Islamophobia among Muslims in Indonesia

Abstract Islamophobia has its long historical roots. Nonetheless, religiously motivated terrorism and the use of the name “Islam” by terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State (IS) may have amplified Islamophobia. Islamophobia has caused violence against Muslims in several stages and contexts. This study was held to investigate whether Islamophobia could also happen among Muslims in the largest Muslim population, Indonesia, as the majority Muslims avoid being associated with Islamist terrorists. Using quantitative method of analysis, the study formulated the Islamophobia Scale (IMOS) and involved 509 participants. The findings show that 92% of Muslims in Indonesia do not demonstrate any sign of Islamophobia. Nonetheless, 7.67% shows prejudice, fear, and rejection toward certain Islamic symbols, religious traditions, and Muslims with distinguished appearance which may be associated with terrorists’ outfits.


Introduction
Islamophobia has its long historical roots (Esposito, 2019). Nevertheless, the tragedy of the WTC 9/ 11 2001 which uses the terms "jihad" or "Islam" has worsened the situation (Dauda, 2020). The tragedy has caused trauma for all the global citizens, and Islam has been strongly linked to the attack as Osama bin Laden along with his network, Al-Qaeda, used (or 'hijacked) the name "Islam" in their claimed action (Wijaya, 2016). The series of "moral panics" have occurred not only in Western society but also in many places in the world as valued universal wisdom (e.g., humanity, I actually found that more common. Internal Islamophobia from Muslim to Muslim. From in my personal experience, it is more common. I have to fend off and explain myself more to Muslims than I have to non-Muslims. And my children as well. (Alia in Iner & Nebhan, 2019, p. 202) The present study sought to examine if Islamophobia could also happen among Muslims in the largest Muslim population, Indonesia. It aimed to understand the Indonesian Muslims' reaction or even prejudice toward one another. The study's hypothesis is that Islamophobia significantly occurs among the majority Muslims in Indonesia as the Muslims avoid being associated with Islamist terrorists. Involving 509 participants from at least seven cities in Indonesia, the study also developed the Islamophobia Scale (IMOS) and applied quantitative analysis. The study is to understand how study could contribute to the literature on Islamophobia. It could also inspire counterterrorism practitioners to manage a softer approach in counter-narrative programs which would prevent prejudices or stigma that may jeopardize peaceful coexistence.

The distorted meaning, sentiment, and stigma towards Islam
The use of the word "Islam" by extremists to legitimate their terrorist acts had activated many westerners and beyond to fear Muslims and label Islam as a threat (Cipriani, 2019). Supporting Cipriani's argument, Abubakar (2019) explains that the major cause of Islamophobia is because extremists hijack Islam/hide underneath the name of Islam in their actions. These extremists twist the religious texts for justifying their agenda to cause instability and mayhem, and destroy peaceful society (Abubakar, 2019). Other causes include 1) Orientalists' perceptions of Islam; 2) poor knowledge of Islam; 3) hate speeches by public figures; 4) the rise of Islamophobia industry; 5) fear of domination; and 6) public anxiety over immigrants/immigration programs (Dauda, 2020).
The presentation of Islam is demonstrated in four different "theaters" (Sayyid, 2014, p. 3). The first theatre is "Muslimistan" which is a collection of countries socially and culturally dominated (informally or formally) by the "Islamicate". Islam has some constitutional privilege in this regard; for instance, Islam is expressed as a state religion. Countries where a huge percentage of the population would define themselves as Muslim are included in this type of theater (Sayyid, 2014). The second theater is Muslims as a clear minority and might be marginalized by the national narrative although their existence was prior to the formation of the state; for instance, the Muslims of China, India, Russia, and Thailand. The third theater is Muslims as mainly immigrants in territories such as Western countries. The fourth theatre is Muslims as negligible/unrecognized, therefore Islamophobia is performed indirectly or virtually. For instance, the Muslims in South America or large parts of Central Africa. These four contexts/theaters determine distinctive forms of Islamophobia (Sayyid, 2014).
The distorted meaning of Islam has been studied by several authors. Ridouani (2011), in his study titled "The Representation of Arabs and Muslims in Western Media", explains that the distorted definitions of Islam and Muslims in the mainstream media began decades ago. Moreover, paintings which discredit Islam have been created hundreds ago (Rachman, 2018). Ramji's (2005) study titled "From Navy Seals to The Siege: Getting to Know the Muslim Terrorist, Hollywood Style" also describes how Islam is portrayed in American media and Hollywood. Some of these descriptions might be accurate, yet some are inaccurate (Rachman, 2018).
