Quashing protests abroad: The CSTO’s intervention in Kazakhstan*

ABSTRACT The Collective Security Treaty Organization’s military intervention in Kazakhstan in January 2022 quashed the unfolding nonviolent protest movement in the country. Nonetheless, the intervention raised few concerns with regard to the prohibition of the use of force in international law. Among states and scholars, the invitation issued by the Kazakh president was regarded as sufficient to justify the intervention. This article critically assesses this understanding. The intervening states limited the Kazakh people’s right to self-determination and violated protesters’ human rights. Against this backdrop, the authors develop an argument for why international law prohibits states from intervening in another state in order to quash nonviolent protest movements. While the intervention in Kazakhstan serves as the primary example, the argument also applies more broadly and is of particular importance as nonviolent protest movements have a central role in spreading democracy and advancing human rights.


Introduction
Only a few days after protests erupted in Kazakhstan in early 2022, the Kazakh president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, requested assistance from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).Within hours, the CSTO approved Tokayev's request and sent 2500 soldiers to safeguard critical infrastructure throughout Kazakhstan.Thereby, the armed forces of the other five CSTO member states participated in the effort to violently suppress the ongoing nonviolent protests in a foreign state.A week later, the CSTO forces started withdrawing after Kazakh security forces succeeded in quashing the nationwide protests.The first collective intervention in the CSTO's thirty-year history 1 was over as quickly as it had begun.
With international scholarly attention focusing on the illegal full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine, the intervention in Kazakhstan only raised a few eyebrows.The few comments on the matter raised little or no doubts regarding the international legality of the CSTO's intervention. 2owever, the CSTO's intervention gave a decisive blow to the unfolding protest movement in Kazakhstan.Since 2019, protests had increased in frequency and scale throughout Kazakhstan, culminating in the protests of early 2022. 3The intervention ended the protesters' ambition to reform their societal and government structures.In doing so, the radical suppression of the protests contrasted sharply with the overall nonviolent character of the protest movement.
A recent trend in the literature has identified the significance of nonviolent protest movements in international law, in particular with regard to the right of self-determination, democracy, and human rights. 4Protests, so it is argued, are the only avenue for popular involvement in public affairs when the institutional participation mechanisms are dysfunctional or shut off. 5 In these settings, nonviolent protest movements have a significant role in claiming and realising a population's rights to self-determination, democracy and human rights.Against this backdrop, an intervention that supports an embattled government in quashing popular and nonviolent dissent raises questions.
Whereas the International Court of Justice (ICJ) famously stated that interventions upon the invitation of a government are 'allowable', 6 this right is qualified by other rules of international law. 7When people resort to nonviolent protests to voice their discontent and demand fundamental changes in their societies against an authoritarian government, they exercise several human rights.Moreover, such nonviolent protests can qualify as a struggle for self-determination.Therefore, an intervention to quash a nonviolent protest movement abroad infringes on the right to self-determination and the international protection of human rights.These rights must, however, be respected even if an intervention is undertaken at the invitation of the respective government.If these rights are violated, which is the case when states quash nonviolent protest movements abroad, the intervention will violate international law.Thus, we argue that international law is a barrier to quashing nonviolent protests abroad.
This argument is developed in three steps.First, the events and justifications for the recent intervention in Kazakhstan are detailed (Section 2).Then, the international legal framework is outlined, suggesting that three fundamental legal principles of international law are violated by an intervention to quash a nonviolent protest movement (Section 3).If a nonviolent protest movement fulfils certain criteria and faces an autocratic government, then that government loses its authority to issue invitations (Section 3.2).Furthermore, an intervention to quash a nonviolent protest movement could violate the population's right to self-determination (Section 3.3).Additionally, quashing popular and nonviolent dissent abroad is incompatible with international human rights law (Section 3.4).Drawing upon the example of the CSTO intervention in Kazakhstan, the authors demonstrate the practical implications of these limitations.To conclude, the argument against military interventions to quash nonviolent protests is set out and put into context (Section 4).
Despite this article's focus on the CSTO intervention in Kazakhstan, the argument made is relevant beyond this particular case.Nonviolent protests against authoritarian governments are a widespread phenomenon. 8Particularly in the post-Soviet space, so called 'colour revolutions', a term used for unarmed, mostly peaceful pro-democracy movements aiming for a change of government, 9 have been a decisive factor in upending authoritarian 6 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v  governments and initiating democratic transitions. 10Therefore, authoritarian states have grown wary of popular mobilisation and have united to suppress such tendencies. 11Most prominently, the Sino-Russian Joint Declaration on International Relations of February 2022 places the prevention of colour revolutions as a central foreign policy goal. 12Accordingly, military interventions in foreign states to quash nonviolent protests can be expected to increase in the future.Nevertheless, this situation has to date never been dealt with in international legal scholarship.Moreover, state practice in this regard is still scarce and does not point to a consolidated legal framework that comprehensively regulates interventions against nonviolent protest movements.It is therefore of particular importance to highlight the international legal regulations that suggest that such interventions violate fundamental principles of international law.

Protests in Kazakhstan and the CSTO's intervention
After describing the events of January 2022 in Kazakhstan (Section 2.1) and the intervention by CSTO member states (Section 2.2), this article critically assesses the invocation of Article 4 of the CSTO Treaty (Section 2.3) This lays the groundwork for the argument that an intervention by invitation violates fundamental principles of international law (Section 3).

