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To cite this article: Nini Jensen (1980) Nakane Chie and *Japanese Society* , Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 12:3, 60-65, DOI: [10.1080/14672715.1980.10405589](https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.1980.10405589)

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Published online: 05 Jul 2019.



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### Nakane Chie and *Japanese Society*

by Nini Jensen

Nakane Chie is probably the Japanese anthropologist best known in the West, and *Japanese Society* the most widely read of her books.<sup>1</sup> As such, it plays an important role in the West's understanding of Japan. Although the book is supposed to be a key to the post-war period, I have chosen to discuss it for two other reasons: because of her reputation and influence and because she places herself in a social anthropological tradition. My main task will be to criticize her conception of pre-capitalist social forms—in other words the social relations she characterizes as native or feudal/traditional.

In the preface Nakane comes across as an exponent of the “uniqueness perception,” which means she claims that Japan is permanently different from other societies. R. Benedict and J. Abegglen are among her allies:

*They all describe Japan in terms like loyalty, hierarchy, duty, groupishness, and shame, and stress the immense importance personal relationships have in Japanese society. Since the bedrock norms, values and institutions differ so radically, Japan will never become Western in essence, though it may approximate Western ways in outward form.*<sup>2</sup>

It is common to oppose this interpretation with the “convergence perception” which, among others, includes R.P. Dore and R. Cole and claims “that there is a common arrangement toward which all industrial and industrializing societies are moving . . . With much sophistication and mystification this view has been purveyed by what has come to be called ‘modernization studies’.”<sup>3</sup>

But if one stays within this framework, an important point might escape notice. This point is what both perceptions have in common: their conceptual starting-points and their analytical procedures both result in an apologetic for the capitalist mode of production.

If one is to generalize and at the same time take into consideration the above comments it can be claimed with a certain fairness that the exponents of the “convergence perception,” or modernization studies, emphasize what one could call the material or “technological” background for the subsump-

tion of production under capital.<sup>3</sup> They stress the superiority of the capitalism over what came before, which may be called the feudal, the traditional or, for that matter, the irrational system. The exponents of the “uniqueness perception,” on the other hand, discuss social relations, values and individuals, the rationality of which is taken as proven by the fact that they exist. By virtue of such a basis of legitimation, the theory appears impossible to disprove, and may seem more sophisticated than the modernization studies, since its justification of the subsumption of production under capital builds on a procedure that conceals this very subsumption.

While Nakane may be included in the group of uniqueness exponents, she bases her rejection of the modernization studies not on a critical evaluation of their theoretical approach but by resorting to some of their analytical procedures.

#### The Social Structure

With the social structure (and its components, the social relations) as her object of study, Nakane starts her analysis by narrowing down her sphere of interest while at the same time disavowing the dualistic inclination of the modernization studies.

*The fabric of Japanese society has thus been made to appear to be torn into pieces of two kinds. But in fact it remains as one well-integrated entity. In my view, the “traditional” is one aspect (not element) of the same social body which also has “modern” features. I am more interested in the truly basic components and their potentiality in the society—in other words, in social persistence. (emphasis added) (ix)*

This historically invariable relation, “the persistence”—the object of her analysis—is seen in personal relations. At the same time, it reveals a society's basic value orientation:

*The persistence of social structure can be clearly seen in the modes of personal social relation which determine the probable variability of group organization in changing circumstances. This persistence reveals the basic value orientation*

*inherent in society, and is the driving force of the development of society.*

There is a lack of clarity here regarding where to localize the values that is not unusual in her analysis. Leaving this lack of clarity aside for the moment, our attention is next drawn to the kinship group “which is normally regarded as the primary and basic human attachment [but which] seems to be compensated in Japan by a personalized relation to a corporate group based on work, in which the major aspects of social and economic life are involved.” (7)

This group is constituted on the basis of a loosely-defined, fixed principle, the “frame” principle:

*Frame may be a locality, an institution or a particular relationship which binds a set of individuals into one group: in all cases it indicates a criterion which sets a boundary and gives a common basis to a set of individuals who are located or involved in it. (1)*

The contrast to “frame” is “attribute”:

*Attribute may mean, for instance, being a member of a definite descent group or caste. In contrast, being a member of X village expresses the commonality of frame. Attribute may be acquired not only by birth but by achievement. Frame is more circumstantial. (2)*

The two criteria are perceived as operative in any society, but Nakane is interested in the relative degree of stress since this is closely related to the values of a given society.

