Securitization, fear politics, and the formation of an opposition alliance in competitive authoritarian regimes

ABSTRACT This article examines how opposition parties with diverse ideologies can form alliances in competitive authoritarian regimes despite the securitization strategy used by authoritarian incumbents. Using Turkey as a case study, the article demonstrates that an authoritarian leader may associate terrorism with opposition parties and may disseminate this fear to manipulate moderate voters and prevent coalition formation between niche parties. By analysing public speeches of political actors in Turkey, the study argues that if opposition parties recognize the vulnerabilities of the regime and believe that forming an alliance would gain support from the masses and encourage cross-party voting, then the securitization strategy would not deter them from forming a pre-electoral alliance. However, the failure of the securitization strategy to prevent opposition parties from forming an alliance does not guarantee opposition victory in elections. The securitization strategy employed by the authoritarian regime can still be utilized to effectively empower the authoritarian leader, enabling them to win elections by capitalizing on fear and depicting the opposition alliance as a security threat and a potential source of instability if they were to come into power.


Introduction
Competitive authoritarianism is a worrisome trend in global politics, posing a threat to numerous democracies.This type of regime has become increasingly prevalent since the Cold War and being one of the most frequently encountered regime types around the world 1 .According to Levitsky and Way 2 in this regime type, autocratic incumbents often violate and manipulate the formal rules of democracy, but they allow contestation in the electoral arena to gain legitimacy 3 .To do so, authoritarian incumbents allow international observers to monitor elections with the aim of showing that they are held fairly and transparently.However, when international observers and media outlets monitor the elections, their participation brings uncertainty for such incumbents because they may lose the elections in such an observed competition.Therefore, autocratic leaders take elections seriously and pursue a dirty political strategy against their opponents, such as harassing, intimidating, criminalizing, and portraying them as an existential threat to the security of the country 4 .
Since the May 2013 Gezi protests, Turkey has undergone a regime transition under the Erdogan administration, which is often referred as to a shift towards competitive authoritarianism 5 .Since then, there is an increasing tendency of Erdogan utilizing the manipulative tactics that are associated with competitive authoritarianism whenever his office is confronted with regime-debilitating events like economic crisis or mass protests.In this context, any pre-electoral alliance attempts between the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP) and other opposition parties is one of Erdogan's favourite topics to frighten the moderate median voters.This subject is widely open to political manipulation because HDP has a complex relationship with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) 6 , a separatist terrorist organization designated as such by both Turkey and the EU.Using this association, Erdogan associates all HDP members with the PKK and argues that any voting or coalition attempt with the HDP is equivalent to supporting the PKK and posing a threat to the country's security 7 .This regime-sponsored connection between the PKK and the HDP disseminated by the government-controlled media with the intention of curtailing the pro-Kurdish HDP's political viability as a legitimate alternative political party in an opposition alliance 8 .
As a result of this rhetorical construction, a pre-electoral fracture occurs between niche parties in opposition block appealing to specific ethnic, religious, and ideological groups 9 .For instance, the secular-nationalist Good Party (IYIP), which has a significant share of the opposition block's voters, declines to form a pre-electoral alliance with the pro-Kurdish HDP because they view the HDP as an extension of the PKK 10 .In response to IYIP's marginalizing stance, the HDP is hesitant to engage in pre-electoral compromise with another opposition party that associates them with a terrorist organization and ignores the niche interests of their voter base 11 .Therefore, the rhetoric employed by Erdogan and disseminated by the government-subsidized mass media undermines the opposition parties' efforts to form a coalition.It becomes a disruptive strategy that often successfully raises barriers for opposition parties to build a pre-electoral alliance.
As previous studies suggested that, in order to validate their authority to rule, authoritarian regimes need legitimacy, which is often achieved through electoral victories 12 .However, to tackle uncertainties associated with elections, authoritarian incumbents rely on electoral manipulation to turn those elections in their own favour 13 .In this context, many studies identified various tactics employed by authoritarian regimes such as changing election rules 14 , using coercive measures to suppress the opposition and their supporters 15 , controlling judiciary to silence opposing views projecting a sense of dominance 16 , and using patronage to buy support 17 .These authoritarian regime tactics often categorized as "divide and rule strategy" 18 .They highlight the intention of authoritarian incumbents that aims to deepen ideological differences of position parties to prevent their formation of opposition alliance and stop their voters to engage in cross-party voting.