The protests in Kazakhstan
Popular protests occurred in Kazakhstan between 2 and 11 January 2022.Initially, the protesters criticised a 50% increase in oil prices resulting from a reduction in government subsidies. 13This immediate reaction to the subsidy reduction, however, quickly diversified to other subject matters.Within a few days, demonstrators shifted their focus to a more general critique of their government. 14They demanded greater political liberalisation, including increased political representation, an improvement of the civil rights situation 15 and the resignation of the current government, including President Tokayev. 16Moreover, the protesters took issue with socio-economic disparities and economic stagnation in Kazakhstan and demanded increased social support programmes. 17These general economic, social, and political grievances addressed one central figure: former President Nursultan Nazarbayev. 18Nazarbayev had stepped down from office in 2019 after thirty years in power. 19After his resignation, Nazarbayev's successor, Mr. Tokayev, whose election was predetermined and accompanied by electoral irregularities and popular protests, 20 had promised economic and political reforms, including those now demanded by protesters. 21However, the Tokayev administration failed to deliver on its promises. 22In the view of the protesters, this was also due to the continuing role of Nazarbayev in Kazakh politics.As chairperson of the National Security Council, his influence on public policies remained significant.Therefore, slogans such as 'Old Man, Out'asking for the definitive departure of Nazarbayev from Kazakh politics characterised the demonstrations. 23These had already been present during prior protests in Kazakhstan from 2014 onwards. 24Although the protests developed without a single and identifiable leader, 25 they nevertheless quickly spread from Zhanaozen in western Kazakhstan to most districts of the country. 26

The intervention by the CSTO states
Following the broadening of the protestsboth in numbers and scopethe Government of Kazakhstan declared a state of emergency. 27President Tokayev threatened protestors with massive violence and liquidation, 28 and enforced an internet blackout for several days. 29Furthermore, authorities carried out mass arrests, 30 and used tear gas and stun grenades against the demonstrators. 31Following a shoot-to-kill-without-warning order issued by President Tokayev, 32 government security forces used considerable and deadly force against protesters. 33evertheless, the Kazakh authorities were unable to end the protests, and the resignation of the prime minister and his government did not appease the protesters. 34This situation can be traced back to internal disagreements over the distribution of power between Tokayev and former President Nazarbayev 35 and a defection of officials to the protestors. 36Confronted with this situation, the Kazakh president requested assistance from the CSTO under Article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) 37 the first successful request under Article 4 in the CSTO's thirty-year history. 38he CSTO is a military alliance, established in 1992, consisting of Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Belarus. 39Its objectives include the 'strengthening of peace, international and regional security and stability, protection of independence on a collective basis, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Member States'. 40The collective defence clause in Article 4 CSTwhich is comparable to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 41 determines that aggression against one of the states 'will be considered by the Member States as aggression to all the Member States'. 42President Tokayev held the opinion that Kazakhstan was faced with such an 'act of aggression'.He stated: [R]elying on the Collective Security Treaty, today I appealed to the heads of the CSTO states to assist Kazakhstan in overcoming this terrorist threat.In fact, this is no longer a threatit is undermining the state integrity, and most importantly, it is an attack against our citizens … Almaty was attacked and suffered vandalism.Its residents have become victims of terrorist attacks, bandits.Therefore, it is our duty, including the Security Council members of the Republic of Kazakhstan present here, to take all possible actions to protect our state from an external threat … 43 In response to the request, Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan sent up to 2500 troops to Kazakhstan, the vast majority of them from Russia. 44The intervening states deployed soldiers and armoured vehicles, but their troops did not actively participate in combat operations or the confrontation with the protesters themselves.Rather, the foreign troops took over the traditional tasks of the Kazakh security forces, such as guarding state and military facilities, allowing them to focus on quashing the protests. 45Moreover, their presence was a considerable sign of support towards President Tokayev. 46Accordingly, the CSTO forces had a decisive role in ultimately ending the nonviolent protests in Kazakhstan.

Invocation of Article 4 CST
The deployment of military forces to the territory of another state will in principle contravene Article 2(4) UN Charter. 47Therefore, states frequently advance jus ad bellum justifications to justify such deployments.The CSTO states justified their intervention in Kazakhstan with reference to Article 4 CST 48 and held that the 'operation was carried out on a sound international legal basis'. 49Although the legality of the military intervention in Kazakhstan was not questioned on the international level by states, this reasoning merits further scrutiny.Article 4 CST reads: If one of the Member States undergoes aggression (armed attack menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty), it will be considered by the Member States as aggression (armed attack menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty) to all the Member States of this Treaty.In case of aggression commission (armed attack menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty) to any of the Member States, all the Member States at request of this Member State shall immediately provide the latter with the necessary help, including military one, as well as provide support by the means at their disposal in accordance with the right to collective self-defence pursuant to article 51 of the UN Charter.The Member States shall immediately inform the United Nations Security Council on the measures taken on the basis of this article.When implementing these measures, the Member States shall adhere to the relevant provisions of the UN Charter. 50cordingly, two lines of justification can be derived from an invocation of Article 4 CST: the invocation of collective self-defence (Section 2.3(a)) and an intervention by invitation (Section 2.3(b)).Both justifications, however, are legally unsound, as will be explained subsequently.

