Exploiting International Development Ideals. The Rwandan Government’s Approach to Local Participation in Light of its Exercise of National Ownership

Abstract While the Rwandan government is acknowledged for assuming national ownership and eloquently commits to local participation, its participation practices are severely criticised and its governance deemed authoritarian. This points to a tension between two long-lasting ideals in international development cooperation and this article argues that – despite their shared aim of increased recipient agency, initiative, and influence – the interrelation between national ownership and local participation needs to be investigated. Rwanda, also known to prudently navigate opportunities and requirements of the aid sector, provides a critical case for such an investigation and the article asks how the Rwandan government’s approach to local participation relates to its exercise of national ownership. Based on previous own and others’ research along with extensive government and donor documentation, the analyses point to interlinkages in the government’s employment of the two ideals, and to the interrelation between national ownership and local participation inevitably depending on the recipient state and its population.


Introduction
A recurrent ambition in international development cooperation 1 is to increase recipient agency, initiative, and influence.Reflecting this ambition, the ideals of 'national ownership' and 'local participation' have for decades been unanimously adhered to.Though the reasoning behind national ownership is older, it was with the Paris declaration in 2005 that it gained prominence, for a while constituting the core of the aid effectiveness agenda.Based on the original ambition of shifting power from those who provide to those who receive aid, the assumption remains that development priorities and strategies should be domestically determined rather than shaped by donor agendas (Harper-Shipman, 2020;Hasselskog, 2022;Lie, 2019;GoS, 2016, p. 56f).Local participation, meanwhile, promoted since the 1960s, was rapidly adopted by the mainstream in the 1990s.During a decade, according to Mansuri and Rao (2013, p. 15), the World Bank alone allocated almost $85 billion to local participatory development and, since then, continued aid funding reflects the sustained belief that people should influence decisions that concern them rather than being exposed to externally determined interventions (Cornwall, 2011;Hasselskog, 2016;Hickey and Kothari, 2009;Ranjitkar and Haukanes, 2022).
Large, but separate, bodies of research point to a range of problems in the application of local participation and national ownership respectively (e.g.Cornwall, 2011;Harper-Shipman, 2020).What is more, the interrelation between the two ideals is not clear (Hasselskog, 2020).Both concerned with inherently asymmetric aid relations and aimed at increased recipient influence, they tend to be treated as conceptual siblings, talked about as a pair, and apparently assumed to go hand in hand.Ownership and participation are often used interchangeably and in combination, with Lie (2015), for example, consistently merging 'partnership, participation and ownership' (cf.Flint and Meyer zu Natrup, 2014, p. 273;Lie, 2019.Also, aid-recipient countries' ownership is frequently referred to as 'local', while the relevant distinction is reasonably between domestic and foreign, or internal and external (Arensman et al., 2017;Ejdus and Juncos, 2018).Such intermingling may be related to community development vocabulary, where 'local ownership' was a favoured ideal long before the Paris declaration.In contrast to the more recent ownership agenda, here ownership evidently refers to the community level, and the link with 'participation' is explicitcommunity members' active involvement in developmentrelated activities is expected to create a 'sense of ownership', and with that a sense of responsibility, such as for the maintenance of local infrastructure (Hasselskog, 2009;Lachapelle, 2008;Marks and Davies, 2012).
An increase of national ownership should however not be assumed to be conducive to local participation.That development priorities and strategies are domestically determined does not per se imply that the population has a say.Those who set the national agenda may not favour popular influence, and empirical research shows that strong national ownership often coincides with centralised state control and policymaking (Hasselskog, 2020;Rocha Menocal and Mulley, 2006;Whitfield, 2009).The relation between the two ideals therefore needs to be investigated.
Rwanda provides a critical case for such an investigation.The country is acknowledged for assuming ownership, closely following the Paris agenda, and reaching high scores on ownership indicators (GPEDC, 2018;Hasselskog et al., 2017), and the government eloquently affirms its commitment to local participation (Hasselskog, 2016).However, and pointing to the tension indicated above, its participation practices are severely criticised and its governance deemed authoritarian, not providing for local influence (Desrosier and Swedlund, 2019;GoS, 2019;Straus and Waldorf, 2011).
In Rwanda, as elsewhere, local participation is promoted largely through decentralisation reform and civil society 2 endorsement, which are also long-term favoured aid practices.Donor supported decentralisation, which has since the 1990s been adopted by a range of aid recipient countries across the world, started in Rwanda in 2000 (Arkorful et al., 2021;Chemouni, 2014;Gaynor, 2014b, p. 296;Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2015;Manor, 1999;RoR, 2001).Strengthening the role of subnational authorities is expected to bring decisions and services closer to the population, with participatory governance enabling citizens to influence public policies and hold those responsible to account (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007;Gaventa, 2002).The importance of a vivid civil society, meanwhile, is also strongly emphasised by international providers of aid as well as the Rwandan government (Protik et al., 2018;RGB, 2022a).A strong and active civil society is expected to facilitate for the population to voice their concerns and hold officials to account, thereby playing a crucial role in local participation and decentralised governance (Adamczyk, 2012, p. 63;GoS, 2016, p. 52ff;Manor, 1999, p. 8ff).
On the Rwandan scene, several widely promoted and intrinsically interrelated ideals and practices are thus playing out.As noted, there is an apparentthough possibly mistakenexpectation that when an aid recipient state gains ownership, it will adhere to the ideal of local participation, taking on and 'owning' related practices.The Rwandan government appears on the one handin its firmly expressed commitment and ambitious decentralisation and civil society policiesto be doing just that.On the other hand, the critique of participation practices and top-down decision-and policymaking indicates something different.
With the pronounced ambitions of national ownership as well as local participation, and with the tension between government commitment and observers' critique, Rwanda is expected to be a particularly illustrative case of how the reading and the practice of the two ideals may affect and relate to each other.The Rwandan government has for long been seen to skilfully 'deal' with donors (Whitfield, 2009).Still receiving large amounts of aid (World Bank, 2022b), it continues to navigate the international development community and its various ideals.As part of this navigating, how the government interprets and approaches local participation is likely to be contingent on how it interprets and exercises national ownership.Its stance towards aid providers, such as how it allowsor nottheir priorities to influence, will affect what decentralisation and civil society practices it pursues, and the apparent contradiction of proclaimed commitment to local participation, on the one hand, and top-down 2 Civil society is a complex phenomenon and concept, and this is not the place for a nuanced discussion on it.What the article does is to show and discuss how civil society is talked about by different actors in relation to local participation in Rwanda.In the article, as in the research and documentation that its builds on, what is implied are civic associations and organisations, which are assumedoften implicitlyto represent (parts of) the population and constitute a crucial building block of a democratic society, in addition to the state and the market.Related terms, such as CSOs and NGOs, are used as they are in the texts referred to.