In a separate body of literature, this rhetorical manipulation of authoritarian incumbents through social construction of a threat has been conceptualized as "securitization" a theoretical framework developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap De-Wilde 19 from the "Copenhagen School".According to this concept, the securitization actor uses rhetorical actions to frame an issue as a security threat, aiming to convince the audience to support the counter-measures to eliminate the constructed security threat 20 .The use of securitization by authoritarian leaders serves multiple purposes, including diverting the attention from their failures in the economic, social, and political spheres, justifying future actions against political opponents, promoting polarization, and maintaining their power 21 .This is achieved by linking them to the already established state of exception and securitized actors and threats, which can then be used as a means to securitize all other opponents and label them as threats 22 .
When these two group of studies are combined, there is still a missing piece of a puzzle in the literature whether the securitization strategy utilized by a competitive authoritarian regime can always divide opposition parties.According to Ong, without referring to securitization, opposition parties are more likely to form a preelectoral opposition alliance; (1) if the opposition parties realize the vulnerability of the regime because of defections such as economic crisis (2) they have clear information that their compromise will pay of wining the elections (3) their niche voters will support cross-party voting 23 .So, based on this argument, realizing the regime vulnerability, and understanding mutual dependency based on ex-ante information by opposition parties may turn the securitization strategy inefficient to divide the opposition alliance.
Building upon Ong's argument, this article aims to examine to what extent securitization fails to divide an opposition alliance.The article suggest that the securitization strategy employed by an autocratic leader to create divisions between opposition parties based on their ideological differences may not be successful; (1) if opposition parties possess reliable prior knowledge that moderate voters are dissatisfied with the incumbent's economic performance and (2) are willing to support an opposition alliance.Turkey is an important case study in this regard where an autocratic leader used securitization over a decade to divide opposition alliance attempts.The study's findings could contribute to both opposition alliance and securitization literature by demonstrating limitations of the securitization strategy in dividing pre-electoral opposition alliances.Securitization may fail when the dominant party's patronage is weak in influencing voters to support the incumbent and opposition parties have ex-ante information indicating mutual dependence and median voter support, thereby dispelling the uncertainty 24 .
This article aims to investigate this argument in two distinct timeframes: preand post-super-presidential system.This is an important juncture that not only marks a significant change to the electoral rules, but also forced the opposition parties to realize their mutual dependence.The data for this article is based on public speeches made by political leaders in Turkey, which are available as open-access data sources in the mass media.Through a latent content analysis, the article hermeneutically interprets the speeches beyond their literal meaning and uncover their implied significance 25 .This article begins with a theoretical discussion of the securitization concept, followed by an exploration of the impact of Erdogan's securitization strategy before and after the implementation of the super-presidential system.The concluding section summarizes the research findings and offers political insights for political parties struggling to form a coalition under the intense securitization strategy of competitive authoritarian regimes.

The securitization of an opposition alliance
In authoritarian regimes, the dominant political parties have exclusive access to resources, including capital and media outlets, which create significant barrier for opposition parties to secure financial resources and communicate their political agenda to voters 26 .As far as the regime generates resources that appeal to the vast majority of moderate median voters, its patronage introduces a bias in favour of the authoritarian incumbent 27 .This relationship is sustainable as far as there is a continuous exchange of resources between the rulers and citizens 28 .Because the dominant party controls all resources, the only way for resource-poor opposition parties to unseat the incumbent leader is build a collation of opposition parties 29 .
Authoritarian incumbents are aware that opposition parties could potentially defeat them through electoral coordination.So, they pursue a strategy to prevent opposition parties from coordinating and forming a pre-electoral alliance 30 .These strategies involve playing on ideological differences between opposition parties and dividing their alliance attempts, making it difficult for them to mobilize the majority of voters 31 .In this respect, securitization is one of the options for authoritarian regimes to create a threat perception among voters.They rhetorically manipulate voters that the authoritarian incumbent is necessary for security and stability, thereby discouraging them to prefer an opposition alliance.
According to this strategy, during the pre-electoral alliance stage, an authoritarian leader (the securitizing actor) may use securitization to convince voters (the audience) that there is an existential threat that must be addressed with extraordinary measures (state of exception) 32 .The leader may argue that the constituents' safety and stability (referent object) are at risk if the opposition alliance wins.This emotional isolation is meant to divide voters and present the authoritarian leader as the only solution for stability 33 .By using securitization to portray opposition alliance as a security threat, the incumbent justifies future actions against political opponents.To do this, the authoritarian incumbent associates opposition parties with an already securitized issue or actor, such as a terrorist organization, to frame them as a threat 34 .In this way, opposition alliance is securitized by utilizing an already securitized actor as a tool to exploit.By shifting a routine coalition attempt from everyday politics to a security politics, the securitization actor may portray losing the election to the opposition alliance as a defeat against foreign and domestic enemies of the state 35 .
