On the Receiving End of Diaspora Engagement Policies: Evidence from the Turkish Diaspora in Sweden

Abstract: While many states directly engage their non-resident populations to rally support for domestic political agendas, extract remittances, or to further foreign policy objectives, few countries have been more active in this space than Turkey under the Justice and Development Party (AKP). By the early 2020s, researchers and scholars had obtained a fairly good understanding of the ways in which the Turkish government seeks to (selectively) engage or cooperate with, but also to suppress some members of what it perceives as its diaspora. These efforts are specified in official diaspora engagement policies and implemented through, for instance, governmental institutions like the ‘Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities’ (YTB), or cultural institutions like the ‘Yunus Emre Institutes.’ However, even though scholars have learned a fair bit about the supply side of Turkish diaspora engagement, we know comparatively little about the demand side of and for such efforts. To begin filling this gap, this article switches perspectives from the supplier to the consumer/recipient and seeks to understand better the ways in which diasporans perceive, relate to, and engage with such efforts. By building on primary and secondary sources as well as semi-structured interviews with members of the Turkish diaspora in Sweden, this article seeks to contribute to an understanding of the varied ways in which diasporans relate and react to different forms of state-led diaspora engagement.

the globalization-induced compression of time and space and related innovations such as near instantaneous communication or comparatively affordable air travel, migrants and their descendants often continue to maintain dense transnational linkages to their countries of origin even after settling in their current countries of residence. 3 Simultaneously, there has been a surge of interest from the migrants' countries of origin variously to engage or cooperate with, to extract resources from, or to control their now extra-territorial populations. 4 Regardless of the underlying motivations, 5 which often include (economic) remittances, 6 the furtherance of either domestic 7 or foreign 8 policy objectives, origin countries increasingly are paying attention to their populations that either have chosen or were forced to emigrate. Many migrant sending states have formulated explicit diaspora engagement policies, 9 created special governmental bodies and institutions to take care of 'their' diasporic populations, 10 or extended voting rights to their non-resident citizens. 11 In fact, at the time of writing, 135 UN member states have provisions in place to enfranchise their expatriate populations, although the degree to which these provisions are implemented varies from country to country. 12 Few countries have been as active in this space as Turkey since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002. 13 Engaging with and leveraging the support of the Turkish diaspora has been a clear policy priority for both the AKP and President Erdogan. 14 These efforts have included the establishment of governmental institutions, such as the 'Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities' (YTB), 15 and cultural institutions like the 'Yunus Emre Institutes,' 16 improved access to consular services, as well as various outreach activities to diaspora youth, such as language classes, or organized homeland visits.
Following the intensification and diversification of Turkish diaspora engagement policy and practice, a similar surge in scholarly interest to understand these efforts better has developed. It is important to note, however, that most of these efforts have focused primarily on what could be described as the supply side of diaspora engagement. Most studies have tried to understand better what the Turkish government and various government-linked organizations and institutions 'do' to engage actively with the diaspora in countries like France, Germany, 17 or the United States. 18 Thus, while we have a solid understanding of the supply side, we know markedly less about the demand side of the equation. 19 This means that we know comparatively little about the ways in which members of the Turkish diaspora relate to, use, support or oppose these efforts. To begin filling this gap, this article takes its point of departure with the question: How do members of the Turkish diaspora perceive, relate to, and engage with the various diaspora engagement policies and practices? To answer this question, the article focuses primarily on the Turkish diaspora in Swedennot only because it is the tenth largest migrant community in the country, but also because it is diverse in terms of its composition. 20 In pursuit of this purpose, the article builds on a variety of primary and secondary sources such as social media posts, news articles, and an additional 10 semi-structured interviews with members and leaders of the Turkish diaspora in Sweden.
