Ikegami Eiko’s honorific individualism thesis – critique and development

Abstract The aim of this qualitative study is to test Ikegami Eiko’s “honorific individualism” thesis, which claims that the modernization of Japan was the result of a tension between honorific individualistic and collectivistic impulses in the dominant samurai culture, against our counter-hypothesis that the development of conscientious collectivism was the cause of modernization in Japan. We propose a multi-dimensional theoretical framework for the individualism-collectivism divide, and by applying this framework to the interpretation of the ethical discourse of the samurai it is possible to show that our counter-hypothesis is more successful in interpreting the historical data than Ikegami’s thesis. We furthermore test both theories against recent empirical data from the GLOBE study, and also this result supports our hypothesis that modern Japan is best characterized as a conscientious collective society. The driving force towards the modernization of Japan was therefore not honorific individualism (a combination of shame and egoism) but much more likely conscientious collectivism (a combination of guilt and altruism)


Introduction
In 1995 Ikegami Eiko's book The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan was published. In this book she proposed a new reading of Japanese history, which focused on "the tensions between individualistic aspirations and normative standards of conformity" within samurai culture in order to explain the development of Japan's different historical periods (Ikegami, 1995, p. 4). This indigenous form of individuality in the samurai ethic, which she called "honorific individualism," became the driving force behind the modernization of Japan (Ikegami, 1995, pp. 5,349). "Honorific individualism" was from its beginning an important characteristic of Japanese warriors, but the Tokugawa shogunate suppressed it, because it threatened the peaceful collective political order (Varley, 1995, p. 561;Lebra, 1996, p. 536). This led to a dilemma for the bushi: "If a man retaliates in answer to an insult, he will be executed in the name of law and order. If he keeps quiet, he might survive, but he will be dishonored in the samurai community" (Ikegami, 1995, p. 212). Despite or because of this pressure, this "individualistic, autonomous image of the medieval samurai was to be glorified and recaptured nostalgically by later generations of samurai as their ultimate ideal" (Lebra, 1996, p. 536). As a result, "honorific individualism" did not only survive the hegemonic control of the shogunate (Lebra, 1996, p. 537), but "supplied an indigenous moral resource that was subsequently fully utilized for promoting organizational solidarity and efficacy during the later phase of national efforts to industrialize" (Ikegami, 1995, p. 329). The specific ethic of the samurai caste shaped the characteristics of modern Japan (Creighton, 1996, p. 554). This leads finally to her main thesis that Japan could develop in a manner largely equivalent to the development of modernity in the West (Eisenstadt, 1996(Eisenstadt, , p. 1731, although this development had its source in "a completely different cultural matrix" (Ikegami, 1995, p. 331). Furthermore, Ikegami (1995, p. 5) contends that discourse in the early modern period also contributed to shaping "present-day" Japan.
The aim of this paper is to test Ikegami's thesis that the "honorific individualism" of the pre-Tokugawa samurai survived the Edo period and had a strong impact on modern Japan against our counter-thesis that it was rather a newly developing idea of conscientious collectivism, spreading among these pre-Tokugawa samurai, which more crucially influenced the modernization of Japan.
In contrast to many historians-who have ignored Ikegami's work-we believe that Ikegami has not only formulated an interesting conceptual framework that can be further developed, but she also provided a hypothesis which can actually be tested. This is something that most of the historians have not done. Ikegami's The Taming of the Samurai is despite its age still one of the most interesting interpretations of Japanese history and therefore worthy of further investigation.
We will start with a critique of Ikegami's conceptual framework. We propose instead an expanded conceptual framework, which retains Ikegami's key concept of honorific individualism but adds three other dimensions, resulting in a fourfold ethical system. This is followed by a short discussion of how to test historical theories. The extended framework is then applied to the history of Japan as described by Ikegami in order to test her "honorific individualism" thesis. Finally, we will present empirical data from modern Japan that supports our interpretation of the historical samurai texts.

Criticism of Ikegami's conceptual framework
As with most reviewers of Ikegami's book, we are impressed by her detailed description of samurai culture throughout Japan's different historical periods. Our major concern is, however, her insufficient conceptual framework (cf., Eisenstadt, 1996Eisenstadt, , p. 1732). Ikegami's key concept is "honorific individualism," which she defined as "the strong belief that the ultimate responsibility for the different requirements of social honor creating an honorific identity belonged not to the society as a whole but to each member of that society" (Ikegami, 1995, p. 370). Here "honorific individualism" seems to imply an emphasis on individual identity rather than on group identity, which, however, does not explain why we should call this identity "honorific." On the other hand, she tells us that "honorific individualism" does not mean that those samurai would constantly "rebel against limitations," but rather would "take these boundaries seriously, even though the ultimate decision about whether or not to conform would be his own and no other's" (Ikegami, 1995, p. 370). In this definition, "honorific individualism" is characterized as a decision to rebel or not to rebel. Based on this definition, every behavior could be interpreted as "honorific individualism." Ikegami furthermore insists the samurai's individuality is "wedded to an equally strong sense of sovereign power" (Ikegami, 1995, pp. 377 f.), although this seems to contradict her first definition, in which she rejected any form of group identity. She states that "honorific individualism" is not the same as the choice optimization of American individuals (Ikegami, 1995, p. 4), nor that it has anything to do with individualism in the West (Ikegami, 1995, pp. 350 f.). It is neither an ethic that is connected to traditional societies (Ikegami, 1995, pp. 372 f.), or uniquely Japanese (Ikegami, 1995, p. 351). Ikegami tells us many times what "honorific individualism" is not, but she does not precisely tell us what it is. Therefore, it is not surprising that Bellah(1996, p. 112) concluded that the term "honorific individualism" is an oxymoron. We, however, believe that it could be a very useful concept, if it is theorized and clearly defined. This is what we try to achieve in the following section. reached the conclusion that the individualism-collectivism divide is not a one-dimensional problem (Gelfand et al., 2004, p. 443). In the following, we will describe two dimensions of individualism and collectivism, which we will derive from subject-based perspectives.
