Negotiated Agreements and Sámi Reindeer Herding in Sweden: Evaluating Outcomes

Abstract In the European north, there is a growing trend for Sámi reindeer herding communities to enter negotiated agreements with developers on projects that aim to exploit land and natural resources. This paper offers, for the first time, an evaluation of the content of a selection of these agreements, drawing on a sample of 15 agreements from five communities in Sweden. The evaluation was conducted from a Sámi perspective on how the agreements affect the ability of herding communities to safeguard reindeer wellbeing. The overall conclusion is that the agreements provide some positive contributions to mitigate harm to the reindeer, but also contribute considerable risks. We argue that agreements might have a meaningful role to play in the integration of Sámi rights in land and resource decisions, but herding communities have considerable space to increase the range of clauses – guided by larger goals of Sámi self-determination.


Introduction
In the European north, there is a growing trend for Sámi reindeer herding communities to enter negotiated agreements with developers of projects that aim to exploit land and natural resources.One important driver of this trend may be a growing resistance to resource developments on Sámi lands.While many developments commence with scant regard for Sámi rights and interest, herding communities have in recent years been successfully challenging developers as well as government actors, both in the national court system and in international fora (e.g., Brännstrom 2021).This likely provides motivation for developers to take proactive measures beyond legislative requirements and negotiate consent from herding communities, and agreement-making may here play a role.
Little if anything is publicly known about the content of these agreements and their implications for Sámi rights and livelihoods, including reindeer herding.This knowledge gap is reflected in the wider literature on agreements between developers and Indigenous Peoples, and it undermines informed debate about the efficacy of these agreements as a potential governance instrument.There is a substantial literature discussing the rationale for negotiated agreements and seeking to interpret their significance as mechanisms of corporate social responsibility or of neo-liberal governance (for recent reviews see Cascadden, Gunton, and Rutherford 2021;Gunton and Markey 2021;O'Faircheallaigh 2021).However, except for work by O'Faircheallaigh (2008O'Faircheallaigh ( , 2016)), there have been limited efforts by scholars to undertake empirical work focusing on the provisions of agreements themselves, and of how these might be evaluated in terms of their implications for Indigenous signatories.This gap is only partly explained by the existence of confidentiality clause in agreements, a constraint which can be overcome through the negotiation of appropriate research protocols with groups involved in agreement making, a point to which we return in discussing our methodology.
In this article, we offer-for the first time-an analysis of a selection of agreements involving Sami reindeer herders in Sweden.We also develop and apply criteria for evaluating agreements, criteria developed in collaboration with Sami reindeer herders and focused on the wellbeing of reindeer affected by development projects.Our research draws added significance from the fact that previous work on agreements focuses on Anglo-Saxon settler states and almost exclusively on extractive industries (Caine and Krogman 2010;Cameron and Levitan 2014;O'Faircheallaigh 2016;Howlett and Lawrence 2017;Papillon and Rodon 2017).Little is known from other regions, including the Arctic outside Canada, or about agreements in sectors other than mining, oil and gas.The few studies we find from the Arctic are about benefit-sharing agreements in Russia, highlighting the formative role of its special 'illiberal' political conditions (Tysiachniouk et al. 2018;Sulyandziga 2019).Because of the different political and cultural circumstances in the Nordic countries, studying the content of agreements in Sápmi considerably expands the empirical knowledge base on which to gauge their significance and impact, especially as we expand our focus beyond extractive industry to include a substantial number of agreements dealing with wind power and tourism, activities that increasingly affect the territories of Indigenous peoples across the globe.
In response to these empirical knowledge gaps about agreements in Sápmi and globally, this paper reports on a study that had three objectives: i.To develop a method for the evaluation of agreements between Sámi reindeer herding communities and commercial developers, based on a set of criteria defined in relation to what the Sámi communities hope to achieve through the negotiations.ii.To identify the sorts of provisions being negotiated between Sámi reindeer herding communities and developers across multiple industry sectors, including renewable energy and tourism; iii.To test our evaluation methods in a review of a selection of agreements, contributing both empirical insights and setting directions for future research about agreements in Sápmi.

