Blindspots in acculturation research: An agenda for studying majority culture change

ABSTRACT Research has investigated conditions which lead to minority members’ wanting to maintain their culture of origin, and to them wanting to adopt the majority culture. Majority members’ ideas for what minority members should do have also received attention. However, past research has developed a blindspot for some important questions: majority and minority members will also have preferences for whether they desire majority culture change, and members of both groups will have perceptions regarding the respective outgroup’s preference. This paper will present a 2X2X2 framework yielding 8 different foci: 2 (focusing on the perspectives/wishes of the minority vs. majority) X 2 (acculturation preferences regarding oneself vs. the outgroup) X 2 (own preferences vs. perceptions of what the respective outgroup wants). This framework will be used to crystalize what is known and what is not yet explored, suggesting a research agenda for the future.

culture adoption), separation (culture maintenance but no contact/culture adoption), and marginalisation (rejection of both culture maintenance and contact/culture adoption). The development of this field of acculturation research aptly coincided with a rapid increase in global immigration in recent decades (United Nations, 2020), making the question of how minority members manage their identities especially topical and relevant, particularly in light of frequent interethnic conflict (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). There is no sign of international migration slowing down, and ways in which to manage cultural difference will remain a key issue around the globe. In this paper, we will review the research inspired by this four-fold model of acculturation, with particular attention to our own contribution, and thereby highlight some important issues that have escaped scientific attention to date, and that point to urgent avenues for future exploration. In particular, research to date has largely ignored views and preferences about whether it is seen as desirable for majority group members to undergo cultural change.
The scientific community has made significant advances in understanding acculturation processes over the last 40 years. But, research to date has almost exclusively focused on attitudes and preferences concerning the minority group (with some notable exceptions that will be discussed below, e.g., Zárate et al., 2012). Demands for the minority group to change to accommodate the majority culture, or -at the other end of the political spectrum -a wish to cherish societal diversity and ethnic difference within models of multiculturalism or interculturalism and to allow minority members to maintain their distinct identity, have dominated not only political rhetoric and the media, but also social scientific research (e.g., Barrett, 2013;Cuadrado et al., 2021;Moghaddam, 2008;Urbiola et al., , 2017Verkuyten, 2005;Verkuyten & Yogeeswaran, 2020). Studies have considered four broad issues: what minority members prefer regarding their minority culture; what majority members prefer regarding the minority culture (e.g., whether they think minority members should assimilate); what minority members perceive the majority to want regarding the minority culture; and what majority members perceive the minority to want regarding the minority culture. Note that in all those four topics, the focus is on minority rather than majority culture. As such, research has been rather one-sided: it has focused primarily on change among minority group members, whilst ignoring attitudes towards potential changes (or the lack thereof) among majority group members, as well as the behavioural consequences that result from those perceptions and attitudes. 1 This is surprising, because the classic definition of acculturation by Redfield et al. (1936) clearly emphasises a process of bidirectional change, where both the minority and majority cultures may mutate in response to intergroup contact. Although early on some scholars ignored the bidirectional nature of effects (e.g., Foster, 1960) and others explicitly rejected it (Graves, 1967), both majority and minority members can clearly be assumed to have certain ideas about whether they desire not only minority but also majority culture change (to be clear, while Redfield et al.'s classic definition refers to actual change, what is usually studied in the acculturation literature are attitudes towards, or preferences regarding, change). That is, members of both groups have view on, and preferences about, what members of their own ingroup should do, but also what members of the respective outgroup should do. Further, members of both minority and majority groups will have perceptions regarding the respective outgroup's preference -they do not only know what they want, but also what they think the other side wants. It seems likely that ideas about majority culture change will have important consequences for intergroup relations, and exploring hitherto neglected research questions about preferences regarding majority culture change should therefore be a top priority. This paper will present a framework for studying acculturation that crystalises what is known, what is not yet explored, and that proposes avenues that should be explored in the future. In doing this, our framework takes Berry's two dimensions of culture maintenance and contact as a starting point, although following the approach recommended by some (e.g., Snauwaert et al., 2003;Tip et al., 2012;R. Y. Bourhis et al., 1997) we cross culture maintenance not with contact but with culture adoption.
To clearly set out what this framework covers and what it does not cover, some scholars have discussed culture change and diversity preferences at a societal/group level (e.g., in terms of institutional state policies or preference for cultural diversity and multiculturalism). Moreover, some scholars focus on the effects of actual or perceived cultural change (e.g., Zárate et al., 2012). In contrast, the present paper focusses on attitudes and preferences about such change at the individual level (see also, Graves, 1967): ideas about whether it is perceived to be desirable for individual group members to adopt "Acculturation preferences" is the term used here to describe people's own preferences about acculturation, although other labels such as acculturation "attitudes", "goals", "choices", "strategies", or "orientations" have also been used in the literature. The terminology "perceived acculturation preference of the outgroup" is used to describe the preferences people impute/ascribe to members of the outgroup, i.e., preferences they believe others to have, or meta-perceptions (relatedly, see the work on meta-stereotypes, e.g., Saroglou et al., 2011;Vorauer et al., 2000). Other labels such as acculturation "expectations" have been used, but we prefer the (admittedly more wordy) label here for greater clarity (e.g., "expectations" might not only mean what people expect of others, but what they expect/ demand for themselves). new cultural behaviours. The acculturation literature focusses on attitudes towards and opinions about culture change. In other words, the literature reviewed here does not so much study how people react to factual change, but rather it studies what people's opinions are about these matters.
A framework for studying both minority and majority acculturation. As the review below will make clear, acculturation research can consider: a) the perspective/wishes of minority or majority group members, b) the participants' own preferences or what participants perceive the respective outgroup to want, and c) views regarding the ingroup's culture or the respective outgroup's culture. When crossing those different dimensions, one arrives at eight potential areas for exploration: 2 (minority vs. majority perspective) X 2 (own preference vs. preference the outgroup is perceived to have) X 2 (own culture vs. outgroup culture). This is illustrated in Figure 1.
As outlined above, only some of these areas have received research attention: those that are focused on change (or not) in the minority culture (in Figure 1, these are Areas 1, 4, 5, and 8). In contrast, very few studies explore areas that are focused on change in the majority culture (in Figure 1, these are the areas that are shaded in grey to highlight them, Areas 2, 3, 6, and 7). As is clear from the figure, the neglected areas together make up a full 50% of the framework. Given that the framework highlights possible clusters of levers that might be used to smooth possible intergroup tensions, clearly ignoring half of them is not ideal. Figure 1. Framework for studying acculturation: 2 (minority vs. majority perspective) X 2 (own preference vs. preference the outgroup is perceived to have) X 2 (own culture vs. outgroup culture). Note. Shaded areas are under-researched, not shaded areas are well-researched.
In the following, we will first briefly review the main research insights that have been generated for those areas that are well studied, with particular emphasis on contextualising our own contributions in the broader literature, and then use this as a launching pad to generate research questions that might function to guide future explorations of the unexplored half of the framework. Within each of the "minority culture change" and "majority culture change" sections, we will discuss research areas in order of descending knowledge -starting with those areas that are most researched and finishing with those that are least well researched.
Areas that have been well-studied: Potential change to the minority culture