In the case that, as in Japan, the situational element is stressed, individuals are brought into a social relationship within a strong and lasting “frame” and groups will consist of individuals with different “attributes.” Nakane then posits a need for further strengthening of the “frame” because the most elementary form of such a situational group is a “simple herd” with no inherent internal cohesiveness. This can be accomplished in two ways which are in practice bound together.

*One is to influence the members within the frame in such a way that they have a feeling of “one-ness”; the second method is to create an internal organization which will tie the individuals in the group to each other and then to strengthen this organisation. (9)*

In other words, positive steps must be taken to create this feeling of one-ness. People are “led to feel”—a typical delicate reference to underlying coercion—and the feelings become both the goal *and* the means for strengthening of group solidarity. Below, in the section on oppression, we shall see that Nakane minimizes the element of coercion, and instead stresses voluntariness. Here I shall only mention that the way Nakane presents her model, the components of it appear to explain and legitimate each other. In any case, the conclusion is that this feeling of one-ness “helps to build a closed world and results in strong group independence or isolation.” (20)


Nakane next turns to a central internal factor in the group form in Japan, the way in which a group with differing attributes can be tied together vertically “into a delicately graded order.” That is:

*If we postulate a social group embracing members with various different attributes, the method of tying together the constituent members will be based on the vertical relation. (23)*

Through an inexplicable mutation, what was a mere postulate somehow becomes actuating principle:

*The vertical relation which we predicted in theory from the ideals of social group formation in Japan become the actuating principle in creating cohesion among group members. (emphasis added) (25)*

The vertical principle is placed in opposition to a horizontal one, somewhat as follows:



The basic structural difference between a vertical and a horizontal group is that in the former the relation between *b* and *c* is missing or very weak, whereas “Y group’s organization can continue without the existence of *a*, because *b* and *c* are linked.” (41-42) In the case of X, however, the constituents are all linked by *a*, the absence of which would leave the other members unable to organize.

The vertical relation of X has such an overwhelming influence that even among individuals equipped with the same qualification there is a tendency towards differentiation, and “an amazingly delicate and intricate system of ranking takes shape.” (25) Furthermore, the ranking system is dominant, for “once rank is established on the basis of seniority, it is applied to all circumstances, and to a great extent controls social life and individual activity.” (29)

In what I would like to call a “displacement,” i.e. an interchange of concepts, Nakane now argues that “without consciousness of ranking, life could not be carried on smoothly in Japan, for rank is the norm on which Japanese life is based. (31) That is, Nakane has displaced the vertical relation by consciousness of ranking, making the two phrases interchangeable.

Nakane’s thesis is that no member of this set can make even a partial change,<sup>4</sup> but that the only means of effecting change is either by some drastic event which affects the principle of the order or by the disintegration of the group. (29) Yet in elaborating what this might mean, attention is centered on the leader (44, 45) and change is discussed as being dependent upon the presence and the capability of the leader at point *a* between contending parties *b* and *c*. Furthermore, in contrast with what Nakane claimed above—that “the individual member cannot change his relative position within the organization” (41)—we are presented with a situation wherein “noting *b*’s restiveness, *c* may sense his opportunity, and, drawing closer to *a*, may encourage tension in the *a-b* relation, eventually creating a critical and unstable situation which will lead to a crisis.” (47)

In the end the change, whether resulting in “the disintegration of the group” or affecting “the principle of the order,” turns out to be only temporary, as the vertical principle is reestablished when the critical period is over. In other words, the crisis situation can lead to two results: to reintegration through seniority succession or to fission. The first one involves the integration of a new leader in the group internally, succession ordinarily going to the one who is not only the most senior man, but who has the most considerable number of *kobun* (subordinates). Thus, the vertical principle still holds. The solution to the second type of crisis is either one in which *a* takes

c with him into exile from the group or in which *b* pulls out with his "family and retainers" and forms a new independent group. Again the vertical principle triumphs. (47-48)

Nakane can now line up the negative and positive characteristics of the group organized on the basis of frame:

*From the above discussion two negative characteristics of group structure X can be deduced as follows; (1) the group is always under the risk of internal fission, (2) it has a crucial external weakness of not permitting co-operation between groups. On the positive side, when the group is functioning at its best the power and efficiency of X in concentrating and mobilizing its members' energies can exceed that of Y, since in X the ties binding individuals together are emotional and stable. (57)*

Nakane has argued in effect that any given *order of ranking* is fragile, but the *principle of ranking* is persistent and brings long-term stability, and above all is an unparalleled means for mobilizing a group behind its leaders.

