The rise of new public management at the institutional level: an analysis of a Dutch university and the role of administrators in initiating organizational change, 1980s to 2010s

ABSTRACT New Public Management (NPM) is a remarkable development in the history of the management of public and semi-public organizations and one that requires more attention from historians working on the history of management and organizations. This article examines the rise of NPM at the institutional level through an in-depth analysis of a Dutch university in the 1980s to 2010s. By combining a social-science-based analytical framework for NPM in higher education with a variety of sources, including organizational archives and oral history, the article sheds light on how NPM ideas, techniques, and concepts were transposed to the institutional level. In line with earlier studies, the article illustrates that this was essentially a ‘pick-and-mix’ process in the NPM toolbox. The study complements previous research by generating insights into how management concepts were used to initiate organizational change. The analysis advances previous studies by revealing that NPM-style changes were not only the result of shifts in national policies, but were also instigated by actors (administrators) at the level of the institution. This means that if we want to fully understand NPM, more historical research focusing on the institutional level and the actors involved in organizational change is needed.


Introduction
The rise of New Public Management (NPM) is a remarkable development in the history of the management of public and semi-public organizations.Since the 1980s, many OECD countries have implemented reforms based on ideas, techniques, and concepts developed in or inspired by the private sector, with the aim of increasing the efficiency, effectiveness, and performance of public and semi-public organizations.These reforms have been attributed to the umbrella concept of NPM (Boston 2016;Hood 1991;Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).Historians working on the history of management and organizations have studied the rise of NPM, but have often only analyzed some of its constituent elements (see, e.g.Kroeze and Keulen 2014;Lusiani and Zan 2011;Nevalainen 2017;Rennison 2007;Wadhwani et al. 2017).Within the field of management history, the main emphasis has been on management as an activity of industrial businesses.As Keulen and Kroeze (2014, 321) have stressed, little emphasis has been placed on the rise and impact of NPM.
On the other hand, much has been written about NPM in the social sciences, and NPM specifically is widely studied within the field of higher education research (Ferlie, Musselin, and Andresani 2008;Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).But there are still several gaps.One key aspect missing from our understanding of the rise of NPM in higher education concerns historical practices at the institutional level.Research examining NPM in higher education has generally focused on NPM-driven policies at the level of the national higher education system (e.g.Huisman et al. 2015), which makes sense because universities have to comply with national regulations.These studies have certainly improved our understanding of NPM, but they were generally not sensitive to important nuances within universities and the role of specific actors in instigating NPM-style changes, sometimes independently of national policy shifts.To fully understand the rise of NPM, it is essential to address the institutional level.Although NPM is a global phenomenon, it materializes in local contexts.This means that the nature of the reforms and the extent to which reforms are implemented vary from country to country as well as from university to university (Broucker and De Wit 2015, 60).There is evidence to suggest that some characteristics of NPM, such as the development of stronger managerial roles, are relevant specifically at the institutional level (Deem 2020;Ferlie, Musselin, and Andresani 2008).
The Netherlands is interesting in this context.The Dutch NPM reforms have been implemented in an early stage, were fare-reaching compared to other OECD countries (Kösters et al. 2021, 8), and received international attention (Kickert 2003, 395;Oudenampsen and Mellink 2021, 21-22).This makes it interesting to examine exactly how reforms have played out at the organizational level, in the context of this article in a university.The Dutch higher education system and, consequently, its institutions have transformed enormously since the 1980s.Based on the insights of the leading public administration scholars of the time (Hood 1983), the Dutch Ministry of Education embraced a new steering-at-a-distance and performance-oriented philosophy of governance and subsequently implemented a series of reforms in the higher education sector (Don et al. 1989).The NPM-style reforms ranged from increased institutional autonomy to performance-based funding models and ex post accountability (De Boer 2003;Jongbloed and Salerno 2003).
Thus, this article aims to contribute to our understanding of the history of the management of public and semi-public organizations by focusing on the rise of NPM in higher education at the institutional level.In doing so, it seeks to increase the attention devoted to the rise of NPM as an important phenomenon in the field of management and organizational history, since NPM often falls through the cracks in historiography.Using the example of the rise of NPM within a Dutch university during the 1980s to 2010s, the article will demonstrate how NPM ideas, techniques, and concepts circulating internationally were transposed to the institutional level, a process in which, this study argues, specific actors (university administrators) often played a decisive role.
Combining social science insights with a historical approach to understand NPM Since the 'historic turn', management and organization scholars have increasingly agreed that history is important for understanding organizations.In this respect, Rowlinson, Hassard, and Decker (2014, 269) argue that there is potential for management and organization scholars to engage in more dialogue with historians.This article will demonstrate that in the case of the rise of NPM, this engagement is indeed useful in gaining new insights.
Firstly, more engagement in terms of sources is beneficial in improving the understanding of NPM within the history of management and organizations (Rowlinson, Hassard, and Decker 2014).Nevertheless, despite some existing studies, there is still reluctance among management and organization scholars to use historical sources or, if sources are indeed accessed, scholars do not know how to analyze them.Organizational archives in particular are underutilized (Rowlinson and Hassard 2013, 121;Rowlinson, Hassard, and Decker 2014, 250-251), yet such archives can provide important new insights into the rise of NPM.For instance, they can shed light on NPM practices specific to the university level.Therefore, this study draws on a critical reading of literature and archival sources, including organizational archives (policy texts, letters, yearbooks, strategic plans, speeches).
