The Failure of the Social Contract in Iraq: Iraqi Perspectives

ABSTRACT This article focuses on the failure of the post-2003 social contract in Iraq. It relies on extensive primary data collected in all of Iraq's 19 provinces through Focus Groups and Online Surveys. It develops an analytical framework based on five core elements (corruption, services, security, economy, and governance), that can be applied to the assessment of the state of a social contract. The article argues that the steady decline of the social contract has fuelled Iraqis' resentment and discontent with the ruling elites and inspired their calls to move beyond sectarian divides towards addressing the most pressing issues facing Iraq.


Introduction
In October 2019 mass protests began in Iraq.Known as the Tishreen (October) Uprising, these protests were significant as protestors moved beyond individual issues and called for a complete change to the system of governance that had emerged following the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq.The protesters were essentially demanding a new social contract.Trust in the political system as a whole was so low that protest was seen as the only means of real political participation (O'Driscoll et al. 2022).The dire state of the political system was further evidenced when the peaceful protestors were met with violence from security forces and militias, which led to the death of hundreds and left thousands more injured.Additionally, thousands were arrested and there was an increase in restrictions on freedom of speech and expression (United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq 2020).The development of protest movements in Iraq since the territorial defeat of the Islamic State demonstrates the need for Iraq to realign the relationship between the state and societyand the obligations each have to one anotheras there has been a failure to develop a just and equitable social contract within the post-2003 political order.
The 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq was part of the heyday of the liberal peace agenda, and top-down interventions, centred on statebuilding and democratisation, were implemented with little consideration for the needs of the local population (Richmond 2006).It was based on an inherent belief that liberalisation and democratisation would result in an immediate positive transformation (Shlash and Tom 2011).The resulting intervention period prioritised elites and marginalised society.Thus, the state that was created, as this article demonstrates, lacks legitimacy from the population it exercises authority over (Lake 2016), partly due to statebuilding not involving bottom-up influence (Mako and Edgar 2021).Although the rhetoric around the invasion had a strong premise of restoring human dignity, the reality was far removed from this.In post-2003 Iraq there has been a failure of the rebuilding of the social contract, particularly in terms of meeting the needs of the population (O'Driscoll et al. 2022).
By providing a bottom-up perspective and applying the social contract as an analytical tool, this article offers a unique and original insight into the failures of post-2003 Iraq statebuilding, as well as the first in-depth academic analysis of the population's view of the social contract.It relies on extensive fieldwork and primary data to understand how Iraqi society, and the different segments within, perceive the performance and legitimacy of the social contract, showcasing their specific grievances and demands towards the Iraqi state.The article argues that the steady decline of the social contract in Iraq over the past decade has fuelled Iraqis' resentment and discontent with the ruling elites and inspired their calls to move beyond sectarian divisions and identity-based politics towards addressing the most pressing issues facing the country.
The article proceeds as follows: first, we present our methodological approach and offer an overview of fieldwork, data collection, and data analysis.Second, we provide our theoretical framework and a background on the development of the social contract and state societyrelations in Iraq.We then move on to the analysis of our findings, which show that decreasing trust in the Iraqi government combined with long-standing structural issues have resulted in the call for an urgent renegotiation of the social contract and the meaning of citizenship in Iraq.Finally, we offer a brief discussion and conclusion on the state of the Iraqi social contract.

Methodology
The data informing our findings have been collected through a mix-methods approach, relying on a combination of desk research and fieldwork.We began by conducting an in-depth literature review of the scholarship focusing on the social contract, state institutions, and popular grievances in the region, with a specific focus on Iraq.We then complemented this with primary data collection, which was conducted in three main ways: Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), social media surveys, and consultation meetingswhere members of Iraqi civil society were invited to discuss the research and its findings.These different methods allowed us to gain a first-hand understanding of how the different components of Iraqi society understand the notion of citizenship, their stances towards the social contract more broadly, and of how these are being impacted by long-standing grievances.All aspects of the research were designed so that the data could be disaggregated to understand how fields of difference (such as ethnosectarian identity, gender, age, location, economic position, and education level) influence participants' perceptions.This allowed the research to identify both commonalities and variations across the population regarding views on citizenship and the social contract.
An integral part of this project was holding FGDs in every governorate of the country (19 overall), 1 to investigate social groups' understanding of the social contract and the changes they would prioritise.In each governorate two FGDs were conducted, one with men and one with women, with a total of 38 FGDs.Based on our prior fieldwork experience, this gave women the space and liberty to participate in the discussions and express their views as a marginalised category.The number of participants for the FGDs was set at ten to allow sufficient time for participation and generate a rigorous debate.
