External, non-governmental resistance in relation to interstate war: an analytical framework

ABSTRACT The Russian war against Ukraine in February 2022, unleashed an unprecedented wave of non-governmental, external resistance directed against Russia. In many ways, previous literature on war and resistance does not capture the characteristics of this phenomenon. Besides noting the presence of civilian war protests outside of the warzone, most research has focused on internal resistance during war. In this article, we draw on a wider array of resistance literature and present an analytical framework that allows us to capture the broad elements of non-governmental, external resistance during war – including the power-resistance nexus at work. The analytical framework sorts the various kinds of resisters, it categorises the form of resistance and the targets pursued. The usefulness of the analytical framework is demonstrated through an exploration of empirical examples and illustrations drawn from media reports gathered during the first 10 days of the war in Ukraine. It is concluded that new analytical tools are necessary in order to capture non-governmental, external resistance during war as it is waged in Europe in the 2020s.


Research problem and theoretical contribution
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought full-scale war to Europe.In a comprehensive and coordinated attack, the state of Ukraine was invaded by Russia from several different directions, with the apparent aim of destroying the state altogether.Warfare in 2022 may follow the same military strategic principles as it did in the 1990s and even before this, but we argue in this article that the unfolding of events brought an unprecedented array of non-governmental external resistance that is difficult to capture using available analytical tools.In this article, it is argued that this novel aspect of war in the international system can be captured through the concept of External, Non-governmental Resistance during interstate war.Resistance in war is usually regarded from the perspective of the internal, domestic context of the state in question (Thurber 2019, Svensson andFinnbogason 2021).This literature focuses on internal resistance towards either the war itself, the occupying military power, or different forms of guerrilla warfare (Idler et al. 2015, Brissette 2016, de Almeida Teles 2017, Johnson 2020).Another strand of literature, located largely within peace studies, covers external support for civil resistance movements within states that may suffer from intrastate war (Dudouet 2017, Chenoweth andStephan 2021).Its focus is often upon long-term support for regime change, involving both external non-governmental and governmental efforts.The effects are diverse, in the case of major powers with strategic interests in the state concerned, the involvement may be negative for civil resistance movements (Kalin et al. 2022).
The external society reacted rapidly with expressions of opposition against Russia, whether as individuals, consumers, participants in civil society, or company managers.This is here conceptualised as resistance.Resistance is usually defined as a conscious action aimed at protesting/and or changing something that is considered illegitimate or unjust.The motivations may have differed, from sympathy to economic concerns and self-interest, but taken together, the civic resistance created a dynamic that reveals a societal power relation (compare Foucault 1982) in opposition to Russia that has not been given much attention in relation to interstate war in the international system.This is quite strange given that war is the most violent example of attempts at social change (compare Lilja and Vinthagen 2014).When it comes to the actions of external governments imposing sanctions and attempting to affect the course of the war in various ways (a form of public resistance), there is already considerable literature (Lektzian andPatterson 2015, McCormack andPascoe 2017).
The theoretical contribution of this article consists of the introduction of an analytical framework that allows for analysing several different types of actors at the same time, identifying their different forms of resistance action and the basic character of their resistance.The pilot application conducted suggests that resistance collects a very broad array of different actors, seemingly uncoordinated, it takes the form of actions previously unknown, and demands for organisation and leadership are less than could be expected.The dynamic of this concert of resistance is undoubtedly of great importance for the study of international relations.

Purpose
Our purpose is to provide an analytical framework that is able to capture and characterise external, non-governmental resistance and the power-resistance nexus at work in relation to interstate war in the international system.There is a relationship between resistance and power, which can be seen as mutually constitutive (Foucault 1982, Lilja andVinthagen 2014).In this article, we narrow the definition of resistance down somewhat, focusing upon resistance as civic (re)actions against the sovereign power and domination undertaken by Russia.Our contribution is that we do not only turn to the domestic context of Ukraine to find resistance.We show that the nexus of resistance to Russia's power is broader than previous literature has envisaged, it is entangled with and incorporates large parts of the Western society outside of Ukraine (and Russia).Attention is directed towards resistance that was manifested during the first 10 days following the Russian attack on Ukraine, from 24 February 2022 to 5 March 2022.This focus is motivated by the character of the event -a struggle against an attempt at social and political domination such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine is something that requires quite an immediate response of resistance (compare Foucault 1982, Lilja 2018).
In constructing the analytical framework, we draw on literature from resistance studies set primarily in a non-war context.We define external resistance as resistance originating from outside of the territory of the warring parties.Non-governmental means that the resistance is civic, not expressed by state representatives or state authorities.Although the productive effects of this resistance (compare Lilja 2022) may never be fully determined, and it is certainly not the object of this article, it is important to capture the unfolding of events and in particular the key aspects that may exert an influence upon the context of warfare and in the end, the outcome of the conflict.