Area 1: Minority members' preferences for what the self/minority members should do
Studies among minority populations, asking them about their preferences regarding culture maintenance and adoption, were the original starting point of the field of acculturation research. As outlined above, Berry's original model focused on minority members' wishes regarding their own culture (Berry, 1997). This was not only the inaugural area, but for a long time the only one, and it remains one of the best researched ones.
Main insights from this body of work were that often minority members prefer a strategy of integration. In one of our first explorations on the topic conducted among secondary school students during school hours, we found that 68% of our (mainly Turkish-origin) immigrant sample in Germany preferred this strategy over one of assimilation, separation, or marginalisation (Zagefka & Brown, 2002). Another frequent finding is that integration is correlated with the most beneficial psychosocial and health outcomes for migrants (Dona & Berry, 1994;Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2013;. For example, in a recent study on migrants from central Asian republics and South Korea in Russia, Tatarko et al. (2020) found that acculturation attitudes (in the form of preference for integration, assimilation, or separation) were linked to sociocultural adoption, which was defined as the degree of difficulty migrants experienced while living in Moscow in each of 20 areas of daily life. Overall, the associations of integration and assimilation choices with the outcome were positive, and the association of separation with the outcome was negative.
Minority members' acculturation preferences have also been linked to other outcomes, such as friendship choices (Zagefka et al., 2016): among a sample of Muslim women and another sample of Somali minority members in the UK, a preference for culture maintenance was positively related to friendships with minority members (standardised path coefficients between .13 and .17) but it did not negatively impact the formation of friendships with majority members, and a preference for culture adoption was positively related to intergroup friendships (standardised path coefficients between .22 and .28) but it did not decrease to intragroup friendships. Further contributions have highlighted the fact that acculturation preferences are dependent on context: e.g., preferences for what happens in the private home might differ to what happens at work (Navas et al., 2007;Rojas et al., 2014).
Other work has demonstrated that although the two dimensions of culture maintenance and culture adoption are sometimes found to be empirically orthogonal to each other, as would be assumed according to Berry's (1997) theoretical model, in reality this is not always the case. Moftizadeh et al. (2021a) found that the extent to which it is perceived as possible or desirable to simultaneously achieve maintenance and adoption of both cultures depends on lay theories about the nature of the identities in question, such as essentialism imputed into the identities: in a sample of ethnic minority members, in this case Somalis living in London, we found that desire for culture maintenance was only negatively related to desire for culture adoption if the majority identity was perceived in essentialised terms (simple slopes −.01 at low levels of essentialism, versus −.70 at high levels of essentialism).
Overall, the research field has matured sufficiently to warrant the statement that both the antecedents and the consequences of minority members' acculturation preferences are now well understood , although it should be acknowledged that much of amassed evidence constitutes survey data and does not include experimental manipulations of hypothesised predictors. Evidence of this type does not allowing for stringent testing of the causal direction of effects (Kunst, 2021, see also, Bierwiaczonek & Kunst, 2021.