Secondly, oral history provides a useful method for improving our knowledge of the role of actors.Focusing on the key actors involved has been proven to be central in understanding NPM-style changes (Keulen and Kroeze 2014, 324).That is not only because actors, especially senior administrators and managers, often played an important role in instigating new NPM-type policies (Deem 2020(Deem , 2085)), but also because they use language to concretize abstract elements of organizations (Watson 2004, 76) and adopt management concepts (Karsten and Letiche 2006).This means that elite interviews (Tansey 2007) with key players of the time are an important source.Elite interviews can corroborate other sources and add new information by probing respondents at length.Importantly, they can shed light on hidden elements behind organizational changes such as informal processes, deliberations, motivations, and ideas that are not clear from analysis of archival sources.But there are also downsides.For example, respondents may have fading memories.They may also attempt to inflate or minimize their role in processes of organizational change, depending on the sensitivity of the matter, career interests, or public accountability.To overcome these limitations, substantial background information was available during the interviews (e.g.specific dates) and the respondents have been pseudonymized.The latter also enhanced open conversation.
Lastly, as a response to the call of Booth and Rowlinson (2006, 9) for more historical research informed by organization theory, this study incorporates social-science knowledge of NPM in higher education.Integrating concepts from organization theory within a historical approach is important, as several studies have suggested this can be used to advance archival research (Rowlinson and Hassard 2013, 121).Thus, the article analyzes the rise of NPM within a Dutch university, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU Amsterdam), by using a social-science-based analytical framework for NPM in higher education (Broucker and De Wit 2015).In so doing, it contributes to the fields of management and organizational history on the one hand and to the field of higher education research on the other.
The remainder of the article is as follows: the first section defines NPM.The second section discusses NPM in higher education and introduces the analytical framework for NPM in higher education.The third section presents three major NPM changes at VU Amsterdam.Specifically, the case study addresses a shift from a democratic governance model to a corporate governance model, an attempt to merge with a university of applied sciences, and a reorganization of the university's business operations.Although more NPM-type changes have taken place at VU Amsterdam, a study of the source material pointed to the significance of these specific changes.The fourth and final section discusses the developments at VU Amsterdam within the NPM framework and formulates some suggestions for further research.

Conceptual understandings of new public management
Most authors agree that NPM was a response to the crisis of the welfare state of the 1970s, during which criticism of the functioning of the public sector grew in many OECD countries (Boston 2016, 19).Traditional politics and policies failed to formulate an answer to the crises, causing governments to look for alternative modes of governance.In their quest for cost-cutting and an alternative model, governments of OECD countries committed to liberalization and reform of the public sector based on private-sector principles.As Stephen Dorrell (1993) (Secretary to the UK Treasury 1992-1994) put it, 'all around the world governments are recognizing the opportunity to improve the quality and effectiveness of the public sector.Privatization, market testing, and private finance are being used in almost every developing country.'This reform wave was given the label NPM, which eventually became the new norm for public governance (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, 208).
The term 'NPM' was coined by the public administration scholar Christopher Hood (Hood 1991).NPM is a multi-faceted concept.There is much scholarly debate about the exact definition of NPM, but it is generally believed that the concept refers to a combination of business principles, assumptions, and theories on the one hand, and a wave of concrete reforms in administrative practice on the other (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, 10).I this study, NPM is defined as a governance practice in which ideas, techniques, and concepts developed in or inspired by the private sector are used to transform public and semi-public organizations.It should be noted that theories underlying NPM include neoliberalism, agency theory, (new) managerialism, public choice theory, and many more (Boston 2016, 20-21).However, for the sake of clarity and focus, this article will not discuss the intellectual origin of NPM at length, but will focus on NPM and how NPM has played out at the organizational level.Importantly, around 2000, criticism of NPM grew, causing new policy paradigms to emerge, such as whole-of-government, digital-era governance and new public governance (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, 19).

New public management in higher education: analytical framework
What are the characteristics of NPM?Given the thematic scope of this article, I focus on NPM in higher education.Since the 1980s, governments have introduced NPM-based policies in the higher education sector in order to reduce costs and maximize results (in terms of research, education, and service).This led to a new system: a combination of increased institutional autonomy and result-oriented government steering.Importantly, NPM-driven changes were instigated not only at the national level, but also at the level of the institution, resulting in many different manifestations, interpretations, and understandings of NPM-based governance (Broucker, De Wit, and Leisyte 2016, 20-21).
Many scholars have defined the characteristics of NPM in higher education, highlighting different elements.Although this scholarly attention has certainly contributed to our conceptual understanding of NPM in higher education, the abundance of definitions is also confusing and the more narrowly constructed conceptual lenses of NPM are not very helpful if one wants to analyze the rise of NPM from a historical perspective, as specific contextual factors often play an important role in historical research.The challenge is therefore to incorporate a conceptualization of NPM that is sufficiently open to case-specific nuances and accommodates, as Maclean, Harvey, and Clegg (2016, 616) describe it, 'dual integrity', i.e. research which contributes to historiography and at the same time informs conceptual lenses.To that end, this article utilizes a categorization of NPM and its constituent core elements in higher education by the public administration scholar Broucker and De Wit (2015).