Research design
The application should be regarded as a pilot and a plausibility probe (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999).In this context, a few words need to be directed at the value of the empirical illustration.The interstate war between the industrialised states Russia and Ukraine, both located in the Northern Hemisphere, can be seen as an uncommon feature in the post-World War context.One might therefore question its usefulness as a pilot for exploring external, non-governmental resistance.It may be that this case is something of an anomaly when it comes to the unique support that Ukraine has received.However, it can also be indicative of an increasing conflict dynamic between the so-called West on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other.Another such conflict line -that has the potential to reach similar external civic resistance reactions -is the one between Israel and Palestine, which was intensified in 2023.Here, the presence of diaspora and the links to religious communities in the Middle East, Europe and the United States has the potential to create a potent power-resistance nexus on both sides.The highly mediated case of the Israel/Palestine conflict has been analysed by Wajner (2019) as a battle for legitimacy although this analysis was neither framed as a case of resistance nor separated between civic and public elements in the case at hand: the Gaza flotilla in 2010.Other cases, such as the conflict between China and the United States over Taiwan, might not generate as much attention.

Disposition
The article is organised in the following manner: first, we review previous literature on resistance in war, concluding that its focus has mainly been on internal resistance.We then look to the wider literature on resistance and argue that this can be useful for understanding external, non-governmental resistance and the power-resistance nexus at work.This section is succeeded by a methods and material section, where we introduce and operationalise the key components of the analytical framework proposed, including its levels of analysis.The article then moves forward to empirically illustrate the framework.We conclude by discussing the findings, contributions as well as limits of the analysis, including the need for further research.