International Outlook on Agreements
The development in the Nordics is part of a trend globally with agreements-variously labeled as impact-benefit agreements or community development agreements-during the past decades becoming increasingly popular as a complementary governance instrument.In concrete terms, they are tools for involved parties to seek agreement on the conditions for an industrial project to proceed, including distribution of benefits and mitigation of harms.Depending on perspective, the underlying purposes can be diverse: accommodating community concerns, supporting governments in implementing policy goals, and aiding developers obtain so-called social license to operate (e.g., Papillon and Rodon 2017;Gunton and Markey 2021).Notwithstanding, in an Indigenous context, negotiated agreements with developers tend to emerge as a response to gaps in state regulation as regards the integration of Indigenous rights in resource decisions (O'Faircheallaigh 2016).From the perspective of Indigenous groups, agreement-making can form part of a larger portfolio of strategies to defend rights when states fail to honor their duties.These alternative strategies include lobbying, court action and public protests (Thériault, Bourgeois, and Boirin-Fargues 2021).Indeed, many agreements come about only after substantial Indigenous resistance, when developers recognize that it is in their own best interest to seriously attend to Indigenous concerns (see also Tysiachniouk et al. 2018).
With such strategic engagement, agreement-making can comprise a path for Indigenous groups to gain more decision-making authority in line with their aspirations for self-determination (e.g., Boron and Markey 2020).From this view, O'Faircheallaigh (2016) has discussed how agreement-making can be a method for Indigenous groups to proactively insert themselves into resource governance that otherwise offer little recognition of their rights.Through extensive analyses of agreements in Australia and Canada, he has shown how some Indigenous organizations have managed to use agreements to extract from companies benefits and mitigation measures that far exceed those required under legislation, significantly raising the bar for the interpretation of what constitutes equitable resource governance.
Agreement-making is, however, a double-edged sword.It can also shift responsibilities from governments to developers and risk confusing legal responsibilities with voluntary measures, in turn, raising issues about democratic accountability and legitimacy in environmental governance (Brock et al. 2021).Some scholars discuss how developers can lure Indigenous parties into agreements that undermine their rights, a phenomenon sometimes known as 'manufactured consent' (Brigg 2018).Decision makers and the wider public may interpret agreements as expressions of freely obtained consent, although the Indigenous groups may have felt forced to the negotiation table.One reason may be a lack of viable routes to resist an undesirable project on their traditional lands (see also Szablowski 2010;Papillon and Rodon 2017).
In the literature, the space for Indigenous agency to meaningfully engage with so-called 'extraction contracting' (Scott 2020) is thus hotly debated: are agreements nothing but neoliberal governance instruments biased against Indigenous groups or do they, under the right conditions, help ensure social justice for them?Kotalainen et al. (2022:2) talks about the existence of a dichotomy in the academic literature, with opposing frames viewing agreements as either a 'neoliberal tool for the exploitation of indigenous peoples… [or] instruments that facilitate sustainable community development.'Contributions to this debate should be pursued via contextual analysis and empirical evidence.The current paucity of empirical evidence in evaluating outcomes of agreements, already highlighted above, is also underscored by recent reviews of the literature, such as that of Gunton and Markey (2021).

Study Context
Reindeer herding is a fundamental part of traditional Sámi culture and livelihood (together with, e.g., hunting and fishing), exercised on close to 55% of Sweden's land area.The impacts of renewable energy projects, such as for wind power, and the search for critical raw materials combine with forestry and other infrastructure as well as escalating climate change.Both individually and cumulatively, such projects provoke accelerating land dispossession and disturbances, threatening to both undermine remaining functional reindeer pastures (Stoessel, Moen, and Lindborg 2022) and burden herding communities with disproportionate transaction costs when participating in decision-making processes that give limited scope for influence (e.g., Widmark and Sandstrom 2012;Österlin and Raitio 2020).
When engaging in court proceedings during environmental permitting of such commercial projects the legal grounds evoked by reindeer herding communities involve the reindeer herding right.This right is a civil right recognized and regulated though the Reindeer Herding Act (SFS 1971:437) (Allard 2011, 165).Swedish property law in general distinguishes between private interests (enskilt intresse), to which civil based rights belong, and public interests (allmänt intresse), where also Sámi reindeer herding is considered a public interest.The protection of Sámi reindeer herding is expressed both in various national laws and through the state's international obligations to protect Sámi rights and culture (as an Indigenous people and 'national minority').
Yet, land use planning and licensing suffer from a host of issues when it comes to the protection of Sámi rights.This is something for which Sweden has received repeated criticism from, e.g., from the Council of Europe and the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (see e.g. the opinion on the case of a proposed mine in Rönnbäcken, CERD (Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination) 2020).Two of the many issues concern the lack of consent requirements and a lack of formalized mechanisms for meaningful Sámi influence in impact assessments (Raitio, Allard, and Lawrence 2020).In this view, negotiated agreements can be considered a private law mechanism through which reindeer herding communities and commercial developers seek to fill a gap in state regulations, aiming to resolve disagreements pertaining to Sámi property rights and to compensation for the infringement of those rights (for a legal discussion of the contract law applicable to Sámi herding communities in Sweden, see Brännstrom and Allard 2019).
The regulatory procedures of planning and/or licensing of resource exploitation on traditional Sámi lands look different depending on, e.g., the nature of the activity, its scale and location.It is beyond the scope of this paper to review these legal intricacies that although crucial to explaining outcomes in specific cases will not have bearing on this paper's ambition to map outcomes in a wider sample.We ask readers to instead see the following key works for more insights on the statutory processes: Mineral extraction: Raitio, Allard, and Lawrence (2020), municipal planning, including of relevance for wind power: Bjärstig et al. (2020); forestry: Brännstrom (2017); and more broadly about (the failures in) governance of cumulative effects (Kløcker Larsen et al. 2017).

