Unravelling Africa’s misgovernment: How state failures fuel the emergence of violent non-state actors: Selected case studies

Abstract This paper explores the multifaceted challenges post-colonial African states face in addressing underdevelopment and ethnoreligious intolerance, resulting in an unstable socio-economic and political environment. It argues that the inability of post-independent African states to foster good governance, accountability, and inclusive politics has given rise to violent non-state actors (VNSAs) seeking to challenge the state’s legitimacy due to its failure to provide essential services. With Africa’s diverse ethnoreligious makeup, the fragmentation in governance inevitably incites rebellion against the state, fuelling the growth and influence of VNSAs. This paper utilizes a literature review methodology to address the research question and provide insights into the subject matter. By employing the concept of state fragility as an analytical framework, it examines how political elitism and corruption have come to define the modern African state. As a result, violent non-state actors (VNSAs) have emerged as significant challengers to the established rules-based order of the state. Furthermore, these VNSAs find support among marginalized local populations, which have grown disillusioned with political elites exploiting their power and neglecting their responsibility to deliver essential services. In light of these findings, this paper underscores the urgent need for a collective developmental framework that prioritizes the involvement of the African people in the governance process. Without such a framework, VNSAs will persist in questioning the state’s legitimacy, leading to dire repercussions for human life and the overall stability of the continent.


Introduction
When African countries gained independence, there was hope that the continent would be on the path towards inclusive socioeconomic development. For Africans, this newfound freedom underpinned the hope to consolidate stability, socioeconomic inclusion, good governance and ABOUT THE AUTHOR Victor H Mlambo is a Lecturer at the University of Johannesburg, School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy. Victor's research interests include Conflict and Migration Studies; Political Geography; Regionalism; Security Studies. development. Nevertheless, such feelings were short-lived as Africa in the post-colonial era has been characterized by numerous developmental challenges (Dimkpa, 2015). Arguably, weak governance in Africa has reflected one unique manifestation, the rise of violent non-state actors (Diatta et al., 2021), which have become a menace not only to development but also to challenging the legitimacy of the state. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees planning figures, 44 million people are reportedly displaced in Sub-Saharan Africa, up from 38.3 million at the end of 2021 (Mbiyozo, 2023). Governance problems on the continent revolve around many leaders' inability to manage economies properly, diversities, and political inclusion (Diatta et al., 2021).
Consequently, the decay of state institutions hinders effective service delivery, thus increasing societal discontent and eventually leading to riots and protests. Recently, the governance decay and a culmination of other factors in Africa have led to the emergence of violent non-state actors (VNSAs) who have been able to use this vacuum to grow, spread, recruit those who are marginalized and eventually begin to challenge the legitimacy of the state (Raeymaekers et al., 2008). While realist scholars agree that states are absolute actors in the international system (Stirk & Schuett, 2015), the growth of VNSAs and their financial capabilities have undermined the state as a guarantor of security and territorial sovereignty. This paper argues that increased political instability, corruption and poor governance will increase the emergence of VNSAs. Apart from these, the failure of the state to reconcile different religious and ethnic groups, create employment and prevent the exploitation of natural resources will further give rise to VNSAs (Conrad et al., 2019). The rationale behind this paper is to reflect that in a post-independence era, Africa has struggled to consolidate good governance, accountability, and inclusive politics. The subsequent implications of this have been widespread conflicts and the emergence of violent armed groups. This has therefore removed the urgent need for political stability and inclusive development (Mlambo & Simon, 2021). The rise of VNSAs threatens the continent's security architecture and prolongs underdevelopment, prompting the need for effective interventions to address this conundrum. Therefore, the following question will guide this paper: To what extent has the rise of violent non-state actors challenged the state's legitimacy, and how has the state responded to this increasing threat? After the introduction, the paper's research method is explained, followed by the literature review and, finally, the findings and conclusion of the paper.

