Contested Forgiveness: Unsolicited Amnesty and the Reintegration of ‘Repentant’ Bandits in Northwest Nigeria

Banditry poses a serious threat to lives and livelihoods in parts of Nigeria’s Northwest and Northcentral regions. This has resulted in the deaths of thousands and the displacement of several others. Both the federal government and the affected subnational state governments have responded to this threat by deploying different measures aimed at bringing an end to it. One of such measures adopted by some subnational governments has involved granting amnesty to so called ‘repentant’ bandits. This approach has failed. While several works articulate the origins, nature, character, and trends of banditry, this essay focuses on the controversial issue of amnesty for bandits in Nigeria’s Northwest region. It interrogates the rationale behind the decision to grant amnesty to bandits and why this has failed. Three fundamental things are required for amnesty to yield the desired results within fragile and conflict affected settings, yet they remain absent in the case of Northwest Nigeria. These include the need for individual risk assessment for ‘repentant’ bandits; the buy-in of the affected local communities throughout the entire process; and third, the need to incorporate the voices of victims, including women and girls. The consequences of attempting to reintegrate ‘repentant’ bandits in Northwest Nigeria, in the absence of these, guarantee the repeated failure of such initiatives.


INTRODUCTION
N orthwest Nigeria is faced with multiple security challenges that affect not only the peace of the region itself, but also the entire Nigerian state. Some of these security related challenges range from the farmer herder crisis to the activities of organized criminal gangs (International Crisis Group, 2020) and terrorist groups such as Ansaru, the first breakaway faction of Boko Haram (International Crisis Group 2022). However, banditry remains the most prominent crisis confronting the region, with Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara being the most affected states in the region. The nefarious activities of bandits in the affected region have claimed the lives of several thousands, in addition to resulting in the displacement of millions. As of 2022, at least 1 million people had been displaced by the activities of bandits in Northern Nigeria (Hassan and Barnett, 2022). The situation has also led to a looming humanitarian crisis (France 24 24, 2021). In response to the scourge of banditry, the federal government of Nigeria has deployed the military, which has since been involved in several counter-banditry operations in the affected region (Oyewole, Aina, and Ojo 2022). While these operations have recorded some successes, they have not been able to rid the affected region of the protracted crisis. During some of these military operations, bandits have used their victims as human shields, such as when their camps are being bombarded .
Constrained by the scarcity of resources, subnational states have found themselves in a quagmire, requiring them to come up with alternative means of addressing this issue to guarantee the restoration of peace and security. This has led to some granting amnesty to 'repentant' bandits in the hopes that this would cause them to lay down their arms and subsequently be reintegrated into society. So far, none of this has worked. This essay examines the reasons for this, some of which can be attributed to a lack of policy coordination across the region, among several others. It also offers a pathway for addressing this by drawing attention to three fundamental linkages that have been absent all along yet are required for any amnesty initiative in the region to stand the test of time. The essay explores the question of why amnesty for 'repentant' bandits in Nigeria's Northwest region has repeatedly failed and what can be done to address this. It therefore makes the case that until these missing linkages are properly aligned, any effort at granting amnesty to 'repentant' bandits in the region remains an effort in futility.
Following the introductory section, the essay proceeds to lay out its methodology and then provides an overview of the banditry crisis in Northern Nigeria, which is accompanied by the subject of amnesty for 'repentant' bandits in Nigeria. The reasons for the failure of amnesty for 'repentant' bandits is discussed, after which the essay ends with a conclusion.

METHODOLOGY
T his qualitative essay, which is descriptive, and based on deductive reasoning, draws on secondary sources of data obtained from books, academic journal articles, official reports, and local and international news outlets. The data obtained was analyzed using thematic data analysis. This is mostly advantageous for identifying and reporting patterns within the data itself, thereby helping to corroborate or refute the central arguments of the study The research techniques adopted by the essay include content analysis which is useful in sorting and ranking relevant information from the various sources. The scope of the essay is limited to the short-lived attempts at offering amnesty for bandits in Northern Nigeria.

THEORETICAL ANCHOR
T his essay's core arguments rest on the appropriateness and timing of efforts other than military approaches in addressing the plague of banditry in Nigeria's Northwest region. To this end, the essay adopts the ripeness theory which lies at the heart of the perception and recognition by warring parties on the need for a peace settlement, in this case the Nigerian state and violent non-state actors, referred to here as bandits. The ripeness theory is anchored on the notion that when parties at war find themselves locked in a conflict that appears to be devoid of victory for either of them, seeking an alternative way out becomes the preferred choice (Zartman 2008). This particularly holds true when the situation reflects an urgency for a resolution in the face of escalation reflected through pain. Where this is the case, both parties explore options such as mediation and peaceful settlements such as amnesty provided by the state to the non-state actor(s). It is significant to also note that amnesty connotes an official pardon to offenders who have been convicted of political offenses.