Based on a comparison of definitions of NPM in higher education used in the literature, Broucker and De Wit (2015) have divided the major characteristics assigned to NPM into four areas, as shown in Table 1.Incorporating Broucker and De Wit's conceptualization of NPM has potential for 'dual integrity' because its comprehensive yet clear articulation allows for both a historical analysis that includes context, nuances, and details, as well as a meaningful conceptual conversation.

Introduction to the case
VU Amsterdam was founded in 1880 as a private and relatively small Calvinist university owned by a Society.Until the 1960s, the university retained a strong Calvinist identity and financed itself via donations.The latter changed in the 1960s, when, due to the growth of students and staff, VU Amsterdam became a completely state-funded university from 1968 onward (Brinkman 1990, 15).At the time of writing, VU Amsterdam is a large university with more than 30,000 students and more than 4,000 staff.The university has an international orientation with more than 5,000 international students and features in the top 200 of most rankings (e.g.Times Higher Education, Shanghai Ranking).VU Amsterdam is an interesting case to examine because, although it has been entirely state-funded since 1968, its private background meant that it historically had more autonomy than the public universities in the Netherlands.In that respect, even though VU Amsterdam currently has a governance structure similar to public universities, minor differences still exist, for instance in the appointment and supervision of the executive board.

From democratic governance toward corporate governance in the 1980s and 1990s
Following the student protests that started in the late 1960s across Western Europe (which had also taken place at VU Amsterdam) and the call for the democratization of universities, Dutch universities have been governed according to the University Governance Reorganization Act (Dutch abbreviation: WUB) since 1972.The WUB Act established a democratic governance model.At the central administrative level, VU Amsterdam was governed by an executive board and a university council.The executive board consisted of two members appointed by the Society, two members from the faculties chosen by the university council, and the rector magnificus who was chosen by the deans (Schut 1996, 117-118).The administrative power of the board was initially limited, i.e. it was responsible solely for the operational management of the university (e.g.property management) and had little formal influence on strategy and policy-making (Respondent 1B1; Respondent 1A3).At the time, administrative power lay mainly with the university council, a governing body representing students, academic staff, and professional staff.The council consisted of different parties, more or less along ideological lines, and elected members who were affiliated with one of those parties.A small part of the council comprised members from outside the university (Van Deursen, 313).The university council was responsible for almost everything except the operational management of the university.The tasks and responsibilities of the council therefore ranged from dealing with disputes and student affairs to determining the university's budget (Respondent 1B1).The democratic governance applied not only to the central level of the university but also to the faculty level and the basic level.
The 1970s are considered the heyday of university democracy, not only in the Netherlands but also in Western Europe and the U.S.A..In the Netherlands, however, the system of democratic governance began to erode in the 1980s.In the context of economic downturn, the first Lubbers cabinet (1982)(1983)(1984)(1985)(1986) (and subsequent cabinets), led by prime minister Ruud Lubbers of the Christian Democratic Party, pushed budgetary cutbacks and a NPM-style reform agenda in a variety of public sectors.The new direction was part of an international trend.In the 1980s and 1990s, management became a political-cultural phenomenon.Management books written by (mainly American) management gurus were extremely popular, including among public administrators.The popularity of management ideas, managers defined by leadership style, and a personal approach putting managers at the forefront was unprecedented and differed from the more technical, systems-based approach of the previous period (Kroeze and Keulen 2014, 399).Consequently, a variety of management concepts, techniques, and methods, which were regarded as the rational instruments for successful change in an organization, were introduced within public organizations.Also, because of the widely held belief that successful organizational change required a good manager, influential actors such as politicians, top civil servants, and public administrators changed into (new public) managers who were trained and motivated to apply management methods in their organizations (Oosterhuis and van der Krogt 1996, 244-245).
Lubbers was the face of this trend in the Netherlands.He was referred to as the 'manager in politics' and played a key role because he remained in office for almost twelve years.He received international recognition.According to Time Magazine (23 January 1984), Lubbers 'transformed the Netherlands from one of Western Europe's freest-spending welfare states into its leading belt tightener.'Moreover, during a visit to The Hague, British Prime Minister Thatcher declared that Lubbers was so tough that he was going to '[. ..] ruin [her] reputation as the Iron Lady' (Time Magazine, 23 January 1984), although Lubbers never gained such a reputation in the Netherlands.While there were demonstrations against the policies of the Lubbers cabinets, there was no major clash with the opposition, as there was in the UK, for instance.This was largely the result of policies being depoliticized and given the technocratic label of 'no-nonsense' politics (Kroeze and Keulen 2014, 401).
The NPM-style policies of the Lubbers cabinets were pushed broadly across the Dutch public sector and did not bypass higher education.In the 1980s, the officials of the Ministry of Education embraced managerial ideas and transformed its steering strategy accordingly.One notable essential difference, however, was that, compared to some of the other Dutch ministries, the process of policy-making in the Ministry of Education was not so much guided by the expertise of business executives and management gurus, but was based primarily on scientific knowledge from the fields of management studies and public administration.For instance, the work of the public administration scholar Christopher Hood was very influential.Hood's book Tools of Government (1983) was mandatory reading at the Ministry (Don et al. 1989, 43;Respondent 5E1).
