Gap analysis of Pakistan’s non-kinetic responses to violent extremism

Abstract Pakistan’s counter-terrorism (CT) strategy represents a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic means. Besides the use of military, intelligence and police force, the state has also employed de-radicalization, rehabilitation and counter-narrative campaigns to counter-extremism in its violent and non-violent manifestations. However, a significant decline in accumulative number of terrorist incidents from 2014 onward led the authorities to slash efforts and resources on soft CT front. Using “Three Levels of Analysis” by Moghadam, which dissects the root causes of extremism and terrorism at the levels of individuals, organizations and the environment, this paper seeks to provide a brief overview of the soft measures adopted by Pakistan at these three levels. Subsequently, through the application of the RAND’s de-radicalization framework (individual-level), organizational transformation (organizational-level) and Aristotle’s Communication model presented in Rhetoric (environmental level), the paper compares and contrasts these non-kinetic interventions with established practices and cases of soft CT in other parts of the world. It argues that quantitative decline in the incidents of terrorism from 2014 onwards must not lead to counter-terror triumphalism. Post-drawdown (American withdrawal from Afghanistan) spike in the incidents of terrorism in Pakistan attests to importance of sustained CVE efforts to deal with the new character of extremism and terrorism in the country.


Introduction
Terrorism is a bi-product of extremism that results from radicalization. According to Schmid, extremism is "a process characterised by increased commitment to and use of violent means and strategies in political conflicts" (Schmid, 2013, p. 6). While extremism is characterized by commitment to violent means and strategies, terrorism consists of actually committing violent acts in pursuit of ends in political conflicts. Keeping this distinction in view, extremism transforms into terrorism (violent extremism) through the process of radicalization. Radicalization can be defined as "a process of moving away from equilibrium thinking" (Iqbal & Mehmood, 2021). This brings us to the question of what equilibrium is and who defines it?
Equilibrium is a concept from mechanical sciences that represents "a state of rest or balance due to equal action of opposing forces, an equal balance between any powers, influences, etc." ("Equilibrium, n.d.). In such a state, disturbance of any constituting object (forces, powers, influences, etc.) may disturb the equilibrium). There are also states of equilibrium in other subjects, e.g. human, social, legal, political, etc. In the process of extremism, equilibrium in thinking is significantly impacted by disturbance in human equilibrium in society. However, before describing it in detail, a discussion of human equilibrium delves us into the philosophical debate of monism and dualism.
Monism is the philosophical school whose belief is rooted in the understanding that human experience comes from one universal attribute. The monist universal attribute may be material (body) or immaterial (mind). In contrast, dualism is the philosophical school that views all human experience as being rooted in two contrasting attributes of body and mind ("Dualism, 2003). The body deals with material and physical experience of reality, e.g., sensations, function of organs, and physical activities, etc. Whereas the mind deals with immaterial experience of reality, e.g., thought process, emotions, ideas, and ideals. Dualism has dominated Western philosophy since Plato, and the modern Western philosophy of life continues to reflect the dualist ideals of Plato and Descartes. Therefore, any human equilibrium has to balance between mind and body according to Western ideals.
In religious and theocratic philosophical systems; however, a third attribute of human experience is of equal significance, i.e., the spirit. Such a triangular view is prevalent across different religions of the world, both biblical and non-biblical. It emphasizes that there must be a balance among all three attributes, i.e., body, mind, and spirit, to achieve equilibrium in human experience. This philosophical view can also be called religious pluralist. According to such a view, equilibrium is a dynamic state of human experience wherein an individual's physical, mental, and spiritual aspects are in synergy. And, it is in this pluralist view that we will examine human equilibrium and its relationship with extremism and radicalization.
Drawing from the above discussion on equilibrium and relating it to the concept of radicalization, equilibrium thinking can be defined as collective consensus on issues relating to religion, politics, society, law, etc. Any deviation or digression from the collective consensus maybe considered as radicalization (Iqbal & Mehmood, 2021). For example, the peaceful coexistence of different sects with differing theological stances is a collective consensus. Any person digressing from the consensus is considered a radical. Likewise in Pakistani context, the Constitution of Pakistan is an agreed-upon collective political consensus. Any digression, beyond constitutional means, from the Constitution will be regarded as an act of radicalism. In similar light, national unity is an equilibrium, and whosoever challenges national unity based on ethnicity or religion can be considered radical. This radicalization, when it turns violent, transforms into terrorism.

