Innovating in uncharted terrain: on interpretation and normative legitimacy in the CESCR’s General Comment No. 25 on the right to science

ABSTRACT Science permeates almost every aspect of society, yet the human right to science remains neglected. In 2020, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights published its General Comment No. 25, intended to interpret the abstract provisions of Article 15 ICESCR. As a non-binding treaty body pronouncement, the General Comment’s reception and impact depend on its normative legitimacy – the extent to which its reasoning is coherent, determinative, transparent, systemically consistent, and adheres to international law methodologies, particularly those set out in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This article evaluates the General Comment’s normative legitimacy and practical value by reference to three key interpretations in Article 15: ‘science’, ‘enjoy the benefits’, and ‘participation’. The General Comment, it concludes, does not represent a comprehensive interpretation, but should be seen as opening a door to state practice and, therefore, more detailed interpretation by the Committee, States parties, and domestic and international courts. Despite purporting to innovate, the Committee’s approach generally builds on pre-existing conceptualisations, further increasing its normative legitimacy. The article concludes that the future impact of the right to science can be greatly enhanced by increased attention by the Committee and by States parties.


I. Introduction
In April 2020, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR or the Committee), the treaty body responsible for the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR or the Covenant), 1 published its twenty-fifth General Comment, 2 the first to focus on those provisions of Article 15 ICESCR 3 which have collectively come to be known as 'the right to science'. 4The purpose of this article is to consider whether General Comment No. 25 succeeds in authoritatively and persuasively setting out the normative content of the right.More specifically, the article considers its 'normative legitimacy'that is, whether the content of the General Comment is 'sufficiently persuasive to induce compliance with the norms contained therein'. 5Since the output of a treaty body is nonbinding, 'its de facto legal force and impact depends on how convincingly and persuasively it is argued, which in turn is largely shaped by the consistent use of an accepted and appropriate method'. 6Other considerations such as the composition of the treaty body and the quality of its previous work, as well as the procedure by which a pronouncement has been arrived at, will be relevant.
To be clear, in considering normative legitimacy, the paper does not engage with broader notions of legitimacy, such as the legal legitimacy or competence of a treaty body to issue pronouncements, although the authors note that a lack of state compliance inferring weak normative legitimacy in respect of a pronouncement may have a practical impact on broader legitimacy concerns.However, discussion of these potential impacts would require a much deeper consideration which goes beyond the scope of this contribution. 7his emphasis on persuasiveness is reflective of judgments of various international courts in relation to the importance of treaty body pronouncements to treaty interpretation. 8It also featured prominently in the International Law Commission's (ILC) plenary debates for its Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreement and Subsequent Practice. 9s such, it is fundamental to assessing the future value of General Comment No. 25.
To do so, this article will begin by summarising the pressing need for treaty body pronouncements dealing with the right to science, setting the right in context, and briefly exploring its normative history (Part II).It then outlines the function of UN treaty bodies as interpreters of their respective instruments, with a particular focus on the CESCR's interpretative methodology prior to General Comment No. 25, which some scholars have suggested has led to 'uncertainty' and a lack of 'legitimacy' 10 (Part III).The article will then consider General Comment No. 25 and discuss the practical future value of the General Comment by reference to three key interpretations: 'science', 'enjoy the benefits', and 'participation' (Part IV).
The article makes two core propositions: (a) General Comment No. 25 does not represent a comprehensive interpretation of the right to science, but should be seen as opening a door to state practice and, potentially, international human rights law jurisprudence that can and must lead to further pronouncements including a more comprehensive later General Comment in this area; and (b) despite purporting to innovate, much of its approach builds on pre-existing conceptualisations of the right's normative content and its substantive and personal scope, thus heightening its normative legitimacy.The article concludes that the future usefulness of the Committee's work, as well as of the right to science, can be further enhanced by increased attention by State parties in their reporting procedures on this right; further international, regional, and domestic instruments aimed at elaborating and clarifying the right; as well as additional legal and interdisciplinary scholarship.

II. The right to science, neglected
Much of the scholarship on the right to science begins with observations on how neglected the right has been.As Schabas wryly observed, 'if economic, social and cultural rights lie at the vanishing point of international human rights law, then the question of the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific and technological progress and its applications lies at the vanishing point of economic, social and cultural rights'. 11lthough it has begun in recent years to receive greater attention, 12 the right remains overlooked by State parties to the ICESCR, international institutions including CESCR, right holders, and scholarship alike, despite its provenance first in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (ADRDM) 13 and then the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), both in 1948. 14tates have habitually given insufficient attention to science in their reports to CESCR, 15 hence there has been little in the way of traditional state practice to draw from in interpreting the provisions of Article 15.The Committee itself has, until relatively recently, given the right little direct attention 16 (there has been just one communication related to Article 15 (1)b under the Optional Protocol on which it has adopted Views), and neither the UN General Assembly nor the UN Human Rights Council have discussed the right in detail.Three UNESCO-initiated expert meetings between 2007 and 2009 attempted to elucidate the normative content of the vague provisions of Article 15(1)(b), to clarify the state obligations it imposed, and to set out how these might be implemented nationally and internationally.These meetings ultimately culminated in the Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications (the Venice Statement). 17Then came reports and recommendations by a UN Special Rapporteur, Farida Shaheed, 18 and a seminar organised by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 19Still the right to science remained abstract and understudied.Attempts to describe the normative content of the right came from substantially different departure points, emphasising specific tensions or focus areas that have tended to impede a holistic understanding of the right and marginalise the rest of Article 15 in favour of discussions centred on Article 15(1)(b)what has come to be known as the 'REBSPA'.
Several explanations have been offered for this neglect.Riedel, writing whilst a member of the CESCR in 2012, was pragmatic: discussions of other rights were more important to States parties and time had almost run out by the time meetings reached Article 15; 20 there was no consensus on the precise meaning of the components of Article 15(1)(b), no definitions exist in the Article itself, and the Committee's view then was that there was little conclusive help to be found in the travaux préparatoires. 21mportantly, Article 15 was still in the process of evolution even after its drafting.It is clear from the travaux préparatoires for the Covenant that it was 'generally agreed that article [15] dealt with important human rights and should be retained in substance although certain concepts or notions contained therein might still be in the process of evolution.' 22More specifically, with regard to paragraph 1 of Article [15] which '[set] forth the content of the rights', sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) did not 'give rise to extensive discussion.' 23 The provision's bland and abstract wording thus did little to 'reveal clearly the scope, purpose and functions that could be associated with REBSPA'. 24While not unusual for human rights in general, especially for economic, social, and cultural rights, this problem is particularly acute for Article 15.