The new policy paradigm was clearly reflected in the publication of the policy paper 'Higher Education: Autonomy and Quality' (Dutch abbreviation: HOAK), which argued that the government should abandon the traditional approach of planning and control and instead steer at a distance.Universities would be held accountable for their performance ex post and management should be given more power.The HOAK philosophy corresponded to a large extent with the views of the president of the executive board of VU Amsterdam at the time, Harry Brinkman (1972Brinkman ( -1996Brinkman ( , president from 1979)).For instance, in his speech at the opening of the 1985-1986 academic year entitled 'voorwaardelijke autonomie' (conditional autonomy), Brinkman referred positively to the HOAK paper and its impact on faculty governance: 'Speaking of faculty boards in terms of leadership and management is not part of the culture of today's university.For the faculty-new-style in tomorrow's university [as a consequence of HOAK], these are appropriate terms and norms' (Brinkman 1986, 23) [own translation].In his eyes, the new balance between autonomy and accountability outlined in the HOAK paper made sense.'As long as and to the extent that faculties are publicly funded, external evaluation is part of faculty autonomy, as the minister steps back in steering and regulations, and faculties are given more leeway in policy' (Brinkman 1986, 25) [own translation].
The ideas of the HOAK paper would eventually be formalized in the Higher Education and Research Act (Dutch abbreviation: WHW, 1993).However, a first small step had already been taken in the 1980s by means of the Academic Education Act (Dutch abbreviation: WWO, 1986).The WWO maintained democratic governance but shifted the administrative balance from the university council to the executive board.This meant that the tasks and responsibilities of the university council were limited to a number of key issues such as the university's budget.On the other hand, the competences of the executive board were expanded (De Boer 2003, 48-50).

Between national reforms and institutional-level initiatives: introducing corporate governance at VU Amsterdam
So how did the new policy paradigm affect VU Amsterdam?The 1980s and 1990s can be characterized by a shift from democratic governance toward corporate governance and a reduction of faculty representation at VU Amsterdam, caused by national policy changes on the one hand and initiatives by institution-level administrators on the other.We can also see that, in some instances, administrators were inspired by internationally circulating management concepts, although in this period these were not the type of concepts associated with NPM.
One of the first indications of change was the decline of administrative power of the university council.The enthusiasm to invest time and energy in the council as an employee or student had declined sharply in the 1980s, partly because of less engagement and a high workload.There was also growing dissatisfaction among the council members with the time-consuming meetings concerning small details and issues that were not directly related to academic affairs at VU Amsterdam, such as the situation regarding apartheid in South Africa (VU Amsterdam had ties with South African universities) (Respondent 1B1; Van Deursen 2005, 370).Consequently, the administrative leeway of the executive board increased and with it its power, which resulted in board members operating more independently of the council, even before the actual implementation of the WWO Act.For example, the executive board increasingly took the lead in the university's strategy for the appointment of full professors, i.e. the number of professors per faculty as well as the establishment of new chairs.Being a private institution, VU Amsterdam could decide who to appoint as professors, but for the establishment of new chairs the executive board had to negotiate with the Ministry for funding (after the WWO Act this was no longer required).From that position, the executive board gradually began to initiate change (Respondent 1A3).
The tide had turned and there was little opposition to the WWO Act within the university community.After the Act's implementation, the university council was no longer authorized to appoint members of the executive board and the number of council members was reduced from 40 to 29 (VU Amsterdam 1989, 8).The popularity of the council declined even further.Participation was increasingly regarded as some kind of chore.Consequently, the Demokratisch Akkoord party, traditionally one of the most important parties, dissolved itself in 1988 because there were not enough quality members (Respondent 1B1).
Governance transformations were taken one step further around 1990.After the implementation of the WWO, the executive board was still not satisfied with the governance structure of the university.After a period of deliberation, the executive board came to the understanding that VU Amsterdam, as a private university, should opt for a corporate governance model and organize employee participation accordingly.The concrete issue on the table was the establishment of a new employee governing body at VU Amsterdam: a works council (Rijkhof 2017).This was a governing body that arranged employee participation through the right to advise on and consent to a number of issues, and was typically found in the governance structure of large companies and government agencies.In particular, the board member Ate de Jager (1979)(1980)(1981)(1982)(1983)(1984)(1985)(1986)(1987)(1988)(1989)(1990)(1991) -who himself had a background in the corporate world -was an advocate of works councils.He argued that the communication between the executive board and the employees had to be prioritized.The general idea with a works council was that continuity could be ensured, whereas with the students in the university council the same discussions had to be held over and over again because the student population changed more frequently (Respondent 1A3).Also, a works council would fit in well with VU Amsterdam, as the university was formally a private legal entity (Ad Valvas, 6 June 1991).
But the university council was opposed to the idea of a works council.A university council committee noted in a January 1988 letter: 'An overlap in advisory and decisionmaking powers will lead to delays in decision-making and cause conflicts between the works council and the university council' (University Council 1991) [own translation].The view was that the executive board could use this to its advantage.Either way, the university council argued that there already was a representative body (i.e. the university council) and a works council was not necessary.This led to a situation of deadlock, in which the executive board and the university council could not reach an agreement (University Council 1989).
