Countering the Islamic State in the Lake Chad Basin: A case for a security-development-governance nexus?

Abstract The Islamic State in the West African province (ISWAP) has gained prominence in Lake Chad Basin by filling in the security, service delivery, and governance gaps in Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger. This has won the group recruits and support in some communities, entrenching it in the region. Using the security-development-Governance nexus conceptual framework, this mixed methods study explores viable counter-terrorism measures in the Lake Chad Basin. The paper argues that although a military option is viable, combating underlying state failures and applying soft counter-terrorism measures will go a long way in restoring the state-community trust needed to defeat ISWAP.


Introduction
The meteoric rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq caught the imagination of terror groups like Boko Haram, which pledged allegiance to the group for several reasons, like legitimacy and financial support. The subsequent demise of the organization led to a proliferation of groups in Africa. The Islamic State held territory for a while in Libya and subsequently spread its wings in the Sahel, West Africa, and East Africa. Nevertheless, this study focuses on the Islamic State in West Africa, which has entrenched itself in the Lake Chad Basin and operates in Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon.
The Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP) is a branch of ISIS that operates in West Africa, primarily in Nigeria. ISWAP was formed in 2015 after internal struggles within Boko Haram ABOUT THE AUTHORS Norman Sempijja is an Associate professor with University of Mohammed VI polytechnic in Morocco. His research interests are in international security and has written extensively on inter-organisational cooperation in peacekeeping. Of recent he has developed a keen interest in the security development and governance nexus. Paula Mora Brito is an emerging researcher in international relations with a special focus on war and peace studies. Her geographical specialisation is on Africa and the European Union Zineb Moutaoukil is an emerging scholar in global politics specialising in security-development and governance nexus. she has also developed an interest in the role of the private sector in peacebuilding in Africa. which had been turned into an insurgent group called Jamatu Ahli Al-Sunna lil Da'wa Wal Jihad (JAS) 1 by Abu-Bakr Shekau who had succeeded the founding leader Mohammed Yussuf. 2 The internal struggles were due to a leadership contest that pitted Abu-Bakr Shekau against Mamman Nur and Abu Musab al-Barnawi. 3 Although Shekau had pledged his allegiance to Islamic State of Iraq and the Levante and was quickly acknowledged by Bakr Al-Baghdadi and subsequently named as the new Wali (leader) of Islamic State in West African Province 4 the splinter group led by Nur and Al-Barnawi soon emerged and began to challenge the dominance of Boko Haram/JAS. The splinter group was able to retain the ISWAP name as it got the support of al-Baghdadi. 5 While both ISWAP and Boko Haram share some similarities in their ideology and tactics, there are also some key differences between the two groups. One key difference between ISWAP and Boko Haram is their overall approach to violence. While Boko Haram has traditionally relied on suicide bombings, kidnappings, and attacks on civilians, 6 ISWAP has focused more on direct attacks against military and police forces. 7 This has allowed ISWAP to establish a stronger foothold in the region and gain more support from local populations. Moreover, the group has presented itself as an alternative to the state by providing services 8 and introducing the Rule of Law according to Sharia Law. Yet although ISWAP has used force on civilians, especially those accused of a crime or suspected of spying, most violence has been reserved for the national armies.
Yet the proliferation of terror groups in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) creates concern for any counter-terrorism strategist. The centrality of the LCB is paramount, especially as the region faces various challenges, from climate change, local grievances, poor governance, insecurity, and poverty, among others. For example, the LBC region has been affected by a rise in temperatures around 1.5 times faster than the global average, thereby increasing the frequency of droughts from one every ten years to one every two years, 9 and since 1960, has caused the loss of 90% of Lake Chad Basin's volume since 1960. 10 This has led to a rise in violence and insecurity in the area due to the scarcity of resources, making survival even more difficult.
Economically, northern Nigeria is one of the territories with the highest extreme poverty rate, 11 accounting for the highest population. 12 Growing insecurity due to terrorist activities has not only led to internal displacement but also migration, which has put pressure on its neighbours; for example, 239,370 Nigerians sought refuge in the Lake Chad Basin areas of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. 13 This has led to competition around the scarce resources of the Lake Chad Basin, creating tension between the different communities, like farmers and pastoralists. Organized criminal activity has increased, with human and narcotics illicit trafficking increasing considerably in the region, providing another source of insecurity. This situation has led to an increase in food prices, thus provoking a food security crisis in the area. In September 2020, 5.2 million people were suffering from food insecurity, among whom an estimated 500,000 children were at risk of acute malnutrition. 14 As observed by Jahangir Khan, the Director of the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre: "It is with grave concern that we have watched the situation in the region develop into one of the largest humanitarian emergencies in the world, with terrorism having compounded the effects of climate change, displacement, and socio-economicchallenges." 15 Nevertheless, states have put together counter-terrorism measures like the 2018 Council of Ministers of LCBC AU approved Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery, and Resilience (RSS) of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin region. It aims to "develop an overarching regional approach in dealing with the deep-rooted causes of under-development and the drivers of violent extremism and conflicts in the Lake Chad region." Yet it has failed to include the local population in these projects.
