When Security Imperatives meet Sectarian Temptations: the Tehran-Riyadh rivalry

Abstract This paper discusses how security considerations and sectarianism have served Iran and Saudi Arabia as mutually reinforcing tools in their strife to secure their positions in the struggle for regional influence and standing. It premises that no single factor can explain this conflict and that its proper understanding requires a more comprehensive approach that links factors and analyses their joint impact. The main hypothesis is that an analysis of the impacts of security and sectarianism, both individually and as mutually reinforcing dynamics, allows for a more credible understanding of the Iran-Saudi Arabia conflict. The discussion studies the approaches that both sides have adopted as they dealt with regional developments and made efforts to preserve their legitimacy and internal stability. It contextualizes these approaches with the rivalry during the era of the Shah, the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, the end of the Cold War, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, and the Arab uprisings of 2011, particularly the conflict in Syria. This study proposes that understanding how sectarianism and security considerations have impacted both countries’ decision-making since 1979 can help explain how security has become an essential element in the Tehran-Riyadh conflict.


Introduction
Political theories, including international relations theories and comparative studies, generally agree that states have the profound tendency to use all feasible means to prevent other states from gaining sufficient power to dominate. This may include seeking parity and engaging in direct or indirect war. Parity is achieved by bolstering individual states or forming counterbalancing alliances that aim to reduce insecurity, deter an aggressive state from initiating an attack, and allow a weak state to avoid defeat if attacked (Heo et al., 2003;Lemke & Werner, 1996). Parity can also serve as an initial step towards securing hegemony. Wars-whether direct, or proxy, and even if deemed illegitimate-are another means to assert status (Spykman, 1942, p. 25). By employing aggressive approaches and protective measures, countries may avoid the tolls of a prolonged conflict or of pressures that could be worse than waging war (Palmer & Perkins, 1970, p. 212). They adjust and re-adjust their policies and positions to keep pace with changing conditions, and countries unable to employ such measures lose more than those that can (E. V. Gulick, quoted in Schweller, 2016). To maintain power, states must overcome and manipulate political, ideological, and personal obstacles, keeping in mind the golden rule that today's friend could become tomorrow's enemy; as Gulick cautions, "never destroy a power under the pretext of restraining it" (Schweller, 2016, p. 8).
To manage conflict, states employ a range of means, including soft methods such as dialogue, diplomacy, and cooperation as well as harsh measures such as boycotts, escalation, and proxy wars. The repercussions that balancing-or failing to balance-power have on the potential for war or peace are wide-ranging (Little, 2014;Suganami, 1996). One view notes that a significant power imbalance allows the stronger state to impose its will and may force a state to surrender or bear the burden of loss, including a lost war (Paul, 2006;Vasquez, 1996). Therefore, peace and stability may be threatened when states have unequal power because an unequal condition increases, rather than decreases, the probability of war (Claude, 1962;Jeong, 2017). Conflict may allow the stronger party to unrestrainedly impose facts on the ground, strengthen its position, and bolster its ability to maximize gains, which is why a power imbalance may become dangerous. Ideally, both sides acknowledge that they are equal in status, rights, and security needs (Gallo & Marzano, 2009). The latter situation, however, may be an ideal premise and occurs only rarely because conflicting parties hardly accept such equality, as is the case with Iran and Saudi Arabia, the concern of this paper.
The approaches utilized to investigate the causes of the enmity between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the results emerging from such studies are disparate, at times decidedly contradictory. Cited causes range from geopolitics to Iranian hegemonic aspirations, tensions between Persian and Arab nationalism, foreign (Western) intervention in the region, competition over leadership, security considerations, and sectarianism. 1 There is general agreement, however, that the repercussions are wide ranging. Ibrahim Fraihat quotes a workshop participant stating, "If the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia is resolved, then half of the Middle East conflicts will disappear" (2020,p. 1), and the Tehran-Riyadh conflict may be the only one to compete with the Palestinian conflict in terms of level of complexity and range of consequences. This paper discusses the interaction between security and sectarianism and explores the joint impact of both factors on this conflict. The discussion bears in mind several considerations. Any single factor, including security, does not explain the conflict. Rather than focusing on one aspect, this study thus links various factors that influence the conflict because recognizing how they interrelate is crucially relevant for an understanding. For example, while security and internal considerations are vital, foreign (particularly American) interference is important as well. Western military bases in the region and Israeli threats against Iran explain why Tehran feels besieged and in need of allies, the acquisition of which in turn increases Saudi Arabia's fears. Moreover, one must keep in mind that the factors that affect the conflict vary in stability and constancy. For example, the international system, whether unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar, has always been a powerful influencing factor, whereas the influence of sectarianism was less relevant in the years preceding the Iranian revolution (1979) and rose strongly thereafter. In addition, it is important to realize that the conflict is susceptible to internal conditions, particularly political and social differences, and to the perceptions and interests of relevant elites, whether they are reformist or conservative, associated with the regime, or belonging to the opposition. Unsurprisingly, the conflict is strongly influenced by the ruling elites that are able to turn security attributes and sectarianism into repressive means in the name of internal stability.
Building on the premise that a single factor, no matter how important, cannot explain this multilayered conflict, the argument's main hypothesis asserts that by analyzing the impact of security and sectarianism both individually and jointly, a deeper and more credible comprehension of this conflict is possible. While each factor by itself explains certain aspects of the conflict, their instructive power increases when linked together, each becoming a testing ground to assess the impact of the other. Similar to the linkage that Matthiesen (2017) makes in his study on Bahrain, an understanding of how sectarianism has impacted security since 1979 will enable us to better understand how the latter has become essential in the Tehran-Riyadh conflict. The analysis contextualizes important developments such as the 1979 Iranian revolution, the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, and the Arab uprisings of 2011.
The main body of the discussion consists of three sections. The first discusses the meaning and utilization of security and sectarianism and their impact on the Tehran-Riyadh conflict. The second section broadly sketches the characterizations of the two polities and assesses the rivalry between them from the Shah era to the Iranian revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, the Iran-Iraq War (1980)(1981)(1982)(1983)(1984)(1985)(1986)(1987)(1988), the end of the Cold War (1990), and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The third section focuses on the rivalry since the 2011Arab uprisings. It deals with the reactions to the uprisings, giving particular attention to the conflict in Syria; assesses the extent of success of both sides; and examines their utilization of sectarian rhetoric to serve security considerations.