2.3(a) Collective self-defence
Article 4 CST refers to the right of collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.According to Article 4 CST, such right to collective selfdefence arises when one state is subject to aggression, which is defined as an 'armed attack menacing to safety, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty'.The Kazakh president precisely claimed that Kazakhstan was subject to such an attack. 51However, it is doubtful whether the requirements for exercising collective self-defence were met in the case of Kazakhstan.
First, the protests in Kazakhstan did not cross the threshold of an armed attack.In the Nicaragua judgment, the ICJ held that armed attacks are 'the most grave forms of the use of force'. 52Therefore, an armed attack can only be assumed when an act of armed force of considerable magnitude and intensity significantly impacts another state. 53ith regard to the January 2022 protests, no evidence was presented that Kazakhstan was the target of such an act of armed force of considerable magnitude and intensity.According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, 95% (and thus the vast majority) of the 80 demonstration events in the January protests remained peaceful. 54Violent events occurred only in the cities of Almaty, Shymkent and Aktobe.In Almaty, Kazakhstan's largest city and former capital, the city hall was seized and set on fire, and the international airport was occupied on 5 January. 55Furthermore, anti-government protestors directed their anger against the government by storming government buildings and businesses in Almaty, 56 and seizing large infrastructure facilities. 57In Shymkent and Aktobe, the peaceful demonstrations also turned into riots with violence directed against police forces. 58However, these events were isolated from the generally peaceful overall dynamics of the protests, 59 and the sporadic acts of violence were attributed to a subset of actors that did not mix with the peaceful protests. 60Moreover, the demonstrators proclaimed through slogans that they were carrying out a peaceful protest and carried protest signs confirming this purpose. 61Furthermore, the organisations calling for protests, such as Oyan, Qazaqstan ('Wake Up, Kazakhstan!'), only called for peaceful assemblies throughout the protests. 62herefore, no armed force of considerable magnitude and intensity, as required for an armed attack under international law, was present in Kazakhstan.In contrast, references to an armed attack in terms of Article 4 CST seem purely pretextual. 63This is particularly evident in view of a statement by the Russian Federation's President Vladimir Putin, who explicitly stated that he wanted to prevent a 'color revolution' in Kazakhstan. 64olour revolutions generally do not entail widespread uses of violence that would amount to an 'armed attack'. 65Therefore, in the absence of an armed attack, collective self-defence pursuant to Article 4 CST, in connection with Article 51 UN Charter, cannot serve as a legal justification.
Second, an armed attack must originate from the territory of another state.According to the ICJ, an armed attack entails action by regular armed forces across an international border, but also "the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to" (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces. 66is definition borrows from Article 3(g) of the 1974 UN General Assembly Definition of Aggression, 67 which was the basis for the ICJ's understanding of 'armed attack' in the Nicaragua and Armed Activities judgments. 68ven if one assumes, as has been argued frequently in recent years in the literature and state practice, that non-state actors can be the authors of armed attacks, 69 their military actions must likewise cross international borders. 70An operation by a non-state actor within the state's own territory does not trigger the right to collective self-defence. 71he protests in Kazakhstan only took place in Kazakhstan, did not cross borders, and had no foreign backing. 72Therefore, they were neither attributable to another State, nor conducted by a non-state actor from outside of the Kazakh territory.The requirements for the invocation of collective self-defence under Article 4 CST were therefore not met.Accordingly, collective self-defence cannot serve as a justification for the deployment of the CSTO troops.Therefore, the question whether the invitation by the Kazakh president justified the intervention is decisive (Section 2.3(b)).

2.3(b) Intervention by invitation
Alongside their reliance on collective self-defence, the CSTO member states relied on an invitation issued by the Kazakh president. 73The Chairman of the Collective Security Council, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, explicitly made reference to President Tokayev's request when justifying the intervention. 74nvitations can justify the deployment of military forces on the territory of another state. 75This effect derives from the sovereignty of the inviting state.As the sovereign over the territory, the inviting state can in principle decide freely for which purposes and by whom the territory is used.Therefore, there is a strong presumption in favour of the legality of an intervention undertaken at the invitation of an official government. 76Concurring with this finding, Julia Emtseva has pointed out that under the current CSTO framework, foreign military support can be dispatched 'for basically any purpose'. 77A particular reason, i.e. to defend against an armed attack or aggression, is not required by the general doctrine.Therefore, it seems particularly difficult for someone claiming the illegality of an intervention by invitation to prove why the legality of an intervention is unfounded. 78erations.However, the states did not substantiate this claim or present any evidence thereof.Their argument stands in contrast to the proclamations of the protest movement and the assessment of international observers. 73 With regard to the intervention of the CSTO states in Kazakhstan, one would thus assume at first glance that the intervention was lawful.This assessment also seems reasonable if one considers the lack of state reactions to the intervention in Kazakhstan.The CSTO's intervention was neither commented upon nor condemned internationally.
Nevertheless, there are certain circumstances which can render an intervention by invitation illegal.As mentioned previously, in its Nicaragua judgment, the ICJ held that a military operation in another state, undertaken at the invitation of that state and therefore with its consent, is 'allowable'. 79The wording 'allowable' (and not allowed) leaves room for various conditions of an invitation, including in connection with its objectives and effects. 80In this respect, an intervention undertaken with a state's consent is valid only if certain legal conditions are met. 81The observance of a people's right to self-determination during a foreign intervention has been the most frequently discussed issue in this area throughout recent decades. 82However, beyond self-determination, other fundamental principles of international law, including human rights, must likewise be observed.
In line with this reasoning, some authors have formulated a so-called purpose-based approach. 83Under this approach, an intervention by invitation is only lawful if it pursues certain purposes that are compatible with the fundamental principles of international law. 84The fight against terrorism, the rescue of nationals, and the fight against transnational criminal groups are qualified as a permitted purpose. 85In turn, proponents of this approach consider an intervention illegal if it solely aims at undermining a fundamental principle of international law. 86his approach, however, has received criticism due to its limited support in state practice. 87Furthermore, the notion of 'purpose' remains indefinite, 79 Nicaragua (merits) (n 6) para 246. 80 as the authors of the purpose-based approach themselves do not provide a concrete definition. 88Therefore, the dividing line between a permissible and impermissible purpose is difficult to draw, as the assessment of an intervening state's 'real' purpose and intention proves difficult in practice. 89aking the intervention in Kazakhstan as an example, the official purposes of fighting terrorism and aggression would constitute legitimate purposes.However, if one examines these purposes for their plausibility, the purposes appear questionable: According to President Putin's statements, preventing a colour revolution was at least one of the central purposes of the intervention. 90Thus, identifying the purpose by means of the stated intention risks turning the purpose-based approach into a 'self-defeating theory'. 91herefore, it seems preferable to observe the effects of an intervention rather than its motives.The effects of an intervention must not conflict with fundamental principles of international law, such as human rights and the right to self-determination. 92In the words of Olivier Corten, 'what matters most is determining whether or not this right has been respected considering the effects of the intervention, whatever the intentions of the intervening state may have been'. 93If an intervention by invitation violates fundamental principles of international law, it will therefore be illegal under the jus ad bellum.
In light of the foresaid, it is questionable whether the intervention by invitation in Kazakhstan can still be considered lawful.Quashing a nationwide nonviolent protest movement through foreign military forces has severe adverse effects on the human rights of the protesters and their self-determination ambitions.Therefore, the next section details the effects of a foreign intervention on these fundamental principles of international law and details why they bar invitations to quash nonviolent protests abroad.
Subsequently, three conditions for an intervention by invitation to be legal are assessed.First, a government must have the authority to invite foreign military assistance.This authority is put into question when an authoritarian government is confronted with a nonviolent protest movement (Section 3.2).Second, an intervening state must not violate a population's right to selfdetermination.Yet, under certain circumstances, a nonviolent protest movement embodies a popular struggle for self-determination.Its quashing through foreign military troops would therefore violate the right to selfdetermination (Section 3.3).Third, an intervention must not violate human rights.As protest movements acquire manifold protections under international human rights law, an intervention that undermines the exercise of human rights stands in contrast to fundamental principles of international law (Section 3.4).