The LCBC mandated the Multinational Joint Task force to: "create a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by the activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, in order to significantly reduce violence against civilians and other abuses, including sexual-and gender-based violence, in full compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law and the UN HRDDP; facilitate the implementation of overall stabilization programmes by the LCBC Member States and Benin in the affected areas, including the full restoration of state authority and the return of IDPs and refugees; and facilitate, within the limit of its capabilities, humanitarian operations and the delivery of assistance to the affected populations." 16 Yet the organization struggled to effectively cope with Boko Haram and the emergency of ISWAP in the region. Authors like Berlingozzi and Stoddard (2020), 17 Zenn (2019), 18 and the International Crisis Group, 19 highlight the changes in tactics of ISWAP, especially the adoption of population-friendly tactics and presenting itself as an alternative to the state. The fact that it has been able to entrench itself into Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon raises questions about the effectiveness of the existing counter-terrorism measures. Moreover, filling the security, governance, and even economic development spaces highlights the notion that there is a void left by the states. Alternatively, the governments of Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria have not been effective in delivering security, good governance, and economic development for the population, leading to indifference to the activities of ISWAP.
The study aims to examine the counter-terrorism strategy against ISWAP and explore whether the security-development and governance nexus is appropriate in this case. The study was guided by two questions: (1) Examine the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism strategies against ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin.
(2) To what extent is the security-development-governance model nexus a viable alternative?
The paper's methodology followed an exploratory research design and mixed research methods. Qualitative data was drawn from primary and secondary sources. Primary sources included key informant interviews, and country reports, while secondary sources entailed journal articles, policy papers, and other sources like newspapers. The quantitative data was drawn from the Fragile states index for three countries: Niger, Cameroon, and Nigeria. The study thus relied on conflict risk indicators such as security apparatus, state legitimacy, public services, group grievances, human rights and the Rule of Law, and uneven economic development. The data covered 2006 to 2021 and was computed to reflect the average score. The rationale for using Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon is that these are the countries most affected by the Islamic State in the West Africa Province. Chad has been excluded due to a lack of enough data on the activities of ISWAP in the country. By late 2021, the group had yet to make a formal statement about expansion into Chad. 20 On the other hand, the indicators were specifically chosen to highlight the performance of the three countries in the three subcategories of security, development, and governance before and during the rise of ISWAP.

The security indicators
The security apparatus indicator entails the ebb and flow of threats to the state and manifestations of resistance to the state. Such acts include battle-related attacks and deaths, uprisings, insurgencies, terrorism, rebel movements, and coups. The indicator further explores other threats to the state, like organized crime. 21 The link to security is essential, especially in navigating the effect of the states' responses to these threats.
The Group Grievances indicator focuses on social divisions, where aggrieved groups have cited injustice and cases where state authorities single out certain groups for repression or persecution. Some grievances may be historical and continuously shape a group's role and relationships in society. 22 The indicator is fundamental to the security perspective, especially in showing the link between unaddressed grievances and link to increased violence against the state.

Development indicator
The Uneven Economic Development indicator explores structural inequality, usually based on race, gender, ethnicity, and perceptions of inequality. 23 The indicator is essential, especially in drawing the link between increased structural inequality and insecurity. Moreover, the indicator is also crucial to the nexus with governance, especially public service.

Governance indicators
The Public service indicator delves into the service delivery abilities of the state, such as education, sanitation, transport, and infrastructure, among others. The indicator further explores the ability of the state to maintain infrastructure, especially as its failure could lead to instability. 24 The Human Rights and Rule of Law indicator explores the relationship between the state and the population in so far as adherence to human rights, and other fundamental freedoms are concerned, 25 . In contrast, the State Legitimacy indicator examines the population's confidence in the government. Lack of confidence in the state is exhibited through protests, civil disobedience, and armed rebellion. 26 The above three indicators are crucial to understanding the state's ability (public service and respect for human rights) and the legitimacy that must govern society. The ability and legitimacy of a state are essential in understanding its capacity to maintain security and address developmental issues.
The study further explores the security development governance nexus and counter terrorism strategies within the ambit of social constructivism theory. The reason for this is that traditional international relations theories like realism and liberalism are too state-centric 27 in focus and do not have enough space to explore the roles of non-state actors or develop tools to deal with intrastate challenges effectively. Social constructivism perceives the world as socially constructed and provides an alternative to the rationalist and materialist 28 approaches to international relations discourse. Theys (2018) notes that social constructivism goes beyond the; Material reality by including the effect of ideas and beliefs on world politics. This also entails that reality is always under construction, which opens the prospect for change. In other words, meanings are not fixed but can change over time depending on actors ideas and beliefs. 29 The ideas and beliefs are fundamental to norm-making in international relations. This has also been reflected in the changing nature of norms, from humanitarian intervention to the responsibility to protect. Therefore, social constructivism has been crucial in unpacking the link between security and development. Furthermore, the concept has further evolved to include governance, a true reflection of the constructivist approach, as the nature of reality in the discourse has changed over time.

