When defence drives foreign policy: Brazilian military agency in the revitalisation of the ZOPACAS

ABSTRACT The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS) is a maritime zone of peace that was established, largely through Brazilian efforts, by the UN General Assembly in 1986. Since its establishment, ministerial meetings have been convened to discuss the zone’s evolving agenda, which has focused on maintaining peace, building diplomatic and defence cooperation between its twenty-four member states, and encouraging development in the South Atlantic region. This article examines Brazilian diplomatic and defence interests in the South Atlantic, providing an analysis of sections in Brazil’s official defence documents (1994–2020), pertaining to the ZOPACAS, South-South cooperation, development and regional security. It ultimately seeks to address how efforts behind a new revitalisation of the ZOPACAS are being driven by the Brazilian military with the aim of expanding Brazil’s defence framework in the South Atlantic.


Introduction
The Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS) was established by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on the 27 th October 1986. This maritime zone of peace serves as an instrument to maintain peace in the South Atlantic region and further cooperation between its 24 member states, 1 which are all littoral countries situated in South America and Africa. We can observe that the zone includes G20 members, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa, as well as prominent African Union members Nigeria and Ghana, amongst its membership. None of the ZOPACAS member states possess nuclear weapons, and they seek to establish the ZOPACAS as a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the South Atlantic region. The establishment of the ZOPACAS should be considered as part of a significant wider movement towards nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons led by countries in the Global South. Since its inception, there have been seven 2 ZOPACAS ministerial meetings: Rio de Janeiro (1988), Abuja (1990), Brasilia (1994), Somerset West (1996), Buenos Aires (1998), Luanda (2007) and Montevideo (2013). These ministerial meetings were convened to discuss the zone's evolving agenda, which has expanded to include multilateral cooperation in a number of fields, such as in defence, diplomacy and development.
The ZOPACAS' core principles and objectives are outlined in seven preambulatory and seven operative clauses, laid out in its founding Declaration, UN Resolution A/Res/ 41/11. These clauses centre predominantly on the pursuit of maintaining the South Atlantic as an area dedicated to peace and cooperation; 'for the benefit of all mankind and, in particular, of the peoples of the region', 3 while also stressing the need to remove the threat and presence of extra-regional military powers and nuclear weapons. A commitment to the promotion of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic region is thus a shared interest for both Brazil and its fellow member states. This is a position that has become all the more significant in present times, especially facing rising levels of drug trafficking, overfishing, piracy and the growing involvement of non-state actors. The need to address regional security concerns has consequently become a dominant feature in both the agenda of the ZOPACAS and Brazilian defence policy. As we will examine in this article, the ZOPACAS has been viewed as a mechanism through which Brazil can further its diplomatic and defence relations with its fellow member states. Efforts behind the current revitalisation of the ZOPACAS, and the instigation of a new ministerial meeting, however, will be demonstrated as led predominantly by the Brazilian military, rather than civilian diplomatic actors.
Brazil, the country at the centre of this Special Issue, is widely accepted in academic literature as a leading member of the ZOPACAS. 4 Whilst the promotion of peace, cooperation and nuclear non-proliferation are the zone's principal areas of focus, there also exists an interest in 'promo[ting] development cooperation among member states in the economic, environmental and social domains'. 5 This highlights the existence of a nexus between development, defence and security, 6 which will be central to this article's evaluation of the ZOPACAS and Brazilian foreign and defence policy. This article contributes to academic literature that focuses on the ZOPACAS, Brazilian diplomatic and defence priorities in the South Atlantic, and Brazil's interests in the ZOPACAS and the South Atlantic region. It also seeks to understand how the ZOPACAS has been featured in Brazil's defence agenda and its perspectives on South Atlantic security, as well as its ties to development.
Following a review of Brazil's official defence documents, issued between 1994-2020, this article argues that Brazil and especially the Brazilian military can be viewed as responsible actors for recent resurgent interests in the ZOPACAS. This position has become increasingly apparent, for example, due to the organisation of a number of symposiums as well as bulletins issued by the Brazilian Ministry of Defence and other Brazilian research bodies. These in turn are shown to be due to the country's interests in addressing growing regional security threats in the South Atlantic. These are threats posed by extra-regional state actors, such as the UK, US and China, and non-state actors, particularly seen in the Gulf of Guinea. This stance by Brazil will also be interpreted as an incentive to increase efforts behind the instigation of a new ministerial meeting, with Cape Verde affirmed as the next host in A/Res/75/312, the recent ZOPACAS UN Resolution, issued in July 2021. 7 Brazil's official defence documents, including its National Polices of Defence and National Maritime Policies, provide a significant insight as to how Brazil views its national, regional and international defence priorities and objectives. They also outline their intrinsic connections to the development of the country, and how Brazil plans to utilise the three branches of its Armed Forces: the Navy, the Army and the Air Force.
