An Argument Against Weiism: A Nietzschean and Philosophical Posthumanist Reading of Ira Levin’s This Perfect Day

ABSTRACT In this paper, I set out to argue in favour of a philosophical posthumanist and Nietzschean reading of Ira Levin’s This Perfect Day while demonstrating how transhumanism isunbefitting of being called a Nietzschean theory. I will do this by establishing Chip, the protagonist, as a posthuman and being on the path of the ‘Overhuman’ whereas Wei, the antagonist, will be illustrated as Chip’s intended counterpart the Last Human. Through explaining ‘Transhumansim’ and connecting the field to Wei, I will showcase a new way of reading transhumanist ideology, namely ‘Weiism’. The polar opposite in characters of ‘Overhuman’ and ‘Last Human’ will argue in favour of the Nietzschean paradoxical, as part of philosophical posthumanism. Amor fati and the eternal recurrence become posthumanist narrative tools through their weaving into the posthuman narrative of Chip. My argument is that by making philosophical posthumanism more existentialist in nature, it becomes simpler to argue against nihilistic and totalitarian tendencies of worshipping technology. Finally, it is the spiralling motion forward as a mix between the Nietzschean, eternally cyclical re-inventing of oneself and the posthumanist consideration for the future which makes for a literary combination of the two fields of study.

namely my idea 'Weiism'.The latter is a tyrannical, technocratic, theological, and pseudo-Marxist manner of governance which exploits people of their autonomy, sense of self and individuality in exchange for material abundance, safety and an assured existence.This, among many other factors, will point to Wei and the humans he wants to shape in his image as the Last Human.Through Weiism and its transhumanist aspects in relation to the Last Human, I will argue against the idea that Nietzsche might have been a transhumanist given his dislike for the Last Human.This will make Weiism a legitimate sub-category of transhumanism on a philosophical and literary level.Then, I will argue that Chip, the protagonist, is a prototype of the posthumanist's idea of a posthuman.His manner of behaviour and his constantly changing perspectives on relationships, love, freedom, and authenticity make Chip a candidate for being a well-established example of not just the posthumanist's posthuman but also the Nietzschean Overhuman.The many similarities between the Overhuman and the posthuman showcase through literary means that there are ties between posthumanism and proto-existentialism.So far, this is something that philosophical posthumanism has been discussing, however not on a literary level in such detail.I will argue that the eternal recurrence and the way Chip lives his love to his fate makes it a posthumanist narrative tool.Additionally, a new idea arises; namely, that of the spiralling motion forward as a mix of the posthumanist's political approach and the endless re-envisioning of the Overhuman.As opposed to the Overhuman endlessly and cyclically reinventing themselves, Chip does so in relevance to the future, thus, a spiralling motion forward.The posthumanist argues similarly but simply with a careful approach.Given the strong connection to the Overhuman and the posthuman through Chip, the connection between Wei, the Last Human and transhumanist ideology is also fortified.This is so because of the Last Human being the intended counter-term to the Overhuman.Thus, I have argued that Chip is more akin to the Nietzschean Overhuman and posthuman than some transhumanist thinkers believe and that Weiism is a transhumanist form of governance which brings forth the Last Human.Now that I have introduced the structure of the subject fields and my argument pertaining to the characters within the book, I will lay out a short plot summary to further clarify my intent.The novel follows Chip and is framed as a coming-of-age story.At the beginning, he is a child and towards the end a middle-aged man.He grows up to learn that he must obey the alldictating and controlling Unification Computer, in short UniComp.However, through the help of many side characters, Chip's curiosity, creativity and rebellious tendencies start to blossom.He stops taking forced neuropharmacological treatments which numb his strength of will and sense of self and make him content and complacent.Thus, he plots to destroy UniComp to free all of humanity.This also means taking away the power from the dictating oppressor Wei who built UniComp and behaves like a god on Earth.Humans have been eugenically merged into what is called 'The Family', a single ethnicity for Wei to control which all live the same, get told what to eat and wear, what job to do, when to die and how many children to bear.Finally, it is Chip's grandfather, Jan, who taught him to learn how to 'want' in a world where this does not exist as a concept.Furthermore, it is Karl who taught him about the subversive power of creativity, and it is Lilac, his love interest and later his wife, who is Chip's reason to have an impact on the world as an individual.Chip's trajectory as a character is tumultuous in opposition to Wei's which is stable and fortified.These narratological differences help with my arguments.