Protests in Kazakhstan as a nonviolent protest movement
The protests in Kazakhstan qualify as a nonviolent protest.A nonviolent protest movement is an association of a large number of people that seek profound changes in their system of government through extra-institutional avenues by repeatedly exercising different forms of nonviolent action. 94A protest movement is nonviolent when it refrains from using physical force against people or objects in the vast majority of incidents. 95The Kazakh protesters pursued the extra-institutional resignation of key government figures and a profound reform of political institutions in a countrywide manner, with over 80 protest events in a few days. 96The vast majority (95%) of these protests remained peaceful, despite repeated violence from government forces. 97Moreover, organisations calling for protests urged protesters to remain nonviolent, which protesters repeated through verbal slogans and signs brought to assemblies. 98Their protests were therefore nonviolent and due to their widespread character formed a nonviolent protest movement.This qualification is of relevance when arguing, in the next sections, about the (il)legality of the intervention.As Section 3.4 will highlight, nonviolent protest movements exercise a wide array of human rights and are protected by several human rights provision.In turn, violent actors are not protected by the same human rights provisionsmost importantly, they do not retain the protection under freedom of assembly (Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).Therefore, the 94 Kriener (n 5) 886-7. 95Florian Kriener, State Support to Nonviolent Protest Movements in International Law (Nomos, forthcoming 2024). 96Satre and Satke (n 54). 97Special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and others (n 33) 7. 98 Kudaibergenova, 'Art and Protest' (n 3).
argument made subsequently only applies to struggles led by nonviolent movements. 99