Forum for Development Studies
decision-and policymaking, on the other, will be linked to how it handles national ownership.This article therefore asks how the Rwandan government's approach to local participation, in the context of decentralisation and civil society policies and practices, relates to its exercise of national ownership.
The article contributes to the literature by combining previous own and others' research and available government and donor documentation in new ways.Intentions and outcomes of local participation have been analysed, as have those of national ownership, in general and in Rwandan practice.Bringing two main elements of Rwandan development policy togetheri.e. the firm assuming of national ownership and the eloquent adhering to local participationwill reveal common traits and interlinkages.Analysing prevailing characteristics of participation practices, and relating them to those of national ownership, will shed light on the government's continuous navigating of opportunities and requirements provided by the aid sector.In so doing, the article also connects the two major debates in development thinking on local participation and national ownership, which have been conspicuously separated, and findings on the Rwandan case will shed light on possible interlinkages, also in countries where the exercise of national ownership and the approach to local participation are less pronounced, and the navigating of the aid community less proficient.

Materials and methods
While, due to the covid pandemic, no interviews have been conducted specifically for this article, the author's understanding of the Rwandan aid and development scene is informed by previous field work.Between 2011 and 2013, around 100 interviews were conducted with residents, community leaders and local officials in southern Rwanda, focusing on their experiences of several participatory development programmes.In 2015, then, interviews were conducted with key national officials, international advisors and donor representatives, focusing on their views on aid relations in the country.Over the same period, government and donor documentation were followed.What is most closely analysed and referred to here, are more recent government vision, policy and strategy documents related to decentralisation, civil society, and development cooperation, while aid provider documentation includes strategies and plans by the UN, the European Union and Sweden, as well as monitoring surveys and progress reports on aid effectiveness by OECD and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC).
Based on this material, and presented in the first sub-section below, local participation as asserted by the Rwandan government through decentralisation and civil society policies has been traced.The following sub-section discusses how these policies and their practices are interpreted by observers.In the third sub-section, qualities of local participation in Rwandan decentralisation and civil society practices are analysed, identifying what can be understood as the Rwandan government's approach to local participation.Aspects of this approach are then, in the next main section, related to the Rwandan government's exercise of national ownership.In the final section, Rwandan navigation of international development ideals is highlighted, also reminding of the original ambitions of national ownership to address the power imbalance between recipients and providers of aid, and of participation to increase people's influence on decisions that concern them.

Local participation
Assertion of participation through decentralisation and civil society endorsement