The sentiment and stigma towards Islam and Muslims are captured in statements in the media (e.g., Muhammad is described as a figure who is hungry for blood, nonetheless the prophet never killed anyone in his life) (Rachman, 2018). John Hagee, the founder of Christian United for Israel (CUFI), argued that the USA is in the war against Islam (Rachman, 2018). In 2010, Terry Jones who claimed himself as a priest in a church of Gainesville, Florida, declared "International Burn the Quran Day" (Majid, 2012). Roger Williams, a leader of baptism in Rhode Island, USA, defines Islam as a religion of sensuality, dishonesty, despotism, and ignorance, while the true meaning of the word Islam is actually "peace" and Muslims are forbidden to practice any type of "two-faces" ("munafiq"), oppressions, lethargy, and adultery (Rachman, 2018). Furthermore, Rod Parsley in his book "Silent No More" (2005) describes Islam as a religion of Anti-Christ, yet the Quran (the sacred text in Islam) mentions Jesus 25 times and Mary 34 times (whereas it only mentions Mohammed 4 times) and asks Muslims to respect Jesus as one of the God's messengers (Takawi & Reynolds, 2020). Majid (2012) explains that people can become famous (at least, getting attention) after insulting Islam and Muslims. For example, Franklin Graham became famed for stating that Islam is a very malevolent and wicked religion, and Pat Robertson for portraying Mohammed as a wild-eyed fanatic, a thief, and a killer. Another example, John Farwell was popular for calling the prophet a terrorist on national television.

Indicators of Islamophobia
Phobia is a consistent distress towards an object (Moordiningsih, 2004). Anxiety in a phobia occurs when a person faces an object or situation which he/she is afraid of; therefore, the person would avoid the object/situation (De Clerq, 1994). The act of avoidance becomes the main indicator of a phobia, or in this case, Islamophobia (De Clerq, 1994;Moordiningsih, 2004). The study of Islamophobia is placed on stereotypes, prejudices, and fears towards Muslims within a mainly Western context (Iner & Nebhan, 2019).
Islamophobia is combined words: "Islam" and "phobia". The word "Islam" is Arabic which means a belief system that reflects a total and voluntary submission to God Almighty and the systems of the universe He has created (Dauda, 2020). The word "phobia" means fear of something due to the danger thought/perceived to be associated with it (Dauda, 2020). Therefore, Islamophobia implies uninformed fear associated with Islam. Islamophobia is used to describe the negative stereotypes, hatred, and hostility committed toward Muslims or Islamic symbols because of inappropriate perceptions about Islam. The hostility includes hate speech, intimidation and marginalization, harassment, discrimination, verbal and physical attacks, torture, murder, bombing, arson and vandalism, kidnapping, demonstrations, rallies, and marches against Islam and other objects/ subjects (e.g., Muslims, buildings) related to Islam (Dauda, 2020).
Scholars propose different conceptual understandings of the term "Islamophobia" (Dauda, 2020). The term "Islamophobia" appears due to the rise of anti-Muslim prejudice in the past decades (Moordiningsih, 2004). Anti-Muslim prejudice is based on a claim that Islam is an "inferior" religion which becomes a threat against values in society ( Abdel-Hady, 2004). The use of the term is helpful to target inappropriate/false perceptions on Islam and Muslims and develop peaceful coexistence, according to Young European Muslims (2002).
The protuberant use of the concept of Islamophobia has increased after the Runnymede Trust's Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia's (CBMI) report titled "Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All" (1997). According to this Commission, Islamophobia defines as "unfounded hostility towards Islam and practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities" (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 4). Moreover, Kumar (2018) explains that daily acts of hate crimes, hostility, and discrimination (e.g., in employment, health services) against Muslims are the obvious manifestations of Islamophobia. Islamophobia also includes prejudices (cognition) and dislike (affection/attitude) to Islam and Muslims, other than attacks, exclusion/rejection (e.g., from political and governmental posts), discrimination, elimination (psychomotor) (Dauda, 2020;Gardell, 2010;Sway, 2005). Hence, Islamophobia is more than the expression of fear or hatred. It also is expressed in many forms of discrimination such as in policies, gestures, and speeches (Baker & Peter, 2004).
Islamophobia is an institutionalized and systemic racism and discrimination against anyone perceived to be associated with Islam (e.g., people with certain appearance/outfits); a hatred or fear of Islam; and prejudice/hostility towards Muslims (Abdulhadi, 2018, p. 14). Nevertheless, there is no biological locus for Muslims or Muslims are not defined by a "race"; hence, Islamophobia would not be towards a subject given by nature (unlike classical discriminatory practices) (Sayyid, 2014). In a larger context, Abadi (2018) explains the use of harsh talk, elimination of Muslim voices, discriminatory condemnation, constant embarrassment at public places (e.g., airports), Muslim ban, and selective surveillance and policing as samples of behaviors of Islamophobia. Further, Islamophobia is widely spread in most countries driven by the fear of Islam of some world leaders (Dauda, 2020). Cipriani (2019) describes that Islamophobia is represented in physical or verbal attacks on places of worship, people, and property; troll or bullying on social media; policies by governments or their legislations which indirectly only affect Muslims; and discrimination in education, housing, employment, or access to services. Other manifestations of Islamophobia include religious and ethnic profiling, police abuse, and negative statements by politicians which stigmatize Muslims as "terrorists" and disregard their positive contributions (e.g., paying taxes) to the communities/countries where they live (Dauda, 2020).
