Assessing the EU’s Evolving Position in Energy Geopolitics under Decarbonisation

ABSTRACT As a major importer of fossil fuels, the EU will likely see its position in the geopolitics of energy change following its commitment to carbon neutrality by 2050. This article analyses the implications of the energy transition for the EU’s role in energy geopolitics, looking at declining and emerging energy dependences by investigating the EU’s exposure to the material foundations of interdependence (sensitivity) and its ability to manage them (vulnerability). The EU is generally in a more advantageous geopolitical position in a clean energy order than in the current fossil fuel-based energy system. This is mostly a result of the geological distribution and specific material features of clean energy materials and the EU’s ability to manage such interdependence, as decarbonisation involves a set of policy areas where the EU shows important external strengths. Weaknesses may persist, however, as growing contestation could render sectoral state-like industrial policies more central to geo-economic competition.

As the European Union (EU) and the world embark on deep decarbonisation, the EU's position in the geopolitics of energy is bound to shift.The transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy and related fuels such as hydrogen will significantly affect power relations between old and new suppliers and consumers of relevant materials (O'Sullivan et al. 2017;IRENA 2019).While the energy transition will reduce the EU's dependence on fossil fuel imports, it will also create new dependences on key inputs for clean energy technologies (IEA 2021a;2021b), which we will refer to as "clean energy materials" (CEMs).This raises new geopolitical concerns about China's control of CEM supply chains (Smith Stegen 2015; Kalantzakos 2020), great power competition for access to CEMs (Gulley et al. 2018) and a new "resource curse" (Ross 2001) among fragile states rich in CEMs (Church and Crawford 2020).
In the EU public discourse, analogies are increasingly being made between the risks associated with reliance on CEMs and those linked to oil and gas dependence (Simon 2018;Breton 2022).This shift in framing has taken place as the EU's quest for climate neutrality has been accompanied by an increasing emphasis on the goal of "strategic autonomy".Referring to the "capacity to act autonomously where necessary, and with partners whenever possible" (European Council 2016), this goal has evolved in the context of growing concerns about the rise of economic statecraft and the weaponisation of economic interdependence as well as increasing geopolitical contestation (Farrell and Newman 2019).
In light of this, existing literature has paid limited attention to the implications of the energy transition for the international constellation of power and the EU's position in it.
In particular, we identify gaps in two strands of literature.First, the literature on energy geopolitics and energy security in the EU has mostly focused on the case of natural gas, where relations between the EU and Russia, a major supplier, have been highly contested (Haukkala 2014).Contributions have paid particular attention to the EU's external governance and various related tensions between commercial and geopolitical objectives (McGowan 2008;Goldthau and Sitter 2014), between the EU and its member states and among member states (Schmidt-Felzmann 2011).However, this literature has rarely addressed the implications of the EU's climate priorities and policies for its position in the geopolitics of energy.Rare exceptions have focused on particular aspects of the clean energy transition, such as the EU's relations with declining petrostates (Khrushcheva and Maltby 2016;Oberthür et al. 2021), the energy security significance of the EU's power connectivity with third countries (Lilliestam and Ellenbeck 2011), the EU's industry struggle to access specific CEM supplies (Rabe et al. 2017;Barteková and Kemp 2016) or the extent to which contested international political environments might affect Europe's path to climate neutrality (von Homeyer et al. 2022;Kuzemko et al. 2022).What is more, this literature has not elaborated on what the European and global clean energy transition will mean for the EU's overall position in the geopolitics of energy compared to the still dominant fossil fuel-based system.
Second, the emerging literature on the geopolitics of the energy transition has mostly provided general overviews that explain the geopolitical significance of the decline of petrostates or the geopolitics of renewable energy (Månberger and Johansson 2019;Scholten et al. 2020;Van de Graaf et al. 2020).Some of this literature has questioned the increasingly popular analogies between the risks associated with CEMs and fossil fuel dependences (Overland 2019;Krane and Idel 2021), but without thoroughly investigating specific empirical cases.We aim to contribute to this literature by systematically comparing the EU's external positioning as a fossil fuel economy to its positioning as a clean energy economy.