A major criticism of the ripeness theory has been its attempt to claim a predictive capacity in conditions which are too fluid, in addition to being complex to allow accurate prediction (O'Kane 2016). However, given that bandits operating in Northwest Nigeria do not have a political ideology and are rather driven by economic opportunism, the proscription of bandits as terrorists by the Nigerian state, confers on them a form of political identity. Furthermore, 'ripeness' is derived from a perception of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) between both warring parties, that is impending, past, or has been a recently avoided catastrophe (Zarman and Berman;1982, Tourval andZartman, 1985).
In the case of amnesty for bandits in Northwest Nigeria, the willingness of both the state and non-state actors (bandits) to engage in peace talks is indicative of the recognition by both parties of an MHS. NORTHERN NIGERIA'S BANDITRY CRISIS T he first ever recorded case of banditry in Northwest Nigeria took place in 1901 when a 12,000-strong camel train was attacked, resulting in the deaths of 210 merchants between the western Hausaland and Niger border (Anyadike, 2018). Contemporary banditry in Northwest Nigeria, however, has its origins in Zamfara, which was the result of the commissioning of a tribe of nomadic militants called upon to defend herding communities against which they were embroiled in land-related conflicts with farmers belonging to the Hausa tribe. The first bandit organization to emerge in the region, mostly composed of Fulanis, and headed by Buharin Daji and Kundu, was the Kungiyar Gayu in Zamfara state in 2011 (Rufa'I 2021). By 2016, the group had taken on a transnational posture and expanded to include other groups such as the Tuaregs of Mali, Chad, Niger Republic, and those of other neighboring countries. (Rufa'I 2021).
Following the killing of Buharin Daji by Nigerian security forces in 2018, the group began to split into other groups, which subsequently took root in the Northwest Nigerian states of Kaduna, Katsina and Sokoto (Rufa'I 2021). It is significant to note that understanding the menace of banditry in Nigeria goes beyond pastoralist insurgency which can be attributed to the interplay of several connected factors, actors, manifestations, and varying dimensions (Ojo, Aina, and Oyewole 2023). Some of these factors can be attributed to land-related disputes and climate change, socio-economic grievances, several years of poor governance across the region, subnational fragility and weakness, the proliferation of vigilantes engaged in revenge killings (Adejumo 2022), and the inadequacies of traditional means of conflict resolution across the region (Hassan and Barnett, 2022).
Banditry across Northern Nigeria has since become a significant threat to peace and security not only across the entire region, but also to national security in Nigeria (Okoli and Ugwu 2019). While the total number of bandits that exist across Northern Nigeria remains unknown, as of April 2021, there were an estimated 30,000 bandits within Nigeria's troubled Northwest region, which has the highest concentration of bandits in Northern Nigeria. Each of the affected states in the region is estimated to also have at least 100 bandit camps, consisting of about 300 bandits in each camp.
Bandits in Northern Nigeria have mostly taken advantage of the region's porous borders (Ojewale 2021) which are characterized by little to no state presence. These ungoverned spaces (Ojo 2020) have served as a conduit for the smuggling of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALWs) from places such as Cote d'Ivoire, Libya, and Turkey (Sobowale 2020;Omilana 2020;), in addition to drugs, which have continued to fuel the criminal activities of bandits across the entire region . There is also the issue of illicit gold mining across Nigeria's Northwest which bandits benefit from by exploiting artisans working in these mining sites (Ogbonnaya 2020;Adedeji 2021). In addition to these, bandits operating across the region have also resorted to perpetuating sexual violence in the form of rape (Daily Trust 2021), exploiting farmers (Odebode et al. 2019) and affected local communities through demands for the payment of taxes (Okoli and Abubakar 2021;Hassan-Wuyo, and Gudau, 2022). Other activities that differentiate banditry in Northern Nigeria, from livestock rustling which essentially focuses on the theft of livestock such as sheep, and cows by criminal gangs, include brigandage, theft, highway robbery, rural violence, and mercenary militancy (Okoli and Nabuihe, 2019). Furthermore, there are also concerns about the connivance of bandits with jihadists, thereby exacerbating the complex web of the crime-terror nexus across the troubled region (Okoli and Nwangwu 2022). In January 2022, the federal government of Nigeria formally proscribed bandits as terrorists (Ameh 2022).