Weiism and the Paradox of Transhumanist Ideology
Arguably, Wei's speeches from the last parts of This Perfect Day eerily foretell of what is now known as the Silicon Valley mindset.Wei speaks much of eternal happiness while describing a savior-like position which he holds as the techno-centric overlord of the Family (Levin and Trigell 2014).Already, this reflects the perspectives of some public figures and researchers such as Ray Kurzweil and David Pearce.Pearce embraces drugs and genetic engineering to bring people to a constant state of subjective happiness (Pearce 2011).In This Perfect Day, people get 'treatments' every other week approximately which make them complacent, content, and obedient (Levin and Trigell 2014).This should sound alarming, but this is where transhumanism as a field of study is lacking.It's not just that transhumanists view the human as open to change, but they (Kurzweil in particular) believe(s) that by eliminating barriers to become the transhumanist's posthuman, a singularity will arise by 2045 (Kurzweil 2006).What does this mean and how does this relate to Wei? Wei wants to usher in the age of the immortal human, led by the machine UniComp, extending endlessly all over the universe (Levin and Trigell 2014).Wei does not use the term 'singularity', but he defined it nearly perfectly.Vernor Vinge popularized the idea as a scifi writer and describes the singularity as 'the imminent creation by technology of entities with greater than human intelligence' (Bostrom 2014, 6) and according to Kurzweil it will 'allow us to transcend (. ..) our bodies and brains', which will enable us to live forever (Kurzweil 2006, 9).
Wei describes the Family as incapable of taking care of themselves and he uses the chaotic nature of governance on Liberty as an example of neuropharmalogically untreated people, called 'the Sick'.Important to note is the children's song from the novel which mentions the sacrifices of Marx and Christ apart from Wei and what they have done for the Family (Levin and Trigell 2014).Hence, there is clear indoctrination of children ongoing, and the individual ideologies are being used by Wei for his personal gain.
Arguably, the message is that Marx and Christ left the world so that Wei may take over.Wei picks up on both ideas and claims to be the next big step in human governance.Not just is he there to replace the symbol of Christ but he also swears to have all people lead equally decent, materially cared for lives.However, Wei believes some people to be more capable of being reasonable and living life correctly than others, echoing Orwell's Animal Farm and the famous line 'some animals are more equal than others' (Orwell and Baker 1996, 81).This statement is used to make obvious the authoritarian and populist abuse of socialist ideology by the bourgeoisie and Wei is no different in this.Therefore, Weiism can only appear as a pseudo-Marxist transhumanism.In addition, Wei, as the supreme leader of the Family and the headprogrammer of UniComp controls techno-scientific means as the head of the bourgeoisie.Furthermore, Wei has a right to morphological freedom.People with morphological freedom can change their body however they sees fit as long as others do not come to harm (Sandberg 2011).However, the Family themselves are being prescribed how to live and which treatments to get (Levin and Trigell 2014).This showcases the totalitarian nature of Weiism where the rights of the individual to equal access to technology are being abused and thus also Sandberg's morphological freedom as a fundamental rule for all to access in transhumanism.Transhumanism celebrates accessible technology for all so that humanity may transcend into a new age of existence, free of suffering (Pearce 1995).Then all should be free to use technology however they see fit.By breaking this right, Wei is dehumanizing most of humanity.Therefore, one cannot exclude the possibility that Wei got into power by equally totalitarian and fascistic means as all humans have been eugenically merged into one ethnicity, creating the Family (Levin and Trigell 2014).
Furthermore, most people in the Family look similar, do not have body hair apart from growth on the head, and biological sex is only vaguely determinable by the bass or non-bass sound of a voice, absence or presence of breasts and different genitalia which is indicated by the members' almost unnatural sameness (Levin and Trigell 2014).Wei has achieved what Pearce calls 'abolitionism' through eliminating most differences between people and therefore establishing peace and happiness by using gene modification and neuropharmacology (Pearce 2011).However, Wei's self-acclaimed position as a savior for bringing about subjective happiness can appear as a pseudo-Christian transhumanism.Here, a leader claims that techno-scientific progress is a gift by God which leads to transcending physical barriers (Conde and Javier 2021).These technologies seem to be misused for the sake of absolute control as opposed to a means to transcendence to heaven, however.The denial to leading a meaningful existence through suffering and difference between people, as it also took place in Brave New World, is one of the biggest downsides to transhumanism.Here, most of Nietzsche's philosophy as a meaning-constructing one through making mistakes, learning, and suffering, appears as the better alternative (more on this later).Given that ascendance to heaven is achieved by living a good life on Earth, the following must be asked; how can this ascendence occur if humans will inevitably become immortal through techno-scientific progress as Steve Fuller's notion of Humanity 2.0 puts forth (2013)?Does this not collide with the more religious aspect of Wei's project?In addition, is it not blasphemy to try and take the place of God in his stead as a homo deus?It appears contradictory and nihilistic.Arguably, this is indicative of deeply nihilistic tendencies found within a world in the absence of God in the Nietzschean sense.