The implications become clear when one turns to Nakane's view of the social totality, that is, the structure of a society made up of a multiplicity of such groups; "the overall picture . . . is not that of horizontal stratification by class or caste but vertical stratification by institution or group of institutions." (87) As was true of the "simple herd" of individuals in the primary group, so too "the entire society is a sort of aggregation of numerous independent competing groups which themselves can make no links with each other: they lack a sociological framework on which to build up a complete and integrated society." (102)

Phrased in this way, it is difficult to see which is the superior social entity—the vertical principle or the principle of competition. Nakane gets around this difficulty by representing the ranking and the competition as conditional to each other. Her resolution is once again accomplished through what I have called displacement. In comparison with a caste society, Nakane writes:

*. . . a Japanese group, the internal composition of which is heterogeneous, has a character homogeneous with that of many other groups. Hence there is no necessity for positive relations with other groups; instead relations tend to be hostile or competitive. . . . Competition and hostile relations between the civil powers facilitate the acceptance of state power and, in that a group is organized vertically, once the state's administrative authority is accepted, it can be transmitted without obstruction down the vertical line of a group's internal organization. (102)*

This is a critical point in Nakane's analysis: atomistic individual and group competition necessitate order and purpose being transmitted from above. Japanese society is only made complete and integrated through its leaders.

Finally, I would like to make a preliminary statement of what I see as the basic constituents of her analysis. On the one hand, she starts out from a conception of the individual as the social atom, in the sense that individuals and their interrelations provide the realm for the realization of freedom and equality. Conceiving the relation thus, she is not alone among social scientists,<sup>5</sup> but the point I wish to make here is that the focus upon the isolated individual as the fundamental unit for grasping

the meaning of the abolition of "pre-modern" oppression has a specific location in history, namely the capitalist era. In other words, her analytical starting point is based upon a conception specific to capitalism. Nakane chooses to illustrate this in Japan through both competition and ranking.

On the other hand, the social relations—for example the vertical relation and ranking—are concepts that do not in themselves express freedom and equality. They seem rather to contradict freedom and equality, originating as Nakane says they do, in precapitalist forms of sovereignty. This dilemma becomes clear when Nakane herself presents certain objections to them in her discussion of freedom. What is essential here, though, is that whatever hesitations or doubts she might have, they are wafted away by the spirit of capitalism, leaving us with her starting point which was a view of the modern social structure as the realization of free and equal individuals.

What makes her analysis ambiguous, however, is that these two sides *do* contradict each other. Moreover, although it is possible to discern these two elements, her analysis is complicated by the fact that it is not always clear when Nakane is referring to one or to the other.

### Nakane's Social Anthropology

Nakane calls her speech social anthropology, and problems are supposedly dealt with through "structural analysis" and not from a cultural or historical angle. Nakane justifies her claim to the anthropological tradition by using the method of cross-cultural comparison:

*. . . I should restate the aim of this study—not to describe Japanese society but to view Japanese social structure in the light of cross-cultural comparison of social structures; this is the concern of social anthropology which distinguishes it from other social sciences. (148)*

Thus Nakane proposes to combine structural analysis and cross-cultural comparison, but upon examination of her argument it becomes clear that the latter enters into her analysis in only the most simplistic way.

Throughout the book a number of sociological terms are used in pairs which can be read as meaning "Japan-others"—frame-attitude, vertical-horizontal, homogeneous-heterogeneous, gemeinschaft-gesellschaft, seniority-merit. What is actually happening, on a more concrete level, is the opposition of Japan to the rest of the world. The well-known anthropological distinction between We and Them is translated to oppose Japan to other societies, such as Europe, USA, India, China. In Nakane's hands, the cross-cultural comparison becomes the medium of an argument where the specific characteristics of half the comparison—usually Europe, USA, India or China—are postulated, then the argument is reversed, and the postulated characteristics are used to establish the validity of the opposite characteristics for Japan. (See, for example, pp: 69, 82, 102-103.)

### Precapitalist Social Forms and the Vertical Principle

Although Nakane's thesis is based on concepts specific to capitalist society, she places herself in opposition to the dualism of modernization studies. More exactly, she does not consider "feudal" or "premodern" elements as incompatible with or

impeding modernization. On the contrary, she points to them as functioning in or justifying modernization, and asserts that the vertical principle is traceable to precapitalism. Historically the span of her focus is wide. This does not seem to make much difference in the end, since her perception of history is one in which there are no structural differences and no transitions. The vertical relation, rather, is lifted out of history and simultaneously imbued with the basic character of being a relation between equals.