Conceptual framework
Pakistan's counter-violent extremism (CVE) campaign has lately been driven by a combination of hard and soft measures, entailing a multi-level approach towards the problem. A multi-level approach supposes that motivation for violent extremism or terrorism can occur generally at three different levels, i.e., at the level of individuals, organizations, and the environment. Different approaches to the study of terrorism focus on different levels. However, the multi-level approach towards the analysis of terrorism takes into account all three levels. It suggests that factors driving an individual to resort to terrorism differ significantly from the factors that motivate terrorist organizations. Consequently, these factors are also influenced by the environment, including political, socio-cultural, economic aspects. For instance, in Pakistan individuals committing acts of terror are usually driven by misinterpretation of Islam and sense of vengeance, but the terrorist organizations employ this method because of its efficacy when compared to non-violent methods (Iqbal, 2015).
Multi-level analysis is extracted from Moghadam's seminal work on suicide terrorism (Moghadam, 2006). He uses the distinction in three "images" or levels of analysis introduced by Kenneth Waltz in the book Man, the State and War in 1954. Waltz's division of three levels of analysis to understand the causes of war through analysis at individual, state, and international system levels introduced multi-level analysis in understanding International Relations. Moghadam adopts Waltz's three levels of analysis and modifies it for developing a framework for understanding causes of (suicide) terrorism.
The first level of analysis in Moghadam's framework remains similar to that of Waltz, the individual level. State-level in Waltz's approach is replaced by the organization, which is responsible for planning and executing the strategy of violent extremism. And the international system is replaced with the environment, representing different aspects of society like cultural, economic, and political etc., within which individuals and terrorist organizations exist and interact. Taking all these levels into account for a multi-level analysis can best explain the various factors affecting the phenomenon of terrorism.
At the first level, i.e., the individual level, the prevalence of tendencies for violent extremism are examined by investigating psychological motivations for terrorism. There may be different sets of motivations for a radicalized individual to get involved in violent activities. Even though a general view regarding violent extremism, particularly in hardcore forms like suicide terrorism, may suggest that terrorists are mentally ill. However, scientifically there is not much evidence to suggest that terrorists are necessarily mentally ill (Borum, 2004;Moghadam, 2006, pp. 90-91). Contrary to the general misassumption, a range of motivations exist for individuals to carry out terrorism, ranging from a misinterpretation of religion (M. Munir, 2008); to need for vengeance (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 394); a distorted sense of identity (Borum, 2004, p. 25); seeking a sense of glory (Kruglanski et al., 2014); or even financial incentives (Iqbal, 2015;Noor, 2013, p. 19). However, individual motivations are still only one aspect of terrorism. Terrorist acts are rarely carried out in isolation and are usually manipulated and applied on a larger scale by terrorist networks and organizations (Moghadam, 2006, p. 93).
A general motivation for terrorist organizations is that their political goals can be more efficiently achieved using violence. According to Crenshaw (1981, p. 385), terrorist organizations usually resort to violence when they are convinced against the legitimacy of their adversary, and carrying of violence has become morally justified. Once legitimized, terrorist organizations may perpetrate violence for various goals, including gaining recognition, damaging the adversary physically and morally, gaining popularity among its audience, creating discipline and fear within its own ranks, etc.
The goals and motivations for carrying out terrorism are also affected by political, cultural, religious and economic factors, which make up third level of analysis of violent extremism, i.e., the environmental level. The environment in which terrorist organizations and individuals operate is also one of the key factors affecting whether violence will be adopted or not. For instance, political domination of one group over the other may motivate the adoption of violence as a method to fight against the delegitimized adversary, as in the case of LTTE against Sri Lankan government. There might also be various cultural motivations for terrorism, for instance the glorification of martyrdom in both religious and secular cultures (Moghadam, 2006, p. 99). Likewise, perpetration of terrorism as a religious obligation may also motivate the adoption of violence, as in the case of ISIS. At the same time, some groups may carry out terrorism for economic incentives or due to feeling of impoverishment.