Previous research on war and resistance
The literature on war and resistance has largely focused on internal resistance against war in which the state is involved and/or against an occupying force in the resisters' own state.It covers everything from soldiers' mother's protests, draft resistance and civilian peace movements to guerrilla warfare (Eichler 2006, Managhan 2007, Idler et al. 2015, Brissette 2016, de Almeida Teles 2017, Glaßel et al. 2020, Johnson 2020, Svensson and Finnbogason 2021).For example, this research has addressed the importance of social ties for civil resistance (Thurber 2019); how the mobilisation of internal resistance has been used as a state-building strategy (Rodriguez 2011); how war was coped with by the people through both resistance and adaptation during occupation (Evjen and Lehtola 2020), and feminist activism during war (Eichler 2006, Cárdenas andHedström 2021).An alternative, more top-down perspective on internal resistance has been provided by Conway (2008) who analyses the state's response to war resisters as gendered.
When it comes to the research on external resistance against war in other countries, the dominant strand of literature focuses on civilian protest and demonstrations against war and for peace (Such et al. 2005, Peng 2008, Kakizaki 2011, Browne et al. 2019).Media framing is central to many of these analyses.Sometimes, this literature shows that the media come to frame resistance as dangerous.In the case of Browne et al. (2019), this has to do with the resisters being seen as drawing attention to troop movements, whereby security risks are created.Walgrave and Verhulst (2009) address whether external protests are affected by the government's position on the war in question, and they find that it is.Also, opposition, public opinion and media framing affect protests.There is also literature on a broader feminist resistance against war and militarism, which relates this to opposition to several interconnected systems of oppression (Pratt 2012).
Among researchers focusing on external resistance towards interstate war, Kakizaki (2011) makes a greater effort to contextualise resistance efforts against a specific war, focusing on the protests in Turkey against the Second Iraq War.Kakizaki identifies the actors who are active (political parties, trade unions, professional associations and civil organisations) and the forms the action takes (public statements, public meetings, marches, signature collection, submission of signature lists, petitions, strikes, symposia, hunger strikes, boycotts, Friday prayers).This study also exemplifies forms of symbolic action, which include distributing roses to passers-by, planting trees for peace, spreading red ink about the streets, reciting anti-war poems and shooting fireworks at the United States embassy symbolising missiles (Kakizaki 2011).While this analysis is important, it covers only one country and mixes governmental and non-governmental initiatives.This article is able to collect a broader set of examples around two decades later -in a setting where information technology and globalisation have achieved a greater spread and a potentially different power-resistance nexus in the digital realm.Our findings suggest that external non-governmental resistance has adopted less of a symbolic character and more the character of action aiming to directly influence the occupying state.A minor amount of the research takes other perspectives, for example, Rodgers and Ingram (2014) studied the counter-culture that grows among marginalised communities in Canada as a consequence of their joint resistance against war (in particular the Vietnam War).Given the reports of such a wide range of resistance efforts being undertaken in relation to the war in Ukraine, current literature on resistance and war seems too limited, failing to capture the relational power-resistance nexus spurred by globalisation and the information society.
Moving beyond war, the wider resistance literature was initially largely focused on work-life.From the writings of Scott (1990Scott ( , 2008)), who studied peasants' resistance, to the organisation of unions during industrialisation in the West (Hollander and Einwohner 2004).Scholars -often drawing on Foucault -have recognised the interconnected nature between power and resistance.Foucault (1981, p. 92) argues that power must be understood in a comprehensive, relational manner, as it originates from everywhere.
in the first instance [it must be understood] as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them, as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system […] This understanding of power allows it to manifest in different ways.Foucault (1981, pp. 95-96) discusses resistance as something that is present in all power relationships.
[…] points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network.Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary.Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by definition, they can only exist in the strategic field of power relations.Lilja and Vinthagen (2014) have developed an analysis of this relationship, arguing that different forms of power (sovereign power, disciplinary power and biopower) produce different forms of resistance.They also point out that this dynamic interaction is often connected to processes of social change.The temporalities of resistance also differ in relation to different forms of power (Lilja 2018).Lilja and Vinthagen writes: Sovereign power stops and limits certain behaviour.Often this form of power involves a dramatic show of force, the use of examples, violent punishing and even extreme pain.It is the kind of power that does not accept any public dissent […] it creates subordinate subjects.(2014, p. 112) They discuss whether resistance against sovereign power is even possible.However, they find that resistance … becomes a matter of breaking such commands or repressions; that is, doing what is illegal or doing things for deviant interests and circumventing, undermining the sovereignty of power centres.[…] Resistance is, in a corresponding way, typically openly defiant and challenges through rebellions, strikes, boycotts, disobedience and political revolutions, by overthrowing kings, governments and regimes, with the attempt of ever more clever applications of violence, counter-power and strategies of power play.(2014, p. 113) It seems more or less taken for granted that resistance towards such sovereign power should take place in an internal context, as we also show above in relation to the literature on resistance in relation to war.What we argue here is that the power-resistance nexus spurred by Russia's invasion of Ukraine cannot be limited to the warring parties.The empirics tell us differently.We lose knowledge of the dynamics of war and the power-resistance nexus at work if we limit the analysis to the internal, domestic context.Therefore, the analytical framework aims at capturing resistance toward sovereign power in a broader fashion than previous literature.What we call external, non-governmental resistance can also challenge sovereign power.
A considerable amount of literature has been directed at resistance in relation to organisations; by leaders, by members of the organisation and by the organisation itself (Prasad andPrasad 2000, Erkama 2010).This has produced different typologies for analysing resistance (Courpasson 2017, Mumby et al. 2017).Societal resistance has also received an increasing amount of attention.As the organisation of people into political parties and unions is decreasing in many Western states (Putnam 2000), people are likely to channel their engagement into other arenas.This literature has also noted that political and social transformation and change spur counter-resistance -a form of evidence of social conflict (Strid 2018, Alvinius andHolmberg 2023).The next section looks into how this broader literature on resistance can be used to analyse external, non-governmental resistance during war.