Considering the focus of this article' research, a prominence has been conferred to the sections that pertain to Brazil's defence interests in the South Atlantic, and those concerning the ZOPACAS. Attention is also given to Brazil's positioning regarding cooperation, peace-building and multilateralism, as well as its stance on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, all of which are significant factors in Brazil's diplomatic and defence priorities.
The rest of this article is organised into two main sections. The first analyses the defence documents issued between 1994 and 2012. These are the years prior to Montevideo (2013), the most recent ministerial meeting of the ZOPACAS. This is followed by a second section which explores the themes outlined in the 2016 and 2020 issues of these documents, thus providing a contemporary examination of Brazil's stance on the ZOPACAS. It will also briefly examine the symposiums convened by the Brazilian Ministry of Defence regarding the ZOPACAS. The article closes with final remarks and a conclusion in which we will be able to assess current efforts behind the new revitalisation of the ZOPACAS. The National Maritime Policy (1994), issued under President Franco, puts forward Brazil's maritime and naval objectives, interests and activities. These are described to span from those based in the South Atlantic Ocean to Brazil's rivers and lakes. This provides us with an awareness of how, while the South Atlantic is a prominent security priority for Brazil, the country still, nevertheless, has multiple other bodies of water to protect and defend. This Policy aims to employ 'the intelligent application of maritime power and its naval arm, for the benefit of the country's interests'. 8, 9 It also contains an important overview of Brazil's vision and definition of maritime power: Maritime Power is to be understood as a component of National Power which the nation possesses as a means to achieve its objectives connected to the sea or its dependents. These are of political, economic, military and social means and include, among others, the maritime conscience of the people and the political class, the Merchant Navy and the War Navy, the naval building industry, ports and the apparatus of maritime commerce. Naval Power is a military component of Maritime Power. 10,11 The 1994 Policy next details Brazil's maritime objectives, including reference to the need to improve and develop the Navy and Brazil's ports, and stimulate 'production, in the Country, of ships, boats, equipment and specific material, in relation to the development of maritime activities and encompassing the defence of the Country's maritime interests'. 12,13 A connection is also made between Brazil's diplomatic and defence agendas, with an objective of presenting 'a favourable image of the County abroad, in support of Brazilian diplomatic actions'. 14,15 These inclusions thus denote an overlap between military development, and the advancement of Brazilian foreign and defence interests in the South Atlantic. It is important to note here that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed by Brazil in 1982, entered into force in November 1994. There is also clear indication in both the Naval Building and Research and Development sections of this 1994 Policy, of Brazil's ambitions to 'encourage research and the development of new technologies for maritime power, include nuclear'. 16, 17 As we are aware, Brazil's interests in enlisting nuclear power in its naval development have since manifested in its current Submarine Development Programme (PROSUB). 18 The 1996 National Policy of Defence outlines Brazil's defence priorities and objectives, developed under President Cardoso. It begins with an appraisal of how the new geopolitical Post-Cold War framework called for a need to formulate a Brazilian national defence policy. This need was mentioned to be in response to internal, regional and global influences, 19 although it was noted that 'South America, far from the global focal points of tension, is considered to be the most de-militarised region in the world'. 20 A deliberation of Brazil itself followed, one of 'different internal regions and of a diverse profile, at the same time Amazonian, Atlantic, of the River Plate and Southern Cone, the concept of the regional space goes beyond continental South America and also includes the South Atlantic'. 21,22 This aids in our understanding of Brazil's diplomatic and defence interests during the Post-Cold War period, and the 1996 Policy also demonstrated the manner in which Brazil viewed its spheres of influence and identified the areas in which to further its relations. The Cardoso Government Policy included a clear emphasis on cooperation, peacebuilding and development, understood to extend from both regional to international level, with a call for: the reinforcement of the integration process provided by Mercosul, a closer relationship with the Amazonian neighbours -developed in the scope of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization -, the strengthening of cooperation with Portuguese-speaking African countries and the consolidation of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic -the result of a positive and tangible diplomatic action -that underpin a true ring of peace around the Country, enabling the focus of efforts that aim to fulfil the national project of development and the fight against social inequalities. 23,24 The 1996 Policy also comprised of a list of objectives, including 'the achievement and maintenance of Brazilian interests abroad . . . Brazilian projection in the international community and greater inclusion in the international decision making process, and its contribution to the maintenance of peace and international security'. 