Soon after this, the executive board presented a new argument: a works council would lead to more distance between the university and the Ministry of Education because any dispute would be settled in court, not in the Ministry.This proved to be a turning point.The Minister of Education, Jo Ritzen, was an advocate of the steering-at-a-distance strategy.In a parliamentary debate in 1990, Ritzen made clear that '[. ..] we pursue greater autonomy for the institutions' (Trouw, 24 October 1990) [own translation].And although VU Amsterdam, being a university and not a business, was not legally obliged to establish a works council, Ritzen approved the executive board's plan.The Society, which had to approve the amendment to the university's articles of association in which the works council would be formally established, also gave its approval (Society 1991).Here we clearly see NPM element 'more institutional autonomy'.The council started its work in 1993 ('T Hart 2005).
In the mid-1990s, the executive board made more attempts to transform the governance model of VU Amsterdam.For instance, the executive board proposed in a draft to further reduce the number of university council members from 29 to 15 and, to compensate for this loss, to create a student platform with advisory rights and a supervisory board similar to the governance structure of a corporate organization.This resembles NPM element 'hierarchization and corporatization reform'.The proposal ultimately failed, however, because the other stakeholders (university council and Society) were opposed to it (Ad Valvas, 19 May 1994).
The final break with the era of democratic governance came in 1997, when the Modernization of University Governance Act (Dutch abbreviation: MUB) was introduced.This Act provided a businesslike governance model with a monistic structure (De Boer 2003, 55-56).The structure of co-decision-making by the executive board and the university council, which had already been considerably eroded, was now completely abandoned.The university council was abolished, but the works council continued and a student council was established (Van Deursen 2005, 407-408).However, most powers of decision-making on academic and non-academic matters were allocated to the executive board and the deans.Staff and students were only given the right to advice and consent on a few issues.In addition, a supervisory board was established, to which the executive board was accountable.The supervisory board also appointed the members of the executive board.Notably, at VU Amsterdam the members of the supervisory board were appointed not by the Minister of Education, as was the case at the public universities, but by the Society.The Society thus retained influence and the university remained at a greater administrative distance from the Ministry compared to the public universities.
The members of the executive board had embraced the MUB Act.Brinkman had served as a ministerial advisor in the Van Der Zwan Committee, which was established in preparation for the MUB Act.Brinkman was inspired by the insights of Robbert Birnbaum (1988) and his idea of the university as a loosely coupled system, in short, a decentralized system with much autonomy at faculty level.For instance, Brinkman believed that faculty managements should have integral responsibilities.At the opening of the 1989-1990 academic year, he stated that the development of the university as a professional organization '[implies] integral management of and within the organization' (Brinkman 1990) [own translation].He even had the other members of the Committee read Robert Birnbaum's book How Colleges Work and then discussed the book at one of the Committee meetings (Respondent 5E1).Although the Minister did not follow the Committee's advice, the MUB Act reflects a number of principles and options from the advice, such as integral management at all levels and a strengthening of the administrative powers of the deans (Respondent 5E1; Van der Zwan et al. 1991, 26).
Moreover, Jan Donner (1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999), the board member who coordinated the implementation of the MUB Act, wanted even greater hierarchization than the MUB Act prescribed.Donner argued that what mattered to students was the quality of 'the product' (education) and that students therefore had a 'consumer right.'Thus, Donner advocated for an even more limited model of student participation, which he believed to be possible because of the distinctive identity of VU Amsterdam as a private legal entity (Rijkhof 2017, 29, 32-33).
But there was opposition.The university council was opposed to the strict interpretation of the MUB.The council initially wanted to keep the co-decision-making structure, but realized that this was not feasible and therefore strived to retain at least as many competences under the MUB Act (Ad Valvas, 9 October 1997).Eventually, the council raised the issue with the Minister of Education.In a letter, the Minister made clear to the Society and the executive board: 'I cannot see why the distinctive identity of your institution would prevent it from respecting the participatory rights explicitly indicated by the legislature as a minimum standard.I therefore trust that you will modify your student participation in accordance with the legislature (Minister of Education 1998) [own translation].Consequently, a regular interpretation was implemented at VU Amsterdam, with some minor differences.
Taken together, the transformations in the 1980s and 1990s point to NPM elements within areas 3 and 4. With regard to the latter, the emphasis was on 'hierarchization and corporatization reform', 'reduction of faculty representation', and 'development of strong executive and managerial roles.'These elements are clearly reflected, for instance, in the establishment of a works council and the executive board's attempts to introduce a strict interpretation of the MUB Act.As for area 3, which was less prominent in the shift from democratic to corporate governance, the focus was on institutional autonomy, i.e. retaining the autonomous position of the university as opposed to elements relating to accountability and performance, which received little attention.

Applying the 'right to manage' in a fast-changing higher education context
The implementation of the MUB Act had significantly strengthened the position of the executive board and its 'right to manage'.It is against this backdrop that the management style of the board began to change gradually.The board became more proactive in initiating organizational change, although changes at VU Amsterdam in the 2000s were often also related to policy shifts in the national and international higher education landscape.
Importantly, the executive board increasingly saw the university and faculties as a single entity rather than a loosely coupled system, a view shared to some extent by Wim Noomen, president of the executive board (1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005).Although a traditional administrator with a relatively moderate style, he believed the executive board should look after the interests of the university as a whole.This new approach was shared increasingly widely in the board.Hence, the board began to intervene at the faculty level more often, for instance by reallocating budget from the science faculties to the alpha and gamma faculties (Executive Board 2004b, 31), which reflects NPM element 'stronger executive and managerial roles'.But the board became more active particularly at the central level.
