Defending Europe from below: pro-European activism in Germany and the UK and its contribution to the politicisation of Europe

ABSTRACT The ‘politicisation of Europe’ has mainly been discussed with reference to Eurosceptic parties in the ‘conventional’ political arena. From the perspective of the anti-Brexit campaign in the UK and Pulse of Europe in Germany, this article focuses on grassroots pro-European mobilisation to explore the potential of politicisation ‘from below’. The two movements stood out in their ability to provoke considerable levels of grassroot mobilisation. We argue, however, that both movements reached a strategic impasse that was marked by a lack of clarity about their desired future of Europe, and which hampered their ability to generate political change. Our comparative analysis of campaign materials and interview data reveals that these movements struggled to articulate a) diagnostic frames that struck the right balance between problematising the current political situation whilst supporting the established order, and b) prognostic frames that extended much beyond the defence of the status quo (ante).


Introduction
In the past several decades, there has been a growing public concern about the process of European integration (e.g.Hooghe and Marks 2009).Events such as the financial and migrant crises and the UK's Brexit referendum vote in 2016 placed the EU higher on political agendas (Voltolini, Natorski, and Hay 2020) -even if only temporarily (Hutter and Kriesi 2019).This 'politicisation of Europe' has mainly been discussed with reference to Eurosceptic forces in the 'conventional' party-political arena, not least parties on the radical right (Hutter, Grande, and Kriesi 2016).More recently, however, citizens have started to come out to defend the EU.Although these movements are concentrated in only a limited number of countries, pro-European citizens have been forming local grassroots organisations as well as cross-national networks.
This article compares two crucial cases of pro-European protest activism: the anti-Brexit movement in the UK and the German-based Pulse of Europe (PoE), both emerging in 2016.
No other movement has managed to mobilise pro-European citizens at regular intervals on such a large scale.Neither movement, however, could decisively shift the terms of public debate.The anti-Brexit movement lost its drive after the crucial 2019 general election that secured the UK's departure from the EU ('Brexit').As for Pulse of Europe, its spate of large street protests and demonstrations ended when a series of elections across Europe did not result in an obvious far-right Eurosceptic victory.The fact that social movements eventually reach the end of their life cycle is not surprising as such -certainly at a time when the COVID-19 pandemic hindered street protests.Nonetheless, it is striking that, in spite of the significant levels of mobilisation, the impact of the movements' actions was far from obvious: the UK experienced a 'hard Brexit' and the Eurosceptic far right in Germany is still a force to be reckoned with (as it is elsewhere in Europe).In our article, we focus on the role of the movements' positions and strategic messaging to explain this apparent lack of efficacy.
Our study makes a significant contribution by studying a new phenomenon from a comparative perspective: pro-European activism that is broadly supportive of the EU status quo.Fairly little has been written about social movements' visions of European integration (Caiani and Weisskircher 2020;della Porta 2020;della Porta 2022), and studies on explicit pro-European activism are even rarer (e.g.Blokker 2021;Brändle, Galpin, and Trenz 2018).At a time when the direction of European integration and the very idea of a united Europe have become increasingly contested, it is important to study relevant actors inside as well as outside the conventional party-political arena.Relying on original interview data and analysis of campaign materials, we assess the ability and potential of pro-European movements to contribute to a politicisation of Europe 'from below' and, more specifically, to make a meaningful impact on their political environment (Amenta et al. 2010;Bosi, Giugni, and Uba 2016;Giugni 2007). 1  In particular, we focus on the movements' interpretation and problematisation of the political situation as well as their proposed solution, i.e. their framing strategies.Whilst the impact of any social movement is conditioned by multiple interrelated variables, we start out from the premise that '(f)raming processes play a decisive role in mobilization campaigns' and influencing society (Gerhards and Rucht 1992. 572).After providing a descriptive analysis of the issues that dominated both campaigns, our analysis focuses on how pro-European organisations and activists have problematised the current situation ('diagnostic framing'), and how they have expressed their future visions of 'Europe' ('prognostic framing') (see Benford and Snow 2000).Our findings reveal that both movements faced a challenge in supporting the status quo or status quo ante (EU membership) that had come under increased criticism, whilst constructing an alternative vision for the future that was not substantively different from the previous political order.
In the next section, we begin by introducing the literature on the 'politicisation of Europe', which provides us with key conceptual starting points for our analysis and by discussing existing studies on politicisation 'from below'.We continue by explaining the concept of 'framing' and how it has been used within social movement studies to explain variations in movement and activist efficacy.We then introduce our analytical approach, which is followed by the presentation of our findings.
In our analysis, we highlight important differences between the movements' messages.We nonetheless argue that neither movement formulated clear visions and ideas about the future of European integration.Neither was seemingly prepared to 're-imagine Europe' so as to confront the challenges facing the continent in general and the EU in particular, including the erosion of the permissive consensus and concerns about democracy and citizenship (Blokker 2021).We argue that limited efforts to identify the underlying causes of increased Euroscepticism -other than blaming established politicians (UK) or identifying antagonists (Germany) -also limited the scope for formulating visions for the future of Europe.Where pro-European movements shy away (consciously or not) from offering concrete proposals for EU reform, they may be successful in attracting a broad pro-European following, but their influence on their political environment is likely to remain limited.To genuinely shift political agendas, pro-European movements will need to construct 'critical, imaginative, and innovative narratives' (Blokker 2021, 6) that may speak to a narrower audience, but that also offer more scope for influencing decisionmakers in formal political institutions.