25,26 Strategic considerations followed, positioning Brazil as a country with a policy 'centred around an active diplomatic approach orientated towards peace and a dissuasive defensive strategic position'. 27,28 The document concludes with a set of directives, centred around the promotion of peace. These included: [Brazil] actively contributing to the building of an international order, based on the rule of law, which fosters universal and regional peace and the sustainable development of mankind . . . the promotion of Brazilian position which favours global disarmament, conditional upon the decommissioning of nuclear arsenals and other weapons of mass destruction, with an agreed upon multilateral process . . . [Brazil] participating in international peace-keeping operations, in agreement with national interests . . . working towards the maintenance of a spirit of peace and cooperation along national borders, for the solidarity of Latin America and in the South Atlantic region 29,30 It is noteworthy to remember that Somerset West (1996) occurred this same year. This was the fourth ZOPACAS ministerial meeting, which took place in South Africa, a country which had recently decommissioned its nuclear arsenal and become a ZOPACAS member state. This year also encompassed the Treaty of Pelindaba 31 being opened for signature, as well as the establishment of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP).
The  34 It is significant to note here that much of this international engagement was steered by Brazil's interests in increasing cooperation in the areas of development, security and defence. This current period of the new millennium can consequently be viewed as a time for the greater advancement of the Global South. In the case of South America as a region, Herz (2010) explores how 'in some countries the aspiration to regional leadership or hegemony has acquired relevance in guiding foreign policy'. 35 This is an attitude progressively seen in the dominant roles played by the new leading state actors, such as Brazil, which have increasingly been grouped in multilateral associations. These include institutions, like the African Union, MERCOSUR, BRICS, IBSA, UNASUR and the South American Defence Council (CDS), and zones of peace such as the ZOPACAS, which have permitted their member states to have greater influence on the world stage as well as further their own development.
The 2005 National Policy of Defence was the first of two documents issued under Lula. As we have observed, he is a President which, similarly to Cardoso, was invested in strengthening Brazil's diplomatic and defence relations with countries in the South Atlantic region. This 2005 Policy includes an outline of Brazilian defence priorities, an appraisal of the international and regional environments and Brazil's strategic environment. This is followed by a delineation of national defence objectives, strategic guidelines and the subsequent directives developed so as to achieve the objectives of the Policy. It begins with how the 'National Policy of Defence is orientated, predominantly, towards external threats' 36,37 and how it 'has as its premise the foundations, objectives and principles set out in the Federal Constitution and is in line with government guidelines and the Country's foreign policy' and is thus 'based on the search for peaceful solutions to conflicts and the strengthening of international peace and security'. 38,39 Here we can understand Brazil's priorities in the new millennium and also witness a continuation of Brazil's peaceful interests. Similar to the 1994 Policy, there is a brief overview of Brazil's vision and its definition of terms. In this case, two concepts are defined: Security is the condition that permits the preservation of the Country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, the accomplishment of its national interests, free from any manner of pressures and threats, and the assurance to its citizens of their constitutional rights and duties, 40,41 National Defence is the set of policies and actions taken by the State, with an emphasis on the military components of national power, for the defence of the territory, sovereignty and the national interests against predominantly potential or overt external threats 42,43 We can observe that defence and security have similar definitions, with an emphasis on the preservation of national sovereignty and protection against possible threats. There are also several deliberations included in this 2005 Policy with regard to the international and regional state of play. It is reasoned, for example, 'that the prevalence of multilateralism and the strengthening of the principles established by international law such as sovereignty, non-intervention and equality between States, are the promoters for a more stable world'. 44,45 This position is built upon, explaining how Brazil 'seeks to deepen its ties of cooperation, [and that] the Country sees its strategic environment as reaching beyond the area of the subcontinent [of South America] and includes beyond the border of the South Atlantic and the coastal countries of Africa'. 46,47 This is understood as encompassing the countries that comprise the membership of the ZOPACAS. A reaffirmation and emphasis on both cooperation and peace-building, are also featured, previously seen in the 1996 Policy. There are likewise mentions of Brazil's ambitions related to strengthening cooperation via MERCOSUR, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization and the ZOPACAS, as well as building stronger ties with countries in both South America and Africa. 48 It is consequently clear that a desire to maintain both Brazil's peaceful and multilateral interests are central to the country's defence policy priorities.