First, we will take the position of a sociologist (or anthropologist), who would approach the individualism-collectivism divide with the question: Who is sanctioning norm-breaking behavior? This leads to the contrast of guilt and shame as it was famously proposed by Benedict (1946). Shame is a negative emotional response in the deviant person to the signs of disapproval from other people. Feelings of shame can only occur when somebody else knows about the normbreaking behavior. Guilt, on the other hand, is a negative emotional response in the deviant person to his/her own knowledge of the norm-breaking behavior. The feeling of guilt occurs regardless of whether other people know about the deviant acts or not. Another important aspect of guilt is that it implies a choice of values. Guilt, in contrast to shame, does not depend on other people, and therefore frees the actor to choose his/her own ethical code. But once the ethical code is chosen, it is usually applied much more strictly than in the case of shame, because there is simply no way of evading the negative feelings.
Based on these nominalist definitions of shame and guilt, it seems that Ikegami equates "honorific" cultures with shame. According to her, honor (meiyo) is often expressed "as na (name), haji (shame), menboku (face), chijoku (dishonor), iiji [sic] (pride), and sekentei (one's appearance in the world), depending on the precise context" (Ikegami, 1995, p. 17;cf., 2003, p. 1352. The terms na, menboku, and sekentei are clearly related to how other people perceive someone, and therefore we conclude that Ikegami's "honorific" cultures are what we have defined as shame cultures. In this sense, we will continue to use the term honorific cultures (now without quotation marks) for cultures based on shame. On the other hand, we will call cultures based on guilt conscientious cultures, "conscientious" in the sense of "conscientious objector." The second subject-based perspective, from which we can approach the individualismcollectivism divide, is economics. An economist would ask: Whose interest is maximized? This question would lead to the distinction of egoism and altruism (Becker, 1976(Becker, , p. 819, 1981Collard, 1978, p. 37). An egoistic actor maximizes his self-interest, whereas an altruistic actor maximizes the interests of other people, the group, or the nation. Both egoists and altruists are active and immediately adjust to environmental changes. Therefore, collectivism is not necessarily passive. Only shame implies passivity, but altruism does not. Another important difference between shame and altruism is that shame requires a concrete community, but altruism does not. Certainly, somebody can have altruistic feelings towards his/her spouse (which we usually call love), but it is also possible to have such feelings towards abstract entities like the state.
We assume that the sociological and economic dimensions are independent of each other. By combining both, we thus arrive at four ideal-types of cultures (see, Table 1). The pure type of individualism is conscientious individualism. A conscientious individualist is an egoist, who maximizes his/her self-interest, which implies an avoidance of self-imposed sanctions (guilt). An example of this type might be a student who studies at least eight hours a day in hopes of securing a well-paying job, and who feels defeated if he/she can not attain this. Likewise, an honorific individualist is also an egoist who maximizes his/her self-interest. However, he/she tries to avoid sanctions from other people rather than selfimposed sanctions. This would be a student who studies whenever his/her father is present, considering that he pays for the education and would be angry to see it neglected. By contrast, an honorific collectivist would do what is best for the group (altruist), as long as the outcome of his/her actions could be observed by others (shame). An example of this type is a student who works very hard for a group assignment (where all members receive the same grade regardless of their contribution), because he/ she wants to show the other group members that they can rely on him/her. And finally, the conscientious collectivist would choose the collective good as a guiding principle, and would act accordingly, even if punishment might be expected for such actions. This would be a student who reports his/her classmates for bullying other students, even at the risk of then being bullied in retaliation.
We want to emphasize that these four ideal-types represent ethical systems. Of course, not all people follow ethical codes. Some people simply break the law in order to enrich themselves without considering shame or guilt. We will call those people unethical egoists, which is a possible fifth ideal-type. In the following sections, however, we will focus mainly on these four main idealtypes to test Ikegami's honorific individualism thesis.

Methodology
Max Weber stated that historical sciences could be objective despite the fact that they deal with singular phenomena and that any historical analysis is largely determined by the interests of the researcher and the arbitrarily designed conceptual frameworks. Objectivity could be achieved, nevertheless, if the conceptual framework is clearly defined so that its logical application to historical processes by other researchers should lead to the same interpretation of those processes (Etzrodt, 2014, p. 352). Unfortunately, Weber's solution does not allow for testing different theories based on different conceptual frameworks. It would be impossible to decide whether Marx's (historical materialism), Durkheim's (social Darwinism), or Weber's (Protestant ethic thesis) explanation of modernization processes are more or less accurate.
We believe that this is an unsatisfactory result for historical sociology and therefore propose to combine Karl Popper's method of falsification with Weber's methodology (cf., Etzrodt, 2014, p. 353). Different historical theories could be qualitatively tested against historical phenomena, which could be regarded as the data. 1 The theory that leads to more contradictions in its application to the data could then be regarded as falsified. However, this does not imply that the surviving theory is true. The theory which performed better in this test could be falsified in the future against another theory or in another test with a different data set.
The first problem however is a lack of agreement about which historical phenomena are relevant. How can we avoid introducing bias through the selection of sources and examples? First, some justification is required for the selection of the historical phenomena. Historical figures that are often discussed in historical overviews should be included. And sources and examples which support an opposing thesis should not be ignored.
The second problem is related to the interpretation of historical events or texts. What exactly is looked at for each case? We especially focus on statements about the motives of ethical and unethical behavior. If, for example, a samurai stated that bushi should not defend their family name or reputation, then we can conclude that he rejects shame as a motive for ethical behavior (and therefore he would be classified as conscientious rather than honorific). We would conclude the same thing, if the samurai emphasizes principles (internal rules rather than external sanctions). On the other hand, if a samurai demands that a bushi should sacrifice himself for his lord and parents or should take other people's feelings into account, then we have a clear sign of altruism, because the actions are evaluated based on the consequences for other actors (rather than for oneself). However, the interpretation of historical events or texts does not always lead to a conclusive evaluation. Due to such problems the determination of a theory's superiority may not always be possible with such methodology.