Conceptualising the politicisation of Europe
Scholars addressing the 'politicisation of Europe' generally refer to 'the process through which European integration has become the subject of public discussion, debate, and contestation' (Schmidt 2019(Schmidt , 1018)).We follow Hutter andGrande (2014, 1003), who identify three main conceptual dimensions of politicisation: issue salience (visibility), actor expansion (scope) and actor polarisation (intensity and direction).Whilst only the first is considered a necessary condition, a full-scale politicisation of 'Europe' would imply a) increasing salience of the theme in terms of, for example, media coverage, public awareness and the actions of politicians; b) expansion of actors and audiences involved in EU issues; and c) polarisation of attitudes in favour and against different aspects of EU governance.
Many scholars have observed an increasing politicisation of European integration along these or similar lines (e.g. de Wilde 2011;Statham and Trenz 2015;Voltolini, Natorski, and Hay 2020).The focus of these studies is typically on debates about EU issues in formal political institutional settings (such as parliament) or as conveyed in mass media (Gheyle 2019).Several studies nevertheless indicate that EU politicisation tends to vary considerably across countries and time (Hutter and Kriesi 2019).Grande and Kriesi (2016, 283) speak of 'a patchwork of politicising moments across European countries', and a general process of 'punctuated politicisation, in which a significant but limited number of singular events produce high levels of political conflicts for shorter periods of time'.Where it is observed to occur, this politicisation is typically seen to be driven by actors resisting further European integration, not least political parties of the radical right (Hutter and Grande 2014;Kriesi 2016;de Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke 2016).
Genuine politicisation, however, requires an expansion of actors and/or a polarisation of attitudes and positions (and thus an expression of pro-European views as well).One way in which 'fully fledged' politicisation can manifest itself is through the mobilisation of pro-and anti-European civil society actors and citizens in the protest arena.There are various studies that consider the way the EU and its institutions are perceived and approached by a variety of interest groups and social movement organisations (SMOs) (Marks and McAdam 1996;Imig and Tarrow 2001).Yet studies concentrating on the general course of European integration as a key focus of actors in the protest arena remain scarce (van Kessel and Fagan 2022).A limited number of studies have described the 'critical Europeanist' positions of radical left SMOs (della Porta and Caiani 2009;della Porta 2020;Kaldor and Selchow 2015) or the EU-sceptic 'Europe of sovereign nations' vision of far-right movements (Caiani andWeisskircher 2020, 2022).Whilst the issue of European integration has remained more salient in the electoral arena than in the protest arena (Dolezal, Hutter, and Becker 2016), the recent emergence of several high-profile movements with outspoken views about European integration indicates that the underresearched 'citizen setting' of politicisation (Gheyle 2019) deserves more scholarly attention.With our contribution, we seek to contribute to the theorising about politicisation 'from below'.

The potential for grassroots pro-European movements
Whilst a labyrinth of organisations and movements, such as the European Movement existed across the continent from the late 1940s onwards, these were elite-level formations more akin to professional lobbying organisations and interest groups than protest movements.More recently, several transnational initiatives have appeared that have called for democratisation of the EU and that favour 'European' solutions for crossnational challenges (Blokker 2021).Amongst the more notable ones is Volt, which was established in 2017 and identifies itself as a 'Pan-European Political Movement'.Volt has organised multiple grassroots campaigns and street actions but also entered the conventional political arena as a socially liberal political party with candidates across EU member states.Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25) is an example of a transnational movement with a more left-wing populist character (De Cleen et al. 2020;Císař and Weisskircher 2021).It also has transnational electoral ambitions through various affiliated parties and can be seen as a recent exponent of 'critical Europeanism' in its description of the EU as an undemocratic and oligarchical institution.
Volt and DiEM25 are certainly not the only originations that ask for radical reform and highlight the EU's current institutional problems -European Democracy Lab and European Alternatives are amongst the initiatives that have no ambition to enter the conventional political arena.Such 'alter-European' networks do not necessarily treat 'Europe' as a core issue, but see European cooperation as a means to strive for ideals, such as social justice, environmental protection, and democratisation (Scharenberg 2021).Left-wing activist engagement with, and critique of, the EU has been part of a broader mobilisation against neoliberal globalisation and international financial institutions (della Porta 2020; Kaldor and Selchow 2015), and support for 'Europe' amongst these actors has been tacit rather than overt (Marks and McAdam 1996).
Two grass-roots movements stand out in placing their key focus on 'Europe' as an issue, and in expressing explicit support for the EU.What is more, it is precisely these two movements, which showed the greatest ability to mobilise citizens to come out in defence of 'Europe' on a regular basis.Bearing this in mind, they can be considered as 'crucial' cases of pro-EU grassroot movements, which are paradigmatic and best suited to offer theoretical lessons for pro-European protest mobilisation in general (Gerring 2001, 219).
The first is the anti-Brexit movement, which only genuinely arose after the UK's referendum vote on June 23 rd , 2016 (Fagan and van Kessel 2023).Prior to that point, an active pro-European movement infrastructure in the UK was lacking: the Stronger In referendum campaign in 2016 was essentially managed centrally from London.The grassroots movement gradually emerging in the referendum's aftermath was thus largely new and consisted of a complex network of affiliated groups and personalities.A plethora of small local grass-roots organisations typically associated themselves with the nationwide Britain for Europe (BfE) and European Movement (EM) organisations, and later, upon its launch in April 2018, the central People's Vote (PV) campaign.PV was essentially a coalition between the rebranded Stronger In campaign, the local groups represented by BfE and EM, and several other anti-Brexit initiatives.Several other organisations remained unaligned, including the left-wing and more 'critical Europeanist' Another Europe is Possible.PV coordinated several large marches in London from late 2018 onwards that attracted hundreds of thousands of people (Brändle, Galpin, and Trenz 2018).The organisation imploded, however, prior to the crucial national election of December 2019, which saw the fate of Brexit sealed with the victory of Boris Johnson's Conservatives.