Authority to invite
The first requirement for the legality of an intervention by invitation is that the invitation must emanate from the highest available governmental body in a state, is given free of error, fraud or coercion, and is clear and certain in content. 100Moreover, the body issuing an invitation must have the authority to grant an invitation.This will generally be the case if the invitation originates from the government of a state. 101Therefore, international law has, broadly speaking, developed two approaches to determine the government of a state, which can accordingly issue invitations. 102On the one hand, the effective government that controls the territory of a state and its security forces can be considered the pertinent body.As the arbitrator in the Tinoco Arbitration (1923) argued, a sovereign government could establish itself through the control of a territory despite its anti-constitutional origins and lack of international recognition. 103Even though this ruling dates back approximately 100 years, in current literature the arbitrational ruling is still cited by some scholars as a reference for the limited relevance of the recognition of governments by other states. 104In line with this, some contemporary scholars continue to apply the effectiveness criteria when assessing which institution represents a state. 105On the other hand, the legitimate governing body can be considered as the government that represents a state, even if it is not effectively in control of the territory of a state. 106A government is legitimate if it represents the people of a state and governs with their consent, and not alone by brute force. 107Recent state and UN Security 99 Accordingly, military operations by invitation of another state with the purpose of fighting an armed insurgency cannot serve as precedent for the question analysed in this article.The legal framework regulating those operations is different from the framework for quashing nonviolent protests abroad, and, thus, the situations are not comparable. 100 Council practice has been strongly inclined towards this approach. 108In particular, invitations relying on an invitation by a legitimate but not effective government were widely accepted by the international community during the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervention in the Gambia in 2017, 109 the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) intervention in Yemen from 2015, 110 and the ECOWAS intervention in Cote d'Ivoire in 2011. 111Moreover, the ICJ did not question the effectiveness of the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Armed Activities case, despite serious doubts as to its effectiveness in several parts of the country during the civil war. 112Rather, the ICJ continuously assumed that the central government in Kinshasa had the sole authority to issue invitations to intervene.Although the ICJ did not elaborate on the government's effectiveness or legitimacy, the Court's treatment shows that the effectiveness of a government throughout its territory is not the stand-alone criterion for issuing a valid invitation.Accordingly, a government's legitimacy is central to the question whether it can issue an invitation.
The legitimacy of a government is dependent on its origin and the exercise of its governmental power. 113First and foremost, governmental legitimacy is a question of internal (constitutional) law.Most states have constitutions that detail the conditions for governmental ascension and succession. 114onstitutions set out the process through which a state organ acquires the consent of the people, and define how this consent can be renewed (i.e. through elections). 115Accordingly, constitutional legality will entail international legitimacy. 116However, this conception reaches its limits when constitutional systems are barred from popular participation. 117As Tom Ginsburg has set out, constitutional systems have been exploited by authoritarian governments to create the image of popular legitimacy. 118In these contexts, popular participation mechanisms are frequently inaccessible to public participation and ineffective in legitimising the exercise of power.Elections are frequently rigged, the political opposition is persecuted or marginalised, and civil and political rights severely undermined. 119If this is the case, the constitutional system of a state does not guarantee the consent of the governed.Accordingly, the origin of its governmental power is tarnished.In addition, specific exercises of governmental power can tarnish a government's legitimacy, which includes severe human rights violations and jus cogens breaches. 120Furthermore, the deliberate exclusion of its population from the political decision-making is an illegitimate exercise of governmental power.Therefore, the international legitimacy of governments that base their legitimacy on exclusionary constitutional systems, bar popular participation from public affairs, and commit grave human rights violations, is severely diminished.
Under these circumstances, protests can amount to the only form through which the population of a state can participate in public affairs. 121By exercising their 'back-end people power', 122 they demonstrate that they do not consider themselves represented by the government and reject its authority.Nonviolent protests thus constitute a further challenge to the international legitimacy of a government. 123A government cannot claim to represent the people of a state if its constitutional system does not allow for effective public participation and the people are massively requesting its removal through protests.This will be the case when protests are sufficiently inclusive, persistent, responsive and comprehensive. 124They must unite a state's principal political and ethnic groups and engage collectively in nonviolent action methods directed against a government's authority.This struggle must expand over an extended timeframe, in order to ensure sufficient perseverance and not just an immediate reaction against a particular issue.Furthermore, the protest movement must react and accord to demands and wishes from the public opinion, which ensures its responsiveness towards the population's wishes.The individual criteria are detailed thoroughly elsewhere. 125Some state practice confirming this assumption has already emerged in the context of protests in Venezuela and Sudan in 2019 and Belarus in 2020. 126However, state practice remains underdeveloped on this issue to date.Nonetheless, protest movements must be considered when assessing the legitimacy of a government; it is the consequence of the assumption that only governments that rule with the consent of their population are legitimate.Thus, when a protest movement arises against an illegitimate government, the government's authority to invite foreign forces for their quashing is precluded.
This applies to the invitation issued by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.Tokayev was the president of Kazakhstan (the highest body of government) and was not under coercion or threat when issuing the clear and concise invitation towards the CSTO to intervene.However, Tokayev had ascended to power after the resignation of Nazarbayev amidst popular protests.His subsequent election was marred with election fraud 127 and, in the words of the Election Observation Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 'tarnished by clear violations of fundamental freedoms'. 128Kazakhstan ranks 129th on the 2021 Economist Intelligence Unit's democracy ranking and is considered an 'authoritarian regime'. 129Accordingly, popular participation mechanisms and election integrity are minimal.Moreover, international observers have accused the Tokayev regime of committing serious violations of international human rights law and prosecuting the internal opposition consistently, 130 which likewise tarnishes the government's legitimacy.Furthermore, the government faced widespread nonviolent protests demanding fundamental changes in the system of governance and the government's and president's resignation. 131 government as a last resort due to non-existent participation mechanisms.The Tokayev government's legitimacy was accordingly severely tarnished before the protests, and then actively withdrawn by the country-wide protesters that demanded fundamental changes and a resignation of the government.Therefore, it is submitted here that President Tokayev did not have the necessary authority to extend a valid invitation to the CSTO states.