That neglect is all the more regrettable given the increasing influence science and technology have had on global society.The drafters of the UDHR and ICESCR could not possibly have envisaged the extent of that influence, the globalisation that still gives it context, nor the nature and multiplicity of the complex social, economic, and political issues engendered by it.Additionally, there is an intrinsic relationship between Article 15 and other human rights such as health, an adequate standard of living, education, and food, as well as civil and political rights such as freedom of expression, information, and privacy. 25evertheless, as Moeckli notes, although the Committee has not yet specifically invoked the 'living instrument' character 26 of the Covenant, it has made it 'abundantly clear' from pronouncements on the right to health 27 and its analysis of gender roles 28 and discrimination, 29 for example, 'that the meaning of the ICESCR's terms can evolve over time'. 30However, Riedel suggests that '[a] fine line exists between interpretation and legislation' and for abstract, bland, and vague provisions like Article 15(1)(b), it becomes 'very difficult to assess what precisely the provision covers'. 31If the Committee 'went too far in its legitimate interpretation exercise, [States parties] sceptical of too dynamic an interpretation might easily fall back to positions of discretionary power, of arguments concerning the hallowed domaine reserve which they wish to leave not to an expert Committee but to themselves'. 32uch a cautious, state-centric approach appears to have influenced much of the Committee's output in the decade following Riedel's comments.Yet in respect of the right to science not even that cautious treaty interpretation work has materialised.Instead, the right to science has remained unduly ignored with limited input or elaboration, despite the dramatic evolution of the influence of science and technology on human rights provisions and the cross-cutting nature of the right to science as identified by the Venice Statement. 33There is a world of difference between cautious treaty interpretation and neglect.With this in mind, the following sections explore the normative legitimacy of treaty body pronouncements, and General Comment No. 25 in particular, by reference to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention, VCLT). 34

III. Interpretation of human rights provisions
Even if the interpretation of international law documents might be said to be an art rather than a science, 35 it becomes more complex still in the context of the lex specialis of international human rights law and pervasive suggestions 36 that the interpretation of human rights provisions is subject to special interpretive methods.While this article will go on to discuss the manner in which the CESCR has interpreted the ICESCR in the past and its importance in assessing General Comment No. 25's normative legitimacy, some context is needed.

III.A. UN treaty bodies as interpreters of human rights
Given their task of monitoring compliance with their respective treaties, human rights treaty bodies are fundamental to the process of interpreting the provisions of those treaties as well as acting as 'clearing centres' for the varied interpretations of the Covenant advanced not only by States parties, but also by interested non-state actors. 37Like other human rights treaty bodies, 38 CESCR has three main functions: (1) consideration of periodic reporting by State parties regarding measures adopted and progress made on compliance with treaty obligations, and 'Concluding Observations' in respect of that reporting; (2) elaboration of 'General Comments'; (3) and, more recently, 39 the adoption of 'Views' in response to individual communications which allege treaty violations. 40he Committee has described the functions and purposes of its General Comments as mak[ing] the experience gained so far through the examination of these reports available for the benefit of all States parties in order to assist and promote their further implementation of the Covenant; to draw the attention of the States parties to insufficiencies disclosed by a large number of reports; to suggest improvements in the reporting procedures and to stimulate the activities of the States parties, the international organizations and the specialized agencies concerned in achieving progressively and effectively the full realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant. 41reover, the Committee has not ruled out revisions to its General Comments where appropriate.As this article will suggest, General Comment No. 25 in particular was both necessary and intended to fulfil these functions.
Views how authoritative and persuasive General Comments should be considered have been strikingly contrasted. 42Some commentators have viewed them as the most authoritative interpretations of a treaty's provisions, while others see them as abstract and vague or purely moral pronouncements with little legal value. 43Given the prominence of human rights treaty bodies as interpreters of their instruments, their pronouncements had been considered by some to be important contributors to 'subsequent practice' within Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention. 44This is almost certainly no longer the case, 45 following the ILC's Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreement and Subsequent Practice. 46Instead, treaty body pronouncements may be used by those seeking to interpret the treaty 'in the discretionary way in which Article 32 describes supplementary means of interpretation'. 47The reason for this is that such pronouncements are considered 'conduct mandated by the treaty the purpose of which is to contribute to the treaty's proper application'. 48Moreover, they also 'contribute to the determination of the ordinary meaning of the terms in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty'. 49inally, they may be considered 'subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law' under Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 50hile the Draft Conclusions may signal the end of suggestions that treaty body pronouncements are themselves to be considered 'subsequent practice' under the Vienna Convention, States parties cannot have it both ways.Arguments that treaty body pronouncements have uncertain or equivocal value are now less convincing.They have an important place in the interpretive process.States cannot rely on the Draft Conclusions to exclude treated body pronouncements from 'subsequent practice' under the Vienna Convention, and then deny the weight attributed to them by the ILC and by various international courts and tribunals such as the ICJ.
In Ahmadou Diallo, for example, the ICJ said that [a]lthough the Court is in no way obliged, in the exercise of its judicial functions, to model its own interpretation of the Covenant on that of the Committee, it believes that it should ascribe great weight to the interpretation adopted by this independent body that was established specifically to supervise the application of that treaty.The point here is to achieve the necessary clarity and the essential consistency of international law, as well as legal security, to which both the individuals with guaranteed rights and the States obliged to comply with treaty obligations are entitled. 51he ILC's 'without prejudice' clause in Conclusion 13(4) explicitly recognises the importance to the interpretive process of treaty body pronouncements. 52Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32 VCLT will frequently need to be made because human rights provisions are often ambiguous until treaty bodies begin the process of making them less so.The right to science offers a singular exemplar of such a case.