The security challenge
Maintaining security, defined by the MacMillan Dictionary as "safety from attack, harm, or damage," is a classical, universal challenge. It is encountered by all states, and the task is particularly taxing in the absence of a global force (institutions and authorities) that could enable states to take charge of their security and pursue their generally narrow self-interests (Schweller, 2016). While always crucial, security is neither static nor unconditional and, as Jervis (1978) asserts, threats to security increase at times of competition, tension, and conflict and decrease at times of cooperation, prosperity, and peace. Moreover, security is not only an arena for struggle among states but also a biased term (Lipschutz, 1995) and subject to varying interpretations.
The related issue of securitization is raised frequently in the literature on the Tehran-Riyadh conflict. 2 Discussing the interplay between security and sectarianism in Bahrain, Matthiesen (2017, p. 200) defines securitization as: [T]he processes by which political actors transform subjects that do not constitute existential threats to the survival or the territorial integrity of the state into matters of national security, thereby securitizing subjects and legitimizing extraordinary measures to "deal" with those "threats." Perceptions and speech acts, i.e., the ways politicians think and talk about certain "threats" are key. (Matthiesen, 2017, p. 200) Security and securitization are crucial for Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the achieving of security (or at least perception thereof), is likely to reduce conflict not only between Riyadh and Tehran but also in the wider region. But as the two states embody radically different types of government, they also hold two very distinct visions of regional order and security.
Manifestations of US power in the region is one of the key factors at the core of the conflict: Iran considers them a threat, whereas SA perceives them as an external balancer that holds Iran in check (Malmvig, 2016, p. 9). Thus, the conflicting security needs of the two parties and each side's perception that the other side constitutes a stumbling block for-if not threat to-the achievement of security complicate this conflict (Fraihat, 2020). Iran feels endangered by the spread of US bases in the region and by the American-Israeli alliance against it, which explains Tehran's strive to expand its own network of alliances in the region. This in turn causes Riyadh to feel threatened, seeking the support of the United States. The resulting mutual, reciprocal distrust causes a major quandary for the two parties because "both sides are caught up in this security dilemma and mistakenly have adopted a strategy of escalation to resolve it" (Fraihat, 2020, p. 4). The exacerbation of this impasse, as both sides are choosing to intensify the conflict in order to deal with it, has repercussions on the stability of both countries' regimes. By standing against the United States and its allies, Iran seeks to legitimize its revolutionary rhetoric and distract its people from the regime's inability to improve their standard of living while gaining approval for its expansionist foreign policy (Maloney, 2019). As Riyadh challenges Tehran, the Saudi regime strives to contain calls for internal reform. Thus, the security perceptions of both parties are related to external influences, to the nature of their two respective systems of government, and to the challenges they encounter in carrying out, or refusing to carry out, internal reform (Wehrey, 2016).

Contests and sectarianism
Sectarianism is defined as the "excessive attachment to a particular sect or party, especially in religion" (Al-Hindawi & Kadhim 2021,pp. 408-425). It utilizes faith-based convictions and principles whose roots lie in the past and that have, over time, become an identity for a group or community. Sectarianism 3 is frequently caused by both internal and regional factors, including rivalries among states over what Bishara (2021) calls the formulation of a sectarian identity. Its meaning is acquired partly through the perceptions of onlookers who take an attitude towards a group after it has been categorized as "other." Simon Mabon suggests three theories to explain sectarianism's rising influence over recent decades (2020,p. 3). The first emphasizes bottom-up drivers of sectarianism, when individuals and groups respond to threats and opportunities that arise from state failure, identitybased repression, and weak authority. The second links sectarianism to leaders who harness public discourse to distort their opponents' image on sectarian grounds. The third theory views the phenomenon through the lens of geopolitical rivalry, when two sides exploit faith to increase their influence and harness support. The suffix -ism in sectarianism suggests an identity, ideology, or even way of life. 4 As it induces the entrenchment of groups behind particular convictions and beliefs, sectarianism becomes part of the conflict and aids in narrowing the space for cooperation with other groups.
Sectarianization denotes the use of religious doctrine to manipulate the adherents of a faith or sect for political gains and the framing of a political conflict in religious terms in order to achieve political goals. It can be understood better in the context of various contending agendas that may be pursued by an existing rule, an opposition, or even an external party. Sectarianization is carried out by political parties within certain settings and for a specific purpose, which involves the mobilization of sentiments around specific identity determinants (Hashemi & Postel, 2017a, p. 3). As a method of using identity to reproduce power relations (Wiesner, 2020), it must be viewed in in the context of efforts to re-engineer a state and society and to restore groups and agendas, as happened in Iraq after the 2003 US invasion. Sectarianization is applied by rulers, political parties, opposition groups, religious figures, institutions, and the media and always serves a higher master who stands behind an agenda while aspiring to defend the regime, de-legitimize an opposition, or submit to a foreign power.
Sectarianization transforms sectarianism into a state of diligent activity and renders it an industry or agenda that serves certain groups as they expand their influence. As sectarianism becomes an effective strategy to gain influence and legitimacy, transforming an existing power structure, it leaves a strong impact on the various aspects of society, including education, laws, civil society, culture, and external relations. Thereby, sectarianization permeates political, social, and cultural discourse and conduct and becomes part of a region's societal and cultural identity.
Authoritarian regimes employ sectarianism to conceal illegitimacy, misrepresentation, and the absence of democracy. Such regimes are among the parties that benefit the most from sectarianization because it helps them conceal illegitimacy, advance the spread of misinformation, and hide the absence of democracy. Hashemi and Postel (2017a, pp. 3-4) conclude that because authoritarianism's corrosive legacy has deeply stained the societies of the Middle Eastern region, totalitarianism, not theology, is the central issue in the ongoing sectarianization process.
De-sectarianization is the effort to oppose sectarianization and a necessary strategy if a society wishes to counteract the effects inflicted by sectarianization (Mabon, 2020).