Self-determination
Second, quashing a nonviolent protest movement in a foreign state conflicts with the right to self-determination.
As outlined previously, the ICJ's ruling in the Nicaragua judgment implies that other conditions, besides a government's authority, must be met for intervention by invitation to be legal.In this regard, respect for the right to self-determination is often mentioned. 132espite its deep historical roots, the principle only emerged as a rule of customary international law during the decolonisation period. 133In modern international law, the principle of self-determination is firmly rooted in customary international law and set out in Common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).It enables peoples to freely determine their political, economic, cultural and social order 'without external interference'. 134According to the UNGA's 1974 Definition of Aggression, 135 the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 136 the principle of self-determination also guarantees self-determination struggles.These resolutions and treaties argue that international law recognises a right to self-government and freedom from colonial oppression. 137o enforce and assure this right, forcible oppression of a people's self-determination is prohibited and the people are accorded a right to take action against such forcible oppression.In this regard, the Friendly Relations Declaration states: Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence.In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. 138e Friendly Relations Declaration further underlines that no state 'shall … interfere in civil strife in another State'. 139This wording confirms that the principle of non-intervention, which significantly relies on the principle of self-determination, 140 may prohibit foreign military support in favour of the governmental authorities in some circumstances. 141In this sense, a state must not be reduced to its government, but rather taken as the sum of its constituent parts, which, importantly, includes its population. 142herefore, people's self-determination struggles must be taken into account when assessing the legality of an intervention by invitation.
Drawing thereon, the Institute de Droit International (IDI) in 1975 posited a prohibition of military assistance to 'parties to a civil war which is being fought in the territory of another State', 143 and argued that, in any case, when it appears that intervention has taken place during a civil war in violation of the preceding provision, 'third states may give assistance to the other party only in compliance with the Charter and any other relevant rule of international law'. 144Thus, respect for the rules of international law must be given.These rules includeeven though not yet explicitly mentioned in the 1975 resolutionthe right to self-determination.This socalled doctrine of 'negative equality' or 'strict abstentionism' 145 has since gained the support of a multitude of authors. 146n 2011, the IDI expanded the scope of the doctrine and explicitly referred to the right of self-determination.Considering that not all self-determination struggles reach the threshold of a civil war, and given the pervasive application of the principle of self-determination, 147 the resolution stipulates that interventions by invitation are likewise outlawed below the threshold of a civil war if they violate a people's right to self-determination. 148The IDI resolution lists 'internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature' 149 as examples where the doctrine can apply and reiterates that military assistance is prohibited 'in particular when its object is to support an established government against its own population'. 150This reasoning is in line with the premise espoused in the Friendly Relations Declaration.If international law permits struggles for self-determination, foreign interference with such struggles is impermissible even if the struggle does not reach the threshold of a civil waror remains nonviolent in the first place.
These arguments were developed against the backdrop of a colonial right to self-determination.However, the scope of the principle of self-determination has expanded throughout recent decades to include an internal dimension. 151Accordingly, the right to self-determination does not only guarantee the pouvoir constituant of a people to self-governance but continues to guarantee self-determination within independent states.Thus, the right to self-determination guarantees the continued right of a population to choose its own political organisation.That choice can only be made in systems that allow for popular participation in political decisionmaking. 152Therefore, the internal right to self-determination guarantees the removal of an oppressive government within a state that severely undermines the people's will. 153If an oppressive government violently suppresses all forms of public participation and thereby withdraws the choice of political order from its population, the population may engage in nonviolent struggle for their internal (political) self-determination.Following this argument, more recent peaceful protest movements have been qualified as struggles for self-determination by some authors. 154This includes the protests during the so-called Arab Spring. 155herefore, the principle of self-determination allows people to take up a nonviolent struggle against oppressive governments that bar all forms of political participation and accordingly inhibit the free of political order.Correspondingly, states may not support such a government in quashing these struggles.
This reasoning is particularly striking in the case of the protest movement in Kazakhstan.The protests pursued a profound change in the political system and the removal of a repressive government.They occurred nationwide and included a large number of participants that repeatedly protested until their movement was violently repressed.The intervention, however, ended the protests violently and quashed the Kazakh peoples' intentions to free themselves from an oppressive government.The intervention therefore interfered with the self-determination struggle of the Kazakh people and thus violated the principle of self-determination.

Human rights
Thirdly, quashing nonviolent protest movements abroad by military means undermines international human rights law (IHRL), as IHRL entails several guarantees to protest (Section 3.4(a)) and generally prohibits their suppression through domestic or foreign military forces (Section 3.4(b)).

