Illiberal Peacebuilding in UN Stabilization Peace Operations and Peace Agreements in the CAR, the DRC and Mali

ABSTRACT Researchers have shown how UN stabilization peace operations mix liberal and illiberal goals and strategies. Yet, further research is needed to theorize and comprehend illiberal peacebuilding features of stabilization operations. This article fills this gap by demonstrating how UN stabilization operations wield illiberal peacebuilding practices. Building upon previous scholarship, we understand illiberal peacebuilding both as an approach and outcome which is oriented by and helps diffuse illiberal norms in the societies where illiberal peacebuilding is instrumentalized by local, regional and international actors. We frame UN stabilization operations in the CAR, the DRC, and Mali as illiberal peacebuilding processes infused with illiberal strategies and show that liberal actors can engage with illiberal strategies for peace promotion. We also analyse peace agreements that accompany these missions as illiberal peacebuilding outcomes and show how these are shaped by illiberal norms. Our key finding is that a set of illiberal norms – exclusion, violence, power inequality and authoritarianism – are central for both UN stabilization operations and peace agreements signed in CAR, DRC and Mali. Therefore, we challenge the UN discourse that stabilization is a needed first step towards liberal and inclusive peace agreements.


Introduction
UN stabilization peace operations are robust military missions aimed at stabilizing countries in conflict and strengthening state authority by helping them combat non-state armed groups.This signals a contemporary focus on conflict containment rather than its resolution through liberal ideas of democracy, human rights, and economic liberalization. 1For this reason, UN stabilization peace operations have been under the spotlight.Scholars have explored the mandates and strategies of stabilization, 2 its political implications, 3 the increasing doctrinal tensions created by this militarized and non-neutral approach to peace 4 and problematized the collaborative relationship between the UN and autocratic regimes. 5Despite differences in analytical focus, scholars agree that UN stabilization peace operations represent a shift from liberal peacebuilding to stabilization 6 and that this often happens 'at the expense of peacebuilding', 7 since economic revitalization, infrastructure and institutional reforms have become more marginal in the militarized approach which characterizes stabilization. 8However, research on whether there is a shift towards an illiberal peacebuilding approach is still missing.
In this article, we contribute to filling this gap by analysing how UN stabilization operations contribute to diffusing illiberal peacebuilding practices in the contexts where those missions are deployed.Drawing on previous scholarship, 9 we understand illiberal peacebuilding both as an approach and outcome which is oriented by and help diffuse illiberal norms in the societies where illiberal peacebuilding is instrumentalized by local, regional and international actors.We suggest an analytical framework for capturing illiberal peacebuilding, which drives attention to (1) actors involved in a given (2) illiberal peacebuilding process or illiberal peacebuilding outcome, with a particular emphasis on the (3) illiberal norms disseminated through them.Our approach differs from earlier conceptualizations of illiberal peacebuilding which conceptualizes it as a practice instrumentalized by local actors or authoritarian regimes 10 as we also consider that actors such as the UN can also shape infuse their practices with illiberal norms.Thus, this article also contributes to the illiberal peacebuilding literature by showing how seemingly liberal actors can also wield illiberal norms for peace promotion. 1Curran and Hunt, "Stabilization at the Expense"; Karlsrud, "For the Greater Good?"; Osland and Peter, "UN Peace Operations"; Rosas Duarte and Carvalho, "'No Peace to Keep'?". 2 Howard, Power in Peacekeeping; Gilder, "The Effect of 'Stabilization'"; Karlsrud, "From Liberal Peacebuilding"; Karlsrud, "For the Greater Good?"; Rosas Duarte et al., "It May Look like War"; Rosas Duarte et al., "Da contenção à resolução?";Rosas Duarte and Carvalho, "'No Peace to Keep'?". 3 Curran and Hunt, "Stabilization at the Expense"; Hunt, All Necessary Means; Osland and Peter, "UN Peace Operations." 4 Peter, "Between Doctrine and Practice"; Rosas Duarte et al., "Da contenção à resolução?";Aoi and De Coning, "Conclusion." 5von Billerbeck and Tansey, "Enabling Autocracy?" 6Karlsrud 2019, Gilder, "The Effect of 'Stabilization'." 7Curran and Hunt, "Stabilization at the Expense." 8 Curran and Hunt, "Stabilization at the Expense"; de Coning, "How not to do UN Peacekeeping"; Rosas Duarte et al., "Entre a contenção." 9Cheung, "The Rise of Illiberal Peacebuilding"; Abboud, "Making Peace to Sustain War"; Lewis et  Such illiberal norms include authoritarianism, exclusion, power inequality, populism, and violence. 11e frame stabilization operations as 'illiberal peacebuilding processes' 12 that seek to create an enabling environment for the negotiation of political settlements.We analyse three cases, which are the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA, 2014-ongoing), the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA, 2013-2023), and the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO, 2010-ongoing).Moreover, we examine three 'illiberal peacebuilding outcomes', 13 which are three peace agreements that accompany these stabilization missions: (1) the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR ( 2019), (2) the Agreement between the Government of DRC and the Ituri Patriotic Resistance Force (FRPI) (2020), and (3) the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers Process (2015).We analyse both stabilization and peace agreements because the UN discourse on stabilization champions that stabilization would pave the way for negotiations of liberal, inclusive peace settlements.Yet, we challenge this discourse by showing that a set of illiberal normspolitical exclusion, violence, power inequality and authoritarianismare promoted by UN stabilization operations and are also advanced in the terms of peace agreements signed in the CAR, the DRC and Mali.To reach this conclusion, we assembled materials, which include the peace agreements, UN documents, mandates and follow-up reports, reports issued by research networks and organisations and previous research.