Varying meanings and modes of utilization
Iran and Saudi Arabia have employed changing means-both soft and hard, including sectarianization-to achieve security. They have strengthened internal stability and augmented their rivalry for dominance by politicizing their respective versions of Islam. Promoting sectarianism has prompted each side to perceive the other side as challenging its security and legitimacy. Convinced that the Iranian interpretation of Islam is inauthentic, Riyadh deems Tehran's approach as dangerous, erroneous, and a threat (Fraihat, 2020). And while Tehran considers the Shia in Arab countries as an extension of its ideological influence, Riyadh deems the Saudi Shia a fifth column and an extension of the enemy, which reinforces a deeply ingrained stereotype among Sunnis, particularly in Saudi Arabia with its strictly anti-Shia Wahhabi doctrine (Gause, 2020). Correspondingly, Iran justifies its ties with regional Shia allies as responding to the threat posed by fanatical Sunni factions (Akbarzadeh, 2015).
Commentators generally disagree over where to position sectarianism in the Riyadh-Tehran rivalry and on how to assess its impact. Commentators such as Wehrey (2016, p. 19), for example, argue that the rivalry is informed less by sectarianism and more by other internal and geopolitical factors. Nasr (2007, p. 22) places sectarianism at the heart of the Iran-Saudi Arabia conflict, considering it a determining factor that has traditionally influenced Islamic political history and is likely to continue. This view is challenged by other commentators such as Saqr (2016), who places sectarianism into the larger context of regional, political, security, and economic factors that include the two countries' distinct approaches to oil market policies as well as Persian versus Arab national aspirations. Matthiesen places sectarianism in the context of an ongoing transformation of religious group identities into politically oriented ethno-sectarian identities (such as the Shia minorities in the Gulf) that increasingly are considered a threat, both locally and regionally (2014). This characterization is not inconsistent with Lynch (2016b,p. 15) who emphasized the "top-down push towards sectarian polarization" and relates the rise of sectarianism to the manipulation of identity politics by and within regimes. Halalwi (2017, Introduction) assert that such manipulation has become indispensable for regime survival. Gengler (2017) associates sectarianism with efforts to acquire legitimate authority and preponderance, as Gulf rulers' legitimacy deficit, feeble or dysfunctional participatory institutions, discrimination in key sectors, and uneven economic development contribute to regional Sunni-Shia tensions (Wehrey, 2016). Similarly, Al-Rasheed (2017, p. 152) judges sectarianism as a policy that covers up illegitimacy and prevents revolution. Al-Rasheed exposes that ruling circles instrumentalize religious differences and levels of diversity and pluralism when they engage in political struggles against their constituencies. 5 Halalwi (2017) emphasizes that authoritarian regimes have gained "decades of experience in instrumentalizing religious differences," which explains why they have been so effective in thwarting the prospect of democratic change, co-opting popular mobilization, and, in some cases, renewing allegiances to authoritarian allies.
While legitimacy crises are factors that credibly explain certain aspects of this conflict-why and how rulers deploy sectarianism to suppress an opposition or forcefully manage society (Lynch, 2016, p. 5)-the repercussions of sectarianism should not be minimized. Sectarianism has instigated animosity and bitterness not only between Saudi Arabia and Iran but in the entire region. In 2012, only 53 percent of Sunnis in seven Arab countries (Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Iraq, and Tunisia) believed that Shias are Muslims Pew(Research Center, 2012). Hostility has been observed in mosques, media, public gatherings, and political discussions. Nourished by both capitals-willingly or otherwise-to serve their regional rivalry for control and leadership, sectarianism has revived differing interpretations of religion, increased the awareness of ethnicities and tribal groupings, and deepened intolerance (Mabon, 2018).
Despite its relevance, sectarianism cannot be considered the sole or main factor in explaining the Iran-Saudi Arabia conflict or any other conflict in the Middle East (Lynch, 2013) because political relations and alliances that are premised in security and other narrow interests may transcend sectarian considerations. For example, Riyadh for some time supported the Shia Imamate in Yemen, and its main allies in Lebanon are the liberal Al-Mustaqbal party and the predominantly Christian March 14 Alliance. Iran supports the Sunni Hamas movement in Palestine and backs Christian Armenia against majority-Shia Azerbaijan (Richter, 2012).

Two different polities
Before discussing the decades-long thorny relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it is necessary to outline the general features of the two regimes. The Saudi monarchical rule considers itself a stalwart of continuity and Islamic tradition, as it is the guardian of the holy sites. As a polity, Saudi Arabia lacks elections, political parties, a parliament, freedom of the press, and civil liberties. With the ruling family limiting the role of civil society and controlling the country's wealth and all relevant aspects of societal and political life, the Saudi people are subject to the monarch (and the crown prince, as of recently) rather than the state and its laws and institutions. 6 This rigidity imperils internal cohesion because it satisfies neither the advocates of change nor their arch-opponents, the Sunni extremists who in 1979 seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca to challenge the Saudi authorities. To encounter the internal threats, the ruling family sought the support of the Wahhabis, an austerity-preaching sect and the family's Sunni ally since 1744. Historically, the Wahhabi clergy has consistently considered Shias as their main enemy, whereas relations between Shia political leaders and the Saudi ruling family have fluctuated. However, the ruling family has pointed to the "Shia threat" whenever faced with internal and external unrest (Matthiesen, 2014).
Making efforts to reinforce sectarianism, the regime has invested heavily in exporting Wahhabi teachings (Lacey, 2010). Thus, Riyadh spent between 1975 and 2000 over US$70 billion of "overseas development aid" to consolidate its international standing and promote Wahhabism (Jonsson, 2006), building 1,359 mosques, 210 Islamic centers, 202 colleges, and 2,000 schools (Okruhlik, 2003). Nonetheless, internal disjointedness has remained, if not worsened. Despite its resort to sectarianism and with the ongoing escalation of its rivalry with Iran, the regime remains vulnerable and reliant on protection from the outside.
Iran's ideology is based on the Shia interpretation of Islam and claims to be open to modernity, diversity, social mobility, and democracy (Azimi, 2010). Thus, the defenders of this ideology believe that the existing system of government possesses a degree of dynamism that the Saudi governmental system is lacking. One of the arguments presented to support this claim is that Iran has diverse political and ideological elites that include moderates, centrists, and radicals (Al-Samadi, 2017), which cannot be seen in Saudi Arabia. But while true legitimacy is an expression of the will of the people, in the Iranian case that will is severely restricted by the religious doctrine of Velayate Faqih that places massive powers into the hands of Al-Morshed, the Supreme Leader who holds the highest authority in both the state and the armed forces (Constitute Project, 2020). 7 This post raises serious questions regarding the genuineness of Iranian democracy (Ganji, 2018). Other important issues facing Iran are questions surrounding economic, political, and human rights that have profound implications for internal and external security. 8 Nevertheless, Iran views its pro-oppressed, Shia belief as an ideological asset, even though politicians face challenges when trying to translate it into tangible policies.