In Europe, Nielsen and Allen (2002) define the general signs of Islamophobia. They include acts of violence (e.g., verbal abuse, harassment, and aggression) towards Muslim women, those who look like Muslims (e.g., Singh, Arab descent), asylum seekers, and Islamic cultural centers. Identifying the behavior indicators of Islamophobia is to understand the behaviors include in the term 'Islamophobia' (Sayyid, 2014). Furthermore, Sayyid (2014) describes Islamophobic behavior indicators in six main clusters. The first, according to him, is attacks on persons who are perceived to be Muslims, which include pushing, shouting abuse, spitting, various forms of beating, pulling hijabs from Muslim women, and murder. The second is attacks on assets/properties linked to Muslims (e.g., cemeteries, mosques, working places). The third is acts of intimidation which can be systematically organized by a number of persons. This includes demonstrations against the building of cultural centers or mosques, marches in the areas of large Muslim populations, the burning of the Qur'an, and black campaigns on Islam. What distinguishes the cluster of these behaviors is the level of coordination which requires the expenditure of socio-economic capital. The fourth is Islamophobia in institutional settings where Muslims receive systematic discrimination or less favorable treatment than others in similar positions within the same groups/organizations (e.g., discriminating distribution of tasks, biased assessments of performance, bullying, harassment, pointed jokes). Other behaviors such as forcing particular foods (e.g., pork, alcohol) to Muslims with the understanding of Islam, or particular dress code which places a burden on Muslims (e.g., Santa Clause's dress during Christmas, miniskirts, taking off veils/headcovers) are also included in this cluster. The fifth is systematic and constant indirect or direct statements/ mocks that ridicule Muslims or Islam in public. For example, publishing the sacred texts (Qur'an) by listing Muhammad or hate speeches on social media by politicians (e.g., websites such as Bare Naked Islam and Jihad Watch). The sixth is Islamophobia facilitated by a state. This cluster includes discriminatory criminal justice system or state policies, security bodies' gentle refusal to provide necessary protections, active intensification of surveillance to Muslim populations (e.g., using paid informers, information technology, and agent provocateurs), and certain secret/clandestine operations which treat Muslims less favorably than others (Bazian, 2012;Sayyid, 2014).

Islamophobia in several countries
Around the globe (e.g., in the US, Australia, Norway, China, Myanmar, UK, New Zealand, Palestine, Central African Republic, Sri Lanka, India, Vietnam, Poland, Hungary, Sweden), anti-Islam violence such as hate crimes, rallies, murders of Muslims, and bombings to Mosques and Muslim graveyards, affected by Islamophobia has become a concern (Dauda, 2020;Nielsen & Allen, 2002). Islamophobia has occurred prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks but has amplified (in quantity and quality) in the post-9/11 era (Nielsen & Allen, 2002;Gallup News in Dauda, 2020).
In the US, Islamophobia has not become a usual and constant threat to American Muslims until after the 9/11 attacks (Dauda, 2020 (Osman, 2017). A series of assaults by right-wing nationalists against Muslims have caused the rise of Islamophobia in North America and Europe, and the rise of the Hindu nationalist movement has driven violence against Muslims in India (Osman, 2017). An extensive poll in 2011 demonstrated that 48.6% of Australians had anti-Muslim attitudes (ABC News, 2011); whereas another survey in 2014 revealed that a quarter of Australians had unfavorable/ negative attitudes toward Muslims compared to any other religious group (Chalkley-Rhoden, 2014).  In Asian countries, Muslims have been targeted in several attacks linked to Islamophobia. For example, the Chinese government is suspected of detaining an estimated a million Uighur Muslims (ChinaFile Conversation, 2019). In India, approximately 10 Muslims have been murdered in public during the rise of Islamophobia since April 2017 (Amnesty International, 2017). Table 1 by Dauda (2020) reveals the cases of Islamophobia around the world between 2001 and 2019. The table also demonstrates that no continent is safe from Islamophobic threats, even the one with democratic system. The European countries show the highest records of this problem, whereas the American and Asian countries are following. Anti-Muslim hatred stimulates the major cause of these incidents, followed by racism, xenophobia, extremism, and revenge. Recorded by Dauda (2020) and Sampathkumar (2017) Dauda (2020) (2020) explains that Muslim women who display an observable manifestation of their religious identity (such as women wearing hijab) have been the frequent target of the attacks, followed by Muslim men with beard or other religious outfits (e.g., Turban). The "visual manifestation" of Islam (e.g., traditions, symbols, buildings, properties) and Muslims who "look like Muslims" become targets for hostility (Nielsen & Allen, 2002). Esposito (2017) proclaims that, similarly to xenophobia and anti-Semitism, Islamophobia is historically rooted. Islamophobia is not a brand-new phenomenon as it is rooted in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries during the European Crusades and in the late fifteenth century during the dismissal of Muslims (e.g., Arabs and Africans) from Andalucia (Abdulhadi, 2018). Islamophobia is also rooted in European colonialism, Orientalism, and East-West dichotomy (Abdulhadi, 2018). Bleich (2011) has outlined the use of "Islamophobia" as a new word in Said's study in 1978 which titled "Orientalism in the late 1970s". In this publication, it was widely recognized/agreed that the West society had been associating Islam with negative images, stereotypes, and sentiments. Orientalism explains how the western cultural, imperial, and academic works have constructed a dehumanising representation of the Arab world as "exotic and barbarous Orients" (Dauda, 2020, p. 264). By interpreting the West as "civilised" and the Arab world as "backwards", Orientalism demonstrates the earliest stigmatization against Muslim identities and produces the negative stereotypes of Eastern cultures to justify colonial ambitions (Itaoui & Elsheikh, 2018, p. 7).