Applying multi-causal analysis on terrorism in Pakistan, most individual fighters appear to be driven by a sense of vengeance and misinterpretation of Islam. However, terrorist organizations use this tactic (terrorism) because it is more effective than other means (democratic struggle, social penetration, etc.) to implement their perceived goal of establishing Shariah. Similarly, few segments of Pakistani society subscribing to the extremists' worldview may be driven by an entirely different set of motives (Iqbal, 2015).
Moghadam also designed a feedback loop model for the description of a multi-causal approach towards (suicide) terrorism (see Figure 1). The loop describes how three levels interact to motivate terrorism, whose effects are responded to by relevant actors, creating a feedback loop that may increase or decrease the further likelihood of terrorism. According to the model, the individual and organizational motives for terrorism overlap with environmental factors, which result in the recruitment and commitment of terrorism by the radicalized individuals. This prompts a response from the government, media, public, and even external actors at times. The reaction may then either reinforce the environment to become more conducive for motivating terrorism or change the environment in favour of discouraging both organizations and individuals from resorting to violence. Due to this reason, a comprehensive and effective counter-terrorism (CT) strategy is essential in fighting terrorism and will be discussed in the coming parts.

Responding to violent extremism at three levels
Any CT strategy is divided into two major components: hard CT and soft CT. Whereas hard CT deals with killing and capturing terrorists and decapitating terrorist organizations' leadership, soft CT mainly relies on identifying, preventing, and pre-empting violent extremism through non coercive means. Some scholars have also dissected this distinction between hard and soft approaches towards CT on tactical, operational, and strategic level. According to Gunaratna (2017), hard CT includes countering terrorism on tactical and operational level. In contrast, soft CT includes countering terrorism on strategic level by using deradicalization and countering violent extremism (CVE) programmes.
As mentioned, hard CT includes adopting kinetic measures such as killing and capturing terrorists in military and law enforcement operations. Even though using kinetic measures can disrupt the operational capabilities of terrorist groups, yet it fails to provide a lasting solution (Jordan, 2014). This can be observed by the fact that the terrorism by Al-Qaeda increased after the invasion of Afghanistan, and coercive detention facilities like Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and Bagram provided recruiting ground for terrorists belonging to Al-Qaeda, and later for ISIS (Exploiting Disorder, 2016). In Pakistan too, the Operation Sunrise in Lal Masjid (Red Mosque), Islamabad, was a turning point in increasing intensity of terrorism. Only 1 year after the operation, 88 terrorist attacks claimed 1188 lives (Hussain, 2017).
Studies establish that counter-insurgency and CT is 20% military (hard) and 80% political (soft). Political, non-coercive and non-kinetic measures including de-radicalisation, rehabilitation, transformation, and counter-narrative, fall under the broader category of soft CT component.
Literature on de-radicalization and CVE in Pakistan has been largely produced after 2010, despite the increase in international attention on subject in decade of 2000s. Pakistan's first deradicalization program that started in 2009 in Swat could be attributed for the increasing academic interest in de-radicalization and CVE. Ever since, the literature on subject has remained focused on mono-causal explanations, which also fall short of drawing comprehensive comparison with global best practices. Rana (2011) carried perhaps the most comprehensive assessment of Swat de-radicalization model by comparing it with prevalent de-radicalization programmes in Muslim and non-Muslim countries, with four practical approaches to de-radicalization on security, societal, ideological, and political level as base. However, he did not explicitly analyse which approaches have been incorporated in Swat model and which have been left out. He concluded that the program needed an ideological anchor and needed to be a part of larger de-radicalization policy. Azam and Fatima (2017) in a later study concluded that the Mishal de-radicalization program focused more on reintegration rather than de-radicalization because of taking lower cadres of militants into account. However, their study also remained limited to surveying individual-related factors contributing to radicalization and how the programme redressed the problem.
Other assessments of Pakistan's CVE campaign include those by Abdul Basit (2015a) who divided Pakistan's campaign into de-radicalization and counter-radicalization components and recommended for adoption of a national CVE policy. Khan (2015) also divides Pakistan's CVE programme into counter-radicalization (military operations, and other hard measures) and de-radicalization campaigns, while suggesting that the National Action Plan (NAP) against terrorism should be implemented and a counter-narrative should be formed to denounce extremism. Zahid (2017) argues that Pakistan's CVE measures consist of de-radicalization and rehabilitation, legal reforms, and policy measures. However, consolidation of measures is necessary by increasing expenditure on CVE programme and institutional capacity building. All these assessments, however, fell short in one way or the other to address efforts undertaken on soft CT on organizational and environmental level. Where they did, they did little to no comparison with global best practices.