The last statement coalesces with a Nietzsche quote: The truth is precisely the opposite of what is asserted here: science today has absolutely no belief in itself, let alone an ideal above it -and where it still inspires passion, love, ardor, and suffering at all, it is not the opposite of the ascetic ideal but rather the latest and noblest form of it (Nietzsche 1989, 147).
It is easy to see how Weiism is very much of a religious order.It is just one which is not Christian, but theological-technological, and in this, one can find the dreading of the end of a life without any inherent meaning.There may be the promise of eternal life (becoming posthuman) if only one behaves as told to (living under Weiism).
Heidegger wrote that technology could become an ontological threat given that rational expression is also one of nihilism; an age of technology also means an age where everything can be turned into a problem to be solved by a particular tool (Heidegger 1977).Heidegger influenced some of these ideas, as the transhumanist does not see technology as an ontological thing, nor does life carry any ontological meaning.The end to life becomes a problem to be solved.This is about epistemological problem solving rather than living a meaningful life.In addition, Heidegger spoke of three levels of time, which is partially echoed by Ferrando's idea of the transhumanist's time-dependent ontological and future oriented project of endless change (Ferrando 2019).The past, as being thrown into the world, the future, as projection of possibilities, and the present, as fallenness where we take care of issues now.These aspects are grounded in caring and thus care is a deep part of temporality (Dreyfus 1991).Similarly to Heidegger, we find in Nietzsche's ideas on compassion that the human who is truly strong seeks all the pain and suffering attached to their life.Even if this proves debilitating and one might wish to change it (as does a transhumanist), escaping this would mean not really grasping the human condition and thus lacking in compassion, understanding and care (Frazer 2006).Given that the transhumanist disturbs our timely existence by extending it endlessly into the future, caring in the moment no longer provides meaning nor compassion.This is a belief that directly contradicts Nietzschean ideas of living for the moment and striving to overcome who it is that we are now, ideologically (Stegmaier 2011).Hence, Wei constructed a lifestyle under nihilistic governance.Therefore, the transhumanist's projects of immortality and singularity need ontological fuel.The meaningful fear derived from our timely existences in relation to death serve as fodder for all future goals of transhumanism, eerily echoing Pepperell's statement of the increasing uselessness of humans with the increase in technological innovation (Pepperell 1995).

Wei as the Last Human as Opposed to the Overhuman
As established in the previous sub-chapter, Wei has nearly absolute control over the Family through the surveillance work of UniComp, the drugging of the members and genetic editing.The fact that members are being told what to eat and wear, when to sleep, work and be sexually active, how to work and which job to pick, and finally, who gets and doesn't get to have a baby, is a good example of hyperparenting.Hyperparenting describes a strict, rigid, and absolute planning out of the life of a person shortly before their birth (Skowron 2013) just that Wei is doing this on a planetary level.Therefore, Wei believes that he can teach the Family how to be his perfected vision of a human.Wei takes this to be fully granted because there is no alternative to living a good life as everything before his UniComp is merely a remnant of savagery according to his propaganda (Levin and Trigell 2014).He maintains Liberty simply for making an example out of it for this idea (Levin and Trigell 2014).Here, the lack of hubris, or a measure one can work with to make a comparison (Skowron 2013), makes it difficult to oppose his claim.So, Wei's ideal human, the Nietzschean Last Human, seems to be the only option.
Wei believes the Sick from Liberty to be disgusting, dangerous and pitiable, hence he created the drug-treated members of the Family.Out of his despise for humanity as it is, in its free will and autonomy, Wei created his version of the unitary model of the Last Human for the Family to copy.The members are made after his image; physically fit like a professional athlete, the mind of a genius, despite being over 200 years old.Not only does this image of the human appear inhuman, but monstrous.The thought of Wei being biologically engineered is reminiscent of Frankenstein's monster who was built out of the best body parts Frankenstein could find.Arguably, the lesson of Shelley's story was that the seemingly perfect human as intelligent, capable, and strong is more monstrous than human.However, much of the disgust for the creation came from the way it looked (Shelley 1992).Wei made sure to look healthy and charismatic (Levin and Trigell 2014).His attractive characteristics gloss over what his body is and how it came to be.It is in our faults that we find humanity and Weiism effectively hides this truth making him seem more like a homo deus to those around him.