Rivalry and suspicion during the Shah's rule
Even though Iran and Saudi Arabia were competing for regional influence long before the Islamic revolution, until 1979, both countries were perceived by the West as "twin pillars of stability" and a "security valve that restricted the regional influence of the Soviet Union" (Behestani & Shahidani, 2015,pp. 27-28). To maintain a power balance, the Shah aligned himself with regional so-called republican states that strongly opposed Saudi Arabia (such as Iraq and Egypt), while Tehran and Riyadh disagreed over Iran's secular and modernist orientation versus Saudi Arabia's traditionalism and conservativism. Religious differences played a minor role, and both regimes maintained strong ties with Western countries and acted united in their quest to prevent Soviet expansion (Alinejad, 2022;Vakili-Zad, 2022).
Beyond strengthening their economic and military power, both countries forged regional and international alliances that played a pivotal role in creating a power balance. Tehran took advantage of the country's oil and gas revenues that enabled it to play a pivotal role in the security and political arrangements of the region as Iran sought rapprochement with Arab countries. For example, in 1974, Iran granted aid valued at US$850 million to Egypt, US$7.4 million to Jordan, US$30 million to Morocco, and US$150 million to Syria (Barzi, 2008, p. 28). Tehran realized that its regional leadership depended on being recognized by Arab states.

The birth of the Islamic Republic
The 1979 Iranian revolution and the birth of Khomeinism strongly affected political relationships and alliances throughout the region. Many Muslims-Sunnis and Shias alike-perceived the revolutionary rhetoric as empowering, partly because it opposed the United States and Israel, and partly because it championed the cause of the oppressed. As Iran became an Islamized republic and developed a revolutionary brand of Islam, many Sunni Muslims were inspired to establish their versions of emancipatory Islam. Iran was perceived as an inspiring center of revolutionary change, in line with the centuries-long revolutionary history of Shia Muslims (Behzad, 2018). As "the Iranian Revolution weaponized Shi'a identity" (Gause, 2020, p. 133), Tehran was able to develop a vigorous behavior across the region. The Gulf's conservative monarchies perceived this development as threatening, a potential inspiration to impose regime change, and a challenge to their legitimacy. The rapid spread of Khomeinism pressed these regimes, especially Saudi Arabia, to stress the "proper" Sunni interpretation of Islam, which energized Shia versus Sunni sectarianism (Fraihat, 2020) that has subsided at times and risen at others.
Following the Iranian revolution, Saudi Arabia assisted Bahrain in building up Sunni Islamic movements as a counterweight to the emerging Shia Islamic movements (Matthiesen, 2017, p. 200). On a broader level, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to protect the Gulf states mainly from Iran and to a lesser extent from Iraq. Iran, perceiving that its religious orientation was shunned by the West, aimed to counter the threat by seeking support from other Shia groups in the region, extending backing in return. Determined to resolve its border dispute with Iran in the Shatt al-Arab in 1980, the Iraqi invasion of Iran also aimed to counter what Iraq considered an Iranian threat to neighboring countries (Rajaee & Farhang, 1997). The ensuing war lasted for eight years, as Iraq aimed to take on regional leadership. While Western countries (particularly the United States), Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states extended financial and military support to Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, a Sunni, anti-Shia sentiments rose in many parts of the Islamic world. Wahhabi schools spread, aiming to contain the influence of Khomeinism, and tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia increased. When during the 1987 hajj pilgrimage, Saudi security forces killed hundreds of Iranian pilgrims who allegedly had carried arms while performing their rituals, Riyadh formally cut diplomatic ties with Tehran, and Iran officially began to boycott the hajj in 1988. As Saudi Arabia and Iran utilized their divergence over security and over the interpretation and practices of Islam to foster their respective political goals (Chubin & Tripp, 2014), animosity and tension marked their relationship, eventually affecting most developments in the region.
After the first Gulf War of 1991 and with the emergence of the unipolar world order in the early 1990s, Iran and Saudi Arabia grew concerned and sought the optimal approach to deal with the ensuing dramatic regional and international changes. A short-lived breakthrough in the relationship between Tehran and Riyadh ensued, as both capitals took concrete steps toward rapprochement. In 1991, diplomatic ties were restored, and Iran resumed the hajj (under special arrangements), signifying improving relations. In 1997, Saudi Arabia invited Iranian president Rafsanjani to visit Saudi Arabia; the reformist Mohammad Khatami was elected president of Iran; a Joint Economic Commission was established; direct flights between the two countries resumed; and Khatami and King Abdullah met and shared a photo-op at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation conference in Tehran. In 2001, Saudi Arabia and Iran signed a security pact that addressed terror and drug-trafficking issues; plans were in place to negotiate a defense agreement (Vakil, 2018).
During Khatami's presidency (1997Khatami's presidency ( -2005, Iran reversed trends that had been introduced after the revolution and engaged in internal self-solidification, expressed through reform and openness, which included supporting economic and diplomatic cooperation with countries worldwide (BBC News, 2009). Under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005, internal selfconsolidation and economic justice became priorities. Generally, Iran continued its political modernization, allowing a degree of partisanship and contest within a system that-even though it emanates from the Islamic revolution-is inclined as much towards Persian nationalism as towards Shia Islam (Ashraf & Banuazizi, 1985). Tehran does not bypass, however, geopolitical realities in the region and the world, including the rocky relationship with Saudi Arabia and its allies. Nor does it ignore the importance of its revolutionary Shia ideology in confronting Saudi Wahhabism and its regional extension, as Tehran's Shia ideology is neither passive nor neutral and considered its "most effective soft power tool" to achieve higher goals (Akbarzadeh, 2015, p. 48).