Materials and Method
The research reported here was undertaken as a collaboration between the authors and the Sámiid Rikkasearvi (Swedish Sámi Association, SSR), guided by participatory action research principles (e.g., Greenwood and Levin 2007) and research ethics in a Sámi context (see e.g.Drugge 2016 and the research guidelines published by SSR: https://www.sapmi.se/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/forskning-eng.pdf ).Prior to commencing the study, the proposed method was reviewed and approved by the Stockholm Environment Institute's ethics committee (case reference number 2020-12-14-01).
We initially signed an agreement with SSR about how to protect the integrity of the participating reindeer herding communities and individual knowledge holders.This included us as authors committing to ensure anonymity, for the herding communities and individual Sámi participants.We also undertook to respect confidentiality clauses in the collected agreements, hence also protecting the integrity of the corporate signatories (for this approach to confidentiality, see O 'Faircheallaigh 2016, 84).When a community expressed interest in participating in the study, it was asked to share its written consent, which included a confidentiality agreement with SSR.Prior to interviews, we also obtained written consent from each interviewee, using consent form and information sheet approved by SSR.Following the study, each reindeer herding community was offered a bilateral meeting to share key findings and feedback.
The research was conducted using an approach adapted from that pioneered by O'Faircheallaigh (2016,(66)(67)(68)(69)(70)(71)(72)(73)(74)(75)(76)(77)(78)(79)(80)(81)(82) in his analyses of agreements between Aboriginal groups and mining companies in Australia.In essence, this method starts with identifying the purposes that an Indigenous group has when engaging in negotiations, and on this basis developing relevant criteria and scales for assessing agreements.This allows for a ranking of agreements from the Indigenous group's own perspective.In so doing, the purpose was to pursue a situated and contextual analysis, respectful of the invariably place-based character of Indigenous culture and relations to land (e.g., Joks, Østmo, and Law 2020).Importantly, a scale can include criteria that exceed what may be observed in agreements today, i.e., allowing for critique based on a wider understanding about what could be included in an agreement.
We undertook the following three steps: i. Identifying the purposes of Sámi reindeer herding districts when engaging in agreement-making: Data generation through interviews.ii.Developing a scale with criteria, allowing for evaluation of the agreements based on the views of the Sámi actors: Based on the interviews.iii.Applying the scale in an analysis of the collected agreements: Review of agreements collected, ranking them according to the scale, using the aggregate understanding from interviews, literature, and insights from the authors' own experiences with agreements.
The collection of agreements was initiated with a written request sent by SSR to all herding communities that are members of the association (Nov.2020).In total, we received 15 agreements from five reindeer herding communities.To protect the integrity of the reindeer herding districts and respect confidentiality clauses in the agreements, results below are presented in anonymized form.
Exploration of the reindeer herding communities' intended purposes with agreement making was undertaken through interviews, seeking to be guided by árbediehto-traditional Sámi knowledge.Árbediehto has been defined as the Sámi Peoplés collective wisdom and skills, which have been used to enhance their livelihoods for centuries (Porsanger and Guttorm 2011).This is knowledge that is transferred orally since upbringing, where personal experiences are guided by wisdom of older generations.Herders' broad understanding of how to predict and make decisions about the reindeer and land use during different seasons and climate conditions is informed by this traditional knowledge (Kuoljok 2020).Like for other Indigenous Peoples, little is documented about árbediehto and we hence had to ask traditional knowledge holders for their guidance.
A round of semi-structured interviews was conducted (Jan.-Mar.2021).Participants with personal experiences from agreement-making were invited from reindeer herding communities, seeking to capture a diversity of views: across different types of reindeer herding (mountain vs forest herding), gender, and geographical location (county).In total, six interviews were conducted: #1: Southern Norrbotten, mountain community, male; #2: Southern Norrbotten, forest community, male; #3: Southern Västerbotten, mountain community, female; #4: Central Västerbotten, mountain community, female; #5: Southern Västerbotten, mountain community, female; #6: Northern Norrbotten, mountain community, male.Interview questions were open-ended, aiming to allow the participants themselves to define how agreements may be meaningful to them.They took place via phone and were recorded and transcribed and later fact checked with each person (phone interviews were chosen, rather than face-to-face meetings, to reduce health risks for participants during the ongoing covid-19 pandemic).
Once we had developed a proposed scale for analysis of the agreements, we further validated it with a group of elders and other traditional knowledge holders within reindeer herding.This was similarly done through individual phone conversations, wherein the scale and criteria was presented verbally and feedback received from an additional number of six people: male from forest herding community in Southern Norrbotten, male from mountain herding community in northern Jämtland, male from mountain herding community in northern Dalarna, female from mountain herding district in northern Västerbotten, female from mountain herding community in northern Västerbotten, and male from mountain herding community in northern Norrbotten.
The subsequent analysis was done in stages: Initially, the first two agreements we received were reviewed by all project team members, informing a joint understanding of potential agreement content.Two people from the team then reviewed all 15 agreements and cross-checked findings.When the review identified clauses in agreements that we had not anticipated, then we updated the scale with additional/adapted criteria to ensure such clauses could be adequately captured in the analysis.
As will be elaborated below, the interviews indicated that the key purpose for Sámi reindeer herding communities, when engaging in agreements is to mitigate impacts and protect reindeer wellbeing.We hence constructed a scale with several sub-themes, addressing this topic.In the Sámi herding perspective elicited in this study, any new resource development and associated land dispossession will always carry with it some negative impact that can never be adequately compensated, regardless of socio-economic benefits.The 'best' score on the scale was thus set to −1.Less favorable scores were then sequentially set as − 2, − 3, − 4 and −5.The number of levels varies somewhat between the themes within the scale, dependent on potential range of outcomes.
The criteria were organized into six themes, all contributing toward reindeer wellbeing.While the criteria were initially co-developed with the Sámi experts on negotiations and traditional knowledge holders, the thematic organization and final ordering of criteria is the responsibility of the authors alone.Following O' Faircheallaigh and Corbett (2005), if an agreement met several criteria within a theme, then we allocated the most generous (i.e., highest) score.This helps address the complication that arises to comparison when agreements vary in extent and number of clauses.

