Accelerating innovation for the Dutch bioeconomy transition: the case of biobased asphalt

This article explores and explains the factors affecting the development of biobased innovations for the Dutch bioeconomy transition. Qualitative analysis through semi-structured interviews and secondary data was made on Bioasphalt as a case study to extract these factors from the empirical situation. Due to the scarcity of literature on biobased innovation for the bioeconomy, this research offers a base for policy makers to position the biobased innovations into the circular economy plans. The findings show that the urgency factor associated with the circular economy implantation has negatively affected the development of biobased innovations. On a micro level, the analyzed factors will assist niche actors in accelerating their biobased solutions. Although the innovation ecosystem structure highly depends on the nature of the technology or product, studies using similar approaches will allow for the generalization of the results.


Introduction
The current climate crisis requires fundamental changes across all sociotechnical systems. The Dutch government has reacted to this by decoupling its economy from fossil fuel and adopting a circular economy model to promote the investigation of material flows across sectoral and urban dimensions. However, the ambiguity surrounding the positioning of biobased solutions into this model renders the bioeconomy a less favorable option than reinventing the industrial wheel (Rijksoverheid 2019;Taakgroep Innovatie 2019). At the same time, there is no consensus on the definition of bioeconomy, however according to the European Commission (2018, 4) strategy, the bioeconomy covers all sectors and systems that rely on biological resources, their functions and principles. It includes and interlinks: land and marine ecosystems and the services they provide; all primary production sectors that use and produce biological resources; and all economic and industrial sectors that use biological resources and processes to produce food, feed, bio-based products, energy and services.
This shift from fossil dependency to bioeconomy is known as the Bioeconomy Transition (Hermans 2018). Accordingly, the Dutch government has introduced structured policies, roadmaps, and support schemes (LNV 2007;Langeveld, Meesters, and Breure 2016;IPW and EZK 2013;Taakgroep Innovatie 2019) to set up an encouraging ecosystem for innovation, while focusing on regional networks and facilitating both top-down and bottom-up solutions to bioeconomy transition (Bosman and Rotmans 2016). These solutions have served as an innovation highway within the top Dutch priority sectors with focus on the energy and chemistry to restructure their incumbent regimes. Meanwhile, regional clusters have also been created to strengthen innovation and create enabling ecosystems to incubate niche innovations under the larger players of incumbent regimes, namely the Top Sectors Policy (IPW and EZK 2013). Simultaneously, those top sectors (i.e., energy, chemistry, and agriculture) have worked with the government to strengthen their position and weather the bioeconomy wave by having an exclusive access to niche innovations in order to avoid radical changes (Bosman and Rotmans 2016;Overbeek et al. 2016).
Regardless of the established innovation ecosystem, the ongoing government efforts have been criticized within the literature. The Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) labeled the transition process in the Netherlands as lagging and in a predevelopment stage (Hanemaaijer et al. 2014). While on the European level, an analysis of the Bioeconomy strategies (Overbeek et al. 2016) has revealed specific issues with the transition governance at the Dutch regional levels. These issues included the lack of both shared vision and networking for niche innovation resulting in a portrayal of slow transition. Additionally, Bosman and Rotmans (2016) sided with the previous reports, adding a warning from biased policies toward "vested interests" by top-sectors, along with the too ambitious goal of the transition. On a different level, local governments and municipalities play a significant role in stimulating bottom-up innovations as they are part of the regional clusters and are close to niche innovations; hence, they have the potential to accelerate the transition toward bioeconomy. However, they lack the critical mass to act solely to steer the innovation (Cramer 2020a). Similar to regional smart specialization and circular economy transition, the ecosystem required for steering biobased innovation does not necessarily exist within the same city but through regional collaboration (Lovri c, Lovri c, and Mavsar 2020; Carayannis et al. 2018;Rijksoverheid 2019). Such a set-up gives a different characterization to the bioeconomy transition due to the interactions within the transition network requiring interdependence between municipalities, provinces, national government, knowledge institutions, society and industries that may not share the same regulations, policies, goals, or culture.
The Circular Netherlands policy (IPW 2016) aims to reach 50% circular economy by 2030 and full circularity by 2050. Therefore, a revaluation of the current roles and interdependencies between actors in the transition governance is urgently required to meet the interim goals of 2030. Although the bioeconomy is central to this policy, the urgency of implementing the circular economy has negatively impacted biobased innovations as we concluded in this article. While the process of developing new technologies is dependent on several factors and unpredictable, there is a limited amount of literature that focuses on the impact of the factors affecting the development of biobased innovation in the bioeconomy context. Consequently, empirical knowledge is necessary to spur changes within the sphere of niche innovation management that should resonate in the bioeconomy transition literature.
This article analyzes the factors that affect the development of radical innovation using Bioasphalt as a case study. In the following section, we present an overview of the Transition Management, Strategic Niche Innovation, and Intermediary Agency literature that we relied on for the case analysis. These theoretical approaches have been synthesized and combined in a novel way to provide a suitable conceptual and theoretical framework to analyze the case under consideration. Section 3 demonstrates the qualitative research method used to determine the factors, and the data collection techniques and limitations. The results of the research and the in-depth analysis are then detailed in Section 4. Following the same methodology by Grin, Rotmans, and Schot (2010) we brief the history of the case study and how the Bioasphalt network was formed before we present the results. A discussion on these results from the lens of the multilevel perspective follows in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 presents the conclusion that can be drawn from our analysis and the limitations of the theoretical framework.
We aim for the factors that emerged from this research to be used by policy makers to position the bioeconomy within the circular economy plans and avoid a locked-in economy. At the same time, innovators can equally benefit from these factors to accelerate their technology and create systemic changes in the current fossil-based industries.

Transition management
The theoretical framework is based on literature from Transition Management and Strategic Niche Management albeit the addition of the intermediary agent, which is largely neglected from both theories (Cramer 2020a). The term transition implies a state of fundamental morphological changes to a system, while the management emphasises the possibility of shaping the process of changes for a desired trajectory. Due to the uncertainties, complexity, and long-term requirements that are typically associated with system transformations, the transition management concept is widely used in the transition of sociotechnical systems toward sustainable path-independent systems (Loorbach 2010). Consequently, the transition discussed in this research refers to sociotechnical systems, meaning a change of a system from one state of equilibrium to another.
The transition management theory focuses on influencing the interactions between the institutions, society, and technology to create radical societal changes and control its subsystems (H€ olscher, Wittmayer, and Loorbach 2018). Loorbach and Rotmans (2010) address sustainability governance in the definition of transition management as a process that leads to accelerated changes for sustainable transition through meta-governance. This translates into a level of complex interplay of developments between technological, economic, socio-cultural, and institutional systems (Loorbach 2007). These developments require the multiple involvement of different actors in networks with a high level of cooperation with a multi-level focus, interdependency, and social learning (Loorbach and van Raak 2006). Accordingly, it is characterized by a shift in the societal system or subsystem from one dynamic equilibrium state to a new dynamic equilibrium state. However, the progress of this process has an erratic pace and requires innovation at different parts of the system entailing structural changes (Kemp and Loorbach 2003).

