Institutional Change in the Governance of Chinese Football: The Era of ‘Top-Level Design’ Under the Leadership of Xi Jinping

Abstract This article explores the dynamics of institutional change in the governance of Chinese football in the Xi Jinping era, focusing on the concept of ‘top-level design’. Since Xi Jinping took over as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, Chinese football has been at the centre of a series of far-reaching policy reform programmes, driven by Xi’s vision to promote the sport and improve China’s position in world football. To date, no study has examined whether institutional change has occurred in Chinese football from the theoretical perspective of actor-centred institutionalism. The aim of this study is to investigate whether there has been an institutional shift towards ‘top-level design’ in Chinese football governance under the leadership of Xi Jinping and, if so, what key aspects can be identified. Given the post-hoc character of the theoretical approach of actor-centred institutionalism, the qualitative method of process tracing was chosen to reconstruct and explain possible institutional changes. The data are based on extensive document analysis and complementary interviews with 22 experts. The findings suggest that under Xi Jinping’s leadership, institutional changes towards ‘top-level design’ have taken place in Chinese football in the form of anti-corruption campaigns and the emergence of new actors.

The reform and development of football -the sport also known as 'soccer' -in the People's Republic of China (PRC) has become a high priority for the Chinese political centre in the Xi Jinping era, especially compared to many other sporting disciplines.After Xi Jinping took office as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, a far-reaching football development strategy was launched between 2014 and 2016, including four so-called comprehensive reform programmes. 1 All of these policy reform measures for the development of Chinese football have been associated with the personal leadership of Xi Jinping in both official and unofficial accounts. 2For example, the key document issued by the State Council of the PRC, the 'Overall Chinese Football Reform and Development Programme, ' hereafter referred to as the 'Overall Football Reform, ' begins with the following sentence: 'Since the 18th Party Congress, the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as its General Secretary has put the rejuvenation of football on the agenda as an important task for the development of sports and the building of a powerful sports nation.' 3 The transformation of the PRC into a 'powerful sports nation' (体育强国, tiyu qiangguo) and the corresponding development of sports in China are seen as 'a symbolic undertaking for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.' 4 And according to the 'Overall Football Reform, ' '[t]he revitalization of football is an inevitable requirement for building [China into] a powerful sports nation and an ardent expectation of the [Chinese] people.' 5 It is revealing that these remarks explicitly refer to the key concept of the 'Chinese Dream' (中国梦, zhongguo meng), also known as the 'China Dream, ' which, in contrast to the ' American Dream, ' is not only primarily aimed at the economic comfort of an envisioned middle class, but also has strong nationalist undertones. 6he reform and development of football in China thus appears to be perceived by the Chinese party-state in the Xi Jinping era as an important element of this national 'rejuvenation' process.Brown and Vandenberg write in this regard that '[a] victory at soccer for China would be symbolic of their battles over the last century and a half: to modernize, to be equal, and perhaps even superior, to the world powers that once looked down on them.' 7 From the perspective of the Chinese political centre, led by Xi Jinping, the reform and development of football in the PRC, and in particular the Chinese national teams, is therefore meant to serve as a symbolic expression of the country's re-emergence as a global leader in all respects.
One of the fundamental principles of the 'Overall Football Reform' is to '[s] trengthen top-level design and focus on strategy implementation.' 8 The term 'top-level design' (顶层设计, dingceng sheji) is a normative concept for the best possible policymaking process in the PRC.It envisages the (re)centralization and streamlined hierarchization of the Chinese political system to ensure the holistic consideration, assessment, monitoring, and resolution of perceived challenges and problems, so that political steering capacities can be effectively concentrated in China's political centre and the desired reform and development goals of the country's highest political actors can be achieved as comprehensively and quickly as possible. 9The call in this official reform plan of the Chinese party-state to strengthen 'top-level design' and focus on the implementation of centrally mandated policies in Chinese football suggests that the hierarchical interactions between formally differently positioned actors in Chinese football governance are to be restructured.
The fact that Chinese football has been given a higher political priority by senior actors of the Chinese party-state in the Xi Jinping era has led to increased public and scholarly interest in the topic in recent years. 10However, to date, no study has applied the theoretical perspective of actor-centred institutionalism to examine whether there has been institutional change in the governance of Chinese football in the Xi Jinping era.Therefore, the purpose of this article is to unravel the intricate dynamics of institutional change in the policy field of Chinese football.Specifically, this study investigates whether Chinese football governance has undergone an institutional shift towards 'top-level design' under the leadership of Xi Jinping, and if so, what key aspects can be identified.The theoretical approach of actor-centred institutionalism is particularly well suited to examining whether there has been an institutional change towards 'top-level design' in Chinese football governance, as this perspective focuses on the social coordination function of hierarchical authority structures and compliance with the action orientations of actors in interactions, which corresponds to the research interest of this article. 11he term governance is defined by Cho et al. in the context of sport as 'the exercise of granted power and authority to monitor, direct, manage, and control a sport organization's strategic performance and compliance with relevant regulations and laws in consideration of internal dynamics and external environment.' 12 A particular focus of this study is whether high-level party-state actors in the Xi Jinping era have initiated 'top-down' institutional changes in Chinese football governance to increase compliance with the policies of China's political centre.The article thus fills this existing research gap and contributes to the debate on current governance under the leadership of Xi Jinping using Chinese football as an example.