Subsequent to these considerations, there is an overview of Brazil's perception of itself, taking into account its principal maritime and territorial interests; all significant points to remember when evaluating Brazil's regional security concerns. It states that 'defence planning includes all the regions [of Brazil] and, in particular, the vital areas where there is the greatest concentration of political and economic power', and continues by expressing how 'complementary to this, is a priority given to the Amazon region and the South Atlantic due to their richness of resources and their vulnerability to be accessed via land and maritime borders'. 49,50 This exemplifies how Brazil understands its defence priorities and perceived territorial and maritime vulnerabilities. There is also a direct connection made between defence, security and development, as Brazil's views on the value of the South Atlantic Ocean are further reinforced: The sea has also been connected to the development of Brazil since its discovery. Brazil's natural maritime vocation is underpinned by its extensive coastline and by the strategic importance represented by the South Atlantic 51,52 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] permitted Brazil to extend the limits of its Continental Platform and have the right to exercise jurisdiction over the economic resources in an area of around 4.5 million km 2 , a region of vital importance to the Country, a real "Blue Amazon" 53,54 Similar to the 1996 Policy, Brazil's interests are shown to extend beyond the Ocean and include the countries in South Atlantic region. This is where the concept of Blue Amazon, explored by De Carvalho (2019), is used as a mechanism by the Brazilian Navy to advance Brazil's defence agenda and maritime power. 55 There is likewise, in the 2005 Policy, an added desire for increased cooperation with other Lusophone countries that form part of the CPLP. Brazil's priorities thus include a focus both on strengthening its development as well as building ties with fellow member states in the region.
Brazil's commitment to the non-proliferation movement is also evident in this 2005 Policy. It reiterates how Brazil is 'a signatory of the [NPT] and emphasises the need for compliance of Article VI, which foresees the negotiation for a total elimination of nuclear weapons by nuclear powers, reserving the use of nuclear technology for economic and peaceful means'. 56, 57 Here we can recall PROSUB and Brazil's current nuclear submarine plans, and debates which have arisen regarding whether a nuclear propulsion submarine is a peaceful use of nuclear technology. 58 Regarding Brazil's national defence objectives and strategic guidelines, many are identical in phrasing to those in the 1996 Policy. There is also mention of Brazil's key positions, including 'the peaceful resolution of conflicts . . . an appreciation of multilateral forums . . . due to the value and strategic importance of the Brazilian Amazon and the South Atlantic, these are areas of priority for National Defence'. 59,60 We will see that these attitudes are represented time and again in the upcoming documents examined in this section. These commitments by Brazil are therefore part of a common trend.
The The 2008 National Strategy of Defence, which has 'Peace and security for Brazil' as its subheading, provided the new national strategy guidelines for Brazil's Ministry of Defence and the three branches of its Armed Forces. It included considerations on various strategic areas, such as cyber, space and nuclear, and a series of implementation measures related to, among others, the Brazilian defence industry, training, peacekeeping operations, regional stability, international participation and national security. 63  and remind us of how regional security concerns such as the trafficking of drugs and piracy were becoming a growing issue in the South Atlantic. It is of relevance to mention here that UNASUL was signed earlier this same year, and its South American Defence Council (CSD) is cited as being a 'consultative mechanism that will allow preventing conflict solutions and promoting regional military cooperation and integration of the defence industrial bases, in which no country external to the region should participate'. 65 Regarding Brazil's nuclear policy, the Strategy details how 'Brazil is committed -as per the Federal Constitution and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons -to the strictly peaceful use of nuclear energy' and that 'no other country is more active than Brazil when it comes to the nuclear disarmament cause'. 66 The reasons behind this commitment are said to having been done 'under several premises, the most important of which was the progressive nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon States'. 67 We can furthermore learn how Brazil aims to contribute to regional security measures, including how the 'Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will promote the increase of the activities regarding the regional stability maintenance and the cooperation in the border areas of the country'. 68 Considering that Brazil borders 10 other countries in South America, this is arguably a necessary step in both securing Brazil's borders as well as building stronger ties with its neighbours. This desire for building defence partnerships and exchanges with other countries had been previously mentioned in the 2005 Policy. However, here we can notice some small differences. For example, the 2008 Strategy does not specify Brazil's areas of interest, nor provide specific details of the nations with which it seeks to cooperate; whereas the 2005 Policy clearly names them to be countries that are understood as ZOPACAS member states, i.e. countries in both South America and Africa, which border the South Atlantic Ocean. These are countries with which Brazil has built several defence partnerships, including naval training exercises with Guinea-Bissau, Namibia, Senegal, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. 69 It is significant for us to remember that 2008 was the year following the sixth ZOPACAS ministerial meeting, Luanda (2007). This meeting took place after a nine year gap, following Buenos Aires (1998). This interval between the 1998 and 2007 ministerial meetings had previously been the longest interval between meetings; that is, up until the gap that we are currently witnessing, 2013-2022.