The selection criteria for the participants ensured a granular representation of different segments of the population in each governorate and that both urban and rural voices were heard.Each FGD had a cross-section of age, educational-level, and economic position.In governorates with similar ethnosectarian makeup and profile, FGDs were held in both rural and urban settings.The ethnosectarian makeup of each FGD was decided based on the demographics of the governorate, with particular attention to representation from minorities.Questions for the FGDs were based on the findings from our initial desk research, which identified five main grievances (corruption, economy, governance, security, and service provision) that were discussed and confirmed in the first consultation meeting.The same seven questions were asked in each FGD, with follow-up questions posed depending on the discussion.FGDs were conducted between April and June 2021.The FGDs were recorded, transcribed, translated, and coded through the coding software MAXQDA, which allowed us to draw patterns and disaggregate the data by gender, governorates, regions, age, minorities, and so on.Codes and key areas to highlight during the coding process were developed as a team effort and updated throughout the process.Detailed notes on each FGD file were taken throughout the process, to keep track of common trends, highlights, and differences based on gender, ethnosectarian belonging, and location.Findings from the FGDs were then used to understand the grievances of the population and how these impact the social contract.All of which were then merged with the survey findings.
Social media surveys were used to build on the findings from the FGDs using a larger sample of the population.As they were conducted online, we decided to carry out three shorter surveys of (on average) eight multiple choice questions, to maintain participants' attention.The surveys were translated into Iraq's four main languages: Arabic, Assyrian, Kurdish, and Turkmen.Google Forms was used to build the surveys, and links to the surveys were shared across the Facebook pages of three Iraqi influencers and two media organisations chosen for the relevance of their audiences. 2The surveys were available over six weeks from the third week of June to the end of July 2021.Respondents' demographic characteristics were monitored throughout the process.Targeted boosting of Facebook posts was used to generate a higher number of responses and to balance the demographics to ensure representation across gender, locality, and age.The first survey (on governance) had 8,786 respondents (60.0%men and 40.0%women), the second survey (on bringing about change) had 6,100 respondents (63.4% men and 36.6% women), and the third survey (on basic services) had 8,467 respondents (87.1% men and 12.9% women). 3 We also held three online consultation meetings between March and September 2021 with members of civil society representing the different communities and groups that make up Iraqi society, to act as a sounding board for ideas and to provide feedback on the findings and conclusions of the research.They acted as an added check and ensured wider community involvement.Feedback from the consultation meetings contributed to the research and helped in the design of the questions for the FGDs.Each consultation meeting had between 15-20 participants, and these consisted of women's rights advocates, youth and civil society activists, local peacebuilders, journalists, and academics from across the country.

The social contract as an analytical tool
In this article we address the evolution of the social contract in Iraq and demonstrate its failure to meet the needs of the population in the post-2003 period.The social contract is increasingly used to describe a set of state-society relations, but it remains under-conceptualised when it comes to its potential as an analytical tool to conduct a systematic analysis of contemporary states.Here we build on the works of Loewe, Zintl, and Houdret (2021) and others to apply the social contract as a theoretical framework to understand the status of state-society relations in post-2003 Iraq.For this purpose, we understand the social contract as 'the entirety of explicit or implicit agreements between all relevant societal groups and the sovereign (the government, state, or any other actor in power) defining their rights and obligations towards each other' (Loewe, Zintl, and Houdret 2021, 3).In this context, 'state' is used to indicate a government, a regime, or political elitesincluding the branches of power, institutions, and norms that govern a given community.Similarly, 'society' encompasses various entities, such as the general population, organised societal interest groups, and civil society actors (Owen 2013).While these terms are somewhat vague, they still provide a useful tool to understand the foundations of the state's authority and legitimacy vis-à-vis the boundaries of the state's power and citizens' rights and expectations.A strong social contract is therefore key to outlining mutual rights and obligations, as well as defining the nature of political organisations and the meaning of political actions (Loewe, Trautner, and Zintl 2019;Meijer 2017).
The social contract is therefore a set of formal and informal rules and institutions that regulate state-society relations in a given country, and its application as an analytical tool is conducive to shedding light on changes in state-society relations, understanding governmental policies, and the responses of both societies at large and specific social groups.Loewe, Zintl, and Houdret (2021) conceptualise the use of the social contract as an analytical and theoretical tool by looking at three fundamental deliverables that a state should provide to society, these being 1) protectionwhich includes national and physical security; 2) provision of services, institutions, and opportunities; and 3) participation in public life, including political processes, rights, and freedoms.As El-Haddad (2020) argues, these can serve as indicators for the extent to which a social contract is perceived as being legitimate, how embedded it is, and how societal groups perceive its performance in social, economic, and public life.Within these works there is also an increased focus on dignity and on a dignified life as something that signatories to a social contract have a right to, as we will also discuss later in the article.