Methodological issues
This paper employed a secondary data approach to collect the necessary data. A narrative literature review was employed. The paper sought to offer a thorough and critical overview of previously published research on the multifaceted challenges post-colonial African states face in addressing underdevelopment and ethnoreligious intolerance; hence a narrative review was ideal. The approach allowed the paper to compare the different narratives and arguments around Africa's developmental challenges, thus contributing to a nuanced argument around the topic under study. Data was gathered from sources such as the United Nations, the African Union, and online credible websites and journal articles. Criteria for selecting the data sources were based on the year of publication. In this case, the publication years from 1997 to 2023 were selected. Keywords used in the search for data included conflicts in Africa, violent non-state actors in Africa, ethnoreligious intolerance and communal conflicts in the Sahel. Other data sources were also consulted, such as unpublished dissertations, policy briefs, and online newspaper sources that addressed the research theme. The data was analyzed in narrative form through reflections, arguments and different narratives explaining the emergence of VNSAs in Africa and its relation to Africa's misgovernance and the state's failure to ensure socio-economic and political stability. While information from sources published before 1997 was not part of the selection criteria, their arguments were taken into consideration to better reflect on the current issues around governance and VNSAs in Africa.

Non-state actor and violent non state actors: the conceptualization
Since the decolonial periods in Africa, the concepts of state actors, non-state actors, and violent non-state actors have gained traction within Africa's governance space (Williams, 2008). State actors are the governments of the countries in the world (Longley, 2022). Stirk and Schuett (2015) submit that the state is still considered the most relevant actor in international relations. Governments are major players because they hold the administrative power of a state; they have the ultimate authority in their decision-making procedure (Upendra, 2018). However, despite this, to ensure the legitimacy of the state is respected and adhered to, fundamental elements such as good governance, the consolidation of the rule of law and the provision of goods and services become essential (Gbemudu & Ajabor, 2019). To understand violent non-state actors, one must first dwell on the concept of a non-state actor. The rise of globalization, communication technology and the drive to ensure a multipolar world has drastically changed the idea of the state being the most relevant actor in international relations (Olajide et al., 2022). As a result of these changes, non-state actors have become vital in supporting the state not only in ensuring territorial sovereignty but also support in terms of service delivery provision (Shoba & Zubane, 2022). A nonstate actor can be defined as an influential organization or individual with the potential to influence the actions of state actors but not allied to a state (Upendra, 2018). Changes brought by globalization have seen non-state actors becoming critical to the everyday functioning of a state (Shoba & Zubane, 2022). However, violent non-state actors differ significantly. Violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) refer to organizations or armed groups that adopt illegal violence to attain their goals (Agir, 2014). The reason for the emergence of VNSAs is weak governance, corruption and shortcomings in the state (Williams, 2008). For example, when a state fails to ensure the provision of services, characterized by corruption and the decay of state institutions, it gives rise to societal tensions, protests and riots, which eventually morph into rebellion against the state in which violence plays a considerable role (Olajide et al., 2022). This paper argues that VNSAs do not suddenly emerge; some events led to their emergence. Violence and rebellion against the state become the only solution when there is a breakdown in service delivery.

The rise of VNSAs and the concept of state fragility
In fragile and conflict-ridden states, the formal state is typically unable to deliver essential services, respond to societal demands and impose security (Lindstrom, 2018). Ziaja et al. (2019) describe state fragility as deficiencies in one or more of the three core functions of the state. These functions include state authority, state capacity and state legitimacy. Authority refers to the state's ability to control violence. The fragile state lacks the functional authority to provide basic security within their borders, the institutional capacity to provide basic social needs for their populations, and the political legitimacy to effectively represent their citizens at home and abroad (Ziaja et al., 2019). From the above, it becomes clear that the state plays an essential role towards economic development. When the state fails to ensure development, it will experience some form of rebellion and a challenge to its legitimacy (Alexander, 2010). Africa has not healed from its colonial past that disregarded African values, culture, and tradition. Thus, the modern post-colonial state and its subsequent political structure are built along ethnic and tribal lines (Wa Muiu, 2010). When discriminatory government laws or policies signal that certain groups are disfavored, VNSAs feel empowered to carry out violent attacks with little fear of reprisal (Basedau & Schaefer-Kehnert, 2020).
The modern African state has struggled to build an inclusive continent. This originates from the seizure of an oppressive political structure, the colonial state, by an alliance of elites during a period where African politics had been entirely new to the concept of a modern sovereign state (Pecoraro, 2012). Political elites control a nation by direct and indirect mechanisms. For example, in Nigeria, elites do not occupy formal leadership positions. Instead, they choose and sponsor leaders who may act on their behalf and, by extension, of others (Bolarinwa & Osuji, 2022). With this, they prevail over others. Therefore, this means those in power do not represent the people's interests. Instead, they exercise power to ensure the interests of the political elites (Booth, 2009). This makeup of the modern African states is bound to give rise to conflict as people hold the state accountable for its failures. Hofmann and Schneckener (2011) contend that without inclusive development, VNSAs will continue undermining peace-and state-building, leading to violence. One of the challenges in addressing the rise of VNSAs is their ability to spread beyond borders (Marc, 2021). de Coning and Yaw Tchie (2023) further reflect that the growing threat of violent extremist groups and how these groups operate across borders has stimulated the need for a new type of security arrangement in Africa that is inclusive and underpinned by cooperation.