The 2012 National Policy of Defence, along with the 2012 Defence White Paper, were the two documents issued under Rousseff, regarding Brazil's defence objectives. Strong commitments to multilateral cooperation and peace are evident in past defence documents; and these 2012 documents follow the same path and also reiterate Brazil's commitments to the peaceful use of nuclear technology, steps to increase the country's participation in PKOs and an aspiration to strengthen Brazil's position in the wider international community. Considering that Rousseff and Lula both belonged to the PT, it is understandable that many of the stances set out in the 2012 Policy and White Paper, regarding security and defence policy, should remain similar to those outlined in the 2005 and 2008 documents. Evidence of these shared approaches also serves as an indication of consistency in defence policy building.
The 2012 Policy detailed Brazil's defence priorities, which included an evaluation of the State, security and defence; the international and regional environment; Brazil's strategic interests and its perceptions of itself as a country. This was followed by a description of Brazil's national defence objectives and concluding guidelines. The 2012 Policy had a brief introduction of its purpose and how it served as an instrument to explain the defensive positions of the country, which are coordinated by its Ministry of Defence. Similarly to previous documents, there is a clear stance on how these should align with national interests and Brazilian foreign policy and put forward 'a broad and current vision, the peaceful solution to conflicts, the strengthening of peace and international security, the enhancement of multilateralism and South American integration'. 70,71 It was again noted that to be able to successfully implement the 2012 Policy, a set of definitions for Security and Defence were needed. These are the same terms as those included in the 2005 Policy, and again demonstrate the overlap between Brazil's defence and security objectives.
With regard to the international and regional environment, there are several significant indicators of Brazil's interests and commitments to multilateral cooperation and development. While these indicators share many similarities and parallels with those outlined in previous Policies, such as an acknowledgement of South America as a peaceful continent and a NWFZ, and how further integration would be beneficial to the region, we can observe here that there is a noteworthy expansion in the range of Brazil's considerations. These are described to encompass how: Among the factors that contribute to the possibility of reducing conflicts in the strategic environment, these should be emphasised: the strengthening of the integration process, from Mercosul to the Union of South American Nations; the close relationship between Amazonian countries, in the framework of the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organisation; the increase of cooperation and trade with countries in Africa, Central America and the Caribbean, including the Community of Latin America and Caribbean States (CELAC), aided by cultural and ethnic ties; the development of regional organisations; the integration of industrial defence bases; the consolidation of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic and the dialogues continued at the tables of inter-regional interaction, such as at the Africa-South America (ASA) summit and the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA). 72,73 The inclusion of the Caribbean, UNASUL, CELAC, ASA and IBSA to Brazil's agenda, marks a significant moment with regard to Brazil's interests in South-South cooperation. It shows, not only, that Brazil's interests would now include a greater portion of its regional environment but also involve multiple continents and regions. Nevertheless, in the Brazil section of the 2012 Policy, the prioritisation of the Amazonian and the South Atlantic regions is again made clear. This also reinforces the country's connection to the sea, due to Brazil's long Atlantic coastline. There is similarly a focus on fostering closer relations with countries in South America, Africa, and those part of the CPLP. 74 We can observe that this is the same stance that was previously outlined in earlier defence documents.