In this article, we investigate how the energy transition will likely reshape the EU's external energy (inter)dependence and hence its position in the new geopolitics of energy.We will explore how the EU's energy interdependence will change from reliance on fossil fuel imports to the attempt to secure the material supplies needed for a decarbonised energy system, looking at key materials in the aggregate.We will then assess how the constraints on the EU's political choices will evolve as a result of the transition towards clean energy.
Overall, we argue that the transition will improve Europe's geopolitical position by reducing its exposure to energy interdependence.While the EU's external dependence on many CEMs is as high as or even higher than its reliance on fossil fuels and supply is more concentrated, this situation is outweighed by the CEMs' lesser systemic importance, more favourable location and power asymmetries with suppliers who are frequently more in favour of the EU.In addition, the CEMs' technical and economic properties offer the EU a larger range of options to manage energy interdependence through the development of appropriate policy frameworks.At the same time, new challenges may arise.
We will develop our argument in four main steps.In the first section, we will develop criteria for the assessment of the EU's dependence in the geopolitics of energy.In the second section, we will identify the CEMs that are relevant to our analysis and provide details of our methodological approach.In the third section, we will describe the assessment criteria to analyse the likely evolution of the EU's (inter)dependence through the energy transition, focusing on the identified CEMs.In the last section, we will discuss the results and draw conclusions, comparing the EU's position in the current geopolitics of fossil fuel-based energy with its emerging position in the geopolitics of clean energy and trying to understand the broader implications for policy and scholarship.

Analytical framework: key aspects of (inter)dependence
What does the geopolitics of energy refer to?Geopolitics, in a general sense, refers to the analysis of the role of geographical factors in shaping interstate power dynamics (Agnew and Corbridge 1995).Energy geopolitics is interested in interstate energy interdependence as an important feature of power distribution in the international system (Månsson et al. 2014).Asymmetries in resource dependence may have important foreign policy implications, albeit with certain variations depending on, for example, resource specificities or market conditions (Hughes and Long 2014).For instance, resource-rich countries can manipulate energy flows, prices, infrastructure and discourses; their energy rent can reduce the economic constraints on their foreign policy; and they can extract political advantages from their importance for the importers' economies (Ashford 2022).All in all, a less dependent entity within an interdependent relation is normally portrayed as possessing a significant power resource because it can (threaten to) change that relationship at a lower cost than its partners (Keohane and Nye 1977, 11).
In identifying key aspects and parameters of energy interdependence, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's (1977) distinction between sensitivity and vulnerability is instructive.Sensitivity refers to the material foundations of interdependence irrespective of attempts to manage this interdependence politically; vulnerability concerns the capacity to mitigate external dependence or its impacts through appropriate policies (Keohane and Nye 1977, 13-5).In the following subsection, we identify key aspects of energy-related interdependence by distinguishing between sensitivity and vulnerability as two foundational dimensions (see also Table 1 below).We derive these aspects from the literature on energy security (Månsson et al. 2014;Jewell et al. 2014;Cherp and Jewell 2011).This literature is relevant since energy securityunderstood as the low vulnerability of vital energy systems (Jewell et al. 2014)is a central concept in the geopolitics of energy.States perceive energy insecurity as a major constraint on their power and influence (Högselius 2019).

The sensitivity dimension
First of all, a country's level of external dependencethat is, the extent to which it relies on the external supplies of energy and energy-related goodsis foundational for its energy security.It is commonly measured as the share of consumption met by imports.A high level of external dependence is generally believed to constrain a country's foreign policy options and make it susceptible to political influence by key supplier countries, thereby weakening its geopolitical position (Månsson et al. 2014;Högselius 2019).Whether such influence materialises also depends, however, on the concentration of external supplies, which affects the extent to which individual suppliers can instrumentalise and exploit external dependence.Where supply is highly concentrated, external dependence can provide leverage for key suppliers (Månsson et al. 2014;Smith Stegen 2011).