The argument of this paper is structured around five other sections.The first one discusses stabilization peace operations and problematizes its consequences.We then develop our analytical framework for capturing illiberal peacebuilding in the upcoming section.The framework was utilized in sections three and four, where we analyse the UN stabilization operations and the peace agreements in CAR, DRC and Mali, respectively.Finally, our concluding section summarizes our findings article and suggests new ways forward.

UN Stabilization Peace Operations: Goals and Consequences
Stabilization peace operations have been mandated to contain direct violence by engaging militarily against non-state armed groups and in support of host national governments. 14The most precise definition of 'stabilisation' is found in the HIPPO Report, where stabilization is defined as missions supporting 'the extension or restoration of state authority'. 15Yet, there is still uncertainty around the meaning of 'stabilisation' 16 and scholars have looked at stabilization missions to understand what it entails in practice.Previous research on these operations points to three shared features.First, stabilization peace operations have been deployed in contexts of ongoing, widespread, and multi-party armed violence, 17 and the duties include carrying out security-related tasks such as combating armed groups, transnational crime and terrorism, controlling large population centres, and supporting states to avoid their military defeat and failure. 18Second, stabilization peace operations collaborate with host governments to restore law and order.This indicates a shift from a liberal approach characterized by the promotion of democracy, a neoliberal economy and reforms in the rule of law and security sectors to a militarized response to peace and security issues which combines strategic, short-term military operations. 19These are often conducted in collaboration with military alliances and security forces from the local government and seek to neutralize non-state armed groups, thereby raising questions on whether stabilization resembles war logics of ally and enemy. 20Some non-state armed groups, such as the M-23 in DRC and groups connected to Al Qaeda in Mali, are openly mentioned as national threats to be combated in UNSC resolutions and reports. 21By making the 'enemy' clear in mandates and reports, the UNSC has created internal frictions around the alleged neutrality of the UN in conflict zones. 22Finally, stabilization operations tend to focus on civilian protection and conflict containment and engagement only partially with addressing the root causes of armed struggles. 23nintendedand at times illiberalconsequences of stabilization peace operations have also received attention from scholars. 24Hunt 25 shows that stabilization missions often compromise the effective delivery of humanitarian aid, increase civilian vulnerability and insecurity for UN personnel, and put UN personnel in a difficult position to report human rights violations perpetrated by government forces, since they collaborate closely with them on the ground.Vogel 26 discusses how stabilization produces violence spillover to the surroundings of areas controlled by the UN, thereby creating 'islands of stability' and 'swamps of insecurity' simultaneously.Using Vogel's terminology, Curran and Hunt 27 argue that investments for longterm peacebuilding are concentrated in the 'islands of stability', and the other areas receive fewer resources from the UN.
An illiberal consequence of stabilization concerns whether these operations strengthen authoritarian governments and the illiberalism of peace processes that accompany these missions. 28von Billerbeck and Tansey, 29 for instance, analyse how stabilization enables political authoritarianism in the DRC.The authors draw on the MONUSCO case and conclude that the operation is enabling authoritarian practices in two main ways: by strengthening state capacity and creating a permissive environment for non-democratic regimes to act.The UN support to local governments can also unintentionally trigger conflicts at the local level, as governments use the support, resources and legitimacy provided by the UN to create and maintain an illiberal order. 30Since the UN supports and strengthens local governments, authors such as de Coning 31 argue that the more effective a stabilization peace operation is, the fewer incentives local political elites have to engage in negotiated peace processes that would address the root causes of the armed conflict.

Illiberal Peacebuilding: A Framework for Analysing UN Stabilization and Peace Agreements
In this article, we examine whether illiberal patterns are present in strategies adopted in stabilization operations and peace agreements signed during years of activity of UN stabilization operations.We draw on the growing illiberal peacebuilding literature which points to the lack of research on illiberal features of peace processes. 32Researchers in this field have noted that actors involved in armed conflicts sometimes reject liberal strategies for peacebuilding and prefer illiberal practices as a form to settle armed conflicts. 33Similarly, in the context of peace operations, 'host states have more frequently resisted liberal interventions and have pressed for mandates that more closely align with the self-interest of authoritarian governments'. 34espite the shared emphasis on 'illiberal' features of peacebuilding processes, scholars have conceptualized it differently.Early conceptualizations frame illiberal peacebuilding as a process led by local elites to contest liberal, internationally-led peacebuilding interventions. 35These works pointed to the presence of illiberal politics and norms in the process of managing and reconstructing national orders in the aftermath of wars. 36These have also been particularly concerned with illiberal approaches advanced by local authorities, patrons and institutions.Inspired by this literature, Lewis, Heathershaw and Megoran's 37 work developed a systematic approach to examining 'hard cases of "illiberal peace"'.The authors draw on the idea of illiberal peacebuilding to propose the concept of authoritarian conflict management (ACM), defined as a process that entails the prevention, de-escalation or termination of organised armed rebellion or other mass social violence such as inter-communal riots through methods that eschew genuine negotiations among parties to the conflict, reject international mediation and constraints on the use of force, disregard calls to address underlying structural causes of conflict, and instead rely on instruments of state coercion and hierarchical structures of power. 38wever, the ACM model focuses on authoritarian states, and it does not sufficiently explore illiberal peacebuilding in other contexts such as semi-democratic regimes. 39For this reason, ACM does not equal illiberal peacebuilding and it is rather a 'sub-set of illiberal peacebuilding'. 40espite differences in approaches, we agree with Smith and colleagues that 'what characterises the core of illiberal peace-building is the prioritisation of regime security and stability over accountability, human rights and social inclusion' 41 and that this is a process marked by the presence of illiberal norms. 42 common feature between these conceptualizations is that illiberal peacebuilding is seen as an approach diffusing and drawing on illiberal norms to build a peaceful order which prioritizes stability and maintenance of economic and political status quo over power redistribution and other liberal goals. 43Illiberal norms include authoritarianism, populism and crony capitalism, 44 corruption, 45 inequality and exclusion, 46 control over civilians, information and knowledge production 47 and violent forms of conflict management. 48Furthermore, military defeat, disarmament and demobilization, coercive strategies and no tolerance to opposition are usually present in illiberal peacebuilding processes, and this usually happens at the expense of equalitarian negotiations and power redistribution. 49Given the centrality of illiberal norms and characteristics in illiberal peacebuilding, our framework focuses on such norms.This allows one to identify the illiberal norms and characteristics present both in UN stabilization operations practices and in peace agreements signed during years of activity of those missions.