The article illustrates that the demand for diaspora engagement is to a large extent contingent on individuals' positions and attitudes vis-a-vis the supplier. Those with positive attitudes are more likely to embrace various initiatives and engagement efforts, while diasporans who are critical of -or opposed to-the AKP and Erdogan might be more hesitant to do so. For this purpose, the article proceeds as follows: A first section outlines -in broad strokes-the state of the art in the debate on diaspora (engagement) policy. With this discussion as a backdrop, a second section turns to the case of Turkey and provides an overview of the supply side supply side of diaspora engagement. It presents the multifaceted ways in which the Turkish state under the AKP has come selectively to engage with what it considers 'its' diaspora. Switching perspectives, a third section zooms in on the Turkish diaspora in Sweden and illustrates the ways in which diasporans perceive, relate to, and engage with various Turkish diaspora engagement policies and practices. A concluding fourth section summarizes the main findings and identifies some key theoretical implications for further research in this area.

Diaspora Engagement in Policy and Practice
Considering that, as of 2019, more than 3.5 percent of the world's population resided either temporarily or permanently outside of their countries of origin, 21 it is not surprising that there seems to be a growing discrepancy between 'identities, borders and orders.' 22 These developments have facilitated and accelerated a 'diaspora turn in state policy,' 23 which has entailed the widespread formulation and adoption of diaspora (engagement) policies through which states seek to identify, organize, govern, mobilize, but also potentially to suppress their diasporas. 24 Considering that diasporas are far from homogenous entities, it is important to consider who the intended recipients of such policies are. Diasporas are, in fact, diverse groups that not only vary widely in terms of their socio-economic and demographic composition, but also in terms of the underlying motivations that triggered the initial decision to emigrate. 25 While some migrants may have left their countries of origin voluntarily to pursue, for instance, economic opportunities, others may have been forced to flee from armed conflict or political repression. This diversity produces, in extension, quite varied attitudes toward origin countriesranging from unwavering patriotism and support 26 to a deep-rooted aversion for the government in power. 27 Thus, depending on who these diasporans are, countries of origin may seek to include them as citizens or subjects in various ways, to ignore them for the most part, 28 or to exclude them as criminals or traitors. 29 Extending voting rights and thereby political representation to emigrants (and potentially their descendants) is but one example of the manifold ways through which countries of origin reach out and seek to include their extraterritorial populations. 30 Other inclusionary measures might entail the formation of dedicated governmental bodies, commonly called diaspora institutions, which Alan Gamlen defined as 'formal state offices dedicated to emigrants and their descendants.' 31 These institutions, include such local institutions as special Offices for Emigrant Affairs located at the state-level in Mexico, 32 or top-level ministries such as the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Emigration, which not only is tasked with facilitating emigration, but also with supporting those who have migrated. 33 Different schemes either to invest in or to encourage a return to the country of origin 34 are yet other examples of practices designed to engage and include diasporic populations. In this context, one also can consider different cultural activities like special diaspora conferences 35 or organized visits to the homeland, 36 which are -in no small part-designed to maintain or strengthen the ties between the country of origin and its emigrant populations.
Such policies, institutions, government bodies, and practices represent some of the ways in which home state governments seek to engage with or include select parts of their extraterritorial populations. At the same time, there are numerous ways through which some origin countries deliberately seek to exclude groups of emigrants. 37 37 Glasius, "Extraterritorial Authoritarian Practices"; and Tsourapas, "Global Autocracies." described as relatively benign neglect to outright assassinations. While widely publicized cases like the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018, or the poisoning of Russian double agent Sergej Skripal in Salisbury, UK with a deadly nerve agent might serve as two arguably extreme examples of such increasingly transnational repression, 38 there are countless other, less extreme examples, including surveillance, indirect or direct threats, harassment, or abuses of the Interpol system of 'red notices' 39 that are intended to suppress dissent and silence the critics of homeland regimes. 40 The Supply Side: Turkish Diaspora Engagement Policy and Practice Thus far, we have explored how migrant sending states seek to engage their diasporic populations both in policy and practice. It is against this backdrop that the present section turns toward the ways in which the Turkish state engages with what it considers to be its diaspora.