Historical context and current commitment
Traditions of local participation, decentralised governance and an independent civil society are largely lacking in Rwanda.The political order is historically highly centralised and hierarchical, not providing for participatory policy-and decision-making or political engagement by the population (Adamczyk, 2012, p. 65;Newbury, 1978;Uvin, 1998).
Before 1994, a decentralised structure was in place but, as Gaynor (2016, p. 782) notes, it operated in a tightly controlled manner, with upward rather than downward accountability and inadequate civic participation.The 'culture' among the population has also been continuously characterised as one of obedience and passivity, with people expecting to carry out instructions (Kantengwa et al., 2019, p. 5, 39;Kauzya, 2007, p. 84) though that view has also been challenged (Eramian, 2017).Civic associations and organisations, too, existed before 1994.In the 1980s, there were mainly associations for mutual aid, agricultural cooperatives, and developmental NGOs, while human rights organisations emerged in the early 1990s.After the genocide, new associations were created, largely to channel emergency aid and address social needs (Francois, 2017;ICNL, 2022;Mukunumana and Brynard, 2005, p. 668f).Organisations however remained state controlled and their role ambivalent.According to Uvin (1998, p. 169), they could not play a corrective policy-oriented role, and the conditions were lacking for a civil society to emerge (Adamczyk, 2012, p. 64ff;van Leeuwen, 2008).
The post-genocide government acknowledged centralisation and lack of popular participation as problems, also pointing to an undesirable attitude among the population.The 2001 decentralisation policy talks about 'Passivity, lack of initiative and dependency syndrome on the part of the majority of the population, caused especially by overcentralisation and exclusion from participation' (RoR, 2001, p. 4).Since then, the ideal of local participation has been firmly fostered (Hasselskog, 2016), as seen for instance in the 2003 constitution, asserting that all Rwandans have the duty to participate in the development of the country, and in the current government priority to: 'Increase Citizens' Participation and Engagement in Development' (RoR, 2017, p. 19).
Far-reaching decentralisation of the public sector is a crucial part of the government's political and developmental project.The 2001 decentralisation reform implied profound institutional change, introducing a new administrative division with partly new tiers of government.Roles and capacities of local authorities Forum for Development Studies expanded, and a series of local elections was held in a complex mix of direct and indirect, secret and non-secret voting (Chemouni, 2014, p. 246ff).Local participation was a central motivation of the reform, with the overall objective 'to ensure political, economic, social, managerial/administrative and technical empowerment of local populations to fight poverty by participating in planning and management of their development process' (Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2015;Gaynor, 2016;RoR, 2001, p. 8).Providing a legal framework for increased local participation (Mukunumana and Brynard, 2005, p. 674), an aim was to 'put people at the center of service delivery' (RoR, 2018, p. 18) and participatory governance was to increase local government responsiveness, accountability and transparency (RoR, 2001, p. 9).Though the focus of the decentralisation reform has gradually changed, a priority remains to enhance 'citizen participation, empowerment and inclusiveness', for example by engaging 'the citizen at village level in participatory planning/prioritisation as well as budgeting' (RoR, 2018, p. 39f).Throughout, a particular focus has been on women (Nyiransabimana, 2018;Powley, 2008) with the current government vision stating that, over its early years, decentralisation will be 'fully achieved with equal participation of women and men … ' (RoR, 2015, p. 35).
In decentralisation and other policies, the role of civil society has come to be increasingly emphasised and the government affirms that it will in different ways facilitate for it, recognising civil society as a participating player and stakeholder itself and as a promoter of popular participation and organiser of consultative forums (RGB, 2022a;RoR, 2015, p. 5, 35;2018, p. 62).An NGO law was enacted in 2008 and revised four years later, for example giving national NGOs the right 'to advocate, protect and promote human rights and other national values; and to express opinions and views on national policies and legislation' (RoR, 2012b, p. 53).Along with the decentralisation reform, this is to enable civil society to be involved in policymaking and local governance and development processes (ICNL, 2022;Kantengwa et al., 2019).The government is also to provide financial support and build the capacities of national NGOs (RoR, 2012b, p. 45;2017, p. 19).Dialogue with civil society is welcomed (Adamczyk, 2012), the possibility of partnerships between the government and national NGOs is established (RoR, 2012b, p. 44f, 58) and a recurrent objective is to strengthen such partnerships (RGB, 2022a;RoR, 2017, p. 11, 15f).A Joint Action Development Forum (JADF) has also been created to promote the public sector's cooperation with civil society (RoR, 2017, p. 31), along with a range of other state mechanisms, through which CSOs are to engage with decision-makers, thus enhancing citizen participation (Hasselskog et al., 2023;Kantengwa et al., 2019, p. 43f;RGB, 2022a).
Throughout, the Rwandan government makes firm claims of attainment, for example pointing to participatory and inclusive governance (Gaynor, 2014a, p. S50;RoR, 2015, p. 35;2018, p. 25), to increased numbers of NGOs (RGB, 2022b), and to policy consultations with a range of stakeholder groups, including civil society, with the current decentralisation plan containing a list of 730 consultations conducted in the preparation of the plan (RoR, 2015, p. 9;2017, p. 20;2018, p. 13, 82).
Similar statements of inclusive consultative processes and the involvement of civil society are made by international actors, who also provide extensive support to local and participatory governance, to civic participation and to civil society in Rwanda (EU and GoR, 2014, p. 41;Protik et al., 2018;UN, 2017, p. 6).The decentralisation reform, launched in the context of the international decentralisation wave in the 1990s, was designed with assistance by donor funded consultants, which has been followed by continuous financial and technical support (Kauzya, 2007;RoR, 2018, p. 61;Tilburg, 2008).Rwandan CSOs, meanwhile, receive funds for specific activities as well as technical support to improve their capacity to advocate for local issues and human rights, protect transparency and accountability, perform an oversight role, encourage citizens to voice dissatisfaction, and overall increase the vibrancy of civil society (EU and GoR, 2014, p. 26;GoS, 2020, p. 3;Hasselskog et al., 2023;Holvoet and Rombouts, 2008, p. 593;Ismail, 2018;Kantengwa et al., 2019, p. 80;UN, 2019, p. 56ff).