Area 4: Majority members' preferences for what minority members should do
An important advance of the field was the realisation that minorities are not the only group that has ideas about how they would like to integrate (or not) within the larger society, but that majority members within society also have views on what they want minority members to do (e.g., Florack et al., 2003;Navas et al., 2005). A typical finding is that majority members are less keen on minority members' maintaining their original culture, and more keen on minority members adopting the majority culture, than minority members are themselves. The point here is that even though majority members might quite like the idea of integration in comparison to other strategies in absolute terms, they are still likely to be less in favour of it than minority members. For example, in one of our studies  the mean endorsement of culture maintenance among majority members (on a 5-point scale) in a Northern European sample comprised of respondents from Belgium, Germany, and the UK was 2.57, SD = 1.08, compared to 3.74, SD = 1.06 among minority members in those settings; and the mean endorsement of culture adoption was 3.83, SD = 0.91, compared to 3.05, SD = 1.02 among minority members in those settings.
Similar patterns emerged in studies on Spanish and Italian host adolescents and young immigrants living in these Mediterranean countries (López-Rodríguez, Bottura et al., 2014). Here, too, data showed that there was little consensus in the acculturation preferences of immigrants and hosts, especially on the issue of ethnic culture maintenance, with immigrants tending to prefer to maintain their original culture more compared to what majority members wanted. Urbiola et al. (2021) also found that Moroccan-origin adolescents in Spain preferred to maintain their original culture more compared to what Spanish adolescents preferred them to do. Interestingly, the discrepancy between Moroccan-origin and Spanish adolescents on the preference for immigrant-origin youth to adopt the host culture disappeared when the other group was perceived as trustworthy (i.e., low immoral and high moral), sociable, and competent. In other words, the stereotypes about the other group modulated the majority-minority discrepancy on the preferences for Moroccan-origin adolescents to adopt the host culture. Importantly, preferences about minority cultures often differ depending on the specific immigrant group in question, and in particular whether it is a "valued" or "devalued" minority group in the eyes of majority members (Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001).
The research reviewed above compares the strength of endorsement of different acculturation strategies between minority and majority members, or regarding different minority target groups. Going beyond that, many studies have also tried to address the question of theoretical predictors of acculturation preferences of majority members. Stereotype content (Fiske et al., 2002) is also related to majority members' preferences for how minorities acculturate. López-Rodríguez,  showed that the warmer Moroccan immigrants are perceived to be, the less the perceived need for them to adapt to the host country (r = −.35); and the less threatening Romanian and Ecuadorian immigrants are considered to be, the less the perceived need for them to adapt (for realistic threat, r = .28 for Romanian targets, and r = .31 for Ecuadorian targets). Perceived morality of the minority group seems also relevant for the desire of majority members that the minority members maintain their ethnic culture (López-Rodríguez & Zagefka, 2015): in a study in which stereotype content about Indian minority members was experimentally manipulated in a sample of white British majority members, there was more support for Indians maintaining their culture when stereotype content was positive than when it was negative.
Other factors have also been found to be related to majority members' preferences regarding how they want minority members to acculturate, for example, cross-group friendships and life satisfaction. Hässler et al. (2018) found in Chile that cross-group friendships affected acculturation preferences, so that cross-group friendships longitudinally predicted majority members' support for the adoption of Chilean culture and also Peruvian culture maintenance. Lebedeva et al. (2016) found that both a preference for assimilation and integration were modestly correlated with life satisfaction among migrants in Moscow. A further factor that is associated with majority members' acculturation preferences is knowledge of the minority culture, as shown by Zagefka et al. (2009), who found in a longitudinal study that Chilean majority members who knew more about the indigenous Mapuche were more in favour of the Mapuche maintaining their culture (β = .16). In this and other longitudinal studies carried out by us, we control for autoregressive paths to get a somewhat better handle on the potential causal direction of effects.
Moreover, majority members' acculturation preferences are also related to essentialist beliefs and perceived intergroup threat (Zagefka et al., 2013): in a sample of white British participants, endorsement of essentialist beliefs about being British was positively associated with perceived identity threat posed by immigrants (β = .49), which was in turn positively associated with greater demand that immigrants must adopt the majority culture (β = .51).
We have also found lagged bidirectional effects between majority members' acculturation preferences and their endorsement of prejudice: in our European majority samples , the lagged effects of prejudice on culture maintenance were −.27 compared to −.05 for the effect of culture maintenance on prejudice; and the lagged effects of prejudice on culture adoption were .21 compared to .06 for the effect of culture adoption on prejudice. In this research, the associations between acculturation preferences and prejudice were notably different within majority and minority groups, much as has been found in the contact literature (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005), where effects are also dependent on minority or majority group status.
Other studies have considered potential theoretical outcomes of different acculturation preferences among majority participants. For example, López-Rodríguez et al. (2016) found that preferences for cultural maintenance of the minority's original culture, in this case for Moroccan and Ecuadorian minority groups, were associated in the Spanish majority group with tendencies to actively facilitate or help minorities (r = .21 for Moroccans, r = .48 for Ecuadorians).
The move towards studying majority members' preferences in the academic field went hand in hand with the realisation that acculturation does not only have effects on psychosocial and health outcomes, but also on intergroup relations and conflict (e.g., R. Y. Bourhis et al., 1997). It has been argued that the views of majority members need to be taken into consideration especially because -as the more powerful group -majorities tend to wield more influence and can strongly impact on intergroup outcomes (Barrett, 2013;Geschke et al., 2010). Importantly, several scholars have proposed that it is not the attitudes of one group or the other that leads to intergroup conflict or harmony, but that it is the fit between both group's views that determines outcomes (Piontkowski et al., 2002;Rohmann et al., 2008;R. Y. Bourhis et al., 1997). Some research which has focused on what majority members want minority members to do has explicitly combined this focus with that of what minority members want for the minority group (Navas et al., 2005). Majority members' views of what should happen with the minority culture can also be related to their views about multiculturalism -this is a preference not focused on what individual minority members should do, but it is a group-focused ideology about supporting minority members' cultural maintenance, inclusion into the society, the expectation that there should be intergroup contact as well as that diversity will benefit the larger society (Stogianni et al., 2021; for a further discussion of related concepts of interculturalism, see, Yogeeswaran et al., 2021). Taken together, a fair amount is now understood about what drives majority members' preferences regarding how minority members should acculturate and change (or not), and the potential consequences of such views.

Area 8: Majority members' perceptions of what minority members want the minority to do
A reasonably sized body of work has focused on what majority participants perceive minority members to want with regards to minority culture change. Are minority members perceived to want to integrate, assimilate, or separate? What are the consequences of such perceptions? This body of work has firmly established that intergroup outcomes are not only affected by own preferences, but also by perceptions of what the outgroup wants.
In one of the first contributions to consider these issues, Zagefka et al. (2007) demonstrated that for majority members in both Belgium and Turkey their own preferences for the integration of minority members were associated with what they perceived those minority members to want, with regards to maintenance of the minority culture and/or contact with majority members. In particular, a perception that minority members want contact with the majority was positively associated with majority members' own preference for integration of minority members (β = .18 in Belgium; β = .10 in Turkey), as was a perception that minority members want to maintain their minority culture (β = .25 in Belgium; β = .41 in Turkey). Further, in an experimental study we demonstrated that British majority members' support for integration causally depended on their perceptions of how minority members want to acculturate within mainstream society : a perception that Pakistani minority members desire culture adoption increased support for integration among white British participants, and a perception that Pakistani minority members desire culture maintenance increased support for integration, but only among participants with low prior levels of prejudice. Or, to express the interaction the other way around, prejudice was more strongly negatively related to support for integration when perceived culture maintenance desire was high (β = −.28) than when it was low (β = −.19).
One mechanism through which perceptions of what the minority wants impact on majority members' own preferences for what minority members should do is via threat. Stephan and Stephan (2000) distinguish symbolic and realistic threats, the former being threats to the groups' identity in the form of threats to the worldview of the ingroup, including morals, beliefs, standards, values, and attitudes, and the latter being physical, political, or economic threats (see also, Tip et al., 2012;Velasco González et al., 2008). It seems that often a perception that minority members want to maintain their original culture is perceived as threatening, and thereby ironically dampens appetite for multiculturalism, for example, with betas between β = −.21 to β = −.40 in Tip et al. (2012). Further evidence comes from Spain: Spanish majority participants' perceptions of how Moroccan and Ecuadorian immigrants want to acculturate had indirect effects on the majority members' own acculturation preferences for these immigrant groups, mediated via stereotypes and threat (López-Rodríguez, . Moreover, threat was also found to mediate the effects of perceived preferences of immigrants on attitudes towards immigrants for Italian majority members (Matera et al., 2011).
Threat was also found to be important in relation to perceived acculturation preferences in another way: in a recent study of British majority members, it was found that them perceiving that minority members want to maintain their culture implied also believing that minority members do not wish to adopt the majority culture (main effects of β = −.18 to β = −.20, depending on the outgroup), but this effect only held for participants who felt threatened by minority groups (Moftizadeh et al., 2021b). Overall, then, threat has been conceptualised in different papers as a mediator (e.g., channelling the effects of perceived preferences on own preferences) or moderator. This suggests that threat can be a mediator in some contexts and a moderator in others. Moreover, the correlational nature of much of the data does not allow for the methodological precision to make confident inferences about the causal direction of the effects, and experimental data would be useful to disentangle this further.
Another concept that might mediate or moderate effects of perceived acculturation preferences is stereotype content. Urbiola et al. (2021) found an interaction between stereotypes and perceived adoption of Moroccan youth on the Spaniards' acculturation preferences. When Spanish adolescents perceived that Moroccan youths were not adopting the Spanish culture and when Moroccan youths were not perceived as moral and sociable, the Spanish youths preferred Moroccans' cultural adoption. In other words, it was when Spanish adolescents perceived that Moroccan youths were not adopting the Spanish culture that perceived morality and sociability played a role in their acculturation preferences regarding adoption: the less moral and sociable they were perceived to be, the more adoption was preferred.
Moreover, majority members' perceptions of whether minority members want to assimilate have also been linked to aggression against minorities. Both assimilation and a refusal to assimilate has been linked to more aggression, depending on the context (Thomsen et al., 2008).
Clearly, then, majority members' perceptions of what the minority wants to do with regards to their own minority culture has important consequences, for example, on own acculturation preferences, and variables like intergroup threat, prejudice, and stereotype content are important mediators and moderators in this context.