Existing literature on Pakistan's CVE response, therefore, is largely focused on Pakistan's deradicalization programme only, as a systematic measure of soft CT, while implementing counterradicalization through hard means. This paper in contrast argues that not only is the terrorism in Pakistan caused by multiple factors, but Pakistan's CVE responses have also been undertaken across three levels i.e., individual level by rehabilitation, organizational level by transformation, and environmental level by counter-narrative building. However, there are shortcomings in measures taken at all three levels and shall be discussed in detail in coming sections.
As discussed earlier, radicalization is a process of moving away from equilibrium thinking. Inversely thus, de-radicalization is a process of bringing an individual back towards equilibrium thinking in harmony with the collective consensus of society. Many a time, de-radicalization is carried out in confined spaces like rehabilitation centers, under custody or supervision. For this reason, rehabilitation is generally defined as reversing of radicalization in custody (Gunaratna, 2011). Terrorist organizational transformation is the process of transforming goals and means of terrorist and violent extremist groups. It usually involves taking a combination of soft measures like rehabilitation, negotiation, facilitation and mainstreaming to transform the organization from adopting violent activities as convenient means or ends towards moderation and non-violence. Counter-narrative building is another crucial component of soft CT. It refers to any effort by the counter-terrorist actors that seek to deconstruct the militants' ideology and effectively challenge it with an aim to create an environment that counteracts to militants' narrative (Iqbal et al., 2019).
Once terrorism is identified as a multi-causal phenomenon, it also demands a multi-level approach to counter-terrorism that dissects root causes and recommends remedies specifically tailored for each level. Thus, different but interrelated measures are needed to be taken on each level to effectively CT, particularly in case of soft CT. These approaches include rehabilitation on individual level, organizational transformation on organizational level, and building a counternarrative on environmental level. In the coming section, Pakistan's soft CT efforts to curb the menace of terrorism and violent extremism are examined on all three levels.

Individual level -rehabilitation
Rehabilitation efforts have been carried out in Pakistan in to deal with terrorism using soft approach of de-radicalization on the individual level. This section uses the de-radicalization framework constructed from RAND on "Countering Islamist Extremism" which measures radicalization in three degrees of commitment, and present four variables for de-radicalization prevalent in most of terrorist rehabilitation programs of South Asia and Middle East. The RAND study describes deradicalization as "the process of changing an individual's belief system, rejecting the extremist ideology, and embracing mainstream values" (Rabasa et al., 2010, p. xiii). Such a process brings the radicalized individual back to the equilibrium thinking in society.
The three levels of commitment discussed in the RAND framework include: affective commitment, pragmatic commitment, and ideological commitment. Affective commitment is the measure of a radicalized individual's affection to the group or terrorist organization. Pragmatic commitment is individual's commitment to the organization due to pragmatic material and financial considerations, or due to fear of life and survival. Whereas the ideological commitment is the commitment towards ideational justification of organization's violent activity and the sacrifice it asks for (Rabasa et al., 2010, p. xv). The greater the level of an individual's commitment towards all three measures, the more difficult he or she is to deradicalize. All three measures of commitment should be dealt with in an ideal deradicalization and rehabilitation program.
The four necessary components that effect a deradicalization program include: engaging credible interlocutors, e.g., scholars, former militants etc. who can convince radicalized individuals; addressing all levels of commitment during deradicalization to avoid reversion to violence; providing follow-up support and counselling to individuals released after rehabilitation; and including their families in the counselling and deradicalization process as well. Incorporating all these components in a program can greatly increase success rate of deradicalization. A general framework constructed from aforementioned variables is depicted in Figure 2 Pakistan Army has also created terrorist de-radicalization and rehabilitation centres to deal with ethno-nationalist insurgents in Balochistan. Prominent programmes include Darpesh (Light), initially named as Umeed-e-Nau (renewed hope), at EME Center Quetta and a separate program at FC Public School in Kohlu. Established in 2018, Darpesh was a brainchild of General Asim Saleem Bajwa, the then Commander Southern Command. The programme established in December 2018, has thus far de-radicalized approximately 178 Baloch militants in two batches, with each batch lasting for 3 months (Laskar, 2020).