The Turkish diaspora in Western Europe is now considered to consist of 'more than five million Turkish citizensincluding second-generation Turks and those of Kurdish, Assyrian or Armenian origin.' 41 Here, in fact, it might be more apt to speak of several diasporas, not least due to the ethnic diversity of migrants and their descendants. 42 During the 1960s and 1970s, many migrants left Turkey as part of the so-called guest worker schemes, primarily finding employment in the manufacturing sectors of Western European countries. Then, throughout the 1980s, and to some extent during the 1990s, forced migration came to form the predominant type: leftists and Kurds were forced to seek refuge abroad in the aftermath of the coup d' etat of 1980 and an escalation of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. 43 Since the 1990s, Turkish emigration has included both 'high-skilled and student migration to Europe, the USA, Canada and Australia,' as Aksel 44 has noted. It was only after the attempted coup d' etat in 2016 that this pattern changed yet again. Since then, academics, journalists, real and perceived political opponents, and (supposed) supporters of the now outlawed G€ ulen movement have come to form the latest group of people leaving the country both voluntarily and involuntarily. 45 38 Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer (2021)  Even before the AKP rose to power in 2002, the Turkish state consistently had tried to engage 'its' emigrant populations. 46 However, previously emigrants primarily had been viewed as either a source of (economic) remittances, or, in the case of political dissidents living abroad, as a potential threat. 47 From 2002 and especially since 2010, 48 the perception of and engagement with the diaspora has undergone both a quantitative and qualitative transformation. When considering the intended targets of Turkish diaspora engagement and inclusion, the scope has broadened. While Turkish emigrants and their descendants still form an important -if not the most importanttarget group, 'related communities' in countries with ties to the former Ottoman empire have come to represent another focal point for some inclusionary practices and efforts. 49 This engagement, importantly, not only concerns institutional, legal, or political issues, but also more relational and ideological aspects. 50 While non-resident Turkish citizens gained the right to participate in elections in their home country by casting their vote in person at the border already in 1987, it was not until 2012 that relevant election laws were amended in such a way that truly allowed for effective voting from abroada change that first came into effect during the presidential elections held in 2014. 51 In step with such legal and administrative electoral reforms, there have been a number of other notable institutional and organizational changes in Turkish diaspora engagement policy and practice. For instance, there have been efforts to improve the accessibility and quality of consular services by increasing the number of embassies and consulates around the globe. 52 Even more importantly, the relatively new Presidency for the Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) since its inception in 2010 has come to play a key role in coordinating 'the state of affairs between the citizens living abroad and the ministries in Turkey, while at the same time cooperating with foreign missions regarding activities and programs organized outside Turkey.' 53 In addition to devising strategies for cooperation with non-resident citizens and the aforementioned related communities, it is also tasked with directly supporting diaspora organizations and offering a variety of educational programs for international students with a cultural connection to Turkey. 54 In addition to this line of diaspora engagement facilitated by the YTB, Turkey also continues its long-established practice of dispatching imams to countries with large diaspora populations 55 and has created several cultural institutions, such as the Yunus Emre Institutes, for the purpose of 'introducing Turkish language, art and culture to 46 Arkilic, "Empowering a Fragmented Diaspora"; Arkilic, "Explaining the Evolution." 47 Arkilic, "Empowering a Fragmented Diaspora." 48 Adamson, "Sending States and the Making." 49  foreign audiences, teaching Turkish language and providing insight about Turkish art and culture.' 56 While actively engaging with and seeking to include its diaspora, there is a parallel set of efforts and practices that are more in line with Glasius' 57 strategies for and practices of exclusionincluding systematic and transnational repression of real or perceived opponents. For example, following the attempted coup d' etat of 2016, the Turkish government initiated, according to Nathan Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, 58 a 'global purge that mirrored its domestic crackdown.' This global crackdown not only entailed the rendition of at least '58 individuals [ … ] from 17 countries,' 59 but Freedom House recorded a total of at least 110 physical acts of transnational repression. 60 There are, however, several other exclusionary practices at play, which according to the German domestic intelligence service (BfV), include the widespread surveillance of Turkish emigrant communities using a network of more than 800 intelligence officers and 6000 informants in Germany alone. 61