Security-development governance nexus
Security is a contested concept. It is agreed that it is the absence of any threat to the core values of individuals and groups. Still, there is debate on whether the focus should be individual, national, or international. 30 The Treaties of Westphalia made states the most powerful actor in the international system, becoming the universal standard of political legitimacy. This perspective persisted until the 20 th century as the World Wars, the decolonization process, and the Cold War outbreak gradually created an international system in which the state was no longer the sole provider of security. Through theories such as neorealism, perpetuated by thinkers like Kenneth Waltz, the global system began to be understood as an anarchic system where wars occur because there is nothing to stop them from happening. 31 Thus began an era of global attempts to create international organizations that aimed to establish mechanisms to solve the anarchic nature of this international system. The League of Nations, the United Nations, the World Bank, Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan, and some regional organizations, among others, resulted from this attempt.
Nevertheless, it was only at the end of the Cold War that the concept of security shifted, becoming related to development. The aftermath of the territories where subjugation took place showed that conflict was no longer a matter of external threats but was shifting to a new era of privatization of conflict. Barry Buzan, through his study People, States and Fear (1983), 32 states that the term security should also encompass economic, environmental, political, military, and societal dimensions. This clarification is necessary because it highlights the insufficiency of traditional national security approaches that did not consider, or did not enough, the ethnic, cultural, and religious tensions that might provoke conflict. 33 Securitization of development was thus the approach to internal armed conflict in developing nations and the increase of crime and violence in developed ones shaping the global economy. Conflict started to be understood as the cost of missed development opportunities, low indices of human development, and the rise of failed states. 34 In other words, security can no longer be exclusively addressed from the traditional state-centric perspective. Threats and challenges are intertwined. Conflict in one region leads to massive internal displacement and waves of refugees. Poor health infrastructure or sanitary measures in one area lead to pandemics. 35 This new trend started to become relevant in the international system through the work of Mahbu ul Had and Amartya Sen, with their creation of the concept of human security. Their vision promoted a shift from the state approach to the individual one, focusing on building human/ individual capabilities to overcome illiteracy, disease, poverty, discrimination, restrictions, and threats of violence by advocating for the enlargement of their choices. This understanding was universally received, as it forms part of the 1994 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme. 36 Human security thus highlights several basic human needs that are at the core of individual survival, not only to protect them from conflict, but also as a preemptive measure. 37 Development does not have a universally accepted definition. This is due to the ideological framework through which it must be understood since it reflects societal values and principles. Nevertheless, its most common understanding is the neoliberal one, predominant in Western societies. It argues that a free capitalist market promotes economic development, vital political and social values, individual rights, and freedom of choice. Time has shown that this model has brought prosperity to Western countries but has yet to have the same results in African nations. This is due to the limitations of the theory, which do not consider other factors contributing to underdevelopment that are not directly human-driven, such as global warming. 38 Nevertheless, it was not until 9/11 that the global acceptance of this new interconnected international system became imminent. As Bretherton and Ponton argued, cooperation between states became more necessary than ever since globalization unified our threats and challenges through the intensification of interconnectedness. 39 Another contribution to adopting the nexus methodology realized that instability lasts longer than war because it has long-term legacies. Environmental damage, land mines, and problems of reinsertions of some groups, such as child soldiers, an uneducated generation, etc., result in a lack of development in security. The conclusion was that this new geopolitics relies on soft power rather than military power, 40 and that security and development are two different but complementary concepts of said powers. Hard power provides sovereignty and is linked to a state's necessity to provide for its inhabitants' well-being. Soft power is connected to the relationship between human progress and the said well-being. This new understanding brought about a new practice: humanitarian intervention. The state still plays a relevant role in providing national security. However, it is no longer sufficient to counter the latest global threats, thus creating room for new actors. 41 During the Security-Development Nexus Program in New York in 2003, organized by the International Peace Academy, interesting analyses of the security-development nexus were made. Long-term development became the predominant objective of any humanitarian intervention as the vicious interaction of insecurity and conflict was finally fully understood. Through analysis of the '90s conflicts around the globe, it was concluded that underdevelopment, created by instability, produces an atmosphere of vulnerability to conflict. If it erupts, the conflict will impact a community's economy, education, health, and environmental aspects, provoking a circle of social and political instability and vulnerability that will repeat itself. 42 This new paradigm has thus redefined the approach to security, adding public services and state institutions at the national and local levels as part of the concept. Furthermore, the focus has changed since it now promotes conflict prevention strategies rather than the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of post-conflict processes.