Due to the post-hoc character of the theoretical approach of actor-centred institutionalism, the qualitative method of process tracing is considered appropriate for retrospectively tracing policy processes and actor-based interactions. 13Due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic during the study period, it was decided that the main focus of the empirical research would be an extensive document analysis.In addition, 22 guideline-based expert interviews were conducted in order to draw on complementary, non-publicly available data, taking into account the subjective judgements, experiences, and background information of selected experts who were expected to add value to the retrospective (re)processing of the interaction-oriented object of investigation on the basis of a ready-made functional attribution. 14The interviewees included Chinese and foreign journalists, football association representatives, professional and youth football coaches, scholars studying Chinese football, organised football supporters in China and entrepreneurs in the Chinese sports industry.The expert interviews had to be conducted by telephone or via digital communication channels such as WeChat, Teams, and Zoom meetings, and are only considered complementary in this context, as empirical fieldwork in the PRC was not feasible during the study period.For ethical reasons, it was decided to keep the experts interviewed anonymous and to refrain from direct quotes, as the sensitive nature of the issues discussed could potentially lead to the identification of interviewees, despite assurances of anonymity.

Institutional Changes Towards 'Top-Level Design' During Xi Jinping's Tenure
Chinese politics under the leadership of Xi Jinping represents for many scholars a fundamental institutional shift towards 'top-level design' from previous administrations in the PRC. 15Accordingly, it is often argued that institutional transformations in the sense of 'top-level design' have been instrumental in ensuring that Chinese politics now follows a much more vertical, 'top-down' policy implementation logic in order to enforce the norms and expectations prescribed by the Chinese political centre. 16It thus appears that interactions between formally differently positioned actors in the Chinese political system are characterized by much more pronounced political coordination and steering efforts on the part of the Chinese central party-state to ensure that hierarchically subordinate actors behave in accordance with the action orientations of the Chinese political centre.In the Xi Jinping era, therefore, there seems to be a much greater emphasis on compliance with the policy directives of the highest party-state actors in the PRC.
Prior to the Xi Jinping era, the Chinese political system had been characterized by increasing fragmentation and decentralization since the early 1980s.For this reason, some scholars have referred to the policymaking process in the PRC as 'fragmented' or 'decentralized authoritarianism.' 17 It has been argued that these institutional changes, which began in the Deng Xiaoping era, have not only strengthened the policymaking authorities of local governments in China, but have 'also altered central-local government relations in several critical ways that are difficult, though not impossible, to reverse.' 18 However, despite the decentralization and fragmentation tendencies in Chinese politics, China's central party-state actors still possessed (limited) political coordination and steering capacities that allowed these actors to intervene selectively and contextually in a 'top-down' manner at all levels of policy implementation, especially in times of perceived crisis. 19ver time, however, the growing fragmentation and decentralization of Chinese policymaking in recent decades has triggered a response from the PRC's highest-ranking political actors.In addition to an enormous social and economic transformation process in China over the past decades, these fragmentation and decentralization tendencies in Chinese politics have been accompanied by a steady erosion of central inner-party organizations and a weakening of the hierarchical coordination and political steering capacities of party headquarters, as well as the governability of formally subordinate actors in the PRC. 20Actors in China's political centre have increasingly perceived these developments as a threat to the CCP's centralist leadership and a corresponding crisis of governance, as policies formulated by the most senior political actors in the PRC have often not been implemented in a 'top-down' manner as expected. 21Despite repeated but mostly short-lived efforts by China's central party leadership to restore hierarchical discipline within and outside the CCP's official structures, it has long been unable to prevent the steady trend towards fragmentation and decentralization of political authority in the PRC in the medium and long term. 22et, with the Xi Jinping era, a new party leadership took office in 2012/13 that resolutely opposed this trend towards fragmentation and decentralization in order to address and ultimately overcome the CCP's perceived governance crisis.Some researchers have argued, for instance, that the central supervisory and regulatory agencies of the CCP, such as the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, particularly targeted higher and lower-level party cadres ('tigers and flies') and patronage networks, which 'drastically increased pressures on the lower levels to conform' to the policy course of the Chinese political centre under Xi Jinping's leadership. 23Other scholars have claimed that the emergence of new high-level actors, such as the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, which was transformed into the Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission in March 2018, have significantly enhanced the hierarchical coordination capacities of the Chinese central party-state under Xi Jinping's leadership. 24Such 'top-down' institutional transformation efforts by high-level party-state actors in the Xi Jinping era towards a more streamlined hierarchization and (re)centralization of Chinese policymaking and implementation are summarized in the literature under the term 'top-level design' . 25fter reviewing the literature on institutional change towards 'top-level design' in the Xi Jinping era, the next step is to introduce the theoretical approach of actor-centred institutionalism to examine possible institutional changes in Chinese football governance from this particular perspective.