Multilevel framework
The Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) framework is commonly used when analyzing green transitions or the interactions between innovation aiming at creating a sustainable shift and the other components of the relevant sociotechnical system (Smith, Voß, and Grin 2010;Gliedt, Hoicka, and Jackson 2018;Wihlborg, S€ orensen, and Olsson 2019;Markard and Truffer 2008). Based on Hoogma et al. (2002) and developed later by Geels (2005), the levels of this framework include macro, meso, and micro levels. The focus of this article is on the micro-level manifested in niche due to being the protection space for emerging innovations, which feeds on the social networks built inside this level. Investigating the niche also provides the learning processes that empower innovation for new solutions which are fundamentally different from the regime. Such innovations might have the potential to create radical systemic changes and threaten the whole sociotechnical system (Wihlborg, S€ orensen, and Olsson 2019;Markard and Truffer 2008).
Two types of niche exist at the macro level; the market niche which has different criteria from the regime; and the technological niche which is created by investments from public or private institutions (Geels 2005;Hoogma et al. 2002). On a different scale, the most impactful level is the meso, which refers to the regime and includes the social relationships, institutions, and technology. The strength of this level is derived from its contribution to the functionality of the whole system and its responsibility for stabilizing the system (Wihlborg, S€ orensen, and Olsson 2019;de Haan and Rotmans 2011). At the macro level, the landscape is the context where the other two levels operate. This landscape influences the development of both other levels in the long-term as it includes the legal system, the demography, economy, and natural environment. This power manifests itself in being the "selection environment" for technological development fueled by the intrinsic functions of its components (de Haan and Rotmans 2011;Markard and Truffer 2008;Geels 2005).

Multilevel dynamics
The dynamics of sociotechnical system changes rely on the interactions and interdependencies between its subsystems; macro, meso, and micro. These interactions result in tension, stress, and pressure powers that flow between the system's components, compromising its functioning or raison d'être, and ensuing systemic changes (Loorbach et al. 2016). These forces are positive and negative externalities that give rise to niche innovations to replace the regime through the opening of windows they create for transformations. Due to the dependence of the regime on the landscape for the flow of materials, tensions appear in different dimensions; both structural and cultural. The former type of tension manifests itself in the physical aspects of the system (i.e., infrastructure, legal system, or economy) while the cultural tension refers to conflicts in cognitive, or ideological aspects. Examples of the tension between the regime and landscape or niche and landscape can materialize in pollution, debates, protests, or changes in public opinion (Grin, Rotmans, and Schot 2010). The stress comes from within the regime and is due to its incompetence to function correctly (Loorbach and van Raak 2006;K€ ohler et al. 2019). The mismatch between the cultural and structural rules in the regime is the main driver of this force. The third force, pressure on the regime comes about from the competitive alternatives to its functioning, such as the appearance of new technologies that outperform the incumbent old technologies. This pressure is typically on the regime and originates at the niche level (de Haan and Rotmans 2011).

Strategic niche innovation
Based on Evolutionary Economy, the Strategic Niche Management theory (SNM) was developed during the last two decades of the twentieth century, ultimately to explain the management of two types of innovation. The first is social innovation with longterm transition goals as sustainable development, while the second is related to radical innovation that is barred by the other components of the sociotechnical system (Schot and Geels 2008). Kemp, Schot, and Hoogma (1998, 186) define Strategic Niche Management as the creation, development and controlled phase-out of protected spaces for the development and use of promising technologies by means of experimentation, with the aim of (1) learning about the desirability of the new technology and (2) enhancing the further development and the rate of application of the new technology.
SNM as a policy focuses on technology that promotes experiments before market niche developments, which is the main driver for the creation and development of new technologies. Strategic Niche Management theory is based on two fundamental assumptions; the first is related to the co-evolutionary nature of the emerging technologies as a social process. The second assumption relies on experiments in niches for targeted technologies and markets, which increases the various knowledge processes that are required by the innovation and facilitates the adoption of these new technologies (Hoogma et al. 2002). Schot and Geels (2008) discussed some assumptions that resonate within the SNM theory. They claim that sustainability innovations are radically different, and the selection environments (regime, and landscape) are inhomogeneous and made up of a variety of niches. Fischer and Newig (2016), and Cramer (2020a) stress the importance of the agency role in the transition and how actors orchestrate the governance of innovation to shape the transition trajectory. They exposed the inadequacies of the MLP framework for inattention to the agencies (actors) and focusing mainly on the structure (system), which challenges innovation to exploit the windows of opportunity to scale up and change the regime (Wittmayer et al. 2017).

Transition broker
On one hand, the MLP framework explains in depth the system dynamics; it provides the basis for understanding how the actors can influence these dynamics. On the other hand, transition governance is how actors can influence the transition processes (dynamics); it represents the way they organize themselves, mainly through social networking, to create solutions for changing the sociotechnical regime and generate resources for that same reason (Loorbach, Frantzeskaki, and Avelino 2017). Transition management encourages major systemic changes and creates pressure at the macrolevel through the formation of new policies and regulations. For this reason, governments play a major role in managing this process. At the same time, innovations are dependent on the market willingness to adapt new technologies (Fischer and Newig 2016;Cramer 2020b), and this is where the challenge lies for new market comers (innovation); to collaborate with the government (agent) and force the systemic changes. Therefore, the use of intermediaries in the transition process is not only logical but also inevitable to bridge the gap between the agents and create links between the ecosystem's substructures (Fischer and Newig 2016;Rauschmayer, Bauler, and Sch€ apke 2015). Accordingly, the recognized key actors are niche actors, regime actors, and intermediaries. The intermediaries, or the Transition Brokers, then act as boundary spanners for innovations through disseminating information, creating partnerships and mediating between the triple (or quadruple) helix actors on regional levels (Gliedt, Hoicka, and Jackson 2018;Cramer 2020b;Fischer and Newig 2016).