Yet achieving clarity and consistency in international law means reliance on treaty body pronouncements will not be automatic and comes with caveats.The ICJ has relied on such pronouncements not because of the status of the committee concerned, but rather for the quality of its reasoning. 53In the Advisory Opinion Judgment No. 2876, the ICJ preferred the later General Comment No. 32 adopted on the basis of 30 years of experience in the application of Article 14, instead of General Comment No.13, which 'did no more than repeat the terms of the provision and call on States to report more fully on steps taken to ensure equality before the courts'. 54There will be no presumption in favour of the substantive correctness of a pronouncement. 55As Special Rapporteur Nolte put it, '[t]he point is rather that the weight that should be given to such pronouncements in each case depends on specific considerations which include the cogency of their reasoning, the character of the treaty and of the treaty provisions in question, the professional composition of the responsible body, the procedure by which a pronouncement has been arrived at, and possibly other factors'. 56his is illustrated by the fact that the European Court of Human Rights declined to adopt the views of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD Committee) in Strøbye and Rosenlind v. Denmark 57 and Caamaño Valle v. Spain. 58ccording to the Court, the CRPD Committee's interpretation pushed the envelope too far. 59he importance of these considerations in the context of the normative legitimacy of General Comment No. 25, and the record of interpretation of the Covenant generally by the Committee, should not be underestimated.They underscore that the degree of influence enjoyed by General Comment No. 25 is contingent on the extent to which the interpretations and reasoning are normatively legitimateput simply, they must be clear, convincing, and methodologically sound.If interpretation is the process of persuasionthat the meaning advanced is the appropriate onethen its persuasive appeal will be enriched if it is coherent, determinative, transparent, systemically consistent, and adheres to international law principles, in particular those set out in the Vienna Convention. 60Coherence implies a principled relationship to other rules of the same system and which results in uniform application in similar or applicable instances.By determinative, we mean interpretive clarity and unambiguous reference to or clear use of the interpretative tools of the Vienna Convention, which 'does not confuse either the applicable interpretative methods or their denomination'. 61

III.B. Interpretation of human rights treaties in the Vienna Convention regime
The Vienna Convention offers 'scaffolding for the reasoning on questions of treaty interpretation' 62 determining which relevant matters ought to be taken into account during the interpretation exercise and how to approach them. 63The interpretative process is intended to be 'a single combined operation', a fluid interaction with no defined hierarchy or rigid structure. 64Interpretations organically give meaning to a text; it is not found or retrieved through inflexible and intrinsically mechanical processes. 65lthough the ICESCR contains some provisions concerning its interpretation, they are not particularly helpful as a departure point for interpretive guidance 66 and are rarely relied upon by those seeking to interpret the Covenant's provisions.Instead, the interpretative methodology promulgated in Articles 31-32 VCLT has since been acknowledged to reflect customary international law and its application is considered 'virtually axiomatic'. 67Furthermore, since treaty bodies interpret human rights treaties largely in lieu of States, they are bound to apply Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. 68Consequently, interpretation of the ICESCR ought to be guided by the framework of the Vienna Convention notwithstanding the fact it was concluded before the Vienna Convention entered into force in 1980. 69he exercise of interpreting the inevitably abstract provisions of human rights instruments begins with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention: a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.The four principal methods of interpretation prevalent in international lawreferred to variously as textual or literal; contextual or systematic; 70 teleological, purposive, functional, subjective, or giving effect to the treaty's object and purpose; and historical 71are all embedded in Articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention. 72No one element is to be accorded greater weight than any of the others. 73 teleological or purposive interpretation, in which the treaty is interpreted in light of its object and purpose (Article 31(1) VCLT) and subsequent practice (Article 31(3)(b) VCLT) is required by both 'common sense and good faith'.74 Moreover, such an approach may help determine whether an interpretation might otherwise lead to an ambiguous or manifestly absurd or unreasonable result (Article 32 VCLT).75 Teleological interpretation not only permits dynamic or evolutive interpretation, allowing consideration of evolving social needs and circumstances, but such an approach is in fact inherent in the ongoing process of rights development.76 This is particularly the case for Article 15, given it was still in the process of evolution even after its drafting.Given, the status of treaty body pronouncements as confirmed by the ILC, and the use to which they may be put in the exercise of interpretation, some emphasis can be placed on this.This is all the more the case as this article concludes that General Comment No. 25 represents the first steps of the Committee in interpreting Article 15 and the right to science and must therefore act as a catalyst for subsequent state practice or agreement and, in later pronouncements, reflect the same.77 Importantly, explicit references to actual interpretative methods have not been regarded as imperative.The 'crucible' approach means a teleological methodology often coalesces with other interpretative approaches, such that distinguishing between specific approaches becomes difficult and is not necessarily helpful.78 However, the fact that States parties are already suspicious of interpretations that appear to factually exceed the original wording or meaning of certain treaty rules and therefore extend their material obligations means that interpretations, to be persuasive, must be normatively legitimate, that is coherent and principled, determinative, transparent, and systemically consistent.It is, to use the ICJ's formulation above, intended to achieve legal certainty and legal clarity.

III.C. The importance of the normative legitimacy of General Comments
Given that the process of interpretation inherent in the Vienna Convention was intended to be 'a single combined operation' lacking strict hierarchy and structure, some flexibility exists in the way treaty bodies approach the task of interpretation.However, it is for this very reason that interpretations must be persuasive.Recent scholarship has argued that the CESCR, and other human rights treaty bodies, generally follow the principles within the Vienna Convention, and has rejected claims that the Committee engages in what have been classed as 'special interpretative practices' (through its use of e.g. the principles of effectiveness and dynamic interpretation) as ill-founded. 79Yet, even if its methodological approaches have largely respected the Vienna Convention, this does not mean they have been particularly consistent or transparent.
Clearly a human rights treaty's interpretation and implementation cannot be left purely to the discretion of States who will almost invariably interpret such provisions restrictively.Human rights are necessarily protective, framed by the relationship between individual and State, and, by their very nature, encroach on state sovereignty.Expanding the scope of human rights provisions necessarily further trespasses on that sovereignty and has, unsurprisingly, been met with resistance from States parties. 80hat resistance is influenced and even reinforced by questions as to the legality and legitimacy of methodologies of interpretation deployed by treaty bodies, particularly by the CESCR. 81t is in this context that concerns expressed by some commentators as to the legitimacy of the Committee's interpretations of the ICESCR take on potentially increased significance. 82Its usage of the dynamic method of interpretation has sometimes been the object of criticism by States parties to human rights treaties (and certainly scepticism), and as application of the object and purpose approach becomes almost strategic and is used to garner more support for the use of dynamic interpretation, 83 the need for principled transparency takes on renewed importance.This is especially the case since the task of interpreting human rights provisions may become a balancing act between de lege lata and de lege ferenda interpretations, blurring distinctions between the two, and may risk becoming acts of an ultra vires nature by the treaty bodies. 84Bódig puts the point bluntly yet succinctly: The most obvious defect in terms of striking the right balance between the ambition to improve human rights protection and the need to show due respect for treaty law is that the Committee has failed to ensure the coherence and clarity of its doctrinal work.The uncertainty surrounding some of the Committee's doctrinal constructs [such as minimum core obligations] compromises the credibility of CESCR doctrine and weakens its ability to influence the course of normative development. 85om the perspective of legality, the allegedly special interpretive techniques employed by the Committee are, as already mentioned, not in conflict with the Vienna Convention framework. 86The real issue with these methods of interpretation is that they are 'the product of the Committee's 'moral reading' of the Covenant and, as such, are regarded with suspicion by States'. 87Therefore, the problem is not legality, as some commentators have observed, but legitimacy in the sense described by Franck as the 'property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates if in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process'. 88he important point that bears repeating is the increased responsibility on expert treaty bodies to ensure their interpretations are methodologically sound.Treaty body pronouncements are no longer purely a function of the relationship between States parties and the treaty body, 89 nor are they simply a by-product of the process of examining State reports.They have evolved to become fundamental to the capacity of their wider interested interpretative communities to influence the elucidation of State party obligations 90 and to the formation of customary international law by helping to shape opinio juris and State practice. 91his is crucial since responses by States to expert treaty body pronouncements do ultimately contribute to subsequent practice for the purposes of Article 31(3)(b); as the ILC recognised, treaty body pronouncements 'may give rise to' subsequent practice by State parties, meaning they may act as a 'catalyst' for such practice. 92State practice which may be taken to follow or impliedly support a particular interpretation may, in some circumstances, be considered an indication of agreement by States with that interpretation. 93eeking such agreement could partly account for the 'pull towards State consent' and the search for 'common ground' 94 with States that Moeckli identifies.Subsequent practice, international, regional, as well as national, is therefore an important indicator of States' agreement with a particular interpretation.There is little doubt that, in the context of a pronouncement that innovates in the way General Comment No. 25 purports to, catalysing state acceptance will be crucial to its normative legitimacy.