Reindeer Well-Being: A Scale for the Evaluation of Agreements
Following Sámi legend, the reindeer and the humans have, since time immemorial, had an accord that has shaped the Sámi relationship to the reindeer.The saemieh (humans) committed to protect the reindeer from danger and suffering and the reindeer, in turn, provides the saemieh with what they needed to survive in a harsh environment.In this traditional Sámi view, the destinies of the humans and the reindeer is hence spiritually and materially intertwined.
Today's generation of reindeer herders are critically aware of their responsibility for the lands they have inherited from their ancestors.As one person stated: 'The lands are only on loan and we must pass them on in the same state as we given them -or, rather, preferably in better shape' .This commitment is difficult if not impossible to live up to for most herders, due to the extensive land dispossession and encroachments experienced by other land users, including forestry, wind power, mining, and hydropower.One person explained the situation: 'It is difficult to practice our Sámi approach to the land.We no longer have untouched or undisturbed lands.[All lands] are in some ways exploited…' .
Participants all described, in their words, what is understood as an abysmal disappointment with the way the Swedish state prevents them from protecting their ancestral lands and honor their obligations to the reindeer.This disappointment is, arguably, one reason why reindeer herding districts increasingly have turned to the courts in their struggle for their rights.This also supports the view that it is due to a regulatory failure that agreement-making comes to be seen as a relevant option.
The primary objective for reindeer herders, when engaging in agreement-making, is to try and negotiate some measure of protection for the lands and safeguard the reindeer via various mitigation measures.As such, participants all talked about how reindeer herding communities rarely if ever opt for agreements out of free will or a hope of socio-economic benefits.Instead, communities find themselves pushed into agreement-making as means of mitigating harm, e.g., when perceiving that the developer is intending to proceed without Sámi consent.As one person stated: 'My experience is that, by and large, we're forced to sign agreements.Since we don't see other options, because there is no real protection for us' .Another echoed: 'I don't want any financial compensation.What I want… is lands that I can use…' .
Below, we present the six themes we have used to organize the criteria for assessing the agreements (Figure 1).For each theme the reindeer in the center and the score of − 1 represents the best possible, or least harmful, outcome.Moving away from the center, each circle represents a less favorable, or more unfavorable, outcome, for example as time demands and workload for the Sami community when implementing agreements grow.The following sections examine each theme and their criteria.