The use of securitization rhetoric not only aims to mobilize the supporters of the incumbent, but also intends to limit the political space for opposition parties to form an alliance 36 .This kind of polarization rhetoric provokes a reaction from opposition parties, which often ends up deepening their social and ideological cleavages, making it harder to establish an opposition alliance to compete with incumbent 37 .For instance, in an effort to refute the narrative propagated by the incumbent, the opposition party appealing to a niche voter group supporting a hard-line counter-terrorism policy, may strongly deny any association with another partly linked to terrorist organizations.On the other hand, the party facing securitization might view this statement as offensive and be hesitant to form a coalition with any niche party accusing them of being as an extension of a terrorist group.As a result of securitization, the cost of negotiations and compromises for electoral coordination among opposition parties increases as they endeavour to challenge the established discourse of the incumbent 38 .Niche parties might be able to disprove securitization claims.Yet, they end up getting trapped in another securitization situation, which causes mutual animosity among them and prevents formation of an opposition coalition, thus inadvertently affirming the success of the securitization.
The disagreement between opposition parties also generates significant uncertainty for voters who witness this friction, whether to support the opposition alliance comprising ideologically diverse parties incapable of governing the country effectively or continue with the authoritarian incumbent, who pledges stability and security 39 .Some voters may also be disheartened because of the possible intimidation and less likely to turn out to vote for the opposition alliance 40 .Furthermore, voters who have a strong partisan affiliation to their niche opposition parties and prioritize security concerns over their desire to see democratic turnover will be very wary of voting for opposition alliance 41 .Therefore, the polarization incited by the authoritarian leader through securitization may create challenges for opposition parties to persuade their voters for cross-party voting.
Although authoritarian leaders often exploit ideological vulnerabilities to manipulate the political narrative, their use of securitization to prevent ideologically diverse parties from forming pre-electoral alliances does not always succeed in achieving its intended goal.If the aura of invincibility of an authoritarian leader is vulnerable due to regime-debilitating events such as an economic crisis occurring prior to elections, the potential victory may encourage opposition parties to mute their differences and focus on defeating incumbent 42 .However, to reach that level of awareness, opposition parties need reliable information to rationalize their sacrifice.First, they need exante information about their strengths and weaknesses 43 .Second, they must be sure about whether their niche voters will support cross-party strategic voting 44 .If all these conditions are met, the securitization agenda set by authoritarian incumbent will not bring the desired outcome, and opposition parties will likely build an opposition alliance to compete with authoritarian regime.However, forming an opposition alliance alone isn't sufficient for electoral success.The incumbent can still effectively exploit a pre-securitized actor to perpetuate the distressing fear of moderate voters, shaping their perception.As a result, the opposition alliance might still experience electoral defeat.

Securitization before the super presidential system
When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was founded in 2001, its leaders denied their Islamist roots, and proclaimed their commitment to democratizing Turkey 45 .This message was believable at the time because they suffered several party closures, and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had been barred from politics due to a poem he recited in a public speech.In 2002 election, the AKP won a majority of the seats in parliament and set out to promote democratic reforms to make Turkey eligible for EU membership 46 .This effort paid off, and the Turkish economy flourished with the momentum of democratization.
The wave of democratization in Turkey began to recede after the 2011 elections, in which Erdogan led government secured 49.8% of the vote.Erdogan defined the 2011 elections as the beginning of his and his party's "mastery" years 47 .As Erdogan's confidence grew, fuelled by his successful macroeconomic policies and his image as strong leader in foreign affairs 48 , he became more assertive, authoritarian, and powerhungry 49 .This authoritarian tendency became more evident in the years following the 2013 Gezi Protests, when Erdogan adopted a securitization rhetoric to mobilize his supporters and polarize political events in Turkey 50 .
During this period, Erdogan led governments took a proactive stance in resolving Turkey's longstanding Kurdish Issue by engaging in negotiations with the PKK leadership, which had been regarded as a significant security threat for Turkey since the 1980s 51 .Resolving the Kurdish issue was crucial for co-opting Kurdish votes to secure Erdogan's electoral victories and advance his plans for an all-powerful presidency 52 .As a result, Erdogan de-securitized the PKK leadership to appeal to Kurdish voters and secure an absolute parliamentary majority 53 .In these negotiations, representatives of pro-Kurdish parties acted as intermediaries between AKP government and the PKK.Thus, collaborating with pro-Kurdish politicians did not lead to social stigmatization or criminalization of Erdogan during these years.