It might be argued that the several instruments since the Covenants which purport to address the relationship between human rights and scientific and technological development 95 themselves constitute subsequent practice.It is unlikely they satisfy Article 31 (3)(b) as they do not directly concern Article 15's interpretationthey are not 'in the application of the treaty'so are not considered by the ILC to be subsequent practice or subsequent agreements for the purposes of the Vienna Convention. 96They are nevertheless very relevant to the interpretation of the right to science under Article 32.
With a view towards assessing the normative legitimacy of the General Comment, this article proceeds to examine three key areas of the right to science as explicated therein -'science', 'enjoy the benefits', and 'participation'.

IV. General Comment No. 25
The Committee's pronouncements on the right to science were minimal until the process of drafting General Comment No. 25 began.As of early 2022, only one complaint 97 in respect of Article 15(1)b has been dealt with by the Committee under the minimally ratified Optional Protocol, and few Concluding Observations have been made on State reports concerning the right to science provisions because those reports rarely deal with state compliance in this area.
Communication No. 22/2017, which concerned access to pre-implantation genetic diagnosis of embryos intended for in vitro fertilisation, is interesting for several reasons.Firstly, Italy did not question the competence of the Committee to examine either admissibility or the merits of the communication. 98Secondly, the Committee demurred from setting out any clear guidance on the operation of Article 15.Instead, it decided the communication on largely procedural and evidential grounds.By not rejecting the arguments advanced, the Committee left open the possibility of similar arguments in future communications better suited to them on their individual facts.
Consequently, as Rodrigo Uprimny, a member of the Committee involved with the drafting of the General Comment, observed shortly after its publication, the Committee found itself in somewhat 'uncharted terrain' and was obliged to 'innovate'. 99Uprimny's comments are instructive as they set the General Comment in some context, in particular intimating the drafting challenges faced by the Committee and its choice of methodology.
The General Comment was by necessity and circumstance a ground-breaking document.Given criticisms of the Committee in terms of the consistency of its interpretative methodology and its doctrinal innovations, the Committee may have seen their position as precarious.As noted, Riedel said in 2012 that the time was 'not ripe' 100 for drafting a General Comment due to the lack of Committee practice.Yet were the Committee not to set out some form of guidance for States parties, practice would be unlikely to evolve by itself.Further, there are signs that scholarship has slowly begun to lend the provisions of Article 15 a degree of definition previously lacking, particularly following work by Special Rapporteur Farida Shaheed. 101ortunately, the Committee chose to take what Uprimny characterised as a 'prudent but not shy' 102 approach.The Committee members were not, by their own admission, experts on science, yet there were key areas on which the General Comment would be expected to touch, such as the Fourth Industrial Revolution. 103Complex as these areas are, the Committee felt forced to say 'the minimum [it] could be sure of'. 104iven all of this, determining the extent to which General Comment No. 25 succeeds in elucidating the substantive content of the right to science is a challenging exercise.This article does not profess to be an exhaustive analysis of the General Comment and there will be areas of controversy that are beyond its scope. 105Instead, it explores the wider question by reference to three key interpretations that demonstrate the General Comment to be an instrument that intended to advance the interpretative process and ensure compliance by State parties with the core obligations it elucidates.

IV.A. Key definitions for the purposes of Article 15: 'Science'
Two of the Committee's principal interpretative innovations stem from its approach to defining 'science' and 'enjoy the benefits' for the purposes of Article 15.In its fourth paragraph, the Committee adopts the definition of 'science' laid out in the 2017 UNESCO Recommendation on Science and Scientific Researchers. 106The choice to rely on UNESCO's definition is unsurprising, given UNESCO's mandate is the most relevant and its definition has been agreed upon and adopted by its member states.Not to adopt it might have undercut UNESCO's important work; and there are few, if any, obvious alternative candidate definitions stemming from international authorities or agencies with science in their mandate.Although UNESCO's definition can, without doubt, be criticised on philosophical and practical grounds, we argue that it is nevertheless a reasonable choice for a working definition of 'science' in an international human rights law context.
Less reasonable, however, is the Committee's expansion on UNESCO's definition in paragraph 5 of the General Comment: (…) knowledge should be considered as science only if it is based on critical inquiry and is open to falsifiability and testability.Knowledge which is based solely on tradition, revelation or authority, without the possible contrast with reason and experience, or which is immune to any falsifiability or intersubjective verification, cannot be considered science. 107ereas UNESCO's definition refers broadly to the concept of validation, it does not mention falsifiability, which is a specific theory of scientific demarcation associated with a particular philosophical tradition and set of assumptions. 108This is not the place to rehearse the philosophical arguments for and against falsificationism.Nevertheless, it bears pointing out that the Committee chose to import a specific and controversial 109 theory of scientific demarcation without comment and with no obvious justification.Moreover, in mentioning falsification and verification within its elaborative fifth paragraph, the Committee puts side-by-side mutually incompatible theories of scientific demarcation relying on opposing epistemic assumptions.Whatever one may think of the merits of either verificationism or falsificationism as a matter of philosophy, their simultaneous invocation can only be interpreted as, at best, epistemic fence-sitting or, at worst, confused.It seems likely the Committee intended to provide a gloss on, or explanation of, the 2017 Recommendation's definition in paragraph 5, rather than to provide an alternative definition.As such, any conceptual confusion may be unimportant. 110aving relied on the UNESCO definition in its 2017 Recommendation, the Committee went on to make this important point: 'science, which encompasses natural and social sciences, refers both to a process following a certain methodology ('doing science') and to the results of this process (knowledge and applications)'. 111Put another way, 'science' for the purposes of Article 15 can be said to implicate four interrelated, but quite distinct elementsa process and the results of that process, which includes not only material applications but also the knowledge that produces those applications.
This dual bifurcation is fundamental to the Committee's approach to the substantive scope and content of the right to science and therefore to clarifying future interpretive methodology.Notwithstanding any criticisms of the precise definition of science the Committee has adopted, the crucial foundations for defining entitlements and obligations are to be found in these interrelated elements.

IV.B. Key definitions for the purposes of Article 15: 'Enjoy the benefits'
The distinction between the above-mentioned elements of scienceits process and the results of that process, which includes not only material applications but also the knowledge that produces those applicationsis fundamental because there has been a degree of ambiguity in the scholarship, and even in the Venice Statement, as to the meaning of 'enjoy the benefits'.Early scholarship focused principally on material benefits, as will be later discussed, which had the unfortunate effect of unduly narrowing its interpretation.Clearly identifying that science must necessarily include these four conceptually differentiated elements makes a more nuanced and expansive interpretation of the word 'benefits' possible. 112o begin with, even on a purely textual reading, the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications naturally suggests a conceptual demarcation between two distinct ideasthe benefits of scientific progress and the benefits of its applications.