In certain circumstances, however, the further testing of historical theories could be augmented by considering the impact of their described processes on current societies as well, if the theories claim such an impact of historical events. Here we would not test the theories against the historical phenomena, but against the current phenomena, which can be investigated with the methods of the social sciences. A theory would be falsified in this case if a specific phenomenonwhich was claimed to be the outcome of the historical processes-is not present or not typical in the current society.
In this paper we apply both methods to the testing of Ikegami's theory and our proposed theory, which is possible because both theories share the claim that the samurai ethic shaped present-day Japan.

Justification of the historical sample
Three of the four pre-Tokugawa samurai are discussed here because they represent three types of bushi: a loyal retainer, a disloyal retainer, and a rōnin or masterless samurai. These three are exemplary because they have stated beliefs that are logically consistent with their positions and actions.
The fourth pre-Tokugawa samurai (Suzuki Shōsan), together with samurai of the Tokugawa era, are chosen for different reasons. Suzuki Shōsan, Nakae Tōju, Kumazawa Banzan, Yamaga Sokō, Daidōji Yūzan, and Yamamoto Tsunetomo were prominent samurai who contributed to the development of the samurai ethic. Their inclusion is important for tracing the jagged line among the public and underground discourse of the time. Shōsan and Tsunetomo were Zen Buddhists. Tōju and Banzan belonged to the Confucian Yōmeigaku school. Sokō was associated with the Confucian Kogaku school, and Yūzan was his student. None of them belonged to the Hayashi clan that provided the "official" ideological underpinnings of the Tokugawa regime, but they were nevertheless influential, especially for the historical developments at the end of Edo period. Both Tōju's and Sokō's teachings had an impact on Yoshida Shōin, who played a key role in the socialization of Meiji reformers. Ikegami discussed all of them (with the exception of Shōsan), and we are largely in agreement with the relevance of this historical data.
The Akō incident is discussed because it played a prominent role in Ikegami's argument, and we did not want to neglect the data that supports her theory. On the other hand, Saitō Setsudō is additionally included because of his importance in exemplifying the early 19th century ethos in order to show that Yūzan's position in the discourse became the mainstream solution to the Akō dilemma. Ikegami (1995, p. 86) claimed that the samurai ethic of the pre-Tokugawa period can be characterized as a balance "between an honorific aspiration to autonomy and an honorific regard for loyalty," which would imply that most of the early samurai advocated an ethical code that would fall into either the category of honorific individualism or honorific collectivism. According to Ikegami (1995, pp. 34,352,353,355), the individualistic elements of the samurai ethic trace back to the independent houses (ie), which were established in connection with landed property. Aggression became an important means of defending this sovereign power because it established a credible reputation (Ikegami, 1995(Ikegami, , p. 34,353, 2003(Ikegami, , p. 1371. She further reinforced this argument with a reference to the many instances of betrayal in medieval samurai warfare, which she interpreted as acts motivated by honorific individualism (Ikegami, 1995, p. 377).

The pre-Tokugawa period
We will take a short look at four bushi who were born before the Tokugawa period in order to test Ikegami's claims. The first one is Asakura Sōteki (朝倉宗滴 1474-1555) also known as Norikage. The Buddhist Sōteki was an advisor for three generations of Asakura daimyō (Wilson, 1982, p. 82), and the son of Asakura Toshikage (朝倉敏景 1428-1481) who was "ruthless and typical of the gekokujo daimyo, those lower class warriors who overthrew the upper class nobility" (Wilson, 1982, p. 67;cf., Hane & Perez, 2015, p. 128). Sōteki (in Wilson, 1982, p. 84;in Dōbunkan Henshūkyoku, 1911, p. 127) stated: "Though a warrior may be called a dog or beast, what is basic for him is to win." Obviously he is not concerned with reputation (a rejection of shame). He only cares about winning (an egoistic motive). His position can be characterized as unethical egoism, which might not have been untypical for lower-level samurai, who usurped positions of power.
The second warrior is Torii Mototada (鳥居元忠 1539-1600), who fought for Tokugawa Ieyasu (德 川家康 1543-1616) in the conflict against Toyotomi Hideyori (豊臣 秀頼 1593-1615) in 1600. Although vastly outnumbered, he was ordered to defend Fushimi Castle. He stalled the Toyotomi coalition forces as long as possible but ultimately committed suicide in order to avoid being taken prisoner (Takagi, 1960(Takagi, , p. 1722. Mototada (in Dōbunkan Henshūkyoku, 1911, pp. 247-249) stated in a farewell letter to his son that to sacrifice his life for the sake of his lord is an honor for his family, and that cowardice would destroy his good reputation. Mototada emphasizes the importance of shame here (good reputation), but he also acknowledges the role of altruism (his family's honor and not his own). His position is an example of honorific collectivism.
The third is Miyamoto Musashi (宮本 武蔵 1584-1645), a master swordsman and Zen Buddhist who lost his lord in the Battle of Sekigahara (McClain, 2002, pp. 78 f.). His work The Book of Five Rings (Gorin no Sho) became a classic. Musashi, who was also working as a guest teacher for the Hosokawa family (de Bary et al., 2006, p. 550), stated that bushi desire to make a name for themselves and improve their position either for their lord's sake or for their own (Miyamoto, 2002, p. 6;in Kokusho Kankōkai, 1915, p. 239). This position clearly emphasizes reputation (shame) for both the loyal retainers as well as the rōnin (masterless samurai). But interestingly, Musashi implies that every samurai's chief concern, whether he has a lord or not, is firstly his own advancement (egoism). This position, which was obviously influenced by his experience as a rōnin, we would describe as honorific individualism.