Colonialism and violent non-state actor in Africa: the security dilemma
Developmental debates and narratives on Africa today centre on one crucial question, to what extent has the modern African state socio-economically improved the lives of Africans in a postcolonial era? After independence, most black African countries entered a new era called Black Imperialism (Ayittey, 2006). By definition, black imperialism is the African exploitation by Africans and usually by top government officials, businessmen and women (Ayittey, 2006). Three decades after independence, the freedom and justice many people sacrificed their lives for has been replaced by tyranny, oppression and corruption. Cheeseman and Fisher (2019) narrate that the colonial era strengthened the power of "Big Men" -influential local leaders-over their communities. Before colonialism, African societies were much smaller and were characterized by people living in close-knit communities.
In most cases, a strong central authority was never recognized, which was essential to prevent the abuse of power. The low population density meant communities might move to another area if a ruler was excessively exploitative (Cheeseman & Fisher, 2019). However, this changed significantly with colonialism which undermined the accountability that African societies once displayed. Firstly, to ensure this was achieved, colonialism demarcated national boundaries, a central authority structure, and a more extensive bureaucracy and security forces. This meant postcolonial leaders would lead and wield power over a vast territory and diverse communities (Cheeseman & Fisher, 2019). Secondly, colonial leaders collaborated with-or subordinated-existing leaders and power structures. In many cases, this involved funding and arming willing collaborators to enable them to exert greater control over their communities (Cheeseman & Fisher, 2019). Therefore, the decolonization period was meant to consolidate a pan-Africanist developmental agenda where Africans take charge of their development (Daley, 1996). However, looking at how colonialism entrenched its governance structure, there were concerns that post-colonial leaders would face inherited colonial problems, which would be challenging to address because they were multifaceted. The absence of a strong state meant maintaining political stability depended on coercion and co-option. Leaders who understood the importance of this balancing act could stay in power for decades. Those who did not could be toppled in weeks (Cheeseman & Fisher, 2019). Even though the United Nations exists to maintain international peace, very few states can genuinely claim a monopoly of force within their territorial borders (Torpey, 1998). In Africa, conflicts are rooted in colonial legacies. There is hardly any zone of conflict in contemporary Africa that cannot trace its sordid violence to colonialism (Zeleza & Alfred, 2008). Unfortunately, the post-colonial African leader is still highly dependent on the former colonizer. Thus, issues relating to development are still largely influenced by the colonizer rather than Africans taking charge (Lephakga, 2017). When colonialism collapsed, it was hoped that Africa's liberation would come as the opportunity for Africa to prove her worth. However, contrary to such hopes, African countries in a post-colonial era have witnessed military dictatorships, corruption and never-ending conflicts (Wa Muiu, 2010). These challenges have hindered the need for development. Therefore, this paper argues that VNSAs are challenging the state's legitimacy because post-colonial leaders have failed to consolidate development. Even though one cannot ignore the colonial legacies in Africa's developmental challenges, solely blaming colonialism decades after its demise questions the postcolonial leaders' ability to consolidate inclusive development. As a result, VNSAs have sought to reshape the state's role, that is, since it cannot fulfil society's needs. While violence as an approach ought to be condemned, VNSAs have gained followers and sympathizers, thus signalling growing dissatisfaction with the modern African state (Vlassenroot, 2008). Table 1 below shows the major armed groups currently operating in Africa.