Further, the ordinary meaning of the word 'benefits' does not imply something which is purely material.The Committee seems to adopt this interpretation and, in doing so, brings a degree of welcome clarity to future interpretations: The term "benefits" refers first to the material results of the applications of scientific research, such as vaccinations, fertilizers, technological instruments and the like.Secondly, benefits refer to the scientific knowledge and information directly deriving from scientific activity, as science provides benefits through the development and dissemination of the knowledge itself.Lastly, benefits refer also to the role of science in forming critical and responsible citizens who are able to participate fully in a democratic society. 113 this interpretation is accepted by States parties, any ambiguity as to whether 'enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications' is limited to accessing technological innovations will have been removed by the Committee.This is to be welcomed, but the Committee is not particularly principled or transparent in its interpretation of 'benefits' and is potentially open to methodological and doctrinal criticisms as a result.The Committee's reasoning for reaching this important interpretation is limited and possibly even confusing.In paragraph 10, it relies on Article 27 of the UDHR to define 'benefits' by asserting that the wording of Article 27 supports an interpretation that includes not only a right to benefit from the applications of science but also to 'participate' in scientific advancement.This, the Committee suggests, means that 'benefits are not restricted to the material benefits or products of scientific advancement, but include the development of the critical mind and faculties associated with doing science'. 114The Committee suggests that the travaux préparatoires corroborate this understanding.However, it is not clear whether the Committee relied on the travaux for the paragraph 8 definition itself, and if so what parts, or simply to permit the use of Article 27 of the UDHR as a tool to interpret Article 15.If the latter is the case, this would mean their definition of 'benefits' is derived purely from the notion of 'participation', which this article discusses next.
Given the overall significance of the definition of 'benefits' in paragraph 8, this is regrettable.A more principled approach would have been unambiguous, and might have also utilised a contextual interpretive methodology, drawing explicitly on the documents the Committee refers to in paragraph 1 or indeed other reports concluded by UN specialised agencies such as UNESCO, as supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32.
That said, the Committee goes on to explore in considerable detail what it means by 'benefits' through detailed and practical examples in the main body of the General Comment, for example by identifying twelve core obligations, 115 special topics of broad application, 116 and areas of interdependence with other rights. 117It is from this necessary clarity that more nuanced interpretations of obligations on States parties will be derived.
To take just one example of its expansion of 'benefits' beyond the material and technological innovation archetype, the Committee suggests that a 'clear benefit of scientific progress is that scientific knowledge is used in decision-making and policies, which should, as far as possible, be based on the best available scientific evidence'. 118here is certainly likely to be debate about whether this interpretation is overly expansive.Initially, some of the scholarship either doubted a reading of Article 15 of this kind, or did not convincingly address the consequences of conceptually separating the two elements.Largely in reliance on only one possible reading of the travaux préparatoires, Hans Morten Haugen characterised the meaning of 'benefits' so as to limit its interpretation to the material or technological: The term "benefits" must be understood as material benefits, which every person should enjoy in everyday life.This scientific progress was expected to be distributed to everyone, if the right conditions were provided.The "trickle-down" effect would provide for both the international and national dissemination of new technology and wealth.This right naturally applies to everyone, and there is no requirement that one has actually contributed to this progress.The travaux preparatoires confirm this interpretation.An issue that was brought up in the discussions during the General Assembly related to the terms "participate" and "share."It was generally agreed that participation was more active, but that such participation could not be expected from everyone.The solution was to introduce the phrase "and its benefits" at the end of this paragraph [reference omitted].This would make it clear that not everyone could be expected to participate, but that everyone should have the right to share in the benefits of scientific advancement. 119drey Chapman also concluded, citing Haugen, that [a]n analysis of the travaux preparatoires for this right indicates that the term benefits is to be understood as material benefits that every person should be able to enjoy in everyday life.States parties were therefore obligated to distribute the applications of scientific progress to everyone because there was a universal right to share in the benefits of scientific advancement. 120wever, Chapman went on to note that [t]he wording of this rightto enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applicationsis ambiguous, however, as to whether the right pertains only to the dissemination of the fruits of scientific progress or more fundamentally to its development as well.This is a very important matter on which there needs to be further discussion.The interpretation in this paper is that it requires both, especially given the current bias against investment in areas of scientific and biomedical research and technological development that are targeted to meet the needs of the poor. 121 might be said that as the scholarship on the right to science developed, so too did conceptions of what 'benefits' ought to include.While the 2009 Venice Statement is somewhat ambiguous as to whether 'benefits' included something more than material benefits, the 2012 Special Rapporteur, Farida Shaheed, advanced a more expansive interpretation: 'The "benefits" of science encompass not only scientific results and outcomes but also the scientific process, its methodologies and tools'. 122In her submissions to the UN Human Rights Council in 2014, Jessica Wyndham proposed that 'the right to science included measures to integrate scientists and scientific data, analysis and findings into government functions, including law, policy and programme development'. 123'Benefits' included, therefore, not only knowledge that ought to be made available to policymakers, but also potentially that policymakers paid due attention to that knowledge.Wyndham has also helped carry out empirical surveys of scientists' conceptions of the benefits of their work, which notably include providing an evidence basis for policy as well as other immaterial benefits. 124The fact the Committee explicitly adopts this interpretation in the General Comment is fundamental to ensuring this expansive interpretation of 'enjoy the benefits'. 125he question whether this will be acceptable to States parties is likely to remain unresolved for some time to come, and further work by the Committee in its pronouncements is necessary to entrench that interpretation.

IV.C. Key definitions for the purposes of Article 15: 'participation'
One of the most interesting and potentially controversial innovations of the General Comment is the notion of 'participation' in scientific progress and its applications.The Committee's interpretation aligns with the views of Special Rapporteur Farida Shaheed, who emphasised the importance of opportunities for all to contribute to the scientific enterprise and freedom indispensable for scientific research, the participation of individuals and communities in decision-making and the related right to information, and an enabling environment fostering the conservation, development, and diffusion of science and technology. 126The Committee put it as follows in the General Comment: The right enshrined in Article 15(1)(b) encompasses not only a right to receive the benefits of the applications of scientific progress, but also a right to participate in scientific progress.Thus, it is the right to participate in and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications. 127roughout the General Comment, the Committee sets out instances of what 'participation' in these contexts might actually encompass.It includes, for example, participation in scientific research itself and access to scientific education in order to facilitate that participation. 128Participation in the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, it is suggested, implicates at least two further areas.Firstly, it can be said to mean access 129 to results of the applications of scientific research, such as vaccinations, fertilisers, and other technology. 130Although the scope of this interpretation of the right, and the extent to which it may conflict with intellectual property rights, has yet to be fully resolved, this is also a reasonably uncontroversial interpretation based on the existing scholarship and international instruments.