Consideration for Harm to the Reindeer
The criteria under this theme are summarized below (Table 1).The most comprehensive way that agreements can provide concrete mitigation measures is to either guarantee access to compensatory pastures (of equal quality to those lands appropriated by the development) or finance improvements in existing pastures not affected by the development (e.g., via re-vegetation or re-planting).However, given that few if any pastures in Swedish Sápmi are today unused by reindeer herding or undisturbed by developments, providing access to compensatory pastures is rarely an option.Clauses may instead require the developer to halt activities periodically, based on considerations for reindeer herding, for instance during the seasons that reindeer will be migrating to/through the area.This mitigates impacts on the reindeer's way of life, including on seasonal migration.A next, less favorable, option is to require the development be designed with measures to avoid harm on the reindeer e.g., reflected in how roads are constructed, design of ecoducts, larger fences to steer the herd movement, when blasting takes place, the seasonal timing of transports, and construction activities.Failing that, smaller measures can be included in the implementation of activities, often only for limited periods, e.g., when roads are snow plowed (a road free from snow will allow the reindeer to move easier, increasing the risk of scattering of the herd) or the use of road salt (attracts the reindeer and exposes them to traffic accidents).Finally, the worst alternative under this theme is that the agreement takes no consideration of the risk of harm to the reindeer whatsoever, i.e., is void of mitigation measures.

Financial Compensation to Counter Harm on the Reindeer
Even if herding communities have no interest in financial benefits per se, economic compensation can play a role in enabling the community to safeguard reindeer well-being (Table 2).The most desirable option here is revenue sharing, i.e., that the reindeer herding community has a right to receive a share of the income accrued from the project which it can, in turn, invest in mitigation measures and/or employment of own management staff.Next, clauses can require compensation measures that are related to the actual impacts experienced during a project; this flexibility is desirable since it is typically difficult to predict impacts during the planning phase.However, the evidentiary burden is placed with the reindeer herding community to demonstrate impacts, involving additional efforts and costs for the herders.A third option is that the developer commits to a fixed financial compensation, which can be paid as a lump sum or through regular installments but which, because it is fixed, lacks adaptiveness.An even less favorable outcome is when clauses prevent the reindeer herding community from presenting future demands for compensation (e.g., through formulations that the agreed compensation represents a final solution for all time).Finally, the worst outcome is when agreements entirely lack provision for financial compensation.

Time Demands and Workload for the Sámi Community
A key concern for herding communities is about time demands and workload arising from a new commercial development, when they are already struggling with time and capacity constraints due to a need to react to the cumulative pressures from other land uses.Here, it is beneficial if agreements require the developer to provide financial resources for the Sámi community to recruit and supervise necessary staff to undertake implementation and follow-up on the agreement, on the community's behalf (Table 3).Ideally, such devoted capacity funding (distinct from the general funding toward mitigation noted above in Table 2) would be channeled through an intermediary organization, reducing the risks of undue influence from the developer.Next, the herding community can be financially compensated one-to-one for all work demanded by the agreement, including participation in meetings and internal preparations.However, this still demands that herding families divert their time, focus and energies away from herding or other livelihood activities.Failing this, communities might obtain guarantees for financial compensation for meetings only, i.e., not own preparations between meetings or other inputs required.A worse alternative is when clauses require the reindeer herders to invest time and resources in the implementation of the agreement, without any compensation.This can occur through expectations of participation in unpaid meetings, or in monitoring activities, or in supporting the developer in communications with regulatory bodies.Finally, the worst option is when the developer has a right to unilaterally and without compensation demand, at any time, certain interventions from the herding community (for example to gather and remove reindeer from the area).

Influence in Decision Making Under the Agreement
The preferred way for herding communities to have influence in externally initiated commercial developments on their land is via co-governance, ensuring that the reindeer herding district is involved in decision making on equal footing and in all phases of project life (e.g., planning, implementation, follow-up) (Table 4).This could include representation in the board or other governance organs of the companies involved.However, whereas this has been tried by Indigenous groups elsewhere, to our knowledge no such examples exist in Sápmi.Another way for communities to have some degree of influence is when agreements grant specific mandates on key decision points for the community, for example to temporarily halt project activities out of concerns with reindeer well-being.This allows for meeting the needs of the reindeer as she migrates and her continuously changing use of the land, dependent on for instance weather and external pressures.Next, agreements may entirely fail to provide the community with any possibilities to influence decisions.For instance, the developer can commit to inform and/or request inputs on certain matters, but without any commitment to act on or This can be expressed in several ways: the project description lacks detail, consent is given not only to a specific project but also subsequent extensions (whether in time or space), or the project lacks a clear end date.Another and even worse outcome, is when clauses explicitly prohibit the community from filing complaints or appeals over the project, whether now or in the future, e.g., in case the developer later desires to expand the project (so-called gag clauses).In effect, these two final outcomes remove all possibilities for the community to exert meaningful influence.