The Demand Side: Some Insights from Sweden's Turkish Diaspora
Having discussed some of the key characteristics of Turkish diaspora engagement policy and practice since the AKP's rise to power, this section switches perspectives and zooms in on the Turkish diaspora in Sweden. It focuses on the ways in which diasporans perceive, relate to, and engage with these efforts. While not the largest overall, the Turkish diaspora in Sweden is quite sizeable. Baser 62 described it as 'the tenth-largest migrant group in Sweden.' As of 2020, a total of 52,628 Turkish first-generation migrants lived in the country. In addition to these, an additional 30,414 individuals born in Sweden had two parents born in Turkey, while yet another 14,169 people were born in Sweden to at least one parent born in Turkey. 63 Similar to developments in other European countries, Turkish migration to Sweden increased 'during the early 1960s with laborers who were young men without families,' 64 and for much of the 1960s, labor migration remained the predominant form. With the 1970s, family reunification and asylum seeking became the primary motivations for Turkish emigrees. 65 In parallel with the shifting motivations, the sociodemographic and ethnic composition of migrants began to change as well. While early labor migrants predominantly had been Sunni Muslim Turks from such areas 56 Akilli, "Yunus Emre Institute as a Tool," p. 19. 57 Glasius, "Extraterritorial Authoritarian Practices." 58 Schenkkan and Linzer, "Out of Sight, Not out of Reach," p. 39. 59  as Konya, a somewhat larger share of subsequent arrivals were Armenians, Assyrians, or Kurds. 66 In light of these varied migration trajectories and histories, it comes as little surprise that Turkish emigrants and their descendants relate to their (parents') country of origin in quite different ways. Diasporans who migrated to Sweden in pursuit of, for example, economic or educational opportunities might have a very different outlook on Turkey, President Erdogan, the current AKP-led government, and its efforts to engage with the diaspora than those who left Turkey in the wake of coup d' etat in 1980, the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, or in the aftermath of the more recent failed coup attempt. 67 In fact, some diasporans might be quite skeptical of, if not outright hostile toward, the current government. Discussing homeland conflicts materializing in the Turkish diaspora in Sweden, Baser 68 noted, for instance, how some of the key political fault lines in Turkey have found localized expressions in and among Turkish diaspora communities in Swedenthe Turkish-Kurdish conflict being a particularly pertinent one.
These fault lines also come to light in the domain of external voting and corresponding election results. Here, we can see comparatively higher degrees of fragmentation than in other countries with sizable Turkish diasporas, such as Germany. During the Turkish parliamentary elections of 2018, the Swedish-Turkish voter turnout was a mere 28.12 percent compared to 46.03 percent for German-Turkish voters. Even when considering the actual distribution of votes between the ruling AKP and the HDP, one of the largest opposition parties that is typically regarded as a patron of the Kurdish cause, we can see comparatively lower levels of support for the AKP than in either Germany or Turkey (Table 1). 69 Despite these results and an apparent fragmentation within the diaspora, there is ample evidence suggesting that the Turkish state has become more active in its engagement with non-resident citizens and their descendants in Sweden. In their recent analysis of Turkish diaspora engagement, Mencutek and Baser 70 noted how, '[i]n Sweden, too, interviewees from Turkish associations confirmed that there is more interaction between migrants' associations and the embassies since the AKP came to power.' This includes, among other initiatives, inviting representatives of different associations to embassy-  Mencutek and Baser,"Mobilizing Diasporas," p. 95. organized social or cultural events. 71 It is clear that many diasporans welcome and embrace this new-found interest in them. 72 For instance, one interviewee who emphasized feelings of what could be described in terms of 'in-betweenness,' 73 of not being fully recognized as 'Swedish' when in Sweden and regarded as not sufficiently 'Turkish' when visiting relatives in Turkey, expressed appreciation for various youth outreach programs like summer camps or internship opportunities. Such programs, the interviewee argued, show that the state cares for and takes care of its non-resident citizens and their descendants, and deems their connection to Turkey as important. 