Secondly, the Committee's definition of participation extends the substantive scope of the right into another area: Participation of general citizens in the policy processes of scientific progress itself.Participation, for instance, involves ensuring that science 'is not subject to interests that are not scientific or are inconsistent with fundamental human rights principles and the welfare of society' 131 and facilitating 'a culture of active citizen engagement with science, particularly through a vigorous and informed democratic debate on the production and use of scientific knowledge, and a dialogue between the scientific community and society'. 132It also includes 'the right to information and participation in controlling the risks involved in particular scientific processes and its applications'. 133More specifically, 'participation and transparency become crucial because the risks and potential of some technical advances or some scientific research should be made public in order to enable society, through informed, transparent and participatory public deliberation, to decide whether or not the risks are acceptable'. 134t is not difficult to anticipate arguments that this interpretation of Article 15(1)(b) prima facie imports meanings that are not immediately apparent from a textual reading.Additionally, the Venice Statement's treatment of 'participation' is somewhat ambiguous: in the context of Article 15 1(b) ICESCR, enjoyment as 'participation' is distinct from enjoyment as actual 'sharing' in the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.Participation in scientific progress is valuable in its own right, and while the benefits of science should be shared equitably, neither of these components of the right is a substitute for the other.The right to share in scientific benefits should not be predicated on participation, particularly where there is a direct threat to fundamental rights, most notably the rights to life, health and food. 135rhaps anticipating that such an innovative interpretation necessitated a coherent and unambiguous interpretative approach, the Committee is uncharacteristically explicit about its methodology.It situates the right to science within the broader right to participate in cultural life: The right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress cannot be interpreted as establishing a rigid distinction between the scientist who produces science and the general population, entitled only to enjoy the benefits derived from research conducted by scientists.This restrictive interpretation is contrary to a systematic and teleological interpretation of this right, which takes into account the context, the object and the purpose of this provision, in accordance with article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 136e Committee seems to adopt the view of scholars who have situated the right to science in a cultural rights context: Culture is an inclusive concept encompassing all manifestations of human existence.Cultural life is therefore larger than science, as it includes other aspects of human existence; it is, however, reasonable to include scientific activity in cultural life.Thus, the right of everyone to take part in cultural life includes the right of every person to take part in scientific progress and in decisions concerning its direction.This interpretation is also implied by the principles of participation and inclusiveness underlying the Covenant and by the expression, 'to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress'. 137e intellectual foundations for this approach are important and, as previously mentioned, the Committee grounds its interpretation in the travaux preṕaratoires on the drafting of Article 15 of the Covenant, 'which demonstrate that the Article was intended to develop Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes not only a right to benefit from the applications of science but also to participate in scientific advancement'. 138his notion of participation in scientific advancement is operationalised repeatedly and in various interconnected ways throughout the General Comment, but it is not without its problems.Firstly, it is important to note the internal tensions within the General Comment between the Committee's reluctance to formally endorse an interpretation of Article 15 that affirms a full human right to science, despite Uprimny's suggestion 139 that the General Comment opens the door to such an interpretation, and interpretations that appear to do precisely thatthe four elements approach to defining 'enjoy the benefits of scientific progress', for instance, which is itself the essential departure point for reading into the whole of Article 15 a right to 'participation' in scientific progress and its applications.
Despite this internal tension, its interpretation in respect of 'participation' is reasonably principled and persuasive.It first compares the different language versions of the Universal Declaration, which is perfectly permissible under Article 33 VCLT.It then roots this fundamental understanding of the substantive content of the right to science within the right to take part in cultural life and weds interpretation of Article 15 to Article 27 of the Universal Declaration.In terms of contextual interpretation, use of the Universal Declaration in this way does not offend the Vienna Convention, nor does reliance on other elements of Article 15, including cultural rights.It seems arguable from the travaux préparatoires that the Universal Declaration should be considered an 'instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty'. 140inally, in respect of participation in scientific progress and its applications, the Committee demurred from setting out a full human right to science, or in Uprimny's words, an 'all-encompassing right'. 141Yet, given the expansive interpretation of participation to include general citizens engaging publicly with the policy processes of scientific progress itself, it is hard to see how much more all-encompassing a full human right to science would actually be or what its extended substantive scope might include that participation, on this interpretation, does not.

IV.D. Interpreting the right to science following General Comment No. 25
Given the inattention paid to the right to science from State parties in their reporting to the Committee, and the paucity of human rights jurisprudence discussing the right, there is scope for considerable input into the substantive content of the right to science from a broad interpretive community.As this article has noted, the Committee itself has so far paid limited attention to the right, but seems intent on jump-starting the process of ensuring States parties comply with their obligations under the right.It must follow through on this.International courts such as the ICJ have preferred interpretive pronouncements that have the benefit of experienced application behind them. 142Increased attention to the right when States report to the Committee may both catalyse subsequent practice by States parties and increase the normative legitimacy of this and a later General Comment on the right to science.This is particularly the case given the scope of the General Comment: for example, was it intended to elucidate a general human right to sciencealthough it is an open question as to what that might includeor restrict itself to the REBSPA?As Uprimny noted 'We did not affirm there is such a thing as an all-encompassing 'right to science', but we opened the door to it'. 143That observation characterises much of the General Comment as wholea steppingstone document that only begins the project of interpreting the substantive content of the right to science.
It might at first be considered regrettable that the General Comment is not more detailed and definitive.However, that criticism may be unrealistic.The confluence of factors discussed in this article may have motivated a General Comment which in fact serves to emphasise the role other entities such as UNESCO will play in further elucidating and developing the content of the right to science in the coming years and decades.If the General Comment is approached as an enabling document, legal scaffolding to which substantive content is added through increasing contributions by academia and a community of interested interpreters, it can be seen as an interpretative tool whose value increases as time progresses.
There are, however, regrettable omissions which were perhaps unnecessary.For example, the Committee chose to consider the relationship between science and economic, social, and cultural rights.Indeed, this is the title of the General Comment.There seems little need for it to have restrained itself in this way, and in doing so to not acknowledge the relationship science, and the right to science especially, have with other rights, particularly civil and political rights.The Venice Statement also states that '[i]n conformity with the principles of universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness, this right is relevant to the realization of other civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights'. 144pening the door to an 'all-encompassing right to science' appears to have been the Committee's intention, but what that means in practice is not entirely clear.Firstly, it is unclear what the practical and substantive difference would be between the right to science when used as a shorthand to describe the substantive content of Article 15 as a whole, and an all-encompassing or full human right to science.It is perhaps understandable why the Committee did not identify the kind of substantive interstices that might be covered by a broader rightdoing so might function as an invitation to States to interpret obligation areas in respect of the emergent right to science restrictively.However, it leaves an important question unanswered and gives rise to uncertainty that requires considerable further interpretative work to eliminate. 145owever, whether or not the Committee envisaged a further General Comment once that interpretive work is underway and there is subsequent practice to draw on, there must be one.The Committee pioneered the practice of holding days of general discussion and the formal recognition and publication of input from non-state actors, in particular scholars and civil-society groups, 146 and it is on the work of these interpretive communities that the content of a further General Comment will be founded.