In other words, the security-development nexus tries to break this circle through virtuous interaction through reduced economic disruption, ecological damage, educational opportunities, and disease outbreaks. Thus, there is a decrease in social vulnerability and an improvement in well-being, which hampers the possibility of conflict. In this solution, good governance becomes an indispensable tool. Although this concept is also subject to a lack of standard definition, the EU defines it as "the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in society," 43 and the UNDP considers it "the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country's affairs at all levels." 44 Consensus is found on what good governance stands for: democratic values, political participation, accountability, equality, transparency, and effectiveness. The Rule of Law is also a vital pillar in exercising good governance.
Some issues on the security-development nexus were brought up during this program. First, the concept is excessively broad. The lack of concrete definitions of its core concepts has led to the inefficient deployment of any action since it needs to be clarified what the objectives are, and the recognition of some actors against others can be contested. The "Triple R" approach-rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reintegration-of post-war recovery 48 is often applied. However, we have seen that the aim is to lay long-term grounds for prosperity and to act before violence strikes. Furthermore, some have argued that these unrealistic and excessively moralistic concepts prompt failure since such a utopian outcome could never be attained, thus provoking local disillusionment and the vicious circle of conflict.
Secondly, due to this first issue, there is a lack of coordination. Fragmented and inconsistent approaches have led to gaps in the Tripple R activities or duplication. This is due to the competition around the agents who participate being more interested in applying their legal-value models and obtaining post-conflict deals than in promoting the well-being of the inhabitants of the territory where the human intervention is taking place, which is due to the ambiguous institutions that now participate. Non-governmental and private organizations are in blurred zones when applying sovereign decisions. Locally, different actors are also involved, such as religious or traditional leaders, vigilante groups, hometown associations, militias, organized crime, political parties, and public authorities. 45 This last phenomenon of local authorities is the consequence of the approach to the nexus of development and security during colonial times. At that time, there was a division between the "democratic" regions (white urban areas) and the indirectly ruled rural areas, where nondemocratic governance prevailed. This division aimed to make the colonized responsible for their development and reduce colonial administration costs, which provoked alienation by the inhabitants of the central government. This has inevitably lasted over time, as many governments have not been able to gain absolute social control of their territory. 46 A third issue, which encompasses the absence of local involvement and the lack of in-depth understanding of the security and development actors in the area, is, at the same time, a solution. If local agencies are considered, a better understanding of the roots of conflict and the need for security would create a better approach. Furthermore, their participation would also legitimize the intervention and foster post-conflict stability, as inhabitants would have taken part in the process. Finally, their "buy-in" is necessary, as they are the drivers of change.
Finally, resources and capacity are often insufficient. Most of these humanitarian interventions have created a dependency on the territory, with the donor preventing actual development, thus maintaining the threat of conflict in the long term. Moreover, the bureaucratic procedures to assist also harm the rapidity of the responses needed to prevent or de-escalate the ongoing conflict. 47 In addition to those mentioned above, some solutions to overcome these deficiencies are creating strategic approaches that intervene in the pre-conflict phase. As the securitydevelopment nexus demonstrates, breaking the cycle of underdevelopment is vital. Conflict management depends on the size of each conflict, rather than "one size for all," and its action and capacity have to be sufficiently rapid. Another vital point is the necessary shift of the short project cycles of donors to long-term engagement. A lack of violence does not mean an absence of instability and insecurity. The vicious circle of underdevelopment and conflict takes time to end since governance must acquire social legitimacy. This process takes time as it has to show its good governance and establish the Rule of Law. People's choices must become evident, and coexistence between the different actors who once were in conflict has to become a reality. 48 Further, the conflation of security and development still has adverse effects on governance, as Simpson (2007) noted. Simpson argues that weak states were being targeted for multipronged state-building programmes by Western states through their militaries. However, they were only using humanitarian action to strengthen their military and political agendas. Moreover, development discourse and resources were being overtaken by an agenda far detached from development. 49 Concerning the above, the primacy of security has curtailed good governance in counterterrorism and counter-insurgence scenarios. For example, Sempijja and Eyita-Okon note that the security development agenda of the EU in the Sahel has put the EU states in a difficult position where they are supporting governments that are not trusted by their populations. 50 Therefore, since governance is central to the discourse on conflicts and instability, especially in Africa, applying a security development nexus without considering issues such as the Rule of Law and human rights has tended to suffer contradictions.

The multinational joint task force and its counter-terrorism strategy
The general response to terror groups has revolved around the use of force, especially as an act of selfdefense. 51 Some states have employed armed forces to wipe out the terror groups, for example, as shown in the war on terror by the United States of America and its allies, plus targeted attacks against states like Sudan, 52 which has left many questions about the legality unanswered. 53 There is a general acceptance that using force against terror groups is acceptable as self-defense under the UN Charter article 51. The use of force, especially from a state-based perspective, is categorised as the statecentric orthodox terrorism studies approach, 54 focusing on military outcomes. Yet it should be noted that apart from the use of force (which can operationally be defined as hard counterterrorism), other measures that don't necessarily involve force have been adopted (soft counter-terrorism).