Building on this literature, we apply the social contract as an analytical tool to post-2003 Iraq, using it as a lens to understand the population's grievances and the failures of the post-2003 liberal statebuilding process.We focus on citizens' perspectives towards the social contract and on the five main grievancescorruption, services, security, economy, and governancethat emerged from our fieldwork, as looking at what the state expects from its citizens is beyond the scope of this article.Moreover, we develop Loewe, Zintl, and Houdret's framework further through specifically zooming in on these five grievances.This broadens the scope of their analysis while offering more specific focus areas that can be applied to the assessment of where a social contract is lacking (or not) in a given country.In turn, making it more useful for the study of postconflict societies, as well as more easily transferable as a lens of analysis.Nevertheless, there is a strong connection between these five grievances and the three elementsprotection, provision, and participationidentified in Loewe, Zintl, and Houdret's framework.Using the social contract as an analytical lens allows us to capture useful insights into state-society dynamics, to better understand how citizens envision their relationship with the state and how the latter responds to their demands.

The post-2003 social contract in Iraq
Although the invasion and occupation of Iraq and the resulting 'statebuilding' shaped the social contract of today, it also must be situated within other historical developments.In several Middle East and North African (MENA) countries, including Iraq, the social contract defining state-society relations is embedded in the colonial statebuilding project, which shaped processes of state formation and the construction of national collective identities and notions of citizenship (Massad 2001;Salame 2013).The establishment of states was hence negotiated alongside pre-existing social structures characterised by tribal and ethnosectarian affiliations, which often resulted in the institution of social contracts based on a network of patronage and kin relations (Khoury and Kostiner 1991).Consequently, throughout the MENA region, social contracts came to be characterised by the state's redistributive role, mostly embedded in welfare systems and guarantees of employment in the public sector (World Bank 2004).As a result, these processes emphasised the state's social and economic obligations while downplaying citizens' political rights and representationessentially establishing social contracts based on the tacit exchange of welfare for loyalty (Beblawi and Luciani 2016).These conditions allowed ruling elites to maintain power by bypassing formal institutions and the leverage of informal political and economic networks to build alliances, manage opposition, and ensure continuous support, and are therefore partially responsible for the persistence of authoritarianism across the region (Heydemann 2007).
Iraq's fragile social contract can therefore be attributed, in part, to these pre-existing colonial dynamics.Dating back to its formation in the 1920s, from the very beginning the Iraqi state has developed independently from Iraqi society, leaving a large gap between the two and leading to the conception of the state as a prize to be won, further entrenching ethnosectarian competition between groups to whom the state represented a tool through which to seise resources (Bouillon 2012).The state, therefore, rests on fragmented authorityhistorically shared with self-governing clans and tribes meaning that ethnosectarian divisions largely dominated all aspects of domestic politics and resulted in the lack of an overarching sense of citizenship and national identity.This is also evidenced by the Iraqi state's repeated failures to uphold basic components of the social contract to large parts of the population (Furness and Trautner 2020), with protracted insecurity and political instability manifesting through repression of opposing communities, and recurrent abuse and violence against civilians (Wille 2019).
Before 2003, the Iraqi social contract was also shaped by the Ba'ath regime's exclusionary rentier state model, which exchanged welfare and socioeconomic services for loyalty and political compliance while also relying on tribal relations to construct Iraqi identity and citizenship (Tripp 2000).The 2003 US-led invasion that led to the removal of Saddam Hussein marked a watershed moment for the social contract, with Iraq going from a rentier state to an extremely fragile statefaced with the challenge of statebuilding within a fragile and deeply fragmented society (Schwarz 2008).The 2003 invasion was firmly situated in the liberal peace agenda and as a result, there was a strong focus on elites with the needs of the population widely ignored.This exogenous support empowered elites to cement their power at the cost of the social contract (Richmond 2009).The centralised state was replaced with ethnosectarian power-sharingknown as muhasasa ta'ifiathat underscored the fault lines of Iraqi identity (Dodge 2018).This means that government formation is contingent on grand elite bargains and compromises, at the expense of the population's broader interests that become secondary to individual and political interestswhich has formed the basis of the contested social contract today (Mansour 2019).
In a context dominated by the rivalry between dominant ethnosectarian groups, minority groups often lack meaningful political representation and the political system is characterised by widespread corruption, regional interference, and the ever-growing presence of multiple non-state actors that undermine state authority (Freedom House 2021).Consequently, the political settlement established after the 2003 invasion failed to bring different communities together under a comprehensive social contract.There was a rush to deconstruct and reconstruct the state with little consideration for the impact this would have on the end product (Shlash and Tom 2011).There was a clear failure to understand that peace is built on human needs as defined by the context (Richmond 2009).