Claim of being home-grown
While its proclaimed commitment to local participation is thus well in line with international ideals, and related practices are actively supported by aid providers, the Rwandan government makes a firm point of practices being their own.
Despite external support to the design of the decentralisation reform, the government took pride in it being nationally determined and driven, which is also clearly spelled out in the formulation of the policy (Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2015).The 2008 community development policy, then, states that decentralisation has benefitted from the integration of Rwandan cultural values and from being linked with 'home-grown initiatives' (RoR, 2008, p. 7).Government programmes are also increasingly launched as home-grown, said to imply a return to the national heritage by reviving traditional participatory practices and local involvement in defining and solving development problems, thereby contributing to genuinely Rwandan development and democracy (RGB, 2022c;RoR, 2013).According to a 2015 amendment of the constitution, Rwandans initiate home-grown mechanisms to promote national culture and restore dignity and laws may establish mechanisms for home-grown solutions, while the renewed government vision from the same year aims to continue citizen-centred reforms enshrined in local innovations and home-grown solutions, developed by citizens and reintroduced after the genocide (RoR, 2015, p. 7, 34, 43).In the current transformation strategy, meanwhile, a priority is to 'Reinforce Rwandan culture and values', home-grown solutions are to be consolidated, developed and scaled up and awareness of them to be raised in and outside the country (RoR, 2017, p. 1, 16ff).
Again, the government also announces attainments.Pointing to specifically Rwandan mechanisms for public consultation and downward accountability, it defines its governance as 'developmental with roots from traditional best practices' (Mutesi, 2014, p. 1).Home-grown solutions are said to have contributed to participatory democracy and proven vital in empowering people, and to provide a cornerstone to self-reliance and sustainable development (RoR, 2018, p. 23f, 53).While throughout presented as deriving from Rwandan values, home-grown solutions are now said to be 'blended with modern innovations' (RoR, 2018, p. 23) and may according to the RGB (2022c) be 'drawn from foreign and global ideas or practices, adapted and customized with Rwanda's methodology, context, and inputs'.
Among the home-grown solutions most related to local participation are ubudehe and umuganda, developed specifically to ensure participation in planning and decision-making in the first decentralisation phase (Gaynor, 2014a;2016;RoR, 2018, p. 62), and imihigo, presented in the revised decentralisation policy as a model for bottom-up planning (RoR, 2012a, p. 17).
Alluding to a pre-colonial tradition of mutual support and collective action, ubudehe was introduced in the early 2000s for 'grassroots collective decision making and action' (Gaynor, 2014a, p. S53;Holvoet and Rombouts, 2008, p. 582).From 2008 it was gradually replaced by the more comprehensive social protection programme Vision 2020 Umurenge (VUP), whose main component is participatory planning and implementation of local labour-intensive projects, such as upgrading of terraces and roads (Williams et al., 2020;Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2015).The population is to identify problems, choose a projectwhich is thereby to reflect local prioritiesand carry it out while getting paid for their labour.Residents are also to jointly establish who belongs to which socio-economic 'ubudehe category', which determines who gets access to various benefits.This selection approach is said to encourage community participation and awareness, while ubudehe is stated to promote collective community planning, and to have significantly transformed how citizens engage with their own development, also providing information that is used to determine national development objectives against which the government is held to account (Gaynor, 2016;Hasselskog, 2018;RoR, 2018, p. 23).
The umuganda policy, introduced in 2005 and revised in 2016 (RoR, 2018, p. 22) alludes to a pre-colonial tradition of voluntary work as people called upon neighbours to help solve difficult tasks.In its current form, umuganda constitutes community work, which is obligatory for Rwandans at the age of 18-65 and takes place across the country the last Saturday of every month, while in some areas there is an additional weekly version.What work to undertake is to be jointly determined and common projects include construction and maintenance of roads, terracing, and cleaning of the neighbourhood.In connection to this, a meeting is held, where residents are to discuss community problems and local officials to provide important news (Gaynor, 2014a;2016;Hasselskog, 2018).According to the government, umuganda responds to community needs by community engagement, empowers citizens and promotes social cohesion (RoR, 2015, p. 44).
Imihigo, introduced in 2006, is a comprehensive system of performance contracts, alluding to a tradition of making ambitious commitments, announcing achievements and, in case of failure, face public shame.Binding contracts are signed between every government body and the administrative level above it, up to the president, stipulating goals, targets to be reached within a specific timeframe, and measurable indicators (RoR, 2012a, p. 16f).Achievements are continuously reported, actors annually scored and ranked, and good performers rewarded (Chemouni, 2014, p. 248ff;Holvoet and Rombouts, 2008, p. 587;Purdekova, 2011, p. 484ff).Since 2012, households, too, are to sign performance contracts, committing to before a certain date reach targets such as being included in the national health insurance, owning a radio, having good relationships with neighbours, respecting sanitation, and participating in umuganda, and their performance is monitored by local leaders (Hasselskog, 2016).Thus starting with households setting their targets, and linked to the ubudehe process, local priorities are to feed into higher levels plans (RoR, 2012a, p. 17).Imihigo is presented as making public agencies more effective and accountable, promoting transparency, and involving the population in formulating, implementing, and monitoring national policy, and to help transform people's lives by encouraging them to be involved in their own development (Hasselskog, 2018).According to the government (RoR, 2015, p. 44f) public servants' use of imihigo has greatly enhanced their performance and plays an instrumental role in delivering the government's vision.

Critique of participation practices
The Rwandan government thus expresses firm commitment to the ideal of local participation, and actively engages with policies of decentralisation and civil society promotion.Though this is in line with international trends and supported by aid providers, the Rwandan government firmly claims that what it promotes are its own initiatives, based on long-term Rwandan participatory practices.Meanwhile, scholars as well as aid providers express severe critique and concerns about some of the practices pursued.It is noted that civic participation remains a new and sensitive concept in Rwanda, and that it is not common practiceespecially for women and in rural areasto speak or present one's views in public (Protik et al., 2018, p. 154f;Nyiransabimana, 2018).The quality of participation in governance and development processes is also found inadequate, particularly regarding planning and evaluation (GoS, 2015, p. 2; Kantengwa, et al. 2019, p. 5;UN, 2017, p. 26).The critique includes practices related to decentralisation and associated home-grown initiatives as well as to civil society.