There is also mention of the BRICS, where it is explained that Brazil seeks to strengthen its ties with other emerging economies, and its international commitment to PKOs. This is significant in again demonstrating a widening of Brazil's interests and the importance the country places on multilateral cooperation and the promotion of peace. There is also evidence once more of Brazil's commitment to nuclear disarmament. Regarding the 2012 Policy's national defence objectives and concluding guidelines, Brazil's commitments are clear in that it utilises its Armed Forces for the defence of the country and to protect its interests as well as the maintenance of peace. Brazil, similar to a stance laid out in previous documents, should 'seek strategic partnerships, looking to expand the range of cooperation options in defence and in exchange opportunities'. 75,76 This reference to Brazil's partnerships is particularly poignant as by 2012, Brazil had already begun to conduct naval exercises with countries in Africa and with its partners via IBSAMAR. 2012 was also the year prior to Montevideo (2013), and when Brazil's presence in Haiti was at its highest, leading to conversations regarding if there was a Brazilian way of undertaking PKOs. 77 The 2012 White Paper was the first official defence document of its kind and length. It included a detailed and thorough examination of Brazil's defence, foreign and strategic priorities; the historical and recent actions of its Armed Forces; and considerations of the various levels of the Brazilian State's defence system, ranging from its Ministry of Defence to the training and education of soldiers in the respective branches of Armed Forces. The first three chapters of the Defence White Paper, entitled The Brazilian State and National Defence, 21 st Century Strategic Environment, Defence and the Military Instrument, are of particular interest to this research and are analysed here.
The first chapter features a consideration of Brazil and its defence priorities. There is mention, in the Basic Principles of State subsection, of the manner in which international cooperation is fundamental to Brazilian foreign policy and that 'Brazil gives priority to its immediate neighbours in South America, the South Atlantic region and Africa's western coast'. 78 This is reinforced in the Territory subsection where Brazil's various connections to the South Atlantic Ocean are listed, including its petroleum reserves, the important navigation routes and maritime traffic from trade that are situated in the region. 79 The second chapter includes an overview of Brazil's strategic environment, taking into consideration the international and regional environments, defence treaties and its principal foreign and defence policies. 80 Of particular note to our evaluations of Brazil's development are the repeated references in favour of closer cooperation with countries in the Global South. This includes with the 'the financial G-20, the commercial G-20, the BRICS group, the IBAS Forum and the BASIC group' 81 as well as working towards a more multipolar environment. In the opening of the section regarding the International System, it is asserted that 'Brazil strives so that forums for multilateral consensus-building, especially those of the United Nations, become more representative of the new reality of the 21 st century'. 82 Regarding Brazil's interests in regional systems, South America and the UNASUL are mentioned as important priorities for the country. More specifically, the objectives of the South American Defence Council, a component of UNASUL, are listed: the consolidation of South America as a zone of peace and a basis for democratic stability and full development, and world peace . . . the construction of a South American identity in the realm of defence, which considers sub-regional and national aspects (the River Plate, the Andes, the Amazon, the Atlantic, the Caribbean and the Pacific) and that strengthens Latin American and Caribbean unity; and the generation of consensus in order to strengthen regional cooperation in defence matters. 83 As we are aware, regional cooperation and the building of stronger ties with South America have also been shown to be a defence policy priority for Brazil in earlier defence documents. The maintenance of peace and stability of South America is therefore noted as being crucial to this goal, with the term 'zone of peace' employed to identify it.
Another set of longstanding priorities are Brazil's own waters, its coastline and the South Atlantic Ocean. This is followed by considerations regarding the significance of the ZOPACAS and Brazil's relations with other member states. This is expressed in affirming that 'Brazil also dedicates, together with its Western African neighbours, special attention to the building of a cooperative environment in the South Atlantic, under the aegis of the Peace and Cooperation Zone for the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS)', soon followed by stating that 'in diplomatic terms, the reinforcement of ZOPACAS is important for the Country's defence'. 84 This is critical to our understanding of Brazil's view of the ZOPACAS and demonstrates the zone's significance to Brazil's defence agenda. Here we can thus begin to see a change in perception of the ZOPACAS, from an instrument in the promotion of peace, to also one of military importance.
There is also a brief overview of the commitments laid out in A/Res/41/11, with a focus on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the military presence of nuclear weapons states. The remarks on the ZOPACAS conclude with how 'renewing its involvement in such multilateral precepts, Brazil wishes to contribute, in a responsible way and in collaboration with its partners in ZOPACAS, to the South Atlantic region's potential socioeconomic development'. 85 These positions show evidence of a continued mention and acknowledgement of the ZOPACAS within discussions regarding Brazilian regional security priorities in the South Atlantic and Brazil's agenda for cooperation in the region. It also publicly reaffirms Brazil's interest in the ZOPACAS, in the year prior to Montevideo (2013).