Dispute Resolution
The preferred way for Sámi herding communities to address disputes is via mediation since it tends to carry fewer financial costs/risks (Table 5).Next, disputes can be resolved in public court, demanding considerable resources from the reindeer herding district, but still avoiding the full scope of financial risks that come with private arbitration (although the losing side will typically be expected to pay for the legal costs of the winning side).Arbitration tends to be so costly that, even if the community is only expected to shoulder own costs, then it will be unable to use this venue and hence in practice precluded from access to dispute resolution.This is why, when referring disputes to arbitration court, the developer may commit to shoulder the costs of the reindeer herding community.This provision of funds from the developer is typically a prerequisite for the community to use this expensive form of dispute resolution mechanism.However, arbitration courts are still a worse option since they are bound by confidentiality rules, preventing the community from communicating with other parties or the public.The worst option is when the agreement is void of mechanisms for effective dispute resolution, or otherwise contains clauses that have this effect (e.g., refers to arbitration courts, with a need to shoulder own litigation costs).

Accountabilities in Implementing the Agreement
As regards accountability lines, a preferred option is that the agreement stipulates a clear follow-up (Table 6) process to monitor actual impacts and opportunities for the reindeer herding community to demand adjustments, with the objective of avoiding No meaningful dispute resolution harm on the reindeer.Failing that, it is helpful if the herding community has the possibility to re-negotiate or exit the agreement, if it turns out that it does not meaningfully compensate for actual damages.A less favorable option is when the agreement contains no clauses about re-negotiation or exiting, which means that the agreement either applies to a stated period or as long as the commercial project is active.Even worse is when clauses grant the developer a unilateral right to exit or renegotiate the agreement, e.g., if experiencing unexpected financial costs or if it considers that the herding community is not honoring its obligations.The worst option is confidentiality clauses that prohibit the reindeer herding community from sharing parts or all of the agreement with other parties, preventing seeking support from other organizations in protecting rights and interests (e.g., with government offices, researchers, civil society, media).
From the summary of results (Figure 2), an immediate observation is that few of the agreements contain clauses in the higher range of the scale (−1, −2), which is less damaging for reindeer herding.Meanwhile, there is a dominance of clauses in the medium-lower range (−3, −4, −5), which are unfavorable from the perspective of reindeer herding.
In this analysis we first treat one theme at a time and then draw some wider conclusions.Most insights can be gleaned directly from the ranking of agreements.However, some observations are not visible in this summary (Figure 2), given our approach to allocate the most generous score if agreements contained clauses at several levels (see "Methods" section), and these observations are then noted separately.
Consideration for harm: More than half of the agreements (8) contained clauses requiring the developer to design and implement larger measures to reduce harm to the reindeer, for instance via ecoducts or in the planning of road construction and building of facilities.In contrast, several (5) agreements were void of measures to avoid impacts on reindeer wellbeing.However, this latter observation must be read with caution since it is possible that communities opted not to pursue such measures in the agreements since they had obtained mitigation measures as part of the conditions posed on the license by the land and environmental court (this was observed for a couple of agreements).
Financial compensation: The most common approach was for the developer to offer fixed financial compensation (7 agreements).Two agreements provided no financial compensation and six agreements contained clauses that explicitly prevented the reindeer herding communities from presenting future demands (relevant if a project would result in unforeseen impacts).One agreement contained a more beneficial clause (on the level of −1) about revenue sharing, something we return to below.Time demands and workload: The most common option was for agreements to place demands on communities to invest time and resources in the implementation of the agreement, without any compensation (12 agreements).Only two examples were found of communities having obtained financial compensation for participation in meetings.No agreements compensated for time and other resources invested in preparatory or follow-up activities outside of meetings.As such, clauses about collaboration and communication for the implementation of agreements were often problematic: placing demands for unpaid contributions through time and traditional knowledge.These demands could take various forms, for example concerning meetings or contributions to, or review of, the commercial developers' reports to government agencies.In other words, the reindeer herding districts are here drawn into inequitable relationships, making unpaid contributions to activities that ultimately serve the economic interest of the developer.
Sámi influence under the agreement: This is an area where the agreements performed particularly poorly.In most instances (11 agreements), the developers had only agreed to inform or listen to the reindeer herding districts, without commitment to any actual Sámi influence in decisions.More than half of the agreements (9) contained so-called open consent clauses, removing possibilities for the community to exert meaningful influence.A rare exception involved one community that obtained a specific mandate to temporarily halt project activity to protect reindeer well-being.An important finding not immediately evident from the results summary (Figure 2) is that more than half (9) of the agreements contained so-called gag-clauses prohibiting the reindeer herding communities from filing complaints or otherwise resisting the project.One type of clause was observed that placed an additional demand on the community to actively express support for the commercial project toward the regulatory government authority (e.g., the County Board) or actively lobby to ensure a positive attitude from other organizations (e.g., the Sámidiggi).
Dispute resolution: Here, the most common (7 agreements) was to refer to public courts, with two additional agreements also adding mediation as a first mechanism.This latter approach is the most advantageous for reindeer herding districts since mediation is less burdensome financially.Six agreements lacked meaningful or practicable dispute resolution mechanisms, including referring disputes to arbitration court with demands on the reindeer herding district to shoulder own costs.In effect, access to justice is then absent since herders rarely if ever will be able to pay these costs.
Accountabilities: Several agreements (7) provided developers a unilateral right to re-negotiate or exit the agreement, for instance if the reindeer herding community was deemed to not comply with the agreement or the developer was exposed to more stringent conditions by the regulatory government authority or environmental court.Only one agreement had a clause providing the community with the possibility to re-negotiate or exit the agreement if it did not meaningfully compensate for actual damages.An observation not evident from the results summary (Figure 2) is a recurrence of confidentiality clauses (8 agreements) -preventing herding communities from disclosing information about their agreements (helpful, e.g., when seeking support from other organizations in protecting their rights and interests).