3.4(a) Protest in international human rights law
The protection of human rights during peaceful protests is currently at the forefront of several human rights institutions' agendas.The Human Rights Council's Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly and Freedom of Association centred his 2022 thematic report on the issue. 156Likewise, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) issued its first General Comment on Freedom of Assembly in 2020. 157This surge in activity on the matter is a response to the increasing occurrence and importance of protests.The 2010s have been deemed the decade of protests, with 2019 being the year of most protests recorded worldwide. 158In recent years, significant anti-government protests have erupted frequently, numbering over 400 since 2017. 159rotests have particularly affected authoritarian states, with half of all authoritarian governments confronted with protests since 2015.Therefore, the question frequently arose whether protests receive protection through human rights treaties and what extent they can be restricted.This question is likewise of relevance to the protests in Kazakhstan, as Kazakhstan has been a member state of the ICCPR since 2006. 161he term 'protest' is not mentioned in any of the regional or universal human rights treaties.However, important elements of protest are guaranteed in international human rights treaties.Most importantly, freedom of expression (Article 19 ICCPR) and peaceful assembly (Article 21 ICCPR) guarantee the public and collective communication of dissent. 162Moreover, freedom of association (Article 22 ICCPR) ensures that people can gather to pursue long-term political goals, including repeated peaceful assemblies. 163urthermore, assemblies and expressions of dissent are important elements of the right to participate in public affairs enshrined in Article 25 ICCPR. 164ltimately, individual methods of protest besides peaceful assemblies are guaranteed.The freedom of association entails a right to strike (Article 8 (1)(d) ICESCR) and freedom of expression protects single-person protests.The most important aspects of protests are accordingly under protection by IHRL.
Nonetheless, governments frequently suppress protests, particularly if they transform from single and dispersed assemblies to fully-fledged protest movements that seek profound political changes. 165As justification for their suppression, governments will frequently raise three arguments.
First, governments frequently argue that the protests are subversive. 166owever, such suppression contradicts IHRL, as protesters are allowed to demand a democratic change in government under Article 19 ICCPR, even if this entails advocacy against an undemocratic government.The HRC rejected Cameroon's argument that it could censor such 'subversive' calls for a change in government and democratisation in order to ensure national unity. 167It argued that the ICCPR is based on a democratic system wherefore advocacy in favour of democracy is generally allowed.Drawing on this case, the HRC's General Comment states: Paragraph 3 [of Article 19 ICCPR] may never be invoked as a justification for the muzzling of any advocacy of multi-party democracy, democratic tenets and human rights. 168lls for a democratic change in government are likewise not considered an abuse of rights in terms of Article 5 ICCPR.Article 5 ICCPR has only been applied very narrowly to fascist or totalitarian parties. 169Advocacy for democracy is thus protected by the freedom of expression under Article 19 ICCPR, even if this implies a change in government.The reasoning that protests are 'subversive' accordingly does not justify their quashing.
Second, governments will frequently argue that the protests are violent or likely to turn violent. 170This justification for quashing the protests likewise contradicts IHRL, in particular Article 21 ICCPR.Protesters may assemble peacefully pursuant to Article 21 ICCPR.The HRC's General Comment 37 stipulates that assemblies are peaceful if they refrain from employing physical force that damages or is likely to damage other people or property. 171ccordingly, simple shoving or temporary street blockades are considered peaceful. 172Moreover, isolated incidents of violence do not affect the peacefulness of the assembly as a whole. 173Therefore, governments must generally assume assemblies to be peaceful even if sporadic incidents of physical force occur. 174Accordingly, the speculation that the protests are likely to turn violent cannot serve as a justification for their suppression if there is no concrete evidence to support this forecast.Comprehensive bans on protests under the mere pretext of the likelihood of violence, as set in place by the Kazakh government after 3 January 2022, are in clear violation of Article 21 ICCPR.
Third, governments will frequently rely on Article 4 ICCPR by declaring a state of emergency, as was the case in Kazakhstan. 175However, the presence of nonviolent protest movements does not provoke a 'public emergency' in terms of Article 4 ICCPR that permits a derogation.Moreover, even if a 'public emergency' is accepted in these circumstances, states are still bound to a minimum human rights standard, which the quashing of protests through military means.Pursuant to Article 4 ICCPR, states are allowed to derogate from some of the human rights protected by the Covenant, including the right to peaceful assembly enshrined in Article 21 ICCPR.However, derogations to this right are subject to strict limitations even in the event of mass demonstrations that include acts of violence. 176Restrictions need to be necessary, proportionate, non-discriminatory, limited in duration and comprise key safeguards against excesses. 177Using excessive, systematic, and indiscriminate violence, as used in Kazakhstan by the security forces, 178 exceeds these limits of a lawful derogation pursuant to Article 4 ICCPR.Furthermore, a state must not rely on a derogation from the right of peaceful assembly if it can attain its objectives by imposing lesser restrictions in line with the provisions of Article 21 ICCPR. 179Moreover, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly and Association's 2022 report highlights that even during a state of emergency, other rights and principles relevant to peaceful protests, such as the right to life, are non-derogable in all circumstances. 180A shoot-to-kill order, as issued by President Tokayev, thus exceeds the limits of a lawful derogation all the more.To conclude, quashing nonviolent protest movements by using excessive force cannot be considered a lawful derogation in terms of Article 4 ICCPR.
As outlined previously, the three frequently used justifications for the comprehensive prohibition and suppression of peaceful mass protests are not valid under international law.Thus, the prohibition and suppression of the protests under these pretexts violates the human rights of protesters in general, as was the case for the human rights of protesters in Kazakhstan.

3.4(b) Military suppression of protests
Additionally, Article 21 ICCPR will in principle be violated if protests are suppressed by military forces.Pursuant to Article 21 ICCPR, restrictions upon the freedom of assembly must be necessary, which requires all measures directed against protests to be proportionate. 181The employment 176 UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/37 (n 157) para 96. 177Special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and others (n 33) 8. 178 Ibid, 7. 179 UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/37 (n 157) para 96; Special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and others (n 33) 8. 180 UN Doc A/HRC/50/42 (n 156) para 8; Special rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and others (n 33) 8. 181 Ibid, para 40.
of military forces to suppress protests will in the majority of cases not meet these requirements.
Military forces equipped and trained to combat military threats. 182heir responses are accordingly more severe than regular police forces, and military forces are more prone to use armed force. 183Therefore, the HRC's General Comment 37 asserts that military forces should not be used to police assemblies. 184Furthermore, lethal force against individuals may only be deployed in exceptional circumstances when there is an imminent threat of death or serious injury. 185Unarmed protesters, however, do not pose such a threat in a way that 'excessive, systematic and indiscriminate violence', as used in Kazakhstan by the security forces, 186 would be necessary or permissible.The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Association and Assembly therefore asserts that the use of the military in these circumstances will almost always be disproportionate. 187This is certainly the case if a shoot-to-kill order is given, as was the case in Kazakhstan.The use of force in Kazakhstan to disperse the nonviolent protests therefore exceeds the permissible legal framework of Article 21 ICCPR.
This reasoning applies even more strongly when foreign forces are sent to a different state to quash nonviolent protests.This was highlighted explicitly by the Special Rapporteur in his 2022 thematic report: The deployment of foreign military forces to police protests is of even greater concern, such as in Kazakhstan where troops from the Collective Security Treaty Organization were brought in to suppress large-scale protests.Deployment of external forces increases the potential of violations and impunity.In all circumstances, the deployment of military or militarized forces to police protests tends to undermine efforts to build community trust and create the potential for the escalation of violence. 188us, the suppression of peaceful mass protests by military force willin principlenot be necessary within the meaning of Article 21 ICCPR, and thus cannot justify an infringement of the freedom to assemble peacefully.
In summary, the suppression of protests through the military will generally constitute a violation of international human rights law.When military forces intervene in a different state to quash protests, the effects of the intervention are incompatible with IHRL.