The second organisation is the PoE, which was founded in Frankfurt am Main, November 2016.Although PoE has mobilised affiliated groups in various European countries, its activities have been primarily concentrated in towns and cities across Germany.Its foundation was a reaction against what were considered as illiberal and nationalist tendencies, exemplified by the Brexit vote in June 2016 and the election of US President Trump in November that year.Initially a small network of local acquaintances, PoE soon grew when citizens across Germany and several individuals abroad sought to join.In early 2017, PoE developed a formal organisational structure and weekly demonstrations commenced across, mainly German, cities and towns.The organisation retained momentum in the following years and was especially active around a series of national elections in Europe.Unlike the anti-Brexit movement, PoE operated as a single organisation, although it often collaborated within a network of other (German-based) pro-European initiatives. 2Large-scale and regular PoE gatherings practically ended after the European Parliament elections of May 2019.Whilst the organisation continued with activities -including small-scale deliberative projects called 'home parliaments' -the urge to organise demonstrations diminished after the radical right was ostensibly 'kept at bay' in a series of European elections.
Whilst both cases signify crucial and remarkable examples of pro-European grassroot mobilisation, they reveal several key (interrelated) differences too.First, in terms of political and discursive context, public and elite opinions in Germany -at least the Western part -have historically been more positive towards European integration than in the UK (Diez Medrano 2003).In the UK, levels of Euroscepticism amongst political actors, the public and in media reporting have traditionally been higher, and European integration has more than elsewhere been associated with a loss of national identity and sovereignty.Second, the key focus of the anti-Brexit campaign was the national political arena as it aimed to reverse a domestic political decision (the vote to leave the EU).PoE, on the other hand, mobilised with no prospect of Germany exiting and its ambitions were transnational.Its mobilising rationale related to the ostensible erosion of the pro-European liberal consensus, often with reference to events and developments abroad.Third, whilst the PoE embodied a defence and celebration of the status quo, the anti-Brexit movement mobilised to challenge the political decision to overturn the status quo (continued EU membership).The latter movement effectively aimed to preserve the status quo ante: the situation prior to the referendum of 2016.
Notwithstanding such differences, both movements adopted, what Paul Blokker (2021, 15) refers to as, a 'liberal-legal narrative of European integration'.Such a narrative 'puts the emphasis on the existing achievements of the EU, in particular regarding the rule of law, human rights, and independent judicial institutions as the very basis of democracy in Europe.Politics is understood as inherently messy and problematic, and to be carefully guarded by independent judicial courts' (Blokker 2021, 15).Explicitly pro-EU actors thus emphasise the merits of the liberal elements of liberal democracy and do not inherently seek to problematise the technocratic decision-making and legal procedures of the EU.In adopting this discourse, as we will discuss next, both movements and their individual activists faced a similar challenge in terms of their framing strategies: if the aim is not radical social change, then how to advocate for preserving (or returning to) the situation as it was before?

Social movements and ideational framing
The early social movement literature adopted a 'stress and strain' approach to explaining activism -protest was a response and reaction to grievance (Tilly and Tarrow 2015).Two broad approaches dominated the scholarship for several decades: the political process model and resource mobilisation theory (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).Both approaches were criticised for offering static explanations for protest, defining the source of stability and change in terms of the system and its institutions rather than the actors and movements themselves, and still failing to adequately explain why some activists seemed to interpret, use and manipulate the political opportunities and the available resources better than others.
In response, subsequent scholarship has focused on the concept of 'framing', understood as the 'process of negotiating shared meaning' that movements undertake in order to articulate their grievances and galvanise support (Gamson 1992).A 'frame' is a constructed 'interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the "world out there"' (Snow and Benford 1992, 137), whilst the process of 'framing' can be defined as 'the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action' (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 6).Framing, in other words, is about 'meaning making' (Kurzman 2008), a key function that scholars attribute to social movements in their quest to garner and mobilise support.Critically, frames are not simply a reflection of grievance but are mechanisms for subjectively articulating and developing understanding of the issues to deliver maximum resonance and efficacy.
A distinction is made throughout the literature between 'diagnostic' and 'prognostic' frames (Benford and Snow 2000).The former refers to social movements identifying 'a problem that deserves to be changed (. ..) and an assertion of its cause (or causes) that warrants a response' (Smith 2021, 197); the latter is understood as the articulation of solutions and the course of action to be taken to remedy the identified problem.Prognostic framing involves SMOs proposing 'a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan' (Benford and Snow 2000, 616).Benford and Snow (2000, 617) also identify 'motivational framing' as a third type entailing a '"call to arms" or rationale for engaging in ameliorative collective action'.Following Aslanidis (2018, 449), these frames are omitted from our analysis as they 'lack relevant informational content', and ultimately build on the preceding diagnosis and prognosis.Our study is primarily interested in the ideational contents of the movements' framing.
Studies have sought to differentiate between strategic processes involved in frame production (e.g.bridging, amplification, extension and transformation) (Snow et al. 1986), and also the inter-connectedness of identifying the problem, apportioning blame and devising solutions has been recognised (Gerhards and Rucht 1992).Put simply, if the diagnostic frame only partially articulates the problem and its culprits, the prognostic frame will not be able to comprehensively map the way ahead.How the two frames are intrinsically linked has recently been discussed and illustrated in the context of anti-racist activism (Smith 2021): if racism is depicted and diagnosed (framed) narrowly in terms of racist individuals (rather than institutional or systemic racism), or the extent of the problem denied, then the emergent solutions will likely be ineffective.