Regarding her so-called native pattern, Nakane manages to place the frail beginnings of Japan's "cultural homogeneity" in the fifth century, eventually providing the foundation for the "institutional homogeneity" established in the Tokugawa period. On the whole, she tends to concentrate on feudal personal relations of sovereignty which are presented as harmonious relationships between two persons, and as mutually beneficial in that "protection is repaid with dependence, affection with loyalty." (64)

Linking cultural and institutional homogeneity in this way allows Nakane to argue further on that "the existence and persistence of native values [has been] manifested ever since the feudal age in the relationship between lord and subject." (79) When reference to the Tokugawa period is made, this kind of "persistence" is emphasized, and history is presented as containing no transitions and no structural difference. The same stricture applies to her indiscriminate use of terms like *onjōshugi* (paternalism, affectionism), *ie* (household), *mura* (village) and *oyabun-kobun* (superior-inferior). The relationships referred to are formalized in that they are presented as being applicable at any time in history. The augmented power of:

*... the central administration, the roots of which were already well established in the Tokugawa period, was an essential basis for the rapid modernization which has taken place since the Meiji period. The bureaucratic system of this central administration has an organizational pattern in common with the Japanese native social structure—the vertical organizational principle of 〰. (103)*

More bluntly, Nakane argues that "the basic system of modern Japan was inherited from the previous Tokugawa regime and that the modern changes of the Meiji period, which appear so drastic, occurred without any structural change in terms of the basic state configuration." (114)

Her presentation is full of contradictions, but the point I wish to make is that Nakane establishes an ahistorical concept unable to explain the history of or the present day course of Japanese society. The concept of verticality in its postulated pre-capitalist (feudal) essence rather is the historical result of capitalist development. Nakane is right in her attempt to identify the relations of authority and sovereignty as operative in the "development" process, but, by making relations between free and equal individuals her analytical starting point, she ends up concealing economic exploitation as well as other forms of oppression.



## Oppression

Nakane expresses some uncertainty towards oppression, although she does not use the term. That is, she is at times critical of oppression as expressed in the ranking and seniority systems, but her criticism is mediated through a more or less formalized concept of freedom which turns out to mean "freedom to compete." Her critique fades away in a legitimization of the status quo through reference mainly to the voluntary nature of established relations, the need for emotional satisfaction and, finally, the practical functions of the vertical principle for leadership. Forgotten is the fact that people are "led to feel" and that "social costs" are involved. (10, 32, 150)

More specifically, she ignores the degree of oppression in the workplace that is concealed in so-called *kazokushugi* (familism) or *onjōshugi*. Namely:

*The attitude of the employer is expressed by the spirit of the common saying, "the enterprise is the people." This affirms the belief that the employer and employee are bound as one by fate in conditions which produce a tie between man and man. . . . Such a relationship is manifestly not a purely contractual one between employer and employee; the employee is already a member of his [sic] own family, and all members of his family are naturally included in the larger company "family." Employers do not employ only a man's labour itself but really employ the total man, as is shown in the expression marugakae (completely enveloped). (emphasis added) (14–15)*

Here, on the one hand, Nakane points to the precapitalist character of the relation or, using anthropological terms, the embeddedness of the economic relation in the social totality. On the other, she claims the equality of the individuals involved, the supposed historical result of capitalism.

In my opinion the familism and affection should be conceived of as an ideology functioning as a means of oppression. They should be explained in terms of their function in stabilizing and extending the accumulation of capital. In this connection one could mention Byron Marshall, who cites three factors facilitating the manifestation of familism and affection in the factory.<sup>7</sup> First, during the nineteenth century, workers came from villages where the need for intensive work and cooperation led to a form of group solidarity within and between families in the villages.

*The new labor force was thus well prepared to respond to an ideology that stresses the subordination of the individual interests to the good of the group particularly since it was claimed that the group was modeled on the cooperative family. (63)*

Secondly, Marshall points to the small size of factories at the time. In 1882 the average number of workers per factory was thirty. Finally, there was a high number of women in Meiji factories, and they were more likely to be obedient than men.