The fourth is Suzuki Shōsan (鈴木正三 1579-1655), a Zen master, who fought for Ieyasu in the Battle of Sekigahara and at the sieges of Ōsaka Castle in 1614/15 (Frédéric, 2002, p. 919; de Bary et al., 2006, p. 434). Shōsan was "intensely loyal" to his lord and well known for his uncompromising stance towards Christianity (Bowring, 2017, p. 27 f.;Totman, 1995, p. 167;cf., Heisig et al., 2011, p. 183). Shōsan contributed to the philosophical mixture of Buddhist, Shinto, and Neo-Confucian ideas that became the foundation of the emerging Tokugawa ideology (Gordon, 2020, p. 36;Hirano, 2014, pp. 32,41). We discuss him here because his formative years with the experience of warfare fall into the Sengoku period, although he wrote his important works in the Edo period. He stated: There are those who discuss the amount of rewards and size of entitlement of men who have exercised considerable military valor, laid their lives on the line, ground down their bones, and become famous. They are foolish! Why not do a warrior's deed, costly though it be, for the sake of loyalty? People who think of rewards are nothing but military merchants. (Suzuki in Cleary, 2009, p. 44;in Mori, 1896, p. 3) Shōsan rejects here both rewards (egoism) and fame (shame). On the other hand, he seems to imply that samurai should choose the moral principle of loyalty (altruism), and to follow it regardless of the costs (conscientious/guilt). 2 Thus Shōsan exemplifies a conscientious collectivist.
This analysis gives a very diverse picture of the ethical discourse of the samurai in pre-Tokugawa times. It is reasonable to assume that the positions of Asakura (unethical egoism), Miyamoto (honorific individualism) and Torii (honorific collectivism) were typical for this period. Suzuki's position (conscientious collectivism) on the other hand is very likely an innovative reaction to social change occurring in the transition to the Tokugawa period (cf., Collins, 1997, p. 856; de Bary et al., 2006, p. 434). Therefore, our results largely support Ikegami's claims for this period, although many cases, which she labelled "honorific individualism," were probably unethical egoism. However, Ikegami completely missed Suzuki Shōsan's conscientious collectivism, which played a decisive role in the development of samurai discourse during the Tokugawa period.

The Tokugawa period
The Edo period was characterized by a fundamental re-engineering of the socio-political space. According to Ikegami, with the unification of Japan under the rule of the Tokugawa clan, it became necessary for the shogunate to tame the samurai in order to keep peace and to prevent any challenge to its power. She mentions how " . . . samurai were forced to live in castle towns, usually separated from direct control over their land; and their societal role underwent a major transformation from that of independent, high-spirited mounted warriors to that of sedate bureaucrats" (Ikegami, 1995, p. 21). Tighter government control and the support of Confucian teachings-which emphasize a hierarchical social order and loyalty (Ikegami, 1995, p. 299)-made it more difficult for the samurai to express "their violence-ridden culture of honor" (Ikegami, 1995, p. 218). However, this "honorific ethos remained central to the samurai's identity [. . .] which resisted the total incorporation of their individuality into the structures or purposes of the state" (Ikegami, 1995, p. 356). In other words, the clash of opinions regarding honorific collectivism and honorific individualism of the pre-Tokugawa period became a major conflict, where the advocates of honorific collectivism unsuccessfully tried to suppress honorific individualism.
Moving into the Tokugawa period, we will discuss several bushi of this time to further assess Ikegami's interpretation of the historical facts. The first is Neo-Confucian scholar Nakae Tōju (中江 藤樹 1608-1648). Tōju was the founder of the Wang Yangming (Yōmeigaku) school of Neo-Confucianism in Japan. It was largely independent from the intellectual milieu of the capital (de Bary et al., 2006, pp. 31,76), "never received significant support from the government and was eventually banned in the late 18th century" (Deal, 2007, p. 225), in contrast to the dominant Neo-Confucian school of Hayashi Razan (林 羅山 1583-1657). Tōju was of peasant origin but was adopted by his grandfather-a samurai in service of a daimyō (Bowring, 2017, p. 70;Heisig et al., 2011, p. 318). Tōju had a strong influence on the next generations of samurai (de Bary et al., 2006, pp. 123 f.), because of his insistence that a samurai should study both culture and military matters. He warned other samurai of courage that is based on bloodlust and not justice. Those who overcome others out of bloodlust evince nothing more than the "ferocity of tigers and wolves" (Nakae in Cleary, 2009, p. 37;in Inoue & Arima, 1909a, p. 9 f.; cf., in de Bary et al., 2006, p. 110 f.;in Heisig et al., 2011, p. 322). Tōju further demanded of samurai a willingness to sacrifice their lives for their lords and parents (Nakae in Inoue & Arima, 1909a, p. 9). He argued against the opinion that samurai should defend their honor in quarrels, because it would only "cause anxiety to their parents and steal the fiefs [. . .] of their lords" (Nakae in Steben, 1998, p. 261). This position is probably best described by conscientious collectivism, since he repeatedly emphasizes the importance of principles (guilt) rather than that of protecting the family name (shame) (Nakae in Inoue & Arima, 1909a, pp. 6 f.,9). 3 Tōju's successor as the leading disciple of Yōmeigaku was Neo-Confucian scholar Kumazawa Banzan (熊沢 蕃山 1619-1691). His father was a rōnin. At the age of fifteen he entered the service of the lord of Bizen but lost his stipend in 1638. After studying under Nakae Tōju in 1641-42, he returned to his former daimyō in 1645 (de Bary et al., 2006, p. 112;Bowring, 2017, p. 80). Banzan refers to altruism by claiming that a person who is ignorant of human feelings, "frequently loses the harmony of the human relationships" (Kumazawa in Heisig et al., 2011, p. 334). Additionally, he argued that someone who seeks trouble in order to elevate his reputation is ill-considered and disloyal (Kumazawa in Inoue & Arima, 1909a, p. 34). Furthermore, he stated that someone "who makes a show of valor is hated by others, so even if he achieves something it is not praised but denied" (Kumazawa in Cleary, 2009, p. 58;in Inoue & Arima, 1909a, p. 38). Similar to Tōju, Banzan tried to quell the samurai penchant for fighting over slight insults. But Banzan does not refer to abstract principles. Instead, he sells his position by appealing to shame (hated/praised by others). This is what we have called honorific collectivism. Here Banzan rejected an important aspect of his master's teachings (cf., Bowring, 2017, p. 79), and resorted instead to the more traditional approach towards the honorific individualistic bushi. The reason for this departure can be explained by a tightening of Tokugawa shogunate control. After a failed plot against the bakufu in 1651, 4 the shogunate exerted pressure on the daimyō to control dangerous thought. As a result, the lord of Bizen's support for Banzan's teachings quickly waned (Bowring, 2017, p. 82) and in 1667 Banzan was placed under house arrest for the first time (Totman, 1995, p. 131). He (and the shogunate) must have realized the danger in his teacher's argument. If you allow samurai to choose their own moral principle, then they could choose loyalty to their local lord rather than obey Tokugawa law. And at this point it seems that the shogunate was no longer willing to abide such risk.