Methodology
The analysis we carried out in this research focuses on the MLP framework to derive the sociotechnical system factors that explain the development of biobased niche innovations in the asphalt industry. To trace the process of Bioasphalt development and examine its patterns, we adopted a deductive case study strategy (Yin 2014;Gerring 2017). The data collected included but was not limited to perceptions and motivations of actors in the innovation network, interactions and patterns of relationships, interdependencies, policies, funding schemes, strategies, and plans related to Bioasphalt. An exploration of a qualitative mix of subjective and objective indicators built from the empirical situation was then converted into a synthetic analysis of a single case study to deliver a comprehensive account of the innovative technology. Single case study analysis can provide a nuanced and holistic account of a specific phenomenon. This is particularly appropriate to this study given that it allows to trace the development process, examine its patterns, and test the applicability of the theoretical framework. Following Stake (1995) and Yin (2014), a single case study is appropriate to investigate an empirical phenomenon in depth considering contextual factors, particularly when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly separated. It should, however, be emphasized that case study research and analysis has been subject to a number of criticisms particularly related to the potential lack of methodological rigor and especially of external validity. Regarding methodological rigor, various authors (Stake 1995;Yin 2014;Gerring 2017) have developed systematic procedures for designing case study research. This study has followed these to ensure the use of a sound methodological approach. However, the issue of external validity and generalizability of the findings is an unresolved one in case study research. The explanatory power of a single case study analysis may be limited due to the specific circumstances and contextual factors that intrinsically characterize it. To counter this criticism, it could be argued that the objective of a single case study is not the generalizability of its findings but rather to provide an in-depth understanding of a specific phenomenon. This also relates to the differentiation between statistical and analytical generalization. A case study approach is only appropriate in relation to the latter (Gerring 2017).
Thirteen (13) semi-structured interviews were conducted to generate data for the indicators as well as general information on the case study. A list of respondents (Table 1.1) and a sample of the interview questions (Table 1.2) can be found in the online Annex. Some of the questions were repeated to different sources to collect different views, spot the discrepancies, and validate the information (Bryman 2015). Secondary data such as publications, policy documents, and national and local government strategies were also used to validate the emerging data throughout the research phases. Non-probability and purposive sampling (Bryman 2015) were central to this research, as this is particularly important in the choice of the key innovative technology. Bioasphalt was selected based on its radical characteristics and fully developed state for demonstrations (Technology Readiness Level, TRL 6). In transition management, analyzing the interdependencies and relationships between the actors requires the identification of key actors in relation to Bioasphalt inside and outside of the Circular Biobased Delta (CBBD). By including the role of agents into the analysis, it was possible to adopt a multi-actor perspective within the design of the interviews and the operationalization to find the heterogeneous relationships between the factors and the actors.
For data collection, reliance on elite sampling was made to interview actors who have a key position in the case study. From those influential actors, a snowball technique was used to reach for the rest of the network. For the sensitivity of the information and the protection of the competitive advantages of the actors, quotes and references to the interviewees were coded and completely anonymized. The interviewees were categorized as Entrepreneurs/construction companies/contractors, C1; Circular Biobased Delta Management, C2; Road Owners, C3; Incumbent Industry, C4; Knowledge Institutions, C5 (Table 1.3).

Data analysis
Interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded using the qualitative analysis software ATLAS.ti. Coding was based on the operationalization (Table 1.4) of concepts into variables and indicators (Table 1.5). These codes were mapped, categorized, and scrutinized to understand the relationships between them and identify the mechanisms and patterns of influence. During the coding, new indicators have emerged, which were grouped under the relevant variables (Table 1.6). However, the unfit codes were given a related new variable or category. To analyze the interactions between the variables, the "And query" feature in ATLAS.ti was used. This feature revealed the commonality between the variables, which assisted in understanding how the variables affect each other either negatively or positively.

Data collection limitation
The data collection phase in this research took place in summer 2020 during the pandemic of COVID-19. Therefore, three factors have affected the quantity and quality of data collected: a. All businesses and organizations were closed; some respondents expressed their struggle to keep up with the emails and phone calls. At the same time, their access to data in their offices was sometimes limited, which reflected on this research by lack of some secondary data validation. To partially mitigate this, the design of the interview questions were revised during the data collection phase to shorten the interview duration and appeal for interviewees; and the initial identification of eight TM-MLP factors affecting niche innovation were curtailed to only four. This is to allow for more in-depth analysis rather than breadth of the study. b. Data sensitivity; some actors who work directly in the innovation of Bioasphalt and the CBBD expressed reluctance to share more details about future plans of development, strategies, or the roadmap of programs to protect their competitive advantages; c. Secondary data limitation; no reliable data were found regarding bitumen imports or production levels in recent years due to the Dutch government measures for the protection of market stability.
It is worth mentioning that data collection has reached saturation after the seventh interview, probably due to the small number of actors in the network.

Historical background
4.1.1. The circular biobased delta, CBBD The Biobased Delta was formed in 2012 after the first Biobased Congress same year with an aim to support an economy revolving around the use of biomass. Biobased Delta was then funded by the Southwest Netherlands Chamber of Commerce, the Province of North Brabant, and the Province of Zeeland. This triple-helix cooperation combined several actors to promote the development of green products in the Southwest of the Netherlands and the Flanders. Two years later, this public-private partnership has matured into a registered foundation at the chamber of commerce and set specific vision and goals under the management of its new director who was also the general manager of a large multinational chemicals company.
During the years the BBD Foundation has reshaped its structure, goals, and targets. Most recently is the inclusion of a plan to align with the government policy for reaching 100% circularity by 2050 and the associated attention to the lifecycle of raw materials. This alignment has included a name change to become the Circular Biobased Delta, and the creation of an Acceleration Team to further steer innovation and cooperation. In its latest version, the ultimate goal of the CBBD is to reduce 10 mt of CO 2 emissions in the region by 2030 to support the Dutch circular economy plan for the same decade (CBBD 2014;Jongsma et al. 2020). Consequently, the interest in the use of lignin as a bio binder has gained larger momentum with the launch of a new program designed to study the development of lignin use in asphalt namely, the CHAPLIN program.