The administrative merger with Windesheim University of Applied Sciences (in the Netherlands, institutions of higher vocational education are referred to in English as 'universities of applied sciences') in Zwolle reflects the change in management style.The merger was not unique to VU Amsterdam.At the time, merging higher education institutions was a trend in the Netherlands.By merging, institutions were able to improve their visibility and branding and appeal to a broader student base due to the wider range of educational programs that a larger institution could offer.The idea of merging universities and universities of applied sciences arose in the context of the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS, 1995) and the introduction of the bachelormaster structure (two-cycle curriculum, 2002-2003).In the political debate about GATS, the Dutch government had made clear that it was aiming for a higher education system in which there would be more room for private providers from other (EU) countries (Executive Board 2004a, 9).Here NPM element 'role expansion of private institutions' is clearly visible.Moreover, as Minister of Education Hermans put it in 2000, 'in an open system of higher education, the quality of programs should be the basis for accreditation, not the status of the institution' (Minister of Education 2000) [own translation].In the years that followed, the idea that the distinction between higher vocational education and academic education would eventually disappear increasingly became prevalent.
In that context, the executive board of VU Amsterdam felt that the university should have sufficient mass to cope with the changes (Van Deursen 407).It believed it was better to cooperate than to compete.A merger would make it easier for Windesheim's students to transfer to a master's program at VU Amsterdam, allowing VU Amsterdam to grow (NRC Handelsblad, 24 August).According to the board, a larger institution would have a stronger position in the international higher education market, enabling the university to attract more private funding (Executive Board 2004a, 4).Also, by connecting the two regions (Amsterdam and Zwolle) the number of students could be increased (Ad Valvas, 17 January 2002).Greater student enrollment meant an increase in public funding, 1 although according to Noomen this was 'not the main argument for merging' (Trouw, 30 January 2004) [own translation].That may be so, the reasoning behind the merger points to NPM element 'financial incentives'.Moreover, the institutions' shared Christian identity was seen as an important connection, which should increase the chances of a successful merger (Executive Board 2004a, 3).Against that background, VU Amsterdam and Windesheim merged in 2004.
However, the cooperation between the two institutions was not very successful.The cultural differences, physical distance, and differences in operational management made many staff and deans reluctant about the merger.A simple example illustrates this: academic programs had been set up in Zwolle, but the deans had great difficulty motivating academic staff to physically go to Zwolle.There was a particularly striking moment in 2005, when, during a meeting between the deans and the executive board, a majority of the deans opposed Noomen and his plans to enhance the collaboration between VU Amsterdam and Windesheim.Shortly afterward, Noomen left and a new president was appointed (Respondent 1A1; Respondent 1F1).In the subsequent years there was a national change of direction.The policy stance on private providers and the abolition of the distinction between higher vocational education and academic education was abandoned.Consequently, the merger was rolled back in 2008 (Vunderink 2016, 17;Respondent 1D1).
So what does the merger tell us about NPM?The changes relate to a number of the NPM elements in areas 1, 2, and 4. The executive board increasingly embraced the principle of the university as a single entity, while also beginning to exercise its 'right to manage' (area 4) in the context of the introduction of the bachelor-master structure, growing competition between institutions, and an expected 'expanded role for private institutions' (area 1).'Financial incentives' related to student enrollment were also a factor in the reasoning behind the merger (area 2).

The use of management concepts to achieve organizational change
From around 2005, NPM gained momentum.This was not unique to VU Amsterdam, as the push for more efficiency and NPM-driven policies in public and semi-public organizations was a broader phenomenon in the Netherlands.The executive board took on a change-oriented and more businesslike style.This was very different from the relatively moderate style of the previous decades.The change in style emerged under the leadership of new executive board president René Smit (2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013), who, unlike his predecessors, did not have a background at VU Amsterdam but had held a number of executive positions in the semi-public sector.Smit had an educational background in economics, had followed several management programs at the famous French business school INSEAD as well as the London Business School, and during his education and work experience had been introduced to the leading management ideas at the time, such as the influential bestseller Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector by Ted Gaebler and David Osborne (1992).Under Smit's leadership, the executive board actively initiated organizational change, aiming to make VU Amsterdam more efficient and effective by using management techniques and concepts developed in the private sector (Respondent 1A2; Respondent 1B1; Respondent 1D1).
The businesslike approach to management was reflected in a number of ways.For instance, the executive board began to place a new emphasis on key performance indicators (KPIs).At the time, the use of performance indicators and quantitative metrics had increased dramatically in the evaluation of research and the allocation of research funding, both globally and in the Netherlands (Miedema 2022, 79).When Lex Bouter took office as rector magnificus (2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013), the H-index had just been launched (2005) and quickly became extremely popular.Against that backdrop, on the university's anniversary in 2007, Bouter advocated the use of citation indexes to measure research performance, and in his Dies Natalis speech he said enthusiastically, 'The modern administrator dreams of a cockpit with a dashboard full of performance indicators.In fact, we would have preferred to become pilots' (Bouter 2007) [own translation].Attempts were made to put this into practice, for example when VU Amsterdam established inter-faculty research institutes, a key constituent of which, according to the executive board's aim, would be quantitative performance indicators to measure research performance (Respondent 1F1).This resembles NPM element 'performance measurement and monitoring'.