According to Hoeft (2015), the soft approach to counter-terrorism has been designed to win the hearts and minds of people that have been radicalized or are in the process of being radicalized through non-coercive methods. 55 Soft Counter terrorism approach has used deradicalization (a process of divorcing a person from extreme views) and disengagement, where people have been moved away from extreme group activities. 56 Thus, several initiatives have been instituted in West Africa to deal with the rising threat of terror organizations. Among them is the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).
In 1994, the MNJTF aimed at dealing with trans-border organized criminal organizations' arms trafficking in the Lake Chad Basin. Membership initially included Nigeria but later expanded to Chad, Cameroon, Benin, and Niger. The organization's shift to counterterrorism took place along with attacks from Boko Haram. 57 Thus, in 2012, the organization expanded its mandate to carry counter-terrorism operations, a move endorsed by the African Union, which authorized the deployment of the MNJTF and to re-operationalize it with an increase of around 10,000 troops and the inauguration of the new headquarters in N'Djamena, Chad. 58 This strategy has been helped by the behaviour of groups like Boko Haram that have targeted civilians through killings, torture, and kidnapping, presenting a human security 59 challenge to the civilian populations.
However, the use of force has come under criticism, mainly because it has not dealt with the underlying causes of the conflicts. 60 Moreover, groups like ISWAP have changed the modus operandi of terror groups by filling the security and governance gap in the regions under their control. Berlingozzi and Stoddard (2020) note that Niger and Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy is not adapting well to the new population-centric tactics of ISWAP. 61 McDappa (2022) agrees as she highlights ISWAP strategies that appeal to local populations. 62 Fru and Tayo (2021) highlight ISWAP's tactics change by desisting from attacking civilians and focusing on national armed forces. 63 They emphasize ISWAP's intention to redo the social contract in areas they control and replace the existing state apparatus with ISWAP as an alternative. 64 Husted (2022) notes ISWAP's deeper connections with local communities, mainly engaging in essential law enforcement. 65 This, in turn, has translated into more territorial gains and an improvement in capacity, plus success on the military front. 66 Furthermore, states like Nigeria have been suffering military losses at the hands of ISWAP on a number of occasions even as they have modified their tactics. For example, the Nigerian army adopted the super-camp strategy involving pooling forces together into large, fortified groups. This was an attempt to curtail the losses at the hands of Boko Haram. However, this was countered by ISWAP which adopted similar tactics and is reported to have overrun super-camps on 3 occasions between February and April 2021. 67

The effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies against ISWAP in Lake Chad Basin
Through the use of the six indicators' security apparatus-state legitimacy, human rights and the Rule of Law, uneven economic development, group grievances, and public service-the study explored the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies made by Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger. The data covered the period from 2006 to 2021. This was due to exploring the variation in performance, especially as the three countries have been grappling with Boko Haram, from which ISWAP emerged. The aim was to gain comprehensive knowledge about the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies before the rise of ISWAP and during its operations, especially as it adopted a different approach to that of Boko Haram.
As shown in Figure 1 above, the security threats to Nigeria through the existence of Boko Haram and the emergence of ISWAP have been consistently high. Although the indicator factors in other threats like bombings, homicides, and domestic insecurity, the presence of Boko Haram and its role in destabilizing the country cannot be overlooked. Moreover, ISWAP has stepped up its attacks on the Nigerian army 68 and also continues to have a hold over the populations in the areas it has subjugated. Nevertheless, since the Multinational Joint Task force's launch, Nigeria's security apparatus has remained very high, thus showing the deficiencies in the current counterterrorism strategy. Moreover, Boko Haram has only been eroded from within, as shown by the emergence of ISWAP. Other than that, it had remained a significant threat to security in Nigeria.
As part of the Lake Chad Basin and the MNJTF, Cameroon and Niger also score highly on the security apparatus. In 2021 Cameroon experienced ISWAP attacks on the military in areas like Mayo-Sava and Logone, the Chari division, and Mayo-Tsanaga. 69 In Niger, the region of Tahou was attacked by ISWAP when it targeted villages like Bakorat and towns like Tebaram. 70 It should be noted that in addition to ISWAP, these countries have other internal stressors that make them more fragile and susceptible to other groups, such as separatist movements. There is an acknowledgment that groups like ISWAP have captured the imagination of the youth, especially with offers of money, as some feel that the state has abandoned them. 71 This has led to more youth radicalization that has swelled the ranks of the terror group, 72 thereby increasing the threat to the state.
Respect for human rights and the Rule of Law are fundamental to strengthening states' capabilities to handle internal and external stressors. It is paramount for citizens to have trust in the state to deliver justice and allow fundamental freedoms. However, figure 2 above shows

Figure 2. Performance on human rights and the Rule of Law (own compilation from Fragile states index).
that over 15 years, Nigerian's score is the highest. For example, when fighting Boko Haram, the Nigerian army has been known to engage in sexual violence against women. 73 The army further engaged in mass arrests of men in areas where Boko Haram was known to operate, and some of their families in internally displaced camps were denied food. 74 In addition, Amnesty International exposed several cases involving the sexual abuse of children by security personnel and inmates in Maiduguri maximum security prison and the Giwa barracks in Borneo state. 75 This has not inspired confidence in the state, and ISWAP is filling this void with promises of Sharia law and overall Islamic justice. Cameroon's score rose for a while, and even though it dipped in 2017, it remains high. Some human rights violations have intensified with the penetration of Boko Haram and later ISWAP into Cameroon.