VNSAs and challenging the authority of state Nigeria
Nigeria has been battling with the Islamist armed group Boko Haram since 2009 and has seen more than two million displaced in the country's northeast (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Northern Nigeria (predominately Muslim) has been decrying the apparent neglect by the government for years, arguing that development has been concentrated towards the Southern part of the country (Olatunji, 2021). Onyeiwu (2021) revealed that 47.3% of Nigerians, or 98 million people, live in multidimensional poverty. Most of them are in northern Nigeria. This poverty rate does not include Borno State, where the insurgency has prevented data collection. For Tunji (2023), poor leadership has been the primary reason for the high poverty rate in northern Nigeria. Poor leadership, poverty and marginalization in the North have been central to Boko Haram's ability to grow and challenge the state. Nigeria and especially the North, have suffered an epileptic form of leadership borne out of a lacklustre attitude of elected persons to engineer the much-desired economic prosperity by exploiting regional assets, demographic potentials, geologic advantages, and agricultural benefits for economic, infrastructural, and human development (Tunji, 2023). Boko Haram has been able to control vast swaths of land, impose its own rules, and partake in illegal activities to fund its operations (Higazi, 2022). Efforts by the state and non-state actors to counter Boko Haram's funding capacity are failing to achieve the desired results. This is because of the inability of national and regional actors to implement various policies and measures regarding countering terrorist financing in the region (Dingji Maza et al., 2020). Initiatives such as the "African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)," the "NFIU," and the "National Counter-Terrorism Strategy" (NACTEST) and National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Extremism have not achieved significant results in curbing the financing of Boko Haram (Dingji Maza et al., 2020).
Since 2009, 35000 people have been killed because of the conflict (O'Connor et al., 2021). While Nigeria has deployed the military to quash the rebellion, the army has often complained about the lack of modern weapons, poor coordination, and a demotivated workforce (Sieff, 2015). The Economist (2016) noted that falling oil prices were putting pressure on military spending, thus depriving the army of the much-needed investment in modern artillery and weapons. This has been detrimental to the need to quash the rebellion as Boko Haram has been able to finance the procurement of modern weapons, thus placing it at an advantage over its battle with the military (Akinfenwa, 2021). However, a regional contingent made up of troops under the Multinational Joint Task Force, comprising of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria-was activated in 2014 to respond to the threat of Boko Haram, organized crime, and banditry in the Lake Chad Basin (Dadur & Aliyu, 2021). While the task force has been able to push back the advances of Boko Haram and retake some of the captured lands, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive regional cooperation framework for combating terrorism financing in the region, which draws on the commitment of all members (Attah, 2019). However, while considerable attention has been paid to Boko Haram, another deadly conflict has occurred in the country. In Nigeria's Middle Belt, the competition for land and other resources has intensified between nomadic Fulani herders and sedentary farmers . Unger (2021) communicates that while tensions between herders and farmers have existed since the Fourth Nigerian Republic's founding in 1999, violent clashes have become increasingly frequent in the last few years. The conflict has also seen the introduction of ethnic and religious dimensions. For example, the Hausa and Fulani populations in the North of Nigeria are predominantly Muslim, while the Southern region is mainly Christian (Brottem, 2021). The Buhari lead government attempted to intervene and address the conflict. One of the proposed intervention proposals was the introduction of Ruga settlements (a Hausa term for the Fulani settlements) which would feature grazing areas and villages with some basic infrastructure-a school, a health  (2015) centre, and a vet (Ademola, 2020). The Ruga zones were supposed to accommodate the pastoralist groups and their livestock, thus helping reduce the confrontations. However, this idea has become a highly politicized debate which has faced strong opposition from opposition-run states (Gansler, 2019). There have also been fears of a lack of government consultation over the idea and that government has ulterior motives through Ruga rather than the need to address the conflict (Adebayo, 2019). Since 2010, there have been over 15,000 deaths linked to farmer-herder violence.
Half of those have occurred since 2018 (Brottem, 2021). At the core is the disagreement over the use of land and water, livestock theft or the obstruction of traditional migration routes (Brottem, 2021). As climate change alters weather patterns, herders have had to search for alternative pastures and sources of water for their cattle, leading to confrontations with farmers (Issifu et al., 2022).