Evidently, understanding the mobilisation of a movement and its subsequent effectiveness is not merely a matter of its framing.McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) argue that framing processes should be considered in conjunction with a movement's mobilising structures (e.g. the organisation of its component parts and its repertoires of action) and political opportunities that are, inter alia, conditioned by formal state institutions and elite alignments.The relative importance of individual explanatory factors may vary across time, and SMOs must continue revising their coalition-building tactics, action repertoires and messages to retain their relevance and effectiveness (see Zamponi 2012, 422).
For the purpose of our study on pro-EU protest movements, however, we consider it pertinent to concentrate on these movements' ideational framing practices.Whilst understanding the construction of the two framing components is important for all social movement campaigns, we deem it particularly critical and complicated for the type of organisations central to our research: pro-European movements that essentially seek to defend the EU as an established political institution instead of demanding full-fledged societal change.
For typical 'pro-change movements' the framing task primarily involves envisioning an alternative future.Indeed, Gamson and Meyer (1996, 283) previously defined any social movement as 'a sustained and self-conscious challenge to authorities or cultural codes by a field of actors'.In order to create a political opportunity for themselves, they rely on an 'optimistic rhetoric of change': '[t]heir job is to convince potential challengers that action leading to change is possible and desirable' (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 286).Yet not all SMOs advocate change.Several studies have focused on, predominantly conservative, 'counter-movements': 'a particular kind of protest movement which is a response to the social change advocated by an initial movement' (Mottl 1980, 620).These movements oppose the agenda of left-liberal organisations in areas such as abortion law (McCaffrey and Keys 2000), LGBT rights (Ayoub and Chetaille 2020) and the politics of immigration and race (Blee and Yates 2015;Smith 2021).In the case of conservative countermovements, the primary focus is to critique policies that are seen to undermine the established order, and they engage primarily in 'defensive' collective action (McVeigh 1999).
Movements that are explicit in their support for the EU (and not just 'pro-European' in a broader sense) are lodged somewhere between the two ideal types: they seek to defend aspects of the status quo (ante) whilst also offering a culturally liberal or 'progressive' vision -but one that is not dissimilar from what currently exists.In other words, their 'reimagining' of Europe is at best imminent and at worst, non-existent.Such a positioning makes frame construction far more complex.Whereas conservative movements can refer to a previous era, which was ostensibly better, and movements with a socially or culturally liberal character exist to strive for a fairer future and winning new rights, especially for those who lack privilege and power (Schradie 2019, 157-8), pro-EU movements are neither genuinely pro-change nor are they conservative counter-movements.The challenge becomes how much criticism of the current situation can be articulated without calling into question the merits of the status quo.To what extent can a vision of the future be promoted without sowing the seeds of discontent with the current state of affairs?

Analytical approach
Our analysis is primarily based on original data from 49 semi-structured interviews (31 in the UK and 18 in Germany -see the Appendix for the full list of interviews in both countries). 3Most of the interviews were held between February and November 2019, and several more across 2020 and 2021.They typically lasted between 60 and 90 minutes.For the UK case, more interviews were required to cover the plethora of anti-Brexit organisations that emerged after the referendum vote.In Germany, most interviewees were PoE leaders and activists, but interviews were also held with members of other organisations with a more broadly defined pro-European agenda to understand the broader environment in which PoE was active.In both cases, the pool of interviewees included key figures and movement leaders as well as local grass-roots campaigners.Another important selection criterion was geographical origin: we approached interviewees in more cosmopolitan areas with stronger public support for the EU (e.g.London and Berlin) as well as regions marked by greater levels of Euroscepticism and support for the far right (e.g.Sunderland and Dresden).
The interview data serve to identify the diagnostic and prognostic frames of the pro-European movements.More specifically, we considered, first, how activists problematised the current situation, how they sought to convince the public there was a problem to be addressed, and whom they blamed for the adversities they identified (diagnostic framing).Second, we analysed prognostic framing by considering the goals of the movements (in the words of activists) and their ideas about the desired future of European integration.In our analysis, we are interested not only in the application of certain frames but also in the debates and strategic considerations underlying the choice of these frames.
In addition to interview material, we draw on content analysis of campaign materials of PoE and a variety of anti-Brexit organisations (662 items in total).This includes leaflets, posters and edited photos/memes, most of which were posted on publicly accessible social media (Facebook and Twitter).The anti-Brexit materials date from June 23 rd , 2016 (the date of the referendum) until the general election of December 12 th , 2019.The collected items of PoE dated from December 2016 until the end of 2019, but promotional materials were not systematically produced during PoE's early years.Most items were posted online from the summer of 2018 onwards, with a peak prior to the May 2019 European Parliament elections.
In the next section, we start with a descriptive analysis based on these latter data, illustrating the differences between the two movements in terms of the issues they addressed.We use pre-defined categories similar to those used in other studies on political actors' framing of 'Europe', in which 'frames' are understood primarily in relation to the issues with which the EU is associated.In their study on political party positions towards the EU, Helbling, Höglinger, and Wüest (2010) distinguish 'cultural', 'economic' and 'other utilitarian' frame categories.The former category relates to questions concerning identity, sovereignty, migration and multiculturalism.Economic frames, on the other hand, relate to assumed economic benefits and disadvantages of European integration.The 'other utilitarian' category includes diverse issues such as the efficiency of European institutions, environmental policy and international security.In their study of populist radical right parties, Pirro and van Kessel (2018) similarly identify socio-economic and socio-cultural frame categories, and add categories related to questions of 'sovereignty' and 'legitimacy'.Building on these studies and considering the salience of certain issues in the context of pro-European mobilisation in the UK and Germany, we identified the following four categories and manually coded the campaign materials: 'economy'; 'immigration, culture and identity'; 'peace and security'; and 'democracy, freedom and legitimacy'.The latter category includes not only messages concerning sovereignty, quality of democracy and rule of law but also statements about the integrity and responsiveness of domestic political actors.