Decentralisation
Rwandan decentralisation is deemed typical of decentralisation from above, being proposed, determined and driven by the central leadership (Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2015;Kauzya, 2007, p. 84).Chemouni (2016), while emphasising positive outcomes in terms of stability and service provision,3 summarises much of the critique.Instead of fostering citizen participation and empowering local levels, decentralisation has increased central control through top-down policymaking.The reconfiguration of the administrative structure has extended the reach of the state, while giving local authorities little leeway as they are instructed, directed, and tightly monitored by the centre (Chemouni, 2014, p. 246f;Gaynor, 2016, p. 780;Hayman, 2009, p. 175;Williams et al., 2020, p. 26f).This is clearly illustrated by Baldwin's (2019, p. 364) discussion of the decentralisation of commemoration, which has since 2014 allowed the state to retain total control over materials and programming.
According to the critique, the decentralisation reform does not provide for citizens to express their concerns, participate in local planning and decision-making, or hold local officials to account, throughout being particularly disappointing for women (Nyiransabimana, 2018;Powley, 2008, p. 8).Rather than responding to the population's needs and priorities, and instead of citizens and lower levels influencing national policymaking, local officials are pressured to implement centrally determined policies and meet centrally set targets, which at times makes them resort to coercion (Chemouni, 2016, p. 772;Purdekova, 2011, p. 484f).The result is increased local capacity to realise national goals along with low legitimacy for local governments (Chemouni 2014;Gaynor 2016;Williams et al. 2020).Aid providers, too, express concerns about decision-making not being properly decentralised and about insufficient downward accountability and influence from below (EU and GoR, 2014, p. 11;UN, 2017, p. 26).
Ubudehe was initially hailed among aid providers as genuinely participative (Gaynor, 2014a, p. S53) and residents tend to appreciate the paid work included.Empirical research, however, shows that projects conducted as part of VUP are perceived by residents as determined from outside (Hasselskog and Schierenbeck, 2015, p. 955).Ubudehe, meanwhile, has been reduced to a socio-economic categorisation, used for example to determine who is to pay for the health insurance and how much, and the process, the outcome, and the use of this categorisation are all criticised.The categorisation is perceived as predetermined with meetings serving to inform people about their categories, while there are also complaints that the categorisation that has been established is changed and people moved to categories which do not qualify for any benefits (Gaynor, 2014a, p. S53f;2016, p. 786f;Hasselskog, 2018, p. 319f;Williams et al., 2020).
What work to be carried out as umuganda is also perceived by residents as determined outside the community.The obligation to participate, meanwhile, is shown to imply strong pressure, with reports of people being fined for not attending, and collected by security people if not turning up voluntarily.Participation is also enforced by combining umuganda with paid work, paying people for only parts of their work while the rest counts as umuganda.In a similar manner, various financial contributions are enforced with residents and local officials reporting that different fees and supposedly voluntary contributions are deducted from salaries or from the assets of cooperatives (Hasselskog, 2018, p. 318ff).Participation is thus found to imply cost-sharing through labour and financial contribution (Purdekova, 2011, p. 482, 489).Meetings in connection to umuganda, meanwhile, are found to not provide for deliberation and shared decision-making but to be used for 'sensitisation' on top-down directives, making sure that residents are aware of the latest reform plans and their responsibility to contribute to them (Gaynor 2014a, p. S54f;2016, p. 787f).
Imihigo targets, too, are shown to derive from outside and above.Local governments receive detailed instructions and their performance contracts are noticeably determined by national priorities (Chemouni, 2014, p. 249).Households' targets, meanwhile, are very similar across households, in line with national goals, and experienced by residents as coming from a list of predefined issues that everyone must fulfil (Hasselskog, 2016).Local participation in the formulation of imihigo targets, and through them public policies, is thus found to be low (Kantengwa et al., 2019, p. 71).Rather, the imihigo system reinforces upward accountability by binding local authorities to specific targets in line with national priorities while residents explicitly state that household targets serve to ensure implementation of government policies.The focus on these detailed, quantified, and time-bound targets also adds to the pressure on local officials, whose performance is closely assessed and for whom failure to meet targets implies the risk of losing their job (Gaynor 2014a, p. S56;Williams et al., 2020).Residents, too, perceive strong pressure to reach household targets, with local leaders regularly monitoring their performance and people trying hard to reach the stipulated targets, also at the expense of more immediate needs (Hasselskog, 2016).Moreover, and just as meetings in connection to umuganda, imihigo serves to, through ostensibly transparent and objective measures, advertise national goals and progress to the population as well as international observers (Chemouni, 2014, p. 257).

Civil society
The conditions for Rwandan civil society are also severely criticised and its ability to contribute to genuine participation questioned.The space for civil society action is strictly constrained, illustrated in low ratings on Civicus' Enabling Environment Index (EEI; Civicus, 2022) and the World Bank's (2022a) World Governance Indicator for Voice and Accountability (cf.GoS, 2019, p. 6).Scholars and NGO representatives have continuously pointed to an unfavourable political climate, a culture of fear, and civil rights and the freedom of association being curtailed (Beswick, 2010, p. 226;Holvoet and Rombouts, 2008, p. 596;Human Rights Watch 2010in Adamczyk, 2012;Protik et al., 2018).There are also concerns about civil society being largely controlled by the national authorities (EU and GoR, 2014, p. 26f;GoS, 2020, p. 2), with van Leeuwen (2008, p. 405, 414ff) showing how regional civil society counterparts perceived Rwandan actors as representing the presidential office rather than the population.Meanwhile, much of Rwandan civil society is found to for various reasons remain in an 'embryonic state' (ICNL 2022), fragmented, lacking in capacity and vitality and thus not in a position to enhance citizen participation or demand accountability (EU and GoR, 2014, p. 26f;GoS, 2019, p. 6;Kantengwa et al., 2019, p. 5;Protik et al., 2018).
Moreover, Rwandan NGO legislation is by critics characterised as 'anti-NGO', reinforcing state control and restriction of space (Kelly, 2019;Musila, 2019).National organisations are required to register and report to the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB, 2022a; RoR, 2012b, p. 47), which both entails an administrative burden and allows control by national authorities (EU and GoR, 2014, p. 26f).To be registered, NGOs must present a collaboration letter from the local authorities along with excessive documentation and, in their reporting, they need to provide private details on leading members.Regulation is also found imprecise and changeable, which makes it further difficult to fulfil the requirements (GoS, 2019(GoS, , 2020;;Kelly, 2019), while RGB may for example reject or terminate registration of an organisation based on 'convincing evidence that the (applicant) may jeopardize security, public order, health, morals, and human rights' (Maru, 2017, p. 59).
Rwandan organisations' independence is limited also due to difficulties to attract other support than from the government.Legislation implies restrictions on foreign funding, and delay of registration may be deliberately used to disrupt it (Musila 2019, p. 9f).In combination with unfavourable political climate, lack of democratic space and low capacity, this makes it difficult for international actors to collaborate with and support Rwandan civil society (Protik et al., 2018;Russell, 2015, p. 612;Sida, 2016, p. 2f).In addition, INGOs themselves face strict registration, reporting, and documentation requirements (RoR, 2012c), which can be used to select which ones will operate in the country (Kelly, 2019;Sida, 2016, p. 17).Still, Rwandan CSOs largely rely on foreign funding and technical support, which further undermines their autonomy (Francois, 2017;Transparency International Rwanda, 2015).Hasselskog et al. (2023) show that Rwandan organisations, in addition to seeking government clearance and acceptance, need to adjust to shifting global priorities and individual donors' preferences, but also that some manage to limit the external influence and for example turn down funding calls that do not correspond with the organisation's agenda.
There is great diversity within Rwandan civil society, between for example faith based and farmers' organisations, in capacity and resources as well as in their relation to the population, the government, and foreign funders.Rwandan CSOs had a crucial role in post-conflict peacebuilding and transformation (Francois, 2017), and the current NGO law is deemed relatively progressive, promoting and allowing space for some civil society actors and activities (Sida, 2020, p. 7).The law however also serves to restrict and control others, and it is no secret that the Rwandan government favours a service delivery function of civil society to that of a 'watchdog' (Adamczyk, 2012, p. 68;RoR, 2018, p. 22).Human rights, advocacy, and governance NGOs are the ones that face state interference and problems with registration, while state-driven campaigns also serve to delegitimise them, restrict political activities, and limit dissent (GoS, 2019;ICNL, 2022;Ismail, 2018;Musila, 2019;Protik et al., 2018).
Not only explicit legislation and state control, but also self-censorship, an apolitical self-perception, and a wish to avoid challenging decision-makers, make many Rwandan organisations focus on issues that are not tied to national politics and rather engage in service provision and religious activity (Beswick, 2010, p. 226;Kantengwa et al., 2019;Protik et al., 2018;Sida, 2020, p. 7;Transparency International Rwanda, 2015).State-established mechanisms and umbrella organisations for consultation and coordination also favour certain organisations, with the government turning to those that are close to it.Some CSOs are thereby consulted on selected policy matters, while most are not (Adamczyk, 2012, p. 71;Holvoet and Rombouts, 2008, p. 590;Sida, 2016, p. 5;van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 415).
Instead of a watchdog role, large parts of Rwandan civil society thus work in cooperation with the government, with intricate links and blurred boundaries between the state and CSOs (Adamczyk, 2012;Knutsson, 2014).Required to align their objectives with national developmental priorities (Russell, 2015, p. 611;Musila, 2019;Hasselskog et al., 2023), many CSOs serve as implementers of government policies, and help with tasks such as fostering gender equality and mobilising people to attend public meetings, conduct community work, and pay the health insurance fee (Gready 2010;2011;Kantengwa et al., 2019, p. 12f;Nyiransabimana, 2018), which makes ICNL (2022) describe the operating context for CSOs as one of enforced collaboration.