Democratic Republic of the Congo
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is considered the world's richest country in terms of wealth in natural resources. Most raw mineral deposits remain untapped and are worth an estimated $24 trillion (Stimpson, 2020). However, these resources have not worked for the country as neverending conflict, the rise of VNSAs, instability in governance, and the inability to promote inclusive economic development have derailed the country's developmental agenda (Verweijen et al., 2022). However, one cannot be naïve and not associate the underdevelopment and conflict of the DRC without observing its colonial past. Ruthless rule and the disintegration of indigenous society, coupled with the denial of education, characterized how Belgium's autocratic rule disintegrated Congolese society (BBC News, 2013). When independence eventually came in 1960, bits of the vast country immediately attempted to break away as different groups pushed for autonomy. When Congo collapsed, anarchy spread (BBC News, 2013). This collapse gave rise to VNSAs, who saw the country's vast wealth as a reason for the need for self-governance. The Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group has (even though Rwanda denies backing the group) been by far the most contributor to violence in the eastern part of the country (Aljazeera, 2022b). However, it becomes essential to understand what drives the ability of the group to inflict considerable harm in the country despite the presence of UN peacekeepers. The M23 was an offshoot of the National Congress for the Defence of the People, better known by its French acronym CNDP, a rebel group which fought the DRC government between 2006 and 2009 (Ntanyoma, 2022). For both groups, the systematic marginalization and discrimination of Congolese Tutsi and other ethnic communities in the north and south Kivu has been ongoing as they are neglected in terms of service delivery and are considered to be of Rwandan descent and are commonly referred to as "Rwandophones (Ntanyoma, 2022). Since 1996, Parens (2022) reflects that as many as 6 million people have been killed in the conflict. In the eastern part of the country, more than 100 armed groups are operating there (Center for Preventive Action, 2023). The rise of VNSAs has largely been driven by the mineral trade, which provides financial means for groups to operate and buy arms (Center for Preventive Action, 2023). In 2010, legislation passed in the US was meant to reduce the purchase of "conflict minerals" and prevent the funding of armed militias (Stoop et al., 2018). As a result, many international companies have reduced their transaction with the DRC, thus, putting many miners out of work and even driving some to join armed groups to gain a source of livelihood (Center for Preventive Action, 2023). Since its emergence, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has carried out sophisticated attacks in the DRC. The Peace and Security Council Report (2017) notes that in 2017, the group abducted over 700 people and displaced hundreds of civilians; in February, it carried out 16 attacks in which 70 civilians were kidnapped in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR). Since its emergence, the group has been known for kidnapping and using children in armed conflict (Kelly et al., 2016). Joseph Kony has led the LRA as one of central Africa's cruellest armed groups over the past 30 years (GKToday, 2021). The group has abducted over 67,000 youth, including 30,000 children, for use as child soldiers, sex slaves, and porters and has brutalized communities since it was formed in the year 1987 (GKToday, 2021). However, AfricanNews (2021) mentions that the use of children in armed combat is not new in the country as in the 1990s, child soldiers known as "kadogos" were numerous in the rebel army of Laurent-Desire Kabila, who overthrew President Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997. In 2020, a United Nations report verified that 8,521 children were used as soldiers in 2020, while another 2,674 children were killed and 5,748 injured in various conflicts (Thomson Reuters, 2022). According to some estimates, up to 40% of child soldiers are in Africa. Eastern DRC has the highest number of child soldiers in Africa and the world (Tarver, 2021). The report states that armed groups in the South Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo recruited more than 470 children into their ranks in 2021 (Tasamba, 2021). However, another challenge is the lack of effective reintegration policies for rescued former child soldiers. Re-recruitment rates in eastern DRC have generally been regarded as high. About 60% of active child soldiers have belonged to one or two armed groups (International Peace Support Training Centre, 2013). . Rebel groups hold considerable power and influence at the grassroots. Weak governance has allowed armed groups to subject Congolese civilians to widespread rape and sexual violence, massive human rights violations, and extreme poverty (Center for Preventive Action, 2023). As a result, the Congolese state has been unable to maintain control over its territory, which comprises its role as the guarantor of peace and security. Ongoing violence across the country, particularly in the Ituri, Kasai, and Kivu regions and with more than 100 armed groups in operation makes it difficult for the state to impose the rule of law, thus undermining inclusive development (Center for Preventive Action, 2023a).