In the subsection, entitled Foreign and Defence Policies, the shared positions of Brazil's Foreign and Defence Ministries are explored, demonstrating how defence agendas can drive foreign policy. A significant mention was how Brazil's 'foreign and defence policies are complementary and inseparable' and that 'the maintenance of regional stability and the construction of a more cooperative international environment will be favoured by the joint action of the Ministry of Defence (MD) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE)'. 86 This inter-ministerial cooperation is furthermore shown to occur both at regional level and between diplomatic and defence personnel at multilateral fora, with the South American Defence Council named as an example.
Brazil's interests in strengthening its relations with developing countries is highlighted here, with reference to both BRICS and IBSA. Regarding partnerships with African countries, there is also mention of cooperation in trade, and agricultural goods, named as another element of positive development in the South Atlantic region. 87 These positions demonstrate the various dimensions of Brazil's cooperation with different countries, which range, even in one region, to include defence and diplomatic cooperation, trade and agricultural goods. This range of cooperative pursuits by Brazil is critical in our understanding of how Brazil has sought to advance its agenda in the South Atlantic region and also develop stronger ties with its fellow ZOPACAS member states.
This section has thus examined Brazil's principal interests in the South Atlantic region, encompassing how Brazil views its national, regional and international defence priorities and objectives in its official defence documents, 1994 -2012. These, as we have seen, were issued under four Presidents, who shared similar commitments towards promoting Brazil's interests in the South Atlantic, the ZOPACAS and matters such as cooperation, peace-building and multilateralism, as well as its stance on disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Brazil and the South Atlantic region (2016-2022)
This section involves an examination of the principal themes of the 2016 White Book of Defence, the combined 2016 National Policy of Defence and the National Strategy of Defence, the combined 2020 National Defence Policy and National Strategy of Defence, the 2020 White Book of Defence and the Naval Strategy Plan 2040, regarding the ZOPACAS and the South Atlantic. These issues provide an overview of Brazilian defence and security objectives in recent years. We can note that the 2016 editions were issued in a challenging year for Brazil, which involved the impeachment of Rousseff and the inauguration of President Temer. These turbulent times for Brazilian politics may also go some way in explaining the decline in attention directed towards the ZOPACAS, as well as a lack of an eighth ministerial meeting thus far. Nevertheless, as we will observe, the ZOPACAS is still mentioned in the upcoming documents and listed as a vital tool in Brazil's defence priorities regarding the South Atlantic region.
The 2016 White Book echoes many positions laid out in the 2008 Strategy, including mention of UNASUL and its South American Defence Council. 88 It also summaries the ZOPACAS and has the view of how 'the reinforcement of the ZOPACAS is important for the defence of the Country' and how 'Brazil desires to contribute, in a responsible manner and in collaboration with its partners in the ZOPACAS, for the harnessing of the potential for socio-economic potential of the South Atlantic region'. 89,90 This is the second instance in which we can observe a reference to the ZOPACAS as an instrument of military importance. There is furthermore clear mention of the Gulf of Guinea and the threats faced in the region, with the ZOPACAS cited as a means 'to contribute to the strengthening of the capacities of the littoral States in the Gulf in providing maritime security and stability in the region'. 91,92 This has therefore notably changed the scope of the ZOPACAS and expresses how it could be used to address current regional security concerns.
The combined 2016 Policy and Strategy reiterates these approaches and expresses the need to 'seek the maintenance of the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and cooperation'. 93 This stance is included in the section entitled 'Concepts of Defence Policy' which details how 'peace and stability in international relations require integrated and coordinated actions in the spheres of Development'; with further mention of how the 'three pillars -Development, Diplomacy and Defence -should be explored with more or less depth depending on the concrete case, with the aim of guaranteeing national Defence and Security'. 94, 95 We can therefore understand these perceptions to indicate the necessity of peace in promoting development, conducting successful diplomacy, and forming defence strategies. This again highlights the existence and significance of a nexus between development, defence and security when analysing Brazilian defence policy.