But to return to Nakane, she explains away the existence of oppression by developing a dualistic concept of freedom in a comparative setting; "in contrast to the Japanese system, the Indian system allows freedom in respect to ideas and ways of thought as opposed to conduct." (12)

The main point in regard to Japan is the restricting effect the vertical principle has on verbalizing objections, in effect producing self-censorship because "even if there are others who

share a negative opinion, it is unlikely that they will join together and openly express it, for the fear that this might jeopardize their position as desirable group members.” (35) This curb on open expression of thought is compensated by the fact that Japan has the advantage of “great freedom of action,” (81) although the activity of the individual must in no case break the limits of the group. (83)

Nakane’s discussion of freedom is not limited to making a distinction between “freedom of action” and “freedom of ideas.” She goes on to define freedom as the freedom to compete and then concludes that the “net result” of the seniority system versus the merit system is “rather evenly balanced,” and to claim that “the society in which class distinction is least developed offers man more opportunities for free competition on the road to success than class or caste societies.” (104)

Free competition is not Nakane’s last recourse in anticipating objections. In spite of finding frustration (13), fear and hostility (103), force (131) and total submission (103), she also finds the system’s basic legitimation in the voluntary nature of the group and in the emotional needs of the group members. Nakane insists that there is “neither wish for opposition nor realization of the function of opposition,” (147) and that the need for “warmth” in personal relationships gives the group its driving force. Moreover it all works and “brings greater success than any other type of group organization.” (76) Miraculously, even the individual can be freed from the stresses of competition, since “for weak people the emotional security deriving from the strong leader-follower relationship creates a peaceful world.” (73) Finally, however, she legitimizes the oppression inherent in the vertical principle by stressing its extreme efficiency in accomplishing “communication from the top to the lowest level.” (52)

We can now return to the starting point, her confrontation with the modernization studies:

*In this sense it would not be proper to regard the Japanese system as simply backward; on the contrary, given the conditions of the modern world, it may be said to be very efficient, and may, in fact, be one of the reasons why Japanese industry has been successful in developing to a point where it is well able to compete with the advanced countries of the West. (86)*

*Critics have pointed out, since the early days of Japan’s modernization, that Japan cannot press her claims to have modernized until individual autonomy is given greater recognition. But it is interesting to observe that the traditional system, manifested in group organization, has generated both the major driving force toward a high degree of industrialization and the negative brake which hinders the development of individual autonomy. (120)*

The crux of the matter in this disagreement is how the two sides characterize what has been identified here as feudal relations of sovereignty and authority. Modernization studies focus on the oppressive character of these relations with the purpose of eliminating them, thereby creating the basis for the realization of supposedly non-oppressive capitalist relations respecting individual autonomy. Nakane, in contrast, sees these relations as non-oppressive and as guaranteeing the realization of individual freedom through the group.

## Conclusion

This critique of Nakane has selected certain points related to problems connected with anthropology and with the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and with what are, in my opinion, the central arguments of the book. The logical starting point for Nakane has been found to be a concept of freedom that is distinctly capitalist. She deals with individuals, relations between individuals, structures composed of these relations, consciousness, values and norms, all based on a perception of relationship wherein individuals are free and equal. In her exposition, however, the principles of competition and verticality distort the degree of oppression present in such phenomena as seniority ranking and familism, resulting in a general veiling of economic, political or ideological oppression. In sum, Nakane has made a highly political argument for the classless and harmonious character of Japanese society.

One of the most fundamental objections of this paper to Nakane’s book is the insufficiency of the vertical relation—endowed as it is with an ahistorical character—in explaining the transition from feudalism to capitalism, where the discussion rightly belongs. Although her analysis is stated as being structural and not historical, she finds her explanatory principle in pre-capitalist society. She is, in this respect, concerned with analyzing history, albeit in a most unhistorical way. For the vertical principle expresses a character supposedly realized with capitalism (i.e., freedom and equality) and at the same time it is lifted out of history by way of its “persistence,” in complete disregard for transitions in history or structural differences between pre-capitalism and capitalism.

Nakane is correct, however, in pointing to the central role of the vertical relation and its importance in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. But it is one thing to see the transition as a transformation of feudal relations of sovereignty and authority in the course of their subsumption under capital which is accompanied by the appearance of different forms of political and ideological oppression and exploitation. It is quite another to help perpetuate an ideology which postulates a theoretical equality which enables one to conceptualize society as classless and harmonious and thereby results in a concealing of oppression in general. And this of course is what Nakane has done.