The CHAPLIN: collaboration in aspHalt applications with LIgniN
The CHAPLIN program is based on the triple helix model, uniting twenty-two partners, and eleven road test-sections listed under this programalthough some of these sections were constructed prior to the program. This overarching program has two projects running on governmental subsidies; the CHAPLIN-TKI to investigate the development of Bioasphalt technology; and CHAPLIN-XL, which has a larger subsidy to look into the Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) of Dutch lignin as the raw material for Bioasphalt.
Although none of the 22 partners is a member of the CBBD (Table 1.7), the latter has played the role of the intermediary agent between the innovation and the government to scale up the technology, and involve more actors in the network. In March 2020, CBBD met with the Rijkswaterstaat (RWS) 1 to discuss possible cooperation to allow for a demonstration section on the national roads. The expansion of this network is mainly dependent on word of mouth in official meetings and smaller personal networks established by the actors.

Bioasphalt
Bioasphalt, biobased asphalt, or lignin-based asphalt is a new product that emerged a decade ago from the labs of Wageningen University -Food and Biobased Research (WUR). Since then, WUR sought cooperation with the industry and teamed up with SMEs to take the innovation to the streets. In 2015, the first testing of lignin-based asphalt was in an industrial estate in Sluiskil, in the Kanaalzone between Terneuzen and Ghent (IIZ 2015). Following this test section, an estimated number of fifteen test sections were executed in several provinces in the Netherlands. In 2019, the CBBD has approached WUR and other actors to form the CHAPLIN program to generate resources and scale up the innovation.
According to WUR, lignin holds exceptional properties that rivals bitumen as a binder in the asphalt mix. Being a natural adhesive that gives plants its rigidity and strength, it can also give asphalt the same properties along with weatherproofing if it replaced bitumen. Not only had these properties motivated research in bio-binders but also the abundance of lignin in nature and the lower amount and quality of bitumen available every year. Most of the lignin in the Dutch and international markets is a byproduct of the pulp and paper industry and comes in the form of powder, unlike the liquid form of bitumen. Thus far, researchers have managed to replace only 50% of bitumen with lignin in the asphalt mix, and further plans exist to displace bitumen in the formula, albeit the need for further road sections to test and develop the material.
Two main patents in lignin-based asphalt mixing techniques are currently available in the Netherlands. The first is patented by WUR-AKC, which is more developed and tested on different road sections for over five years. The second is patented by WUR-TNO and still underdeveloped with no commercial use yet.
Today, most of the contractors working with Bioasphalt are SMEs with minor exceptions. Road construction experts consider lignin-based technology at its infancy stage with the oldest Bioasphalt road section built in 2015. Experts compare it to the average lifetime of bitumen-based road of 10 to 15 years therefore, only time can prove its performance before large-scale deployment.
On the other hand, the mainstreamed bitumen-based asphalt industry in the Netherlands is facing major supply disruptions. The amount of bitumen produced does not cover the need for road construction works in the Netherlands and most of it is imported from other European countries, according to experts interviewed and working in the field. Two main factors contribute to this: the depleting fossil fuel resources, and the enhanced crude oil refining technology. While the latter is supported by the oil industry to maximize their profit, the Dutch government has indirectly endorsed this by prioritizing the chemicals industry. On the technical side, better refinement of crude oil results in less quality and quantity of bitumen produced, as bitumen is a residue material of refined crude oil.

Economic and financial factors
The current amount and quality of lignin produced in the Netherlands do not meet the requirements for roadworks. Therefore, an enormous amount of bio refineries would be required in the future in the Netherlands, consequently complicating the Milieu Kosten Indicator (MKI) 2 value of the material. Hence, the investments needed in the production of lignin in the Netherlands are too high compared to the anticipated environmental benefits of using it in asphalt. As a result, reliance on the import of lignin is inevitable, which could create a vulnerability for the Dutch economy in the future.
Due to the unqualified characteristics of Dutch lignin, some Bioasphalt actors were motivated by their innovation to explore international markets. Several actors who agreed on the general potentials of lignin stated that the amount needed for even a fifty percent replacement of bitumen was not locally available. In the meantime, the pulp and paper industry that produces the largest share of Dutch lignin is burning this byproduct in return for energy. This creates a new challenge for Bioasphalt in its supply chain; to find a viable and economic alternative for the pulp industry that can cover the energy acquired from the burned lignin.
From the financial perspective, the Dutch government strategy has made use of several financial instruments and incentives to stimulate innovation in the biobased economy such as the Innovatiekrediet 3 , or Regeling Groenprojecten 4 , and the Innovatiegericht Inkopen 5 . Actors have built coalitions to fund their projects (i.e., the CHAPLIN projects) and apply for subsidies from governmental institutions like the Rijksdienst Voor Ondernemend Nederland (RVO) 6 . These subsidies led to accelerated Bioasphalt demonstrations and the evasion of the financial risks associated with loans. Interviewees who expressed the ability to access funds confirmed this even in the early formation stage of the technology. In the meantime, road owners received a modest tax reduction for making bio purchases. However, two interviewees from different categories claimed that such incentives were not motivating enough, whereas taxation on profit for Bioasphalt remained equal to bitumen-based asphalt companies.
According to Kwant et al. (2018), the Netherlands had 1,258 organizations active in the biobased economy in 2017; eighty percent of them were Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs) like most of the contractors working with Bioasphalt. Many of these profit-oriented organizations favor grants to fund their growth because they cannot afford the financial risk associated with innovation. At the same time, the CBBD does not offer any financial support, but relies on building alliances for the same cause. This suggests a lack of integrated financial schemes that encourage innovation, and a revision of interest rates and taxation is required for sustainable financial models.
The culture of circular production is gaining momentum on a global level, which is reflected on the consumers' evaluation of tenders especially in terms of Life Cycle Assessment (LCA). This trend raises doubts about the percentage of renewable resources currently used in the production of Bioasphalt. These questions remained unanswered in all the interviews. A popular explanation to this is that Bioasphalt is in its early stages of development, and more research is required to determine its LCA and MKI values. For these reasons, the CBBD created the CHAPLIN-XL program to investigate and improve the LCA of Dutch lignin. At the same time, one interviewee had plans to improve the LCA of Bioasphalt, but preferred not to discuss it in this research to protect their competitive advantage. This signals misaligned views on the development of the material between the actors.