The question whether external dependence and its concentration are politically problematic furthermore depends on the partnership quality (Månsson et al. 2014).The quality of the broader relationship with the EU is likely to affect the willingness and ability of important suppliers to exploit and instrumentalise asymmetric interdependence.We suggest that three aspects deserve particular attention in this respect.First, the level of institutionalisation of the EU's general relationship with key suppliers can be expected to shape the geopolitical risk inherent in energy dependence: a dense or even hierarchical institutionalisation of the relationship may constrain the supplier's ability to politically instrumentalise external energy dependence.Second, the nature of the political systems of major supplier countries is likely to matter.Hence, authoritarian countries might be more prone than democratic systems to politically instrumentalise the EU's energy dependence, as they have greater political control of their economy (Charokopos and Dagoumas 2018) and are more likely to have a tense political relationship with the EUa democratic system that values the rule of law.Third, the ability of large suppliers to instrumentalise energy interdependence can be expected to vary with the more general distribution of economic power resources as indicated by market size.Specifically, the EU may exploit its market size to balance any asymmetric interdependence in the energy field (Damro 2012).
Finally, the material features of the energy materials affect the sensitivity of importers such as the EU to supply disruptions.The effects of such disruptions can be expected to vary depending on the general economic relevance of the goods concerned.We suggest that this economic relevance can be measured by assessing their systemic significance.While the disruption of certain energy goods only affects specific parts of the economy, the disruption of other goods may pose a systemic risk by triggering a cascading of events across the whole economy (Månsson et al. 2014).Furthermore, sensitivity to supply disruptions will also vary depending on the quantitative demand for and technophysical properties of energy materials, which affects their logistical flexibility.Solid or liquid goods are usually easier to store and transport than gaseous ones.In contrast, trade in gaseous products often relies on inflexible logistics and long-term supply contracts that can further increase dependence by locking partners into long-term trade relations and limiting options for alternative supplies (Bradshaw and Boersma 2020).

The vulnerability dimension
While a country's sensitivity derives from resource endowments and other structures, an actor can shape its resulting vulnerability by implementing appropriate policies and measures (Keohane and Nye 1977).Based on energy security literature (Stirling 2010; Dannreuther 2017), we can identify several policy options to address vulnerability on both the supply and the demand side, namely: (1) Import substitution, that is, the replacement of imports with domestic sourcing to reduce external dependence; (2) Diversification of supply to reduce supply concentration or raise the share of suppliers with institutionally and politically close relations with the EU; (3) Stockpiling of imported materials to reduce the impact of supply disruptions and the need to access materials on foreign markets in times of scarcity or high prices; (4) Efforts to further institutionalise and develop the relations with key supplier countries to reduce the risk of political instrumentalisation of energy interdependence; (5) Demand-side measures, such as regulation and support of research and innovation, to enhance material efficiency, recycling or material substitution as a means of reducing the need for imports.
For each of these policy options, we will investigate the EU record and prospects with respect to CEMs and then compare them with the record and scope regarding fossil fuels.

The analytical categories: an overview
Table 1 provides an overview of the indicators selected for assessing the sensitivity and vulnerability dimensions of interdependence in energy geopolitics.While factors can be analysed individually, a full appraisal of interdependence requires all factors to be looked at together, taking into account the manifold trade-offs and interactions.For example, high external dependence on individual suppliers of an energy product may not be a problem if the product is not central to the economy and can be substituted if need be.
Similarly, if a product is of central importance and demand can hardly be reduced, even disruptions to smaller shares of supply may constitute geopolitically relevant risks.

Empirical focus and methodology
Key materials in the old and new geopolitics of energy In our assessment of the EU's evolving interdependence in energy geopolitics, we focus on relevant raw materials and energy carriers.Such a focus serves the purpose of understanding the structural interdependence that is shaping geopolitics and the EU's position in it.While the production/supply of raw materials is largely determined by geographical conditions, the capacity to produce related manufactured productsfor instance, oil products or solar panelscan be developed more flexibly irrespective of natural resource endowments.
With respect to the still prevalent fossil fuel-based energy system, we therefore focus on crude oil, natural gas and coal.According to available climate neutrality scenarios, the EU's consumption of these fossil fuels will decline drastically.While coalmostly used for power generationis expected to leave the EU's energy mix completely, limited amounts of oil and natural gas are projected to be used for industrial use, partly in association with carbon capture and storage (European Commission 2018a; 2018b).