However, guilt did not disappear from the samurai discourse. This idea was picked up again by Yamaga Sokō (山鹿素行 1622-1685), a scholar who was influenced by classical Confucianism and Shintoism. He studied under Hayashi Razan, worked for the daimyō of Akō from 1652 to 1660, and taught in Edo until 1665. His criticism of Razan's Neo-Confucianism as a corrupt teaching made him the target of the shogunate's reprisal. Sokō lived the next nine years in exile in Akō, before he returned to Edo (Earl, 1983, p. 290;Blomberg, 1994, p. 160;Heisig et al., 2011, p. 335;Bowring, 2017, pp. 109 f.). He was among the first to "codify" a warrior ethic (Deal, 2007, p. 226;cf., Jansen, 2000, p. 103,203;Schirokauer et al., 2012, p. 137;Hane & Perez, 2015, p. 197). His work, although officially censored, circulated among his descendants and disciples-which numbered over 2,000 (Earl, 1983, p. 290)-in the underground (Cleary, 2009, p. 62). As with previous samurai scholars, Sokō criticized honorific individualistic samurai who "boost their own reputation," viewing them as disloyal (Yamaga in Cleary, 2009, p. 64;in Inoue & Arima, 1909a, p. 189;cf., in Heisig et al., 2011, pp. 337 f.). He also rejected such narrow self-interest as a motive unfit for a sincere samurai (McClain, 2002, p. 81;cf. Yamaga in Heisig et al., 2011, p. 1108 He insisted that the loyalty of bushi needed to be absolute and unconditional (McClain, 2002, p. 81). And therefore, Sokō can be regarded as an advocate of conscientious collectivism. 5 Ikegami too discussed Sokō's work, realizing that he was striving for moral ideals, that he was motivated by an internal sense of honor, and that he placed the abstract state above a personal relationship with the local lord (Ikegami, 1995, pp. 310 f.). Her analysis shows very clearly an orientation towards guilt rather than shame, but she nevertheless declared this to be "honorific individualism" (Ikegami, 1995, p. 310) because she lacked another term to describe it.
The next major historical event that Ikegami discussed extensively was the Akō incident, or the story of the 47 samurai. In 1701, the daimyō of Akō, Asano Naganori (浅野 長矩 1667-1701), attacked without warning Kira Yoshinaka (吉良 義央1641-1703) and injured him in the shogun's castle in Edo during the preparations for an important ceremony. On the same day, shogun Tsunayoshi ordered Lord Asano to commit seppuku. His house was abolished, which made his retainers rōnin. Lord Asano's former vassals tried to restore their clan, but after they failed, in 1702 -one-and-a-half years after Asano attacked Kira-they stormed the mansion of Kira Yoshinaka in Edo and killed him. As punishment, 46 of them were ordered to commit seppuku too (Ikegami, 1995, pp. 223-225). Again, Ikegami (1995, p. 357) interpreted this incident as an example of an outburst of "honorific individualism" against the strict collectivistic order of the Tokugawa shogunate.
However, in order to decide whether the rōnin were motivated by honorific individualism or conscientious collectivism it is necessary to carefully examine the complex background of the incident. The leader of Lord Asano's former retainers was Ōishi Yoshio (大石 良雄 1659-1703) who studied under Yamaga Sokō (Sadler, 2007, p.vii;Schwentker, 2008, p. 92), who advocated conscientious collectivism. A third option is to interpret the actions of the 47 samurai as honorific collectivism, which places more emphasis on the direct relationship with the local lord than on the indirect relationship with the shogun (cf., McMullen, 2003, p. 294 f.;Gordon, 2020, p. 41).
The first important aspect of the Akō incident is that the samurai under Ōishi did not immediately attack Kira after their lord committed seppuku because they heard the rumor that Kira was protected by the Uesugi clan. This would have seriously reduced their chances of success (Bitō, 2003, p. 159). This line of reasoning would rule out guilt as the guiding moral principle. Samurai motivated by conscientious principles would have acted regardless of the chances of success. The driving reason must have been shame. The second aspect is that Ōishi was aware that an attack on Kira could have led to further punishment of Asano Daigaku-Naganori's younger brother and heir-and the main line of the Asano house in Hiroshima (Bitō, 2003, p. 159). In addition, at least two of the 47 samurai had joined the band only a short time before the incident, which would rule out a strong sense of loyalty (Bitō, 2003, pp. 161 f.). Both of these points contradict an interpretation based on altruism. The motivation of the 47 samurai seems to have been a defense of their private honor (ichibun), because as masterless samurai, they could not show their face anymore (Bitō, 2003, p. 160;cf., Satō, 1974, p. 379). We agree with Ikegami's interpretation in this regard.
But say that the other man [who received the money from the man, who died on his travel], purely out of sympathy and compassion and nothing else, and without a single evil thought, immediately informs the relatives and returns all the money to them. This is truly a man who does what is right. (Daidōji, 2007, p. 31) If the other man was not very well off, he might rightly regard it as a lucky windfall and think it would hurt no one to be silent about it and so keep it for himself. But then a sudden shame would come over him for having even dreamed of such a wicked idea, and he would dismiss the thought at once and return the money. This is doing right on account of shame that proceeds from one's mind. [. . .] Then there is the third case where somebody in his houseeither one of his family or of his servants-knows about this money, and he is ashamed of what that person may think or what may be said of him in the future and so returns it to the rightful owner. This is one who does right from shame connected with other people. But here we may wonder what he would do if nobody knew anything about it. (Daidōji, 2007, p. 33) Yūzan clearly recognized that guilt ("shame that proceeds from one's mind") is much more effective than shame in motivating people to do the right thing. On the other hand, he recognized the danger of guilt, allowing autonomous choice among the samurai, especially in light of the Akō incident, which had greatly ruptured the peace of his time. Therefore he argued that shame should become a habit, which would then cause people to follow the expectations of their community even when no one was looking (Daidōji, 2007, p. 35). The desired outcome would then be the same as with guilt yet without the risk of personal choice, in hopes of curbing the bushi. His position is best described by honorific collectivism. As Banzan rejected the conscientious collectivism of his teacher, Tōju, so did Yūzan reject the conscientious collectivism of his teacher, Sokō. The idea of guilt as a guiding moral principle was too dangerous in the Tokugawa period, at least within the realm of public discourse.