Our approach to illiberal peacebuilding differs from previous ones regarding the actors relying on and cementing illiberal norms and politics.A great majority of works within the illiberal peacebuilding research agenda emphasize the role of local political elites in illiberal peacebuilding and contrast it with the approaches adopted by Western, international actors. 50Smith and colleagues suggest that [i]n place of Western powers, illiberal peacebuilding is dominated by domestic actors.In place of economic neo-liberalism, illiberal peacebuilding runs on clientelism, cronyism and corruption.In place of liberal ideals of equality and liberty, illiberal peacebuilding emphasises illiberal norms of inequality and order. 51 see this binary reasoning as a limitation because previous research has pointed out that seemingly liberal actors, such as international organisations, can also take on illiberal strategies to pursue peace or have illiberal (unintended) consequences. 52,53 hus, we follow Cheung 54 who suggests that illiberal peacebuilding can be a process and a result brokered by local elites but also by international actors either directly or indirectly involved in peace processes.As argued by Cheung, liberal presumptions might be invoked, but '[t]hese presumptions, however, are not necessarily aligned with political reality'. 55This does not mean that actors historically engaged with liberal peacebuilding have adopted a fully illiberal approach or that there is no difference between different actors and degrees of illiberalism. 56ather, we simply acknowledge that the actors' 'liberal credentials do not automatically transfer to peace processes'. 57Hence, in our approach to illiberal peacebuilding we look at local, national, regional and international actors in UN stabilization missions and peace agreements to examine whether their practices are rooted in illiberal norms.
Illiberal norms and features can be advanced by actors both through peacebuilding processes and peacebuilding outcomes. 58According to Mitchell,59 there is a difference between the strategies employed to create peace (peacebuilding processes) and the result (peacebuilding outcomes).While peacebuilding processes refer to the activities and strategies adopted by both belligerent parties and third parties involved in managing armed conflicts, peacebuilding outcomes imply an attentive outlook to the nature of the polity, economy and society that emerges as a result of the procedure employed in creating this outcome.What sort of 'order' or 'regime' results from the negotiations between enemiesor enemies plus outsidersaimed at resolving the conflict and bringing a peace. 60 52 Berdal and Suhrke, The Peace In Between; Cheung, "The Rise of Illiberal Peacebuilding"; Mitchell, "'Illiberal' Peace"; Richmond, "Becoming Liberal"; Souza and Mendes, "Building Peace"; von Billerbeck and Tansey, "Enabling Autocracy?". 53Some illiberal consequences include the formation of predatory elites, prioritization of security over the population's concerns and needs (see Richmond, "Becoming Liberal"), uneven development (see Souza and Mendes, "Building Peace"), renewed violence after the implementation of liberal policies (Berdal and Suhrke, The Peace In Between) and strengthening authoritarian governments (see von Billerbeck and Tansey, "Enabling Autocracy?".). 54Cheung, "The Rise of Illiberal Peacebuilding." 55 Ibid, 7. 56 Smith and colleagues (see "Illiberal Peace-Building in Asia") differentiate between thin, medium and thick illiberal peacebuilding approaches.A thin approach makes use of illiberal strategies to stabilise the political context first and then implement more comprehensive liberal reforms.The medium approach is characterised by a situation in which actors are concerned with territorial control and do not show long-term concerns with institutional reforms.Thicker versions are those where illiberal strategies are used to achieve an illiberal end-state.These are often associated with authoritarian forms of conflict management, seeking to create a 'single-patron' rather than a 'multiple-patron' order in the political economy, forming a monolithic pyramid that fuses political and economic power and avoids the conflictual nature of 'competitive clientelism' (Lewis and Sagnayeva, "Corruption, Patronage," 81). 57Mitchell, "'Illiberal' Peace," 6. 58 Mitchell, "'Illiberal' Peace." 59Ibid. 60Mitchell, "'Illiberal' Peace," 11-2.
In this article, we look at illiberal norms both in peacebuilding processes and outcomes.We frame UN stabilization missions as a process that seeks to create an environment conducive to building peace, and we look at peace agreements as outcomes negotiated and signed during active UN stabilization missions.By looking at both, we explore the relationship between UN stabilization and peace agreements, peacebuilding processes and peacebuilding outcomes.
Building on the ideas discussed thus far, we understand illiberal peacebuilding both as an approach and outcome which is oriented by and helps diffuse illiberal norms in societies where illiberal norms are instrumentalized by local, regional and international actors.In our conceptualization, illiberal peacebuilding is not a practice tied to specific actors and it can potentially be wielded by a range of stakeholders, from local political elites to seemingly liberal international actors.The key aspect in our conceptualization is that illiberal peacebuilding is characterized by the presence of illiberal norms both in peacebuilding processes and peacebuilding outcomes.