The emerging decarbonised energy system involves a number of minerals used in clean energy technologies including batteries, wind turbines, solar panels, electrolysers, fuel cells and nuclear energy, as well as alternative energy carriers such as hydrogen and derivatives, renewable electricity and biofuels (IRENA 2019;2022).From the long list of CEMs, we selected those for which the EU foresees a significant rise in consumption in its energy area to attain climate neutrality by 2050 (European Commission 2018a; 2018b) or sizeable external dependence, including several non-critical and critical raw materials (CRMs).Raw materials are considered 'critical' if they both possess significant economic importance and are characterised by substantial supply risks (European Commission 2020a).In addition, we included uranium among the fuels employed in nuclear energy and clean hydrogen (that is, hydrogen produced from renewable or nuclear energy or from natural gas with carbon capture and storage) as a potential major energy carrier in a decarbonised energy system (European Commission 2018a; 2018b).An overview of the selected materials is provided in Table 2.
Our selection criteria lead us to exclude some materials and forms of energy.Thus, biomass and clean electricity are not included because they are expected to be largely self-produced (O'Sullivan et al. 2017;European Commission 2018a, 86).Our focus is on the EU as a whole, rather than on individual member states.Although resource procurement policies are not an EU competence, we consider such a focus appropriate for several reasons.First, energy materials circulate freely within the EU's internal market.Second, the EU is a single trading bloc with a highly integrated trade policy, which is extremely relevant for the import of the materials in question.Third, the climate and energy transition that drives the shift in interdependence under investigation here is to a large extent driven by climate policies set at the EU level.

Data and methodology
Based on the data and projections provided in Table 2, in the following section, we will analyse and compare the current and future potential degree of related dependence by addressing both 'sensitivity' and 'vulnerability'.We will do so by employing relevant databases (including Eurostat's Energy, ComExt and PRODCOM databases, the US Geological Survey and the Democracy Matrix Project), complementing missing data through freely accessible sources (including the World Mining Data and the EU's Joint Research Centre-Raw Materials Information System [JRC-RMIS]) and referring to future situations presented in official projections released by the European Commission.In addition, we will use various reports and existing literature (both academic and grey) as well as EU policy documents and legislation, especially to identify the scope of policy options for limiting vulnerability.Further details on key data used are included and referenced in the Online Appendix.

Moving from fossil fuels to clean energy: changing interdependence
Assessing sensitivity: external dependence, partnership quality and material features Overall, the level of external dependence regarding CEMs is at least as high as for fossil fuels.While the EU relied on imports for about 90 per cent of its gas consumption, 97 per cent of its crude oil consumption and 69 per cent of its coal consumption in 2019, the corresponding rates exceed 70 per cent for most of the CEMs under consideration (see Online Appendix, Table SM1; KU Leuven and Eurometaux 2022).As a notable exception, existing policies and scenarios suggest that dependence on imported hydrogen  SM1).At the same time, the concentration of EU external supplies of most CEMs is similar to or even higher than that of fossil fuels.While the "aggregate supply concentration index" (ASCI) for fossil fuels in 2019 ranged from 10 (coal) to 17 (natural gas), it exceeded 30a critical threshold, according to the EUfor many CEMs between 2012 and 2020 (Online Appendix, Table SM1).As for prospects, even if CEM reserves are less concentrated than current supplies, especially for some key rare earth elements (REEs, which here refer to neodymium, praseodymium and dysprosium) and lithium, their concentration is generally higher than the current supply of fossil fuels, except for some non-critical metals such as copper, nickel or zinc.The supply concentration of clean hydrogen is uncertain, but a mid-range scenario would suggest a similar level to that of fossil fuels in the present (Online Appendix, Table SM1).