The Rwandan approach to local participation
So, what do the Rwandan government's decentralisation and civil society policies and practices tell us about its approach to local participation?
The above shows that the governmentthrough the design and implementation of a far-reaching decentralisation reform, the revival of traditional forms of target setting and communal work, and the enactment of laws and setting-up of mechanisms for the workings of civil societyvigorously engages with what is proclaimed to be the promotion local participation.In official documents, the government also continuously emphasises the importance of participation and highlights attainments such as proclaimed empowerment and comprehensive consultations.Throughout, the approach is firm and compelling, with strict practices being stipulated and participation made compulsory.
In the design and pursuing of these practices, actors and activities are being moulded and directed, with an explicit objective to converge and guide the efforts of citizens and civil society towards the fulfilment of the national agenda (RoR, 2015, p. 5, 8;2018, p. 38).As seen, while certain civil society organisations are resolutely restricted, others are actively supported and guided.Setting out to build its capacity, the government also states that civil societyalong with citizensis to be datadriven and using modern technology (RoR, 2015, p. 24;RoR, 2017, p. 19).The composition of civil society is thus being shaped and its role steered away from some activities towards others, and its intended characteristicsin parts even those of the populationare being outlined (cf.Purdeková, 2012;Hasselskog, 2015, p. 162).Meanwhile, state-established mechanisms, umbrella organisations and selective 'partnering' and consultation serve to direct which parts of civil society are being heard.
While, as also seen, civil society is expected to help for example mobilising people to pay the health insurance and conduct community work, it is also in various government policies explicitly assigned specific tasks.In the current decentralisation strategy, civil society is to help organise consultative forums to debate local development issues, provide feedback to the population, and support the government in implementing and monitoring socio-economic programmes (RoR, 2018, p. 62).In the example discussed by Baldwin (2019, p. 365), meanwhile, NGOs are assigned to spread strictly controlled messages related to commemoration.Civil society is thus made to align with the government and assist in the realisation of its policies.
Home-grown solutions, proclaimed to imply local participation, also serve to direct actors and activities.With targets in local authorities' as well as households' performance contracts, imihigo, deriving from the central agenda, local officials and residents are made to concentrate their efforts to national priorities.As also seen, the work to be conducted as regular compulsory communal labour, umuganda, is determined in line with central priorities, and labour and cash contributions are strictly enforced, whereby people are again made to participate in the realisation of centrally determined policies.
Actors and activities are thus actively shaped and channelled, with residents and civil society made effective use of.Since 2012, there is also a volunteerism policy, with the explicit objective of tapping human resources, converting them into agents for the transformation envisaged by the government (RoR, 2018, p. 21).Throughout, as the population is actively utilised and made to substantively contribute to the national development agenda, local participation is turned into a tool for swift implementation, fast-tracking national development (e.g.RoR, 2017, p. 19;2018, p. 37, 47).
This moulding and utilisation of actors and activities apparently reflect a particular understanding and pursuing of participation.While selective consultation provides directed input that can be showcased, civil society actors dealing with advocacy and political issues are severely restricted and others are geared towards service provision and assigned specific roles in national policies.While the system of performance contracts, imihigo, is presented as feeding local priorities upwards and creating downward accountability, it rather serves to make local officials and residents comply with the central agenda and to their performance being closely monitored.And while community work is launched as being determined locally and community meetings as for residents to express problems and proposals, the work conducted is in line with national priorities and meetings serve to provide information and sensitise the population.Throughout, it is not a sort of participation that could challenge the central agenda and influence national policies, or hold decision-and policymakers to account, but one that contributes to the realisation of centrally determined goals, with Kantengwa et al. (2019, p. 32) pointing to 'tremendous improvement' in citizen participation in the implementation of public policies.
Such participation requires that people are familiar with national programmes.Sensitising the population is acknowledged by the government as necessary for national goals to be reached (Hasselskog, 2016, p. 184) and, as seen, ostensibly participatory and consultative activities serve to make people aware of national priorities, which has for long been discussed in terms of 'persuasion' and 'consciousness-raising' (Pottier, 2002).Continuously sensitised and assigned a role, residents are ascribed individual responsibility and exposed to micro-management (Marriage, 2016, p. 50), most clearly through the system of performance contracts but also through compulsory community labour, and thereby closely tied to the government agenda.
The Rwandan approach to local participation thus implies that the government eloquently proclaims its commitment to an ideal in line with current and long-term trends in international development cooperation, and resolutely puts it into practice.In the pursuing of these practices, however, ideals and practices are actively and inventively being modified.Only selected, or adjusted, aspects of participation are applied, and the contents and implications of decentralisation and civil society promotion are closely managed to serve the leadership's agenda.