Historical context of Islamophobia
According to Benn and Jawad (2003), Islamophobia has escalated since Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa in 1989 (which provoked Muslims to execute Salman Rushdie, the writer of The Satanic Verses) and since the 9/11 attacks (Dauda, 2020;Nielsen & Allen, 2002). In line with this, the International Civil Liberties Alliance [ICLA] (2013) explains that Islamophobia has not been documented in English until around 1950s, and they record that Islamophobia became more extensive after the Iranian fatwa against Salman Rushdie (due to his book "The Satanic Verses"). Hasan (in ICLA, 2013) also describes that the terminology "Islamophobia" emerged for the first time in the UK in 1980s amid the Rushdie issue.
The study of Islamophobia started in 1995 in England where Islam was perceived as a threat, similar to Communism and the Nazi, and associated with infiltration, invasion, and domination (Istriyani & Yuliatun, 2016). Bleich (2011) then argues that Islamophobia initially developed in 1990s to counter harmful actions and rhetoric against Islam and Muslims in the West. Furthermore, Zúquete (2008) and Lee et al. (2009) explain that "Islamophobia" appeared in modern discussions after the report by the Runnymede Trust (1997), entitled "Islamophobia: a challenge for us all". This report reveals that the term "Islamophobia" has been spread due to the resurgence after the Cold War and the 9/11 attack (Dauda, 2020;Vertovec, 2002).
Even though negative prejudices/sentiments have been targeted towards Islam for a long period of time and the hatred/discrimination towards Muslims is escalating in Europe, the number of Muslims is also increasing in the continent (Robby & Amrad, 2021). In France, for example, there are roughly five million French citizens adopting the Islamic faith. This number is the largest compared to the Muslim minority populations in the Western Europe (Robby & Amrad, 2021;Sayyid, 2014). In 2016, French Muslim population scopes 5,7 million citizens, or around 8,8% of the total amount of French population (Moordiningsih, 2004;Robby & Amrad, 2021). This increase of the French Muslim population drives racist movements which have a strong link to Islamophobia (MacMaster, 2003;Robby & Amrad, 2021). Islamophobia in France accordingly has risen since the 9/11 terrorist attack (e.g., attacks against Mosque, Muslim cemeteries, individual Muslims) (Robby & Amrad, 2021;Wijaya, 2010); whereas the relations between Muslim immigrants and the general French population were relatively good before the terrorist attack (Robby & Amrad, 2021 (Robby & Amrad, 2021). Some of the native white French even wanted Muslim immigrants to leave France because of their fear of Islam and anything related to Islam (Robby & Amrad, 2021). Furthermore, the terrorist action against Charlie Hebdo's office made it worse that it has increased hatred toward Muslims in France. After this action, the right-wing political mobilization/ movements against Muslims have become stronger than ever (Dauda, 2020;Nielsen & Allen, 2002;Rachman, 2018;Robby & Amrad, 2021). The presence of Muslims has made the right-wing politicians in France evaluate the political principles of "Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite" that welcome refugees, as the rise of Islamophobia in France has destroyed the equality and brotherhood in the country and affected the stability and security in European countries (Robby & Amrad, 2021). Furthermore, Muslim communities become the main victims of the extremist right-wing groups' terror attacks in Europe (Bayrakli & Hafez, n.d.).

