues that all components of the newly formed nation were involved in the Attack including the national army, police, civilians, and the palace, and that all were united to show the world that Indonesia was a sovereign and independent country. In terms of collaboration, Muflihah et al. (2016) claim that to free Indonesia from the Dutch and secure the nation's sovereignty, the military government collaborated with civil government. Echoing (Suasanto et al., 2023), Muflihah et al., observe that the military government was formed to run military operations against the Dutch. While the civil government provided its knowledge of the ins and outs of the regions to protect and hide guerrilla troops. The civil government provided accommodation, transportation goods, and spying to the guerrilla. Rizal, on the other hand, claim that the guerrilla tactic used by General Sudirman to resist the Duct re-occupation of Indonesia proved to be successful in repositioning Indonesia as a sovereign state in the concert of nations.
The difference between the present study and those discussed above lies in the fact that it investigates the relationship between the then-military government and the civilian government in their joint effort to destroy the Dutch propaganda about Indonesia on the International stage and restore the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia.

Research methods
The research method used in this paper is the historical method suggesting "the process of critically examining and analyzing the records and survivals of the past. The imaginative reconstruction of the past from the data derived by the process is called historiography" (Gottschalk, 1968). From this definition, it can be inferred that the historical method consists of four stages, namely heuristic, criticism, interpretation, and historiography (Garraghan, 1957). The first step is the heuristic which consists of tracing and collecting primary and secondary historical sources that are relevant to the subject matter being studied. This study provides a descriptive analysis of the General Attack of 1 March 1949, which led to the withdrawal of the Dutch from Indonesia and the international recognition of Indonesia as a free sovereign nation. The study also relied on both external and internal criticism to obtain authentic and credible sources. Data obtained from the criticism stage are confronted with non-interrelated comparative sources. This data is then interpreted analytically and synthetically. A series of other data have also been interpreted form the basis for the preparation of past stories in the form of historiography that has resulted in recent studies dealing with the General Attack of March 1, a historical event that is regarded as a milestone in the recognition of the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia. In an attempt to address the research issues, the study relies on the people-based method to investigate the relationship between the then-military government and the civilian government in their joint effort to restore the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia.

Dutch military aggression II
On 18 December 1948, when the Dutch army launched its second military aggression targeting Yogyakarta. After taking control of Maguwo Airport, the Dutch army moved towards Yogyakarta. At 15.00, the Dutch army under the leadership of van Beek arrived in front of the State Building, where President Soekarno lived. Company II CPM, led by First Lt Susetio, tried to hinder the pace of the Dutch army. Losing both quantity and weaponry, the CPM Second Corps was overwhelmed, and Letnan Dua Sukotjo Tjokroatmodjo proposed that President Soekarno leave the State Building. The proposal was rejected, and in line with that, President Soekarno ordered Lettu Susetio and his troops to stop firing at the Dutch army. With the order, van Beek managed to enter the State Building and state that President Soekarno was under house arrest and requested that President Soekarno order the Indonesian National Army or Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) to surrender to the Dutch if it was not to be destroyed by them (Margana et al., 2018). In the end, the Dutch detained President Soekarno, Vice President Moh. Hatta, Foreign Minister Agus Salim, and several other leaders sent them to exile on Bangka Island on 19 December 1948.
Meanwhile, when the Dutch army was on its way from Maguwo to Yogyakarta, Vice President Moh. Hatta held a cabinet meeting to take strategic steps in dealing with the Dutch military attack. One of the most important decisions was that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia transferred power over the territory of the Republic of Indonesia to the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI) led by Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, who at that time served as Minister of Prosperity (Margana et al., 2018). With that mandate and to evade Dutch pursuit, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara formed PDRI which was seated in the village of Bidar Alam, South Solok, West Sumatra on 22 December 1948. With a very uphill struggle, PDRI managed to contact other countries as the official government of the Republic of Indonesia, so that Dutch lies began to be exposed (Abdullah & Lapian, 2012, p. 6). With the PDRI, the international community strongly condemned the Dutch military aggression. The United States has threatened to halt economic aid to the Netherlands if the military offensive did not stop. This showed the United States support of the struggle for Indonesian independence (Ricklefs, 2008).