The distribution of relevant supplies and reserves furthermore suggests that the EU's energy transition will overall improve the quality of the EU's external energy relations, although some CEMs require attention.In 2019, the EU imported less than a quarter of its fossil fuel supplies from partners with an association or trade agreement and less than twenty per cent from states with a democratic political system.While the EU's market size compares favourably with most fossil fuel suppliers, the persistence of member states' competences over their energy mix and external energy supply has limited the EU's leverage in energy relations (Schmidt-Felzmann 2011).In comparison, the prospect regarding CEMs is more varied.On the one hand, a large share of these materials' reserves (including lithium, natural graphite, borates and copper) are located in countries that nurture highly institutionalised relations with the EU and/or possess democratic governance systems (including Chile, Norway, Australia, Turkey and others).Similarly, current scenarios foresee that clean hydrogen will be sourced mainly from democratic partners that are institutionally close to the EU, such as Norway, the UK, Ukraine or Canada (IRENA 2022).On the other hand, some CEM reservesincluding REEs, cobalt and molybdenumare concentrated in countries with autocratic or hybrid governance systems and a low institutionalisation of relations with the EU.The EU's dependence on REE supply from China seems to be particularly problematic, as China's economic size is comparable to the EU, whereas the markets of most other current and prospective suppliers of CEMs are much smaller (Online Appendix, Tables SM2-SM3).
Importantly, the CEMs' material features suggest that the EU is less sensitive to supply disruptions than in the case of fossil fuels.Both individually and in the aggregate, CEMs are of far less systemic relevance than fossil fuels, and any supply disruptions or price spikes would therefore be less alarming from a geopolitical perspective.While supply disruptions and price fluctuations of fossil fuels fundamentally affect and endanger many sectors across the economy (including transport, industry, agriculture and heating), the consequences of a supply disruption of CEMs would be limited to specific sectors and economic activities (Krane and Idel 2021) without affecting the regular functioning of an energy system.A higher year-to-year variation of CEM imports (except for copper, borates, silicon metals and uranium) as opposed to fossil fuelsof which constant inflows are required for the functioning of modern economiesalso indicate the CEMs' lesser systemic importance (Online Appendix, Table SM4).Moreover, given the diversity of suppliers of the different CEMs, it is highly unlikely that the supply of all or a large part of CEMs would be disrupted at the same time.The impact of supply disruptions is further mitigated by the fact that many CEMs can be substituted (so far with particular difficulty: lithium and REEs), even if at the expense of a reduced performance and higher costs (Månberger and Stenqvist 2018;Pavel et al. 2017;Greim et al. 2020).Hydrogen deserves particular attention because of a potentially higher sensitivity to supply disruptions.Under the most expansive scenarios, hydrogen may be used and constantly required across various sectors (including industry, transport and power generation) so that supply disruption could have broader, systemic effects (IRENA 2022).
Finally, a greater logistical flexibilitysuch as easy transport and storabilityof many CEMs also results in a lower sensitivity to supply disruptions.Since import volumes are limited and many CEMs are solid rather than gaseous, the effects of potential supply disruptions can be mitigated through stockpiling.Again, hydrogen poses particular challenges in this respect.Especially at the initial stages of a clean hydrogen economy, trade will necessarily be based on long-term, take-or-pay contracts and rigid logistics, locking the EU in long-term relationships with specific suppliers.It might take time before a flexible, liquid global market develops (Heather 2021).However, even the most expansive demand scenarios for 2050 (Deloitte Finance et al. 2021;Hydrogen Council 2021) foresee imports of hydrogen of about 34 to 39 per cent of the volume of current natural gas imports.Reduced imports of gaseous fuels could also mean a lower infrastructural lock-in with and dependence on particular suppliers (Online Appendix, Table SM4).

Assessing vulnerability: addressing supply and demand
The EU has a range of policy options to reduce vulnerability to remaining sensitivity.On the supply side, the scope for import substitution by ramping up the domestic production of CEMs seems to be limited to the same extent as for fossil fuels.While European countries have shown a limited appetite for the exploitation of their significant unconventional hydrocarbon resources (Joint Research Centre 2017; Bradshaw and Boersma 2020; Maierean 2021), CEM endowments in Europe are generally as modest as those regarding conventional fossil fuel reserves (with some exceptions; see European Geological Data Infrastructure [EGDI 2022] for a mapping; for fossil fuel reserves, see BP 2022).In addition, issues related to regulatory style (Barteková and Kemp 2016), national permitting procedures (Schüler et al. 2018;Regueiro and Alonso-Jimenez 2021) and the lack of public acceptance of mining activities (European Commission 2020b) present considerable barriers.As a result, the share of domestic production of most CEMs is even estimated to shrink between 2020 and 2050 (KU Leuven and Eurometaux 2022).The EU is also expected to need significant foreign supplies of hydrogen, despite existing and planned regulatory, infrastructure and financial support for domestic production (European Commission 2020c;2020d;2021;World Energy Council 2021;IRENA 2022).