The American invasion of Iraq
The 2003 US invasion of Iraq impacted the Saudi-Iranian rivalry enormously because it created a new regional landscape. Initially, neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran opposed the US attack because it eradicated a regime that was a long-standing archenemy of both capitals. Riyadh hoped that toppling Saddam Hussein would strengthen its power in the Gulf region and increase its standing as a leading regional power. Tehran welcomed the removal of an enemy yet remained highly suspicious of the presence of massive numbers of US troops at Iran's borders, as these were the forces of an enemy who allied himself with Saudi Arabia and Israel, other enemies of Iran.
The removal of Saddam's regime and the quandary of the American military intervention in the region created two main challenges for the various regional parties. They had to adjust to the vanishing of Iraq as a major regional power, and they had to adapt their strategies towards the countries that were believed to be the powers who would fill the regional void after the American withdrawal from Iraq, namely Iran, Turkey, and Israel.
The overthrow of the Iraqi regime raised the bar for Iran's regional ambitions and intensified the rivalry with Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia, the new scenario aroused fear, as it was perceived as a threat to internal and regional security. Thus, when sectarian conflict broke out in Iraq following the US invasion, Iran and Saudi Arabia were soon drawn into the strife. Ever since, the region has been dominated by the Saudi-Iranian geopolitical confrontations that have been "fought not through classical realist state-to-state military battles, but rather through proxy domestic and transnational actors" (Salloukh, 2017, p. 38). The confrontation centers around aims to fill the void that was left by the disappearance of Iraq as a large regional power in the aftermath of the US invasion and by the ensuing destabilization inflicted upon the region. Both countries thought they could influence the situation in new Iraq: Riyadh has the resources and the backing of the United States, while Tehran assumed it possessed the tools to influence the new reality and compel the United States to work with Iran, an assumption that has proven to be of some limited validity.

Early reactions to the Arab uprisings
The Arab uprisings escalated the rivalry between Tehran and Riyadh to new levels. In line with denominational affiliations, Iran hailed the fall of pro-American rulers such as Mubarak in Egypt; supported the Shia protesters in Bahrain; continued training Shia fighters in Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan; and helped bring them to Syria to fight the Sunni rebels. 9 Considering the uprisings as both threats and opportunities, Tehran and Riyadh devised and adopted far-reaching, multilayered measures to contain their potential harm and maximize benefits. Both regimes took specific measures to contain local uprisings and advanced full intervention plans to affect the outcome of uprisings in neighboring countries.
Locally, Riyadh made large payments to Saudi citizens, deployed security forces in crucial parts of the country to prevent demonstrations and unrest, observed the Shia-populated Eastern Province to contain protests, and suppressed liberal voices (Matthiesen, 2012). Saudi Arabia's views of the uprisings in neighboring countries varied significantly over time, reflecting Riyadh's shifting preferences and priorities: In the early stages of the unrest, Riyadh strove to contain the uprisings because they empowered Islamists and thus could potentially harm Saudi Arabia. The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt were viewed as spawning chaos and dissent that could erode Saudi influence, and those in Bahrain and Yemen were seen as a direct threat to Saudi supremacy. The uprising in Syria was considered an opportunity to advance both national and regional goals, as Saudi Arabia strove to maintain the good relations it had with the Assad regime at this time (Al-Rasheed, 2022, p. 29).
Tehran was surprised by the uprising's outbreak because most rebels were Sunni dissidents rather than Shias. As Iranians neither wholly understood nor agreed in their assessment of the nature of these uprisings, they showed mixed reactions, fearing that assisting Arab Islamists might bring Tehran unwanted repercussions rather than benefits (Ahmadi, 2013). With the exception of the Green Movement (Kurzman, 2012)-that was in no way capable of challenging the regime (Dabashi, 2013)-neither the Iranian people nor the opposition wished to follow the rebels in Arab countries and turn against their own Islamic Republic. The ruling circles considered these uprisings an Islamic awakening, a delayed extension and victory of its own 1979 Islamic revolution (Mohseni, 2013). But reactions and views varied significantly among the various segments of the Iranian elite, reflecting their preferences, priorities, and regional interests.

The centrality of Syria in the Saudi-Iranian rivalry
The conflict in Syria left a special impact on Iran's decision-makers. Ahmadian and Mohseni (2021) outline four stages in the unfolding of events. The first witnessed Iran supporting the establishment of pro-Tehran militias among Syrians that were supported by Iranian fighters. The second stage denotes a regionalization, as Shia fighters from Iraq and Yemen joined and supported the rebels in Syria. Next, followed the internationalization of the conflict, as an alliance was formed with Russia to balance out US interventions in Syria. The fourth-stage strategy developed after the emergence of Daesh, when Iran formed multiple alliances to fight the growing influence of Daesh's militant Sunni presence; counter the influence of the United States, Turkey, and Israel; and increase its own standing. Overall, these strategies reflected and were guided by Tehran's insistence on maintaining its defiance and deterrence of the United States and Israel (Ahmadian & Mohseni, 2021, pp. 245-254).
Tehran's intervention in the civil wars in Syria and Yemen increased Iran's regional standing', complementing its rising influence in the aftermath of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Among the United States, its Arab allies, and Israel, however, this created the perception that Iran was seeking to dominate the region, intentions that Iran's enemies strongly rejected. In Tehran's view, its policies served to end the strategic isolation the West had imposed on Iran since 1979. Thus, it used its military power to support and protect the Assad regime, fearing that Assad's loss might forecast the Iranian regime's own demise. Likewise, Iranian support of Hezbollah in Lebanon aimed to ensure the continuity of the Islamic Republic. Thus, Tehran adopted a range of strategies to strengthen its power, expand its influence, deter opponents (Israel and its Western allies), and compensate for its former military weakness that had prevented Iran from winning the eight-year war with Iraq. In line with these considerations, Tehran initiated a ballistic missile program and established what it calls the "axis of resistance" to meet external threats together with a network of partners. Iran's nuclear aspirations, whether peaceful or military, came within the framework of comprehensive tactical confrontations in the region. The International Crisis Group (2018, i) summarized Iran's strategy by stating, "Tehran dubs this its 'forward-defence' policy: an effort to exploit weak states, such as Lebanon and post−2003 Iraq, where it can meet its enemies on the battlefield through proxies without direct harm to Iran and its people" (International Crisis Group, 2018). The solidity of this policy is evident in the fact that debates among Iranian decision makers, whether pragmatists or conservatives, do not question the country's strategy to secure the Islamic republic, but only revolve around the best ways to serve these security imperatives, strengthen Tehran's position, and balance its power with that of Saudi Arabia. There is little disagreement over the prerogatives and advantages of securing Tehran's corridor of allies that stretches from Iran to the Mediterranean.
Riyadh has accused Iran of weaponizing Shia narrative to weaken Saudi Arabia and employed all means to prevent Iran's expansion. Considering the protests in Bahrain and in Saudi Arabia as a Shia plot initiated by Tehran, Saudi Arabia mobilized its sectarian narrative and allies in the entire region, sometimes making little distinction between Sunni militant groups such as Al-Qaeda and Daesh and moderate groups and movements such as the Muslim Brothers. Thus, Tehran's leadership was effectively forced into a Shia corner, as it strove to preserve its national security and regional interests (Akbarzadeh, 2015, p. 47).
Whereas Riyadh bases certain aspects of its strategies on the tenets of Wahhabism, Tehran's handling of sectarian politics has been less clear-cut. For example, Iran considered the Syrian protests as a conspiracy by Salafi "terrorists," supported by "enemies" that included Saudi Arabia who aimed at overthrowing Tehran's ally in Damascus (Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, 2017). Relying on its Shia allies to encounter the threat posed by the Riyadh-backed Sunni factions in Syria, Tehran now used sectarian rhetoric in its quest to secure support for the Assad regime in its fight against Daesh-after branding Syrian protesters as Salafi-jihadists aiming to crush the non-Sunni minorities. Enhancing its recruitment efforts by narratives loaded with vocabularies of injustice, martyrdom, and sacrifice, Iran thus created a transnational Shia militia movement that includes members from Shia communities in Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. To consolidate its discourse, Tehran continues to bring up Riyadh's submissive ties with the "forces of global arrogance," particularly the United States. Thereby, Tehran seeks to expose that Saudi Arabia derives support from Western powers rather than its own people. Riyadh meets that claim with the opposing assertion that Iran's expansionist approach sows chaos, instability, and animosity (Akbarzadeh, 2015).