To capture manifestations of illiberal peacebuilding in the contexts we analyse, we suggested in this section an analytical framework composed of three main components: (1) illiberal peacebuilding processes or illiberal peacebuilding outcomes, which refer to different dimensions through which illiberalism can be identified (in this article, UN stabilization peace operations and peace agreements, respectively); (2) actors engaged with peacebuilding processes and outcomes; (3) and the illiberal norms advanced by their strategies and outcomes.This framework is useful for capturing what is 'illiberal' in peacebuilding strategies and peacebuilding outcomes as there has been plenty of research on liberal peacebuilding but not so much on illiberal peacebuilding, as highlighted by Smith and colleagues. 61Yet, we acknowledge that both stabilization missions and peace agreements often mix both liberal and illiberal norms but analytically zoom in on the latter to improve our understanding of the illiberal features of UN stabilization and the peace agreements signed in the contexts of such active peace operations.
We utilize our framework to investigate both (1) UN stabilization peace operations in CAR, DRC, and Mali and (2) peace agreements signed in the context of these stabilization missions.We look at both because since the 1990s the UN has framed peace operations as a process which seeks to create an environment conducive to negotiation and implementation of political settlements. 62We believe it is imperative to analyse these in conjunction since stabilization peace operations are discursively articulated as necessary for creating 'space for the political and peacebuilding actions that are aimed at seeking medium-to long-term political solutions'. 63n what follows we utilize our analytical framework to examine the illiberal features of, and the relationship between, UN stabilization operations in CAR, DRC and Mali and peace agreements signed during years of activity of these missions.
Stabilization in the CAR, DRC, and Mali: Illiberal Peacebuilding Processes?
We frame these missions as illiberal peacebuilding processes which combine illiberal strategies as an attempt to build peace.To analyse whether these constitutes a form of illiberal peacebuilding, we resort to our analytical framework and explore the (1) actors involved in stabilization and (2) the types of illiberal norms advanced by the practices, strategies and mandates of MINUSCA, MINUSMA and MONUSCO.
In DRC, the MONUSCO (2010-ongoing) coordinate its efforts with the national government and regional actors.The operation was authorized to support 'the efforts of the Congolese authorities to strengthen and reform security and judicial institutions' and 'to consolidate State authority in the territory freed from armed groups'. 64As in every stabilization mission, MONUSCO relies on significantly large contingent.Currently, MONUSCO has 18.278 personnel deployed (12.840 troops), and a great majority of troops come from Global South countries. 65The deployment of troops in 2010 did not avoid the resurgence of violence in DRC and the UNSC adopted a more offensive approach by creating the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in 2013.The FIB, which is still active in DRC, is a military brigade coordinated by countries from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), such as South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi.Its main task is to neutralize armed groups that represented a threat to state authority. 66A few months after its deployment, the FIB in collaboration with the Congolese government were able to defeat and demobilize the M-23, an important non-state armed group that was active in the conflict at that time.Therefore, in DRC, the UN often coordinates its efforts with other regional and national actors, such as the SADC members in charge of the FIB and the Congolese government.
In CAR and Mali, the UN also counts on a heavy military footprint, which often cooperates with the local government and military operations led by France.Currently, there are 11,726 UN troops in Mali and the 11,619 63  troops in CAR are authorized to use force in acts of 'preventive defence'. 67In those countries, operations conducted by the UN were often supported by and coordinated with French special forces.In Mali, French troops organized Operation Barkhane (2014-2022), 68 which was granted approval from the UNSC 'to use all necessary means, […] to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat'. 69In CAR, MINUSCA received operational support from the Sangaris Operation (2013-2016), 70 a French military intervention legitimized by the UN and CAR's government at that time.The UN provided the Sangaris Operation with 'all necessary means' 71 to stabilize the CAR and the areas with higher levels of non-state violence. 72Therefore, the cases of MONUSCO, MINUSCA and MINUSMA show that troops are essential in these operations and that peacekeepers often collaborate with other military constellations organized by regional actors such as the FIB, French troops, and military personnel from host states.
By analysing the mandates (summarized in Table 1) and follow-up reports, we identified that MINUSCA, MINUSMA and MONUSCO operate by mixing liberal goals and illiberal practices, such as the use of force to neutralize and annihilate non-state armed groups.In all three mandates, the UN has listed civilian protection and extension of the state authority as key goals of stabilization missions. 73In comparison to mandates from peace operations deployed in the 2000s, the stabilization mandates are not as strong in defending traditional liberal goals, such as stability through promoting democratic, good governance and economic development principles, assisting and promoting comprehensive peace talks which include states, civil society and non-state armed groups, holding elections and democratic routines, and reforming rule of law. 74Others have also identified this shifting context in UN peace operations.For instance, Curran and Hunt 75 show that the mandates of MONUSCO and MINUSCA barely mention 'peacebuilding' or engage with comprehensive liberal reforms at the state level.Moreover, the authors identified that the UN used the budget from the Peacebuilding Fund to help the armies from DRC and Mali to regain territorial control, 76 which led the authors to conclude that stabilization consolidates itself 'at the expense of peacebuilding' 77 within the UN.