The new management style can also be seen in governance.For instance, the executive board expanded its responsibilities by transferring the responsibility for the university's service departments from the university secretary (who was not a board member) to the executive board (Respondent 1A1; Respondent 1F1).But the new management style is most evident in a reorganization of the university's service departments, which took place between 2011 and 2014 under the title of 'New Business Operations VU Amsterdam.'So why did the service departments need to be reorganized?On the one hand, the motive for the reorganization was the fact that the university had grown enormously (from 14,000 students in 2000 to 24,000 students in 2010), whereas the university's service departments had not been transformed accordingly.On the other hand, government funding per student was declining and the executive board wanted to invest more in academic staff rather than in business operations.Thus, according to the board's calculations, an estimated €33 million had to be cut.That was the equivalent of 310 full-time jobs.In 2010, there were 3,424 (FTE) employees working at VU Amsterdam, so the cut involved about ten per cent of the workforce (Programmacommissie Bedrijfsvoering 2012, 3;Gorup 2013, 12;Respondent 1D1).
The plans were contested.The consultancy firm Berenschot, which was hired by the works council, calculated in 2012 that the executive board had underestimated the incomes of VU Amsterdam.The executive board had also spent a lot of budget on external advice, had made substantial investments (e.g. in university buildings) in recent years, and also kept budget in reserve for future investments.The planned budget cuts could therefore be seen as a consequence of administrative choices according to Berenschot (Vloet and Van Horssen 2012;Keulen and Kroeze 2012, 20-21).
The executive board's plans consequently drew a great deal of criticism from the university's staff, who voiced their concerns about the consequences of the budget cuts and the 'university ruled by managers' in an open platform called 'Concerned VU Group' (Gorup 2013, 41).On 23 May 2012, some 200 staff and students protested against the measures.At the same time, the executive board and the works council were meeting to discuss the reorganization.The protesters poured into the conference room and the meeting had to be interrupted.When the meeting continued, the chairman of the works council took a fierce line against the board.Later, in July, the Concerned VU Group presented a petition bearing more than 3,000 signatures to the board.The Group said, 'the cuts cannot be made without severe damage to the quality of research and education' (Concerned VU employees Petition 2012).The concerns were even addressed in the Dutch House of Representatives by member of parliament Jasper van Dijk of the Socialist Party (House of Representatives of the Netherlands 2012).Reading this, one senses the tense atmosphere surrounding the reorganization.
But despite the actions, the reorganization was continued.Besides the job cuts, a new approach to operations was introduced which clearly demonstrates NPM element 'value for money'.The new approached focused on improving the quality and efficiency of the service departments with the slogan: 'what you do, you must do properly and as cheaply as possible' (Programmacommissie Bedrijfsvoering 2012, 1) [own translation].To that end, the concept of operational excellence was used to improve the coherence of the services.Initially, operational excellence was part of the Economics Faculty's strategic plan 'Success beyond Success ' (2010).This appealed to the executive board, which was interested in implementing the concept at the central level (FEWEB Strategic Plan 2010;Respondent 1F1).The idea of focusing on operational excellence was thus internally driven, but the concept was not.Operational excellence had been introduced by CSC Index consultants Michael Treacy and Fred Wiersema in 1993 and was a key constituent of their book The Discipline of the Market Leaders (1995).The concept focuses on improving the production and delivery of products and services for customers.It was based on the business systems of large companies such as Dell, Walmart, and McDonalds.As Treacy and Wiersema put it, 'providing customers with reliable products or services at competitive prices and delivered with minimal difficulty or inconvenience' (Treacy and Wiersema 1993, 84).As we have seen, these types of management concepts were especially popular in the late 20th century.Thus it was rather remarkable that the board was embracing them now.The use of operational excellence clearly indicates NPM area 'new management style and new management techniques'.
The guidelines on operational excellence (reliable services at low costs) were applied at VU Amsterdam by harmonizing the university's business operations.Before the reorganization, all faculties had their own service departments, such as IT, HR, and Finance.There were also central services that also included IT, HR, and Finance.The executive board considered this inefficient.The services were therefore integrated and responsibility for policy was centralized, with one director being given ultimate responsibility for each service department at the central level of the university.Staff members from the service departments were assigned to the different faculties.The staff was operationally managed at the faculty level, but the methods and procedures were set at the central level (Respondent 1A2; Respondent 1D1; Respondent 1F1; Programmacommissie Bedrijfsvoering 2012, 9-10). 2 For example, communication policy was streamlined from the central level and communications staff, who were operationally managed at the faculty level, had to work in accordance with the same central framework in many respects.Another example of the application of operational excellence is reflected in the International Office, which in the reorganization plans focused on 'standardization as much as possible, as few different options as necessary and certainly as little tailor-made work as possible' (Programmacommissie Bedrijfsvoering 2012, 5) [own translation] and KPIs (although the KPIs were not considered in the subsequent evaluation of the reorganization).After the reorganization, the International Office combined all internationalization activities into one organizational unit.The restructuring of the service departments was far-reaching and led to opposition not only from the university's staff, but also from the deans.Many deans had problems with the centralization of responsibility for the service department.As the dean of the School of Business and Economics, Harmen Verbruggen, put it, 'the dean's integral responsibility [academic and operation management] is being eroded' (Verbruggen 2012) [own translation].