In addition, there is also a project for the future, as Wei wants all people on Earth to stop having children so that all may have enough space to live forever and occupy Earth endlessly (Levin and Trigell 2014).This focus on the future is also advocated for by Sorgner according to his interpretation of Nietzsche's term 'overcoming' (Sorgner 2009).As established through the cyclical motion of time through amor fati and the eternal recurrence, 'overcoming' does not mean to become better with an outlook onto the future in relation to the Overhuman.
Furthermore, Weiism's issue with sameness echoes Nietzsche's 'On The Tarantulas' in Thus Spoke Zarathustra; the tarantulas speak to one another about their feelings of revenge they feel for everyone who is not the same as them.They create a problem just to propose a solution to it (2020a).This partially echoes Wei's despise for humanity as they lived before UniComp and solidifies his reasoning for creating the Family.Nietzsche writes: 'your secret tyrant-desires dress themselves up as words of valor' (Nietzsche 2020a, 112)!Arguably, this is befitting, given Wei's self-picturing as a savior (Levin 309).Zarathustra writes: "I do not want to be mixed in with and confused with these pastors of sameness.Justice speaks to and through me: 'humans are not the same' (Nietzsche 2020a, 113).Interpretatively, this clarifies Nietzsche's distance towards all that which is the same.
The Overhuman is a radical individualist.This idea is specifically brought up regarding the death of God.Zarathustra does not wish for a man to take the place of a God because that would mean disastrous outcomes.He fears it could result in a totalitarian form of governance (Nietzsche 2020a), which is true in the case of Weiism.The death of God is interesting in connection to Sorgner's claim that both transhumanists and Nietzsche want to distance themselves from Christianity and that they are looking to re-develop a new set of values (Sorgner 2009).The similarities in Christian imagery, messages and implications in transhumanism are abundant, which agrees with Nietzsche's critique of the worship of the sciences potentially replacing the worship of God.However, Sorgner mentions that Nietzsche held the sciences in high regard and that the future will be one of the sciences.Sorgner links this to Nietzsche's will to power saying that 'If you will power, then it is in your interest to enhance yourself' (Sorgner 2009, 33).and makes another connection to the will to life and a will to stand out more broadly, as the fundamental human drive (Sorgner 2007).
Here, something crucial is being left out.Nietzsche may have believed that the future will be one of technology and the sciences, however, he was weary of this.Nietzsche wrote in Thus Spoke Zarathustra that the Overhuman would be of the Earth, meaning that he embraces life and his body as it is (2020).More specifically, he argues against those who hate the body in 'On the Despisers of the Body': 'They shan't unlearn or re-learn, rather they should bid farewell to their bodies -and thus become quiet' (Nietzsche 2020a, 39).I interpret this as those who despise the body should not speak to Zarathustra about it at all.What makes one a despiser of bodies?Zarathustra says that the body has a larger part to play in the existence of the human than the mind: 'The tool of your body is also your small reason, my brother, which you call "spirit", a small tool and toy of your larger reason' (Nietzsche 2020a, 39).My emphasis in the quote marks how Nietzsche puts value on the mind and the body.To him, 'large' signifies 'more of than' but used it most often as a marker of quality, like 'impressive' (Stegmaier 2011, 183).And 'small' signifies that which has the potential to become 'large'.In addition, 'small' is usually something that is already known to most, and wrongfully put on a pedestal above that which only few recognize to be 'large', the latter meaning the body (Stegmaier 2011, 184).Alternatively, to use the mind to develop machinery and tools to enhance the body also means to diminish the largeness of the body through the smallness of the spirit.

Chip and Philosophical Posthumanism's Life Affirmation
In the first chapters of Levin's novel, we see Chip as a child who is absolutely indoctrinated with UniComp's ideas (Levin and Trigell 2014).Chip believes that UniComp leads the Family; the belief in living in a techno-centric world as led by an all-knowing, all-controlling, all-caretaking machine.This is a depiction not of a posthuman world, but rather, one of transhumanism.The period the Family finds itself in the transitionary period that Steve Fuller wrote about; they are between Humanity 1.0 and Humanity 2.0 while being led by machines (Fuller 2013).