Technical factors
With five knowledge institutions involved in the network (Table 1.8), access to knowledge is not an issue for the actors. This access to knowledge is one of the important factors for improving the technical performance of the material, as well as expanding the network as the outcomes of the experiments were used to promote Bioasphalt among road owners. While competition exists between some of the actors, they expressed their willingness to support each other in the development of Bioasphalt. They based this support on the material quality assurance, which indirectly affects their own business through the level of trust in the product by road owners. This same mutual agreement between actors applies to their knowledge of Bioasphalt potentials as all the interviewees had a strong belief in the prospects of lignin to replace bitumen in asphalt, albeit being an immature technology from the road owners' point of view. These potentials were the motivation for actors to seek test sections to move from the laboratory to practice.
To date, fifteen demonstration roads have been made in different locations throughout the Netherlands with a maximum replacement of 50% of bitumen with lignin (CBBD 2020). Although some of these demonstration road sections existed before the formation of CHAPLIN, it is not clear how many locations were secured by the CBBD. Several actors agreed on the CBBD's prominent role in finding test sections and promoting the technology. It appears that the CBBD was motivated by the development of its own biorefinery to explore the use of lignin in other industries and create a value chain for Bioasphalt with lignin. The challenge, however, for the lignin industry as a complementary technology remains in the quality and quantity of local Dutch lignin, which not only affects the quality of the Bioasphalt material but also the deployment of the technology. The Rijkswaterstaat (RWS) have expressed their concerns regarding the LCA of Bioasphalt based on the processing techniques of lignin. For these reasons, one of the goals of the CHAPLIN-XL program investigates enhancing the processing techniques of lignin.

Standards and regulation factors
The current standards and regulations on local, national, and supranational levels are based on the bitumen asphalt industry, posing major challenges to all actors. The European Standardization Committee would not standardize new materials like Bioasphalt unless it gains enough shares in the market battle. Such reactive policy is an obstacle for innovations as it leaves Bioasphalt exposed to pressure from the incumbent regime and creates a death valley for innovations. This variable has a strong relationship with the indicators used for environmental assessments such as the MKI value or LCA, as well as the procurement policies by governmental bodies and certification for bio products in general. For example, one of the actors spent three years certifying their bio product, while several experts agreed on the injustice of the MKI value, and LCA on biobased products. Two interviewees expressed their doubts in the certification agencies due to vested interests from bitumen-based industries. Simultaneously, Bioasphalt is barred from national roads mainly because of the technical regulations that favour bitumen-based asphalt over biobased asphalt.

Infrastructure and maintenance factors
In both techniques developed by WUR-AKC and WUR-TNO, they considered minimal adjustments in the current asphalt mills for the design of this new technology. Accordingly, Bioasphalt is produced in the same bitumen-based asphalt plant, yet the challenge is how to mix the lignin powder with the other ingredients in the mill. In both techniques, the changes in the asphalt mills seem to be affordable yet it is a question of workflow and efficiency. The affordability of infrastructure was a driver for contractors to step into this technology, since they already have the infrastructure, and only modest investments are required, while the human resources factor has positively influenced the technical development due to the availability of skilled staff and professionals in the field. Although the alignment between both techniques can boost the development of Bioasphalt in general, the expectation from the technology is not shared among all actors, as they seemed only to share tasks assigned to them through the CHAPLIN program. This variation in vision may potentially affect the technical development and the commercialization of Bioasphalt in general.

Shaping expectations
All actors revealed a strong willingness to support Bioasphalt in myriad aspects disregarding competition. In this technology, actors created several sub-networks to generate support, knowledge, and resources for their product based on the agent's vision. These visions are exclusive to the sub-networks and not shared among the broader CHAPLIN network. One interviewee expressed that their ultimate vision is to use 100% lignin-based asphalt in the near future, while another interviewee expressed that such a plan is not feasible in the coming decades, and a third one could not comment on this as they have no information about the performance of this product. This misalignment of vision may have an impact on the transition pathway. When asked about their vision for Bioasphalt, a C1 interviewee said: Yeah, we don't have a clear mission and vision for this product, but it's just a pilot not an exercise as we didn't know if we were going to make it. We tried to make asphalt with something green, and we didn't know if it would succeed. Now after successful demonstrations, we try to refine it.
Returning with these analytics to experts in transition management in the Netherlands, they confirmed that this lack of shared vision and targets is negatively affecting the resourcing and networking expansion through the weak coordination between the actors. Meanwhile, most of the demonstration projects for Bioasphalt were created for municipal roads in the southern parts of the country with few exceptions on provincial roadsunrelated to the CBBDin the Province of Noord Holland. This shows an alignment of expectations from a market point of view but not a technical one.

Social networking
The RWS owns the national highways comprising 15% of the roads network in The Netherlands, while the municipalities, provinces, and private parties own the other 85% of the network. In the asphalt industry, the highways are an essential market with a thriving business. As all levels of the government are considered the major customers for Bioasphalt, their involvement in the experiments is crucial to its success because they are the market and the legislative part of the sociotechnical system. However, the governments (local and national) are absent from the CHAPLIN-XL network. Although the RWS has expressed its interest in Bioasphalt during a nonrelated business meeting, the interaction between the RWS and other members of the network remained limited and exclusive to the transition broker. This renders a highly structured nature of the network, which pushed some actors to establish their sub-networks with other partners from outside the CHAPLIN network. In addition, the disparity in expectations mentioned above has contributed to widening the gap between the actors in this network. The C1 category actors (entrepreneurs/contractors) have relied on external relationships to experiment with Bioasphalt, which increased their knowledge and strengthened their position in the CHAPLIN network. At the same time, these actors have established relationships with several municipalities and provinces who expressed their preserved interest in the technology. In another instance, the involvement of the provincial government of Noord Holland in one of the Bioasphalt experiments has created a change in the procurement policy of asphalt in the province and has given the CHAPLIN actor the chance to experiment with Bioasphalt.
As a matter of fact, actors are still experimenting with lignin use in asphalt irrespective of their years of experience. The internal cooperation between them fostered their learning processes, and generated resources such as infrastructure and knowledge, which is reflected in their success in obtaining grants from the government to further develop the technology.

Learning processes
The asphalt market is uniform, and some actors have used their accumulated experience to establish market dominance (in Bioasphalt) and rely on this experience as a valuable source. They have also gained insights into the market needs from municipal to national levels showing first-order learning mechanisms. In this context, Learning by Doing is typical in the asphalt industry. However, testing the technology on national roads is still missing, which is another reason for actors to seek RWS approval for demonstrations to improve Bioasphalt performance. Furthermore, all respondents showed their awareness of the diverse resources and actors outside the CBBD and had existing plans for the development of the technology. For example, some actors who have not been in contact with RWS already had plans for reducing the temperature of the asphalt and examined the recyclability of the lignin-based solution to improve the LCA using renewable energy for the processing of lignin.