As of December 2021, more than 57,000 and 15,000 refugees who had been forcibly displaced due to banditry from Nigeria's Northwest region were hosted in neighboring Niger's Maradi and Yahoua regions respectively (UNHCR 2021). Between the period of 2011 and 2019, about 8,000 people were killed by bandits across Nigeria, in addition to the displacement of over 210,400 people over the same period (International Crisis Group, 2020). As at the end of 2021, a total of 2,600 civilians had lost their lives to the activities of banditry across several parts of Nigeria (Ayandele and Goos, 2021). Similarly, between 2020 and 2021, bandits operating in Northwest Nigeria were responsible for over 1,100 kidnapings for ransom (Reuters and Reuters 2021). These realities attest to the fact that banditry remains one of the greatest threats to peace and security in contemporary Nigeria (Barnett 2021 (Jaiyeola et al. 2021). This has entailed the closure of markets. Others have included the formal establishment and training of a Special Vigilante Corps with 3,000 initial members (Tribune Online 2022).
Most of these measures began in 2016, when bandits began to gain prominence in local and international media. In early 2016 some of the most affected subnational states in the Northwest region such as Zamfara, Sokoto, and Katsina had resorted to dialogue, negotiations, and other forms of settlement initiatives with the goal of ending banditry. These included a three-pronged phase, with the first being the disarmament of the bandits. The second and third phases entailed their rehabilitation and reintegration, respectively.
In the specific case of Zamfara state, which remains the epicenter of the crisis, given that it has mostly recorded the highest incidences and cases of banditry attacks over the years, the state government has initiated several peace and reconciliation initiatives to address banditry within the state (Tribune Online, 2020). According to the governor of the state, the peace deal had resulted in the release of nearly 1,000 people by the 'repentant' bandits and the surrendering of thousands of weapons (Abubakar et al, 2020). The peace deal that was struck in June 2019, between local vigilante groups, popularly known as Yan Sakai in Hausa language, and the leadership of the prominent bandit groups led to the restoration of peace in the state. 'Repentant' bandits in the state were offered cows for AK-47s (BBC 2020). The bandits had specifically requested, as part of their pre-conditions for accepting a peace deal was that the Yan Sakai stop all forms of extrajudicial killings of Fulanis in marketplaces (Abubakar et al, 2020). As part of efforts to sustain the peace an rehabilitate the 'repentant' bandits, the state had conceived a social intervention programme intended to recruit 18,000 youths across the state, who would be paid N20,000 monthly (Ejiofor et al. 2020).
In Katsina state, where over 33,000 people had been displaced and 500 local communities destroyed due to the nefarious activities of bandits, as of 2020, the state government, in November 2016, had inaugurated a State Dialogue/Amnesty Committee headed by the Secretary to the State Government (SSG) to bring an end to banditry in the affected local government areas (LGAs) of the state. On January 15, 2017, during an occasion in Kankara LGA, 300 'repentant' bandits and other criminals formally surrendered their weapons to the state government (This Day 2020). Following the surrender of their weapons, each 'repentant' bandit was granted amnesty, and the sum of N30,000,000 was given to them. By early 2018, the issue of banditry had resurfaced in the state. This time around, the state governor convened a meeting where he engaged directly with representatives of the bandit groups in dialogue as part of a renewed peace process. This also entailed visits by the governor to the leaders of the bandit groups in each of the 8 affected LGAs of the state; Kankara, Faskari, Dan-Musa, Safana, Sabuwa, Dandume, Jibia and Batsai. As a pre-condition for dialogue, the bandits requested that their arrested members be released, to which the governor had promised to secure their release (This Day 2020). The 'repentant' bandits, in addition to laying down their weapons in the state, also released women and other captives in their custody. The second peace deal only lasted a few days between September 4 and 9, 2019 (Abdulaziz et al, 2020). As part of the initial amnesty process, 10 schools were built for the 'repentant' bandits (Ejiofor et al. 2020).
In the case of Sokoto state, the first peace deal took place in Isa LGA in 2016. This deal soon fell apart, with another one initiated in 2019. The second one was also short-lived owing to the failure of the bandits in the state to live up to its terms (Abubakar et al, 2020). During the period of the peal deals, 100 weapons had been surrendered by the bandits, in the Halilu camp, addition to ceasing fire. However, the notorious Turji camp was not as cooperative. Some of the requests made by the bandits in Sokoto state as pre-conditions for the peace process include the stoppage of air bombardments, the stoppage of arrests, and the harassment of Fulanis. The government, on the other hand, requested the release of captives in the custody of the bandits, as well as rustled animals and the stoppage of kidnapings by bandits across the state. As part of the rehabilitation programme for 'repentant' bandits in Sokoto state, the training of 1,700 youths in furniture making had been approved by the state government as had plans for other vocational trainings (Ejiofor et al. 2020).
In Kaduna state, which has been severely affected by the activities of bandits, the approach of the state government has been a no-negotiation and nonpayment of ransom policy toward bandits (Aworinde 2021). It is, however, significant to note that despite this policy, the state government has admitted to paying bandits as part of efforts to bring an end to the issue of banditry in the state (Vanguard 2016). In early March 2020, the Kaduna state government reiterated its zero-tolerance for bandits and its policy of no-negotiation following several attacks by bandits in parts of the state (Tribune Online, 2020).