Creating and operationalising the analytical framework
The analytical framework identifies and categorises actors at different levels and their forms of resistance.It was developed in an abductive process, where empirical examples were first gathered and then sorted and conceptualised into the analytical framework.Since we are not presenting an empirical study in the traditional sense, no detailed methodological apparatus was employed to analyse the empirical material.The framework draws on different theoretical and conceptual tools that allow us to elaborate on the empirical illustrations' fit with the categories and the complexity of the various levels and forms of resistance.It comprises who conducts the resistance and in what ways.In this way, the analytical framework also illuminates the power-resistance nexus at work in relation to the particular war studied.We depart from the understanding that during interstate war it is a situation of resistance towards sovereign power that is at work, a form of anti-authority struggle.Both online and offline illustrations of resistance are brought forward.
Social science research has long studied different phenomena through levels of analysis (Singer 1961), including political science and international relations where it has been a prominent feature of the understanding of systems, or relations between the international and the national (Onuf 1995, Mingst et al. 2018).It is also common in research on leadership and organisations.Yammarino et al. (2005) point to the usefulness of categorising data into the levels of individual, group, organisation and society in order to achieve more holistic knowledge.This benefits our endeavour since the focus is on civic, external and non-governmental resistance in relation to interstate war.
First, who express and conduct the resistance -the resisters -are divided into four different levels: individual, group, organisation and meta-organisation (Ahrne and Brunsson 2005, Yammarino et al. 2005, Mingst et al. 2018).The number and types of actors involved in resistance are very broad, and they may have different relationships to the sovereign power -individuals may focus their challenge upon values, principles and feelings of solidarity with the invaded country and people.Individuals are also consumers, which gives them voice and power to challenge even sovereign powerirrespective of what formal sanctions external political governments may have decided upon.Groups and organisations consist of companies and communities that are in different ways entangled with the sovereign power, materially and immaterially through various contacts and investments.These are also strongly affected by consumers that demand certain actions from them.Meta-organisations hold a form of overarching responsibility for principles and contacts with the warring parties and summarises the opinions of member organisations.Although different resistors can be identified, the complex power-resistance nexus that they are part of can be difficult to identify, in particular when the action takes place very fast in both online and offline contexts.
Second, various forms of resistance strategies are constructed which differ when it comes to complexity, purpose and characteristics.Hirschman (1970) identifies protest (voice), exit and loyalty as strategies of resistance in an organizational context.In the context of external, non-governmental resistance towards war in the international system, protest (in social media or at physical demonstrations) and exit (exclusion, boycott) are relevant examples of resistance action.Solidarity with Ukraine -that can be symbolic/immaterial or expressed through various forms of material support -is also a possible trait that along with the other forms of action ultimately serves to undermine the power, principles and way of action pursued by Russia.Additional forms of resistance are persuasion (statements that encourage certain actions or efforts at information operations) and symbolic action.Symbolic actions were widely captured by Kakizaki (2011).Moreover, drawing on our empirical examples, we add acts of sabotage (for example cyber-attacks) and delivering of capabilities (financial aid, provision of internet access) as important actions of external resistors that target the sovereign power of Russia and may prove to exert an immense impact.
The analytical framework draws on previous distinctions regarding resistance structure, whether it is coordinated in terms of being organised or unorganised and leaderless (can be leaderless due to spontaneity but also leaderless on a more regular basis such as certain internet communities) or leader-led.Although external non-governmental resistance may take place over a longer period of time, we primarily view the resistance against war in the international system as a form of extraordinary resistance rather than everyday resistance (i.e.Johansson and Vinthagen 2016).The resisters are spread globally and act both independently and as a collective.The target of resistance is the war, the aggressor/ occupying force or to deliver material and/or immaterial support to the state that is attacked.
involve any explanatory function, the collection of empirical material has been uncontrolled and explorative.It took place during the first 10 days of the war in Ukraine, between 24th February 2022 and 5th March 2022.Focus on this period is motivated by the form of resistance we are looking for, which can be expected to be characterised by a certain form of temporality.Lilja (2018), drawing upon Foucault, argues that resistance against the power of domination is usually characterised by rapid action in the form of transversal anti-authority struggles.
As noted in the introduction, we rely on news media articles that report on what we have defined as external, non-governmental resistance against -in this case -the war in Ukraine.We rely on traditional, western media outlets focusing on English-speaking European sources such as BBC News, Sky News, The Guardian and The Independent.We also include Nordic News Media, focusing on Swedish press such as Dagens Nyheter (DN), Svenska Dagbladet (SvD), Aftonbladet and Expressen.Social media was also used to draw our attention to both online and offline resistance.Where relevant, Facebook posts by civil society institutions, business corporations and celebrities were collected and used to find sources to refer to.
The proximity principle can be used as motivation for the selection of material.The purpose was to collect as many empirical examples as possible during a short period of time.Media -both traditional and new -is a common source of empirical material when it comes to resistance studies of this type.At the same time, media framings of war can be criticised for being sensational and subjective.Here, it is important to note that media reports provide us only with examples of resistance, we do not draw on the media analyses themselves.One obvious limitation of the exercise is that it provides a European perspective.We are aware of the risk of spreading propaganda when the research process takes place during an ongoing war, and have tried to avoid this (i.e.Gerber and Zavisca 2016, Oates 2016).We have searched electronic media databases with the help of the Google search engine, using keywords such as Ukraine, Russia, war, protest, demonstration, boycott and resistance in different combinations.

Empirical illustrations: external, non-governmental resistance during the Russian war against Ukraine
In order to understand non-governmental resistance, we sorted it into different levels (Singer 1961, Yammarino et al. 2005): individual, group, organization and meta-organization.Through an iterative process, we could discern various types of resisters and place them at different levels.Similar steps were taken for resistance strategies, where two distinct groups could be crystallised, namely levels of action and levels of coordination.Admittedly, there may be some overlap.For instance, hacker resistance may manifest both at the group and individual levels.Otherwise, the other categories serve as indicators of the types of actors at the different levels we have chosen.These actors then choose among the various types of resistance strategies and act either in an organised or unorganised manner, with leaders or without.In this way, we believe we obtain a holistic picture of the resistance against the war in Ukraine in its early days.Below, empirical illustrations are provided and sorted according to the framework (Figure 1).