Figure 4. Public Services (own compilation from Fragile states index).
Amnesty International has noted arbitrary arrests of children, raids on Qur'anic schools, mass indiscriminate arrests, excessive use of force, and unlawful killing by security forces. 76 Niger, on the other hand, had some fair scores in 2017, but its human rights record has worsened, coinciding with the rise of Boko Haram and ISWAP in the region. For example, reports of extrajudicial killings of men suspected of fighting for terror groups, the disappearances of people, torture, sexual violence, and the internment of women and children. 77 The lack of human rights and the absence of the Rule of Law has given ISWAP space to impose its rule on the population. Yet it should be noted that Niger has slowly tried to move away and attempted to improve its human rights record. For example, it has set up reintegration camps for the lost children in Diffa with the plan of putting them back into society to ensure peace and security. 78 Grievances against the state, especially concerning the marginalization of some groups, have been prominent in Nigeria ,Niger and Cameroon. Figure 3 illuminates this with a high score for the three countries with Nigeria being the highest. According to Thurston (2016) and Afzal (2020), the group grievance in Northern Nigeria is primarily rooted in the marginalization of access to jobs,

Figure 6. Uneven economic development (own compilation from Fragile states index).
even after attaining degrees, and the lack of integration of education systems in the North with the rest of the country, 79 with corruption showcased by the educated elites in government. 80 Northern Cameroon, predominantly Muslim, has been experiencing low state presence and legitimacy, poor public services, high inequality, and poor social services, leading to complicity when Boko Haram extended its regional operations. 81 Similarly, in Niger, group grievances related to neglect, poverty, and lack state presence. 82 Historical border connections with Nigeria, plus the porous nature of these borders, made it easy for Nigeriens to join the ranks of Boko Haram and latch on to its vision. 83 For the territories affected by Boko Haram and later ISWAP, poor public service delivery as per figure 4 was highlighted as significant to perpetuating group grievances. This poor service delivery reflected a lack of state presence that led to support of Boko Haram, despite its violence in Northern Nigeria. 84 Moreover, in Cameroon, there was complicity 85 from the Muslims in the north, who felt marginalized. In Niger, its border areas with Nigeria have been neglected for a long time in terms of public service delivery. 86 Indeed, there is an acceptance within Niger that people in remote areas have felt neglected by the state and have been more susceptible to groups like ISWAP. 87 Thus, ISWAP, with its service delivery agenda, albeit in a limited manner, has caught the imagination of the population.
Adesoji and Alimi (2020) identify the threat by terror groups like Boko Haram 88 in Northern Nigeria as an actual test to state legitimacy. The rise of ISWAP could be seen as a more significant threat to state legitimacy, as the group has endeavoured to focus attacks on the military and police. 89 It has established law and order, providing healthcare, regulating commodity prices, and collecting taxes in the areas under its control. 90 Thus, the group is engaging in state building, an area where Boko Haram has failed. 91 When the data is explored deeper, as per figure 5, it becomes apparent that although Nigeria has recovered from previous years of poor performance, the trajectory post-2021 may see the return of more significant threats to state legitimacy in Nigeria.
On the other hand, although Cameroon and Niger are performing better than Nigeria on state legitimacy, they are still vulnerable to the methods of ISWAP, especially if it continues to establish itself in the region. Nevertheless, the two countries also face other threats to state legitimacy, and failure to curtail the activities of ISWAP will further erode state credibility.
Although African states have suffered poor economic development, the failure to develop a model that ensures equal economic growth has led to a rise in grievances. For example, as explored under group grievances, northern Nigerians have felt marginalized at not being able to convert their education qualifications into jobs. Economically, northern Nigeria is one of the territories with the highest extreme poverty rate, 92 and has the most significant population. 93 The rise of Boko Haram was partly a response to the failure of western education to provide a livelihood for the people. This has further strengthened the hold of ISWAP, as it has promised a form of state apparatus that will treat the people better. For instance, as shown earlier, the group is trying to regulate prices, provide health care, and even levy taxes. The missing state apparatus, and the promise of equitable treatment and provision of welfare, captured the imagination of the civilian population. Thus, even though Nigeria has improved, as shown by the data in figure 6, its score is still high, but the regional imbalances in economic development are evident.
In Cameroon and Niger, ISWAP found refuge in remote areas away from state presence and registered the civilian population's complicity. In Niger, ISWAP has recruited locally, with the leaders of several brigades being Nigeriens. The common denominator, in this case, is that most of the areas ISWAP is occupying are poor, with low or no state presence.

Security-development-governance model nexus: a viable alternative?