Other factors induced from the empirical findings
During data collection, other factors that affect the development of biobased innovation emerged from the empirical situation. By asking different categories of actors about these factors and their effect, they confirmed their influence on the development process of Bioasphalt. Categorized according to the theoretical framework, these factors are presented in the following points: 4.2.8.1. Economic and financial factors. In the Dutch context, the government plans for a 100% circular economy by 2050 has pushed road ownerswhich are mainly government bodiesto favour the purchase of bitumen-based asphalt over biobased asphalt to meet the government's ambitious plans. The same 2030-2050 plan provoked a sense of urgency to reduce carbon emissions, incorporate green solutions, and investigate the lifecycle of products. At the same time, the shortage of bitumen was another principal factor for investigating alternatives. Although this hype around the circular economy created a partial disinterest in bio procurements, actors of the Bioasphalt network remained motivated to seek green alternatives to fossil fuels. From the consumer perspective, the bitumen asphalt is a tried and tested product with zero performance speculations. While biobased asphalt requires time (10 years in the lifetime of roads) for testing to prove its high performance. On the operational level, project managers working in road construction will not jeopardize their projects by using an unknown product. This challenge is due to the procurement strategy of road owners that lacks risk-sharing mechanisms and promoted the business-as-usual model, which clearly creates divisions between the government rights and the contractor's duties and tasks.
As the COVID-19 pandemic hit the economy hard, the virus also hit the development of Bioasphalt, as several ambitious projects for testing the materials were delayed. At the same time, the drop in the price of bitumen has reflected negatively on the price of biobased asphalt, which is already estimated at 20% higher than the bitumen-based counterpart.
Actors from various categories struggled to get the RWS involved in the Bioasphalt demonstrations except for the CBBD management, which happened purely by chance. Several actors had talks with different departments in the RWS and had no success in involving them in Bioasphalt. Three interviewees used the same term "seven-headed monster" to describe the RWS. This shows the degree of fragmentation inside the RSW, which forms another barrier for the development of this innovative technology. Fortunately, the size of the contractors advocating for this technology is an advantage, combined with their motivation for a sustainable transition, SMEs are able to swiftly make decisions and adapt to the market demands faster than larger entities. 4.2.8.2. Political and regulative factors. In the Dutch Climate Agreement (Rijksoverheid 2019), the government showed positive intentions to develop and support its biobased economy. However, there are no integrated plans that guide Bioasphalt or biobased products to this moment. Prior to this agreement, TKI (2015) developed a research agenda for twelve years, which coincided with the first realization of demonstration project for Bioasphalt. According to this agenda, the ingredients for a robust bioeconomy are available in the Netherlands. However, the coordination of projects and vision alignment appear to be missing. Two experts from two different categories have confirmed the absence of an integrated strategy by the Dutch government to support biobased products.

Demand factors. Several road owners are reluctant to experiment with
Bioasphalt on their roads. The environmental gains are a clear reason why Bioasphalt may appeal to them, yet they will not use it. Road owners have insufficient information about the new product, which puts pressure on the biobased innovators to defy the bitumen performance standards. During procurement, innovators are unable to answer typical questions on performance, durability, lifetime, etc. This underscores the mistrust in new technologies and the uncertainty associated with them. Actors react to this by building up their knowledge and experience through gathering valuable data from the demonstration roads to promote the technology for road owners.
4.2.8.4. Natural environment factors. In the bioeconomy, the conflict between land for food and land for energy is common. This conflict has an indirect impact on Bioasphalt. Although the lignin used in Bioasphalt is a by-product of the pulp industry, tracing the origins of the raw material may reveal this conflict, which will remain an issue for the LCA of Bioasphalt. On the other hand, the CHAPLIN-XL project is working on improving the LCA and investigating this conflict further.

Discussion
Theoretically, the tension between the regime and the landscape would open a window for innovations to breakthrough and force a regime shift. Empirically, this is not the case with Bioasphalt. There is minimal traction between the innovation and the bitumen industry as the landscape has primarily endorsed the regime to prevent its collapse and disable bio innovation (alternatives) from creating systemic changes. The main driver for the regime shift is the shortage of the raw material essential for the incumbent industry, bitumen. The macro-level presented here by the policies, regulations, procurements, governance, and cultural norms have collaborated to ensure the survival of the bitumen-based industry and avoid the system collapse for as long as possible. At the same time, the meso-level presented by the bitumen-based asphalt industry has improved its application in recycling and reclaiming bitumen from old roads to weather the disruption in its supply chain. This move by the industrial landscape and regime has formed the main barriers for the lignin-based asphalt. We shared these findings with three academic transition management experts to further confirm the validity of the analysis. The following quote taken from one of the interviewees in the government category demonstrates the regime internal effort in stabilizing the system without looking into bio alternatives.
It's also about the reliability of getting the bitumen. I know there is one supplier who drove their own trucks to get the bitumen from France, because there's a refinery there. The same story about the quality. That's one example but I think it's a global market; the industry is continuously looking for alternatives. C3 Technically, there are fifteen demonstration projects around the Netherlands however; this is not enough to develop a robust technology that can prove its rival performance against the well-established regular asphalt. The road lifespan, which ranges from ten to fifteen years, plays a crucial role in the transition. From the road owners' point of view, a five-year experiment is not enough to prove performance conformity at a time when they want to reach 50% circularity by 2030. This circular economy strategy has indirectly affected biobased innovation in a negative way; road owners favour the incumbent regime solution (recycled asphalt) because it matches their regulations, standards, goals, and their staff have experience using it. At a time when all the government levels are working around the clock to meet the national circular economy targets, giving time and investments to new underdeveloped bio solutions appears to be a luxury that road owners do not afford. Additionally, they will not take any risks regardless of the benefits that Bioasphalt may render in the future for the same sustainability targets.
The advocates across the value chain of Bioasphalt have relied on creating networks through social interactions to harvest resources and gain the essential support to break through the industry's landscape. Meanwhile, the CBBD worked as an intermediary agent between innovation and the government to promote the technology and expand the Bioasphalt network to include the national government. However, the mechanisms used by the CBBD failed to create a cohesive network with bold targets. Agents in the Bioasphalt network, including the transition broker, do not share the same expectations of the technology, vision, or targets. Each of them has their own plans for developing Bioasphalt, which has created a fragmented and fragile network. Both the factors that exist in the sociotechnical system and the governance of the technology at the micro-level have contributed to the deceleration of biobased products development. Conversely, our research has observed minor changes in the structural organization of the Rijkswaterstaat to support Bioasphalt and allow for demonstrations on the national highways, which can be a sign of structural changes in the regime.