Mozambique and Somalia
Apart from DRC, concerning conflict, Southern Africa has been, in the past, seen as a relatively peaceful region apart from battling poverty, inequality and unemployment (World Bank, 2022). However, this changed in 2017 when northern Mozambique's Cabo Delgado region was plunged into chaos (Vhumbunu, 2021). On 18 February 2010, Anadarko Mozambique-a subsidiary of Anadarko Petroleum (bought by Occidental Petroleum in 2019)-discovered a massive natural gas field in the Rovuma Basin off the coast of northern Mozambique (Prashad, 2021). Some of the world's largest energy corporations flocked to the Cabo Delgado province, where the basin is located, as this discovery was projected to change the region's economic fortunes. The structural and systemic" character of social, economic and political dissatisfaction in Cabo Delgado explains the duration of armed violence in the province (Prashad, 2021). Since the revolt-turned-insurgency, over 4 000 people have been killed and 800 000 displaced due to the insurgency that broke out at the end of 2017 (Vaudran, 2022). The predominantly Muslim region has long spoken about the supposed abandonment and marginalization by the state since colonial times, and that feeling continued after independence (Mlambo & Masuku, 2022). While the Mozambique government has responded with force, military force does not create employment or help address marginalization or promote inclusive development, hence the need for a more balanced approach that addresses the root causes (Geopolitical Intelligence Services, 2020). Rather than listening to the pleas of the Muslim north, the government opted for criminalizing and demonizing the causes behind the insurgency, failing to reflect on the socio-economic deprivation, which is the root cause of the conflict (Club of Mozambique, 2021). Studies note that global terrorism or insurgency is greatly linked with poverty, economic exclusion, and the weakness of the state to enforce laws, thus allowing for fertile ground for recruiting disaffected parts of the population into the fundamentalist ranks (Club of Mozambique, 2021). The militant group Ahlu-Sunnah wal Jama'a (ASWJ) has taken advantage of the poverty, marginalization and economic exclusion to consolidate an anti-state feeling in the region. Locals feel marginalized by corrupt elites. Some have lost their land and livelihoods to the gas infrastructure built onshore (Vaudran, 2022). They are doubtful that these projects will reduce poverty and improve service delivery. Thus, such thinking has become vital to the jihadist's recruitment process.
In Somalia, Muibu (2022) argues that the growth of al-Shabaab has been premised on ridding Somalia of foreign forces and implementing Sharia law. The International Rescue Committee (2022) contends that by mid-2023, over 8 million people-nearly half of the population-will be living through crisis levels of food insecurity as the country faces an impending famine. Over the past decade (2010-2020), more than 4,000 civilians have been killed in al-Shabaab attacks, with more deaths in Somalia and fewer in Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti (Maruf, 2020). The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), with its international backers, including the United States, has waged war on al-Shabaab since 2007 (O'Brien, 2022). Despite fifteen years of conflict, with annual costs reaching upward of $900 million, al-Shabaab remains a severe existential threat to Somalia, and there will unlikely be a political solution to the conflict without significant capacity improvements by the Somali federal government (O'Brien, 2022). While the support of The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has played a massive role in stabilizing Somalia, the country cannot defeat al-Shabaab politically because the state cannot demonstrate that it can effectively deliver rudimentary services and govern its people better than the extremists (O'Brien, 2022). The political system used in the country (the so-called 4.5 system) allocates political power and positions based on tribal affiliation rather than direct election, limiting the number of educated and qualified individuals in government positions and thereby weakening institutions (O'Brien, 2022).

Mali
Mali has experienced conflict regularly since its independence in 1960. The first rebellion took place in 1964. Since then, rebellions have been cyclical and recurrent (Wee et al., 2014). Violence in the Sahel region is primarily linked to the collapse of the Libyan state in 2011, which led to the proliferation of weapons and armed fighters (Center for Preventive Action, 2023b). Insurgents have also been able to solicit support from society. For example, groups have won the population's trust by offering several essential services where the state struggles to provide security, education, or healthcare for the Malian population (Chauzal, 2020). To solicit widespread social support, armed groups in Mali have succeeded in competing with the state among what are considered to be the most marginalized classes of the population (i.e. nomadic pastoralists, rural populations isolated from urban centres and young people (Tobie & Sangaré, 2019). Although the government has recently taken steps to (re)deploy security and defence forces in the regions of Mopti and Ségou, the provision of essential social services and economic development remains greatly neglected. For years, this situation forced people to turn to other service providers, for example, traditional authorities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to support them (Tobie & Sangaré, 2019). Armed groups have taken it upon themselves to fill this vacuum by "protecting" the population or addressing the state's shortcomings and providing public services such as judicial, health and education systems (Chauzal, 2020). This has increased the support for armed groups. While their methods of operation may be seen as unorthodox, the failure of the state to provide essential services has driven communities into the arms of armed groups (Tobie & Sangaré, 2019). In desperation to address the growth of these armed groups, the Malian government has played host of other actors, such as the French military and, more recently, the Russian paramilitary organization Wagner group (Ehl, 2023). However, addressing the conflict in the Sahel requires many regional states to commit to a collective security framework, as a combination of weak states with limited control of vast territories and borders drives conflicts.