Erdogan's de-securitization strategy, however, did not proceed as planned.From 2012 onwards, voters' perceptions of AKP's economic performance declined due to low growth and high unemployment rates 54 .This decline in economic performance signalled a weakening of the incumbent and an increased likelihood of opposition parties defeating Erdogan.In this context, despite Erdogan's request for him to withdraw from the 2014 presidential race, HDP leader Selahattin Demirtas ran against Erdogan and received 9.8% of the vote, running a better political campaign than other opposition leaders 55 .Erdogan then sought to consolidate Kurdish votes by using the peace process and pressuring HDP candidates to run as independents in the June 2015 general elections, with the aim of winning more parliamentary seats.However, the HDP leadership foiled his plan by running as a party and opposing Erdogan's super-presidential agenda 56 .Every game-changing move by the HDP weakening the incumbent garnered sympathy for Demirtas and the HDP in the anti-AKP bloc, attracting more opposition votes beyond the Kurdish voters 57 .Despite the absence of an explicit electoral alliance between the HDP and other opposition parties, strategic voting from other opposition voters helped the HDP surpass the 10% threshold.The HDP's entry into parliament as the third largest party prevented Erdogan from gaining a parliamentary majority and forced him to postpone his super-presidential plans.
After the June 2015 elections, forming an anti-AKP coalition was hindered by sudden events including escalating ISIS and PKK attacks.These incidents caused uncertainty among moderate voters.In an interview following these attacks, former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu admitted that these attacks increased their votes 58 .As Erdogan noticed the rise of Demirtas and HDP, which posed a threat to his presidential ambitions, he began to re-securitize the PKK and HDP 59 .He ended the peace process, stating that no agreement could be made with a terrorist organization and their extension in parliament 60 .Erdogan also utilized all his power to delay coalition talks, eventually forcing an early election to consolidate AKP's immigrant votes 61 .
In this atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, the opposition parties that were ideologically distant found it difficult to come together and form a coalition.HDP leader Demirtas announced that they would support any coalition that aligned with their principles, without mentioning the name of their ideological rival Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) 62 .Meanwhile, as the main opposition party, Republican People's Party (CHP) made a significant compromise and offered the prime minister position to MHP leader Devlet Bahceli if he agreed to form a coalition with them.However, despite this generous offer, Bahceli not only rejected it but also emphasized their opposition to forming a coalition with a pro-Kurdish party, as it goes against their niche ideological interests 63 .
Since the elections had already ended, MHP faced no risk of losing their mass supporters.Instead, the possibility of gaining patronage by being a prime minister was a strong incentive for Bahceli to consolidate his party's voter support.However, by choosing not to participate in a coalition as a prime minister, Bahceli deprived his party of both the rewards of office and access to state resources for patronage distribution.Furthermore, his party also lost a role in the formulation of policies in accordance with their programmatic objectives 64 .In an interview following the elections, Bahceli clearly stated that any coalition alliance with HDP was not possible for them, and he expected to gain more votes in a repeated election 65 without the help of his rivals.Based on the existing election results, Bahceli possibly assumed that the upward trend in MHP's votes and the decline in AKP's electoral strength would continue, especially since AKP's de-securitization strategy towards the PKK had failed and Erdogan's economic performance showed no signs of early recovery 66 .
However, Bahceli was wrong in his assumption that Erdogan would not recover quickly within a short period.In the general elections held in the shadow of terrorist attacks and opposition fracture, AKP won the elections in November 2015 and re-took the majority of the seats in the parliament.The securitization strategy of Erdogan paid off and gave him the opportunity not only hinder the convergence of opposition parties but also to portray them as disoriented in bringing stability and security to Turkey.This election results highlights the importance of not underestimating the authoritarian incumbent's ability to use security threats and media to their advantage.The opposition parties need to be aware that if they allow any room for manoeuvre to the incumbent, even in a short period, the incumbent may play on security concerns of voter to their advantage and that a fragmented opposition can play into their hands.
After Erdogan realized that the peace process and HDP were not helping him to achieve his goals for a super-presidential system, he began searching for alternative partners 67 .He found an opportunity in Devlet Bahceli, who had lost a significant number of votes in the November 2015 elections and was facing internal opposition led by Meral Aksener who later became IYIP leader.Using patronage, Erdogan leveraged a controversial judicial decision against Aksener and her supporters to be sidelined in the MHP 68 .Bahceli, who had been a deal breaker in the summer of 2015, became Erdogan's new partner in securitizing the HDP and paving the way for an absolute authoritarian regime 69 .At the time of this decision, both parties represented nationalist-conservative voters, the central cluster between 60% and 70% of total voters 70 .Erdogan's alliance with Bahceli helped him consolidate his power and allowed him to use security concerns to stifle opposition voices and maintain control over the government.