Analysis
Looking for emerging patterns across the results in the six themes, we can again take inspiration from earlier work of O'Faircheallaigh (2016) in studies of agreements between Aboriginal groups and mining companies in Australia.Here, he found that that Indigenous groups either tend to negotiate an agreement that is strong across most or all aspects or weak across most or all aspects.This is important since such findings help deconstruct the narrative sometimes found in public discourse that agreement-making is a 'give-and-take' .Rather, it supports a view that it is strategic for Indigenous communities to stick to their principles based on the right to self-determination in all matters negotiated.Did we find such pattern also in our sample of agreements from the Swedish side of Sápmi?
In some instances, there is indeed a tendency for agreements to be either stronger or weaker across themes; compare for instance a set of somewhat 'better' agreements (agreements no. 1, 6 and 9) with those that contain multiple −4 and −5 clauses (agreements no. 2, 4, 8 and 12).To protect the integrity of the reindeer herding communities as well as corporate parties we cannot disclose details about performance across communities in this limited sample of agreements.Yet, we can say that we see an indication that some herding communities have come out with the worst outcomes across themes in several agreements, while other communities, several times, obtained better outcomes.As we touched upon in the introduction, we may speculate that key factors that explain at least part of this variation pertains to differences in resources, competence, and access to strategic advisory and legal counsel (Szablowski 2010;Papillon and Rodon 2017).However, we have not examined such explanatory factors in this preliminary study, and they remain for further research.
There are also several agreements where it is hard to discern coherence in outcomes across themes.Admittedly, this can in part be an artifact of our method, i.e., the judgments made in the selection of criteria and development of themes.Still, from our reading of the agreements, there may also be substantive reasons for the varied outcomes across themes within the same agreement.Several agreements were clearly focused on one or a few objectives, for instance the construction of a fence (agreement 3), the possibility to periodically halt a ski lift to protect the reindeer (agreement 9), or a type of revenue sharing from quarry mining (agreement 15).This could suggest that Sámi herding communities involved in this study have been approaching agreement-making in a selective manner, focusing on obtaining specific outcomes in one area rather than consistently pursuing broader goals based on their reindeer herding rights.Some variation in outcomes appears partly explained by the type or size of the commercial development being negotiated.In the only instance, besides those concerned with dispute resolution, where a reindeer herding community had obtained a −1 clause, this a sort of revenue sharing from a smaller quarry (also mentioned above).In contrast, all but one of the wind power companies managed to sway the reindeer herding communities to accept a combination of high-risk or − 5 clauses, on open ended consent (for instance allowing undefined projects), gag clauses (wherein the herding communities give up their right to appeal to government or courts), and confidentiality clauses (preventing communities from publicly communicating about their experiences).We may here speculate that the negotiations with a smaller, and even locally owned, enterprise tend to take place on a somewhat more level playing field than is the case for national or even international energy companies, which often will have much greater financial and legal muscles.Again, these are speculations pointing to the need for further research that probes into the factors explaining variation in outcomes.