Moving the government to West Sumatra
Feeling the pressure of an imminent arrest and detention by the Dutch, President Sukarno along with his vice president decided to surrender and gave power to Syafruddin Prawiranegara to establish a temporary government in the town of Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. Syafruddin was informed of this decision via radio broadcast, but he did not know about it. Nonetheless, Syafruddin initiated the creation of a similar government there, so this decision was implemented without consultation with the central government. In late 1948 and early 1949, the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI) moved inland to evade the Dutch pursuit, initially from the city of Bukittinggi, then to Payakumbuh, before leaving urban settlements. By 9 January 1949, one of the groups, led by PDRI head Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, reached Bidar Alam and came up with plans to advance further up to the Province of Pekanbaru due to Dutch progress (Subisjarah, 2011). The local population was mainly supportive of the PDRI and provided accommodation and food to provisional government officials. Supported by Indonesian Air Force personnel, PDRI established a mobile radio station in the town to communicate with the outside world. To print the country's money, a village house known today as Jama's House was used as the printing house by the emergency government.
The relative safety at the village allowed PDRI to communicate with guerrilla fighters in Java and consolidate a provisional government. PDRI remained at Bidar Alam until late April 1949, when they moved once more following the news of negotiations between the Dutch and Indonesians (Makmur, 2019 , 1945Indriastuti, 1988;Margana et al., 2018). To facilitate coordination in carrying out guerrilla warfare, Col. Bambang Soegeng formed three wehrkreise (circles or defense areas) (Abdullah and Lapian, 2012). Wehrkreise III oversees Yogyakarta and is led by Lt. Col. Suharto (Hutagalung, 2010). After Lt. Col. Suharto was appointed commander of Wehrkreise III, he formed six subwehrkreises codenamed SWK 101 -SWK 106 (Army Historical Service, 1972;Sanusi et al., 1981).
After the organizational structure in the Wehrkreise III neighborhood was formed, Lt. Col. Suharto immediately planned retaliatory attacks on the Dutch military enclaves to restore popular confidence in the republic. The first integrated offensive launched by Commander Wehrkreise III took place on 29 December 1948. At night, the TNI launched an attack on Godean, and guerrilla warfare in this attack continued until 5 January 1949 (Margana et al., 2018;Nasution, 1979, p. 10;Seskoad, 1993).
On 7 January 1949, Lt Col. Suharto prepared a plan to carry out a second attack by issuing Tactic Order No. 09/S/Cop/49 addressed to all subwehrkreise commanders in the Wehrkreise III neighborhood. An attack carried out on 9 January 1949, was directed at the city by passing through the cracks of enemy posts and destroying enemy posts from behind. SWK 101 successfully destroyed the enemy in Sentul and Balapan. The enemy's position in the Kraton region to the south until Jalan Parangtritis, Imogiri, and Bantul was successfully destroyed by SWK 102. Meanwhile, the SWK 103 defense area managed to destroy the enemy in the Wirobrajan, Ngabean, and Kraton areas to the west. The enemy's position in the Gandekan area, Kereta Api Station to Jalan Magelang, was destroyed by the TNI in SWK 103A. While the TNI in the SWK 104 area managed to destroy the enemy forces around Yogyakarta-Tempel. As for the enemy military base along with Jalan Yogyakarta-Kaliurang, it was successfully destroyed by a unit known as SWK 105A, which also destroyed the Dutch military pocket in the Yogyakarta-Prambanan area and buildings in Maguwo controlled by the Netherlands (Margana et al., 2018;Sanusi et al., 1981).
Successful guerrilla tactics manifested through the first and second attacks, and on 16 January 1949, Lt. Col. Suharto and all SWK Commanders and troops in Wehrkreise III carried out the third integrated attack. The attack carried out in the afternoon succeeded in destroying and confronting the Dutch army in their respective SWK areas. The confrontation was successfully carried out when the Dutch army moved to take full control of the Bantul area and other areas in Yogyakarta. As a result, the battle between TNI and the Dutch is getting fiercer, and it is this condition that encourages the determination to carry out a fourth integrated attack. In this fourth attack, coordination between Commander Wehrkreise III and SWK commanders with the civilian government under the leadership of Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX was getting steadier. This fourth attack paved the way for a much larger general attack on Dutch positions in Yogyakarta and was carried out during the day, which came to be known as Serangan Umum on 1 March 1949 (Margana et al., 2018).