Iran is not loosing, nor is Saudi Arabia winning
Although the uprisings have affected Saudi Arabia and Iran differently, and the two countries pursue dissimilar goals and strategies, their approaches have shown similarities in five aspects. First, both countries rushed to strengthen their relations with potential allies to augment their regional influence, giving particular attention to Damascus (Tehran was more successful). Second, the two capitals intervened and supported both opposition groups and regimes. For example, Tehran supported the opposition groups in Bahrain and Palestine (Hamas) yet sided with Al-Maliki in Iraq, Assad in Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, even though supporting these regimes was somewhat at odds with Tehran's long-standing claim that it backs the people, not regimes. Riyadh found itself supporting opposition groups in Syria and Iraq, which deviated from Saudi Arabia's record of supporting regimes rather than opposition parties in its quest to expand its influence and promote regional stability.
Third, both sides acted as both senior and junior players. For example, Iran was the sole senior player in Yemen through its massive support of the Houthis, yet in Syria Tehran cooperated with Russia once the military operation was launched in September 2015, but not as a sole player. Similarly, Saudi Arabia acted as a senior power in Bahrain and Yemen and as a less relevant party in Iraq and Syria. Fourth, friends and foes changed with time, particularly for Saudi Arabia, validating the claim that today's friend could become tomorrow's enemy. Thus, Saudi Arabia's relations with Hezbollah have fluctuated (they had been good in the aftermath of the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon), as have its relations with Ali Saleh in Yemen, whereas Tehran maintained more stable ties. Fifth, both countries used sectarianism and sectarianization to delegitimize and co-opt the uprisings, anchor the forging of regional alliances, and center their regional policies on serving security.
A quick glance at the outcomes of the two parties' conflicting intervention policies shows that Iran was more effective, made greater overall gains than Saudi Arabia, and experienced fewer setbacks (Phillips, 2020, p. 7). This could be due to changes in the regional structure (such as the rise of a Shia-friendly regime in Iraq after the US invasion) or because Tehran has managed its interventions calmly, solo, and effectively under the command of Qassem Soleimani, who engineered the details with great skill and kept them in line with Iran's broader strategy. 10 Tehran's approach was gradual and relatively modest, but solid in declaring objectives that called for cooperation and peaceful coexistence with others, even though it supported rebel groups (Akbarzadeh, 2015).
Saudi Arabia's attempts at gaining ground over Iran lacked such steady leadership. Wahhabism dominated Riyad's efforts to evade the negative repercussions of the Arab uprisings after 2011. Yet, Prince Bandar bin Sultan's oversight of Saudi Arabia's intervention in Syria has been deemed an "instance of poor leadership impacting outcomes" (Phillips, 2020, p. 8). Despite the prince's expertise in security matters, he failed to mobilize the rebel forces in a united front, deploy and diversify the material capabilities of Saudi support, or cooperate with external parties, especially Turkey, Qatar, and later Russia. While Saudi Arabia has distinguished itself from Iran with its international alliances that significantly impacted the balance of power between the two countries, and whereas formidable parties such as Washington and several European and Arab capitals have sided with Riyadh, Saudi Arabia has not made good use of that advantage in its fight against Iran (Juneau, 2014). For example, Saudi Arabia did not sustain harmonious relationships with the United States and Russia, the two predominant military powers worldwide. Similarly, Riyadh advocated bringing down the Assad regime, disagreeing with Russia and Iran who opposed the regime's overthrow. (Iran successfully defended Al-Assad.) In Yemen, Saudi Arabia's vision prioritized the defeat of the Houthis, disagreeing with the United States; yet Saudi Arabia has thus far proven unable to restore its allies to power in Sanaa. Moreover, Saudi Arabia disagreed with neighbors (such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Yemen) and differed with the United States and Turkey over how to deal with the conflict in Syria (Shahram Akbarzadeh & Barry, 2017).
Riyadh was not successful in forging lasting alliances, whether during the 2003 American invasion of Iraq (although Saudi Arabia cooperated with the United States) or in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings, even though Iran has long been subjected to international isolation. Saudi Arabia's foreign policy has become more flexible and goal-oriented since King Salman ascended to the throne in January 2015 and after the rise of Mohammed bin Salman as crown prince in 2017. It is evident in the rapid pace of external (and internal) openness in various directions, especially towards China and Russia. Generally, Saudi Arabia's inconsistent and inefficient approach neither supported its overall strategy-that was unclear in the first place-nor did it facilitate alignment with the inclinations and interests of its allies. Riyadh's apprehension towards (Sunni) Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brothers, Salafis, and Jihadists has led to limited engagement with these groups. Its engagement in rivalry with (Sunni) allies who did not support Iran, such as Turkey and Qatar, further reduced Saudi Arabia's ideological appeal. And finally, Riyadh lost dearly in the wake of the 2018 killing of Jamal Khashoggi that did not serve Saudi security at all.
Overall, Iran's ideology and approach have been more successful than Saudi Arabia's. Tehran was able to mobilize fighters from several places because it did not make Shia identity the main ideological tool, presenting itself as the leader of the anti-Western axis of resistance. Thereby, Iran increased its appeal also among Sunni circles such as Hamas in Palestine (Phillips, 2020, p. 9), whereas Saudi Arabia failed in this context, even though it has potentially greater religious and ideological appeal.
Riyadh's attempts at presenting itself as a leader of Arabs and Sunni Muslims was met with little enthusiasm, as Riyadh's hostility to Arab nationalism since the 1950s is well remembered. Moreover, in places such as Syria, where Saudi Arabia's Islamic credentials might have appealed more strongly to religiously motivated Sunni fighters, Riyadh had to contend with rival international patrons such as Qatar and Turkey. Similarly, Saudi involvement in Yemen, motivated mainly by anti-Iranianism rather than sectarianism (Phillips, 2020, p. 9), was strongly welcomed by Yemen's Sunnis yet had a rival in the United Arab Emirates, in this case not another rival but Riyadh's own ally. Thus, while Saudi Arabia could not unite religious Sunnis behind one broad doctrine-as Sunni Islamists, Salafis, and Jihadists disagreed on politics and theology-Iran successfully pushed its claim of being the sole voice of anti-Western or religiously motivated Shia fighters. Saudi Arabia found itself the weaker party with inconsistent regional relations, fearing that both Shia and Sunni Islamists, through their disapproval of Riyadh's incoherent policies, might threaten the Saudi rule (Phillips, 2020, p. 9).