Conclusions
In this paper, we have offered a first evaluation of the content of agreements between Sámi reindeer herding communities and commercial developers, focusing on the impacts on the ability of herders to safeguard reindeer wellbeing.Cognizant of the rift in the literature on agreements and the tendency of dichotomized analytical positions (e.g., Kotilainen, Peltonen, and Reinikainen 2022), the ambition in this study was to combine a critical lens on the risks presented by agreement-making (e.g., Szablowski 2010; Papillon and Rodon 2017) with an openness as to the possibility that agreements can play a meaningful role for Sámi herding communities in asserting claims to self-determination (O'Faircheallaigh and Corbett 2005;Thériault, Bourgeois, and Boirin-Fargues 2021).
To be sure, several agreements yielded some positive outcomes, e.g., larger measures to reduce harm to the reindeer and financial compensation.Yet, the overall conclusion is that the harmful outcomes generally outweigh the limited gains.This was especially evident in the high-risk agreements for wind power, containing a combination of open consent, gag clauses, and confidentiality.Arguably, it is noteworthy that the renewable energy projects, promoted as part of the green transition, were those with some of the worst outcomes for herding communities.This general finding is also supported by the few available analyses of specific cases, for instance the effort of the Muonio reindeer herding community to negotiate an agreement with the Kaunis Iron mine (e.g., Haikola and Anshelm 2016;Kløcker Larsen et al. 2022).This supports the view that the green transition, contrary to espoused objectives, often-times deepens an entrenched colonial mode of industrial land dispossession (Össbo 2023).
A key finding was that several agreements were focused on obtaining specific outcomes for the protection of reindeer well-being, rather than showing evidence of a consistent and strategic approach to pursue larger goals of Sámi self-determination.There may be multiple explanations for this, something that lends itself well to further research.However, an important argument emerging from this study must be that Sámi herding communities, and other Sámi organizations, could widen their view on what can legitimately be included in agreements.Internationally, examples exist of agreements offering extensive forms of revenue sharing, a right to veto expansions of developments, and the right to close a project if not respecting the conditions of the agreement (O'Faircheallaigh 2016).Such clauses can far exceed the protection provided by government regulations.To try and change this situation, factors such as financial resources and competence development among Sámi organizations seems critical.
Árbediehto was critical for this study (e.g., Porsanger and Guttorn 2011), with the guidance from Sámi elders and negotiators enabling the critical analysis from a Sámi herding perspective.Yet, many questions remain unexplored.For one, herders' views on and engagement in agreement-making may tell us many things about Sámi views on land and sustainability-views that often remain marginalized in the shadow of state and corporate discourses (e.g., Johnsen, Benjaminsen, and Gaup Eira 2015).Moreover, it is relevant to consider what mistranslations may be happening in the journey from Sámi situated views on the land and its social relations (e.g., Joks, Østmo, and Law 2020), when communities are forced to abide to both Swedish law and language in the negotiation of private contracts.
The further development of evaluation methods for agreement-making in Sápmi is an obvious task for future research.This includes probing what constitutes the most relevant scales and criteria for evaluation of outcomes as well as how Sámi worldviews can guide such studies.A range of knowledge gaps require dedicated long-term research, some which include: (i) What other purposes may the Sámi People have with agreements?The reindeer herding right also includes a right to other land uses, such as fishing and hunting, and strong interests may exist in Sámi cultural heritage and craftmanship; (ii) What factors explain variation in agreement outcomes?Potential factors noted above are, e.g., the degree of (in)equality between the parties and the resources and experiences held by the Sámi community; (iii) What experiences do Sámi organizations have from the implementation of agreements?Anecdotal evidence suggests that implementation of agreements is challenging and commitments hard to enact.
Finally, the openness about the potential meaningfulness of agreements could not, at present, embrace the possibility of positive agreement scores, which could leave Sámi herding communities better off than they were before the development took place.This is because the guidance received from Sámi participants in this study posited that the starting point for most if not all communities is that developments are undesirable: They provoke land dispossession in a situation where land already is a limiting factor for cultural protection let alone cultural development.Analytical emphasis thus had to be on the degree to which agreements help mitigate harm and hence enable communities to safeguard reindeer well-being under already intense land dispossession and cumulative effects of competing land uses.
The observed Sámi approach to agreements is, we contend, to large extent a response to the political and legal context in Sápmi, notably the absence of consent mechanisms in resource regulations.In other words, the fact that Sámi communities are not enabled to have meaningful influence in regulatory decisions on commercial projects is a major reason why they feel forced to view externally initiated commercial developments a priori as unwanted.In this light, inevitably, agreement-making is primarily a means of reducing harm.Had a consent requirement and other means of meaningful influence existed in planning and licensing processes for commercial developments, e.g., in strategic land use planning, project design and governance, then the Sámi herding communities could potentially have a different view on the potential role for agreements.

Figure 1 .
Figure 1.Schematic of the scale of reindeer well-being, with its six Sub-themes.

Figure 2 .
Figure 2. evaluation results for the collected agreements.Shows the score for each agreement across the six themes, all part of the scale for reindeer well-being.the numbering of agreements is random.

Table 1 .
consideration for harm.

Table 3 .
time demands and workload.respond to the views of the community.A more detrimental outcome is when clauses involve the reindeer herding community giving open-ended consent to the project. otherwise

Table 4 .
influence in decision making under the agreement.