All above-mentioned programmes draw significantly from Saudi Arabia's rehabilitation model. The model adopts counselling on both psychological and religious level to balance the extremist views of those under rehabilitation. It is then followed by providing social support through education and family counselling (Boucek, 2008). Once the mainstream education is complete, the individual is released, and a course of post-release counselling is initiated. Beneficiaries are also provided with financial assistance to help them make a decent living through setting up businesses around skills imparted to them during rehabilitation process. An examination of Pakistan's DREPs shows how this model has been applied in Pakistan.
In order to better assess Pakistan's rehabilitation and de-radicalization efforts, it is best to contrast and analyse de-radicalization programs carried out in Pakistan with the RAND framework. Starting with the Mishal DREP in Swat, first the former militants are selected for the program. The project only takes those militants who do not have "blood on hands," i.e., they have not killed anybody and have only performed mid-tier jobs in the terrorist organization (Jawaid, 2020, p. 12). This is similar to the Saudi rehabilitation program, where anyone with "blood on hands" would not be released even if they completed rehabilitation (Boucek, 2008, p. 60). Once someone is taken in custody for rehabilitation, they undergo collective religious education and counselling under credible interlocutors. This phase includes lectures by khateebs (Islamic orator) and former militants to the participants. These are targeted to discourage affective and ideological commitment of the participants.
After counselling, vocational training is also imparted to make them self-sufficient in living and help shun pragmatic commitments to terrorists. However according to an assessment of the program by Rana (2011, p. 10), "The authorities at the Mishal Rehabilitation Centre stated that only 11 out of the 494 individuals released so far had received financial support to enable them to have access to livelihood opportunities." The lack of resources therefore put in doubt whether the de-radicalization program has effectively addressed militants' pragmatic commitments or not.
The rehabilitation process ends with an assessment interview where it is decided if the participant is ready to leave, or will stay for another term in the rehabilitation centre. This phase includes both individual and collective counselling. The post-release period starts once the participant leaves the centre. Family members and community elders are advised on supporting the individual and are obliged to meet the Mishal administration weekly for the first 3 months. Later, the participant is required to report once a month for 6 months before being considered completely rehabilitated (Jawaid, 2020, p. 13).
A detailed in-person study on Mishal centre found multiple factors on the individual level in motivating the radicals to adopt terrorism. Some common factors included: low socio-economic status, large families, history of physical abuse, strict and negligent behavior of elders, and lack of education. Lack of critical thinking, emotional instability, and revenge-seeking and authority seeking behavior was also observed among the former terrorists interviewed (Azam & Fatima, 2017, p. 13). This shows several motivating factors for adopting violence on the individual level, and how a comprehensive rehabilitation program can help overcome these multiple factors altogether.
The second major deradicalization program in Pakistan is Punjab Rehabilitation Programme, initiated in 2011 and managed by CTD and TEVTA. It also adopted a prevention, rehabilitation, and aftercare strategy, similar to the Swat DREP. It included de-radicalization under religious interlocutors and professional psychological assessment (Basit, 2015b, p. 54), in addition to allocation of Rs. 9.33 million by Punjab Government during fiscal year 2012-13 for the programme (Iqbal, 2020, p. 169). It provided the militants an opportunity to undergo technical and vocational education and receive a loan of up to Rs. 30000 to start their own business. After this rehabilitation, the militant and his family would undergo regular meetings and collective counselling for 3 months and follow-up meetings for 6 months. By 2016, three batches of 311 participants were trained and rehabilitated under the programme (Iqbal, 2020, pp. 170,171). This program also aimed to cater for all the aspects of individual de-radicalization, including ideological and affective dissuasion, providing material support and collective counselling. However, the amount of loan provided to rehabilitated individuals was too small to start any sustainable business or livelihood, therefore still putting in doubt the redressal of pragmatic commitment of former militants.