Sectarian rhetoric prevails and continues
Over time and to disproportionate degrees, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have resorted to sectarianism as an essential resource in efforts to achieve security. Their successes in encountering the other side was in part due to the targeted and systematic employment of sectarianism, with Saudi ideology relying on the social and political tenets of Wahhabism (Shane, 2016) whereas Tehran's ideology is based on the revolutionary ideals of Khomeinism. However, this sectarian rivalry slipped from Tehran and Riyadh's grip when Daesh turned it into a deadly weapon against many in the wider region. In Daesh's ideology, anti-West and anti-Shia hatred found its most extreme expression (Hassan, 2016). However, American efforts to fight the self-declared Islamic State were met by Iran with apprehension. Tehran considers them insincere and merely a smokescreen to enable the West, Israel, and complicit Arab capitals to dominate the region. Tehran's conservatives accuse these parties of seeking to subjugate Iran, "snuff out the light of the Iranian revolution," and destroy the Islamic Republic (Akbarzadeh, 2015, p. 6). Tehran accuses Saudi Arabia of prioritizing the United States' security agenda in order to dodge local domestic reforms, assuming that Washington, if preoccupied with Iran, will not press Riyadh to introduce reforms (Akbarzadeh, 2015, p. 47). Tehran implicitly highlights hereby Saudi Arabia's intimate relationship with the colonial West, especially the United States, whereas Iran stands assertive in opposing the West's arrogance, remaining loyal to its revolutionary and Shia ideals.
Strongly frustrated with and critical of Iran's policies, Riyadh accuses Tehran of using antagonistic Shia rhetoric. Refuting these allegations, Tehran asserts that Iran's goal is to achieve security and accuses Saudi Arabia of sponsoring militant Sunni sectarianism and firmly standing with the United States and Israel and even Daesh to oppose Iran. Riyadh admits to cooperation with regional partners but justifies it as a necessity to encounter alleged Iranian hegemonic ambitions and hamper Tehran's alleged efforts to subjugate the region and assume its sole leadership. Tehran denies such a claim and asserts that as a key Muslim country it stays clear of sectarian disputes with its Sunni neighbors, framing its disagreements with Riyadh in terms of geopolitical Muslim interests. Tehran persistently disagrees with most Arab countries on issues of cooperating with Western interests, such as in the Palestine conflict where it accuses them of leniency towards Israel and failing to protect Palestinians (Akbarzadeh, 2015, p. 44).
Startling statements have been made by Iranian and Saudi officials, revealing strong sectarian hatred between the two regimes. Ali Reza Zakani, a confidant of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the current mayor of Tehran, is quoted as bragging that following the uprisings, Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut belonged to the Iranian Islamic revolution and were entirely in the hands of Iran, also predicting that Sanaa would soon follow (East Monitor, 2014). He described these developments as part of a phase he called the "great jihad" and justified supporting the pro-Tehran parties as part of efforts to end subjugation and support the oppressed in the Middle East. Zakani went on to say that before 1979, with Saudi Islam and Turkish secularism, two main pro-American currents dominated the region. He asserted that this predominance changed in favor of Iran after the success of its revolution, allowing Iran to reach the peak of its power and enabling the Islamic republic to impose its will and strategic interest on everyone in the region. Today, the struggle for dominance is between the United States and its Arab allies, on the one hand, and Iran and its allies who joined the Iranian revolution project, on the other.
To demonstrate the importance that Iran places on supporting its allies, Zakani said: "If General Qassem Soleimani had not intervened in the last hours in Iraq, Baghdad would have been in the hands of the Islamic State, and this intervention applies to Syria." He added, "If we were reluctant to take decisive decisions regarding the Syrian crisis, and if we had intervened militarily now, the Syrian regime would have fallen at the beginning of the revolution." He also deemed the Yemeni revolution a natural extension of the Iranian revolution, predicting that 14 out of 20 Yemeni governorates would soon be controlled by the Houthis and that their influence would reach Saudi Arabia itself. He foresaw also that the Yemeni revolution would not be confined to Yemen alone but would, after its local success, extend to Saudi Arabia, with the vast Yemeni-Saudi borders helping to accelerate its deep penetration into Saudi territory.
Similarly, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif condemned as "the key driver of violence" in the region an "extremist ideology promoted by Saudi Arabia," referring to Wahhabism, which he called a "theological perversion" and a "death cult." He alleged, "Over the past three decades, Riyadh has spent tens of billions of dollars exporting Wahhabism through thousands of mosques and madrasas across the world" (Zarif, 2016).
These statements that asserted Iran's control of four Arab capitals struck a major nerve in the Sunni Arab world. 11 Leaked US diplomatic cables of 2008 indicate that Saudi Arabia repeatedly urged Washington to launch military strikes on Iran to"cut off the head of the snake" (Colvin, 2010). Goldberg (2018) quotes Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman accusing Tehran of aiming "to control the Islamic world." Referring to Iran's Shia-oriented political theology, Bin Salman asked, "How can I come to an understanding with someone, or a regime, whose foundational belief is built on an extremist ideology?" He then compared Iran and its rulers to Hitler and Nazi Germany, saying, "I believe that the Iranian Supreme Leader makes Hitler look good . . . Hitler tried to conquer Europe . . . the Supreme Leader is trying to conquer the world" (Goldberg, 2018).
While these statements reflect ideological differences between the two sides, the strong emotionality of these accusations points not only to the depth of the current political and ideological gap but also reflects both sides' deep perceptions of insecurity-and indicates that it might be very difficult for Iran and Saudi Arabia to overcome their differences it in the future. This gap is unlikely to narrow as long as the two parties cling to efforts to achieve their internal and regional security through a zero-sum approach, rather than seeking to build on potential commonalities.