Micro-micro interactions
The most powerful relationship between the indicators used is between Social Networking and Shaping of Expectations. The CBBD has endorsed these expectations through stimulating the cooperation, gathering information on the market and its users, and spanning the boundaries of this cooperation. The strong willingness from all actors to support the technology reflected in their experimentations and plans for further developments. Although the targets for the CHAPLIN program revolve around the reduction of carbon emissions to match the superior goal of CBBD, the goals specific to the technology remain missing.
There's no specific plan for Bioasphalt, because that's a new development. But it's one of the developments that support CO 2 reduction and the change from fossil to circular and biobased production. C2 The CHAPLIN program was created through social networking by the CBBD to connect stakeholders along the value chain and share resources. This strategy aimed at shaping the expectations of actors, which is the main ingredient to gain knowledge and improve the technology. While the stakeholders are not part of the CBBD and each of them already has their own networks, the interdependencies between them remain elevated. The contractors rely on WUR and TNO for developing the material properties, Utrecht University for the LCA development of Lignin, Q8 Research for its laboratories and knowledge of bitumen, and the CBBD for the promotion and marketing among governments. Evidently, actors have used their networking skills to secure first and secondorder learning, which is crucial in developing the technology and market competition.

Micro-macro interactions
The previous social networking strategy has resulted in interactions with the macro-level, mainly in the technical part. By generating resources at the micro-level, actors were able to convince the road owners with the demonstration projects. At the same time, the involvement of road owners has expanded their networks, which shows the strong relationship between the technical factors and social networking. Although the Rijkswaterstaat does not share the same expectations, yet recently they managed to involve them in the cooperation hoping to align them with the Bioasphalt experimentations.
While the impact of the economic factors on social networking is mostly negative, it is worth mentioning that the availability of lignin in the international market has allowed for the demonstration projects to take place, and for actors to test the use of lignin in asphalt. Unfortunately, the policies and regulations that were initially created for bitumen-based asphalt are unjust toward lignin-based asphalt. On the operational level, the governance of procurement and project management has prevented the rapid development of this technology. According to several actors, procurement is based on performance, price, and lifespan without any risk-sharing from the road owners regardless of mechanisms such as the Innovatiegericht Inkopen.
Project managers have a strong knowledge in bitumen and favor bitumen-based techniques, which puts pressure on Bioasphalt contractors to offer higher values in their bids to compensate for the reluctance to use an underdeveloped bio product. On a bigger scale, the hype around the circular economy and the government plan for 2030 has influenced the road owners' choice during procurements. They favor a tried and tested product over new bio products because of their limited timeframe. The fragmentation of the Rijkswaterstaat and the varying systems of each regional and local government have also influenced the innovation in myriad ways. Innovators have to network more and use several techniques to defy these variations. Ultimately, the material availability in the case of Bioasphalt is a major factor. The main driver here is the disruption in bitumen supply and the need for a sustainable solution. At the same time, the limited availability and quality of Dutch lignin has opened access to international markets and networks, allowing for demonstrations beyond the Dutch borders.

Micro-meso interactions
As stated above, the interactions between the micro and meso levels are minimal at this stage of development. Changes in perception of the need for new technologies already existed before the invention of lignin-based asphalt in the form of recycledasphalt. The Netherlands is a leader in the recycling of asphalt for decades, but not because of the shortage of bitumen, rather due to the culture of sustainability and recycling. In addition, the need to reclaim more bitumen from old roads is increasing and the higher the percentage of recycled asphalt the more it satisfies the consumer's sustainability goals. While the demand for biobased innovation is stable, the curiosity from road owners is increasing, and actors are using their knowledge of the potentials of lignin combined with the results of demonstration projects to attract governments to collaborate in experiments.

The intermediary agency
The effectiveness of the mechanisms used by the CBBD, as a transition broker, to steer the innovation in Bioasphalt remains under question. The CBBD vision to develop the technology is to promote it among actors outside the network. At the same time, it focuses on stimulating cooperation inside the network; however, the boundary spanning activities here are directed toward road owners only (market). These mechanisms are the dissemination of newsletters that include the development on all fronts, and the CHAPLIN Expedition Day which is aimed at creating personal connections and sharing information among actors.
The CHAPLIN doesn't offer infrastructure. Because all participants have the infrastructure and through collaboration, we made the product available. We also help in branding. We don't have the funds ourselves but our friends within the CHAPLIN program have. Now, we have two projects running that are supported by grants from the Dutch government. C2 In contrast, three other interviewees portrayed the CBBD policies ineffective except for marketing and promotion of the technology, confirming the labeling of CBBD as a user intermediary that is concerned only with translating the technology to the users (the government in this case). Not only actors in the network appear to have specific tasks without general agreement on their expectations from the experiments, but they also have different plans for developing the technology. Although there is cooperation between them to perform these tasks, the lack of vision and specific time-bound goals mentioned above create a mismatch and render a highly structured network. Some actors believe that access to the national roads market will automatically follow the domination of the municipalities market, while other actors believe in the opposite process.
Obviously, the biobased technology cannot access markets without the involvement of all related actors, and mainly the government. In the case of Bioasphalt, the government can steer the development of the technology by removing barriers to the market. The role of the transition broker here is essential to bridge the gap between the government and the innovation to allow for the removal of these obstacles. Although progress on this front is moderate, no clear targets are assigned for such involvement, which stagnates the development of the technology and risks losing a valuable opportunity to create regime changes. Simultaneously, some of the respondents expressed their dissatisfaction with the CBBD strategy in managing the network and described it as overly controlling. Accordingly, this internal strategy has resulted in a fragmented network and created: a. Repulsive effect; not all actors agree on the broker's development plans but only cooperate out of their obligation to the network with little motivation b. Unshared expectations; actors unwillingness to fully share resources beyond their "assigned tasks" c. Lack of synergy; resulting from the above, actors are working in different directions and relying on their own sub-networks which undermines their effort.