The causes of Islamophobia
The causes of Islamophobia are explained through several approaches: 1) individual, 2) socialcognition, 3) intergroup interaction, and 4) sociocultural. At individual approach, Islamophobia is caused by prejudice and hatred towards particular people due to the nurturing process (Moordiningsih, 2004). Nesdale (in Augoustinos & Dan Reynolds, 2001) describes the four factors which could develop prejudice in a child: emotional maladjustment, social reflection/likeness, cognitive and social development, and social identity. Emotional maladjustment is related to authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1950(Adorno et al., /1982. In this case, children who are raised by authoritarian parents who apply frustrating disciplines would generate bitterness in children (e.g., anger, frustration, and hatred toward others as a displacement). Social reflection is related to social learning, such as gaining rewards for having negative thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors against others from parents and significant others (Bandura, 1977;Kinder & Sears, 1981). Moreover, social identity is related to the motivation/desires to define one's group (e.g., a race, a group of religious believers) as more advanced/better/higher than others' in order to increase self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Further, cognitive and social development is related to cognitive experience of children between 5 and 7 years old where they begin to perceive differences among humans (Aboud, 1988). Prejudice in an individual occurs because his/her lack of knowledge creates assumptions during perception development and fears of the unknown (Moordiningsih, 2004). Tajfel (1972) also argues that perceptible physical differences could also generate prejudice; nevertheless, the stronger prejudice, such as among religious believers and people with different sexual orientation, could also happen amid the absence of observable physical differences. In terms of cognitive development, Runnymede Trust (1997) explains that the views on Islam could be the key to understanding Islamophobia. Phobia and fears subjected to Islam are the result of closed views on Islam, whereas respects/appreciation, logical disagreement, and critiques are from the open views on Islam (Abdel-Hady, 2004).
At social-cognition approach, Islamophobia is caused by stereotype made by individuals to reduce the overflowing amount of information that needs to be processed (Moordiningsih, 2004). Stereotype itself is transmissible beliefs about characteristics (e.g., personalities, behaviors, and values) of a group of people (Lippmann, 1922). This approach emphasizes on how information is collected, processed, and recognized in memory and how prejudice often occurs because of a falseness in information processing (Ashmore & Delbolca, 1981;Moordiningsih, 2004).
At intergroup-interaction approach, Islamophobia is caused by prejudice derived from "in-group and out-group thinking" in a group process. According to Social Identity Theory (in Moordiningsih, 2004), favoritism when making/joining a group (e.g., creating "we are better than them" way of thinking) is unavoidable. Moreover, Social Categorization Theory explains the correlation between individuals and groups, individuals' pathway in joining groups, circumstances which determine a person to act as an individual or a member of a group, and subjectivity/bias/social antagonism developed by being in a group (Turner & Onorato, 1999). Further, xenophobia (the hatred/fear of foreigners) is another origin of Islamophobia (Dauda, 2020). Alan (2011) even argues that Islamophobia is similar to xenophobia or racism but covered in religious terms. Xenophobia is spread through the settlers/indigenes' dynamic public narratives which aggressively labels/stigmatizes immigrants as a threat or scapegoats for socio-economic troubles in the country (Crush, 2015).
At socio-cultural approach, Islamophobia is caused by cultural conformity, objectives, and interests (Ashmore & Delbolca, 1981). In this situation, prejudice is developed by the internalization of socio-cultural norms and values. Lost in translation leading to prejudice/blaming/accusation is an example of this approach. Furthermore, visual identifiers (e.g., hijab, burka, niqab) stimulate the shifts of attitude and the rise of violence against Muslim, other ethnicity, or minority communities (Nielsen & Allen, 2002).
As mentioned earlier, this study aimed to understand the Indonesian Muslims' reaction or even prejudice toward one another. Using quantitative method of analysis, an instrument for measuring Islamophobia in this study is developed based on the above reviews on literature. Indicators of Islamophobia, based on the reviews, are clustered into three groups: cognition, emotion, and actions, aiming at several visual identifiers such as behaviors of Muslims, Islamic symbols, and Muslims with distinguished appearance (those different from the mainstream of society). Hence, the instrument includes these indicators.

Design
This study applied quantitative research design. The study's null hypothesis is that there is no significant amount of Islamophobia among the majority Muslims in Indonesia. The alternative hypothesis is that there is a significant amount of Islamophobia among the majority Muslims in Indonesia as the Muslims avoid being associated with Islamist terrorists. Developing the "Islamophobia Scale" called as IMOS, the study was performed in three stages: 1) formulating indicators of Islamophobia, 2) identifying psychometric properties of IMOS, and 3) investigating Islamophobia among Muslims in Indonesia. Islamophobia as a construct is defined as a constant distress toward particular objects and/or practices recognized in Islam.

Aspects of Islamophobia.