Despite the presence of liberal goals (e.g.human rights and promotion of national dialogues in MINUSMA), the mandates and follow-up reports connected to UN stabilization peace operations in CAR, DRC, and Mali have centred its activities around civilian protection and neutralization of nonstate armed groups.For instance, MINUSCA's current mandate stresses that the mission is designed to advance a multiyear strategic vision to create the political, security and institutional conditions conducive to national reconciliation and durable peace through implementation of the APPR and the elimination of the threat posed by armed groups through a comprehensive approach and proactive and robust posture without prejudice to the basic principles of peacekeeping. 78milarly, the mandate of MINUSMA encourages peacekeepers 'to continue to carry out its peacekeeping mandate with a proactive, robust, flexible and agile posture'. 79In the MONUSCO's case, the mandate foresees that the stabilization mission should act in support of the authorities of the DRC, and on the basis of information collection and analysis, carry out targeted offensive operations in the DRC to neutralise armed groups, to ensure effective, timely, dynamic and integrated  protection of civilians, and to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in the DRC and to make space for stabilisation activities, either unilaterally or jointly with the Congolese security forces, through a reconfigured and effective FIB. 80ese excerpts indicate that the use of violence is now a resource commonly employed to achieve the goals set out by the UNSC.Indeed, scholars have shown that the UN is commonly involved in battles and acts of political violence against non-state armed groups. 81In some cases, this makes peacekeepers a target for non-state violence and reduces the humanitarian corridor available for activities. 82he heavy use of military force and violence instead of political negotiations is, in itself, an illiberal norm advanced by the mandates and practice of stabilization peace operations.By eliminating the opposition to national governments, the UN helps to consolidate exclusionary peace(s) in the CAR, the DRC, and Mali, characterized by the exclusion of relevant groups from negotiated settlements. 83This leads to the exclusion of combatants from armed groups as it deprives them of the right to take part in negotiations and to benefit politically and economically from negotiated agreements that could be established in the future.Therefore, violence and exclusion are two key illiberal norms that we could identify in the activities authorized and carried out by MINUSCA, MINUSMA, and MONUSCO.
Scholars have raised the possibility that UN stabilization peace operations can directly or indirectly contribute to strengthening autocratic regimes that often adopt illiberal strategies to manage domestic politics. 84The troubled political scenario in Mali is a case in point.In August 2020, the then-president Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, elected in 2013 and re-elected in 2018, was removed from power by a military coup supported by popular protests.In May 2021, a new coup took place and the military junta took control, removing the transitional government that had previously been established. 85This new coup took place a few weeks after the assassination of Ould Sidati, a leader of the Tuareg movement who participated in the negotiations for the national peace agreement. 86Mali is going through an autocratising process and autocratic leaders have managed to 'obtain popular support for their anti-democratic agendas and to shore up the legitimacy of their regimes'. 87In this context of political authoritarianism, Mali's military junta has been establishing security ties with Russia and Russian private military companies such as the Group Wagner, which even led to France's decision to end Operation Barkhane. 88The government has also partnered with Group Wagner in several operations targeting civilians.According to data from ACLED, 89 71% of the military operations carried out by the Wagner Group in Mali targeted civilians and Mali's security forces partnered with the Wagner Group in many of these military operations.Both in Mali and in the CAR, Wagner mercenaries 'actively targeted civilians from communitiesmost notably, ethnic Fulani communitiesstigmatized for their perceived connections with armed insurgencies'. 90Other autocratic tendencies can also be seen in CAR.President Faustin Archange Touadéra has been trying to change the country's Constitution so that he can run for a third term in office. 91In DRC, authoritarianism has been a key feature of recent governments.For instance, Joseph Kabila, who took over the country's presidency after his father's death in 2001, won elections in 2006 and 2011 and postponed new presidential elections twice because he was unable to run for office again.Despite international pressure, a newly elected president (Félix Tshisekedi) only took over the DRC government in early 2019. 92von Billerbeck and Tansey point out that the MONUSCO mandate and the establishment of the FIB produced two important unintended consequences: the UN's complicity to harm caused to civilians in joint operations with Congolese forces and the strengthening of Kabila's 'increasingly personal political regime'. 93ecurity forces from CAR, DRC and Mali have also perpetrated several human rights violations.In DRC, most human rights violations in conflict-affected areas were perpetrated by state actors and in several provinces these actors were responsible for all the reported abuses. 94In the CAR's case, state agents are responsible for about 10% of reported incidents 95 and they have promoted violations in collaboration with private military contractors such as the Wagner Group. 96Similarly, Malian forces and 'Russian military personnel' were accused of violating human rights and attacking civilians. 97Thus, by supporting authoritarian governments, the 87  UN may be indirectly contributing to authoritarianism and to a lack of accountability for human rights violations. 98et, some human rights violations have been reported by the UN.In May 2023, the UN Human Rights Office reported and investigated the 'Moura Massacre' in Mali.More than 500 people, mostly civilians, were executed in an operation conducted by Malian security forces with the support of foreign security personnel linked to the Wagner group. 99A few months later, the government of Mali sent a letter to the UNSC withdrawing the consent for MINUSMA claiming that there is now a lack of trust between the parties.The UNSC decided to end the operation and is gradually withdrawing its presence.The MINUSMA case illustrates the complexity and constraints of balancing the need for consent, and the imperative need for reporting human rights while at the same time partnering with local governments on the ground. 100As Hunt nicely puts it, 'the robust turnimplying firm partnership with governments that epitomize the stabilization logicmakes it extremely complicated and politically sensitive for missions to perform an impartial human rights monitoring role'. 101ace Agreements in the Context of Active Stabilization Missions: Illiberal Peacebuilding Outcomes?
Scholars have explored the negotiation of ceasefire and peace agreements and showed that illiberalism takes place when illiberal actors take over negotiation processes. 102Our focus is somewhat different since we are particularly interested in agreements negotiated during years of activity of UN stabilization peace operations in the CAR, DRC, and Mali.Therefore, in this section, we analyse three agreements as illiberal peacebuilding outcomes that accompany these operations.We show that peace agreements signed after the deployment of stabilization peace operations have illiberal components. 103By doing so, we question the argument that stabilization is necessary to pave the way for a more comprehensive conflict resolution.In each section, we apply our analytical framework to analyse the actors engaged with this specific form of political settlement and the illiberal norms advanced by each agreement. 98Phayal and Prins, "Deploying to Protect." 99 OHRCR, Rapport sur les évènements. 100 Car: Khartoum Accord (2019) In 2019, the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, also known as the Khartoum Accord, was the 8th peace accord signed in the CAR during the seven years of active armed conflict.