Among the underground, however, the virtues of guilt still had currency. Yamamoto Tsunetomo's (山本 常朝 1659-1719) Hagakure is a famous example of this. Tsunetomo, a Zen Buddhist, forbade the publication of his teachings, which were nevertheless copied secretly by hand (Tanaka, 2001, pp.xiv-xv;cf., Bennett, 2014, p. 12;Bennet, 2017, pp. 87 f.). He was influenced by Suzuki Shōsan, who provided the first description of conscientious collectivism in the Japanese context (Steben, 2008, pp. 26 f.). He saw the essence of a samurai's life in his willingness to die for his lord and his family (Yamamoto, 1937, p. 5). He rejected people as fools who were not able "to transcend thinking based on 'I'" (Yamamoto, 2001(Yamamoto, , p. 15, 1937. This argument rules out egoism (cf., Bennett, 2014, p. 26). He furthermore stated: On the other hand, if you but make the choice of death and fail to hit the target, your body will eventually die but no shame will come to you. No shame will come to you even though you will be regarded as crazy and as dying like a dog. (Yamamoto, 2001, p. 14, emphases added;1937, p.6; cf., in de Bary et al., 2006, p. 390) For Tsunetomo, it should be irrelevant what other people think of a samurai ("regarded as crazy"), nor should the outcome of his actions matter to him ("dying like a dog"), as long as the samurai acts according to the principles that he has chosen. Tsunetomo's position is a clear case of conscientious collectivism. The focus on loyalty to the local lord and the choice to die is a sign of resistance against the domestication of the samurai in the Tokugawa period (Bennett, 2014, p. 12), which stands in sharp contrast to Daidōji Yūzan's law-abiding version of bushi ethics (cf., Bennet, 2017, p. 82). Ikegami sees this similarly (1995, pp.279,282), but in contrast she interpreted Tsunetomo's death cult as a sign of "honorific individualism" (Ikegami, 1995(Ikegami, , p. 281, 2003(Ikegami, , p. 1361. It seems that Tsunetomo's radical ideas had very little impact on the ongoing discourse. In contrast, Daidōji Yūzan's habit-based version of honorific collectivism became the mainstream solution until the end of the Tokugawa period, which can be seen in the writings of Saitō Setsudō (斎藤 拙堂 1797-1865). For example, Setsudō argued that the feelings of shame in a three-year-old samurai child, when called a coward by his peers, ought to be habitual, stressing further that a samurai must forsake all personal desire (Saitō in Inoue & Arima, 1909b, pp. 409 f.). The expectations of others (shame) should be internalized while their own desires should be neglected (altruism). This clearly replicates Yūzan's position of honorific collectivism based on habits.
This section has shown that the ethical discourse of the samurai shifted from a conflict between honorific individualism and collectivism in the pre-Tokugawa period to a more complex conflict between honorific collectivism and conscientious collectivism (punctuated by outbursts of honorific individualism in some incidents of the Tokugawa era). The order of the shogunate was threatened from several ethical standpoints. Honorific individualists were a source of trouble because they started quarrels in order to defend their personal honor by disregarding Tokugawa law. Conscientious collectivists were dangerous fanatics because they followed their own moral code, regardless of the outcome of their actions. And even honorific collectivists could not be fully trusted because shame emphasizes personal relationships (the local lord) rather than abstract concepts (the shogunate or the state). A daimyō who wanted to rebel against the shogun would have had a loyal following. The only solution offered in the samurai discourse to the complexity of this conflict was Daidōji Yūzan's habitualization of shame. Although we agree with Ikegami's interpretation of the Akō incident, we must conclude that her interpretation of the discourse throughout the Tokugawa period, which she characterizes as a continued conflict between honorific individualism and collectivism, is the result of her limited conceptual framework.

The Meiji restoration
Ikegami argued that "honorific individualism" did not only survive the Tokugawa period, but also became the main source of the shogunate's downfall. The transformation to a modern state came from within the samurai culture (Ikegami, 1995, p. 365), despite the fact that "honorific individualism" "lacked any connection to transcendental values such as one finds in Christian or Kantian schemes of universal moral principles" (Ikegami, 1995, pp. 357 f.). In a later study, Ikegami (2003) provided an analysis of Yoshida Shōin's (吉田 松陰 1830-1859) ethical teachings in order to reinforce her claims.