Two new rehabilitation centres were also opened in former FATA in Bajaur and Khyber in 2012. These centres also focused on combining religious and ideological training along with vocational training. The rehabilitation centre in Bajaur was run jointly by Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps. The centre would offer a 12-week rehabilitation program to the participants. In 2013, the fourth batch of 47 participants was passed out from the centre ("Rehabilitation and integration, 2013). Whereas the programme in Khyber comprised of three learning centres with 400 participants. The distinguishing feature of the Khyber programme was that it also included feedback from militants regarding their stay at the programme (Basit, 2015b, p. 15). The data on these programs were however insufficient to indicate whether it was followed up by any collective counselling or not. Likewise, there was no data available on the state of Darpesh deradicalization program in Quetta.
These four distinct programmes collectively comprise Pakistan's overall de-radicalization and rehabilitation efforts (see Table 1). They focused on countering the causes and motivations of violent extremism on the individual level. The non-kinetic approach of rehabilitation as a reaction to terrorism prevents a negative feedback loop which could otherwise provide a conducive environment and encourage further terrorism. However, the non-kinetic approach in Pakistan is also applied with caution and limited number of participants. This was evident from the "no blood on hand" policy in the Mishal programme. Despite growing extremism in the society, as evident by some recent surveys and incidents of terrorism in 2021-23, the decreasing number of programs under Mishal, and the closing of Punjab de-radicalization programs due to lack of budget allocation also shows that resource allocation remains a major constraint towards these efforts.

Organizational level -transformation
The threat of terrorism cannot be dealt adequately by focussing merely on an individual level. Different terrorist organizations have different goals and motivations to adopt violent means. To deal with terrorism on organizational level, it is essential to bring about organizational transformation or change as well. In Pakistan, different terrorist organizations can be broadly divided into four Table 1
There are generally five prerequisites for successful organizational transformation of a terrorist organization. They include: relinquishing violence; expression of political will; ideological reorientation and endorsing democracy; internal cohesion; external recognition, including both internal and external recognition. According to Neumann (2008, pp. 92-94), only the terrorist organizations fulfilling these five prerequisites should be negotiated for effective organizational transformation. Transformation of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) proceeded successfully, albeit in a lengthy timeline, due to fulfilling all these prerequisites.
In case of Pakistan, attempt for terrorist organizational transformation through mainstreaming and rehabilitation was witnessed in case of religious nationalist organization Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD), affiliated with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). In addition to the rehabilitation of militants, the organization also attempted mainstreaming itself. The intent of mainstreaming effort by JuD might have also been influenced by factor of constraints that terrorist organizations faced due to sanctions applied after 9/11. Nevertheless, contrasting the mainstreaming effort with organizational transformation framework shows that the effort faced difficulty due to various reasons.
The leaders of organization announced forming a political party in 2017 by the name of Milli Muslim League (MML) ("Jamaatud Dawa enters political arena, launches Milli Muslim League party, 2017). This showed a commitment to political will and relinquishing violence. However, there were no public statements to confirm organization's ideological reorientation or indicate their views on democracy. The internal cohesion of the group also remains intact. Even though the spokesperson for MML stated in an interview that the party has no affiliation with JuD leadership or any group, many commentators and observers maintained that the party enjoyed full support from JuD leadership (S. Khan, 2017).
The announcement of JuD forming a political party was met with considerable criticism both internally and externally, despite the fact that organizational mainstreaming is an acceptable phenomenon in dealing with terrorist organizations across different countries. This happened due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the JuD did not take into confidence any stakeholders and actors at internal and external level in its attempt at mainstreaming. Consequently, no Pakistani political party came to support JuD in its mainstreaming process. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior of Pakistan also advised the Election Commission not to register MML (Gishkori, 2017). The United States saw it as an effort by LeT to circumvent sanctions applied on them (Anwar, 2018). Thus, the project of transforming into a political party remained incomplete for the JuD.
Proponents of the attempted transformation argued that the mainstreaming will render the JuD obsolete, as religious political parties have never performed well in Pakistan. Another rationale is that once the parties enter mainstream political process, they will be forced to change their stance from radical to moderate for the sake of appealing to greater audience for securing votes. Therefore, the best way of dealing with such religious nationalist terrorist organizations is to let them enter the mainstream politics and allow the nation to decide their fate in a democratic system.