Rwandan exercise of national ownership
So, how does this approach to local participation relate to the Rwandan government's exercise of national ownership?

Committing and taking responsibility?
As seen, part of the approach is to eloquently commit to the participation ideal and to assert it apparently in line with donor favoured practices.
When it comes to the ownership ideal, too, Rwanda acts in line with international norms.Already in 1994, i.e. several years before the ownership agenda, and despite aid dependence, the post-genocide Rwandan government emphasised its policy independence (Zorbas, 2011).By 2000 there was a firmly formulated development vision, by 2004 a sophisticated aid coordination structure was in place, and by 2006 an aid policy was adopted, declaring how aid should be used and managed and that the government would assert genuine leadership (RoR, 2006).Since then, the Rwandan government has continued to follow the Paris agenda in terms of domestic policy formulation, aid coordination, policy dialogue, popular consultation and more.National development plans and related documents are produced in a timely and Forum for Development Studies professional manner, making up coherent policy frameworks tied to budgets, while relatively robust national systems for public financial management have been developed (GoS, 2015, p. 3;GPEDC, 2018).There is an institutional set-up including a permanent secretary's forum and a development partners coordination group with clearly delineated roles and responsibilities, along with numerous sector working groups, where the government regularly meets with aid providers and representatives of the private sector and civil society (RoR, 2017, p. 30;Sida, 2020, p. 8;UN, 2017, p. 46f).
The Rwandan government's diligent assuming of ownership has throughout been reflected in monitoring results.In the 2011 OECD survey, Rwanda was one out of two countries receiving the top score on the ownership indicator (OECD, 2012, p. 31).Since then, the country has continued to receive recognition for abiding by the ownership principle, appreciated by aid providers and seen as something of a 'best pupil' (Desrosiers and Swedlund, 2019, p. 458;GPEDC, 2018;UN, 2017, p. 14).
This points to similarities between how the Rwandan government neatly abides by the Paris agenda and how it firmly adheres to the participation ideal, and its approach to local participation could be interpreted as an aid recipient country committing to and taking responsibility for donor preferred agendas, reflecting the kind of weak national ownership that implies continued donor influence and that has been discussed by a range of critical scholars (Harper-Shipman, 2020;Hasselskog et al., 2017;Lie, 2019;Whitfield, 2009;cf. Tjønneland, 2022, p. 19).

Dealing with donors?
However, as also seen, along with expressing commitment to local participation and pointing to attainments, the Rwandan government formulates and proceeds with practices despite severe critique and concern among scholars as well as aid providers.
In its overall stance to aid, the Rwandan government has been able to create policy space for itself, not least by using the right language.It has for long been seen to say what aid providers want to hear, strategically using rhetoric to manage its image and shape its relations (Desrosiers and Thomson, 2011, p. 446;Laws, 2021, p. 176;Zorbas, 2011).Even when donors have not been favourable, at times threatening to withdraw their funds, the government has insisted on its own agenda and priority issues, sometimes explicitly excluding donors from certain policy debates (Hayman 2009, p. 171).A renowned example is rural re-settlement, where the government has moved ahead despite donors' reluctance, using drastic means to make people move and thereby reach specified targets of having rural households settled in congregated villages (Newbury, 2011;RoR, 2015, p. 30;2017, p. 15).
As Harris and Conthe (2020, p. 46) note, an aid recipient's relationship with its donors fluctuates and differs across donors.Rwanda has, even when pursuing criticised practices, largely remained popular, enjoying donors' praise and trust, presented as a 'donor darling' or 'poster child' (Gaynor, 2016, p. 779, 782;Grimm, 2013, p. 87;Zorbas, 2011, p. 105f) or at least as belonging to a group of privileged aid recipients (Desrosiers and Swedlund, 2019, p. 436).Along with general efficiency in Rwandan policymaking and implementation, aid providers appreciate the leadership's development-orientation, capacity and seriousness, and low levels of corruption, which provide for efficient service delivery and makes Rwanda an easy country to work with (Beswick, 2011;Desrosiers and Swedlund, 2019, p. 458;EU and GoR, 2014, p. 11;GoS, 2015, p. 3;UN, 2017, p. 14).A sense of guilt in the international community for not intervening during the genocide and a desire for African success stories have also been used to explain the leeway that Rwanda is allowed (Hasselskog, 2020, p. O100).Moreover, positive indicators of development and collusion around high aid spends reflect well on both Rwanda and its aid providers (Marriage, 2016, p. 55) who also share an interest in being able to point to Rwandan ownership (Hasselskog, et al. 2017(Hasselskog, et al. , p. 1826)).
Again, there are similarities between how the Rwandan government exercises ownership and how it approaches participation, and the approachreflecting a tactic and ability to apparently adhere to prevailing international norms, while holding on to its own, sometimes controversial, positioncan be interpreted as confirming the view of the government skilfully 'dealing' with donors.Not least by paying lip service to donor ideals, eloquently using the language of international development, it manages to retain their goodwill (Beswick, 2010, p. 227;Harris and Conthe, 2020, p. 49;Zorbas, 2011, p. 108).