Other countries where violence has been observed include Burkina Faso, which has become the epicentre of armed group violence in the Central Sahel region since 2019 (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Several non-state armed groups are active in the country, including Ansarul Islam,and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (Durmaz, 2022). Armed groups at the epicentre of the conflict are seeking to control the country's gold mines and regional economic trade routes connecting other landlocked Sahel countries to the West African coast. In Chad, while in 2022, the government and more than 40 rebel groups signed an agreement that paves the way for national reconciliation talks and a return to civilian rule (Aljazeera, 2022a), there is fear that outbreaks of violence will likely continue drawing from the rest of the Sahel region.
In Northern Mali, armed groups such as Ansar al-Din, AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Katibat Macina, Ansarul Islam and The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara have consolidated their presence, often with devastating implications for local communities (Institute for International Political Studies, 2021). Since 2012, Mali has faced a volatile crisis as armed political groups, including ethnic-based movements, jihadist groups and transnational criminal networks, fight for hegemony and the control of trafficking routes in the North (Asian News International, 2019). When the Tuareg rebel groups took up arms against the government, with the support of violent extremist groups in 2012, these networks widened their allegiances (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023). Even though a 2015 peace deal (The Algiers Accord) aimed to bring stability to the country's vast northern desert, the deal has not yielded the desired results. Al Arabiya (2023) notes that in 2022, rebels' groups, under the Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA), pulled out of long-running peace talks based on a 2015 Algiers accord because of what they call a lack of political will on the part of the country's military government. Like other Sahel countries, Mali has been characterized by an increasing conflict between Fulani herders and the Dogon ethnic group. In central Mali, killings highlight the age-old conflict between the nomadic and predominantly Muslim Fulani and the Bambara and Dogon ethnic tribes (Benjaminsen & Ba, 2021;Hansen, 2019). The Fulani are primarily cattle breeders and traders, while the Bambara and Dogon are traditionally sedentary farmers (Brottem, 2021). The Bambara and Dogon ethnic tribes accuse the Fulani of grazing cattle on Dogon land and water access issues. Over the years, fighting has intensified. In 2019, 134 Fulani herders were massacred in central Mali, allegedly by members of the Dogon ethnic group (France24, 2019). A UN report 2019 maintained that in 2018, fighting between the Fulani and Dogon ethnic communities resulted in the deaths of some 600 women, children and men (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2019). The Dogon, who have been victims of militant attacks, accuse the Fulani of aiding the jihadists.
Meanwhile, the Fulani say that the government has armed the Dogon self-defence groups and is committing atrocities against them, which the authorities deny (BBC, 2019). The continuation of this conflict means there will likely be an upsurge in those displaced and the subsequent increase of regional refugees. In the last decade, these conflicts have increased due to using assault rifles and other military-grade weaponry in cattle herding .

VNSAs and a state response: the question of legitimacy
The state's legitimacy lies in its ability to protect, deliver essential services, respond to the needs of the people, and create an environment conducive to business development and investments (Jawad et al., 2021). However, there was added pressure on the modern African state to consider other issues that were key in the drive for unity, such as uniting the different ethnic and tribal groups that made up the composition of the continent (Wa Muiu, 2010). Reflecting on Africa's developmental misfortunes, an essential question is: How long will Africa keep blaming colonialism for its socialeconomic misfortunes? Even though one cannot take away the role of colonialism in Africa's underdevelopment, one must submit that the modern African state has found it challenging to forge a collective developmental framework to ensure the continent's development (Aka, 1997). Socioeconomic marginalization, never-ending conflicts, and governance detached from the people's needs have given rise to rebellion against the concept of the state (Ganahl, 2014). This has inadvertently forced one to think critically about the state's role in one's development. If states provide essential services, exercise control over the territory and promote economic development, one can argue that there will be little, if no, rebellion against the state. Today, VNSAs have been able to solicit support and sympathizers in communities, consolidating the argument that the state has failed to improve their socioeconomic conditions (Asal et al., 2022). Unfortunately, states still need to improve governance processes and ensure political stability, especially in the Sahel. Even though the African Union has been granted the right to intervene in a member state in respect of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (Perez-Leon-Acevedo, 2016), it has not played a considerable role in improving governance and political instability, which are the root causes of the emergence of VNSAs. Yeşiltaş et al. (2022) note that VNSAs undermine the state's unique character by claiming strategic/territorial autonomy from within the state's borders. Historically, conflict management in West