The six-hour control of Yogyakarta by the military
The Dutch military attack on Yogyakarta was responded to by Sri Sultan Hamengku-buwono IX by showing disapproval of the Dutch action and refusing to cooperate with their ambition to establish a federal state (Lombard, 1996, p. 128;Ratnawati et al., 2021). This was an important milestone at the end of the Dutch's effort to colonize Indonesia (Margana et al., 2018). Hamengkubuwono IX's action helped make the palace the safest place for fighters as it could not be controlled by the Dutch.
In early February 1949, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX heard from the BBC that the United Nations would discuss the issue of the Indonesia-Netherlands conflict in March 1949. For Sri Sultan, the news created momentum that benefited the struggle. Before the UN discussed Indonesia, the UN heard "surprising achievement made by the TNI". The surprise in question was a military action to make the international community aware of the existence of both the Republic of Indonesia and its military (Atmakusumah, 1982). This is based on the idea that Indonesian diplomacy abroad would not be effective if it was not supported by military forces and actions known to the international community. On the other hand, military attacks carried out in the Region of Wehrkreise III did not have an international impact as they failed to shake the Dutch position in international diplomacy (Margana et al., 2018;Sastroamodjojo, 1974).
It must also be recognized that countries in Asia urge the United Nations to urge the Netherlands to stop its military aggression and restore the Indonesian government in Yogyakarta as soon as possible (Hatta, 1981;Talsya, 1990). However, the support of Asian countries will be more optimal for the struggle to maintain independence if the TNI can show that militarily, the Republic of Indonesia still exists (Margana et al., 2018). Sri Sultan's thoughts were followed up by sending a courier to contact General Soedirman. The courier handed over a letter containing the idea of carrying out a general attack on the Dutch position in Yogyakarta that must be carried out during the day and broadcast to all corners of the world. General Saoedirman welcomed the idea and asked Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX to be in direct contact with the Commander of Wehrkreise III, Lt. Col. Suharto. Furthermore, through the intermediary of Marshudi (Commander SWK 101), Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX made intensive contact with Lt. Col. Suharto. After a long period of contact, the two sides agreed that the TNI needed to carry out an open public attack, and it was agreed that the attack would be carried out on 28 February 1949. However, the plan was canceled due to a leak, so the public knew there would be a general attack plan. Realizing that the conditions were unfavorable for the Republic of Indonesia, Sri Sultan and Lt Col. Suharto agreed that a general attack would be carried out on (Margana et al., 2018Toer et al., 2014).
After all the necessary things were completed, on 1 March 1949, at 06.00, along with the sound of sirens as a sign of the end of the curfew, all the troops who were stationed at certain posts, simultaneously attacked the designated targets. Under the command of Lt. Col. Suharto, all troops in the Wehrkreise III region attacked Yogyakarta from four directions simultaneously. Troops from SWK 102 attacked Yogyakarta from the south, SWK 103A troops attacked Yogyakarta from the west, SWK 104 attacked Yogyakarta from the north, and attacks from the east were carried out by SWK 105 forces. Meanwhile, SWK 101, SWK 103, SWK 106, the Mobil Brigade, and other forces helped the four SWK forces by pounding Dutch positions in Yogyakarta (Hutagalung, 2010;Margana et al., 2018).
The March 1 general attack shocked Dutch forces under van Langen. Dutch aid troops had difficulty entering Yogyakarta because they were blocked by troops who had been assigned to confront the Dutch outside Yogyakarta. With the military strategy that had been designed by Lt. Col. Suharto, in a relatively short time, the TNI in the Wehrkreise III region managed to control Yogyakarta. With the barrier, Dutch aid troops from Semarang and Magelang only arrived in Yogyakarta before 11 p.m. At the same time, TNI troops began to be pulled back outside Yogyakarta city because the Dutch troops were already stronger than when the general offensive began.
To achieve the main objective of the general attack, AURI's radio transmitter, located in Playen, Wonosari, Gunung Kidul disseminated the event. The broadcast of the event was carried out in a chain started by Captain Boediardjo, who sent the news of the event using the news text received from the Head Officer of the Indonesian Army Staff, Colonel TB Simatupang, who is based in Kulon Progo. The text of the news was then received by Air Sergeant Major Umar Said Noor, who reported the receipt of the news to Airman Captain Dick Tamimi. The two then faced Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara so that the events of the General Attack of 1 March 1949, were known by the Chairman of PDRI. After the news was received, Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara ordered that the news of the general attack of 1 March 1949, be sent to Radio Rimba Raya (a radio belonging to the Army X Division which was broadcast in Bireuen Regency where Division X was headquartered), the transmitter post located in Rimba Raya, Aceh Tengah Central Aceh, now Bener Meriah, a division of the Central Aceh District) to be directly sent to radio in Burma (now Myanmar)." From the radios emitted in Burma, the events of the General Attack were received by Ole All India Radio in New Delhi. From here, the events of the General Attack of 1 March 1949, spread throughout the world (BERNAS, March 2, 1999). With the receipt of the news, the international community became aware of the existence of the Republic of Indonesia. The United Nations then succeeded in urging the Dutch to stop their military offensive and ordered the return of President Soekarno, Vice President Mohamad Hatta, and other leaders to Yogyakarta. In addition, the UN also ordered the Dutch and the Indonesians to return to the negotiating table to discuss Indonesia's future.