For example, the coalescing of uneven economic development with group grievances has been fundamental to perpetuating the security-development nexus argument. This has led to organizations like the European Union 94 and the United Nations championing development to reduce the risk of conflict and the rise of violent extremism. A case in point is the UN General Assembly's 2006 Resolution 60/288 outlining its counter-terrorism strategy. At the time, the resolution argued for entrenching millennium development goals, its desire to end poverty, and to achieve sustained economic growth and sustainable development. The UN also argued for social inclusion, especially youth employment, to reduce marginalization and the sense of victimhood that is a catalyst for extremism and the recruitment of terrorists. 95 This argument is further supported by Source A (an expert on counter-terrorism strategies in Morocco interviewed on 10/ 09/2022). He argues for measures related to enhancing security in the Lake Chad Basin to be considered and evaluated concerning the implementation of the SDG-related pillars. 96 This is based on the notion that terrorism goes beyond criminality and insecurity to governance systems.
Further linkages of counterterrorism to the security-development and governance nexus are the perpetuation of the Rule of Law and respect for human rights. Respect for human rights, especially for those linked to terror organizations, is fundamental to building sustainable peace and viable states. 97 As explored earlier, the LCB states use of force, torture, taking hostage family members of people linked to terror groups, sexual violence and a general lack of state presence have presented a governance deficit that ISWAP has exploited. Furthermore, the governance deficit can be filled with a soft counter-terrorism strategy advocated by the 2010 International Peace Institute and led to a conference on Countering Violent Extremism. The participants advocated for a soft counter-terrorism programme "that seeks to undo the radicalization process by engineering the individual's return to moderate society, usually by providing them with a stable support network, probing their original reasons for radicalizing, and divorcing them from their extreme beliefs and social contacts." 98 One of the key elements of soft counter-terrorism is the idea of de-radicalization, which is aimed at tackling multiple domains starting from political, economic and social conditions to religion, security, and human rights matters, to reach the most marginalized populations and offer them vocational training and employment opportunities so that they can reintegrate into society after their release.
To guarantee a successful deradicalization approach, it is crucial to grasp the reasons behind radicalization. Deradicalization programmes are geared toward peacefully moving individuals and groups away from violent extremism; it's a process of divorcing a person, voluntarily or otherwise, from their extreme views. 99 Moreover, it is crucial to address prison radicalization based on targeting channels between prisoners and terrorist groups outside. Furthermore, it is fundamental to develop aftercare programmes focusing on the prevailing socio-economic situation by offering detainees vocational training during their prison sentence and introducing peer education programmes in prisons. 100 Another soft counter-terrorism measure is inter-cultural dialogue aimed at promoting religion and based on moderation and tolerance. This is fundamental in the Lake Chad Basin, especially as the population is multi-religious and culturally diverse. A case in point is the Sahelo-Sahara 2015 seminar organized in Tunis around the radicalization of terrorism and violent extremism in the region. The Middle East emphasized the vital role of regional organizations such as ECOWAS in organizing consultations between religious representatives. Still, the main issue was that the programme targeted only countries in the West African space. 101 The idea was to expand these programmes to the LBC countries so that they could tackle the issue of the propagation of terrorist groups threatening national and international security.
The international community stressed the importance of intercultural dialogue on multiple occasions among different civilizations and religions as it was concluded that linking extremism and terrorism to a specific community raises social divisions and debilitates marginalized individuals. Hence, the United Nations Global Counter-terrorism Strategy Resolution adopted by the General assembly in 2006 as well as the Security Council resolution 2129 of 2013 note the significance of building initiatives to "promote dialogue, tolerance, and understanding among civilizations, cultures, peoples, and religions, and to promote mutual respect religious values, beliefs and cultures" 102 through the establishing and encouraging, as appropriate, education and public awareness programs involving all sectors of society. In this sense, the Alliance of civilizations and UNESCO play a crucial role in fostering intra-faith and inter-faith dialogues together with "enhancing dialogue and understanding of civilizations" and "addressing unresolved regional conflicts and the full range of global issues, including development issues, will contribute to strengthening the international fight against terrorism." 103 Source A takes argument further to advocate for smart counter terrorism measures which the United Nations also noted through resolutions 1624, which called for a denying of safe haven for terror groups, sharing information but also enhanced dialogue among civilizations to prevent indiscriminate targeting of religions and cultures. The resolution also called for addressing regional conflicts, global issues like development. 104 Moreover UN Security Council resolution 2354 called for bespoke gender specific responses to different scenarios but in adherence to international law. The resolution further stressed the need for positive counter-narratives to provide credible alternatives to vulnerable populations. 105 Smart counter terrorism strategy moves from merely deradicalization to taking preventive action like, among others re-management of mosques and places of worship to neutralize non devotional activities and training and retraining machinates (religious preachers). 106 Source C takes the argument by advocating incorporating youth in the counter terrorism strategy, especially as military force cannot resolve everything. The integration of youth is appropriate, especially as they are targeted by the groups like ISWAP to swell their ranks. Moreover, suppose more youth get driven into terror activities. In that case, countries will not only face military security threats but brain drain and food insecurity due to the lack of youth in the agricultural sector. Further threats can be envisioned in the tearing apart societies as the youth once recruited in terror groups like ISWAP attack and kill in their communities. Therefore, further steps like reintegration and reinsertion in ensuring peace and security in communities. 107 Source C notes that in the Diffa Region, several young people who returned have taken advantage of government aid to open their small projects and have rejoined their families.