The repatriation of CEMs refining capacity as well as the production capacity of clean energy productswhich are segments where the EU depends on China to a much larger extent than for raw materials (Rabe et al. 2017)also faces substantial challenges.In particular, the EU possesses a more limited capacity for industrial policy than its main competitors.As the geopolitical and geo-economic competition grows, both China (Barteková and Kemp 2016;Sattich et al. 2021;Chen and Lees 2016) and the US (US Congress 2022; US Department of Energy 2022a; 2022b) have mobilised substantial state support to bolster domestic clean energy value chains, with the 2022 US Inflation Reduction Act representing a recent culmination point.By contrast, the EU lacks capabilities in industrial policy.Support and incentives from the EU and its member states are still at an embryonic stage and have focused on networking and information-sharing initiatives (European Raw Material Alliance 2020).Different preferences among member states, as well as a legacy of ideas and institutions that consider industrial policy as a distortion of the internal market (Defraigne et al. 2022), could constrain the EU's ability to develop its domestic clean energy value chain.
Options for a diversification of imports seem more significant.While the concentration of reserves imposes limits, there is scope to diversify supply, as CEM reserves are generally less concentrated than current supplies (with the exception of borates and platinumsee Online Appendix, Table SM1).A greater availability of EU policy instruments in comparison to fossil fuels may also enhance prospects for such supply diversification.While strong member state competences in external energy policy have led to increasing dependence on Russia for fossil fuel supplies (European Commission 2020a), despite an established objective of diversification and related support (European Commission 2014), exclusive EU competence in trade may support more coherent and strategic approaches to the supply diversification of CEMs.In this respect, diversification of the supply of minerals is established as an EU objective (European Commission 2020e) and the Commission has underlined that "the EU is currently negotiating Free Trade Agreements with a number of important countries from a raw material perspective" (European Commission 2020e, 15).While member state approaches and initiatives towards hydrogen are more fragmented (Piria et al. 2022), the level of sensitivity is moderate thanks to their relatively good relationships with the potential key suppliers (see above).
Furthermore, stockpiling would be easier for CEMs than for fossil fuels.The EU has adopted stockpiling policies for both oil (Directive 2009/119/EC) and gas (Regulation (EU) 2017/1938).EU support has helped enhance gas storage capacitynotably in countries with no or limited facilities (European Commission 2017).Nevertheless, persistent national approaches have continued to cause internal market bottlenecks that have left the EU vulnerable (European Commission 2022a).By contrast, while the EU has not yet developed a related policy, stockpiling of CEMs should be easier to arrange than for fossil fuels.Quantities are significantly lower, and the transport and storage of mostly solid CEMs do not require complex infrastructure (see Table 2).However, hydrogen may present technical storage challenges similar to those associated with natural gas, implying high upfront costs and rigid logistics (ACER 2021).
The EU also has significant potential to further develop partnerships with key suppliers of CEMs.The EU's efforts to build close partnerships with fossil fuel suppliers have had very limited success, as is evident from the case of Russia (Thaler 2020).In contrast, there is a good basis for developing closer relationships with a number of potential large CEM suppliers such as Australia, South Africa, the US or the Mercosur area.Accordingly, the EU has already signed memoranda of understanding on CEMs with Canada, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Namibia.The prospects for such efforts are better than in the case of fossil fuels for at least three reasons.First, many prospective CEM suppliers are already close EU partners.Second, in most prospective partner countries, CEM extraction and exports play a much smaller role in the economy than oil and gas do in petrostates.Even hydrogen will arguably be a less pervasive sector for prospective suppliers owing to the limited quantities, while the sophistication of the hydrogen supply chain is more likely to bring about local industrial diversification (Eicke and De Blasio 2022), paving the way for a healthier economy that is less conditioned by resource rents (Giuli 2022).Third, the EU has common external policy instruments at its disposal, such as trade and development policies (European Commission 2019).It has already pushed for the removal of constraints on CRM exports in the accession protocols of the World Trade Organization and in trade agreements with key suppliers.Supported by supply chain transparency instruments (see Regulation (EU)2017/821; European Commission 2019), EU development policies have provided technical assistance to improve CRM governance in developing countries.