The so-called national unity government formed after the 2005 elections de facto entrenched sectarian divisions into government formation, leading some communities to continue harbouring grievances, while others saw the new political order as an opportunity to monopolise power rather than seek reconciliation (Mansour 2016).Because of this, as we will show later, an overwhelming majority of our research participants displayed very little trust in state institutions and political processes, which they see as inherently corrupt and not open to dialogue and participation.Overall, Iraq has struggled to reinvent an inclusive social contract that incorporates the interests of the variety of groups composing society, failing to articulate an overarching Iraqi citizenship and sense of national belonging that goes beyond group affiliations and parochial interests.This was epitomised in Nouri al-Maliki's second term as prime minister (2010-4), which severely challenged Iraq's fragile post-2003 social contract as it threatened the return of authoritarianism.Maliki effectively ceased to represent the entire population to appeal to his base and consolidate his grip on power.He built a network of patronage and influence composed of family and close allies from the Da'wa Party.Under his rule, Iraq increasingly appeared to slide into 'competitive authoritarianism', a system in which a façade of procedural democracy is maintained while the regime effectively controls the political process, using institutions to debilitate the opposition (Dodge 2013;O'Driscoll 2017).
The above marginalisation facilitated to a great extent the rise of the Islamic State 4 and its expansion in Sunni-majority areas in 2014.The Islamic State successfully exploited and capitalised on Sunni grievances and resentment (O'Driscoll 2017; Costantini 2021).
Furthermore, it implanted itself into the vacuum left by the retreating Iraqi state, competing with the state for authority and threatening to establish its own separate 'social contract' with the local population, with its own system of governance and service delivery (Revkin 2016).In this respect, the rise of the Islamic State represented a threat to the very existence and sustainability of the state in these areas (Dodge 2014).Furthermore, the relative ease with which the Islamic State seised territory and the little resistance offered by the Iraqi army to its advance underscored the deep crisis of the post-2003 Iraqi state and the corrosive effect of corruption on its institutions, both civilian and military.With the collapse of the Iraqi security apparatus, dozens of militias and armed groups mobilised to take territory back from the Islamic State under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF).Although these groups were crucial in the fight against the Islamic State, their emergence was symptomatic of the deficiency of the state and the predicament of the Iraqi social contract.These non-state actors exposed the state's lack of control over the security sector and supplanted it as the provider of security and came to constitute a major factor of insecurity for the government.The different groups composing the PMF represented subnational identities and sub-state loyalties within Iraq, and they also had connections with foreign actors (especially Iran).Consequently, their existence not only challenged the sovereignty of the Iraqi state but also jeopardised the prospect of consolidating Iraqi identity (O'Driscoll and van Zoonen 2017; Mansour and Fālih  2017).
Since the territorial defeat of the Islamic State in 2017, the state has gradually regained control over the territory, however, Iraq continues to grapple with numerous enduring problemssuch as endemic corruption, a weak economy, and lack of basic services, as well as significant environmental challenges.These problems gradually eat away at the basic foundations of the social contract and hinder the establishment of an updated and robust framework for state-society relations (O'Driscoll et al. 2022).These structural issues and the ethnosectarian power-sharing system are sources of widespread popular frustration among ordinary citizens, for whom the social contract should first and foremost be based on the needs of the citizens.As the mass protests that erupted in 2018 and again in 2019 illustrate, Iraqis want to shift from post-2003 formulation of identitybased politics to a system based on issues, such as providing better employment opportunities, better public services, and more transparency and accountability.Most of all, Iraqis across all ethnosectarian groups are asking the state to provide them with the services, employment, and security necessary to lead a dignified lifethe very human needs that were ignored in the post-2003 liberal statebuilding project.Thus, much of the population has moved beyond sectarianism, while the members of the political elite still rely on it for their power and wealth.This evidences a clear separation between the two regarding how the social contract should be envisioned (O'Driscoll et al. 2022).
These tensions came to the forefront with the Tishreen protests in 2019.The protests took place against a backdrop of years of conflict and violence that have significantly affected Iraqi society, resulting in the reversal of development gains, increased poverty, deaths of many Iraqis, and large-scale displacement of many communities (Higel 2021;Alshamary and Hadad 2023).Hence, the Tishreen Uprising was driven by demands against corruption, unemployment, and a lack of basic services as well as for the overhaul of the post-2003 muhasasa ta'ifiawhich many protesters felt had failed to protect citizens' rights and ensure decent living conditions.For many Iraqis, the sectarian power-sharing system in place has facilitated the spread of corruption and empowered political elites to use public resources to serve their private interests and increase their influence.During the protests, popular demands also highlighted the need for a unified nation (nurid watan) against kleptocratic practices by the ruling elites (Frantappie 2019).
Although the Covid-19 pandemic halted the protest movement, the sentiment did not go away, and continued uprisings and new protests sparked by the recent parliamentary elections show that there is still the need for Iraq to develop a new social contract.Iraqi society also needs to feel that the political system can equitably address their grievances without the need to protest.In many ways, the protests marked a shift in how people perceive their relationship with the state and the meaning of citizenship, therefore statesociety relations need to be urgently addressed by meaningful reforms by the government (Frantappie 2019;Higel 2021;O'Driscoll et al. 2022).The protests signalled that a large segment of the population feel that the post-2003 social contract fails to meet their needs and it is these understandings of the population that we turn to next.