The Khartoum Accord discussed issues such as democratisation, national reconciliation, pastoral migration and transitional security forces.Moreover, two main points were often stressed in the accord: the redistribution of political power and the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation of combatants from non-state armed groups, which would be included either in civilian life or re-deployed in Special Mixed Security Units. 104he Khartoum Accord was mediated by the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).The signatory parties are the government of the CAR, represented by President Faustin Archange Touadéra, and fourteen non-state armed groups, which are the Anti-Balaka Mokom Branch, Anti-Balaka Ngaïssona Branch, Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC), Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC), Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice (MLCJ), Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC), Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC), Retour, Réclamation et Réhabilitation (3R), Révolution et Justice-Belanga Branch (RJ-Belanga), RJ-Sayo Branch, Séléka Rénovée, Union des Forces Républicaines (UFR), Union des Forces Républicaines-Fondamentales (UFR-F), Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC). 105mong the representatives of the armed groups and government, Esther Audrienne Guetel-Moïba from the RJ Belanga Branch was the only woman.In general, data shows that women's inclusion as negotiators, mediators, signatories of agreements and parliamentarians remains extremely low in CAR, 106 and the agreement did very little to change this situation.It recognized that 'the majority of the population of the Central African Republic is made up of children and women who have been deeply affected by the armed' 107 and emphasized 'the fundamental role of women of the Central African Republic in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in building sustainable peace'. 108However, the accord did not open enough space for women participation.For instance, the only mention of women as active parts of the peace process concerns the nomination of two women or 104 Political Agreement. 105Ibid. 106CFR, "Women's Participation." 107 Political Agreement, 3. 108 Ibid.
youth civil society organisations for the Prefectural Implementation Committee to deal with local issues at the prefecture level. 109he agreement also promoted the exclusion of other non-state armed groups active in the CAR at that time.This happened because the Khartoum Accord decided to include only the 14 groups that took part in the Bangui Forum of 2015, which resulted in a shared commitment to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate. 110However, more than 30 non-state armed groups were active in CAR between 2013 and 2019.Some were active during the Bangui Forum and decided not to take part in negotiations and others emerged after 2015 and were not included in the arrangement either. 111Amongst the many groups involved in political violence throughout 2022 in the CAR, at least 7 are not part of the Khartoum Agreement. 112The main one is the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), a group created in 2020 and is composed of representatives of both ex-Seleka and anti-balaka.In 2023, the group launched a new offensive against the CAR government and Wagner Group mercenaries supporting the CAR forces.The CPC tried to block roads and used tactics such as homemade drones, improvized explosive devices and abductions in this new offensive. 113ivil society representatives were consulted during the negotiations of the Khartoum Accord, but they did not sign the agreement, nor did they have an active role in the negotiations.According to Murray and Sullivan, the decision to have civil society representatives left out of negotiations was a politically motivated decision as they feared that civil society 'could produce positions that differed from the Bangui Forum, which is still in effect and used to inform policymaking.As a result, the perspectives of ordinary citizens were underrepresented during the negotiations'. 114Thus, the Khartoum Accord marginalized some actors such as some non-state armed groups, women and civil society organisations, thereby promoting illiberal norms such as exclusion.
Exclusion, power inequality and authoritarianism can also be grasped in the passages on power redistribution in the Khartoum Accord.The agreements tasked the President of CAR with establishing 'an inclusive Government immediately after the signing of this Agreement' 115 but the Khartoum Accord did not specify how this would be implemented.It was up to the President to distribute political positions, which granted the CAR government more leverage in the process.On March 3rd, 2019, President Touadéra announced the new government with 37 Ministries, 109 Ibid. 110ICG, "Making the Central African." 111 ACLED, "Data." 112Ibid. 113Picco, "Ten Years After." 114Murray and Sullivan, "Central African Republic." 115Political Agreement, 10.
but only six ministries were conceded to six armed groups in the Khartoum Agreement.Most assigned ministers were from the former cabinet and their presence in the new government asserted Touadéra's control over crucial areas such as finance, foreign affairs, and interior. 116Civil society organisations contested the redistribution of power as they received almost no relevant positions in the new government structure. 117Armed groups followed suit, and some refused to take office as they interpreted the new government as an authoritarian power-sharing structure. 118Therefore, allowing the President to redistribute power in the new government led to generalized discontent amongst parties.Fearing a renewal of violence in the country, the CAR government redesigned the arrangement and awarded non-state armed groups with more posts.In late March 2019, it was announced that [a]rmed groups gained twelve ministerial positions in a new cabinet of 39 ministers, twelve further ministerial-level or other senior posts in the president's and the prime minister's offices, including one charged with overseeing the mixed security units, as well as two prefect and five sub-prefect posts, all going to armed groups active in the areas concerned. 119e agreement also emphasized the need for implementing the National Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Repatriation (DDRR) Programme.It foresees the creation of a mixed commission, composed of the government and non-state armed groups, which would be responsible for processing individual reintegration requests. 120Nevertheless, the parties who did not sign the agreement produced in the Bangui Forum of 2015 cannot partake in the program.Furthermore, the agreement is vague regarding the criterion adopted to judge individual cases, thus leaving room for a lack of transparency and biased decisions.