The introduction of new methods and techniques was also an important component of the reorganization.In this regard, standardization was the main guideline.Standardization was realized, for example, through a system of 'click-call-face', that required staff and students to solve their problems online in the first place, secondly allowed them to call a staff member, and finally let them arrange for a service employee to physically visit the faculty (Programmacommissie Bedrijfsvoering 2012, 11).
After the completion of the reorganization around 2015, organizational changes at VU Amsterdam were less far-reaching.Although they occurred, they were generally more gradual and focused on professionalization (Respondent 1A4; Respondent 1A5).This reflects a broader shift in Dutch and European higher education from around the second decade of this century, when it became more widely accepted (by many administrators) that NPM and its emphasis on KPIs had major downsides, such as a widely felt lack of alignment in the academic community due to the focus on short-term output conforming to a quantitative credit system (Miedema 2022, 89).In 2015, the EU Commissioner for Research, Innovation and Science, Carlos Moedas, had made a series of talks in which he embraced open science, with a focus on inclusive evaluation of research results.This was very different from the NPM-driven research evaluation focused on quantitative rankings (Miedema 2022, 190-192).The shift was formalized in the publication Open Innovation, Open Science, Open the World (European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation 2016).It was a watershed moment, because the idea of open science was embraced at the top European level.Of course, although this was specifically about open science, it represented a broader break from the NPM narrative, albeit that in many respects NPM-style governance was continued.
Taken together, NPM elements in areas 2, 3, and 4 can be seen in the reorganization of VU Amsterdam's business operations.The executive board took on a 'stronger executive role' (area 4), placed more emphasis on key performance indicators (area 3), and initiated a far-reaching reorganization, which was intended to produce cut-backs and greater quality and efficiency (i.e. more 'value for money') in the university's business operations (area 2).Moreover, internationally circulating management concepts developed in the private sector, specifically operational excellence, were used by the executive board and became an important part of this organizational change (area 4).Importantly, although many elements of NPM can be linked to the reorganization, we also find nuances, i.e. not all elements within the areas apply.

Conclusion and discussion
The case study shows three major NPM-style changes within VU Amsterdam and the important role of key actors in initiating organizational change.Interestingly, all four areas of NPM in higher education, as identified by Broucker and De Wit (2015), are reflected in the analysis, albeit to varying degrees, with variation within the NPM areas and particular elements highlighted in specific organizational changes.However, this does not mean that a full 'wholesale' NPM model was implemented at VU Amsterdam.Rather, the rise of NPM at VU Amsterdam was the result of a 'pick-and-mix' process in the NPM toolbox, in other words administrators introduced and emphasized different NPM-style concepts at different times to initiate change.This finding is consistent with Broucker and De Wit (2015, 70), who have shown that NPM-based reforms differ in their timing, intensity, and content.Another interesting aspect of the findings is that NPM elements linked to 'new management style and management techniques' can consistently be linked to the changes, whereas the other areas seem to vary more.Thus, the findings of this study suggest that not only have governments prioritized different NPM elements, but we also see differences in focus on elements among administrators at the institutional level.Caution is called for, however, given that the study was limited to examining one case.
A close look at VU Amsterdam clearly shows that NPM-driven governance changes were not only the result of shifts in national regulations, but also took place independently of national policy shifts and were instigated by administrators at the level of the institution.For instance, in the early 1990s the executive board had already taken steps toward a corporate governance model at VU Amsterdam before it was mandated by national regulations.Additionally, around 2010-2014, the operational excellence management concept was utilized, which was not a part of national shifts.Moreover, at times, new administrators at VU Amsterdam introduced a new NPM-like management style within VU Amsterdam, which accords with Deem's 2020 study pointing to the movement of senior administrative and management personnel from organization to organization as a driver of NPM-style organizational change and also confirms Kroeze and Keulen's, (2014) reflection that change in leadership language and style is related to policy change.On the other hand, the analysis reveals that although university administrators looked to NPM-based instruments to transform the university, in some instances their personal leadership style was not completely consistent with this.This suggests that, in addition to the role of individual administrators, the key drivers of the transformations also included national regulations and developments in the national and international context, such as the introduction of the bachelor-master structure or the popularization of management ideas, and that the actions of the executive board were therefore also a reflection of the historical context.
Taken together, combining a social science analytical framework with a historical approach proved useful in gaining new insights into the history of management of semi-public organizations and, in particular, the rise of NPM in higher education.By showing that NPM-style changes at the organizational level were initiated independently of shifts in national regulations, the study demonstrates that a historical perspective on the organizational level and actors can advance existing studies of NPM in higher education, which tend to focus on system-level change.Also, the analytical framework helped to identify organizational change as NPM and make sense of a variety of NPM-style processes.On the other hand, the historical perspective on the institutional level made initially abstract NPM elements more concrete.This intersection offers potential to enhance the academic conversation about the rise of NPM.Moreover, through the example of VU Amsterdam, this article highlights NPM as an important phenomenon in the history of management and organizations, which is still insufficiently studied within the field of management and organizational history focused mainly on industrial business.Thus, this article will hopefully be followed by other in-depth historical case studies on the rise of NPM at the institution level to further unravel the precise meaning of NPM.

Notes
1.In the Dutch funding system at the time, a financial incentive was linked to the number of enrolled students and the number of degrees awarded.2. There were some exceptions.