WHY AMNESTY HAS FAILED
I t is pertinent to note that among the reasons for the failed amnesty programmes initiated by most of the affected states in the region is the issue of the uncoordinated nature of these efforts (Aina 2022). Despite these amnesty programmes intended to banditry in the region, crucial factors remain missing that have largely been responsible for the failure of amnesty for 'repentant' bandits. The first is the failure to conduct an individual risk assessment on each 'repentant' bandit. The adoption of a blanket approach to amnesty negates the degree of radicalization of each bandit, thereby making it significantly difficult to separate those who have truly repented from those who have yet to. An individual risk assessment of each bandit offers an opportunity to determine their level of radicalization, thereby making it possible to know the appropriate stage in their deradicalization process as well as their readiness and extent of their qualification to be reintegrated back into society. Considering that some of the bandits are leaders of their various camps while others within these camps are merely foot soldiers carrying out instructions, their levels of influence and embeddedness should not be assumed to be one and the same.
Secondly, the affected local communities have been left out of the peace process (The Guardian, 2022). Given that they are the most affected, the chances of any successful amnesty programmes are largely dependent on the affected local communities being an integral part of efforts to bring an end to banditry. In this regard, both the federal government and affected subnational states must be willing to engage and work closely with these communities in determining the extent to which the so called 'repentant' bandits are qualified to be reintegrated back into society, most of which they were responsible for destroying. Given that some of these 'repentant' bandits at some points were members of these local communities before voluntarily joining or forcefully being recruited into various bandit camps, their history and character as members of the community are best known by these communities. This is also important in ensuring their eventual acceptance or rejection into these communities which could potentially lead to issues of stigmatization, and discrimination. This potential lack of acceptance has the unintended effect of pushing them back into banditry which offers them a source of economic opportunism.
Thirdly, the voices of women and girls, who are among the most affected by banditry across the region, need to be heard. This is particularly important as most works on deradicalization, and reintegration have tended to neglect these important members of society. Women and girls are among the most vulnerable and most affected members of society by the nefarious activities of bandits. In addition to kidnapping women and girls, bandits continue to perpetuate sexual violence against them, mostly in the form of rape. The effect of these on women and girls includes psychosocial trauma. Women and girls as equal members of affected local communities, and as victims, must be encouraged to determine the fate of their abusers as part of a transparent, just, and legally driven process. It is also important that this process guarantees their safety and the protection of their identities. There has also been a tendency to neglect the role played by women and girls beyond victimhood, but rather as enablers, in the emerging literature on banditry in Northwest Nigeria. Understanding these differences is paramount to achieving a lasting peace process that involves amnesty for bandits.
It is, however, pertinent to note that other reasons for the failure of amnesty for bandits in Northwest Nigeria can be attributed to the failure of the government to identify the different groups operating in specific areas across the region. Some of which include those who rustle livestock, kidnappers for ransom, and community invaders, to mention a few. This is in addition to the continued presence of conflict entrepreneurs, including informants and those who supply weapons, food, and other daily needs to criminals across the region. There are also claims that some government officials benefit from the continuation of armed conflict perpetuated by bandits across the region which derails the prospects of amnesty. Evidence in this regard is, however, unsubstantiated and remains difficult to come by.

CONCLUSION
A cross the Northwest states of Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara, the devastating effects on lives and livelihoods caused by the nefarious activities of bandits who lack a political ideology, yet mostly driven by economic opportunism, remain an important issue of concern. While banditry is the most dominant cause of armed conflict in the troubled region, it is significant to note that it is not the only cause. Others include violence between pastoralist Fulani herders and farmers, the activities of Ansaru, a terrorist group, as well as organized criminal groups that have taken advantage of the deteriorating situation in the region. Banditry remains a major threat to peace and security in Northwest Nigeria and Nigeria's broader national security, peace efforts aimed at bringing an end to it must be well coordinated across states to begin. This explains in part the failure of previous attempts by the federal government and affected subnational states to bring an end to the scourge of banditry across the region, which is mostly manifested through acts of kidnapping for ransom, exploitation, and extortion, as well as attacks on vulnerable local communities, and sexual violence against women and girls, to mention a few. Furthermore, any prospects of a successful amnesty programme for 'repentant' bandits, as part of non-kinetic approaches, must prioritize the individual risk assessment of each 'repentant' bandit. In addition, the affected local communities, as well as women and girls, must be allowed to take a prominent role in the entire peace process. This is in addition to identifying and paying attention to the different types of criminal groups operating in specific areas across the region, the role of conflict entrepreneurs, such as informants and sympathizers, and potential government officials who derail such peace processes. Anything short of these increases the likelihood of a failed amnesty initiative, thereby resulting in a protracted crisis across the region. ORCID Folahanmi Aina http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4999-2042