DRC: Agreement between the Government of Democratic Republic of Congo and the Ituri Patriotic Resistance Force (FRPI) (2020) In DRC, conflict parties have not yet agreed upon comprehensive peace deals.A new peace process was initiated in April 2022, but no peace agreement has been reached yet.For this reason, we chose to analyse the agreement signed in 2020 between the DRC government and the Patriotic Resistance Front of Ituri (FRPI), which, despite being bilateral, is the agreement that resembles a peace deal the most.The agreement was the result of a long negotiation process that began in 2017 and it was signed between the 116 ICG, "Making the Central African." 117Ibid. 118Ibid. 119ICG, "Making the Central African," 11. 120 Political Agreement.
government and the FRPI, a non-state armed group that operated in the region of Ituri (Eastern DRC).The negotiation was brokered by the government program Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for War Affected Areas (STAREC) and by the non-governmental organisation ACIAR.It also received logistical and technical support from MONUSCO.The agreement focuses on the ceasefire between the parties and the FRPI disarmament process.It also addresses, even if briefly, the return of displaced persons and refugees, the concession of amnesty, the restoration of state authority and the reconciliation process. 121ifferent actors participated in the negotiation process, such as community leaders, the provincial governor, military officials and some relevant ministers. 122Yet, the agreement also excluded several other non-state armed groups.Back then, the FRPI was the main group operating in the region, but it was certainly not the only one.In 2020 alone, more than 250 episodes of violence were recorded in the Ituri region, involving more than ten different non-state armed groups. 123CODECO, an association of different non-state armed parties, is an example and the group even intensified its attacks after the signing of the peace agreement to reclaim their right to similar privileges conceded to the FRPI, such as amnesty and integration into the national army. 124This reaction shows that the agreement was not inclusive and that authorities missed the opportunity to negotiate with the other non-state armed groups in the Ituri region.
In our interpretation of the agreement, the presence of the illiberal norms of power inequality and defeat of the opposition were striking.The agreement demanded vital concessions from the FRPI.For instance, the agreement urged for the cessation of the FRPI as an armed organisation and claimed that its disarmament and demobilization should take place right after signing the deal. 125In turn, the FRPI would be allowed to transform into a political party.Nevertheless, the government did not provide the FRPI with any government posts or seats in relevant spheres of regional and national decisionmaking.The only commitment made by the DRC government was to 'facilitate this process [of transforming into a political party], particularly insofar as filing of statutes for this formation, prepared by the FRPI, and administrative authorization, pursuant to current regulations'. 126Therefore, the FRPI was left with no guarantees regarding their political inclusion in DRC.
Passages in the agreement on the DDR process also confirm the power inequality between the DRC government and the FRPI.proposal in this regard was to reintegrate ex-combatants into the armed forces and to submit a request for an amendment to the Parliament seeking amnesty for combatants. 127Yet, according to Article 5 in the agreement, the government is only responsible for filling out the amendment proposal and presenting it to the Parliament, and there is no guarantee that the Parliament would approve it. 128Similarly, Article 8 states that the government agrees to build economic reconstruction projects and stabilization strategies for the region. 129However, there is no detailed strategy or implementation plan put forward in the agreement.Thus, the FRPI has only to trust that the DRC government will implement those projects, which illustrates the power inequality advanced in this agreement.
Inequality manifests itself to the extent that the FRPI abdicates from its armed strategy and receives just one guarantee in return (the integration of combatants into the Congolese armed forces). 130In the end, the DDR process did not take place as expected due to a lack of implementation by the DRC government.After the disarmament of the FRPI began, FRPI members were confined to their bases awaiting transfer to the armed forces, which did not occur.In October 2020, discontent with the lack of agreement implementation fuelled new clashes between the FRPI and government forces leading to the ultimate failure of the peace agreement. 131n 2022, more than 15 violent episodes between the FRPI and the government were registered and more than 30 deaths were connected to these events.

Mali: Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (2015)
The Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali ( 2015) is the most comprehensive agreement signed since the establishment of the MINUSMA in 2013.It proposed the creation of an institutional design that would allow Tuareg groups in Northern Mali 'to manage their own affairs in a spirit of participative citizenship, based on the principle of free administration and enabling wider representation of these populations within national institutions'. 132The agreement suggested the creation of a Regional Assembly elected by the population, with legal, administrative and financial capacities, and the establishment of a second chamber in the Parliament, to increase the representation of the Tuareg population at the national level. 133127 Ibid. 128Ibid. 129Ibid. 130Ibid. 131The Defense Post, "DR Congo Militia"; Monitor, "Congolese militia." 132Agreement for Peace, 5. 133 Agreement for Peace.
Different actors participated in the peace process.The agreement was brokered by an international mediation team composed of the government of Algeria, MINUSMA experts, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the AU and the EU.The USA and France also engaged unofficially in the negotiation process. 134The agreement was firmed between the Malian government and six Tuareg non-state armed groups (MNLA, HCUA, MAA, CMFPR, CMFPR2, CPA).The Tuareg groups were split into two distinct coalitions: the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and the Platform of Armed Groups (Platform).A key difference between the two is that the CMA has always pursued the goal of selfdetermination for the Tuareg people, while the Platform argues that Tuareg demands can be met without infringing Mali's territorial integrity. 135owever, we concluded that the agreement promotes the illiberal norm of exclusion despite its comprehensiveness.The agreement engaged different non-state armed groups in the North in the process, but it excluded jihadist non-state armed groups that were (and still are) active in Northern Mali.Jihadist groups such as the Ansar al-Dine, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), were responsible for about 30% of the events of political violence in Mali between 2013 and 2015. 136 This does not come as a surprise because MINUSMA troops and French military operations were deployed in Mali to combat and neutralize jihadist groups excluded from the process.By deliberatively excluding these groups from negotiations, the parties disregarded that 'conflicts [in Northern Mali] between different social and ethnic communities, between jihadist groups and the government, and between different armed groups often have no clear boundaries'. 137For instance, jihadists cooperated with Tuareg groups that signed the 2015 agreement, and the former argued that they were protecting the latter from attacks from the government and other parties in the conflict. 138nother aspect is that the vagueness of the agreement has allowed the government of Mali to exclude and postpone the participation of nonstate signatory parties in the political life in Mali.At the regional level, a Regional Assembly to Northern Mali would be created to grant Tuareg groups autonomy over local issues. 139At the national level, the agreement stated that 'the representation of the populations in the National Assembly shall be enhanced by increasing the number of electoral constituencies and/or other appropriate measures'. 140However, the agreement lacks in 134 Pellerin, Mali's Algiers Peace. 135 clarity as to which non-state armed groups would be included, how would posts be distributed and how this process would be implemented.This has significantly delayed the implementation process.Since 2015, several appeals to revise the agreement were put forward and changes in the political framework have been either inexistent or extremely limited. 141Frustrations with the exclusion from political life also triggered the creation of factions in the CMA and the Platform, such as the Coordination des Mouvements de l'Entente (CME) and another faction of the Mouvement pour le Salut de l'Azawad (MSA) that were eager to benefit from the DDR programme foreseen in the agreement.