Individual resistance
Social media influencers and celebrities in sport, art and culture all over the world have strongly manifested their condemnation of Putin's war in Ukraine (Dagens Nyheter 27 February 2022b, Aftonbladet 2022).Raising awareness of political issues and taking a stand against injustice is not unusual among celebrities and individuals who function as opinion leaders (i.e.Click et al. 2017).Posts on Twitter, Instagram, Facebook and blogs are typical examples where discontent with war is expressed, and these messages become freely available to the public.Individuals use their different powers of influence to resist Russian actions and express solidarity with Ukraine's people and principles of international law.
Famous individuals express their discontent on social media and target Russia through protest, persuasion and encouragement for boycotts (Aftonbladet 2022).Other examples include resourceful business leaders who counter Russia's power exhibition by donating humanitarian aid out of their own wealth (Expressen 2022a).Resistance at the level of individuals is primarily to do with an information campaign against the war, it is visible, largely unorganised and with relatively low risk of consequence.The resources available to individuals vary.Many may contribute with information and persuasion among their small community, and donate small amounts of aid (that may be important, too).Others have a great number of followers and can influence them extensively.The same goes for financial aid.Irrespective of the level of resources available, individual resistance targets are action-oriented and emotion-oriented and seem to achieve much acceptance.The Swedish Red Cross reported that it had not collected as much money in one day since the Tsunami disaster in 2004 (Dagens Nyheter 25 February, 2022a).
The impact of the power-resistance nexus at work at the individual level probably works largely to inspire and strengthen the resistance within the external audience.It creates a dynamic that has the potential to spur resistance at the group and organisational levels.In retrospect, it is clear that Ukrainian public communication has picked up and highlighted particularly famous individual resistance and used it as a means to draw attention to the Ukrainian cause or inspire internal resistance.Resistance at the individual level is about courage and there may be risks involved, depending on the context in which it is expressed.However, individual resistance, as mentioned, is a crucial catalyst and symbol, where individuals sometimes take a stand in this conflict, even at the risk of their own lives.

Group resistance
The war in Ukraine spurred several examples of external, non-governmental groups that expressed and practiced resistance toward Russia.Both organised and unorganised groups of people joined together physically and virtually in order to protest the war.Civic resistance through protests against war has a long history (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, Vinthagen 2015, Croissant et al. 2018, Chenoweth 2020).Public protests took place in major cities across the world.Media reported both smaller and larger crowds of people expressing sympathy for Ukraine, demanding that Russia stop the war (BBC 2022a, 2022b, Dagens Nyheter 2022b).Civic resistance through protests is an important signal to politicians on both sides of a conflict, including outside of the warring parties.For example, Germany's radical shift in deciding to go from not exporting/giving weapons to warring parties to doing so in the case of Ukraine was followed by a 100,000 people-strong manifestation in support of Ukraine in Berlin (Dagens Nyheter 2022b).
One more unconventional example of groups that expressed and practiced resistance during the Russian War on Ukraine is hacker collectives.During the first days of the war, the hacker collective Anonymous declared a "Cyber War" against the Russian Government on X (formerly Twitter) (Independent 2022a).Anonymous appears unorganised and relatively leaderless -it communicates on X but does not seem to want to perform in media interviews, nor does it necessarily claim responsibility for attacks.Its resistance is both open in that it is declared, and at the same time covert in that it operates hidden and in "private", it encourages individuals to perform certain actions, while at the same time, nobody controls who is performing these hacker attacks -anyone can join the collective.The targets of the group were said to be Russian state official websites and statecontrolled media, which, according to the Anonymous X post, should be prevented from providing the Russian people with censored, state-controlled information.The group also said that it would work to provide internet in Ukraine (The Guardian 2022a).Different media reported that Russian Government homepages and state-controlled media Russia Today did suffer from disturbances caused by DDoS, or Distributed Denial of Service, but it cannot be confirmed who was behind these attacks (Vice 2022).At the same time, there were reports of a different hacker group, named "Cyber Partisans" group, working from inside Belarus to disturb the Russian occupation by slowing down trains that transport Russian forces to the front (Independent 2022b).According to The Independent, Anonymous had stated that it was avoiding "critical infrastructure such as nuclear plants or traffic control systems" (Independent 2022c).
The resistance of hacker groups can be analysed as targeting Russian sovereign power both through actions of sabotage and through exercising a form of cyber defence capability.It is of course difficult, if not impossible, to determine the effect of civil, nongovernmental hacker groups in war, neither is this the object of this article.However, what we can do is these actions as a form of resistance against the Russian War against Ukraine.The actions and capabilities of the hacker groups, assuming that they are behind the attacks that they have said to target, are also similar to the military cyber capabilities possessed by governments.Consequently, their impact is potentially powerful and interesting to study as a form of civilian, non-governmental force of resistance that appears to be guided by the overall resentment characterising the West's reactions to Putin and sympathy towards Ukraine.As such, it has the potential to engage people against the target of its resistance.Also, anyone in the world with sufficient competence and access to IT equipment can participate.It is an interesting power-resistance nexus that truly illustrates the power of globalisation and information technology and the influence it can give individuals and groups.However, the interest in this form of resistance can easily diminish while attention is diverted to other issues.Therefore, it is difficult to determine its impact long term.Group resistance can be organised as well as unorganised.It can also have leaders or not, unlike individual actors who operate alone to express their protests.The degree of organization and the presence of leaders can also determine whether the resistance can be more enduring or not, and whether resources can be allocated to it or not.