It is however essential to integrate a deradicalization programme in the process of reintegration and reinsertion of youth. Moreover, older fighters need to be included in this process, especially men who may have to be reunited with their families. Communities' sensitization is fundamental especially in preventing backlash and revenge attacks. Governments further need to explore the reintegration of hostages, especially women who may be ostracized 108 by their communities.
Coupled with the above was the need for enhanced dialogue and mediation with the terror organizations, with an effort to address the underlying causes and resolve the conflicts. Such discussion should obviously take place at the right time and in a way that acknowledges the existence of these groups while showing a will to end the conflict without portraying weakness. 109 Source B, a security expert on the Sahel, noted that negotiations with terror organisations had been mainly focussed on the release of hostages and therefore had not yielded much in curtailing the activities of ISWAP. The challenge states in the LCB face is the mix of local and foreign fighters 110 within groups like ISWAP. This mixture makes it hard to find a negotiated settlement as there could be a disparity between the groups within ISWAP on whether to reach a political settlement. Local fighters may for example be open to some solution. Still, the foreign fighters may persist with the ultimate dream of a caliphate primarily as historically they have always pursued a grand extremist vision. 111 Further governance changes in the delivery of public services are vital, especially in addressing economic marginalization, a cornerstone of the perpetuation of grievances. The lack of state presence in some areas in Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon are an example of their poor state governance, which has led to a rise in vigilante or self-help groups occupying these spaces and providing security and a form of governance that has been missing. The states cannot entirely rely on these groups because they are susceptible to switching sides, especially if a more powerful or persuasive group comes into the picture, as has been the case with ISWAP. In addition, group grievances have become more apparent with the entrenchment of corruption 112 as the elites have siphoned off state resources for their enrichment. This has made ISWAP more appealing to marginalized groups, as shown in Nigeria.
The political will to address these governance gaps is crucial to restoring confidence in the state, especially as most African states have suffered legitimacy challenges since independence. Acquiring state legitimacy may necessitate revisiting the social contract in the states to ensure that all groups in the different regions have equitable access to power. Thus, to reduce group grievances states need to adopt more inclusive political systems through national dialogue. This will also confer on the state legitimacy once the populations gain more confidence in how they are governed. Furthermore, once this is acquired the population will be bound to protect the integrity of the state and will be less susceptible to groups like ISWAP. This argument is reinforced by Source C, who asserts that the MNJTF is sometimes struggling due to the lack of knowledge of the terrain that ISWAP possesses as it gets help from the population. This is so due to fear for their lives, but also disillusionment with the states as some sections of the population feel abandoned 113 due to lack of state presence or service delivery.
By addressing the issues around public services, uneven economic development, human rights, and the Rule of Law, there will be a reduction in group grievances. This will confer legitimacy on the state and lead to a marked decrease in security apparatus as there will be less proliferation of groups seeking to capture state power using violence. Instead, a clear road map for such endeavours will exist in a properly defined social contract with equitable access to power. Coupled with that, the political will to ensure equitable access to economic resources and employment is fundamental to ensuring development in areas occupied by minority or marginalized groups.

Conclusion
Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon face the daunting task of eroding ISWAP's capability, significantly as it has redefined its modus operandi by not necessarily targeting civilians. ISWAP has also tried to build state structures in areas it controls, provides protection, health services, and even collects taxes. A military counter-terrorism strategy can attain limited success, especially as ISWAP is set on winning civilians' minds and hearts. Even if its forces become eroded, it can regroup and launch again. The political elites need to focus on the key driving forces. Indeed, much of the literature has highlighted the futility of using force alone. Yet the violent nature of groups like Boko Haram has led to a lack of political will to focus on other governance and its related development approaches primarily. The study has shown a link between uneven economic development, poor public services, poor human rights and the Rule of Law, and perpetuation of group grievances. Group grievances normally translate into the questioning of state legitimacy, which quite often leads to a desire to capture state power, thereby heightening the security apparatus. Therefore, it is vital to employ the security-development and governance nexus to combat the threat of ISWAP. Critical to this is the need for political will to address human rights and the Rule of Law, to deliver services and champion even access to economic opportunities. Moreover, soft counterterrorism strategies relating to deradicalization, inter-cultural dialogue and dialogue with the terror groups, present a viable way to ensure a reduction in recruits and inter-community cohesion, conflict management and resolution. Furthermore, the reintegration and reinsertion of youth and other local fighters after a period of deradicalization is fundamental to rebuilding torn societies.