74 Appealing to their sense of patriotism, there have been instances in which embassy staff succeeded in encouraging diasporans to mobilize and act on behalf of their homeland. Here, one might mention calls to oppose the construction of a monument in Botkyrka commemorating the 1915 genocide of Christian minorities in the Ottoman empire, 75 or the failed coup attempt of 2016, for which, according to President Erdogan, the G€ ulen movement bears the primary responsibility. 76 When discussing the coup attempt, which has resulted in a large-scale crackdown on supporters of the movement, 77 some interviewees strongly embraced the notion of Turkey's prosperity and security being threatened by the movement, 78 whilst others noted increasing levels of mistrust within the community, 79 examples of intra-diaspora surveillance 80 and even harassment. 81 Still, even interviewees 82 who tended to be rather critical of the current Turkish government stressed the importance of remaining connected to Turkey and embedded in Turkish culture. This included issues such as upholding traditions or ensuring that subsequent generations are proficient in the Turkish language. 83 However, rather than engaging with official Turkish diaspora outreach efforts, or the increasingly influential Union of International Democrats (UID) with its supposedly strong ties to the AKP, 84 these individuals placed a greater emphasis on the sense of community and belonging that various local diaspora organizations could provide. 85 In short, diasporans' views of and relation to different Turkish diaspora engagement efforts resonate quite well with some of Arkilic's 86 findings on Turkish communities in Germany, France and the Netherlands. She found that that some groupsin her case mostly Turkish Kurds and Alevis-felt neglected by or excluded from different state-led engagement efforts, which they variously described in quite nationalistic or neo-Ottoman 87 terms. At the same time, Arkilic 88 pointed out that diasporans' political views and their relation to the AKP and Erdogan played an important role in terms of determining the degree to which they are, or even want to be, included in such efforts.

Conclusion
By drawing on a combination of both primary and secondary sources and an additional ten semi-structured interviews, this article sheds some light on the ways in which some members of the Turkish diaspora in Sweden perceive, relate to, and engage with various diaspora engagement policies and practices. In this way, it provides an important addition to the burgeoning literature on diaspora (engagement) policies, which, so far, mostly focused on the supply rather than demand side of such efforts.
The data revealed that the demand for different forms of state-led diaspora engagement to a large part, can be understood as a function of diasporans' political preferences and opinions vis-a-vis the incumbent in the country of origin. Thus, those who hold a comparatively favorable view of the country of origin's politics and political system are more likely to make active use of different offerings such as events organized by the origin countries' diplomatic representation in the host country. Conversely, those who hold rather negative views, can be expected to make less frequent and much more selective use of different engagement efforts. These results resonate well with previous scholarship that has explored diaspora-homeland relations and found that homeland conflicts often are transported to 89 and prevalent in the diaspora. 90 While this study, focusing on the demand for diaspora engagement policy and practice, helps to deepen our understanding of diaspora-homeland relations, there are several fruitful avenues for further research in this space. Since we already know that the transnational ties of subsequent generations tend to be weaker than those of the first generation, 91 it would be interesting to pay closer attention to potential inter-generational differences in the demand for diaspora engagement. One might assume that at least some migrant descendants belonging to the second or third generation might be comparatively less interested in or receptive to some of the efforts discussed throughout this article. Then, being mindful of questions relating to sovereignty, it might be worthwhile to scrutinize the ways in which host countries relate or react to such forms of diaspora engagement. Here, the recent work of Bahar Baser and Elise F eron 92 might be a good starting point for further inquiries in this space. 86 Arkilic, "Empowering a Fragmented Diaspora." 87 Adamson, "Sending States and the Making." 88 Arkilic, "Empowering a Fragmented Diaspora." 89 Baser, Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts; and Baser, "Diasporas and Imported Conflicts." 90

Disclosure statement
The author received financial support for the research, writing and publication of this article from the Swedish Research Council, grant number: VR 2019-02124.