Chip first gets confronted with the idea of freely exploring thoughts by trying 'to want things'.In a world where 'to want' means to be egotistical, self-centered and a potential threat to the order of sameness, Chip is rebellious by thinking a type of thought.This is a trick his grandfather, called papa Jan in the book, taught him.Chip engages with this and enjoys imagining things and becoming creative, thus starting to question Uni's all-powerful nature.Here, imagining wanting things stands in stark contrast with Nietzsche's 'wanting not-wanting' (Stegmaier 2011, 194), however, this is the first stage in getting there in order to finally reach 'not-wanting-it-differently', the state of 'the big love' (Nietzsche 2020b, 49-51).Important to note is the difference between a freely chosen 'wanting-not-wanting' and one that is forced upon Chip via neuropharmacology.It is only after Chip learns that he can experience subjectively truthful freedom that he picks a goal of his own, namely destroying UniComp, and that his final 'not-wanting-it-differently' is achieved upon destroying UniComp successfully and with it the book ending as an end to Chip's personal development.Once this 'want' or desire has been accomplished, he does not wish for anything else.In addition, his rebellion shows in helping his artistic friend, Karl, because he draws 'better than correctly drawn' even though he ought not to support Karl's personal endeavor (Levin and Trigell 2014).There is a big lack of vocabulary for describing art and emotions in the Family, echoing Orwell's seminal work 1984 (Orwell 1987).Chip, who has a weakly creative side at this point, nonetheless enjoys Karl's stylized drawings.This is indicative of the Dionysian in Chip.Amor fati appears here as a love to irony (Stegmaier 2011): it seems almost funny how Chip adores Karl's non-Uni praising drawings even though he should not as he doesn't even understand what he is looking at given his lack of vocabulary yet still it sdraws him in.This speaks to Chip's attractedness to the openendedness which Karl's creativity proposes.Chip's appreciation of Karl's art has a subversive effect on Chip and it speaks to a desire to feel 'want'.This is an example of the intoxicating effect of the Dionysian and its impulsiveness and therefore also its destructiveness (Nietzsche 1968).Chip, too, is at fault for Karl's displacement for having helped him draw more by getting him paper (Levin and Trigell 2014).There is a connection here in the open-endedness of the freedom of art in posthumanism in opposition to rigid transhumanism; Ferrando writes that art as explorative also has a place in posthumanism as the latter should never become rigid with its view on the future (Ferrando 2016).
Through papa Jan and Karl, Chip is already stepping out of his taught behavior; namely the emphasized significance of his differently colored eyes, that exploring things, emotions, and art just for yourself is deeply egotistical and a sign of sickness, of being like pre-UniComp people.This makes him uncomfortable, but he continues to seek out these emotional and creative deviances, nonetheless.When Braidotti wrote that the"regeneration of the human is not unilateral or universal, but rather situated, perspectivist and hence internally fractured and potentially antagonistic" (Braidotti 2019, 38), we must also look at this from an individual's perspective then, like in Chip's case.His uncomfortableness stands in antagonistic relation to his 'regeneration', or, his re-exploring of himself from this Dionysian impulse of wanting-art.
Karl and papa Jan function as Chip's influences as partially 'experienced, selftaught and raised, critical thinker(s)' (Most 1965, 978;Nietzsche 2017, 98).Through this influence, Chip is staring to learn 'that everyone, who wants to be free, must learn this by themselves and that freedom never just falls into one's lap in the form of a present' (Most 1965, 125).Currently, Chip does not know how far he can deviate, because Karl was reprimanded for drawing in his stylized manner and his grandfather was taken away (Levin and Trigell 2014).The absence of these beacons of difference makes it difficult to know when one can next express authentic feelings (Stegmaier 2011).
Chip's ambiguous characteristics are typical for a posthuman narrative strategy.Arguably, Chip's development proposes a sense of posthuman convergence towards a"representationality in favor of a politics of subjectivity that emphasizes relationality and process among disparate types of beings" (Huff 2017, 280).Karl, papa Jan and Chip represent a minority within the Family in how they are developing in this oppressive world.Furthermore, UniComp could only be a leader to humanity, as a leading tool, or a tool that is used by humans.I deduce this from the idea that nonhuman entities could never have rights as we humans do, given their lack of experience of human existence (Huff 2017).