Last not least, there is considerable scope for demand-side measures to reduce the need for CEM imports.Despite significant progress, reduction in fossil fuels demand has hardly reduced external energy dependence, also as a result of declining domestic production (BP 2022).In contrast, most CEMs are generally recyclable and substitutable, which can be enhanced through regulation, financial support, and research and innovation.Current recycling rates for CRMs vary significantly (Joint Research Centre 2022), with REEs proving particularly challenging as the relevant end products contain very small amounts and mixtures with other metals change over time (Jowitt et al. 2018).However, the recycling of most materials has significant potential, depending on volumes and technologies (Overland 2019;Pavel et al. 2017;Harper et al. 2019).With appropriate policy support, recycling rates of raw materials used in batteries in Europe may reach 50-60 per cent, 10-30 per cent for wind turbines by 2040 (Rizos and Righetti 2022) and significantly higher rates by 2050 (KU Leuven and Eurometaux 2022).
The EU has been promoting itself as a technology leader and standard setter in the recycling and substitution of raw materials (European Commission 2020f).Recent common EU action in this area included the establishment of public and private "alliances" and innovation communities such as the European Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials, the European Institute of Innovation and Technology Raw Materials and the Network on Industrial Handling of Raw Materials for European Industries, as well as several expert networks.Battery recycling has been made a priority area in the Circular Economy Action Plan (European Commission 2020f).In this respect, the European Parliament and the Council reached a provisional agreement on the Battery Regulation, foreseen to take recovery rates to 90-95 per cent by 2025 and 2030 for cobalt, nickel and copper, and to 50 per cent by 2027 and 80 per cent by 2031 for lithium (European Commission 2022b).Under its research policy budget, the EU has supported projects on the recovery, recycling and substitution of several CRMs and related products such as batteries (European Commission 2020f).Again, hydrogen is in a special position because it does not lend itself to recycling.Demand-side measures have focused on ensuring that hydrogen and its derivatives are only used in areas where alternatives are lackingnotably in energy-intensive industries and long-haul maritime transport and aviation (IRENA 2022; Agora Energiewende and Guidehouse 2021; Piria et al. 2022).

Discussion and conclusion
In decarbonising its energy system, the EU is set to improve its position in the geopolitics of energy.While still significant, future clean energy-related international dependencies are likely to be an order of magnitude less than current fossil fuel-related dependencies.To start with, the EU's sensitivity to supply disruptions of CEMs is less pronounced than in the case of fossil fuels.While the EU is at least as dependent on external supplies of CEMs as it is on fossil fuels, a significant part of the supply of (raw) CEMs can be sourced from non-authoritarian countries with which the EU has close trade relationships, and which are not geopolitical competitors.In addition, these materials generally do not pose systemic risks for the functioning of the EU's energy system and economy; in principle, substitutes exist for a significant number of them, and the limited quantities required, combined with the solid state of the materials (except hydrogen), imply greater logistical flexibility than for fossil fuels.
Although the remaining sensitivity to supply disruptions is not negligible, the EU has several policy options at its disposal to reduce its vulnerability.While additional domestic sourcing poses political and technical challenges similar to those generated by fossil fuels, the EU can diversify supplies as well as foster closer relations with supplier countries.Perhaps even more importantly, it can mitigate the impact of possible supply disruptions through stockpiling and policies supporting demand reduction, including recycling, enhanced material efficiency and substitution with alternative materials or technologies.In this respect, our analysis highlights material-specific areas of high vulnerability that deserve special attention.In particular, REEs and hydrogen could be geopolitically more problematic than other CEMs.First, REE supply and reserves are currently dominated by one large authoritarian country (China), while short-term options for substitution are limited.There are fewer but similar problems with natural graphite and molybdenum.Furthermore, imports of clean hydrogen could grow considerably and acquire systemic importance in case of large-scale use across key sectors, among which international and domestic transport, industry, heating and power.Hydrogen is also logistically challenging, and a hydrogen economy requires uninterrupted supplies, suggesting material sensitivities similar to those of natural gas.This may reinforce calls to focus the use of hydrogen on sectors where alternatives are unavailable and carefully select supply partners.Compared to fossil fuels, the conditions for developing coherent EU policies to reduce vulnerability seem favourable, since the EU's competences in international trade, the regulation of the internal market and research support are more advanced and less contested than its ability to choose between energy sources.