Actor-Centred Institutionalism and Institutional Change
The theoretical approach of actor-centred institutionalism was primarily developed and elaborated by Renate Mayntz and Fritz W. Scharpf at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, Germany.They found that the existing theoretical and methodological perspectives developed for the systematic collection, structuring, and processing of empirical data were not suitable for investigating the particularities of the given object of explanation, namely the observed behaviour of actors and the corresponding policy outcomes.For this reason, they formulated actor-centred institutionalism, which provides an orientation for the study of policymaking processes by focusing on the reactions and interactions of political actors within specific institutional settings and particular policy environments.
From the perspective of actor-centred institutionalism, individual and composite actors have socially constructed action orientations that are seen as the 'proximate cause' of their behaviour. 26At the same time, institutions are considered to be formal and informal 'norms of appropriate behaviour' that substantiate mutual confidence in expectations and thus constitute an important influencing factor that shapes, but does not necessarily determine, the observed behaviour of actors. 27The institutional setting can therefore be seen as a stimulating social context of action, to which actors orient themselves and in relation to which they interact with each other.This institutional structure can both facilitate and constrain the behaviour of actors. 28In addition to the respective institutional setting, which is regarded as the central 'remote cause' of the observed behaviour, 29 there are also non-institutional influencing factors, such as the perception of crises or framing effects, which can also have an impact on the behaviour of actors and structure policy outcomes accordingly. 30All of the influencing factors formulated in the theoretical approach of actor-centred institutionalism can be subject to change and thus condition a transformation of the other influencing factors and accordingly affect the observed behaviour of the actors.
Actor-centred institutionalism assumes that institutions are relatively stable and persistent influencing factors and is therefore particularly suited to the analysis of interaction-oriented policy research.For example, Scharpf suggests that institutions, as norms of appropriate behaviour and the expectations derived from them, 'are the most important influences-and hence the most useful sources of information-on actors and interactions because […] the actors themselves depend on socially constructed rules to orient their actions in otherwise chaotic social environments and because, if they in fact perform this function, these rules must be "common knowledge" among the actors and hence relatively accessible to researchers as well.' 31 Actors are therefore often in relatively stable 'actor constellations, ' because 'once institutions are installed, and once actors have come to rely on their coordinating function, institutional change will be costly, and thus institutions are hard to reform or abolish, even if the circumstances that brought them about, and that may originally have justified them, no longer persist.' 32 It could therefore be argued that institutions and institutional settings are likely to be relatively durable and constant.
In addition to this relatively stable and enduring characteristic of institutions, however, they are also transformable and can therefore shape policy outcomes by changing the actor constellations and modes of interaction.Institutional change can thus lead to far-reaching transformations of political processes that reconfigure the interactions and relationships among actors and thereby influence the agenda-setting, implementation and enforcement of specific policies.Institutional change can occur in a variety of ways.For example, non-institutional influencing factors such as internal and external shocks and perceived crises can lead to profound changes in the institutional setting. 33Moreover, changes in the action orientations of one or more specific actors can lead to a comprehensive change in the general social context in which the actors interact. 34Another example that can trigger institutional change is the emergence of new actors (or the disappearance of established actors) in a particular policy field. 35Specific policy outcomes can also lead to changes in the broader institutional context.There is thus a feedback effect between policy outcomes and the institutional setting, which can ultimately lead to transformations in the stimulating social context in which actors make decisions and engage in responsive behaviour. 36aving briefly outlined the influencing factors of actor-centred institutionalism and discussed institutional change, the next step is to apply this theoretical perspective to the research object of Chinese football governance.

Institutional Change in the Governance of Chinese Football
The state of research on Chinese football governance is very incomplete, especially for the period before the Xi Jinping era.The very limited literature on the topic and the reception of the past in the official reform programmes under Xi Jinping's leadership suggest that football was not a national political priority before Xi Jinping took office as CCP General Secretary in 2012. 37Prior to the Xi Jinping era, football fell under the purview of state rather than party politics.While central actors under the State Council of the PRC, such as the General Administration of Sport, were politically involved, football was long treated as one of many sub-departments among other sports disciplines whose main focus was on general sports policy planning and implementation rather than on achieving broad, overarching political goals at the national party-state level through football.It can therefore be argued that before the Xi Jinping era, football was not particularly important to high-level party-state actors in China.