Issues central to the campaigns in the UK and Germany
Figure 1 presents the results of our descriptive analysis of campaign materials.In the UK case, the categories that stand out are 'economy' and 'democracy, freedom and legitimacy' (these issues were invoked in 36% of all campaign materials in our sample).Many materials referred to the presumed adverse socio-economic consequences of Brexit (damage to the UK's economy in general; job losses; threats to local businesses, etc.) or expressed explicit criticism of UK politicians.Some materials criticised the government for acting irresponsibly or against the interest of the British people, others were more explicitly ad hominem and emphasised the supposedly dishonest behaviour of politicians such as Prime Minister Boris Johnson.
Amongst the campaign materials addressing immigration and cultural issues (23% of our sample), some celebrated the tolerance and diversity that was associated with EU membership.More often, however, materials in this category voiced a more pragmatic message, for instance arguing that Brexit would deter much-needed EU health care workers -the supposedly 'useful' immigrants -from coming to the UK.These materials thus combined economic and cultural messages.The issue of peace was referred to in less than 10% of all materials (occasionally with reference to the detrimental impact Brexit was predicted to have on stability in Northern Ireland).
The data from PoE campaign materials reveal that, unlike in the UK case, there were very few references to economic issues.In its messages PoE focused predominantly on liberal-democratic values and a celebration of a common identity.Tellingly, the three key concepts 'Peace, Freedom, Togetherness' (Frieden, Freiheit, Zusammenhalt) dominated banners and posters in the public offline space from 2019 onwards.The dominance of issues related to the 'immigration culture and identity' category (present in over threequarters of campaign materials) is partly explained by the series of citizen 'testimonials' that expressed their overlapping identities (often: German and European) and the slogan: 'My home is Europe' (Meine Heimat ist Europa).Some of these explicitly stressed liberalcosmopolitan values: 'I am a daughter of Europe -a community that prophesies an antiracist and multicultural future.My home: a cosmopolitan Europe!'.
Similar to the UK case, PoE's messages often also invoked issues related to 'democracy, freedom and legitimacy' (in just under a quarter of materials).Yet the specific messages were quite different in tone: PoE typically refrained from attributing blame to political actors and instead linked the EU to democratic quality, liberty and rule of law in a positive manner.Only a few leaflets expressed mild criticism, such as 'Europe is not perfect.But only together can we do better', and 'Reform is necessary (. ..) the EU must be closer to the citizens'.
The above findings illustrate the different nature of both movements: the UK's anti-Brexit movement being primarily concerned with the negative (economic) consequences of Brexit for its own country, expressing frustration with the functioning of the UK's political system.PoE can be characterised as a more optimistically pro-European movement with a transnational outlook.While both movements adopted a liberal-legal narrative with positive messages about the current achievements of the EU, the anti-Brexit movement unsurprisingly focused on what was lost due to Brexit, while PoE emphasised the need to celebrate liberal values under pressure.In what follows, we consider how these differences reverberated in the diagnostic and prognostic framing of both movements.

The anti-Brexit movement
Turning to the findings from our interviews, it was abundantly clear that the key issue that concerned UK activists was stopping or challenging Brexit; this was 'the problem' and the driver of activism.In terms of convincing the wider public that Brexit was a problem, local activists described how they challenged pro-Brexit viewpoints carefully and somewhat indirectly, arguing that the EU was used as a scapegoat for social problems for which domestic politicians were to blame: You've got to kind of understand where they're coming from and agree with their problems: 'yeah, the state of the roads is dreadful; the fact that you can't get a doctor's appointment is dreadful.However, how about this: have you considered that actually, you know, Europe doesn't decide how much money gets spent on your local doctor's surgery.They're not responsible for roads.Who do you think is actually making that decision?' You've got to sort of acknowledge their pain, if you like, because it's genuine.And you take it from there (Interview UK 13: Lincolnshire for Europe).
You try to explain: 'well, we agree with you about the homelessness, absolutely.And all the issues (. ..) we're worried about them ourselves.But all these are the fault of our government, and our government has tried to blame the EU' (Interview UK 14: Stockport for Europe).
In areas where public support for the EU was relatively strong, activists tended to highlight the loss of benefits (such as freedom of movement) that Brexit would lead to.Yet in parts of the country where support for Brexit was strong, overly pro-EU messages did not strike a chord.As these activists explain: If you're in an area where people don't travel, it doesn't really mean anything to them.They're like: 'well, so what?What have I lost then?'So you have to start talking about loss of investment and loss of jobs (Interview UK 15: Stockport for Europe).
You can tell them all you like until you're blue in the face about the benefits of the EU and what they funded, and they just don't listen.But the nearest agreement you'll get is: 'you don't like the Tories [Conservatives], you don't like a "Tory Brexit"; we might have voted for it, but that's not the Brexit we voted for, so we may as well just have the status quo'.Which is basically an anti-Brexit stance, rather than a pro-EU one.I don't really care, so it's like 'if that works, we'll just use that one' (Interview UK 9: North East/Angels for Europe).
Notably, the vast majority of local activists interviewed did not seem confident about trying to highlight the problems of ending free movement.Whilst privately convinced about the merits of open borders, most expressed reservations about raising it as a strategic part of their campaigning.One of North East for Europe's leaflet messages was telling in this regard: 'Brexit will not stop immigration'.The underlying assumption being that immigration was generally perceived as a problem and that positive messages about immigration would be ineffective.
Particularly in Leave-supporting areas, the case against Brexit was typically made by arguing that the future outside the EU would be worse than within.Especially given the activists' often gloomy portrayal of the current political situation, this diagnostic framing amounted to a rather awkward and half-hearted defence of the status quo ante.