Shōin was an extremely important teacher during the early years of the Bakumatsu period. Half of the high-ranking politicians in the Meiji government were influenced by him (Dumoulin, 1938, p. 351;McClain, 2002, p. 140;de Bary et al., 2006, p. 554;Hane & Perez, 2013, p. 70). Born to a vassal of the daimyō of the Chōshū domain, he was adopted by his uncle Yoshida Daisuke (Dumoulin, 1938, p. 352). His house belonged to the military school of Yamaga Sokō (Dumoulin, 1938, p. 353;Jansen, 2000, p. 291;de Bary et al., 2006, p. 160,553,557;Hane & Perez, 2013, p. 70;Bowring, 2017, p. 302;cf., Timperley, 1942, p. 344), and he was influenced by Nakae Tōju through Satō Issai (佐藤 一斎 1772-1859; Steben, 1998, p. 234 f.; cf., de Bary et al., 2006, p. 105,555;Hane & Perez, 2013, p. 70). It is additionally possible that he knew Suzuki Shōsan's version of conscientious collectivism. Shōin had Zen Buddhist friends, although he was always distant towards Buddhism (Dumoulin, 1938, p. 365). In 1855, he was placed under house arrest because he tried unsuccessfully to smuggle himself onto Commodore Perry's ships, hoping to learn from the West (Ikegami, 2003(Ikegami, , p. 1355. Ikegami (2003) showed that he was not feeling ashamed, although an accusation of a crime "was usually considered shameful for the other members of the defendant's family." According to her, Shōin emphasized an individual's inner sense of morality instead of a societal definition of shame (Ikegami, 2003(Ikegami, , p. 1353. He also stressed the importance of loyalty towards the local lord (Ikegami, 2003(Ikegami, , p. 1356. And finally, she stated that Shōin nevertheless demanded of samurai to "act according to their own moral principles rather than automatic obedience to the laws of the shogunate and their immediate master" (Ikegami, 2003(Ikegami, , p. 1356. 6 Ikegami (2003Ikegami ( , p. 1358 wanted to show that "honorific individualism" was the motivation behind Shōin's teachings, but she actually provided strong evidence for conscientious collectivism. He was not ashamed of the accusation of a crime, nor did he value the societal definitions of shame, which rules out the expectations of others (shame) as a source of motivation. He insisted that serving the local lord was important (altruism; cf. Yoshida in de Bary et al., 2006, p. 558), but even this loyalty should not stop a samurai from acting according to his moral principles. The shogunate was fully aware of the danger of Shōin's influential version of conscientious collectivism. 7 He was executed at the age of 29 (Ikegami, 2003(Ikegami, , p. 1358. This, however, did not stop Shōin's disciples. In the years 1862-64 alone his followers committed around 70 assassination attempts on foreign diplomats and traders, as well as on high representatives of the shogunate (Schwentker, 2002, p. 56).
This analysis supports Ikegami's claim that an indigenous discourse created an ethical code, which motivated a group of samurai to modernize Japan. However the underlying moral principle was, in our opinion, not honorific individualism, as she stated, but conscientious collectivism. Conscientious collectivism was introduced by Suzuki Shōsan at the beginning of the Tokugawa period and was picked up by Nakae Tōju, Yamaga Sokō, and Yamamoto Tsunetomo. Their teachings reached Yoshida Shōin, who then motivated the anti-bakufu rebels.

Empirical data for modern Japan
In this section we will discuss the implications of the GLOBE study vis-a-vis the claims and interpretations presented in the previous sections. The GLOBE study attempted to map cultures according to different dimensions. It can be regarded as a refined version of Geert Hofstede's study on cultural variations worldwide (Hofstede, 1980). The GLOBE study collected data from 17,300 managers in 951 organizations among three industries (financial services, food processing, telecommunications) in 62 cultures and tested 27 hypotheses (Triandis, 2004, p.xv). The data was collected between 1994and 1997(House, 2004. The GLOBE study is especially useful for the discussion of Japanese characteristics because it measured two different dimensions of the individualism-collectivism divide separately. The two dimensions were: in-group collectivism (kin relationships) and institutional collectivism (non-kin relationships). Four questions were asked in order to measure each of the two dimensions. Unfortunately, only one of the eight questions was specific about the motive (shame vs. altruism) for collective behavior. It was the question about whether the emphasis is on collective or individual interests in the institutional setting, which is exactly what we have defined as the altruism-egoism dimension (Gelfand et al., 2004, pp. 462f.). However, since shame requires a close concrete community (in order to identify the person who did something wrong), we can expect that shame plays a much more important role in kin relationships (ingroup) than in anonymous institutions. Therefore, we can conclude that the GLOBE study actually did measure with the institutional collectivism dimension what we called altruism-egoism (as the only specific questions suggests) and with the in-group collectivism dimension shame vs. guilt. Obviously, it would be better, if all the questions would be specific about the motive. Unfortunately, the GLOBE study is the only study which makes a distinction between two dimensions of collectivism, and is therefore the best information that we have to test several claims and interpretations about the influence of samurai ethics on "present-day" Japan (the data of the GLOBE study from the mid-90s corresponds to what Ikegami called "present-day" in 1995).
In Figure 1, we have mapped 21 cultures according to their placement on the shame-guilt and altruism-egoism dimensions. We have placed the scores for societal institutional collectivism practices along the altruism-egoism dimension, and the scores for societal in-group collectivism practices along the shame-guilt dimension (see, Gelfand et al., 2004, pp. 468f.). 8 We arbitrarily set the border between the four ideal-types of honorific collectivism and individualism and conscientious collectivism and individualism at 4.25 for the altruism-egoism dimension and at 5 for the shame-guilt dimension in order to have equally large quadrants. 9 This map makes it possible to test several claims and interpretations. The first point to test is whether or not our interpretation of Ikegami's term "honorific individualism" correlates with our definition of it. Ikegami (1995, p. 374) argued that what she called "honorific individualism" is connected to what anthropologists identify as honor in Mediterranean cultures. And indeed, the Mediterranean cultures scored prominently in the honorific individualism quadrant (assuming that aspects such as cultural variation between Northern and Southern Italy are recognized, 10 as well as Brazil and Argentina's inclusion vis-a-vis cultural similarities to the Mediterranean). This would imply that what we called honorific individualism is the same concept that Ikegami had in mind.
On the other hand, Ikegami's claim that honorific individualism would be characteristic for modern Japan is not supported at all by the empirical data. Japan is placed clearly in the quadrant of conscientious collectivism, very far away from honorific individualism. Ikegami's description of samurai culture as being partially influenced by honorific individualism was probably correct for the pre-Tokugawa period, but it is wrong for modern Japan. Similarly, Ruth Benedict's classification of modern Japan as a shame culture is also wrong. Shame is not the defining characteristic of Japanese culture. Accordingly, the difference between the United States and Japan regarding the shame-guilt dimension is small. The decisive difference between these two is that Japanese are excessively altruistic, whereas Americans have rather a balance between altruistic and egoistic motives.