Regardless, the transformation of JuD never concluded and came to an abrupt halt instead. The party was not registered in general elections, and their endorsed candidates faced humiliating defeat. Ever since, the MML disappeared from public and media discourse. However, it made a few things clear. First, that only willingness of a terrorist organization for mainstreaming may not lead to a conclusive organizational transformation. All the actors and stakeholders need to have a clear image of purpose and outcome of transformation to facilitate the process. Furthermore, merely adopting the status of a political party or joining electoral process does not ensure transformation of terrorist organization. In order to convince all stakeholders and actors as well as the general populace, they must also denounce violence and adopt a moderate public stance clearly.

Environmental level -counter-narrative
At the environmental level, violent extremism can be effectively countered using counternarratives as non-violent measures to contain extremism. There are three key types of narratives, i.e., collective, ontological, and public narratives. Collective narratives are those which evolve organically in a society with the passage of time, without any author or messenger. For example, folklore, proverbs, and popular stories. Ontological narratives are those told by ordinary people. Ontological narratives have an author, and only become collective narrative in society if they are widely accepted. For example, works by authors and orators. While the public narratives are those which are specifically constructed by any actor (governments, media, clergy, organizations, etc.). Public narratives built upon collective narratives have more chances to be accepted widely (Iqbal et al., 2019, pp. 147,148).
As stated earlier, counter-narrative is any narrative created by actors to counteract violent terrorists' narrative. In that regard, counter-narratives are usually public narratives created and endorsed by the state. Counter-narratives also act against terrorism on all levels; however its impact is most prominently seen on the environmental level. Thus, counter-narrative is an imperative in dealing with environment conducive for terrorism.
The case study of counter-narrative building by Egypt can be regarded as an ideal model. Immediately after 9/11, Egypt sought to create a counter-narrative to keep the influence of violent organisations like Al-Qaeda and Al-Jihad away from Egypt. For that purpose, they endorsed and patronized former terrorist leaders who spoke against committing the acts of terrorism. Two key figures in Egypt's counter-narrative were Imam Shareef and Yusuf Qaradawi. Their works Rationalising Jihad in Egypt and the World and Fiqa-e-Jihad respectively were landmarks in transforming the aggressive minds in society from radicalization to social synchronization (Bahri, 2013;Hamzawy & Grebowski, 2010). The counter-narrative in Egypt shook foundations of violent extremist groups in Egypt and decreased incidences of terrorism. Despite the fact that their internal environment (economic, political, social) was as much trouble-ridden.
In similar light, Pakistan also started constructing a counter-narrative against terrorism with extremists as its target audience after the realization that post-9/11 hard counter-terrorist methods have not been able to effectively eradicate violent extremism. The public narrative before general audience was constructed through media and songs highlighting the efforts of armed forces. Most of such narrative was constructed and led by Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), the media wing of Pakistan's military. According to Iqbal (2020, pp. 155,156), there are 35 different dramas, movies, songs, and documentaries made and released by ISPR until 2019 to counter-the extremist narrative. However, these were not all well received as the target audience saw military patronized media with suspicion.
The religious clergy also supported efforts in building counter-narrative against terrorism in Pakistan. In Tahir-ul-Qadri, 2010 wrote a 600-page long document in which he denounced violent extremism carried out by different groups in the name of Islam (Tahir-Ul-Qadri, 2010). Later in 2016, the Pakistan Ulema Council (PUC), led by Hafiz Tahir Ashrafi, issued a fatwa (religious ruling) declaring a number of organizations like ISIS and Hezbollah as terrorist ("Pakistan Ulema Council issues fatwa against ISIS, 2016). However, both these narratives also did not popularize, as both the persons leading these initiatives had questionable and partisan character in the public eye.
Perhaps, the most comprehensive narrative building was carried out in Paigham-e-Pakistan, a fatwa written and endorsed by religious scholars from all sects of Pakistan and approved by the President of Pakistan (Munir, 2018).It logically refuted the violent terrorism, clarified the term jihad, and emphasized upon concepts like social harmony, spirit of forgiveness, and maintenance of social order. The document also represented consensus of all sects that the constitution and state of Pakistan were not in contradiction to Islam. Thus any "jihad" against Pakistan and its citizens was invalidated. It had all the necessary features to formulate an effective counternarrative. The only drawback was that its outreach towards its targeted audience, i.e., militants and violent extremists, was not as much as it should have been. Thus. this is one domain where the state needs to work upon for effective counter-narrative.