Iraqis and the social contract
The recurrent outbreak of protests and the permanence of deep-seated popular grievances show the issues with the social contract in Iraq, which are further highlighted by the lack of a cohesive sense of citizenship and the state's failure to deliver 'participation', 'protection', and 'provision'.Ultimately, Iraq lacks a framework for formulating a common vision between the population and political institutions.As a result, protest is seen as the most viable way of articulating dissatisfaction with the government: many protesters (and the majority of our survey participants) see elections as pointless within the current social contract (Frantappie 2019).This highlights the lack of political participation, which Loewe et. al (2020) indicate as being a core component of the social contract.This is because elections are associated with fraudulent practices and corruption, which has led citizens to lose hope in the possibility of gaining political change through democratic practices.In the words of two FGD participants: 'There are no opportunities for change as long as the parties themselves exist.The political blocs have been stable since 2003 until now, and nothing will change.'and 'I am 30 years old, as far as I can remember, this situation has been the same.Until we have a clear election process, no changes will happen … All citizens can vote, but what is the benefit?In any case, the elections will be forged'.Within this framework, we set out to identify the population's main grievances against state institutions, to gain a better insight into the failure of the social contract and what is necessary to create a more inclusive sense of citizenship.We zoom in on the key grievances already identified, namely: corruption, services, the economy, security, and governance, relating them back to the three main components of the social contract outlined aboveprotection, provision, and participation.
In both the FGDs and the surveys, participants identified corruption as the main issue influencing the disintegration of state-society relations and affecting the population's trust in political institutions.This indicates that addressing corruption should be a priority when renegotiating the social contract to build a more cohesive sense of citizenship and national identity, as well as ensuring participation.In the survey results, corruption was followed by improving services, addressing the economic crisis, reforming the security sector, and reforming the system of governance, with little variation when the data was disaggregated by governorate, age group, gender, and employment status.Yet, when participants were asked what single factor would be required for them to have or regain trust in the government, we found that while addressing corruption (41,7%) was still seen as a priority, getting rid of the muhasasa system was seen as the second (23,7%) most important factor in trusting the government (see Graph 1). 5 This could indicate a lack of confidence in the government system and the ability to reform it, as when participants were given the option, 'reforming the system of governance', it was ranked fifth as an issue for the government to resolve.This correlates strongly with the FGDs' and consultation meetings' findings: participants connected the muhasasa system to corruption and saw addressing corruption as essential and catalytic for other issues to improve.Essentially, for many, the muhasasa system and corruption are one and the same.We now move on to the examination of each of these grievances and their impact on the social contract and state-society relations.

Governance and corruption
As demonstrated above, you cannot separate governance and corruption and in the eyes of our research participants they are intrinsically linked.We take corruption to refer to the privileged allocation of resources, positions, and opportunities, as well as illicit activities by political elites and their networks, for private gainall which firmly connect to the political system.Networks of clientelism and patronage have old roots in Iraq, but the sectarian system of governance, as well as post-2003 reconstruction, have aggravated the issue as they have allowed sectarian leaders to use their positions to capture resources, increase their influence, and mobilise political support (Abdullah, Gray, and Clough 2018;Abbas and Ismail 2017;Dodge 2021).Overall, participants in the FGDs reported that they see corruption as being extremely embedded in Iraq's social and political fabric, and there was a broad agreement that it should be one of the most urgent issues in any attempt to rebuild the social contract.There was a firm belief that addressing corruption would have positive effects on the other structural issues and grievances in Iraq (as highlighted in this article).
Graph 1.What is required to have (or regain) trust in your government?Note: this formed part of the first survey which had 8,786 respondents.
FGD participants overwhelmingly connected corruption with political processes, associating it with practices such as electoral fraud, lack of transparency in decision-making processes, and lack of institutional governance.Therefore, as citizens perceive political processes to be inherently compromised, this further diminishes their trust in state institutions and democratic processes.Many FGD participants stated that they saw no point in engaging politically to foster structural change, leading to a core component of the social contractparticipationbeing largely missing in Iraq.For example, one participant reported that: participation [in politics] is based on nepotism and political party affiliations.Ordinary people like us have a slim chance of participation.If I know a powerful character, I will be emboldened to do whatever I like in all sectors; if I do not have connections with any such characters, there is little I can do.Nepotism plays a big role today.
This situation further marginalises parts of the population that are already discriminated against, such as women and minorities, as their political participation is based on quotas and therefore does not represent their needs at all, but only fulfils a legal obligation.The strong connection between corruption and the political process can be further seen through 41,7% of survey respondents seeing corruption as the biggest obstacle to participating in politics, whilst 22% see loss in trust in politics as the biggest obstacle.