Chip wants to overcome UniComps's domination, and he expresses his wish to destroy it during a moment of self-realization.Chip realises that UniComp has nearly absolute control over everything it is that they do and when they die.When people reach a certain age, 62, they are being deported to a facility no ordinary member knows where and are assumably killed there (Levin and Trigell 2014).A feature that is reminiscent of Brave New World and its 'recycling' of people where the elderly are put in a factory to be recycled into energy (Huxley 2004).The realisation of this catastrophe makes Chip want to become rebellious.Here, Chip is enabling what Braidotti coins 'posthuman subjectivity (which allows for) a re-grounding of ourselves in the messy contradictions (and absurdities) of the present' (Braidotti 2019, 38).This is a showcase of Braidotti's posthumanist life affirmation: a yes-saying to life despite its chaos and paradoxes.Furthermore, while Chip is visiting his fellow non-medicated, Sick friends, he must act unsuspicious around other members (Levin and Trigell 2014).This immanence and imminence to this catastrophe makes him envision resistance (Braidotti 2019).Chip's idea of destruction is perceived as radical by his peers at the time (Levin and Trigell 2014) because he is radically open to building his own posthumanist narrative framework.The dynamic and ever-shifting quality of his creative-political activism showcase that he understands that there are many ways of doing things to remain within a process of becoming a new person (Lovell 2017).This mixture of creativity and wilful impulse is also a Dionysian marker.
Chip's posthuman subjectivity and his sense of striving towards a neverending posthuman convergence tells him more about his relationality to the world that he inhabits.This route of thinking and action brings Chip out of the Family and onto 'Liberty', the island we know as Majorca.However, the way there was not easy as he wanted to take Lilac, his love interest, with him.He kidnaps her, after having developed a plan for many years prior.After a few weeks of wandering around in the wilderness, trying to remain undetected from UniComp and the Family, Chip worries about his facial hair growth and it makes him feel insecure knowing that Lilac can see his beard (Levin and Trigell 2014).This is reminiscent of the character Walter Faber from Homo Faber, a story about a man who wishes to control nature.In this story, the protagonist is obsessed with his beard-growth as a sign of the uncontrollably natural within him.Thus, he develops a neurotic tick which forces him to shave his beard as soon as he sees it grow (Frisch 1977).This is the same with Chip.Furthermore, even though Chip is a deeply freespirited being who doesn't shy away from radical political action, he gets nervous in the gaze of a woman perceiving his beard.In addition, this is where the Apollonian in Chip shows for the first time after breaking free from the Family.Facing Lilac, he feels his impulsivity and the biologically male hair growth may be seen as vile and so he must control it.
Furthermore, when Chip rapes Lilac after an intense fight, she has calmed down and tells Chip that he was in the right to act out his urges.She also admits that she has liked the sex too, even though she was rebelling against it at the time and was calling him an 'animal' (Levin and Trigell 2014).This is shocking given the non-critical distance to this event in the novel; it is depicted as troublesome but as justified.Chip's deeply misogynistic tendencies will remind any feminist thinker of the notion of hysteria: the origin, on paper, being from the middle-ages when doctors believed that less frequent procreation in women leads to them becoming hysterical (Meek 2009).In addition, this also relates to Chip's obsessive control over the natural despite his deep-seated revolt against UniComp and technology.Here, we find a dualistic narrative of the natural as feminine and the cultural and forceful as masculine.Given that this is rejected by post-dualism, this means a regressive step backwards for Chip's development, but it also signifies that there is room to improve; hence, the posthuman notion of never-ending selfbecoming (Ferrando 2019).In other words, posthumanism cannot work outside of humanism (Badmington 2003).In addition, his Apollonian need for control over the natural as feminine but his wilful impulse to destroy UniComp as Dionysian are contradicting each other here.This paints Chip as a complicated character who has only started his search for himself.

Chip as the Nietzschean Overhuman in Connection to Philosophical Posthumanism
From pages 144 to 158 in the novel, Chip experiences something that I coin a 'nihilistic outburst'.This constitutes a detrimental drive to expose the underlying truth of the world pre-maturely.This drive has a fatalistdramatic affect to it that pushes the individual to try to convince their peers about the falsehoods of their society.This is masked as eager, political activism, but in the end, it has a mostly destructive quality.Again, the Dionysian in him appears to take the overhand and showcases that which Wei has feared, the destructive sides to self-important impulsivity, which gives some credit to Wei's transhumanism.Chip exposed the ideas he had been gathering for months to his supervisor Bob and the public.No one believed him and Chip realised that he committed a form of rebellious suicide.In his revolt facing the Family and UniComp, he was grabbed by members of the Family and immediately given a very strong dose of treatments.It was his desperation masked as eagerness which led to this situation and so he self-sabotaged.