The failed coup attempt in July 2016 was a crucial turning point for Erdogan's plan to establish a competitive authoritarian regime in Turkey.He saw the coup as a "gift from God," which he used to his advantage by declaring a state of emergency to silence and securitize the opposition 71 .In the months that followed, MHP leader Bahceli approached Erdogan with an offer to end excessive use of his presidential power either adhering to the law or changing the constitution 72 .In response, AKP drafted a referendum proposal, which, with the support of two parties, replaced the parliamentary system with a super-presidential one in April 2017.Throughout the campaign, the issue of securitization was at the forefront, with AKP politicians justifying the constitutional amendment as necessary for the country's stability and to fight against terrorist organizations 73 .
Considering the pre-super presidential system years, despite Erdogan's deteriorating macro-economic performance as a regime-debilitating event, his securitization strategy framed the HDP as an extension of the PKK.This strategy not only instilled fear among nationalist-conservative voters but also compelled MHP to refrain from joining the opposition coalition, allowing Erdogan to divide the opposition parties to build an opposition alliance.Despite a huge compromise given to the MHP to acquire the prime ministry seat, within a securitized atmosphere, the MHP prioritized its niche political agenda rather than "office seeking" motivations.This decision was not purely an ideological choice.Based on the June 2015 election results, Bahceli thought that if a new election was held, he would get more votes in the November 2015 elections.However, Bahceli did not foresee that giving room for manoeuvre to a securitizing actor who has a huge political power could turn the political atmosphere against them.In this shorter period, the focus of Erdogan shifted from Kurdish voters to nationalist conservative voters to regain his party's lost votes.To attract this audience, he re-securitized PKK and HDP and forced the MHP to priorities their niche ideological interests to create a division among opposition parties.The disgruntled audience seeing scattered profile of opposition parties again voted for Erdogan who portrayed himself as a leader who can maintain stability.(See Tables 1 and 2 for details on party ideology, collaboration with AKP, and consequences of securitization).

Securitization after the super presidential system
In 2017, Turkey's political system shifted from parliamentary to presidential, concentrating power in the hands of the president.Erdogan gained more authority, bolstering his authoritarian leadership and enhancing his ability to address political challenges.He acquired a virtual monopoly over patronage using it to his advantage.The referendum also introduced changes to the electoral system, making it harder for opposition parties to coordinate 74 .The new president is elected through a two-round system, requiring an absolute majority in the first round.If not achieved, the top two candidates compete in a second round, with the winner being the one the most votes.No specific threshold is needed for the run-off.The first election following the constitutional amendment came as a snap election with the call of Devlet Bahceli.At the time of this election Turkey had been conducting cross-border operations against the PKK's Syrian wing People's Protection Unit (YPG) in Northern Syria.Erdogan emphasized the necessity of early elections to eliminate some of the uncertainties regarding these operations 75 .Similar to the 2015 November elections, internal and external security became one of the main themes of the elections.As Erdogan's macroeconomic performance began to deteriorate, he relied on more securitization strategy to pump fear on moderate voters because in each security related tension, his diminishing post-approval leaps several points until another security crisis 76 .
During the first election held under the new electoral system, the opposition parties were unable to cooperate and put forth a single candidate despite some leaders' constructive efforts 77 .In an attempt to avoid the pre-electoral division experienced during the 2015 November elections, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu proposed former president and AKP founder Abdullah Gül as the opposition's candidate, with the support of Islamist Felicity Party (SP) leader Temel Karamollaoğlu.Gül was viewed as a candidate who could attract support from both conservative and moderate voters and potentially defeat Erdogan.However, despite the initial plan, the opposition parties ultimately failed to unite behind Gül, and each party nominated their own candidate 78 .
The opposition alliance failed due to various factors, one of which was the formation of a new party called IYIP after the 2017 referendum.This party was established by moderate MHP members who opposed Bahceli's decision to support Erdogan and decided to participate in the election on their own.The leadership of IYIP saw Meral Aksener's presidential candidacy as a critical component of their political strategy.Although Aksener was popular among nationalist-secular voters, her inability to appeal to Kurdish voters was a weakness 79 .She also made it clear that her party saw HDP as an ideological opponent and did not want to form a coalition with them 80 .
Moreover, the election held in 2018 was the first electoral test for the newly-formed IYIP, and as such, there was a lack of clear and reliable data regarding their level of support.Due to this and the party leadership's confidence based on lack of election data, the IYIP did not agree to support a single candidate, resulting in each opposition party fielding their own candidate.Within this pre-electoral fracture, Erdogan emerged as the winner in the first round with 52% of the votes, while Meral Aksener, who was seen as a crucial figure in the opposition alliance, only managed to secure 7% of the votes.In contrast, HDP candidate Selahattin Demirtas, who was in jail during the election and did not campaign, received 8% of the votes.Following the elections, in different interviews Akşener admitted their oversight by saying that her party's strength was not tested in 2018 elections due to absence of reliable data 81 and she confessed that 2018 elections helped her to curb her ego for future elections 82 .