Conclusively, in the formative phase, the counter-narrative efforts in Pakistan did not meet the true purpose of substantially altering environment motivating terrorism due to various reasons. First the messengers or actors constructing the public narrative were questionable for the intended audience. Secondly the message, even if correct, could not effectively reach the intended audience, i.e., radicalized extremists and terrorists. Lastly any counter-narrative effort has also to be accompanied with actual development of material means to alter the environment on economic, political, and social level as well. Thus, successful counter-narratives need to consist of authentic messengers with appeal for the audience, acceptable and understandable medium, and identification of the correct audience to deliver the narrative.

Analysing the outcomes of Pakistan's CVE efforts
A comprehensive overview of Pakistan's CVE efforts on individual, organizational and environmental levels illustrate various strengths and shortcomings. The strengths, first of all, include effective deradicalisation of individuals undergoing the programmes and a comprehensive narrative against terrorism agreed upon by religious scholarship from all circles resulting in Paigham-e-Pakistan. However, the deradicalization program suffered from limitation of its scale (with less than 1000 individuals deradicalized in different initiatives in one decade, 2010-2020). Attempts at organizational transformation failed altogether. Whereas the counter-narrative also did not result in bringing about any long-term decline in terrorism or prevent its resurgence.
Pakistan's non-kinetic responses to violent extremism have certainly complimented the state's kinetic response. Military operations, followed by Intelligence-Based Operations (IBOs) and subsequent deployment of various CT bodies paved the way for the government's soft interventions. This led to significant decline of incidents of terrorism in the country. According to various independent think-tanks and research centres annual number of violent attacks dropped from nearly 2,000 in 2009 to fewer than 319 in 2020 (Afzal, 2021). A comparison of PIPS (Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies) data on terrorist incidents in Pakistan from 2009 to 2022 also shows sharp decline of terrorist attacks from 2012 onwards (see Figure 3). This led to 2020 being the relatively most peaceful year in country with least number of terrorist attacks and violent incidents in the last decade.
However, the war is far from over. The withdrawal of US troops have transformed the militant landscape of the country once again. According to Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) report, terrorist attacks in Pakistan increased by 42% in 2021 as compared to 2020, whereas the interior minister stated a 35% increase in terrorist attacks in recent months (Afzal, 2022;Hussain, 2022). Latest PIPS data shows highest number of fatalities due to terrorism in year 2022 (419) since 2018 (595). At the dawn of new year.

Conclusion
Prevalence of extremism in Pakistan is not only in the form of violent terrorism. Rather the trends of extremism and radicalization also persist. A study of trends of on campus radicalization in six notable universities of Pakistan pointed out that even the educated youth remains at risk of radicalization (Iqbal & Mehmood, 2021). Likewise, the contentious issue of blasphemy has also seen an upward rise from only 15 cases in 2010 to 138 in 2020, and 50 in 2021 (Nafees, 2022). Similarly, the incidents of blasphemy accusations also increased from 9 in 2010 to 227 and 39 in 2020 and 2021 respectively. Another survey from Gallup Pakistan showed that from 2014 to 2018, the number of people who would not like having a non-Muslim neighbour increased by 8% ("Public Opinion in Pakistan Since Year 2010," 2020). These indicators point out towards increasing tendencies of shifting away from equilibrium towards extremism. Therefore, the Pakistan needs to sustain its non-kinetic interventions rigorously. De-radicalization centres in newly merged tribal districts (erstwhile FATA), Swat, South Punjab and Balochistan must be supported with all legal, financial and logistical means. Greater scale and resource allocation is also essential for results of deradicalization programmes to transpire. An external audit of these facilities by subject matter experts can add value and transparency to these initiatives. On transformation of JuD, Islamabad may consider learning from global best practices in DDR domain, by involving key stakeholders such as the UN, US, China and Saudi Arabia. Efforts to counter-militants' narrative must go beyond Paigham-e-Pakistan by encouraging healthy scholarly debate on the document.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.