In addition, while Chip was being dragged away, moments before getting his treatment, he made a statement reminiscent of Nietzsche's madman from The Gay Science: 'You're all dead,' he said.'The whole Family's dead.Uni's alive, only Uni' (Levin and Trigell 2014, 154).I call this a reverse 'God is dead' statement.Chip is speaking to the crisis he recognises as though he is pointing to the elephant in the room.Nietzsche's madman searches for God in a marketplace with a lantern in broad daylight and gets mocked for it.Upon someone shouting at him that God is dead, the madman declares that it is us humans who have killed him.He now asks how we shall deal with this scenario, having the blood of the murderer of all murderers on our hands (Nietzsche 1974).However, in This Perfect Day, it is the people who are dead in a symbolic sense, and it is God, namely UniComp, who has killed them.Can a machine created by man have the blood of all of humanity on its mechanical hands?Is this symbolism for humanity's self-destructive nature or is it a warning that if left unchecked, the appeal to technological innovation can destroy the world?I'd argue that it is the latter; technology and the power it hands over to people can be enticing and deceptive.Hence, I agree with Nietzsche, Heidegger and some of the bioconservatives.There is a nihilistic world-view hidden beneath all the glamour that envelops technology and rather than it always amplifying the good in us, we must stay weary of it.
Furthermore, there are similarities to the moment Zarathustra came down from his mountain to teach the people about his new-found wisdom he obtained from living and studying on his own.As opposed to the people truly listening to what Zarathustra is saying, he realises that he is easily misunderstood.So, Zarathustra becomes downtrodden and reconsiders what he is doing in the village and thus he feels a deep loneliness, emotionally and intellectually (Nietzsche 2020a).Not only does Braidotti encourage the individual to remove ignorance in favour of knowledge of the world and to educate oneself (Braidotti 2019), but so do Zarathustra and Chip.Chip went through a long period of studying, learning and discussion with his fellow Family rebels.After this, he went to his supervisor to talk to him about what Uni really is and how the Family is being controlled.However, Chip merely got a worried look and an answer that indicates that he does not care (Levin and Trigell 2014).This is reminiscent of the villagers from Thus Spoke Zarathustra; they would rather he either become the Overhuman for them and lead them, and if not, they'd like to go on and watch the acrobat's show (Nietzsche 2020a).In other words, they would like to get on with their lives if Zarathustra is not entertaining or interesting enough.In Chip's case, he is not obedient enough and too resembling of a Sick, hence the non-willingness from his supervisor to listen.Interestingly, however, it is this opposition which pushes Chip's development.
To continue, after Chip's treatment, he was subservient for quite some time.However, he remembers Lilac.He dreams of memories and wishes to remember more of his feelings for her.However, he does not want to rebel against Uni any longer (Levin and Trigell 2014).The protagonist from 1984 had a similar experience only that it ended the story for the reader there (Orwell 1987).In that sense, This Perfect Day has a more adequate understanding of human nature as displayed through Chip.We are constantly failing, learning and re-shaping ourselves.This is interesting with regards to Nietzsche's amor fati.Here, Chip embraces his love for Lilac and refuses to get treatments to remember her more deeply.It is love which leads him out of subservience to Uni and the eternal sameness of the Family.This pulling together and tearing apart was adopted by Nietzsche and originally came from Empedocles and it is that which Chip experiences; eternal love and strife (Kaag 2020).Arguably, Chip enacts this love in an absolute but also paradoxical sense.He is aware that he doesn't want to break any more rules and fears consequences.Nonetheless, his love for Lilac is true.Finally, it is this Dionysian aspect in Chip which overtakes his spirit, leading him to rebel against Uni, the Apollonian.Yet, it is the Dionysian which brings him to rape Lilac.Hence, the destructive and intoxicating effects of Dionysus (Nietzsche 1968) that awaken within Chip which must be dealt with accordingly.The calculated, objective and calm in him, being the Apollonian, is mostly being left behind since his escape to Liberty and is only used to plan the destruction of Uni.
Chip planned long before he could reach Liberty with Lilac.In the meantime, he had further Nietzschean realisations.While he manipulated his treatments so he could think and feel freely, Chip started to realise how pathetic the existence of the members really is.He observes a sad sameness about all of them (Levin and Trigell 2014).Not only is this reminiscent of some of the warnings of Zarathustra mentioned from 'On the Tarantulas', but also, this sameness appears eternal to Chip.Every day is the same, the people appear similarly, smile and work the same way, eat, sleep, have sex in the same manner, and so on.The eternal recurrence appears to Chip in this moment, where he possesses an outsider's perspective upon the endlessly, same re-occurring lives of the Family.The eternal recurrence thus becomes a tool of a narrative that Chip is establishing about himself.Here, that which Nietzsche suggested is impossible to do in real life (Stegmaier 2011), can be used for literary purposes.Chip realises that he used to be like his girlfriend from the Family and it fills him with dread.