Pulse of Europe
In terms of the identification of key problems as well as motivations for becoming involved in the movement, PoE activists mentioned, almost without exception, two key political events abroad: the Brexit vote in June 2016 and the election of US President Trump in November that year.Important were also the upcoming Dutch and French national elections between March and May 2017, in which the radical right was predicted to perform well (Albath 2018).Democratic backsliding in Poland and Hungary also featured amongst the concerns of activists, as did developments in Germany itself: the far-right PEGIDA movement as well as the rising popularity of the populist radical right-party Alternative for Germany (AfD).
In activists' minds as well as public campaign messages, all these developments were interpreted as indicative of the rise of nationalist and xenophobic politics and as a more general threat to liberal democracy.As the PoE website declared: There has been an alarming increase of radicalization in political life.(. ..)Nationalist and protectionist tendencies only increase our current global problems.This must be countered!We need a united Europe today more than ever.At stake is nothing less than the preservation of an alliance to secure peace and to guarantee individual freedom, justice and legal security (PoE n.d. a).
This general aim of PoE is echoed by its co-founder in an interview: We are not only a pro-European organisation, but also one which is really trying to [counter] the threat to Western democracy (. ..)In a broader sense, this is all about democracy and the rule of law (Interview Ger 4, PoE Frankfurt am Main).
Given that the movement was explicitly non-partisan (überparteilich), it attracted people from different political backgrounds.Right-wing 'nationalists' or 'populists' were generally considered the main culprits in terms of blame attribution.Privately, individual PoE activists felt that national politicians were found wanting for a variety of reasons.They were blamed for ignoring social inequalities that created the breeding ground for populism; focusing too much on the national interest; using the EU as a scapegoat for unpopular decisions; or failing to explain the merits of European integration or debunk negative stereotypes about 'Brussels'.

As one Berlin activist argued:
They should be much more 'European' in general.I think the politicians still concentrate too much on the national system.I think they should all try to get together [at] the European [level].(Interview Ger 13, PoE Berlin).
Activists also identified areas where the EU had fallen short, for instance in terms of communication and efforts to create a common identity: The communication policy of the EU seems to have been catastrophic . . .a real catastrophe.Because they seem to have been unable to communicate the successes they achieved (Interview Ger 5, PoE Dresden).
They weren't able to create this kind of identity for the European Union (. ..)I think it is something that the European Union missed out on before (Interview Ger 7, PoE Berlin).
What is clear from interviews in both the UK and in Germany is that activists believed pro-European politicians and elites (both at the domestic and EU-level) had been too complacent.PoE hardly voiced such 'blame frames' as part of its public messaging, however, which revealed a limitation in terms of the movement's diagnostic framing.

The anti-Brexit movement
In terms of aims and visions for the future, messages of UK activists were primarily chosen strategically in order to convince people it was best to 'keep Britain in the EU'.When we asked about ideas and messages related to the functioning of the EU and possible reforms, the comment below reflects how most activists across the UK responded: We tend not to have those discussions.I was involved with a London-based group that talked about European democracy and citizenship.I think it's a bit too abstract to have traction in the debates we're going to have in the next 90 days to twelve months (Interview UK 4, Liverpool for Europe).
When prompted to express their own or collective ideal vision of the EU in the future, most interviewees were reluctant to be drawn on these issues.The words of this activist from 'London4Europe' capture a widely voiced sentiment: I don't think now's the time [to discuss reforming the EU] (. ..)I think it's absolutely right the EU should be reformed and it will reform.But what you can't do is say 'the following ten reforms are going to happen if you vote Remain', because you can't deliver that.So I think there is a danger in going down identifying desirable reforms (Interview UK 11, London/ Watford for Europe).
Plans to improve the EU's performance and legitimacy were thus neither part of internal discussions nor of strategic messages directed at the wider public.Crucially, the timing seemed unripe for debating visions of Europe as the priority was stopping Brexit.
The launch of the People's Vote campaign in April 2018, with which most local organisations affiliated themselves, hardly contributed to the formulation of a clear prognostic vision of 'Europe'.Whilst grass-roots activists generally saw the need to formulate a positive message (for a second referendum instead of against Brexit), many criticised the campaign for lacking a genuinely pro-European message (some of whom formed a separate organisation called Grassroots for Europe): Fundamentally, this concept of having a campaign where you try and persuade people 'what we need is another vote', to me was fundamentally flawed.The public were not interested in having another vote for the sake of it.They were sick of the whole thing.You had to give them a reason for wanting to revisit the question of Brexit (. ..)We wanted the powerful, emotional [pro-European] messages (Interview UK 27: Leeds for Europe/Grassroots for Europe).
There were some fundamental contradictions between People's Vote and the broader Remain campaign (. ..)People's Vote was 'we're not really campaigning either to remain or to leave, we just want a People's Vote'.Of course that had no credibility at all with, you know, 'Liverpool for Europe' splashed all over our t-shirts.(Interview UK 26: Liverpool for Europe).
The over-arching focus on a 'People's Vote', i.e. a second referendum, as the aim of local anti-Brexit organisations thus obfuscated the fundamental and strong 'Remain' commitment of these activists.The People's Vote objective further removed the incentive to really think about positive arguments for continued EU membership, let alone European integration: the focus was placed on the means (a new referendum), rather than the end (staying in the EU).

Pulse of Europe
When considering the aims of PoE, a short-term tangible objective was to stop populist radical right parties in their tracks in a series of European elections.Many activists revealed an urge to counter nationalistic narratives by showing that the '"silent majority" is pro-European' (Interview 7, PoE Regensburg/Berlin).In Dresden, a stronghold of PEGIDA and AfD, this sentiment seemed particularly strong: I think it was important for me . . .for us to show up and not to leave the streets, the place [. ..] to PEGIDA.We wanted to show: we are [with] more (Interview Ger 6, PoE Dresden).