Dissatisfaction with the system of governance is a leading factor in mistrust of state institutions, democratic processes, and the lack of a cohesive sense of citizenship.Many of the grievances connected to governance can be traced back to the muhasasa systemas the population has begun to move away from sectarianism, they see this as no longer representing them.A key finding is that 73.2% of those surveyed felt that the political system entirely fails to ensure equal representation of all societal groups (with the figure higher for women and those aged 18-35, see Graph 2).
Graph 2. the current political system ensure equal representation to all societal groups?Note: this formed part of the first survey which had 8,786 respondents.
Additionally, most survey respondents indicated that ethnosectarian identity should be kept separate from politics.However, this figure was significantly lower in the KRI (45.9% thinking it should be completely separate in comparison to 87.4% in the rest of Iraq), but this has to be contextualised with the KRI being a region based on ethnosectarian identity and with the Kurds' strong secessionist goals (O'Driscoll and Baser 2019).Fractures within communities and ethnosectarian groups have emerged over the past decade, as longstanding grievances have cemented socio-political inequalities (Slim 2019).Recently, however, outside the KRI, there has been a growing feeling that the Iraqi identity is strengthening and that ethnosectarian tensions are decreasing as people are more likely to identify as Iraqi than as a member of a particular religion, tribe, ethnicity, or governorate (National Democratic Institute 2019).Overall, aside from regional differences, the muhasasa system is no longer seen as fit for purpose and it has long ceased to represent the needs of the Iraqi people; as one FGD participant stated: 'Iraq has many ethnicities, the basic problem of Iraq is the notion of nationality; this must be solved by the state … The sectarian issues that emerged post-2003 invasion are the root cause of the political instability'.The 2019 protests showed there is an overall desire to move away from sectarian power-sharing, and towards a secular government that can ensure equal representation for all.This highlights the need to tackle issues of governance and representation by establishing a more transparent and inclusive political system that includes all of Iraqi society and is conducive to the establishment of a strong social contract and a cohesive sense of national identity and citizenship (Al-Shadeedi and van Veen 2020).

Service provision
When conceptualising the social contract as an analytical tool Loewe et al. (2020) identify one of its three core components as the provision of public goods and services.Yet, the provision of basic services such as water, electricity, sanitation, education, and healthcare has been a long-standing grievance in the country, as service allocation has historically been used as a means to maintain social control through networks of patronage (Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, and Dunn 2012).Participants in the FGDs indicated that service provision has deteriorated even more over the past five years and has been put in the spotlight by the COVID-19 pandemic.There are wide gaps in service provision depending on governorate, urban and rural areas, and ethnosectarian affiliation, which are being filled by militias and civil society organisations.While civil society's growing role is positive in many ways, this might also further contribute to reducing faith in the state as a service provider (United Nations Development Programme 2020).Participants overwhelmingly agree that the state needs to provide services as an integral part of the social contract, which is not only stipulated in the country's constitution but also linked to the idea of human dignity, which in their opinion the state has so far failed to provide for its citizens.
Participants described dignity as the state having to provide 'the basic necessities and services to lead a decent or dignified life', 'a decent life for each persona life that does not make them need any help or assistance', and 'a decent living for the citizen, by providing a decent income in which the citizen can live with honour and dignity, and not undermining their dignity'.Yet, widespread corruption means that the Iraqi state is largely unable to provide services, with water management, sanitation, electricity, healthcare, and education being particularly affected.The ongoing deterioration of these services signals that the state is unable to uphold its end of the social contract, and to provide its citizens with the right to live a dignified life.Another central issue is related to the differentiated access that different groups have to services, which has developed along established patterns of social inequality and marginalisation.In the words of one FGD participant: In the twenty-first century, we have people living in poverty and without homes, resources, and even without social care.People apply for it, but their names will not appear on their lists, and it seems that everything is according to relationships and nepotism/favouritism.This is the responsibility of the government, but unfortunately, the government is not interested and has no concern for its citizens.
Therefore, while the protests in both 2018 and 2019 focused on issues relating to unemployment, water shortages, and insufficient services, they were just the latest in a long series of clashes between the state and its citizens over unsatisfactory service provision.Yet, the state's track record of addressing these protests and demands has been poor and mostly based on promises aimed at appeasing the population rather than tackling the core problems.This has further damaged trust and state-society relations (Robin-D'Cruz 2018).