Manifesting independence
However, despite ideals and practices coinciding with what the international development community promotes, the Rwandan government does not concede to be adopting external ideas.Though Rwandan decentralisation was launched during an international decentralisation wave and designed with external support, it is actively portrayed as domestically determined and driven, and though practices of community work and target setting are very similar to practices elsewhere, they are depicted as 'home-grown'.This framing can of course be objected to, with Chemouni (2014, p. 257) early noting about performance contracts, imihigo, that, although it is 'presented as the Rwandan "home-grown solution" par excellence, its format is a copy/ paste of a typical "logical framework" used in international development projects'.Still, portraying internationally well-known ideals as domestically designed may serve to downplay external influence and can be interpreted as a manifestation of independence.
Such independence is reasonably in line with the ideal of national ownership, according to which development priorities and strategies should be determined domestically, and such manifestation can also be found in the exercise of Rwandan ownership.One example is the way that foreign aid is depicted.In the annual report on external development finance (EDF; RoR, 2021, p. 8), development cooperation is singled out in a pie chart as part of total development resources, and it is stressed Forum for Development Studies that 'most of Rwanda's financing for development came from its own resources (54%)'.In this way graphically and verbally portraying aid as a minor part of development resourcesfor a country that is the world's eleventh most aid dependent, considering ODA's share of central government expense (World Bank, 2022b)apparently serves to de-emphasise its importance and refute dependence.
The Rwandan government also resolutely manages its aid providers (Grimm, 2013) and has for example imposed a division of labour, assigning sectors and deciding that a provider must not engage in more than three sectors (RoR, 2021, p. 35;Sida, 2020, p. 8).While donors' room for manoeuvre is thereby limited, some of them report also feeling subjected to surveillance (Desrosiers and Swedlund, 2019, p. 455).The Rwandan government closely monitors and assesses the quality and volume of external finance and since 2009/10, a detailed report on donor performance is published annually, more recently included in the EDF report mentioned above (RoR, 2021).Based on aid providers' self-reporting and supplementary government records, their performance is assessed against 14 indicators, largely derived from the Busan agreement, but with some Rwanda specific ones (RoR, 2021, p. 24f).Aggregate scores are calculated and compared over the last six years with performance on each indicator given a green, yellow, or red light indicting if the number of providers that reach the target has increased, not changed, or declined (RoR, 2021, p. 26).Individual aid providers' scores are also presented in a table each, along with comments on their performance and a green or red light on each indicator, for example showing whether they follow the labour division or work in more sectors than allowed (RoR, 2021, pp. 32-45).
The Rwandan government does thus apparently not primarily strive to be considered a good pupil.Instead, it firmly takes the lead, pushes on issues also against aid providers' preferences, andby presenting policies and programmes as their owndepicts itself as following its own analysis of what is needed and how it can be achieved, and as using mainly domestic resources, thus apparently downplaying the importance of aid and manifesting its independence.Similar to its approach to local participation, the Rwandan government not only follows the Paris agendain what could be interpreted as committing or paying lip service to an external agenda.Also taking a proactive stance and actively engaging, it makes active use of the means provided by the agenda, adjusts them, and develops its own version of national ownership.

Conclusions
So, what kind of navigating of international development ideals do the Rwandan government's approach to local participation and exercise of national ownership reflect?
As seen, the government eloquently expresses its commitment to local participation, actively engages with related practices, and proudly presents instances of community involvement, comprehensive consultations, and participatory governance.Convincingly using the vocabulary of the international development community and pointing to attainments in line with its preferences are parts of the government's approach and contribute to making it an appreciated aid recipient and allowing it policy space.
As also seen, government programmes are enthusiastically launched as home-grown, building on and reviving Rwandan participatory tradition.The ownership agenda helps making such reference compelling.By presenting development programmes as genuinely Rwandan, the government draws on the ownership ideal, reflecting a larger global discourse of self-determination (Laws, 2021, p. 186f) and in line with what Eramian (2017, p. 629f) discusses as challenging foreign researchers' right to represent the country and its past.For external actors, committed to the idea that development priorities and strategies should be domestically determined, reference to Rwandan tradition makes it difficult to object.Facilitated by the ownership ideal, the government's alluding to cultural heritage, roots and authenticity thereby further increases its space to pursue partly drastic practices, despite observers' concerns and critique.
In its engagement with local participation and national ownership, the government thus decisively utilises the means and opportunities that the ideals provide, and with their help claims space for itself, which it uses to, among other things, pursue particular decentralisation and civil society practices.Throughout, the Rwandan government follows its own priorities and strategies and throughout, it can draw on international development ideals and the recurrent ambition to increase recipient agency, initiative, and influence.
These findings from a country that is recognised for actively and skilfully dealing with donors, and for its firm determination to set its own development model, point to ways that the reading and practice of the two ideals could come to play out, also in countries with currently less resources and/or resolve to deliberately create space for themselves.The study shows that national ownership is not per se conducive to local participation and when exercised as in Rwanda, it has moved away from a situation where aid recipients can be expected to commit to and 'own' aid providers' ideals and preferred practices, i.e. away from what has been interpreted as continued donor manipulation.Instead, ownership has moved towards a recipient state designing and following its own development model, thereby undermining aid providers' influence, i.e. towards the ownership agenda's original ambition of shifting the power balance between recipients and providers of aid.As illustrated by the Rwandan case, what such a shift of power does to participation practices and to the belief that people should influence decisions that concern them, cannot be predicted but will inevitably depend on what choices the recipient state makes and how residents accommodate those choices.