Aspects of Islamophobia were derived from literatures which are grouped into three main aspects: 1) cognition (e.g., prejudice, accusation, stigmatization), 2) affection/emotion (e.g., fear, hatred), and 3) psychomotor/action (e.g., rejection, discrimination). These aspects target several visual identifiers/observable practices in Islam, such as tangible behaviors of Muslims (i.e., traditions), Islamic symbols (i.e., mosques, centers, cemeteries), and Muslims with distinguished appearance who are different from the majority (Table 2). The Development of Islamophobia Scale (IMOS). IMOS was formulated by applying 1) content validity (validity based on test content) where all items of the scale were reviewed by seven experts (an Islamic anthropologist, a Muslim scholar, two forensic psychologists, a clinical psychologist, a psychometrician, and an academic in the International Relation) and 2) internal-consistency validity (validity based on internal structure) by examining the correlation of scale items to 312 respondents with Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). Table 3 shows scale items of IMOS in each aspect before and after elimination. In terms of the correlation of each item, Table 4 demonstrates the factor loadings for 44 items of IMOS, whereas Table 5 shows the CFA Second Order. All factor loadings are from 0.68 to 0.90 (≥0.5). In terms of reliability, IMOS' reliability coefficient (Omega McDonald) is 0.98. Furthermore, the norm of IMOS is presented in Table 6.

Sampling
This study used accidental sampling. Accidental sampling (also called convenient or opportunity sampling), according to Alvi (2016), is a technique of sampling where the researchers include the participants who are convenient/easy to approach. This technique is suitable where population target is very broad (i.e., men and women, girls and boys, rich and poor). The method of this technique is by approaching any available individual of the target population (he/she is requested to participate in the research, then the research is conducted after they indicate consent). The technique has several advantages such as consuming fewer efforts, inexpensive, and being less time consuming. However, it has a disadvantage which is related to the broad/infinite target population (Alvi, 2016).

Procedures and material
This study initially developed the Islamophobia Scale (IMOS) to measure Islamophobia by listing aspects for the construct (based on literature review), making items, testing items, and defining psychometric properties of the scale (Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing, 2014). Items were checked and modified during content analysis to avoid social desirability. Social desirability is the participants' tendency to provide certain answers which they think are more socially acceptable than the "true" answer (Lavrakas, 2008). The participants do this to present themselves to be "likeable" by the society and avoid negative image/evaluations. The products of  social desirability are the overstating of socially desirable behaviors/attitudes and the understating of socially undesirable behaviors/attitudes. Social desirability is categorized into bias or one of the respondent-related sources of error, according to Lavrakas (2008); hence, it is avoided in this study.
For quantitative examination of IMOS, the researchers conducted a pilot study to identify psychometric properties of the scale prior to data collection for the study. Data collection was conducted on October 2021 for 2 weeks (from 11 to 24 October 2021). Due to COVID-19 pandemic, the scale was spread online to participants in eight universities from different cities, six Whatsapp groups (which have members above 17 years old), and counterterrorism forums. Inform consent and explanation of the research were given in the introduction section of the scale.
During the data collection, two of the researchers received complaints from people who considered the items of the scale as containing prejudice towards Islam and Muslims. The researchers, accordingly, explained the purpose of this study, which was to uncover any prejudice, fear, and rejection towards Islam and other Muslims in the Muslim-majority society like Indonesia. Moreover, at least two candidates of participants withdrew from the research while filling the scale: one of them could not manage to have a sufficient internet connection, while the other disagreed on an item about the quality of religious practice. The latter disagreed with the term priyayi, abangan, and santri by Geertz (1960) mentioned in the item.

Analysis
Prior to investigating Islamophobia, the study analyzed the efficacy of IMOS in measuring Islamophobia. The analysis of IMOS was to identify the psychometric properties of the instrument. In this, researchers identified the validity and reliability coefficient of IMOS by referring to the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (2014). As mentioned in an earlier section, the formulation of IMOS applied content validity (validity based on test content) with expert review and internal-consistency validity (validity based on internal structure) by correlating all items of scale with Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). Reliability was analyzed with Omega McDonald coefficient. For analyzing research results, the researchers of this study used descriptive statistics by reviewing frequencies and matrix of variables (with Chi-squares). Moreover, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was implemented to examine differences between variables.

Results
The findings of this study demonstrate that 92% of Muslims in Indonesia do not show any sign of Islamophobia. This demonstrates that the study's null hypothesis is proven. The Muslims do not demonstrate any prejudice or stigmatization (cognition), fear/hatred (affection), and rejection or discrimination (action) towards several observable practices in Islam, which include symbols (i.e., mosques, centers, cemeteries), traditions, and other Muslims with different appearance from the majority. Nevertheless, 7.67% participants are showing Islamophobia: 5% (27) of participants are categorized into the group with low level of Islamophobia, 1% (9) participants are into the medium, and 0.59% (3) are into the high, as seen in Table 7.  Overall, 7.67% of participants show stigmatization and accusation towards other Muslims with distinguished appearance (e.g., Muslims whose appearance is associated with conflict areas, Middle Eastern, unknown cultures), for example, by labeling them "terrorists", "radicals", "womanizers", or "violent". They express feelings of discomfort, fear, or hatred, and show rejection and discrimination against other Muslims with particular shapes of beard or outfits associated with conflict areas (i.e., Afghanistan, Iraq, Yaman). These participants also find certain Islamic traditions (i.e., fiqh, sharia law, segregation between men and women, prayer calling, holding tasbih/prayer beads, the use of niqab for women) and symbols (i.e., Muslim names, Islamic schools, imams/ clerics) outdated or even intimidating and threatening.