Area 5: Minority members' perceptions of what majority members want the minority to do
As seen in the previous section, several studies have focused on majority members' perceptions of what the minority wants, and the consequences of these perceptions. Much less work has focused on the flipside, i.e., on minority members' perceptions of what the majority wants the minority to do with regards to maintenance of the minority culture, or adoption of the majority culture. One exception is a study conducted in Chile with minority members who belonged to the indigenous group of the Mapuche . In this (albeit correlational) study the authors found that minority members were more in favour of integration when they thought the majority members were also in favour, compared when they thought the majority members were not (b = .38 vs. b = .03 in study 1 which had an N of about 570, and b = .34 vs. b = .02 in study 2 which had an N of about 400). These results were interpreted in terms of the more powerful majority group limiting and setting boundaries for what the minority group might see as feasible (see, Geschke et al., 2010, for a similar argument). If minority members believe that the powerful majority supports cultural maintenance, cultural maintenance will be seen as less of an uphill struggle, less of an impossibility, and it would therefore be endorsed more strongly. The same rationale was applied to explain the effects with regards to contact: if minority members believe that the powerful majority is in favour of contact, this makes the contact seem easier and more enticing. After all, there will be little point trying to seek out a more powerful other if that other is perceived not to be interested in contact and to be likely to block any attempts at contact. This suggests that minority members' choices are constrained by what the majority is perceived to allow them to do.
A similar pattern was also found in a study conducted among minority members in Portugal (António & Monteiro, 2015): here too, results suggested that minority members' perceptions of what the majority wants moderate the impact of their own acculturation preferences. In this study in which perceived majority support of immigrants' learning the host culture was manipulated, participants' attitudes towards the host culture were positively related to perceived quality of Black-White relationships, but only when perceived support was low. An interaction was also found in Germany, between minority members' own preferences regarding their minority culture on the one hand and their perceptions of what the German majority wanted regarding the minority culture among Turkish and Italian minority members in Germany (Rohmann et al., 2006; see also, Zagefka & Brown, 2002). The pattern was that the positivity or negativity of intergroup relations did not so much depend on the preferences of one group, but more on whether the groups agreed on what was desirable.
Indirect evidence of the effect of minority members' perceptions of how majority members want to manage the minority's difference comes from work that has looked at effects of the larger context such as school climate, for example, in the form of school diversity policies (e.g., Baysu et al., 2020;Celeste et al., 2019). Such studies typically show that minority members' acculturation preferences interact with the larger climate -e.g., pursuing integration is only going to bring favourable outcomes if the broader societal climate is also supportive of this approach. Although such studies do not directly measure what the outgroup is perceived to want, effects of the broader climate are potentially filtered through individual minority members' perceptions. Such work, then, again speaks to the idea that the fit between what one group wants and what the other group is perceived to want does matter a great deal for subsequent outcomes.
It should be noted that in some studies, the wording chosen makes it quite ambiguous whether participants are being asked about their own preferences or perceptions of others' preferences. For example, M.S. Navas et al. (2013) asked immigrants to what extent they thought they should adapt to the Spanish culture in different life domains. The idea of "should" might express a perceived normative obligation, but it could also refer to an internal preference. Future work should consider this ambiguity at the stage of study design.
Several studies, then, have investigated the direct effects on intergroup outcomes of minority members' perceptions of what majority members want the minority to do with regards to the minority culture, as well as how those perceptions might interact with minority members' own preferences in informing outcomes. Although some (Rohmann et al., 2006) have found that these effects are mediated by perceived identity threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), there is scope for further exploration of the psychological mechanisms that can explain such effects. For example, threats to collective continuity (Sani et al., 2008), or collective angst (Wohl & Branscombe, 2009) might be worthy candidates for future exploration. Collective continuity is the idea that the ingroup is temporally persistent and has historically existed for a long time and will continue to go on to do so (Sani et al., 2008;Smeekes et al., 2017). Collective angst is defined as anxiety about the future existence of the ingroup and perceived threats to the group's existence (Wohl et al., 2019). Although such explorations would add value, nonetheless it is fair to say that significant inroads have already been made to our understanding of processes in Area 5.
Summarising across Areas 1, 4, 5, and 8, which all focus on minority culture change, a reasonable amount is known already: studies have explored the antecedents and consequences of minority members' preferences, majority members' preferences, and each group's perceptions regarding the respective outgroup's preferences in relation to minority culture change. The discussion will now turn to the other half of the framework that is, as of yet, severely understudied : those areas relating to majority culture change.