Moreover, in the years prior to the Xi Jinping era, there were fragmentation and decentralization tendencies in the authority structures of Chinese football that granted more policymaking competencies to subordinate Chinese football officials and professional football clubs, most of which were run by private and state-owned enterprises, especially in the wake of the commercialization efforts of domestic football leagues in the 2000s.In other words, prior to the Xi Jinping era, football was virtually non-existent as a distinct policy field at the central party-state level, both in party policymaking practice and in research.Football was only one element of a partially decentralized and fragmented national sports policy that was primarily concerned with international sporting success at the Olympic Games and a correspondingly high ranking in the medals table in order to enhance China's international prestige and soft power abroad and to strengthen national pride, cohesion, and a sense of belonging at home. 38nly when massive corruption and match-fixing scandals occurred, as in the late 1990s and early 2000s, did higher-level party-state actors intervene. 39Senior football officials, however, were largely spared from these political measures.Football supporters of professional clubs and national teams, who have become a focus of international research on football governance in recent years, especially in European and Latin American contexts, played a marginal role, if any, in such considerations of political decisions and interactions in China before the Xi Jinping era. 40Although a differentiated football fandom has developed since the professionalization of Chinese football in the early 1990s, the desires and expectations of these individuals and groups seem to have hardly factored into political decision-making processes.Only the dissatisfaction of supporters with the performance of the Chinese national teams has been recognized by the Chinese political authorities, who have promised and formulated policies to improve the state of Chinese football, which have mostly been poorly implemented.
After this brief overview of the state of Chinese football prior to the Xi Jinping era, the following sections examine what, if any, institutional transformation efforts towards 'top-level design' by party-state actors have taken place in Chinese football governance under Xi Jinping's leadership.

Anti-Corruption and Disciplinary Campaigns
The implementation of far-reaching and long-lasting anti-corruption campaigns is indicative of a shift in the institutional setting of Chinese football governance towards 'top-level design' and an accompanying (re)centralization and hierarchization of political decision-making processes, as well as an increased emphasis on conformist behaviour on the part of formally subordinate actors vis-à-vis the action orientations of the Chinese political centre.Shortly before Xi Jinping took office as General Secretary of the CCP in 2012, the Ministry of Public Security of the PRC conducted one of the most extensive anti-corruption and disciplinary campaigns in Chinese sports history between 2009 and 2011. 41As part of this major crackdown on corruption, match-fixing, and illegal gambling, more than 50 football officials, professional footballers, including Chinese national team players, referees, and club managers were arrested. 42High-ranking football officials such as Xie Yalong and Nan Yong, two former vice presidents of the Chinese Football Association (CFA) and CCP administrators at the General Administration of Sport (GAS), were not spared from these anti-corruption and disciplinary measures and were each sentenced to ten years and six months in prison and ordered to pay heavy fines for, among other things, accepting bribes. 43reviously, especially at the turn of the century, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, there were numerous match-fixing and corruption scandals in the Chinese professional football leagues, which led to a significant loss of reputation and popularity for Chinese football.As a result, many Chinese and foreign entrepreneurs withdrew their investments from the Chinese football industry. 44At the time, there were also political countermeasures, and people were punished and sentenced for engaging in illegal activities.For example, in 2001, five Chinese second-division clubs and their players and coaches were sanctioned by the CFA for match-fixing, resulting in court cases.Although one of the five Chinese club owners provided a list of referees he had allegedly bribed, only one referee was ultimately sentenced to prison.The Chinese club owner himself and the other accused referees were not punished by the Chinese judiciary. 45At the time, however, these efforts were not sufficient to address the problems of corruption and match-fixing in Chinese football in a sustainable way and to initiate fundamental institutional changes in Chinese football governance.For instance, Fan and Lu note that '[a]lthough the league had been abandoned by the investors and most of the fans and struggled to survive over the next few years, match fixing, corruption and gambling did not stop.Both the clubs and the CFA showed little concern about the sustainable development of the league and the future of Chinese football.' 46 It can therefore be argued that despite the anti-corruption and disciplinary measures in Chinese football before the Xi Jinping era, not much has changed in the institutional setting of Chinese football governance.
One of the most important differences between previous anti-corruption and disciplinary campaigns in Chinese football, for example in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the campaign conducted between 2009 and 2011 was that it was not the CFA or the GAS, which are responsible for the management and administration of football in China, that essentially investigated these illegal activities themselves, for instance by setting up a relevant commission or dealing with the matter in a disciplinary committee, 47 but that higher-level central regulatory and supervisory bodies intervened and conducted this anti-corruption and disciplinary campaign, which also targeted these formally subordinate football authorities. 48In the wake of these more pervasive and comprehensive anti-corruption and disciplinary measures by central party-state actors in the PRC, one Chinese media report stated that '[t]here is a general consensus in the [Chinese football] industry that the fierce anti-corruption campaign in the football world [conducted by the central authorities for discipline inspection and supervision] has restored the hope of most fans in Chinese football.People see this as an opportunity to overcome the institutional barriers in football governance and promote the healthy development of the sport in China.' 49 It seems, then, that these far-reaching 'top-down' sanctions have encouraged many Chinese football supporters and observers to expect institutional changes in national football governance and a general improvement in the situation of Chinese football, as many of them considered illegal activities such as corruption and match-fixing in Chinese professional football leagues to be one of the biggest problems for the development of Chinese football, as a study shows. 50It might therefore be argued that the extensive implementation of an anti-corruption and disciplinary campaign by a central governing authority in China between 2009 and 2011 arguably initiated a change in the institutional setting in the policy field of Chinese football, leading to a greater emphasis on the compliant behaviour of formally subordinate actors vis-à-vis the action orientations of the Chinese political centre.