Conclusion
While analyses of the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia tend to focus on either the security aspect or sectarianism, this article considers security but approaches it through the lens of sectarianism. Specifically, it argues that sectarianism is as important as security in the rivalry calculus and stresses the importance of recognizing the limitations of considering security on its own. To avoid such limitations, the purpose of security, they ways of how it is being served, its beneficiaries, the timeframe, and the vulnerability of security to external (regional and international) developments must be taken into account. This paper does not aim to reduce the weight of the security factor in understanding and interpreting the conflict, but rather intends to give it greater weight by linking it to sectarianism and analyzing the joint impact of both factors. This is consistent with our guiding premise that a single factor, no matter how important, cannot explain this multi-layered conflict. By examining the interrelation of these two themes, it becomes clearer how both regimes secure their legitimacy, regional alliances, and international relations, which allows for better a understanding of this embittered conflict.
By associating security with sectarianism and vice versa, both capitals have responded more effectively to the needed requirements of their rival agendas. As the complementary relationship between security and sectarianism is neither neat nor clear or static, both together illuminate the incentives behind the rivalry and show how both sides have been affected by the 1979 Iranian revolution and the founding of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 2003 American invasion of Iraq, and the 2011 Arab uprisings and their regional implications.
Sectarianism has remained pertinent for Tehran and its Shia satellites as well as the Saudi Wahhabi doctrine at home and abroad. The orders of the region and the world have witnessed dramatic change over the past four decades, and the rivalry between Iran and SA has fluctuated, yet the impact of sectarianism on security and on the conflict in general continues to affect the approach and rhetoric of both sides. Thus, whereas before 1979, contentions revolved around Tehran's secularism and Riyadh's traditionalism, sectarianism rose to prominence following the 1979 revolution despite its proclamation of the universal principles of justice and emancipation. Under Iran's clerical regime, it became harder to differentiate the Shia character of the revolution and its transformative general principles from Iranianism. Similarly, under the rigid Saudi monarchical regime, it became harder to differentiate Wahhabism and its outdated traditional doctrine from the Saudi polity. These two features of the current regimes in both countries strongly manifested themselves after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, as securitization and sectarianization have become two sides of one coin and were utilized systematically by both capitals. Both sides sought to achieve their divergent interests in varying manners, which included securitizing sectarianism. Iran strives to expand its influence, find allies, and restrict Western foreign influence in the region, whereas SA seeks to keep its un-elected rule unchallenged, preserve regional influence, and maintain strong ties with the protective West. As both capitals aimed to enhance identity politics, they employed security and sectarianism at times independently and at others as features that mutually complement each other. Simultaneously, both capitals also aspired to divert the attention of their constituencies away from the internal (particularly economic) difficulties and the regime's legitimacy and internal stability.
Other contextual effects are likely to further strengthen sectarianism, including the widening gap between politics and religion, the exacerbation of the legitimacy crisis of both regimes both locally and regionally, the continued Western (American) military presence in the region, and the great ease with which sectarianism is summoned and used whenever the regime finds it useful.

Author details
Basem Ezbidi 1 E-mail: bezbidi@gmail.com 1 Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Public Administration, Birzeit University, Birzeit, Palestine.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Correction
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

For a useful analysis of sectarianism in the Middle
East see Ardovini, People, Sects andStates, 2016. 4. Makdisi (2017) links sectarianism to the breakdown of the Ottoman system and to the eruption of violence between Muslims and Christians in the 19th century, between Arabs and Jews in the 20th century, and between Sunni and Shi'a in the 21st century. 5. For example, Saudi Arabia's strategy invoked sectarian differences and hatred in order "to thwart the prospect of peaceful protest to demand real political reform" (Al-Rasheed, 2017, p. 152). 6. Barak Mohammadzadeh (2019,p. 3) discusses the impact of Saudi Arabia's financial dealings on its foreign relations and on the cohesion of the Saudi state itself. One opinion states that despite the continued importance of royal politics, Saudi Arabia operates in a wider space that includes individuals from outside the royal family with whom the ruling family is obliged to interact. 7. The Supreme Leader is an appointed religious authority with great political influence; daily decisions, however, are taken by an elected president and an effective parliament; see also Al-Samadi (2017). 8. In September 2022, the death in custody of Jina Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish woman who had been arrested over charges that she violated the dress code and failed to properly cover her hair, sparked demonstrations and violent crackdowns on the streets of Iran. Largely led by women and students, the protests call for political change. 9. Sectarianism is observable to varying degrees in other countries, with Iraq carrying possibly the largest share (Dodge, 2014). 10. Phillips (2020, p. 7) states, "SA has sought to contain Iran's regional influence since 1979. Until 2003 it was relatively successful. The fallout of the invasion of Iraq set back Saudi containment strategy significantly. Since the 2011 Uprisings, Riyadh has been even less successful." 11. King Abdullah of Jordan coined a controversial phrase that still resonates in the region, indicating that a "Shia crescent" led from Damascus to Tehran, passing through Baghdad, where a Shiadominated government had taken power and dictated sectarian politics that radiated from Iraq across the entire region (Postel & Hashemi, 2018).