Areas that have been neglected: Potential change to the majority culture
For each of the remaining areas, we will briefly review the state of play in terms of existing research, followed by what we perceive to be the two most pressing or interesting research questions. In generating those, we draw on insights already established with regards to minority culture change when they seem helpful for illuminating mechanisms to do with majority culture change.

Area 3: Majority members' preferences for what the self/majority members should do
When majority members acculturate in response to exposure to minority cultures, this involves a genuine incorporation of aspects of the minority culture into the majority group's cultural repertoire, leading to adaptation in the mainstream culture at the societal level . Minority influences as a result of immigration might expand existing culture by introducing new ideas and customs. Examples might range from relatively surface-type adaptations (e.g., the popularity of Asian curry dishes as an integral part of a night out endorsed by white British people; the deep undercurrent of Jamaican beats in European popular music); to more significant adaptations (e.g., the mainstream adaptation of Eastern-philosophybased mindfulness approaches as a way to maximise not only mental health but also as an approach to leadership and management styles in the West, see e.g., Carter & Hougaard, 2021). Acculturation in the majority group also implies knowing and incorporating others' cultures and modifying the majority's way of seeing and understanding the world, having representations of other worldviews in the school curriculum and accommodating them in the workplace.
Just a handful of studies rooted in Berry's fourfold model have investigated questions in this space, and Berry notes that there is a lack of studies addressing the views of majority members about how they themselves prefer to acculturate . As early as 2008, Dinh and Bond -in their special section on changes among host individuals and communities in their adaptation to immigrant populations -identified that there is a paucity of research on majority members' acculturation preferences with regards to their own majority culture. However, unfortunately this special section has not, in subsequent years, sparked the research interest in this topic one might have hoped for. Furthermore, as Prilleltensky (2008) points out, many of the adaptive changes discussed in the special section were about changes made to better serve newcomers. Special section contributions discussed what measures would support minority members' cultural adaptation, and they did not focus on changes to the majority culture per se. There thus remains much work to be done. Lefringhausen and Marshall (2016) queried whether for majority members an embrace of multiculturalism (or psychological acculturation towards immigrant cultures) would be perceived as incompatible with a desire to maintain the native majority culture. They demonstrated that majority members in North America, Europe, and Asia can have positive views towards both national culture maintenance and adoption of other cultures simultaneously. These attitudes were, just as proposed in Berry's fourfold model for minority members, orthogonal to each other for some majority groups, although oblique solutions were found for others. In general, this result supports the idea that it is possible to have dual identities and that the adoption of a new culture does not always imply threat to or the necessity to reject the original culture . More specifically, this result means that in some contexts, or for some majority groups, a desire to maintain the mainstream culture is seen as compatible with multiculturalism, and in others it is not. More work needs to be done to better understand when to expect one or the other.
The fact that majority members clearly have opinions about the adoption or maintenance of their own or minority cultures was also demonstrated for majority members in England . Here, maintaining the English culture was also negatively correlated with positive affect towards immigrants (r = −.48) and perceiving minority cultures as an enrichment (r = −.47); meanwhile, adopting minority cultures correlated positively with positive attitudes towards immigrants (r = .57), and with perceiving minority cultures as an enrichment (r = .61). Moreover, Haugen and Kunst (2017) investigated whether Norwegian majority members want to maintain the Norwegian culture and/or adopt aspects of immigrant cultures. They found the two orientations to be negatively related, and that participants were clustered in groups resembling integration and separation, but not assimilation or marginalisation. A desire to maintain the majority culture was positively correlated with life satisfaction and self-esteem, but also with perceived identity threat. Desire to adopt immigrant cultures was not associated with life satisfaction and self-esteem, and it was negatively related to perceived identity threat. Overall, by combining the two underlying dimensions of adoption or maintenance of majority members' own or minority cultures, research across 14 independent samples from six countries has so far identified five acculturation groups  -that is, beyond integration and separation, the most frequently reported acculturation group for majority members was one indicating a form of diffusion (i.e., scores around the midpoint for both cultural orientations) and the least often identified groups included assimilated and marginalised majority members. Additionally, specifically higher intergroup contact quality (e.g., friendships) was associated positively with minority culture adoption.
The lab that has most thoroughly studied and conceptualised majority culture change is that by Zárate (e.g., Zárate & Shaw, 2010, see also, Zárate et al., 2019). This work centres around the phenomenon of "cultural inertia", which is a resistance to cultural change unless change is already occurring. Majority members can, by default, be assumed to want to resist change to their culture, and prefer minority groups to assimilate in order to ensure that the majority group does not have to change (Zárate et al., 2012). Thus, cultural inertia, or reactions to potential cultural change, are proposed to underlie attitudes towards assimilation and multiculturalism for both minority and majority groups. Perceived pressure to change will likely be met with prejudice against the perceived source of the pressure. In a couple of experiments, Zárate et al. (2012) found evidence for the ideas that minority groups prefer a changing society and majority groups prefer a static society, and that a perception that change is already occurring in response to immigration reduced majority members' prejudice towards immigrants (see also, Levin et al., 2012;Zárate et al., 2019). The work on cultural inertia clearly puts majority culture change centre stage, but it does not, like the works by Lefringhausen and Kunst described previously, measure existing levels of assent among majority members for changes to their culture. For example, Lefringhausen et al. (2020) reported that US American majority members who endorse growth values (e.g., universalism and stimulation) rather than self-protection values (e.g., security and power; Schwartz et al., 2012) are more likely to intend to adopt the minority culture (for more on personality variables, see also .
Suggestions for future exploration. Despite these inroads made by Haugen, Kunst, Lefringhausen, Zárate and colleagues, much territory remains unexplored when it comes to majority members' preferences regarding change to their culture. Four issues in particular have rather less obvious answers, and we propose these as having high priority in future research.
First, self-relevant cues often have more motivational force than cues related to others. As previously discussed, plenty of studies have linked majority members' ideas of what should happen regarding the minority culture to prejudice against minority members. What, then, if majority members' ideas about what should happen with their own majority culture are also considered in relation to prejudice? Are preferences regarding the minority culture really the best predictor of prejudice, or are preferences regarding the majority's own culture potentially a much more powerful predictor? This is the first question that could be explored further.
Second, borrowing from the research in Area 1 that shows a positive association between an integration preference and successful adaptation/ well-being, the link between majority members' preferences with regards to their own culture and stress by majority members could also be explored. Although some studies mentioned above have suggested links between a preference for multiculturalism and, for example, self-esteem of majority members (Inguglia & Musso, 2015;Inguglia et al., 2020;Verkuyten, 2009), the mechanisms that explain such effects, and the boundary conditions, are still poorly understood. For example, a perception that immigrant numbers are substantial might only cause feelings of threat and psycho-social stress among majority members strongly opposed to majority culture change, and variables like essentialist beliefs about national/ethnic groups (Verkuyten & Brug, 2004) might also play a role.
Third, more should be known about antecedents of majority members' preferences regarding majority culture change. In addition to stable individual difference variables (e.g., conservatism, openness to experience) and intergroup contact , there might be more contextual or modifiable predictors of majority members' preferences, such as beliefs about collective continuity or transgenerational entity, social dominance orientation and tolerance towards inequality. Similarly, implications of positive as well as negative, direct -but even more so -indirect intergroup contact could provide practical routes towards promoting cultural adoption for majority group members.
Fourth, research exploring majority members' preferences regarding their own culture could borrow from the ideas by Navas and others, and explore how attitudes towards change might differ between different dimensions and topics (e.g., public vs. private domain). As the research by Haugen shows, attitudes indeed seem to be dimension dependent, with their majority participants having rather different ideas regarding change to the role of women in society, compared to some other dimensions. Future research looking at different dimensions (e.g., gender roles, adherence to national law, language use, religious practices, etc.) in a fine-grained way could establish a much more accurate picture of openness to change, and therefore also a more accurate picture with regards to likely areas for minority-majority conflict. This and similar questions could be explored.
These are pressing questions indeed. An openness among majority members might, under some circumstances, signify a deep-seated cultural liberalism, or intercultural tolerance (Verkuyten & Kollar, 2021). In contrast, it might also signify something more superficial or even predatory such as cultural appropriation (see e.g., Mosley & Biernat, 2021). The meaning of majority members' views of culture change of the majority group must therefore be studied in sensitive and contextually situated ways.