Conclusion
Several factors have affected the development of biobased innovations; these factors can stimulate and stagnate the development processes. The Dutch plan for 2030 circularity has pushed the national and local governments toward sustainability and investigating the material resources across the value chains, which allowed for exploring bio alternatives. However, the sense of urgency to apply these plans has reflected negatively on biobased innovations that strive for a market to test and develop. Users favor a mature product to meet their environmental targets swiftly and would not risk applying new solutions, as in the case of Bioasphalt. To meet their 2030 goals, Dutch governments rely on indicators such as the LCA, MKI, or TRL in the procurement of new materials. While the first two indicators proved being effective in measuring the environmental impact of materials, they negatively judged the bioeconomy. Biobased products will perform worse against the fossil-based ones in these assessments due to the emissions weighting methodologies, which are still under discussion. Valuing carbon sequestration or weighting the environmental impact through economic values requires changes in the methodologies of MKI and LCA assessments to ensure the standardization of environmental impact norms across different products, and a fair judgment to biobased products in comparison with their fossil-based counterparts. In addition, the TRL indicator allows procurement managers to exclude underdeveloped innovative materials when evaluating tenders which gives little room for innovators to test and experiment with their products in real world situations. Therefore, innovators depend highly on personal relationships and social networking to involve the government in niche experiments and living labs.
In the meantime, the current standards, regulations, norms, and policies are based on the incumbent regime, which might be decades old. Regulations affect the applications of bio products, as they do not conform to the current standards, which creates market distancing and further conflicts in certifications. Although the strategic procurement plans have given a marginal space for innovation to grow through the Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Inkopen (MVI) 7 or Innovatiegericht Inkopen, the governance of procurement and execution largely depends on a clear division between the government and labor, as well as the projects managers' ideologies. Uncertainty and underdevelopment of innovation is the classical dilemma in this vicious circle; deploying the technology will improve it, or should it be fully developed before deployment? Innovation requires risksharing mechanisms, which are usually missing from the consumer's procurement policy.
Therefore, the Strategic Niche Management theoretical framework has provided a general understanding of the process of biobased innovation development which depend on; social networking; sharing expectations; and learning processes. Social networking is an essential factor for the development of innovation (Figure 1). By bringing actors together under the same vision and targets, networking creates willingness among actors to invest and generate resources essential for the technology. Networking then leads to new experiments that allow for second-order learning. Through learning by doing, innovators not only take their innovation from the laboratory into the practice, but also expand their network, build trust with consumers, and the technical development of their product. This is where the transition brokers have a crucial role in the development of new innovative technologies because they align the expectations of technology between different actors. Hence, the neutral intention of this intermediary agent is critical to steer the development. However, the absence of mutual agreements and shared time-bound goals between both ends of the link obstructs the innovation progress.
The above findings demonstrate that regime changes are not necessarily due to the development of niche innovation or pressure from the industrial landscape. Ultimately, the regulative, cognitive, and normative aspects that exist in both the meso and macro levels have kept the regime stabilized regardless of the supply chain disruption. Specialized applications (i.e., recycled asphalt) may give the system a longer life (Grin, Rotmans, and Schot 2010), but the developments of the complementary industries within the regime, as in better oil refining, may potentially force systemic changes and open a window for radical innovations. We also suggest adding indicators like the TRL, MVI, and LCA to the theoretical framework of transition management. Such indicators will give a normative perspective on the transition phases which may allow for a nuanced analysis of phase changes in the multi-phase perspective. These tender evaluation criteria will also provide a clear perspective on the factors that affect market penetration of biobased materials.
Theoretically, according to Rotmans (2016, 2014), Rauschmayer, Bauler, and Sch€ apke (2015), the existence of key regime actors in the innovation network may stagnate the process of innovation to avoid radical changes. Results demonstrate that this is not necessarily the case, as these stakes may not appear during the early phase of technology formation. This may raise concerns about several transition governance tenets stated by Loorbach (2010), which are missing from the Dutch bioeconomy transition. For example, the mismatch between long-term thinking of circularity and biobased short-term innovation policies.
The Dutch government has used several instruments to stimulate its economy and the adoption of biobased products, but at the same time the absence of an integrated strategy with specific plans to coordinate and synergize between projects and programs is what derails the development of the biobased innovation. It is safe to confirm the slow development of the Dutch bioeconomy, which is attributed to the interdependencies between the above factors, along with the lack of urgency related to the biobased case.
SMEs are usually the frontrunners in innovation due to their minimal and flexible structure. This agent opts for government subsides over green loans, as they cannot afford the high financial risks associated with loans (de Graaf, Kan, and Molenaar 2017). Therefore, they are actively networking to generate resources nevertheless; sustainable financial models are required along with the subsidies and grants to turn their efforts into experiments (Figure 2). A revision of subsidies and tax incentives for biobased innovations and its fossil-based rivals is then required to give more space for the bioeconomy to grow. At the same time, our theoretical framework has failed to examine the dynamics between the agents as the transition management literature lacks this important aspect in sociotechnical systems transition.
The development process is not in one direction but cyclical and iterative, complex, and the interdependencies between its components are high. Hence, the transition pathway cannot be predicted. In the case of biobased innovations, the transition process can be stimulated and directed toward the most sustainable solutions available if the technology network is structured in a cooperative manner; creating synergies between actors and expanding its boundaries to include other relevant agents.
Notes 1. Dutch Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management. 2. Dutch Environmental Cost Indicators. 3. Innovation Credit: with a total budget of 40 million euros in 2020 which was made available by Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate (EZK) for innovative projects supporting the sustainability of the Dutch economy. https://www.rvo.nl/subsidie-enfinancieringswijzer/innovatiekrediet 4. Green Projects Scheme: is a join cooperation by the Rijkswaterstaat and Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate (EZK), offering loans with low interest rates and green certificates are for innovations in the construction projects, environment technology, and circular economy. https://www.rvo.nl/subsidie-en-financieringswijzer/regeling-groenprojecten 5. Innovation-oriented procurement; suggests spending 2.5% of the procurement budgets on innovative solutions. PIANOo, the Dutch Procurement Expertise Center, has a dedicated section on their website for the tools, practices, and a practical guide to explain the benefits of biobased procurements and how to benefit this type of procurement. https://www.pianoo.nl/nl/themas/innovatiegericht-inkopen 6. The Netherlands Enterprise Agency. 7. Socially-responsible procurement.

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