The economy
Another key grievance that, according to participants, is eroding the population's trust in the state with negative repercussions for the social contract is the economic situation particularly when it comes to employment opportunities.Economic structures and the social contract are inherently tied in Iraq, as the population's economic prospects are dependent on the state's redistributive role, especially when it comes to public sector employment and the welfare system.Yet, a key finding is that participants agree that the state's wealth has historically not been distributed fairly.89.2% of survey respondents were unsatisfied with the government's management of the country's resources, with the figure higher in the south and Baghdadsee Graph 3.This was Graph 3. with government's management of country's resources Note: this formed part of the third survey which had 8,467 respondents.
one of the key grievances at the core of the October 2019 uprisings.The Iraqi economy is characterised by its reliance on oil (which makes up 95% of total revenues) (World Bank 2021), which the state apparatus historically used to increase its independence from society.Combined with the lack of economic diversification, the volatility of oil prices negatively affects wealth distribution and directly contributes to the entrenchment of social inequalities and discontent, as highlighted by our participants, such as in this statement: 'In terms of economy, we do not have any local industrial production, we are solely dependent on oil whereas in the past our productivity was well known'.Despite repeated calls to diversify the economy (Matsunaga 2019), this is yet to be done.Participants state that diversification is key to creating more opportunities, citing the private and agricultural sectors as possible avenues that would increase employment opportunities and generate more wealth (World Bank 2021).Another common grievance that emerged from the FGDs is the widening gap between the number of graduates and the availability of jobs, meaning that Iraq has a growing amount of unemployed young people who are highly educated, which continues to fuel popular frustration.Additionally, this also indicates that the Iraqi state once again fails to deliver one of the main components of the social contract, this being the provision of opportunities.This was a recurrent point throughout the FGDs, with one participant stating that: 'I studied 16 years or more, I want the government to give me my right.I am the one who studied for years so the government is supposed to employ or appoint me'.Both the FGDs and the surveys highlighted the need for the state to generate more employment opportunities as part of its obligation under the social contract to provide key services to citizens.However, as seen in the statement above, one area where there are unrealistic expectations was in public employment -68,8% of women and 57,5% of men who responded to our survey think the government is obliged to provide public sector employment. 6The figure was also higher for 18-35s, who face significant unemployment in Iraq (see Graph 4).This desire for government employment does demonstrate some tensions with the vision of the social contract.Despite the population wanting to move beyond a rentier social contractand the lack of rights that this entailsa large percentage still expects state employment.Nonetheless, research participants highlighted that addressing unemployment would be a key factor in citizens having or regaining trust in the government and reviving the economy.Hence, citizens believe that ensuring a stable economic situation is a key responsibility of the state, as it would allow them to reach their full potential and uphold their side of the social contract, as voiced by one FGD participant: 'If the economic situation is good, there will also be stability in the security situation and in the psychological state of the citizen too'.

Security
Protection is one of the three key components of the social contract as conceptualised by Loewe et al. (2020), highlighting the provision of national and physical security as one of the core functions of the state.The state's failure to provide security and an equal representation of the various segments that make up Iraq's population in the security apparatus is another core grievance that is negatively affecting the citizens' perception of the social contract.Different societal groups indeed see security provision as a key responsibility of the state and, in the words of one of the FGD participants: Providing the rights to a [dignified] life and security are the duties of the state because we gave them the authority, and the state should use that authority to provide the people's rights.If there is a lack of security in the country, it will have an impact on all other sectors such as the economy, politics … without security, there are no life, services, and rights, so the state should provide security first.
A key finding is that citizens across the board believe that personal security levels have been steadily decreasing since 2003, reaching an all-time low in 2021 (this relates to individual security rather than wider security and connects to the population seeing the security forces as often a provider of insecurity).As a result, the population are dissatisfied with the current security conditions in the country and they lack a sense of safety, which negatively affects their trust in the state's institutions and their perception of the social contract's legitimacy.There are several reasons why discontent with security provision is a long-standing grievance, first and foremost being the growing role of militias and armed non-state groups, followed by the lack of ethnosectarian and gender diversity within the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and different standards of security provision depending on governorates (which particularly affects Sunnis, women, and non-Arabs).This is mostly due to the post-2003 Security Sector Reform process, which has focused on the security needs of donors, elites, and the regime, rather than addressing human security (Costantini and O'Driscoll 2022).As a result, this has created a context in which citizens do not feel safe or protected by the state.Finally, considering repeated popular uprisings, another key finding is that citizens fear retaliation from the government for voicing their opinions or demanding changes to the social contract, in addition to heavy restrictions on freedom of expression.

Discussion and conclusion
This article has assessed the development and performance of the social contract in post-2003 Iraq and shown that the population has lost faith in elections and the political process and does not see their vote as being able to bring about change.Citizens no longer feel represented by the muhasasa system and elections are inherently associated with corruption and fraud.In the words of one participant: [the political process] is unfair, and it's corrupt, and there's moral corruption in it, there's nothing that can be achieved, and we have, for example, many parliamentarians, but they're useless.We want officials who are eager for the good of the country, and then everything is going to come up with a plan that's right for the good of the country, but the case which we're living with, is that right official is put in the wrong place.