Area 7: Majority members' perceptions of what minority members want the majority to do
To our knowledge, there are few studies at present that have investigated the effects of majority members thinking that minority members want to change the majority culture. Some scholars are starting to explore this issue. For example, Urbiola and Bruneau (2018) suggest that majority members' perceptions of what the outgroup wants in relation to the majority culture -adopt it, change it, transform it -inform political and behavioural responses towards different minority target groups over and above participants' own acculturation preferences. 2 Outside work using the acculturation framework, there is evidence that a perceived tipping of the demographics in numerical favour of former minorities might lead to a conservative backlash (Craig & Richeson, 2014). Moftizadeh et al. (2022) tested, in a sample of white British majority participants, the participants' perceptions of a demand by minority members that the majority should adopt the minority culture. The authors found that a perception that minority members want to change the majority culture led to perceived symbolic threat, which in turn was associated with majority members' own ideas about how they wanted the minority to acculturate within larger society. Apart from this work, there seems a dearth of research focusing on the question of majority members' perceptions of what minority members want the majority to do in terms of maintaining the majority culture or adopting the minority culture. Several avenues for future exploration present themselves.
Suggestions for future exploration. First, given that research in Area 5 has demonstrated that minority members' perceiving that the majority wants the minority to change their culture has been linked to threat, future work could follow up the work by Moftizadeh and colleagues to investigate processes related to threat also. In particular, a perception by majority members that the minority is trying to impose change on the majority might lead to perceived symbolic threat and collective angst. None of these variables have been studied in relation to majority members' perceptions that the minority is out to change society at large, so this is an obvious area for further exploration. It is possible that the extent to which perceived acculturation strategies affect outcomes is contingent upon moderating variables such as political conservatism, perceived exclusive collective ownership (Nijs et al., 2021), and belief in collective continuity, and such moderators could be explored in the future.
Second, another interesting question concerns the effects of imputed intentions to change society. Culture change as studied by Zárate et al. has largely tapped into whether or not change is perceived to occur. However, using research about perceived acculturation preferences of the outgroup as previously conducted in Area 5 as starting point, the proposal would be to study perceptions that the minority demands or desires the majority to change. It remains an open question whether this distinction matters: are the psychological consequences of feeling that minorities are changing society different from the consequences of feeling that the minorities are doing this intentionally, i.e., that it is a purposeful volitious act? This could be explored in the future.

Area 2: Minority members' preferences for what majority members should do
We now come to the last two areas, which -to our knowledge -have not received any attention at all yet. Relatively little research has investigated minority members' opinions about what should happen regarding the majority culture. Many questions could be explored in this space, so below we merely give examples.
Suggestions for future exploration. What are the antecedents and consequences of minority members wanting the majority culture to change, or stay the same? Just like Nijs, Verkuyten and others have studied perceived collective ownership of majority members, ideas about this could also be explored for minority members. What are the influences of individual difference variables such as tolerance for other worldviews and need for cognitive closure? Does a temporary refugee status versus the goal of permanent resettlement matter? What are the behavioural correlates of wanting to change, versus not wanting to change, majority culture, in terms of contact seeking, and peaceful or violent political activism? These questions go beyond the contributions by Zárate and colleagues, which have focussed mainly on culture inertia regarding one's own culture, by looking at attitudes to culture change of a cultural outgroup. Vast unexplored territory remains.

Area 6: Minority members' perceptions of what majority members want for the majority
As far as we are aware, no study has used Berry's fourfold approach to study the minority members' perceptions about whether majority members want their own majority culture to change or not. On reflection, this does seem rather surprising. Presumably, for the lived psychological reality of immigrants it is crucially important whether they believe that majority members are open to culture change, or whether the majority group is perceived to dogmatically reject new impulses.
Relatedly, although buy-in to multiculturalism has been investigated among both minority and majority members (e.g., Verkuyten, 2005), considerably less work has focused on minority members' perceptions of the extent to which the majority buys into ideologies that value diversity. In one interesting study among Hispanics in the US, it was found that a societal norm for multiculturalism fosters social cohesion (Watters et al., 2020). This data, however, does not allow to clearly distinguish between perceptions of what the majority wants versus perceptions of what the minority wants. This issue has, to some extent, been considered in work on acculturative fit (e.g., Rohmann et al., 2006), but much is still unknown. Studying minority members' perceptions of what majority members want for the majority, then, is the fourth and last research area to do with majority culture change that, in our view, merits urgent attention.
Suggestions for future exploration. Migrants' perceptions regarding how open the majority society is towards cultural change might be related to feelings of being accepted and welcome (or not), to perceptions of whether majority members essentialise their ingroup (as explored in Moftizadeh et al., 2021a), sensitivity to subtle prejudice cues, experiences of discrimination during intergroup contact, and behavioural tendencies to seek out versus avoid cross-group encounters.
Another intriguing avenue for future exploration is how perceptions of openness to change in the majority society can be encouraged in minority members in order to facilitate a feeling of being welcome. Cross-country comparisons would also be useful, as countries clearly differ in their approaches to the management of diversity (R. Y. Bourhis et al., 1997). Studying such issues would have not only clear theoretical but also practical relevance.