Formulating the problem thus brings us back to the question of uniqueness and the general tendency of the book to juxtapose Japan to the rest of the world. At an abstract level, any transformation from feudalism to capitalism can be seen as a transformation of feudal relations of sovereignty and then subsumption under capital—but this is only one way to see the transition. At a more concrete level—in the sense that Japanese have been exposed to the ideology of familism, affectionism and so forth ever since Meiji—Japan can be said with some justification to differ from, for example, European countries with their more individualistic inclination. However, this must be qualified with regard for the different periods in the transition and for the ways in which these countries differ among themselves. Nakane’s analysis is faulty in this respect and I find her justification for juxtaposing Japan against the rest of the world very unconvincing because of its ahistorical approach and confusion of levels of abstraction.

In making her claim to have reached a deeper understanding of Japanese society, Nakane ascribes to herself an advantage denied to her foreign readers—the fact that she is Japanese.

While I will not dispute that a knowledge of the Japanese language is at present a virtual necessity for those who attempt to "understand Japan," I hope that my remarks above will help to demonstrate that there is more to it than simply being Japanese. In fact, insofar as she is a Japanese academic, Nakane has to bear part of the burden for having molded the present superficial Western understanding of Japan. But her influence has not been due solely to her national origins. It lies elsewhere, primarily in the fact that her writing is very much at one with the major tendency in the study of Japan in the West since World War II, one which is particularly marked in modernization studies. This is the tendency to reject the literature in Japanese which analyzes Japanese society from the viewpoint of class exploitation or oppression. Nakane and the exponents of the modernization studies both carry a good deal of the responsibility for these works not having reached the English-reading public.

## Notes

1. Nakane Chie, *Japanese Society*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970; England, 1974).

2. Joe Moore, "The Japanese Worker," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1974), p. 35.

3. In a more specific sense the forms of subsumption under capital implied here take the direct subsumption under capital to imply capital having entered the process of production. And, on the basis of this, distinguish between the real subsumption (i.e. production of relative surplus value) and the formal subsumption (i.e. production of absolute surplus value). The indirect subsumption under capital implies conditions where capital's appropriation of surplus value is performed at the level of circulation (in other words capital has not entered the process of production), the dominant forms of capital being commercial—and usury capital. For further information see Boesen et al., *Kapitalen og Bonderne. Marxistisk Antropologi 2*. Kobenhavn. (*Capital and Peasants. Marxist Anthropology 2*. Copenhagen).

Also relevant to this point is Marx's discussion of the subsumption of labour under capital.

*The general features of the formal subsumption remain, viz. the direct subordination of the labour process to capital, irrespective of the state of its technological development. But on this foundation there now arises a technologically and otherwise specific mode of production—capitalist production—which transforms the nature of the labour process and its actual conditions. Only when that happens do we witness the real subsumption of labour under capital.* (Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, appendix, pp. 1034–1035, Penguin Books Limited, England, 1976)

4. During a description of the form that discussions take in Japan, and of ranking's tendency to prevent "logical procedure" (36), one finds what could be a more abstract argument for why Japanese groups are unlikely to reach a compromise. At the same time Nakane hints that change may be brought about via consciousness:

*The premises underlying thesis-antithesis are parity and confrontation on an equal footing which will develop into or permit the possibility of synthesis. Because of the lack of discipline for relationships between equals, the Japanese do not practise these three basic steps of reasoning and must overcome great odds in order to advance or cultivate any issue brought under discussion.* (35)

Note, parenthetically, the form of argumentation that is so typical of Nakane; the reason why a principle cannot be said to be valid in a certain situation (eg. in the vertical group) is that the principle is valid in the opposite situation (i.e. in the horizontal group).

5. For a discussion along these lines see *Videnskab og Kapital* (62–63), Saernummer 1. Fagkritik (Kobenhavn, Aarhus). (*Science and Capital*, Special issue 1. Subjectcritique, Copenhagen, Aarhus). See also Korsch, K., Karl Marx, *revolutionaer videnskab* (Kobenhavn, 1974). (Karl Marx, *Revolutionary science*, Copenhagen). (31–33)

6. Harbsmeier, M., *Om undertrykkelse og kapitalisme*; Ms., Kobenhavns Universitet. (*Oppression and Capitalism*; Ms., University of Copenhagen), 1978.

7. Marshall, B.K., *Capitalism and Nationalism in Prewar Japan. The Ideology of the Business Elite, 1868–1941* (Stanford University Press, 1967).

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
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