Organisational resistance
Private companies joined the massive resistance efforts.Withdrawing businesses from Russia can be seen as undermining its power globally in a direct way while strengthening Ukraine undermines Russian power and military action in Ukraine more indirectly.Several examples can be drawn from the financial sector, including MasterCard and Visa.Media reported that both these companies would block transactions with certain financial institutions in Russia and also give humanitarian aid to Ukraine (Reuters 2022a).A broad array of companies in different sectors: including Apple, Boeing, Volvo, Scania, Jaguar, Nike and others also reported that they would halt operations in Russia and stop delivering spare parts to Russia, and equipment needed to sustain their products (SVT 2022, Guardian 2022b).The civic pressure upon companies to resist Russia and act through protest, boycott and withdrawal from Russian markets was probably great.The first 10 days of the war saw a constant line of media reports covering business decisions regarding Russia.In this context, granting some form of financial aid to Ukraine also became a form of corporate social responsibility.This form of external resistance became the norm that was expected of companies, an influential part of the power-resistance nexus in the external, non-governmental sphere.However, as was later seen, this may develop into a risk if the Russian regime chooses to seize foreign assets in the country.
Interestingly, in many cases, large private tech companies such as Meta, SpaceX and Apple have been called upon directly by the Ukrainian government with requests for practical support (BBC 2022a, Reuters 2022b).This illustrates that the divide between non-state and state actors in the power-resistance nexus was not clear-cut.This can be seen as an illustration of the impact of the private sphere.The potentially powerful effects of private companies' direct resistance actions in relation to information technology could be regarded as indications that the internet is, for the first time, a key frontline player in the waging of war (compare BBC 2022a).Many private-company actions concern managing capabilities and access to the internet.In addition to the controlling and blocking of content online and in media, however, there are also examples of cases where private companies have chosen to keep their platforms open in an effort to facilitate resistance in repressed states.This was the argument used regarding the platforms Facebook and Instagram in Russia, despite Ukrainian requests to lock them down (BBC 2022a) -they were seen as a resource undermining the power of the Russian state.However, later Russia shut them down.
A particularly interesting case also concerns the direct provision of internet availability to Ukraine by a private company, SpaceX.Media reported that the Ukrainian government called upon SpaceX CEO Elon Musk asking him on X (formerly Twitter) to secure internet availability over Ukraine through his company's Starlink satellite broadband.Musk answered in affirmative, and, according to reports, receivers were on the ground in Ukraine within days (BBC 2022a, Reuters 2022b).This action must be regarded as an unprecedented provision of a central capability (useful for both civilians and the military) to a warzone, by a civilian actor.It may be analysed as a form of expression of solidarity with Ukraine and resistance towards the Russian government by an external, non-governmental organisation.The impact of the internet provided by SpaceX is reported to be important over a year after the war started.Cultural organisations also joined the resistance.For example, PEN International collected signatures from over 1000 writers worldwide in a protest effort aimed at expressing solidarity with Ukraine and targeting Russia's government (PEN International 2022).Several movie production companies reported that they would not release their new films in Russia.Many also donated financial aid to humanitarian organisations working in Ukraine (BBC 2022b(BBC , 2022c)).Since all the examples in this section are organisations, they are apparently organised and led by leaders that act on behalf of the organisations.Their resources are usually extensive and, as discussed above, the risk associated with not resisting may be larger than the risk that comes from resisting -at least when it comes to businesses.
In our conclusion and from a Foucauldian perspective, organisations wield a certain power in their ability to protest against the war in Ukraine.Foucault's notion of power extends beyond traditional hierarchical structures and emphasises the dispersed and relational nature of power.In this context, organisations can exert power through discourse, shaping and influencing public opinion, framing the narrative surrounding the conflict.These organisations act as discursive agents, participating in the construction of knowledge and influencing the way individuals perceive the war.They may utilise various channels, such as media, public statements and advocacy, to articulate their dissent and mobilise support against the war.