After appointing his son-in-law as the head of the economy, Erdogan's economic policy declined, keeping interest rates low led to a currency crisis and higher inflation, displeasing the median voter cluster in Turkey 83 .In the midst of this regime vulnerability, Erdogan once again used securitization as a political campaign strategy during the 2019 local elections, and his government relied on the media to support it by framing opposition parties as supporters of PKK sympathizers.The HDP's decision not to nominate any candidates for Turkey's metropoles in the 2019 local elections was an implicit endorsement of the candidates nominated by CHP and supported by IYIP, which was viewed by Erdogan and Bahçeli as an alliance of disgrace 84 .Candidates nominated by the ruling party framed the mayoral race as a critical issue with serious consequences, claiming that Turkey's national security was in jeopardy due to the opposition parties' collaboration with the nation's "enemies," including the PKK 85 .AKP politicians instilled fear among voters by suggesting that if the opposition block candidate wins the election, terrorist organization sympathizers would be recruited by municipalities with HDP support.These speeches were broadcast repeatedly on the media to maintain a sense of security fear throughout the election 86 .Despite Erdogan's use of securitization tactics, they did not have the desired effect.In fact, the opposition block, with the help of IYIP and HDP, managed to win the elections in Istanbul and Ankara, the two largest cities in Turkey.This was a significant achievement for the opposition because these municipalities offer numerous sources of patronage and create a lot of competition among political parties 87 .
The first factor that contributed to Erdogan's loss in the election was the economic difficulties faced by the median voters in big metropoles.Erdogan's poor economic performance made him vulnerable and provided opportunity for his opponents to defeat him 88 .The second factor was the opposition parties' partial coordination in selecting candidates for different areas.CHP and IYIP joined forces, while HDP supported their candidates instead of presenting their own, acknowledging their mutual dependency for the sake of democracy 89 .HDP gave this support despite IYIP's denial of any affiliation with them to disprove the securitization rhetoric made by AKP and MHP 90 .
Furthermore, Erdogan's securitization strategy towards the HDP, supported by the MHP, alienated Kurdish voters and pushed the HDP to endorse CHP candidates in western cities who share a closer ideological affinity with them, rather than IYIP candidates 91 .This endorsement played a significant role in securing the victory of the CHP candidates in closely contested elections against those backed by the ruling party 92 .
After the 2019 local election victory, opposition parties in Turkey became more determined to deepen their pre-electoral coordination before the upcoming 2023 elections due to increasing frustration towards Erdogan's autocratic repression and poor economic performance 93 .Six opposition parties, including CHP, IYIP, Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA), Future Party (GP), SP and DP (Democrat Party), formed an opposition alliance in February 2022 called the "Table of Six", which later on renamed as the "Nation Alliance".The alliance's main priority was to return to a parliamentary system.
The opposition parties began negotiating about the upcoming elections in February 2022.However, they postponed making decisions about who will be their presidential nominee and whether each party will compete on their own almost a year.It was also uncertain whether the HDP would support the "National Alliance", because IYIP insisted on their absence as a condition to participate.According to Aksener, the HDP's affiliation with PKK was the main reason for their exclusion 94 .In response to Aksener's statements, HDP senior members expressed their disappointment in the alliance's attitude, stating that while they were not allowed to join, the opposition alliance expected their unconditional support for their presidential nominee 95 .Because the opposition parties delayed decisions about their electoral strategy, Erdogan was unable to execute his securitization plan early.This is because there were many unknowns about the opposition's plans, such as who Erdogan's opponent would be and whether the HDP would support the "Nation Alliance" candidate.
Although the opposition parties successfully avoided an early securitization strategy of Erdogan, they faced a stalemate when it came to deciding on a front runner for the 2023 elections.There was disagreement between the IYIP and other parties.Aksener refused to back Kılıcdaroğlu, but the other parties consolidated behind him on the condition that their candidates were nominated in higher change electoral districts.Aksener did not publicly reveal her main reason for objecting, but it is possible that her concern was centred around Kılıcdaroglu's Alevi identity, which Erdogan could use to manipulate nationalist conservative voters not to vote for the opposition alliance 96 .When Aksener could not convince the other opposition party leaders, she left the table with a furious public statement.She insisted on nominating either the Istanbul or Ankara mayors instead of Kılıcdaroglu to maximize the opposition's vote share and chances of 97 .
However, since both mayors are members of the CHP, they supported Kılıcdaroğlu's candidacy 98 .After Aksener made her public statement, a wave of public ridicule and criticism started against her and her party, with accusations that they were reducing the opposition's chances of winning in the upcoming elections.As a result, between twenty to thirty thousand party members resigned from the party following Aksener's public statement 99 .In this situation, Aksener had two options: to either return to the table and find a solution with the opposition parties or risk losing significant voter support from those who prioritize defeating Erdogan and promoting democratic governance over their own ideological preferences.