Quashing foreign protests in international law
The previous sections have outlined the international legal framework which suggests that fundamental principles of international law are violated by an intervention to quash a nonviolent protest movement.First, states faced with mass protests lack the authority to issue valid invitations.As the citizens withdraw their consent to the government, its legitimacy likewise diminishes.Invitations issued under these circumstances therefore do not justify an intervention.Second, states interfere with a people's right to self-determination if they undermine peaceful self-determination struggles that take the form of protests.Third, military interventions to suppress peaceful protests undermine international human rights law.The effects of an intervention by invitation on these fundamental principles of international law were exemplified against the backdrop of the CSTO intervention in Kazakhstan.Therefore, it is submitted here that the intervention was illegal despite the invitation issued by President Tokayev.This is particularly important against the backdrop of current international developments.Nonviolent protest movements are indispensable for strengthening human rights and democracy throughout the world.In recent decades, they have been a key driver of democratisation189 and securing human rights. 190Moreover, they have been instrumental in advancing other social issues and the rights of marginalised communities. 191Effective protection of protest movements is essential.
Therefore, it is particularly concerning to see authoritarian states intervening to crush nonviolent protest movements in recent years.Autocratic regimes have learned lessons from each other on how to effectively quash dissent.Moreover, they have aided each other in suppressing protests, 192 with Kazakhstan being only one of the latest examples.Russia sent military forces to Venezuela at the height of protests in 2019. 193Moreover, Russia concluded a security agreement with Nicaragua in 2022 allowing for the dispatch of armed forces in the case of protests. 194China concluded a security treaty with the Solomon Islands in 2022, which likewise allows for the dispatch of troops when protests arise. 195Saudi Arabia already displayed the efficacy of such dispatches when it quashed protests in Bahrain in 2011. 196tate practice is still limited in this regard, and the to these interventions from the international community has not, to date, shown whether such interventions are generally accepted as legal or rejected as illegal.In response to the mentioned interventions, states remained silent and have not expressed opinions concerning their legalitysimilarly as in response to the intervention in Kazakhstan.The practice and opinio juris of states is currently developing in this field.
However, if the practice of intervening abroad to quash violent protests entrenches itself and starts to be recognised as lawful by the international community, the effectiveness and important role of protest could suffer significant losses.The positive effects associated with successful protest movements would decline further.Therefore, it remains essential to highlight the legal framework that suggests that such interventions violate the basic principles of international law.Interventions to suppress nonviolent protest movements therefore must not be accepted without comment by other states. 197 Chairman of the Collective Security Council of the CSTO Mr. Pashinyan (n 48); UN Doc S/PV.8967 (n 49), p. 5 (Secretary General of the CSTO Mr Zas), p. 20 (Representative of Armenia), p. 6 (Representative of Russia); Statement by Putin, President of Russia cited in Hopkins (n 49). 74The Chairman of the CSTO referenced the address by the President of Kazakhstan and referred to a threat to the national security and sovereignty of the Republic of Kazakhstan when arguing why the CSTO decided to send its forces to Kazakhstan in accordance with Article 4 Collective Security Treaty (Chairman of the Collective Security Council of the CSTO Mr. Pashinyan (n 48)).75There is an ongoing debate whether an invitation qualifies as a legal justification or whether an invitation excludes a use of force from the scope of Article 2 para 4 of the UN Charter: see Federica Paddeu, 'Military Assistance on Request and General Reasons against Force: Consent as a Defence to the Prohibition of Force' (2020) 7 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 227-69; Patrick M Butchard, 'Territorial Integrity, Political Independence, and Consent: The Limitations of Military Assistance on Request under the Prohibition of Force' (2020) 7 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 35-73; International Law Association, Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force (2018) 18. 76 Olivier Corten, 'Intervention by Invitation: The Expanding Role of the UN Security Council' in Christian Marxsen and Anne Peters (eds), Armed Intervention and Consent (Cambridge University Press, 2023) 109. 77Emtseva (n 2). 78Corten (n 76) 110.
86See n 83.87A close reading of state practice in this regard suggests that there are certain additional criteria for the legality of intervention by invitation.It does not, however, limit or even link these criteria to the purpose of the action: see Veronika Bilkova, 'Reflections on the Purpose-Based Approach' (2019) 79 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 681, 682.For an overview of the state practice in regard to the purpose-based approach, see also Gregory H Fox, 'Invitations to Intervene after the Cold War' in Christian Marxsen and Anne Peters (eds), Armed Intervention and Consent (Cambridge University Press, 2023) 256. 88Bilkova (n 87) 682. 89Christian Marxsen, 'Conclusion: Half-Hearted Multilateralisation of a Unilateral Doctrine' in Christian Marxsen and Anne Peters (eds), Armed Intervention and Consent (Cambridge University Press, 2023) 322; Bilkova (n 87) 682.
160 156 UN Human Rights Council, 'Protection of Human Rights in the Context of Peaceful Protests during Crisis Situations -Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, Clément Nyaletsossi Voule' (16 May 2022) UN Doc A/HRC/50/42. 157UN Human Rights Committee, 'General Comment 37' (17 September 2020) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/37.Furthermore, the issue also concerns the European Court of Human Rights, which recently published the first guide on its case law concerning the protection of human rights during 'mass protests': see ECtHR, Guide on the Case-Law of the European Convention on Human Rights -Mass Protests (2020). 158Erica Chenoweth, 'The Future of Nonviolent Resistance' (2020) 31(3) Journal of Democracy 31/3, 2020, 69. 159Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 'Global Protest Tracker' (7 September 2023) https:// carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/protest-tracker. 160Carothers and Press (n 8) 20.