To support this argument, a parallel can be drawn with the right to water.The evolution of a right to water may seem, prima facie, quite different to the right to sciencethe latter is identified as a specific right in both the UDHR and the ICESCR, whereas the former developed from discrete interpretations of Articles 11 and 12 ICESCR, and its relationship with other rights.The Committee first acknowledged the right to sustainable access to water and sanitation in 1991 in General Comment No. 4 on the right to an adequate standard of living. 147In 2000, the Committee again referred to the right in General Comment No. 14 on the right to health. 148In 2001, the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food was expanded to include the right to drinking water.Finally, in 2002 the Committee adopted General Comment No. 15 on the Right to Water, which was recognised in 2015 by the UN General Assembly as an independent human rights guarantee. 149Yet this gradual evolution from a single reference 150 in General Comment No. 4 to the requirement within the right to health of 'safe and potable drinking water' to a fully recognised human right to water 151 mirrors the evolution required of the right to science.Far from being inconsistent with the doctrinal approach of the Committee, such an evolution of the right to science, from foundational statements of its substantive content and the nature of the obligations that accrue in one instrument, to later elucidation and clarification in another, is both consistent and sensible.Although the right to science has existed since the ADRDM and UDHR, the kind of neglect it has suffered means it has more in common with the right to water than it does with other rights in terms of the kind of interpretive approach needed for it to evolve into something tangible and valuable.
Therefore, General Comment No. 25 should be viewed as a starting point for the evolutive interpretation of the right to science.Even if it was the view of the Committee in 2012 that a General Comment on the right to science was premature, attention to the right is increasing.Moreover, while there are few international instruments which directly touch upon interpretation of the right to science, there are common themes to be discerned from a variety of instruments dating back to as early as 1975 152 that support and inform its normative content.Yet, as argued in this article, that evolution must be accompanied by principled clarity in terms of which methodologies of interpretation are used, and to what use they are put, in order for these developments to be normatively legitimate.

V. Conclusion
General Comment No. 25 was urgently needed.Even if opinions differ about the legal weight to be attached to General Comments, their value cannot be denied.As the ICJ made clear, 'great weight' may be ascribed to interpretations adopted by an independent body that has 'been established specifically to supervise the application of that treaty'. 153owever, the objective of those interpretations must be to achieve the 'necessary clarity and the essential consistency of international law, as well as legal security, to which both the individuals with guaranteed rights and the States obliged to comply with treaty obligations are entitled'. 154herefore, it is important that such interpretations be methodologically sound.In the case of General Comment No. 25, much of the Committee's approach builds on preexisting conceptualisations of the right's substantive and personal scope and content, thus lending the General Comment overall an important degree of authority and legitimacy.Although its reasoning for adopting a wide reading of the concept of 'benefits' is less than clear and convincing, that reading is nevertheless supported by a straightforward textual interpretation, by the 2012 Report by the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, as well as by subsequent scholarship.Where it departs from such pre-existing conceptualisations and purports to innovate, the Committee has neither exceeded its mandate nor engaged in special interpretive methodologies which call into question its normative legitimacy or that of its General Comment.
One exception to this general endorsement does, however, arise from the Committee's importation of falsificationism in its expansion on UNESCO's definition of 'science'.
What should be emphasised is that the General Comment does not represent a comprehensive interpretation of the right to science, but should be seen as opening a door to State practice and international human rights law jurisprudence that can and must lead to further pronouncements including a more comprehensive later General Comment in this area by CESCR and/or other UN treaty bodies.As Special Rapporteur Nolte observed in his Fourth Report on the ILC Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreements, 'an individual pronouncement normally carries less weight than a series of pronouncements or a general comment reflecting a settled position on a question of interpretation (a 'jurisprudence' or 'case law')'. 155Therefore, the Committee must ensure proper State reporting in respect of the obligations set out in General Comment No. 25 in order to build a body of pronouncements and output that acts to influence state compliance and catalyse 'subsequent practice' within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention.Moreover, the Committee must continue to engage with its interpretive communities, acting as a clearing house for interpretations that support its pronouncements and pressure States parties to adopt them, to ensure its more innovative interpretations, such as the notion of 'participation' in scientific progress and a broader, more complex substantive and personal scope for 'enjoy the benefits', become mainstream in discourse between civil society actors and the State institutions which have practical responsibility for the obligations that arise as a result of those innovations.
The right to science now has a General Comment which must be viewed as preliminary, rather than a definitive final statement.It must therefore be accompanied and supported by (a) increased vigilance by the Committee in ensuring State parties report on compliance comprehensively and in accordance with the obligations and implementation mechanisms identified by the General Comment; (b) international, regional, and domestic instruments which further elaborate and set in context the right's substantive content, obligations, and implementation mechanisms; and (c) further scholarship which engages not only in de lege lata-type discourse, but also interdisciplinary discussions of a de lege ferenda character to avoid bounded and static interpretations.Notes adopted by much of the scholarship in this areawe do not discuss symbolic validation in this article); John Tobin, 'Seeking to Persuade: A Constructive Approach to Human Rights Treaty Interpretation', Harvard Human Rights Journal 23 (2010): 1-50, 17 (Tobin's formulation is slightly different: 'It must be principled, clear and practical, coherent in its reasoning and consistent with the system of international law, and sensitive to the nature of the socio-political context within individual states and throughout the international legal order.');Moeckli where an experimental result accords with the predictions made by a theory, that theory is verified or supported by the experimental result.Falsificationism, by contrast, rejects the notion that inductive reasoning can provide support for scientific theories or statements, arguing instead that science progresses by eliminating theories and hypotheses which do not accord with empirical observations and experimental results.Whereas one can never be sure that the next observation will continue to provide inductive support for a particular theory, falsificationists point out, one will always be sure that a falsified theory is incorrect.Science thus progresses not by experiments providing support for a particular theory or hypothesis, but rather by eliminating theories and hypotheses which have been conclusively demonstrated not to match observations and experimental results.See for example Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Oxford: Routledge Classics, 2002).109.It has been pointed out that falsificationism relies on a number of dubious assumptions and leads to improbable conclusions.Among these are that any theory which can logically or practically be shown to be wrong counts as scientific, including theories widely considered to be pseudoscientific, while excluding areas normally considered scientific yet hard or impossible to falsify; and that it is possible to design tests capable of falsifying a specific theory or hypothesis, rather than a variety of assumptions surrounding that theory or hypothesis (its auxiliary assumptions).