Among the three aspects, participants showed the highest score in cognition (i.e., prejudice/ accusation) followed by action (i.e., rejection, discrimination) and emotion (i.e., hatred, fear), even though the scores are not significant in portraying Islamophobia (Table 8). Furthermore, the findings indicate that particular Islamic symbols (in this case, Islamic schools/centers, imams, and Arabic language) gain more attention than other observable identifiers, such as Muslims with distinguished appearance and certain Muslim traditions practiced in Indonesia such as hijab wearing, holding tasbih/praying beads when walking, and five-time-a-day prayer calling at mosques (Table 9).
In terms of sex and age, the findings show there is no correlation between sex and level of Islamophobia. Scores of female and male participants indicate no significant difference. Chi-square shows that female and male participants express certain levels of Islamophobia (Table 10). Likewise, a significant correlation does not appear between the variables of age and level of Islamophobia (Table 11). Correlation degree between the two is 0.085 with p = 0.998.
In terms of religiosity, 484 participants were believing in the six pillars of Islam (e.g., believe in God, the Messenger of God, sacred texts, and the presence of afterlife, angels, and destiny), whereas the rest were still learning. Based on quantitative examination on the link between the levels of religiosity and Islamophobia, the findings indicate 0.378 level of correlation (p = <0.001); which means there is a significantly negative correlation between the level of religiosity and Islamophobia. Participants with higher religiosity show lower levels of Islamophobia, and vice versa, participants with lower religiosity indicate higher levels of Islamophobia (Table 12).
In terms of religious practices (categorized into three separate types: Abangan, Priyayi, and Santri), quantitative examination showed 0.101 level of correlation (with p = 0.728). This means there is no significant correlation between participants' religious practices and level of Islamophobia. ANOVA shows that all types of Indonesian Muslims, regardless of their quality of religious practices, express certain levels of Islamophobia (Table 13).
In terms of level of education, the statistical examination shows 0.168 degree of correlation between the levels of formal education and Islamophobia (p = 0.926). This means that there is no significant correlation between the two variables (Table 14). Furthermore, the quantitative examination demonstrates 0.09 degree of correlation between participants' attendance to formal Islamic education (i.e., private Islamic schools) and their level of Islamophobia (p = 0.365), which means that there is no significant correlation between the two variables either (Table 15). Nevertheless, the statistical analysis demonstrates that there is a significantly negative correlation  taklim, madrasah, pesantren, liqoah, tarbiyah) and the ones who have not. Those who have received additional Islamic education (other than formal curriculum received at schools) do not indicate any sign of Islamophobia, and vice versa, the ones who have not attended any informal Islamic education express their fear, prejudice, and even rejection towards certain Islamic symbols (i.e., Islamic schools/centers, imams), religious traditions, and Muslims with distinguished appearance (Table 16).
Related to socio-political orientation, the numerical investigation proves 0.120 degree of correlation between participants' involvement in Islamic organization and their level of Islamophobia (p = 0.114). The findings show that there is no significant correlation between the two variables. ANOVA indicates that both groups (Muslims who join and do not join any Islamic organizations) express certain levels of Islamophobia (Table 17). On the contrary, ANOVA demonstrates that there is a significant correlation between political preferences and level of Islamophobia. Islamophobia is significantly seen in participants who vote for pure nationalist political parties  (Table 18). Correlation degree between the two variables (political preference and Islamophobia) is 0,178 (p = 0.034) (Table 18).

Discussions
Islamophobia has a long history (Esposito, 2017). However, the 9/11 tragedy in 2001 has worsened the situation (Dauda, 2020). The 9/11 tragedy has brought agony to all global citizens, including the Western society and Muslims around the world. Islam has been strongly associated with terrorism because several terrorist organizations use the name "Islam" in their actions, so that violence against general Muslims is viewed as justified by "some people" in order to get revenge. Islamophobia has been growing strongly in many countries since the 9/11 attack. This study aimed to investigate if Islamophobia could happen among Muslims themselves in the largest Muslim population, Indonesia, and to understand the Indonesian Muslims' reaction or even prejudice toward one another to avoid being associated with Islamist terrorists.
The study applied quantitative analysis to 509 Muslim participants from several cities in Indonesia and formulated the Islamophobia Scale (IMOS). The scale measures three aspects of Islamophobia: cognition, affection, and action. As argued by Sayyid (2014), the presentation of Islamophobia is complex and multifaceted in which it reflects social or psychological profiles of the individuals. This study supports Sayyid's (2014) explanation that Islamophobia consists of specific assemblages/elements and one can measure Islamophobia and counter it by identifying these elements.