Discussion
As has hopefully become clear, ample research has used Berry's fourfold model as a starting point to investigate own preference for, and perceived preferences by the respective outgroup for, minority culture change or the lack thereof. In contrast, considerably less work has used this approach to study issues related to majority culture change. Eight areas for investigation were proposed, which have -to varying degrees -attracted previous research attention. The framework with the eight distinct areas has allowed us to identify priorities for future investigation, and some initial hypotheses and research questions for future exploration were highlighted. It is hoped that this paper can help spur future research devoted to exploring issues of majority culture change. There are other acculturation researchers who have recently reached similar conclusions about the need to pay attention to majority culture change.  have a different emphasis in their review of the evidence base, and present a testable model, while we synthesise research insights with an emphasis on findings from our own labs. Our suggestions complement each other, and we make separate yet complementary suggestions about the way forward.
The concept of culture maintenance and culture adoption among majority members is related to issues of diversity and multiculturalism. Those majority members who are open to culture adoption are likely to also be in favour of diversity. However, the concepts of interest here operate at an individual, behaviour change level, rather than at the level of global societal values and ideals. Culture change as conceptualised here is more personal, more concrete, more strongly linked to observable behaviours. Hence, the concepts of "preference regarding culture maintenance" and "preference regarding culture adoption" add a different facet to the intergroup literature than concepts and measures of attitudes towards societal diversity and multiculturalism at a more abstract, global, and less personal level.

Reasons why majority culture change has not received attention
The oversight with regards to majority culture change is so glaring that one might be tempted to ask how it is possible that so little research has paid this issue any attention to date. One of the main reasons might be that from the outset acculturation research was inspired by a desire to support minority members in coping with the stresses associated with migration, and to find ways in which positive adaptation of minority members can be encouraged (e.g., Berry et al., 1987Berry et al., , 2006. This focus on improving adaptive outcomes for minority members automatically concentrated the researchers' attention on the minority group, and on behaviours by minority members that could be encouraged in order to foster successful stress management and adaptation. A second, somewhat less benign cause possibly lies in the differential power balances between minority and majority groups, and in the fact that researchers often stem from the more privileged sections of the social strata (Odekunle, 2020). Majority groups with greater ethnolinguistic vitality (more demographic strengths, status, and institutional support) are therefore less likely than less powerful groups to experience pressures to change (Giles et al., 1977). But, when they do, more powerful groups often resist changes to their culture (Zárate et al., 2012;see, Blalock's (1967) Racial Threat Theory, for similar ideas). Hence, an unexamined assumption by researchers from the majority group might be that the "Bringschuld", i.e., the onus for smoothing over intergroup tensions, rests with the minority: recommendations focus on what the minority should or should not do, while the more powerful majority can enjoy the privilege, which may be experienced as a right (Nijs et al., 2021;Nortio et al., 2020;Verkuyten & Thijs, 2019), of remaining unchanged.

Reasons why majority culture change should receive attention
There are compelling reasons for why the issue of majority culture change should be paid some urgent attention. First and foremost is the fact that selfrelevant cues and issues have stronger attentional and motivational "pulling power" than cues relevant only to others (Chandler et al., 2008;Conty & Grèzes, 2012). On this basis, it seems reasonable to propose that whilst majority members will often have strong preferences about what should happen with minority cultures, they will have even stronger preferences about what should happen with their own majority culture. Indeed, this is what was found in a rare study that looked at acculturation preferences among German majority members towards both minority and majority cultures (Geschke et al., 2010).
Important intergroup outcomes that have been linked to acculturation are levels of intergroup conflict and prejudice (e.g., R. Bourhis et al., 2009;Zagefka & Brown, 2002). If there is reason to assume that research to date, which has focused on majority members' ideas what minorities should do, has looked at a potent predictor but ignored potentially even more potent predictors, then there is an obvious need to address this. A desire not to change on the part of the majority can be assumed to have stronger effects on intergroup outcomes. Strong effects can also be expected for or a perception that minority members are out to change the ingroup's culture. For example, fears of cultural alienation spread by right-wing parties tap into majority members' fears about what the minority outgroup will do to the ingroup. A fear of cultural or actual annihilation of the ingroup might account for many intergroup atrocities committed by dominant groups during ethnopolitical conflict. So, both majority members' own preferences about acculturation of their ingroup and majority members' perceptions of what the minority outgroup wants for the majority culture can be assumed to be practically important, but they have not received much research attention. In the light of this, it seems foolhardy not to rectify the lack of attention to the issue of majority culture change. Clearly, then, there is immense scope for exploring the other side of the coin: change to the majority culture.
Another reason for why majority culture change deserves more attention is that majority members' acculturation preferences for themselves might also impact on their health, much in the same vein as has been demonstrated for minority members (Dona & Berry, 1994). But how and why this might be the case is poorly understood to date. For example, Musso (2015, 2020) reported that Italian adolescents who endorsed multiculturalism showed higher self-esteem and life satisfaction. Similarly, a multicultural ideology created a favourable social context for positive self-esteem not only for minority but also for majority members in the Netherlands (Verkuyten, 2009). But, majority members' preferences regarding multiculturalism do not only entail ideas about what they prefer for the minority group, but also crucially what they wish for their majority group and own society as a whole (Jansen et al., 2015;Plaut et al., 2011). For minority members, integration is argued to lead to more adaptive success because it maximises social capital, allowing minority members to draw resources from both the minority and majority group (Berry, 1997;Putnam, 2001). Whether this proves equally valuable for majority members who are already usually high on social capital remains to be explored.