At the time when opposition leaders were trying to reach an agreement, Turkey was hit by one of the strongest earthquakes in its history.The lack of state resources and incoordination between state institutions further highlighted the vulnerabilities of Erdogan's regime.However, the pre-electoral conflict between the opposition not only diverted attention from this devastating disaster, but also portrayed the opposition parties as unable to unify under one banner, even in these extraordinary times.Therefore, to resolve the stalemate between Aksener and other opposition leaders, both Istanbul and Ankara mayors visited Aksener and convinced her to return to the negotiating table.Aksener agreed to do so on the condition that both mayors would become deputies of Kılıcdaroglu following the election 100 .Once the disagreement was settled between Aksener and other opposition leaders, Kılıcdaroğlu was nominated as the presidential candidate for the Nation Alliance.This was followed by the HDP's declaration that they would not nominate any presidential candidate and would support Kılıcdaroglu in the elections.They justified their decision by stating that voters expect an end to the authoritarian regime in this way 101 .
However, despite this consensus another minor fracture emerged within the opposition block and involved two other oppositional presidential candidates.Muharrem Ince, the former presidential candidate of CHP in 2018, accused the National Alliance of collaborating with HDP and PKK, using this as a reason for not participating in the alliance 102 .Similarly, Sinan Oğan, who received support from the "Ata Alliance" comprised of parties with some far-right tendencies, also justified his candidacy by stating that he could not be part of an alliance that includes HDP 103 .While Muharrem Ince decided to withdraw his candidacy just before the election due to increasing criticism that his candidacy undermined the success of the opposition alliance, Sinan Ogan decided to take on the role of a "king maker" if the elections were to go to a run-off.
Once the opposition alliance nominated an Alevi presidential candidate, who was externally supported by the pro-Kurdish party, Erdogan's securitization campaign portraying the opposition alliance as a security threat began during his political campaign.At his political rallies, Erdogan accused the opposition alliance of supporting the terrorist organization PKK 104 and promised to release PKK leader Ocalan 105 .He also claimed that the opposition could not call the PKK a terrorist organization 106 and any concession given to the HDP was equivalent to supporting the PKK 107 .To associate the opposition alliance with the PKK, Erdogan even shared fabricated videos of PKK leadership during his campaigns 108 .These rhetorical constructions were broadcasted by state-subsidized media outlets throughout the Erdogan campaign, sometimes on more than twenty-four TV channels 109 .
In response to Erdogan's extensive use of securitization through state-subsidized media, Kılıcdaroğlu found a way around the restrictions by using social media platforms to promote his positive agenda, which prioritized restoring democratic governance, ending corruption, and attracting foreign investment to alleviate the economic crisis.He employed inclusive language and proactive tactics to escape Erdogan's securitization trap, such as releasing a video where he shared his Alevi identity openly, which resonated well with opposition voters 110 .However, in reaction to Erdogan's securitization campaign, Kılıcdaroglu and his team struggled to formulate a proactive approach to counter and discredit his accusations effectively.
Despite the ideological sacrifices, pre-electoral coordination efforts, positive campaign, and favourable poll results suggesting that the opposition alliance had a chance to end Erdogan's decade-long authoritarian rule, the 2023 presidential elections once again resulted in Erdogan's victory.In the first round of the elections, Erdogan secured 49.5% of the votes, with a slim margin to win outright, and his alliance secured the majority of parliamentary seats.Although Erdogan's securitization strategy did not deter niche opposition parties from forming an alliance, it effectively consolidated nationalist-conservative voters under his banner by portraying the opposition alliance as collaborators with the PKK.Despite attempts by Kilicdaroglu to counter Erdogan's securitization tactics by stoking fears about Syrian refugees during the run-off period 111 , it did not significantly alter the outcome.Erdogan ultimately won the run-off elections with 52% of the votes, marking his third term as president.
In comparison to previous elections, this was the first time Erdogan faced a run-off election.He entered this election with vulnerabilities, including severe economic crisis, poor regime performance during the earthquake, and visible signs of declining health.Opposition parties were also more aware of the detrimental effects of competing against each other, which would split the vote and aid Erdogan's victory.They recognized their mutual dependency based on reliable data from past elections.However, Erdogan's efforts to paint the opposition parties as traitors resonated with his voters, showcasing the influence of securitization in manipulating voter perception.It demonstrated how securitization can be a potent tool for prioritizing security related stability over democracy and poverty.Erdogan's popularity in earthquake-affected regions further exemplified the power of securitization in shaping the perception of voters who had recently experienced tragic losses.