The findings of this study show that 92% of Muslim participants do not demonstrate any sign of Islamophobia. This shows that the study's null hypothesis is proven (that there is no significant number of Islamophobia among the majority Muslims in Indonesia). Nonetheless, the 7.67% expresses certain levels of prejudice, feelings of fear, and rejection against other Muslims with distinguished appearance (i.e. labeling those whose appearance is associated with Middle Eastern and conflict areas as "terrorists" or "radicals"), Islamic traditions (i.e., sharia law, niqab) and symbols (i.e., Muslim names, Islamic schools, imams/clerics). Among the 7.67%, 5% is categorized into a group with low level of Islamophobia, 1% is into the medium, and 0.59% is into the high.
The findings reveal that among the three aspects of Islamophobia, participants show highest score in cognition (prejudice) followed by action (rejection) and emotion (fear). This finding indicates that cognitive process (such as prejudice and assumption) could be the "entry gate" for Islamophobia. As Sayyid (2014) explains, the end of Islamophobia can be achieved when the pathway or hierarchy of it dissolves and the specific elements that make it possible separate.
The findings show symbols, such as Islamic schools and imams, and other visual identifiers (for example, Muslims with distinguished appearance and observable traditions practiced in Indonesia) stimulate Islamophobia. The findings are in line with Najib and Teeple Hopkins's (2020) argument that the foundational element of Islamophobic thinking is the denial of plurality and humanity of Muslim populations. As they describe, Islamophobia is a process of essentializing and homogenizing Muslims into physical and/or racial distinctions and positioning as the Other. Arguably, this Othering of racialized and essentialized Muslims may be undertaken by both non-Muslims and fellow Muslims. While non-Muslims associate Muslims with visible signs of Islamic belonging (beard, veils, but also geographical locations where Muslim communities are concentrated and mosques are built), Muslims may associate these and other features with Muslims who hold extremist interpretation of Islam, hence different from the rest of more moderate Muslims (Najib & Teeple Hopkins, 2020, Najib, 2021. Moreover, the Othering of Muslims by non-Muslims and fellow Muslims is facilitated by visibility of physical features, but also due to government's policy, notably counterterrorism and counter-violent extremism that create the notion of suspect communities, according to Breen-Smyth (2014). Defined as a "community created by the securitized imagination and enacted through a security practices of counterterrorism" (Breen-Smyth, 2014, p. 223), "suspect community" has a flexible and permeable boundary which allows its designator to change which communities and individuals are included in or excluded out and how the wider constituencies perceive the community. Islamophobia is therefore a form of subordination against the Other in the society, operating as an instrument that showcases the effectiveness of power in designating "us" and "them" (Breen-Smyth, 2014;CIGA, 2021;van Meeteren & van Oostendorp, 2019).
Because of the critical role of the ruling power in creating frames of inclusion within the suspect community which implicates on the building of Islamophobia, national leadership has a critical role in de-escalating Islamophobia. As Jeffrey Kaplan wrote, the US president together with decisive law-enforcement put a stop to a surging hate crime directed at Muslims in America following the 9/11 tragedy (Kaplan, 2006). Nevertheless, government's counterterrorism-particularly that conducted by the US and client states whose counterterrorism policies the US government helped establish-had created legal and intelligence surveillance apparatuses that combine terrorists, criminals, ethnonationalist extremists, as well as civil society activities within the same pool of suspect community where Islam as an identity is also embedded  (Marusek, 2018). Accordingly, the current study could suggest counterterrorism practitioners to manage a softer approach in counter-narrative programs and prevent prejudice/stigma that would jeopardize peaceful coexistence.
The results of this study demonstrate that variables of age, sex, formal education, quality of religious practice (in Indonesia is categorized as abangan, santri, and priyayi), and involvement in Islamic organizations have no significant contributions to the emergence of Islamophobia. However, other variables such as religiosity, informal Islamic education, and political preference have significantly negative correlations with Islamophobia. The findings imply that religiosity, additional/informal Islamic education, and political preference could reduce or even prevent the occurrence of Islamophobia. Other than that, this study could contribute to the literature on Islamophobia for its academic implication.
This study developed the Islamophobia Scale (IMOS) with its satisfying psychometric properties. Despite its originality and accomplishment in creating a scale to measure Islamophobia, the study has limitations. The limitation is related to its generalizability. The study may not be applied to societies in countries/cultures beyond Indonesia. Further studies suggested are related to the investigation of Islamophobia among Muslims in Indonesia by using different techniques of sampling, such as proportional sampling in every city in Indonesia. Other than that, it is also important to investigate Islamophobia among minorities in Indonesia and the design of softer approach/programs in Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) that will avoid prejudice and stigmatizations.