However, the location of modern Japan in the conscientious collectivism quadrant strongly supports our interpretation of the samurai discourse in the Tokugawa period as being a conflict between honorific collectivism and conscientious collectivism, with conscientious collectivism eventually triumphing during the Meiji restoration. This result also provides evidence for the thesis that parts of the samurai discourse of the Edo period were in fact the driving force behind Japan's modernization and most directly shaped the ethical principles of present-day Japan. In this regard it seems that Ikegami was correct, although her classification of the details could not adequately capture this.
Finally, the empirical data shows that Japan stands alone in terms of the shame-guilt dimension and has the lowest score among all non-Christian cultures. Altogether only three non-Christian cultures appear in the guilt section. Furthermore, as the discussion of the samurai discourse has shown, Japanese culture most likely shifted from its place between honorific individualism and honorific collectivism in the pre-Tokugawa period to honorific collectivism during the Tokugawa period (where China and Korea were in the 1990s), arriving finally at conscientious collectivism by the Meiji period. The West on the other hand moved from honorific individualism to conscientious individualism, while the Scandinavian cultures moved further to conscientious collectivism. In other words, Japan's development into a modern country had no parallels to the development in the West, although the result of this movement is similar to the Scandinavian cultures.

Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a new theoretical framework for analyzing the samurai discourse in Japanese history in general and for testing Ikegami's "honorific individualism" thesis in particular. Instead of using a one-dimensional individualism-collectivism dichotomy, we constructed four cultural ideal-types from the egoism-altruism and guilt-shame dimensions. This new framework proved to be very useful for interpreting the ethical code of the samurai. The analyzation of key samurai texts from the pre-Tokugawa period basically confirmed Ikegami's claim of a conflict between honorific individualism and honorific collectivism. However, the texts of the Tokugawa period showed a conflict between honorific collectivism and conscientious collectivism, which was not grasped in Ikegami's thesis. Conscientious collectivism seems to have been the crucial motivation of the anti-bakufu revolutionaries. Ikegami's overarching thesis that the samurai ethic was the ideal that shaped modern Japanese culture is supported by some evidence in general. Most specifically however, modern Japan is characterized by conscientious collectivism, an idea which originated in the samurai discourse of the Tokugawa period and thrived to predominance thereafter, as was captured in our theoretical framework and supported by the empirical data of modern Japanese culture (see, Figure 2.).
Nevertheless, this study has serious limitations. It was beyond its scope to show the link between the teachings of Yoshida Shōin and the implementation of the Meiji policies that shaped modern Japan as a conscientious collectivistic society. A detailed analysis of how the samurai ethic changed the other classes is missing here. We believe that Ikegami (1995, p. 360) was on the right track to seek this link in the creation of the modern education system. But such an argument must be pursued elsewhere. Another important point not discussed in this paper is the question of what causes development. The GLOBE study found a strong correlation between guilt cultures and economic growth as well as a significant correlation between altruistic cultures and economic growth (Gelfand et al., 2004, p. 482). Thus one wonders if the roots of Japan's modern economic development might also be further elucidated by the samurai ethic as treated in this paper. However, considering that China and India had very high growth rates in the last 20 years, we are not altogether convinced that the GLOBE results are reliable regarding the influence of culture on economic development.
This research can be developed further in the future in different directions. One approach would be to analyze how samurai ethics could have an influence on other classes. A study of the normative foundation of the Meiji education system seems to be very promising for this purpose. Another approach would be a traditional historical analysis of the samurai ethical discourse, which tracks the different arguments in the pre-modern debate in much more detail. A third approach could be an investigation of Suzuki Shōsan, who was in our sample the first samurai that presented arguments which we called conscientious collectivism. It could be possible that Shōsan received these ideas from somebody else. And finally, our proposed hypothesis should be continued to be tested against other hypotheses based on new sets of data.

Funding
The authors received no direct funding for this research.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s). Notes 1. We treat here individuals and not texts as the unit of analysis. 2. Deal (2007) stated that Shōsan's teaching "was based on the idea that one's daily work, if pursued in a selfless way, was a religious practice that promoted enlightenment." Shōsan promoted a this-worldly work ethic for all classes to which he added altruism (the selfless way; cf., Hirano, 2014, p. 32 f.,34;Jansen, 2000, p. 221). Gordon (2020) described this as a "calling." 3. This interpretation is supported by Bowring's (2017) characterization of Tōju as uncompromising, which suggests that he was a principled person. Hane and Perez (2015) emphasized Tōju's belief "that truth is to be grasped intuitively and that one had to act upon the truth so apprehended." 4. Some of the plotters claimed that they were followers of Banzan, and Hayashi Razan seized the opportunity to attack Banzan in order to weaken a competing Neo-Confucian school (Totman, 1995, pp. 127 f.). 5. Bowring (2017) characterized Sokō's "emphasis on selfsacrifice and self-control [as] Calvinist in their rigour." 6. Cf. Yoshida in de Bary et al., 2006, p.555: "Once a man's will is set, he need no longer rely on others or expect anything from the world." 7. Bellah (1996) provided a third interpretation of Yoshida Shōin's teachings. In his opinion, Shōin should be classified as an honorific collectivist, who had the "capacity to imagine a larger loyalty that allowed him to violate the Tokugawa normative order." 8. We are using the practice scores in the GLOBE study and not the value scores, because the study only questioned managers, which are not necessarily representative of the culture at large. Thus the value scores only tell us about the values of elites. The practice scores, however, tell us what is typically practiced in the wider culture. Such information is much more reliable. 9. The GLOBE study used a 7-point Likert-type scale with 4 as the midpoint of the scale. However, some extreme forms-as for example, cultures with excessive egoism-do not exist in reality, which is not surprising, because they would not be able to overcome the prisoner's dilemma problem. Therefore, we choose the midpoint of the real existing culture's averages. The terms honorific collectivism and individualism and conscientious collectivism and individualism are used as relative and not absolute concepts here, in the sense that some cultures rely more on shame or altruism than others in order to achieve collective behavior. 10. Northern Italy is probably more similar to France while Southern Italy bears a greater resemblance to Greek culture. 11. The concrete data for the 21 cultures follows: Japan  (Gelfand et al., 2004 , p. 468f.).