This loss of faith is further articulated when survey respondents were asked about the best way to influence the political process in Iraq.22.4% saw protest as the best means, whilst 20.3% chose talking to international actors, and only 13% chose voting (see Graph 5). 7 With trust in both politics and the political process being at an all-time low, there is a clear desire to move away from identity-based politics and to develop a system that centres on issue-based politics.Relatedly, corruption is seen as being deeply embedded in the political and social fabric of the Iraqi state and intrinsically linked with the muhasasa system.When it comes to the three key components of the social contract as an analytical toolprotection, provision, and participationparticipants indicated that the corruption of the political system by ruling elites is one of the most significant impediments to citizens engaging with the political process, as well as being a major obstacle to access to services and equal redistribution of wealth and resources.When it comes to security, participants report that personal security has deteriorated over the past decade and that the population overall does not feel safe.This is due to some core issues such as unfair representation in the security forces, the growing power of militias, discrimination and harassment, and poor control over borders.People also reported feeling threatened by the state and they denounced the restrictions on freedom of expression.The economic situation is also steadily worsening, and the creation of employment opportunities needs to form part of a reimagined social contract.The lack of job opportunities was a major grievance driving the 2019 protests, and participants in the FGDs and the surveys agreed that the economy needs to be diversified and that Iraq's wealth must be distributed more equally.Those surveyed largely expected public sector employment as their right, and for the development of the social contract, new employment opportunities away from the public sector must be created.This article has demonstrated that the post-2003 social contract in Iraq has not evolved with the population and as a result, grievances continue to grow alongside the growing perception that the current social contract is drastically under-performing, if not absent.Our research has highlighted citizens' perceptions across different societal groups, showing that the situation has become so perilous that for many reforms are no longer an option, rather they want the entire system of governance to be built anew.A significant finding is that the idea of dignity was central; for our research participants, the government should provide them with the tools to live a dignified life without begging for employment, security, and services.Thus, this article lays bare the fault lines of the development of the social contract in post-2003 Iraq, and of the internationally-led statebuilding project.The gap between the elites and the population continues to grow at the cost of state-society relations.The failure to include bottom-up perspectives in the development of the post-2003 state has hindered the development of a social contract fit for the Iraqi population.Through the voice of Iraqis we have demonstrated the impact of this failure on the lives of the population, showcasing first-hand experiences and perceptions.
Returning to our earlier understanding of the social contract as an analytical toolthe entirety of explicit or implicit agreements between all relevant societal groups and the state, defining their rights and obligations towards each otherwe have shown that in the eyes of the population the state is currently not living up to the obligations the society sees for it.In addition, the state is also consistently failing to uphold its responsibilities to deliver security, provision, and participation to its citizens, therefore failing to uphold its end of the social contract.Iraq continues to operate under the principles of a rentier social contract without giving the benefits this entails.If the state continues to fail to meet the obligations as seen by the population, society can choose to withdraw from its obligations with disastrous effects.Thus, the renegotiation of the social contract between the society and the state in Iraq is of the utmost importance.Our study has shown that, in addition to addressing the grievances discussed above, Iraqis see having a dignified life as an upmost priority and want the interests of all segments of society reflected in the political process, which should also be built anew to shift away from the legacy of intervention and ethnosectarian governance.
To provide clear analytical guidance to scholars interested in assessing the state of the social contract in a given society, this article identified five main grievances, namely corruption, services, security, economy, and governance.Focusing on citizens' perceptions of these core areas can facilitate in-depth and comparative studies of the social contract.We demonstrated the value of this analytical framework by identifying core areas that policymakers and practitioners can focus on to improve state-society relations in Iraq.

Notes
1. Halabja is considered a governorate in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, but is yet to be formally accepted as such in Iraq.We included it as it offers an important variation from Sulaymaniyah.2. Facebook is the leading social media platform, as of 31 March 2021, there were 25,5 million active Facebook subscribers in Iraq, see: https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm3. Issues with boosting not being accepted by Facebook meant that the gender proportion of the final survey was far from ideal.However, 1,095 women did complete the survey, which is a significant sample (comparable to the total sample of many other surveys conducted in Iraq) that allows for gendered analysis.4. Alongside a multitude of other factors that form an article in themselves. 5.This sentiment was particularly strong in Shia-majority areas.It was also the weakest in the KRI, a federal region as part of the muhasasa system, of whom the majority also do not think ethnosectarian identity should be completely separate from politics for similar reasons.Although the figure is also lower in the conflict-affected provinces, when they were asked if ethnosectarian identity should be kept separate from politics, 84,3% thought it should be completely separate.6.The higher percentage for women may be accounted for by the fact that women find it harder to enter the private sector in Iraq.7.This survey happened shortly before the 2021 national elections, making the 13% choosing voting all the more prominent.

Graph 4 .
Is public sector employment a right of Iraqi citizens?Note: this formed part of the third survey which had 8,467 respondents.

Graph 5 .
The best way to influence the political process in Iraq Note: this formed part of the second survey which had 6,100 respondents.