PoE's longer-term goals were more ambitious and, as its website suggested, included the 'preservation and shaping of a united Europe' (PoE n.d.a).PoE activists generally agreed that creating a better awareness of the EU was a first step to the creation of a European civil society.As one PoE leader explained: We want to contribute to the development of a real European civil society and contribute to a new perception of the 'European idea', which has been negatively connoted throughout the last years (Interview Ger 4, Frankfurt am Main).
In PoE messaging the promotion of a 'European idea' has been a recurrent theme.Whilst this concept remains inherently elusive, it is explained as such: The 'European idea' -if I really go to the roots -is: 'we can do better together than alone'only on nation-level.(Interview Ger 4, Frankfurt am Main).
The use of this concept can be seen as one example of an attempt not only to mobilise against current adverse developments but also to formulate a more positive message.In the words of another founding PoE member in Frankfurt: I think for Pulse of Europe officially it was very important to always say 'we are not against anything' but we are 'pro' something.[. . .]For us it's not only a rational thing, to understand why we have the European Union, but it's our home; we should have an emotional relationship to the whole construct, and have an understanding that this is a project carried by all of these people (Interview Ger 3, PoE Frankfurt am Main).
In terms of concrete proposals about the future of Europe, however, PoE has remained deliberately silent.There has been considerable debate within the organisation about adopting a more explicit agenda or even to develop into a (transnational) political party.
Ultimately, however, PoE remained überparteilich.Prior to the EP 2019 elections, for instance, all broadly 'pro-European' political parties (i.e.excluding the AfD) were invited to engage in debate during PoE manifestations.One key PoE message at this time was 'Whatever you vote, vote Europe' (Was immer du wählst, wähl Europa).
Several activists, who did not feel at home in more radical (left-wing) movements like DiEM25, explained that PoE's non-partisan nature was something that attracted them to the movement in the first place.When asked about their private opinions and ideas about the EU it was also clear that activists did not share the same perspective: some wholeheartedly supported the creation of a federal Europe (or a 'United States of Europe'), whereas others considered this an unlikely or even undesirable scenario.In the light of this, several activists also acknowledged the strategic advantage of refraining from formulating a clear set of political demands: We have a very basic message: we're 'for Europe', whatever that means.And this can be criticised but I think this is also why it was successful, at least for a time, because it was able to include a lot of different people (Interview Ger 7, PoE Berlin).
In comparison with their British counterparts, German activists were evidently less hesitant to present themselves in public as passionate defenders of 'Europe' and opponents of nationalistic and xenophobic politics.When we consider 'visions of Europe', however, PoE was not dissimilar to the anti-Brexit movement in shunning the formulation of concrete proposals about the future of European integration.

Conclusion
Both the anti-Brexit movement and PoE contributed to an increased, albeit temporary and localised, politicisation of Europe 'from below'.Their remarkable mobilisation contributed to increased salience of 'Europe', signified an expansion of actors, and underlined a polarisation of attitudes in favour and against European integration.To explain the limited consequences of their actions in terms of generating political change, our research has interrogated the challenges both movements faced in constructing clear ideational frames.
Using key concepts of social movement analysis, we focused on how the two movements 'framed' their campaigns.The resonance of framing depends on a clear interpretation and problematisation of the current situation ('diagnostic framing') as well as a provision of alternative solutions and visions of the future ('prognostic framing').We argued that balancing the two types of frames is particularly difficult when a movement exists not to challenge but to defend the core aspects of the 'liberal' status quo or status quo ante.For pro-EU movements, diagnostic frame construction involves striking a balance between criticising the existing situation just enough to acknowledge that there is a problem requiring a solution, whilst at the same time bolstering support for the existing EU arrangements and not further weakening public support.Any notion or intent to 're-imagine Europe' and directly challenge the Eurosceptic critique is muted, and thus prognostic frame construction involves articulating a vision for the way ahead, which cannot veer too far from the status quo lest it inadvertently conjures further discontent.
Our data suggest that in neither case was an effective balance struck.The diagnostic frames adopted by both movements were skewed towards apportioning blame or identifying antagonists.Both the anti-Brexit movement and PoE explained the lack of popular support for Europe in terms of the failure of elites to defend the EU, the spread of misinformation, and/or a lack of understanding of the benefits of European integration.In neither case did public messages reveal an identification of potentially legitimate reasons why citizens did not support the EU.In terms of prognostic framing, the anti-Brexit movement was primarily occupied with halting the essentially domestic process of the UK leaving the EU, instead of presenting visions about the future of (the UK in) Europe.PoE consciously shied away from developing concrete ideas about the direction of European integration.
Ultimately, then, prognostic frames remained vague and unspecific, and the overarching message from both movements was that the alternative (leaving the EU or a further increase in illiberal nationalism) was a Leviathan that had to be avoided.Neither of the movements we investigated claimed the EU in its current form was perfect.Indeed, the activists themselves expressed their conviction that the EU as a polity ought to be reformed, albeit in a different direction than their 'anti-liberal' or 'nationalist' Eurosceptic opponents desired.Yet no clear solutions were provided.For both movements, the reluctance to provide concrete visions of an alternative Europe was largely strategic, but also a reflection of a lack of consensus or deliberation.Although PoE celebrated European ideals and values more explicitly than the anti-Brexit movementwhich was unsurprising given the generally more pro-EU discursive context in which the former movement operated -there was still no articulation of a future EU that reflected the criticisms or concerns of citizens regarding the status quo.