In particular, the fact that the anti-corruption and disciplinary campaign also targeted high-ranking football officials is likely to have created a sense of insecurity and uncertainty within the established institutional structures of Chinese football governance, as it had to be expected that such prosecutions could now affect anyone who did not comply with the Chinese political centre.Such 'top-down' mobilization campaigns by high-level party-state actors to address perceived grievances and increase the compliance of formally subordinate actors can be interpreted as an attempt at institutional change towards 'top-level design.' Through the lens of actor-centred institutionalism, it then becomes apparent that a crisis situation has triggered a decisive institutional shift towards 'top-level design' in the management and administration of Chinese football.The anti-corruption and disciplinary campaign of the formally superordinate actors in the PRC underlines the increased emphasis on hierarchical compliance by subordinate actors such as the CFA and the GAS.Moreover, these anti-corruption and disciplinary measures can be seen as a crucial precursor to the further restructuring of the institutional setting in Chinese football, creating the necessary conditions for the initiation of the comprehensive reform and development programmes of Chinese football in the Xi Jinping era.
Although this sweeping anti-corruption and disciplinary campaign in Chinese football took place towards the end of the Hu-Wen administration, the timing and duration of these measures is particularly interesting as they can be directly linked to the person of Xi Jinping.With the hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing and the impressive sporting achievements of Chinese athletes, the Chinese party-state has demonstrated that the PRC can compete with other nations not only in bidding for major sporting events, but also in the various individual sporting disciplines.However, in football, as so often the case, China's national teams have not performed particularly well.While the Chinese men's team was eliminated in the group stage, the women's team lost 2-0 to Japan in the quarterfinals.A commentator on Chinese state television CCTV said after the Chinese men's defeat that '[t]he Chinese football team decided to get out quickly, so as not to affect the people's mood while they watch the Olympics.' 51 Following the remarkable sporting achievements in other disciplines at the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the Chinese political leadership reacted to the unsatisfactory state of Chinese football.In an interview, Xi Jinping, then vice president of the PRC and a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo, stated that '[t]he level of Chinese football is relatively low, but after winning so many gold medals in other sports at the Olympic Games, China must be determined to promote football, but this might take a long time.' 52 Just a few weeks later, the central supervisory and regulatory authorities in China launched the extensive and protracted anti-corruption and disciplinary campaign in Chinese football. 53fter taking office as CCP General Secretary, Xi Jinping declared: 'In order to develop and revitalize football, we must overcome the institutional shortcomings and systemic corrupt practices that hinder the development and revitalization of [Chinese] football, and provide better institutional guarantees for the development and revitalization of [Chinese] football.' 54 In other words, without the implementation of far-reaching and long-lasting anti-corruption and disciplinary measures in Chinese football, the initiation of comprehensive football reforms and related development efforts in the Xi Jinping era would likely have been doomed to failure from the outset, as formally subordinate administrative and socioeconomic actors often did not behave in accordance with the norms and expectations of the Chinese political centre, and thus committed illegal acts such as match-fixing and corruption.Moreover, due to the highly decentralized nature of policymaking and responsibility in Chinese football governance, subordinate football actors were often not held accountable by higher-level political actors for these illegal activities.In retrospect, the 'Overall Football Reform' therefore states that '[s]ince 2009, by focusing on initiatives such as combating match-fixing, illegal gambling and corruption to rectify the governance of football […], the trend in [Chinese] football has been positive, ushering in a new high tide.' 55 The anti-corruption and disciplinary campaigns of the central party-state authorities in China just before the Xi Jinping era, which were directed at formally subordinate football actors, can thus be seen as an important building block in the process of restructuring the institutional setting in Chinese football towards 'top-level design, ' which subsequently led to a greater emphasis on the compliant behaviour of formally subordinate actors vis-à-vis the action orientations of the Chinese political centre.
However, these 'top-down' measures have not completely eradicated corruption and bribery in Chinese football.Since late 2022 and early 2023, the CCP's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has launched a new wide-ranging anti-corruption and disciplinary campaign in Chinese football, publicly suspecting a number of senior football figures of serious disciplinary violations, including CFA President Chen Xuyuan, former Chinese men's national football team head coach Li Tie, and CFA Party Committee Secretary and GAS Deputy Director Du Zhaocai. 56Although the full implications of these political interventions cannot be assessed at the time of writing, this sanctioning 'top-down' crackdown by high-level party-state actors in Chinese football governance suggests that anti-corruption and disciplinary measures against high-level Chinese football figures have become an institutionalized component and instrument of Chinese politics in the Xi Jinping era.It appears that undesirable behaviours and developments in Chinese football are being addressed more decisively by high-level party-state actors in order to bring them into line with the policy directives and objectives of the Chinese political centre under the leadership of Xi Jinping.From the perspective of actor-centred institutionalism, this is a clear case of crisis-induced institutional change, in which the 'norms of appropriate behaviour' in the governance of Chinese football are realigned through authoritative 'top-down' interventions, emphasising the importance of 'top-level design' and the corresponding compliance of formally subordinate actors such as the CFA and the GAS.