Meta-organisational resistance
Meta-organisations are a form of organisation that consists of cooperating organisations that together form a new, formal organisation in which cooperating organisations are members.Through their members' power and resources, meta-organisations are influential when it comes to joint issues within their operational fields (Ahrne andBrunsson 2005, Berkowitz andDumez 2016).Examples of meta-organisations include the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA).These have all exercised resistance by protesting and adopting sanctions against Russia.Although these organisations are closely associated with states in that their member organisations represent the nation relation to music and sports (and some countries may finance these corporations or organisations using state funds), we argue that they are primarily regarded as part of civil society and therefore should be considered non-governmental actors.
In the case of Russia's war against Ukraine, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) acted decisively on two occasions.On 27 February, it issued a statement covering initial sanctions against Russia.After pressure from several member organisations, it was unanimously decided that all football-related exchanges with Russia would cease (FIFA 2022).Two days later Russia was excluded entirely from all football events (Newsweek 2022).In addition, the Champions League, F1's Russian Grand Prix was cancelled and Russia's participation in the European music competition Eurovision Song Contest was banned (BBC 2022b).The symbolic action of these meta-organisations within culture and sports is a powerful act of resistance.Resistance is manifested through protest, boycott, exclusion and prohibition.It is leader-led and organised, and well visible in media reports and on organisation websites.Although symbolic in character, resistance of this kind may undermine the power and status of the sovereign, in particular in the long term, if the internal constituency is affected.However, in the case of Russia, considerable propaganda is most likely able to divert attention from these issues among the public.In our conclusion, meta-organizations often play a key role in sustaining the momentum of a protest.Their coordination efforts can help prevent fragmentation and internal conflicts within the protest movement.By fostering collaboration and unity among participating organisations, meta-organisations contribute to the endurance of the protest, ensuring that it remains a potent force over time.