The 2020 Policy and Strategy, and 2020 White Book, also makes reference to the importance of the ZOPACAS in Brazilian regional security considerations. The combined Policy and Strategy details how its strengthening will help to consolidate Brazil's position both as a principal regional actor, and aid to increase the country's influence in its strategic environment. This is where we can observe how the ZOPACAS has become a tool for the promotion and expansion of Brazil's defence interests in the South Atlantic. It can also be used as a means in which to counter the presence of threats in the region. This is evidenced by 'a rise of illicit transnational actions, predatory fishing, environmental crimes and the presence of countries that are not part, although possess interests, in the region'. 96 The 2020 White Book of Defence also mentions the Gulf of Guinea and shares many stances with its 2016 counterpart. 97 The Naval Strategy Plan 2040 includes a 20 year outlook for the Brazilian Navy and outlines the country's maritime interests. It also has many similarities with the 2020 White Book of Defence, and mentions the need to consolidate the ZOPACAS and avoid what it calls the interference of illegitimate interests. 98 These steps, taken by the Brazilian Ministry of Defence, indicate what can be considered as a new revitalisation of the ZOPACAS, as well as the pursuit of advancing military interests in the South Atlantic. The issuing of these 2020 documents occurred in the same year as a poignant reference to the ZOPACAS in President Bolsonaro's speech at the opening of the UNGA in September 2020. It is therefore clear that the Bolsonaro government has given its support to the ZOPACAS and acknowledged its importance. This consequently indicates a continuation in the stance of previous Presidents.
Although Bolsonaro has appeared to have a limited interest in multilateralism, his administration still nevertheless seems to view the ZOPACAS as a mechanism through which to maintain its relations with Brazil's neighbours in the South Atlantic. This was seen in the mention of the ZOPACAS in the 2020 documents and the convening of ZOPACAS Symposiums 99 by the Brazilian Navy, such in October 2020. These online meetings featured Rear-Admirals from Brazil, South Africa, Argentina and Angola, together with a number of academics. They discussed the ZOPACAS, wider South Atlantic security issues, current maritime security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea, such as the rise in piracy and drug-trafficking, and the presence of extra-regional actors in the South Atlantic, such as China. This was followed in November 2020 by the 6 th Symposium on Regional Security, organised by the Brazilian Ministry of Defence, which featured a panel on the ZOPACAS and the Gulf of Guinea. The event included opening remarks presented by former Brazilian Foreign Minister Araújo and the Vice President, retired General Mourão, where they lauded the significance of the South Atlantic for Brazil. 100 This recent activity are part of resurgent interests by Brazil and the Brazilian Navy in the ZOPACAS. It reinforces the possibility of a new revitalisation of the zone, in a more militarised capacity, in the face of addressing regional concerns, and the need for greater collaboration in the realm of maritime security in the South Atlantic.

Conclusions
As we have examined in this article, Brazil's interests in the South Atlantic have encompassed its promotion of peace, cooperation and nuclear disarmament, while likewise seeking to strengthen its naval, military, and diplomatic position in the region. The existing nexus in the analysis of Brazilian defence policy between development, defence and security 101 has therefore been shown to also be evident when we consider the ZOPACAS and the evolution of Brazil's defence agenda in the South Atlantic. Considered the leading member of the ZOPACAS, Brazil has hosted two of its seven ministerial meetings, Rio de Janeiro (1988) and Brasilia (1994), and is now the principal actor behind current efforts for its revitalisation. As mentioned earlier, the zone's most recent ministerial meeting was Montevideo (2013), and we are currently witnessing the longest interval between ministerial meetings.
As concerns regarding regional security have grown in recent years, such as with rising levels of drug trafficking and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, we have accordingly noted a gradual militarisation in Brazil's understanding of the ZOPACAS. The zone, once viewed predominantly as an instrument to maintain peace in the South Atlantic region and further diplomatic and defence cooperation, is now viewed by Brazil to be part of its defence agenda. This attitude has been demonstrated through the mention of the ZOPACAS in many official defence documents, including the 2020 editions, and the convening of ZOPACAS Symposiums 102 by the Brazilian Navy, such as in October 2020. This is where any plans for an upcoming ZOPACAS ministerial meeting, albeit delayed by COVID-19, can be envisioned to help address these regional security concerns and combat current threats to peace in the South Atlantic. As a zone of peace which exemplifies South-South and bi-continental cooperation, the ZOPACAS should continue to be a mechanism to discuss and ultimately resolve regional threats. If the ZOPACAS member states were to cooperate and renew their interests at a Cape Verde (2023 or 2024), this zone of peace could be a way in which to act in a combined and regional approach.
A shared desire for promoting peace and cooperation led to the establishment of the ZOPACAS, 103 and consequently, it should still be perceived as relevant in conversations regarding Brazil, peace, security and the South Atlantic. With the 2022 re-election of Lula to the Presidency, a return to multilateralism and a promotion of South-South cooperation is more likely to be at the centre of Brazil's foreign policy and defence agenda. We therefore await the results of the recent ZOPACAS Resolution, A/Res/75/312, issued in July 2021, and whether current revitalisation efforts by the Brazilian military will be successful.