Establishment of New Actors
The emergence of new actors, particularly high-level actors, in the PRC is another indication of the transformation of the institutional setting in Chinese football governance towards 'top-level design, ' which has involved the streamlining, hierarchization and (re)centralization of political processes and authoritarian command structures, as well as an increased emphasis on the conformist behaviour of formally subordinate actors towards the action orientations of the Chinese political centre in the Xi Jinping era.
One of these newly established actors is the 'Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference on Football Reform and Development of the State Council.' According to then CFA President Cai Zhenhua, 57 the State Council of the PRC approved the creation of this new high-level coordination, oversight and steering body for Chinese football in March 2015, just a few days after the publication of the 'Overall Football Reform.' 58 In addition to senior members of the CFA and the GAS, 17 other high-level political actors in the PRC are part of this central governance body for Chinese football, including the State Council, represented by the then vice premier and 18th Central Politburo Member Liu Yandong, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Central Propaganda Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance. 59The establishment of such a composite actor indicates a higher degree of political coordination between central party-state actors in the management of Chinese football.
Already in the 'Overall Football Reform, ' under the heading '[s]trengthening the leadership on football work, ' it was stated that 'the system of the inter-ministerial joint conference on football reform and development should be established to continuously promote the reform and development of football [in China] and ensure the implementation of the football reform programme [s].All parties should take their respective roles, responsibilities, efforts and synergies to jointly promote the reform and development of football.' 60 Following the creation of this new actor, Cai Zhenhua explained that the main function of the inter-ministerial leadership body in Chinese football is 'to provide macro guidance on the reform and development of football; to coordinate and promote the implementation of the Overall Plan and supervise and inspect the completion of key tasks in the reform and development of football; to coordinate and solve major issues and major problems in the reform and development of football; and to complete other tasks assigned by the Party Central Committee and the State Council.' 61 This straightforward 'top-down' approach and the joint hierarchical coordination and steering efforts of these high-level political actors in the reform and development of Chinese football illustrate the underlying 'top-level design, ' which envisages the emergence of an 'integrated' and 'coordinated development pattern' in the policy field of Chinese football. 62From the theoretical perspective of actor-centred institutionalism, the establishment of new high-level actors in the policy field of Chinese football, such as the 'Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference on Football Reform and Development of the State Council, ' represents a clear transformation of the institutional setting and the corresponding hierarchical actor constellations and modes of interaction within the governance of Chinese football in the direction of 'top-level design.' In August 2015, just a few months after the release of the 'Overall Football Reform, ' another official document entitled 'The CFA Adjustment and Reform Programme' was issued by the 'Office of the Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference on Football Reform and Development of the State Council' and approved by the State Council of the PRC. 63This document addressed the 'decoupling' (脱钩) of the CFA from the GAS and the corresponding restructuring of Chinese football governance.According to the reform plan, '[t]he adjustment and reform of the CFA is the key to the reform and development of Chinese football and the basis for the streamlining of football governance and the innovation of the football management model.[…] In accordance with the "Overall Football Reform, " the CFA will be comprehensively restructured and reformed to remove the institutional barriers that hinder the development of Chinese football.' 64 Furthermore, under the heading of '[s]treamlining the relationship between the CFA and the administrative department of sports under the State Council, ' this official document claims that the CFA will become a 'national self-regulatory body' and the 'sole legal body representing China in international football organizations' and will therefore be responsible for various tasks related to the governance of Chinese football. 65This means that 'the GAS will no longer be involved in the operational work of [Chinese] football.' 66 The CFA thus appears to be becoming independent or less dependent on the GAS in the course of these joint 'top-down' institutional transformation efforts by high-level political actors in the PRC.At the same time, however, this official document emphasizes that 'the CFA is required to fully implement the political lines, guidelines and policies of the Party and the State on sports work, and to carry out and complete the tasks assigned by them.The GAS will provide the CFA with the necessary operational guidance and supervision.' 67 These announced changes are contradictory.