The Roem agreement-van Roijen
The General Attack of 1 March 1949, was a sign of the existence and recognition of Indonesia as a nation to the international community. The UN then urged the Netherlands to cease military operations and ordered the Netherlands and Indonesia to go back to the negotiating table. There were triangular negotiations between the Netherlands, Indonesia, and Bijeemkomst Voor Federaal Overleg (BFO) to end the conflict and determine Indonesia's future. Nevertheless, the Dutch-Indonesia-BFO negotiations did not produce an important agreement to resolve the Indonesia-Netherlands conflict. This prompted the UN Security Council to order the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) to hold a preliminary conference between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The preliminary conference was aimed at restoring the power of the Republic of Indonesia and organizing the Round Table Conference (KMB). A preliminary conference held on April 14 -7 May 1949, in Jakarta, produced the Roem-van Roijen Statements. Through the statement, J. H. van Roijen (Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs) representing the Netherlands officially stated that the Dutch Government will restore the power of the Republic of Indonesia by returning the leadership of the Republic of Indonesia to Yogyakarta. This event became known as Yogya Kembali. In addition, According to Roem-van Roijen Statements, it was affirmed that the two sides agreed to hold the Round Table Conference as a political step toward the surrender of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia (Abdullah & Lapian, 2012, p. 6;Bredasche Courant, 21 June 1949;Ricklefs, 2008).

Round table conference: recognition of sovereignty
The Round Table Conference was

Conclusion
Two important conclusions can draw from this study: Firstly, in the context of the struggle to maintain independence, the General Attack of 1 March 1949, played a significant diplomatic role in the recognition of Indonesia as a nation by the international community. Before the events of the General Attack of 1 March 1949, the results of the struggle for international diplomacy were less than optimally achieved by the newly formed nation. The international community was more confident in Dutch propaganda. Consequently, international law benefited the Dutch more than the Republic of Indonesia. The General Attack of 1 March 1949, was launched as the international community was becoming increasingly convinced of the propaganda carried out by the Dutch portraying Indonesia as their colony. However, the collaboration between the military government and the civil government succeeded in changing that narrative. Through their joint effort to destroy the Dutch propaganda about Indonesia on the International stage and restore the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia.
Secondly, although the General Attack of 1949 was a heroic event, it is shrouded in controversy in terms of leadership. During the era of the New Order Government, the event was reconstructed to portray Lt. Col. Suharto as the central figure. Despite numerous rebuttals of this account, Suharto's sturdiness during the event remains cemented as his name is used in teaching material about the history of the nation's struggle. Historical facts show that the general attack was from Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX who received permission from General Soedirman to carry out the attack with the coordination of t. Col. Suharto as Commander Wehrkreise III, who oversees Yogyakarta. Thus, through the steady coordination of civilian and military leaders, the goal of Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX to carry out the General Attack of 1 March 1949, under the leadership of Lt. Col. Suharto was achieved as they managed to control Yogyakarta for about six hours and therefore having the international community recognize the Republic of Indonesia as a newly form sovereign nation.