Issues around the DDR processes also exemplify how the vagueness in the framework promoted the exclusion of relevant conflict parties in Mali.In article 18, the agreement follows MINUSMA's criteria to judge whether ex-combatants would be suitable to join the DDR programme: [t]he cantonment process for combatants seeks to identify those combatants eligible for integration or the DDR programme.This process shall be completed according to the standards and professional practices established by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali. 142o aspects are problematic with this strategy.The first one is that the UN was granted authority to decide upon the 'eligibility' for the DDR programme, thus excluding non-state armed groups from designing programme requirements.Second, allowing the MINUSMA to set the criteria for inclusion is problematic as the mission was mandated to carry out and support military operations against some non-state armed groups, such as the jihadist ones mentioned above.Therefore, it is unlikely that the DDR programme will, in the upcoming years, be open to reintegrating jihadists.
The DDR programme was only open to signatory parties in the agreement. 143This was problematic as parties excluded from negotiations formed factions after being frustrated with the lack of effective implementation of the programme. 144They 'demanded access to some of the benefits of the accord, particularly Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) programmes that would guarantee economic benefits and possibly reintegration into Mali's defence and security forces for some fighters'. 145There has also been some discontent with the implementation of the programme.In 2020, 85,000 combatants were already registered in the programme by the non-state armed groups, but less than 3,000 combatants were reintegrated accordingly. 146inally, the agreement has also made a call for violent suppression of dissent, which is another illiberal feature we identified.In the agreement, violence and use of force, instead of negotiations, are presented as preferred strategies to deal with so-called terrorist groups and organized crime. 147n Chapter 11 of the Agreement, the parties agreed 'to combatting terrorism and its many connections with organised crime and drug trafficking, including by means of existing strategies and regional mechanisms'. 148To do so, the parties agreed upon creating 'special units' whose functions are not specified in the agreement. 149

Conclusions
In this article, we provided an analytical framework to capture illiberal peacebuilding in UN stabilization peace operations in CAR, DRC, and Mali and in peace agreements that accompany these operations.Building on our analytical framework, we mapped a coalition of national, regional and international actors acting in close collaboration with authoritarian states hosting stabilization missions.We concluded that three main illiberal norms diffused by these actors, which are: (1) use of violence, (2) exclusion of the non-state armed actors to be neutralized by violence and (3) direct or indirect support for authoritarian states often involved in human rights violations.As far as the peace agreements are concerned, we noticed that those are often signed with a limited number of non-state armed groups and with little participation from civil society organisations.We concluded that the illiberal norms of (1) exclusion, (2) authoritarianism, (3) power inequality and (4) violence were somewhat present in agreement terms.The agreements often consolidated the power of authoritarian national states and made almost no concessions to non-state armed groups.In addition, the agreement in Mali also called on the parties to combat terrorism and organised crime by employing existing strategies, which are often violent as we discussed in the case of MINUSMA.
We see this article as a first step towards analysing and theorizing the relationship between illiberal peacebuilding, UN stabilization peace operations and peace agreements.Yet, we acknowledge that further research on individual cases is needed.Qualitative case studies and fieldwork can shed some more light on illiberal peacebuilding practices employed in the field by peacekeepers.Furthermore, research on the processes of agreement negotiation, signature and implementation could deepen our understanding of how illiberal norms are manifested at different stages of peace processes.Thus, there are other promising research avenues and we expect that our framework for capturing illiberal peacebuilding is a first step towards critical reflections on the illiberal features of stabilization and the peace agreements signed in those contexts.

61
Smith et al., "Illiberal Peace-Building in Asia." 62 Duursma et al., "UN Peacekeeping at 75"; Rosas Duarte et al., "Entre a contenção." Good offices and support to the peace process, including the implementation of the ceasefire and the APPR (c) Facilitate the immediate, full, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance (d) Protection of the United Nations MINUSMA (a) Support to the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and to the full realization of the Political Transition (b) Support to stabilization and restoration of State authority in the Centre (c) Protection of civilians (d) Promotion and protection of human rights (e) Humanitarian assistance MONUSCO (a) Protection of civilians (b) Support to the stabilization and strengthening of State institutions in the DRC and key governance and security reforms Own elaboration based on UNSC, Resolution 2605 (2021); UNSC, Resolution 2612 (2021); UNSC, Resolution 2640 (2022). 76Ibid. 77Curran and Hunt, "Stabilization at the Expense," 46. 78UNSC, Resolution 2605 (2021), 9 79 UNSC, Resolution 2640 (2022), 17.
102Abboud, "Making Peace to Sustain War"; Costantini and Santini, "Power Mediators"; Hellmüller, "Peacemaking."103Werecognise that even comprehensive peace agreements can have illiberal characteristics.As noted in Lewis and Sagnayeva, "Corruption, Patronage," 89, '[p]olitical settlements are almost always intertwined with different forms of violence, involve logics of both inclusion and exclusion, and are often hierarchical and authoritarian in their outcomes'.