Media reports had previously suggested that the Chinese party-state would eventually withdraw from the governance of Chinese football and that the CFA would become an 'independent' and 'full-fledged' non-governmental organization. 68Under the term 'decoupling, ' the 'Overall Football Reform' referred to a 'separation of government and society, ' 'clearly defined authorities and responsibilities, ' and 'self-governance according to law.' 69 Cai Zhenhua said at a press conference: 'Before the decoupling, the CFA was a direct subordinate unit of the GAS and carried out various tasks assigned by the GAS; after the decoupling, the GAS is no longer the superior unit in charge of the CFA, and the CFA will independently carry out various activities and serve its members.' 70 Cai Zhenhua went on to say that 'after decoupling, […] the CFA will be self-organized on the basis of improving the association's constitution, and will have autonomy in terms of internal institutional and organizational settings and personnel management.The GAS will no longer be the responsible authority for the CFA and will mainly provide services and supervision to the CFA.' 71 These statements suggest that, once the central political reform plans for domestic football in China are implemented, the CFA will be able to operate largely independently of the GAS and make its own decisions in accordance with existing FIFA regulations, meaning that the CFA must be 'independent and avoid any form of political interference.' 72 Unlike many European football associations, the CFA has been governed by political actors since its inception in 1955.In 1995, the CFA was renamed the 'Management Centre of Football' and officially became a subdivision of the GAS. 73The institutional reform plans of the central party-state actors of Chinese football in the Xi Jinping era aimed to decouple the GAS-led Management Centre of Football from the CFA and, in many respects, achieve a separation between the CFA and the GAS, which would significantly change the hierarchical actor constellations and modes of interaction in Chinese football.In January 2017, it was officially announced that '[t]he Management Centre of Football of the GAS has been abolished and the CFA has become an independent legal entity.' 74 However, these observations and interpretations contradict the call of the 'Overall Football Reform' to 'optimize the leadership structures' and 'strengthen the party leadership' in Chinese football. 75Accordingly, shortly after the official announcement of the 'decoupling' of the CFA from the GAS, Cai Zhenhua stated in an interview that 'decoupling does not mean separation.' 76 He noted that there would be no separation in three respects: 'First, the Party leadership will be retained.Second, the operational guidance and supervision will continue.Third, the financial support [from higher-level party-state actors] will remain.' 77 The 'optimization of leadership structures' in Chinese football governance suggests that the parallel structures of party on the one hand and state on the other, which largely prevailed in Chinese football before the Xi Jinping era, are being abolished or diluted, and that the party is taking the lead in Chinese football.
Regarding the 'strengthening of the Party leadership' in Chinese football, the 'Overall Football Reform' states that '[t]he Party's organizational structure of football associations at all levels [in China] will be strengthened, and the ideological and political work of football associations and the daily management of cadres will be improved in accordance with the Party's principle of cadre management and talent policy.The CFA has established a Party committee under the leadership of the Party Group of the GAS.' 78 This indicates that the CCP is tightening its control and strengthening its overall leadership in the governance of football in China, even in areas where responsibility was previously vested in state actors, and that there is a centralization and streamlining of policymaking processes towards 'top-level design' in the policy field of Chinese football.Such a restructuring of the institutional setting in Chinese football through coordinated 'top-down' efforts by high-level party-state actors in China not only illustrates the streamlined hierarchization and (re)centralization of policymaking processes in this particular policy field, but also points to a clearer separation of hierarchical authorities, responsibilities and tasks, where '[t]he centre is responsible for steering, while leaving much of the rowing to' formally subordinate administrative and socioeconomic actors. 79From the perspective of actor-centred institutionalism, therefore, it can be argued that the establishment of a party committee within the CFA has decisively changed the institutional setting of Chinese football governance, so that the CCP has asserted a stronger hierarchical claim to leadership in Chinese football in the Xi Jinping era.
A journalist asked Cai Zhenhua at a press conference what exactly the difference is between the newly formed CFA, which has been 'decoupled' from the GAS, and the former Management Centre of Football under the leadership of the GAS, when a Party committee is established in the organizational structure of the CFA.He replied as follows: 'The Party committee is mainly responsible for strengthening the ideological and political work of the [football] association and the daily management of cadres in accordance with the Party's principle of cadre management and talent policy.There is no conflict between the establishment of the Party committee and the independent operation of the CFA and the promulgation of the 'Regulations on the Work of the Party Leadership Groups of the Communist Party of China' on 16 June 2015, which clearly stipulates that social organizations with more than three leading Party members in their leading organs may establish a Party group upon approval, which is not in conflict with the nature of social organizations.' 80 The official document mentioned by Cai Zhenhua states that '[t]hese regulations are formulated […] to further regulate the work of Party groups, strengthen and improve the Party's leadership, enhance the Party's governing capacity, and better play the Party's leading role in overseeing the overall situation and coordinating all sides.' 81 As a result, under Xi Jinping's leadership, the CCP is expected to have a much greater say in football matters in China than in the past.
Although Cai Zhenhua insisted that there was no contradiction 'between the establishment of the Party Committee and the independent operation of the CFA, ' it can be argued that the legal reform measures taken by the 'Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference on Football Reform and Development of the State Council' to decouple the CFA from the GAS have resulted in central actors of the CCP being in a better position to control, coordinate and steer the management of football in China in a 'top-down' manner.Thus, through the creation of new high-level inter-ministerial actors and party cells at all levels, and through the implementation, supervision and oversight of legislation enacted by the central party-state authorities in the Xi Jinping era, the 'decoupling' of the CFA from the GAS should allow for a more centralized and hierarchical football governance in China, more in line with the action orientations of the Chinese political centre, indicating a shift in the institutional setting towards 'top-level design.' Due to the previously prevailing fragmentation and decentralization tendencies of policymaking authorities and responsibilities in Chinese football, lower-level football officials and clubs in the PRC were often able to set the agenda and formulate policies, often without being subject to hierarchical 'top-down' political coordination and steering attempts by central party-state actors. 82Under these changed institutional conditions of Chinese football governance, which emphasize 'top-level design' of policy design and implementation processes and place a higher priority on compliance with the central political directives of the Chinese party-state, 'independent' sports policy decisions in Chinese football that deviate from the instructions of China's central party leadership are hardly conceivable in the Xi Jinping era.