Limitations and caveats
Of course, the ideas presented here are not without limitations. One important limitation that should be acknowledged is that the present framework, which has as its starting point a society with a minority and a majority group, might not be applicable to all societies, especially given the changing demographics around the world. Significant proportions of the population are now bicultural, rather than belonging merely to one culture or another (Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2013). Societies are increasingly diverse, leading to increased prevalence of biculturalism and multicultural competence (Van Oudenhoven & Benet-Martínez, 2015), as well as what has been termed "fading" majority cultures (Van Oudenhoven & Ward, 2013). Therefore, in some contexts the idea of a monolithic mainstream culture might be outdated or about to become outdated. The assumption that numerical and political power/ status tend to be aligned is also becoming inapplicable in some countries such as the USA, where the number of traditionally more powerful white English speaking people is predicted to constitute a numerical minority in the near future (Zárate et al., 2019) -maybe in the future it will be necessary to substitute the term "majority group" by the term "dominant group" to better reflect these demographic trends, with dominant groups being those that might even be numerical minorities but that have the power and privilege to determine the implicit rules by which interethnic engagement occurs (Barrett, 2013).
Related to the previous point about the decline in clear minority-majority relations due to demographic trends, recently it has been highlighted that in many contexts more than 2 groups are psychologically relevant (Dixon et al., 2020;Zagefka, 2019). But, although of course contributions that consider more complex identity management strategies that go beyond minoritymajority settings are no doubt valuable (e.g., Ferrari et al., 2019), we believe approaches that consider minority-majority relations also still have their place, as they accurately describe the demographic and psychological realities in many countries.
Another limitation that speaks to a further potential topic worthy of future exploration is that the model depicted in Figure 1 is of course, like any model, a reductive account and not a comprehensive description of all processes that might be at play. For example, although the model considers what the respective outgroup is perceived to want, it does not consider what other ingroup members are perceived to want. Perceptions of what ingroup members want are, of course, akin to descriptive and injunctive norms (Cialdini, 2012). At first glance, effects of perceived ingroup preferences are maybe more straightforward and therefore less theoretically interesting than effects of perceived outgroup preferences: much research demonstrates that people often act in norm-conforming ways (Cialdini et al., 1990;Lay et al., 2019), and on the basis of this one might simply, in the context of acculturation choices, predict that perceiving that the ingroup has a certain preference will increase endorsement of that preference.
Only few studies to date speak to the potential effects of perceived ingroup norms. Phalet and Baysu (2020) suggest that adaptive outcomes for minority members depend on the fit between minority members' preferences with group norms: a desire to pursue acculturative goals that are anti-normative are expected to be sanctioned. Thus, integration (and any other acculturation strategy, for that matter) will only have favourable outcomes if it fits with the prevailing social climate and contextual norms.
In one interesting study by Kunst and Sam (2013) that looked at Muslim minority members' perceptions of what members of the societal majority but also other minority peers preferred, the effects of perceived ingroup norms were particularly pronounced, so that separation was preferred the more peers were perceived to expect separation. However, in another study that looked at perceived ingroup norms regarding acculturation preferences, evidence was found not only for compliance with but also for reactance to and contrasting away from ingroup norms (Tip et al., 2015). This suggests that the effects of perceived ingroup preferences and norms might be an additional exciting avenue for future research that goes beyond the framework outlined here.
The work based in Berry's acculturation model can be critiqued for some shortcomings that also apply to many studies reviewed here. First, the model presents minority and majority cultures as two monolithic entities, giving a reified image of culture that might reinforce stereotypes, where in actual fact the picture might be more complex: there might be many subcultures within either group. Second, the emphasis on "choice" in adopting (or not) cultures might not do justice to the lived reality of minority members, who might feel rather constrained in their ability to choose. Escaping one's culture of origin might often be, psychologically speaking, more difficult than it sounds. Third, as mentioned above acculturation preferences might differ depending on life domains (e.g., public vs. private), but they might also diverge for different issues at hand (e.g., practices, moral values, religion, beliefs). Some have argued for the specificity principle in acculturation research (that our understanding of acculturation critically depends on what is studied where, in whom, how, and when, Bornstein, 2017). Although we believe it does make sense to ask participants about their "overall" preferences (and the fact that such global measures meaningfully correlate with other constructs does support this view), obviously a more situated and fine-grained investigation would yield a richer picture.
One major limitation that should be acknowledged is that much of the work reviewed here is correlational. Even though the hypotheses researchers typically seek to test are directional, such data does not allow for causal inference. This is why an important next step for the field is to address this crisis of causality, as outlined by Kunst (2021). Another point related to the quality of the evidence available to date is that much of the work that was reviewed was conducted before the growing awareness of the importance of running sufficiently powered studies and preregistering hypotheses. The evidence is therefore, in part, weaker than ideal. Another important avenue for the future is, then, to confirm findings using robust scientific practices that are more commonplace now than they were in the nascent phase of acculturation research.

Practical implications
Beyond the theoretical contributions that this work can provide, the social implications that can be derived from the study of majority cultural change perceptions or preferences are essential. Perceptions of majority members about what minorities want to do to the mainstream culture, and associated perceived threat, can be a central predictor of hostility or restrictive behaviours such as the support of exclusionist policies (e.g., prohibition of cultural or religious manifestations like the use of the hijab, restrictions for community activities that take place in mosques or Muslim communities, promotion of Roma school segregation, etc.). Arguments related to the idea that minorities want to change the majority are frequently used by right-wing parties in order to promote hostile political measures in opposition to cultural diversity. One practical example of this is the narrative of Eurabia that has been used in public discourse stating that "Europe is no longer Europe, it is Eurabia, a colony of Islam, where the Islamic invasion does not proceed only in a physical sense, but also in a mental and cultural sense" (Oriana Fallaci in an interview in 2005; Carr, 2006, p. 2). This is why we believe attention to the issue of real or perceived majority culture change is so important.
Overall, changes in cultural majority group have been studied, as mentioned above (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2014). However, what has not received much attention are the preferences, feelings and beliefs of dominant group members, but the acculturation framework and the model presented here could be a useful framework to guide such work. We are aware that this paper raises more questions than it answers. To our mind, this is ok: the purpose was to shine the spotlight on neglected issues to encourage further exploration, rather than provide all the answers. Forty years of research have led to a solid understanding of minority culture change within Berry's fourfold framework; hopefully in another 40 years or less we will have an equally thorough understanding of majority culture change.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).