African countries (francophone) has frequently involved the French military (Siradağ, 2014), consolidating the argument that Africa is still highly dependent on foreign powers rather than unity in the continent, questioning the independence posture. However, today with the changing nature of international politics, other players have seemingly joined the scramble for Africa, further complicating the quest for peace and stability. For example, fighting armed groups in Mali has seen the introduction of the Russia's Wagner group after the Mali Junta government expelled French forces. The support for the Russian organization has often drawn criticism from Western nations, who see the group as an extension of Russia's influence (Ehl, 2023). One cannot deny that Africa is in the middle of great power competition; hence world powers are likely to pursue their interests in helping Africa through the pretext of combating terrorism. Siegle (2021) states that the 82 coups Africa experienced between 1960 and 2000 devastated the continentcontributing to instability, corruption, human rights abuses, impunity, and poverty. The Organisation of African Unity's policy of non-interference meant coup plotters did not need to worry about external costs. The plethora of coups during this era demonstrates the open invitation to military takeovers (Siegle, 2021). The socioeconomic destruction as a result of VNSAs and the inability of the state to rein in on thier growth and influence coupled, with the modern African states' failure to fulfil its primary mandates, drives the emergence of VNSAs. Armed groups will constantly challenge the state's legitimacy unless it is capacitated enough to fulfil its primary mandate (Rotberg, 2003). Moreover, it becomes imperative to ensure that the continent's resources work for the continent and help drive economic growth to improve the livelihoods of Africans. Failure to do this will likely embolden VNSAs and challenge the state's legitimacy.
However, apart from stopping the inflow of weapons to the Sahel, governments in the region need to contend with the growth in sophisticated technology which can aid VNSAs in their operations. Access to drones has changed how armed groups carry out their operations, as these devices allow them to gather surveillance, further changing the dynamics on the battlefield (Allen, 2022). The use of drones in combat has become a game changer as terrorists are using drones to identify targets and conduct surveillance in Africa (Africa Defense Forum, 2022). The risk of militarization of drone technology in Africa represents a new asymmetric tool that violent nonstate groups may deploy to extend the reach of their coercion, reshaping the African battlefield (Ekene, 2022). Using drones in combat gained traction in the battle for Mosul in Iraq when ISIS deployed a weaponized drone or Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). With a range of about a mile and a half, the device had been built and loaded with explosives and detonated in a densely populated urban battlefield (Allen, 2021). The impact was both physical and psychological. In Africa, Africa Defense Forum (2022) communicated that even though drones have not been as sophisticated as in the Middle East, where drones have been equipped with explosives to target troops, it does not mean it will not happen. In Mozambique, drones have been used by extremists for surveillance. Allen (2022) further notes that today, armed groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia and insurgents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique are applying drone technology in combat. In Africa, drones are being weaponized by terrorists for surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance. Olumba (2022) reflects a greater need for Africa to invest in drone research and development to tackle insecurity in the Sahel. African governments must adapt to the changes in the battlefield to ensure the possibility of success in addressing terror-related conflicts.

Concluding remarks
Undoubtedly the demise of colonialism in Africa was seen as an opportunity for the continent to drive inclusive socio-economic development, which reflected the needs of the people. There was hope that a post-colonial Africa would put the needs of the people first. There was hope that the post-colonial leader would usher in developmental frameworks to ensure the continent's natural resources are used to spur the collective development of all African people. There was hope that concepts such as Pan-Africanism, African Solidarity and Ubuntu would form part of the developmental discourse in a post-colonial Africa. Nevertheless, never-ending conflicts, political instability, governance systems that do not reflect the needs of the people and widespread corruption have turned the post-colonial era into a period of misery for many Africans. Patrimonialism, political elitism and the abuse of power have become characteristics of post-colonial Africa. Disfrancished by what they see as neglect, various armed groups have violently challenged the state. These groups have gained sympathizers in communities that share similar sentiments. The role of external actors in Africa's underdevelopment cannot be ignored; colonialism underdeveloped Africa, and today, post-colonial leaders are struggling to break free from the chains of colonialism. Without adequate service delivery, inclusive development and stability in governance, VNSAs will continue to challenge the state's legitimacy and fill the vacuum left by the state concerning the lack of service delivery, thus, enabling them to garner social support at the detriment of peace and social cohesion.

Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Data availability statement
Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analyzed in this study.