Concluding discussion
Barely had the world recovered from the Covid-19 pandemic before a war of major proportions broke out because Russia invaded the sovereign state of Ukraine on Thursday 24 February 2022, causing a humanitarian crisis and thousands of dead people.Western governments responded strongly through political and economic measures that will no doubt be covered at length in IR literature.However, what struck us as academics in the field of political science and sociology, having devoted the past five years to analysing various forms of resistance, was the immense amount of external, non-governmental resistance expressed very rapidly after the initial attack.This turn of events disrupted knowledge produced in previous literature, which had largely focused on internal resistance during war, and in the case of external resistance, on public demonstrations and media framing of the war.The purpose of this article was therefore to provide an analytical framework that is able to capture and characterise a broader array of external, nongovernmental resistance in relation to war in the international system.
The primary contribution made by this article is that the analytical framework created has the ability to bring a broad array of actors at different levels into the analysis.In addition to who conducts resistance, the framework addresses the form of resistance.Since our ambition is to introduce an analytical framework, not to test it, we do not have to be limited to a certain level.This is always a question of concern (Onuf 1995), but we argue that focusing on actors is a way of moving forward, because actions of resistance are never conducted in a vacuum, but must be understood as departing from the level of actors in The second contribution made is drawing attention to the power-resistance nexus that a comprehensive analysis of the resistance of a broad range of actors and forms of actions constitutes.Western external, non-governmental resistance has previously not been considered a major factor in the analysis of interstate war in the international system.We argue that it is high time to consider this form of resistance seriously and acknowledge the effect it may have upon the sovereign power base of even a major state and an attacker such as Russia.Although it is difficult to determine the impact of the external resistance, the effects upon its economic ties with the West were substantial given the major withdrawals from the Russian market.Here we can see that the power-resistance nexus has implications also in the West.It quickly became difficult for Western companies to be present in Russia.Nowadays, several web pages express gratitude to companies that have severed ties with Russia, urging others to follow suit due to Russia being labelled a "terrorist country".Their message encourages businesses to align with those taking a stand against Russia and implies a moral imperative to disengage from trade relations with the country (Boycott Russia 2023).
In terms of symbolic social exclusion, the isolation of Russian sportsmen and women has continued throughout 2022 and 2023 (Reuters 2023).These implications are immaterial and difficult to assess, but given the symbolic value of particular major sports events, it is negative to the Russian self-image.External resistance may also have given power to the state under attack, in this case Ukraine.However, when it comes to the behaviour of the Ukrainian political leadership and people it is also likely that their resistance initially inspired and served as a form catalyst for the external resistance, which further complicates the power-resistance nexus.In the long term, external resistance and the financial support that follows it are likely to be important for internal resistance to continue.
We draw the conclusion that the proposed analytical framework has potential applications for understanding non-state resistance in conflicts beyond just Russia's occupation of Ukraine.At the time of writing, Hamas has attacked Israel, and resistance on various sides has flared up worldwide (BBC 2023a).Sympathies for both parties have been widespread, creating polarization globally at all levels (Politico 2023).Through our proposed analytical tool, we could in this case comprehend resistance, the actors involved, and the various strategies in a more nuanced way than before.
What explains resistance and its effects still needs to be given further attention, but we suggest that globalization and information technology have created interconnections between societies that give non-governmental actors the power to influence what has traditionally been understood as the affairs of states.The power-resistance nexus needs, however, to be triggered, and in this case, it is likely that the atrocity of the Russian full invasion of Ukraine constituted such a trigger (which was not the case in the occupation of Crimea in 2014).However, this also means that the effects of a power-resistance nexus may not be as thorough in a different context, where the target is a more secluded state whose society is not part of as many interconnections.
With the help of well-developed information technology and communication systems that have also spread at an ever-faster pace (Rosa 2013), opportunities to show resistance have been broadened, concentrated, complexified and mobilised in a very short time period.This complexification and concentration of power against a certain cause over a short time period are new in relation to and current theories of resistance in war (Eichler 2006, Rodriguez 2011, Idler et al. 2015).The analytical framework presented here contributes to researching a new form of external, intensive and fast resistance against war.Theories of resistance in organizational contexts (Hirschman 1970, Hollander and Einwohner 2004, Vinthagen 2015) have also been broadened and expanded with new knowledge, as it has been shown that this form of resistance is not limited to organizations, but are being acted out by entire societies in a war context.
A third contribution is related to how resistance in war is imagined.In previous research focused on internal, domestic resistance it is thought of as a more or less strategic endeavour driven by the internal power-resistance nexus.Judging by the illustrative examples presented here, civilian, external and non-governmental resistance appears to be very complex, surprisingly un-strategic and spontaneous.Actors who choose to express resistance have a wide range of potential actions at their disposal, depending on resources and competence.Interestingly, resistance does not need to be organised to appear to have an effect.In the case of business company boycotts, the spread seems to have possessed a dynamic of its own.The external power-resistance nexus thus appears to be more fluid and open to the unfolding of events.When it comes to hackers, once inspiration has been initiated, it does not matter that resistance is unorganised and leaderless.Resistors sometimes interact directly with the parties at war -in both directions -for instance, Ukraine contacted Elon Musk in order to persuade him to give Ukraine internet (CNN 2023), while Anonymous interacts directly with Kremlin databases in order to sabotage and expose them (BBC 2023b).This means that in the future, we need to question the utility of the division between internal and external resistance in the context of war.What constitutes an active participation in a war is a question that is up for debate.The interconnections that allow for and spur resistance may be blurring the borders between internal and external.At this stage, however, it suffices to problematise this blurring in certain areas.
External, non-governmental agents of resistance bring capabilities that are equivalent to military capabilities when it comes to cyber-warfare and satellite resources for internet provision.These acts of resistance may indeed have effectively affected the outcome of the warfare.This is a new aspect of external resistance that has become relevant given the spread of information technology in everyday life.

Methodological discussion, practical implications and suggestions for future research
Like all arguments, this one exhibits both limitations and strengths.The empirical illustrations are related to a Western context, based on media sources.It is also important to critically assess media reporting, in particular during such a heated situation.Although we use news media reporting to illustrate the framework, most of the information provided is available through first-hand sources.The proximity to Ukraine as a European state may affect the "generalisability" or usefulness of the analytical framework.What we show from a Western angle is how non-state resistance can be understood and described.Already at this stage, however, there has been criticism against the Western-oriented, disproportional attention and even racist reporting about the war in Ukraine as compared to other wars.
This article was written at the same time as the war broke out, time as a criterion is, therefore, a but also a weakness as we are not able to assess the turning of events, even in the near future.Further research is needed.Among other aspects, the model in its entirety, or in selected parts, should be applied to several contexts to study resistance in the context of war.We believe, however, that the study's greatest merit is the opportunity to make a scientific contribution to the previously understudied role of external, non-governmental resistance as a phenomenon that makes a difference during an ongoing war that generates significant humanitarian consequences.

Figure 1 .
Figure 1.Overview of the analytical framework.