Our cases offer implications for the future of pro-European activism and the prospects for such movements in countering Euroscepticism.The conscious choice to campaign based on a broad, and largely non-ideological, anti-Brexit or pro-European message may have been expedient in terms of mobilising activists and supporters with diverging political allegiances (see Aslanidis 2018).However, the politicisation and efficacy of such mobilisation is likely to be fleeting and limited without a more progressive and imaginative dimension.Indeed, what our analysis suggests is that if pro-European social movements are to counter Euroscepticism as well as to set the agenda on European integration, they would need to articulate a more cogent vision of a future Europe.
It is remarkable, for instance, that neither PoE nor the anti-Brexit movement had a concrete retort to (right-wing) Eurosceptic arguments about the loss of national sovereignty, or any obvious response to (left-wing) concerns about citizenship, democracy and social justice.In the UK, as also noted by Brändle, Galpin, and Trenz (2022, 248), Brexit was discussed mainly as 'a national-democratic rather than EU issue' with the Remain camp focusing more on debates about popular and parliamentary sovereignty, than engaging with pro-Leave claims about the UK gaining national sovereignty through Brexit (see Rone 2022).Similarly, PoE generally shunned acknowledging potential trade-offs between European integration and national sovereignty, claiming that 'diversity and commonality are not contradictory' (PoE n.d. b).
The 'liberal-legal' discourse adopted by both movements may have attracted a broad church of supporters but has ultimately proved to be 'prosaic and little reformist' (Blokker 2021, 15).In that respect, the two cases differed from various civic initiatives that have considered the EU both as part of the problem as well as the solution, and which expressed 'a broad range of variegated and nuanced visions of Europe, as it is and as it should be' (della Porta 2022, 181).The previously mentioned DiEM25 and Volt are examples of this, but also various movements on the radical left and right move beyond clear-cut anti-or pro-European positions (Caiani and Weisskircher 2022).These 'anti-nationalist Europeans' and 'pro-European nativists' are highly critical of the EU in its current form (for very different reasons), but they acknowledge that there is an inevitable place for 'Europe' in dealing with the political problems they identify and prioritise.
In the UK case, Another Europe is Possible has been an example of a 'critical Europeanist' organisation within the broader anti-Brexit movement that in fact offered clearer visions for the Europe's future.Yet it was notable that the national organiser revealed: 'we were the activist left doing Remain campaigning, rather than being the Remain campaign that was left-wing' (Interview 29: Another Europe is Possible).It may well be that organisations with a clearer ideological profile may outlive 'liberal-legal' pro-European movements precisely because of their broader purpose, but their commitment to realising their vision of Europe may also wax and wane depending on the salience of the topic.
A core function of social movements is arguably 'the construction of critical, imaginative, and innovative narratives' (Blokker 2021, 6).This is not to say that these narratives are sufficient by themselves to overcome the many challenges of successful (transnational) mobilisation (Císař and Weisskircher 2021).Yet any successful mobilisation in defence of European cooperation will need to take seriously the flaws in the EU as an institution and propose creative (European) solutions to contribute to an efficacious politicisation of Europe from below.What our research suggests is that if pro-European social movements wish to counter Euroscepticism effectively as well as to set the agenda on European integration, they first and foremost need to articulate a cogent vision of a future Europe that at least addresses Eurosceptic concerns.If they fail to do this, it is likely that grassroots-driven politicisation of Europe will remain a temporary endeavour that is orchestrated mainly around critical events, such as elections and EU referendums (Grande and Kriesi 2016).Phillip Ayoub, Nathalie Brack, Caterina Froio and Andrea Pirro.We also express our gratitude to the interviewees whose insights and experiences were key to this research project, and to Kristina Lenart who provided invaluable assistance with data gathering and analysis.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding
The work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number ES/R001847/ 1], and part of the project '28+ Perspectives on Brexit: a guide to the multi-stakeholder negotiations' (Principal Investigator: Prof Helen Drake).

Figure 1 .
Figure 1.Issues in pro-European movements' campaign materials.Notes to Figure 1: based on 662 collected items (545 for the anti-Brexit movement; 117 for PoE).The bars indicate how often an issue was invoked in campaign materials.Categories are non-exclusive: some materials covered several different issues.
People reacted very positively to that standpoint (Interview Ger 1, PoE Frankfurt am Main).Compared with those of the anti-Brexit movement, central PoE slogans had a more emotional connotation, a notable example being 'Europe must bring joy again' (Europa muss wieder Freude machen).According to key members in Frankfurt: This was something that PoE wanted to support.That you feel Europe in your heart.It should be more emotional (Interview Ger 1, PoE Frankfurt am Main).
Stijn van Kessel is Reader (Associate Professor) in European Politics at Queen Mary University of London.His main research interests are populism and populist parties, Euroscepticism and EU politicisation.He is the author of Populist Parties in Europe.Agents of Discontent? (2015, Palgrave) and The Failure of Remain.Anti-Brexit Activism in the United Kingdom (2023, McGill-Queen's UP, with Adam Fagan).His articles have appeared in journals including the European Journal of Political Research, West European Politics and Government & Opposition.He is the joint editor of the Routledge book series on Extremism & Democracy.Adam Fagan is Professor of European Politics at King's College London.His research has focused on civil society and popular mobilisations across Eastern Europe.His current research focuses on climate activism and grassroot mobilisations in Poland and Serbia.Adam has recently published (with Stijn van Kessel) The Failure of Remain (McGill-Queen's UP), an analysis of the anti-Brexit mobilisation in the UK.Adam is Senior Editor of East European Politics (Routledge).Notes: * via Skype/Zoom, all others face-to-face.
Notes: * via Zoom, all others face-to-face.