While it is conceivable that the nomination of one of the mayors of Istanbul or Ankara could have potentially resulted in the opposition alliance winning the elections, there were unforeseen circumstances that cast doubt on this outcome.The fabricated prosecution against Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu aimed at preventing his presidential candidacy, as well as the refusal of HDP to support Mansur Yavaş, were additional unpredictable factors that could have ultimately led to Erdogan's victory.

Conclusion
The use of securitization has become a central strategy for Erdogan to deflect attention from his political and economic failures and hinder the formation of an opposition alliance, which would potentially lead to his defeat.As Erdogan has struggled to offer a positive agenda to win elections and maintain the legitimacy of his competitive authoritarian regime, securitization has become a key tool in his arsenal.By exploiting the already securitized actor, the PKK associated with the HDP, he aimed to disrupt any potential attempts by diverse ideological parties to form an opposition alliance.This strategy proved effective, particularly when his macroeconomic performance was not satisfactory enough to appease moderate voters.
In this context, nationalist parties and politicians often find themselves trapped in this rhetorical construction, hoping to achieve better results on their own.However, the presence of pre-electoral fractures always provides Erdogan with an opportunity to employ securitization strategies and position himself as the symbol of stability.This enables him to reframe his allies and adversaries and present himself as the sole actor capable of addressing these perceived threats.The disagreements among opposition parties in this process also play into Erdogan's hands, allowing him to manipulate voters by portraying the opposition as incapable of addressing these challenges.Therefore, opposition parties operating within competitive authoritarian regimes should not be swayed by short-term election outcomes or unreliable data.They should prioritize their shared interests and interdependence in order to defeat the authoritarian incumbent.Opposition parties must remain vigilant and set aside their ideological differences to find common ground and establish a strong pre-electoral alliance as soon as possible.Otherwise, a fragmented opposition only provides the authoritarian incumbent with further opportunities to construct a securitized atmosphere and solidify their grip on power.
In the case of the formation of an opposition alliance, the Turkish context has demonstrated that while securitization may not necessarily deter an alliance from being established, it can still serve as a potent political tool for an authoritarian incumbent to secure victory in elections.This outcome highlights that if the securitization rhetoric effectively portrays the opposition as posing a genuine existential threat, it can overshadow the regime's vulnerabilities and lead the audience to prioritize the security of the referent object.
As observed in the 2023 elections, despite the PKK's diminished significance as a threat to Turkey in recent years due to high technology military advancements, its existence as a terrorist organization in close proximity to Turkey's borders, keeps the traumatic fear alive among moderate voters.Unless pro-Kurdish parties clearly reject the PKK's legacy of violence and distance themselves from the organization, authoritarian leaders like Erdogan, who wield significant influence over mass media, will have little difficulty in manipulating voter perceptions.Therefore, to undermine the securitization strategy, the HDP or any successor pro-Kurdish party must compel the PKK to cease its campaign and clearly state their lack of association with the organization.Otherwise, given the asymmetrical technological advantage in favour of Turkey's military, the PKK's insurgency campaign stands little chance of success.On the contrary, it undermines the opposition alliance's efforts, despite the regime's vulnerabilities and sacrifices made by opposition parties with diverse ideologies.
The 2023 elections also revealed that Kurds are gradually losing their influential "kingmaker" role in Turkish politics, coinciding with the rise of nationalism in Turkey.In light of these regime debilitating events, Erdogan and his successors will likely continue to exploit the PKK as a securitization tool not only to hinder the formation of opposition alliances but also to secure electoral victories in the following elections.
In the context of a diverse and ideologically fragmented opposition, it becomes exceedingly challenging to satisfy the preferences and sensitivities of all stakeholders at an optimal level.Therefore, establishing positive relations and conducting inclusive campaigns are crucial for maintaining negotiations between these parties and encouraging cross-party voting.Any sudden changes in political campaigns within the opposition alliance that primarily target specific niche voter clusters may carry the risk of alienating moderate voters.This was observed in the run-off elections, where Kılıçdaroğlu's securitization approach aimed at attracting ultra-nationalist voters resulted in a decline in Kurdish voters in Southeast Turkey 112 a situation that can be described as a "cutting off one's nose to spite one's face" effect.
This article represents the initial effort to examine the correlation between securitization and the challenges associated with building pre-electoral coalitions involving niche parties in competitive authoritarian regimes.However, its limitation lies in its single case study design.Conducting a comparative study that explores the detrimental role of securitization in competitive authoritarian regimes would contribute to obtaining more generalizable findings.

Table 1 .
Distribution of political parties and cooperation history with AKP.

Table 2 .
Timeline: securitization strategy and its consequences.