Hierarchization and (Re)Centralization of Chinese Football Governance
Recognizing the immense potential of football as a catalyst for national rejuvenation, cultural expression and global recognition, the Chinese political centre in the Xi Jinping era has attached great importance to the institutional restructuring of Chinese football governance.The purpose of this study was to examine whether Chinese football governance under the leadership of Xi Jinping has undergone institutional changes towards 'top-level design' and, if so, what key aspects can be identified.The results show that institutional changes towards 'top-level design' have taken place.Two main aspects can be identified that characterize such a shift towards a streamlined hierarchization and (re)centralization of Chinese football governance: a) the mobilization of far-reaching and long-lasting anti-corruption and disciplinary campaigns, and b) the emergence of new high-level actors and party cells.
One of the most significant differences between previous anti-corruption and disciplinary campaigns in Chinese football, such as those in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the one conducted between 2009 and 2011 was that it was not the CFA or the GAS, which are responsible for the administration of football in China, that essentially investigated these illegal activities themselves, but the central regulatory and supervisory authorities in the PRC that intervened and implemented this anti-corruption campaign, which in part also targeted these formally subordinate administrative football bodies.The fact that high-ranking football officials were not spared from the anti-corruption campaign is likely to have created insecurity and uncertainty within the established institutional structures of Chinese football governance, as from now on anyone who did not comply with the directives of the Chinese political centre had to expect such prosecution.Moreover, a new wide-ranging anti-corruption and disciplinary campaign against high-ranking Chinese football personalities, launched in late 2022 and early 2023, shows that such 'top-down' intervention has become an institutionalized element of Chinese politics in the Xi Jinping era, designed to bring the non-compliant behaviour of formally subordinate administrative and socioeconomic actors back into line with the norms and expectations of China's political centre.
Another indication of the shift in the institutional setting towards 'top-level design' was the establishment of new high-level actors in the policy field of Chinese football, such as the 'Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference on Football Reform and Development of the State Council.' Official documents and announcements stating that this newly established high-level party-state actor will 'provide macro guidance on the reform and development of [Chinese] football' and that 'the CFA is required to fully implement the political lines, guidelines and policies of the Party and the State on sports work' illustrate the hierarchization and (re)centralization of the previously highly fragmented and decentralized policymaking processes in Chinese football under Xi Jinping's leadership. 83Thus, this article is the first to use Chinese football as an example to demonstrate that institutional changes towards 'top-level design' have taken place under the leadership of Xi Jinping.
Although it has been previously reported that the Chinese party-state would withdraw from the governance of Chinese football and that the CFA would become an 'independent' and 'full-fledged' non-governmental organization, it can be argued that the institutional transformation efforts of the Chinese political centre in the Xi Jinping era, such as the establishment of a Party committee within the CFA, have resulted in the CCP's central leadership bodies being in a better position to control, coordinate, and direct the management of football in China in a 'top-down' manner.The Xi Jinping era has therefore not seen a 'depoliticisation' of Chinese football governance, 84 but rather a hierarchization and (re)centralization, with clearer lines of authority and responsibility as to who is 'steering' and who is 'rowing.' 85 FIFA member associations, including the CFA, are obliged under article 15 of the FIFA Statutes to 'comply with the principles of good governance.' 86 This includes that national football associations must be 'independent and avoid any form of political interference.' 87 However, the study shows that the CFA is not politically independent from Chinese party-state actors.In retrospect, it can be concluded that the institutional changes in Chinese football governance do not envisage an 'independently' operating CFA, but rather a concerted and coordinated effort in the Chinese policymaking process to implement the directives and instructions from the Chinese political centre under the leadership of Xi Jinping as quickly and comprehensively as possible at all levels.
Looking at the existing literature, one might get the impression that 'top-down' institutional transformation efforts in the form of anti-corruption campaigns and the creation of new high-level political actors are nothing new or exceptional, but have been used time and again by previous Chinese party-state administrations, especially in perceived crisis situations, to enforce their policies in the face of resistance from local actors, even before the Xi Jinping era in recent decades. 88However, it is argued that the scale and scope of these 'top-down' restructuring efforts of the Chinese policymaking process towards 'top-level design' in the Xi Jinping era have been so extensive and profound that they have led to lasting changes in the institutional setting and the corresponding hierarchical actor constellations and modes of interaction between the higher-level central party-state and the lower-level administrative as well as non-administrative socioeconomic actors in the PRC.
From today's perspective, Chinese football does not seem to have developed positively in many respects.For example, almost a decade after the publication of the 'Overall Football Reform, ' the Chinese national teams are not really competitive compared to successful East Asian national teams such as South Korea and Japan, with the Chinese women's national team regularly performing better than the men's team.This raises gender issues and questions about the effectiveness of centralized and hierarchical 'top-down' policymaking processes in the Xi Jinping era in achieving successful policy outcomes in football, sport and beyond.Future research could address these issues.