In addition, one can relate this to the planning-ahead of philosophical posthumanism.Initially, this might be reminiscent of transhumanism.As established, Nietzsche was critical of the employment of science and technology.What is the connection here then, without repeating Sorgner's misinterpretation?Arguably, the eternal recurrence suggests that we should not dwell on the past and focus on ourselves in the present.Philosophical posthumanism suggests that we should stay with the trouble (Haraway 2016) as we find it in our contemporary times and establish grounds of discussion and activism to enable change (Braidotti 2019).My argument is that Chip embodies a spiralling forward motion; one which is not only circular in that he is constantly reinventing himself but also a motion in which he has a particular motive moving forward while accepting what is being given to him by the circumstances.He thus tries to deal with issues according to how he can in the moment, knowing he will develop new ideas.This can be closely observed through his planning of the destruction of UniComp on Liberty; a plan which constantly changes, ideas get added and removed over a period of 2 years (Levin and Trigell 2014).Chip's posthumanist affirmation to life and his wish to become an authentic individual coalesce here.
This, however, poses a normative issue where if one chooses to be educated in a practical way in terms of life affirming philosophies, one also rejects the reason for doing so in the first place.One overcomes one ideology in order to live by another.This is an issue on can develop in another article perhaps, but here is a starting point; Nietzsche himself wrote that to educate oneself, one must reject that which came before (Most 1965).Now that Chip is free at the end of his struggle with UniComp and Wei, he no longer has to affirm life in opposition to a totalitarian form of it.Thus, he has reached a new level of personal autonomy which grants him more practical-philosophical life choices.This could be a new start for Chip where a new context gives him new possibilities to live his life by given new ideological and material conditions.That is also what lies at heart of my existential-posthuman idea of the spiralling motion forward; an endless renewing of conditions of life to potentially find new starting points which could offer more life affirming ways of existence.

Summary, Weiism and the Spiralling Motion Forward
To conclude, this paper aimed at establishing the fundamental differences between the transhumanist's posthuman and the Nietzschean Overhuman.During this argumentation, it became clear that the Nietzschean Last Human shares many similarities with the transhumanist's posthuman.Thus, the question regarding the Overhuman was made again: in what sense is the Overhuman also a posthuman?The philosophical posthumanist's posthuman is closest to the Overhuman.
The close reading of Ira Levin's This Perfect Day helped in arguing for this in a literary manner.The antagonist, Wei, made for a detailed marker of some of the troublesome sides to transhumanism: the tendency to totalitarianism, its self-perceived non-theism which appears as more of a moral-religious system, the abuse of tools such as mind numbing and hormone inhibiting drugs to force a transhumanist's notion of happiness on all of humanity and the problem-solving attitude with which all of life is approached.Thus, the comparison between Wei and the Last Human becomes justified as both are oppressive in their education of how to be the best version of the human.Hence, Wei, in his transhumanist illusions of grandeur, sees himself as the perfected version of the immortal human.He is, figuratively and in praxis, the model for the Last Human.This stands in argumentative opposition to Sorgner's claims that Nietzsche would have been a transhumanist because if the Last Human is a model for the transhuman, then the Overhuman, as its intended counter-term, is something entirely different.Hence, my argument that Weiism is a totalitarian form of transhumanism and that Wei is the final product of the Last Human.
Through using the protagonist, Chip, as an example for philosophical posthumanism, its ethos and intentions as a practical philosophy turn into a hermeneutical and experimental tool.This philosophy and the character become intertwined.This is used to explain Chip's dynamic and constantly developing characteristics.In combination with some of Nietzsche's ideas, my reading of Chip as a posthuman becomes nuanced.The idea of love as seen through amor fati and the eternal recurrence as a literary-narrative tool helped in framing Chip's coming of age.I argue that by making this connection in my thesis, this makes amor fati a posthumanist narrative tool.In addition, Chip embarks on an individualistic journey of self-discovery outside the influence of UniComp.Given that his individualism inevitably leads him to make mistakes, there is much room for him to develop.This paints him as an Overhuman and his posthumanist approach, which is everdiversifying.Finally, the idea of the endless, forward spiral paints an existentialist-posthumanist image of constantly reinventing oneself in the present in consideration of the future.Thus, this is my contribution to philosophical posthumanism as a literary, radically practical, and existentialist philosophy with a focus on temporality in opposition to the transhumanist's nihilism.

Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Data Availability Statement
Non-digital data supporting this study are curated at James Joyce Library at University College Dublin (Dublin), Universitaetsbibliothek Freiburg at University of Freiburg (Freiburg im Breisgau), and Learning Centre at University of Luxembourg (Esch Belval) as well as data in possession of the author through commercial means.