, 'Interpretation of the ICESCR', 65-70.61.Schlütter, 'Aspects of Human Rights Interpretation', 269.This also captures Franck's notion adherence.See also Keller and Grover, 'General Comments', 159-67.62. Hugh Thirlway, 'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-1989, Supplement, 2006: Part Three', British Yearbook of International Law 77, no.l (2006): 1-82, 19.63.Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 10 (they 'indicate what is to be taken into account (in the sense of text, preamble, annexes, related agreements, preparatory work, etc) and, to some extent, how to approach this body of material (using ordinary meanings in context, in the light of the treaty's object and purpose, distinguishing a general rule from supplementary means, and so on.')).64.United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, 'Official Records: Documents of the Conference' UN Doc.A/CONF.39/11/Add.2, (March 26-May 24, 1968 and April 9-May 22, 1969) 39, para.8;See also for example Richard Gardiner, 'The Vienna Convention Rules on Treaty Interpretation', in The Oxford Guide to Treaties, ed.Duncan B. Hollis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) and Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation.65.Gardiner, 'The Vienna Convention Rules', 462 and 465; Moeckli, 'Interpretation of the ICESCR', 53; Harvard Law School, 'Codification of International Law: Part III-Law of Treaties', American Journal of International Law Supplement 29 (1935): 653-1228, 946; Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law: On Semantic Change and Normative Twists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 10. 66. Article 5(1) provides that 'nothing in the Covenant may be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or freedoms recognized therein.Furthermore, the limitations set out in the Covenant are exhaustive'.Article 5(2) ICESCR clarifies that the rights set out in the Covenant must be viewed as the minimum standard, specifically that the Covenant must not be used as a pretext to restrict, derogate from other human rights or recognize them to a lesser extent.Moreover, Articles 24 and 25 contain parallel provisions in respect of the UN Charter and the right of all peoples to enjoy and utilise fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.These can all be viewed as a detailed presentation of a teleological interpretation, i.e. that a treaty shall be interpreted in light of its object and purpose.67.Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, 15 (referencing Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America) (March 31, 2004) I.C.J .Reports (2004) 37-38, para 83).See also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Palestinian Territories, 174, para.94; Schlütter, 'Aspects of Human Rights Interpretation', 262, and Daniel Peat and Matthew Windsor, 'Playing the Game of Interpretation', in Interpretation in International Law, ed.Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat and Matthew Windsor (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015), 5. 68.Mechlem, 'Treaty Bodies', 909.69.Article 4 of the Vienna Convention (Non-retroactivity of the present Convention).70.More precisely, the context of a treaty comprises its text, including the preamble and annexes, any agreements and instruments made in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and extends to any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all Article 31(3)(b) VCLT) in the application of the treaty by the State parties and international law applicable to the treaty parties (Article 31(3)(c) VCLT) may also be considered.71.See for example Schlütter, 'Aspects of Human Rights Interpretation', 274; Odile Ammann, Domestic Courts and the Interpretation of International Law (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 191-222; Tobin, 'Seeking to Persuade'; and Mark Toufayan, 'Human Rights Treaty Interpretation: A Postmodern Account of its Claim to "Speciality"' (NYU Center for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper No 2, 2005).72.If a treaty has been authenticated in different languages, the rule in Article 33 of the Vienna Convention, according to which the different language versions of the treaty are equally authentic and authoritative, may be relied on to resolve a potential conflict regarding textual interpretation.The rule goes on to specify that terms are presumed to have the same meaning across languages, and that in case of divergence in meaning, the meaning which best reconciles the texts (having regard to the treaty's object and purpose) is to be adopted.73.United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, 39, para 8 and Yearbook of the International Law Commission, II (1966), 219-20, para 8; ILC, 'Draft Conclusions', 21.See also Georg Nolte, 'Subsequent Practice as a Means of Interpretation in the Jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body', in The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention, ed.Enzo Cannizzaro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 138; Mechlem, 'Treaty Bodies', 911 and Georg Nolte, Treaties and Their Practice -Symptoms of Their Rise or Decline (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2018), 336.74.Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur to the ILC, 'Third Report on the Law of Treaties' Yearbook of the International Law Commission, II (1964); Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, 169-70.75.Article 32 provides that recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when interpretation according to Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.This would now appear to formally include treaty body pronouncements.76.Kälin and Künzli, The Law of International Human Rights Protection, 35.77.Nolte, 'Fourth Report', 19 ('Pronouncements of expert bodies may, however, reflect or give rise to a subsequent agreement or a subsequent practice by the parties themselves which establish their agreement regarding the interpretation of the treaty under article 31 (3) (a) or (b).That possibility has been recognized by the Commission, by States, by the final report of the International Law Association, and by authors').78.Schlütter, 'Aspects of Human Rights Interpretation', 281.79.Nolte, 'Fourth Report', 18 ('There is indeed no reason why articles 31 and 32 would be insufficient to deal with particular aspects of human rights treaties.The provisions, and the Vienna Convention generally, are not only suitable for a limited 'ideal type' of multilateral treaty, but they were even elaborated when the existence of expert bodies within the emerging human rights regime was already well known.Indeed, expert bodies under human rights treaties, like international human rights courts, themselves occasionally invoke and apply the Vienna Convention's rules on interpretation.').See also Moeckli, 'Interpretation of the ICESCR', 58 ('In short, from the perspective of legality, the 'special' interpretive techniques employed by the CESCR are unproblematic; they fit well into the VCLT framework.');Schlütter, 'Aspects of Human Rights Interpretation', 317-18 ('some of the claims about the special nature of human rights interpretation overshoot the mark: the treaty bodies generally follow the rules of the VCLT and supposedly special methods, such as the principle of dynamic treaty interpretation and the principle of effectiveness, also fit well within the concept of the VCLT.');Bjorge, Evolutionary Interpretation, 187 ('There is … nothing exceptional about evolutionary interpretation; in common with other types of interpretation it is based upon the objective establishment of the intention of the parties.The evolution involved in the evolutionary interpretation of treaties should 100.Riedel, 'Sleeping Beauty', 511.101.Shaheed, 'Report on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications'.102.'The UN CESCR's General Comment No. 25 on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress', Discussion at the Bonavero Institute of Human Rights, (April 27, 2021).103.Ibid.104.Ibid.105.Clearly further doctrinal work is required in analysing the General Comment and its interpretations in many areas, and each of the authors address the General Comment in doctoral monographs which are forthcoming.One area in which the General Comment has a good deal to say, and which is the focus of one of the authors' doctoral research, is the extent to which the right to science includes 'protection from the adverse effects of science': see for example Ben Saul et al., The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 1215-19 referencing the CESCR's 2009 Guidelines on Treaty-Specific Documents (para.70(b))(stating that States parties must indicate to the Committee in their reports '[t]he measures taken to prevent the use of scientific and technical progress for purposes which are contrary to the enjoyment of human dignity and human rights.')106.UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 'Recommendation on Science and Scientific Researchers', UNESCO Doc 39 C/Res 85 (October 30-November 14, 2017).107.CESCR, 'General Comment No. 25', para.5 (emphasis added).108.Falsifiability emerged as a challenge to verificationism (also mentioned in paragraph 5 of the General Comment).Put crudely, the idea underlying verification is that a scientific theory or statement can be supported by inductive reasoning from observations, e.g.experiments: parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty (Article 31(2)(a) VCLT), and any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty (Article 31(2)(b) VCLT).Further, any subsequent agreements (Article 31(3)(a) VCLT) and practice ( See Sven Ove Hansson, 'Falsificationism Falsified', Foundations of Science 11 (2006): 275-86; Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, ed.John Worrall and Greg Currie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 4. 110.We thank the anonymous reviewer for this point.111.Ibid.112.Although only a limited analysis of the potential effects of this interpretation on both de lege lata and de lege ferenda considerations of the right to science is possible in the context of this paper, one of the authors explores this more fully in a forthcoming paper.113.CESCR, 'General Comment No. 25', para.8. 114.Ibid., para.10. 115.Ibid., para.52.116.Ibid., paras.53-62.