Nevertheless, important challenges remain.Although the EU has more instruments to manage the emerging interdependence with CEM suppliers, its ability to shape outcomes will also depend on its response to broader geopolitical developments and challenges.As the control of complex supply chains and the mastering of clean energy technology become more critical than access to raw materials in the distribution of power and influence in energy geopolitics, increasing geopolitical contestation could imply a growing appetite for interventionist industrial policies, where the EU has comparatively limited capacities.This is particularly relevant since CEMs are not only imported as raw products but also in refined form and in components of clean energy products, with China holding a very strong position.
Overall, we wish to emphasise that our assessment of the EU's role in the geopolitics of clean energy is characterised by a number of uncertainties.The geopolitics of clean energy is only just emerging and subject to dynamically evolving technological, economic and political conditions.For example, technological and economic developments will have a decisive impact on the actual demand for different CEMs in the future, for which current projections cover a very wide range (see Table 2).Political relations with supplier countries can change for better or for worse, and in rather unpredictable ways.For now, uncertain policies can help manage import dependence through the diversification of supply, import substitution and by limiting demandor they can fail to do so.Moreover, the major crises of the 21st century have reminded us that unanticipated events can strongly affect world affairs, including the geopolitics of energy.As such, the EU's interdependence within clean energy geopolitics can hardly be firmly projected and, over time, our assessment will be subject to change.Hence, it makes sense to keep the situation under constant review and take measures to limit dependence.
Our findings have broader implications for scholarship on energy geopolitics and the EU's external energy policy.Much of the existing literature has focused on imports and exports of energy carriers, especially fossil fuels, and related dependences.As a result, the EU hasgiven its limited direct competences in external energy policybeen found to pursue a stronger geopolitical orientation through strategically using its domestic policies as an indirect means of influence.By employing internal market and competition policy, in particular, the EU could make external energy actors abide by its acquis.While it has not been without success (Goldthau and Sitter 2014), this indirect approach has inescapably had its limitations (Schmidt-Felzmann 2011; de Jong and Van de Graaf 2021; Youngs 2009).Our findings suggest that decarbonisation entails a far-reaching shift in the focus of external energy policy from energy carriers (with the exception of hydrogen) to CEMs and related supply chains.As such, a wider set of domestic EU policiesin addition to international trade policieswill directly and crucially shape the EU's position in energy geopolitics.Consequently, external outcomes will derive from a more complex constellation of power and interests, institutional capacity and ideational aspects.While traditional analytical distinctions between commercial and strategic approaches may still be relevant for analysing EU external energy policy under deep decarbonisation, they will need to be declined across a much broader set of policies, raising new challenges for scholarship on EU external energy policy.
Far from exhausting the issue, our research leaves room for further investigation into the evolving geopolitics of energy and the EU's role in it.We will here highlight four promising avenues for future research.First, we have analysed energy interdependence with respect to material supply, but the assessment of political risks could be extended to power competition for access to CEMs, which constitutes particular challenges for the EU.Second, beyond our focus on the EU, a more in-depth analysis of the preferences, capabilities and actions of its member states holds significant potential to advance our understanding of the EU's role in evolving energy geopolitics.Third, our examination of the EU's evolving position in the geopolitics of clean energy could benefit from further research into policy areas that may help to addressdirectly or indirectlyvulnerability, including trade, development, industrial policy and the circular economy.Finally, while our analysis has focused on comparing the future clean energy world with the existing fossil fuel-based one, there is much scope for advancing our understanding of the transition process, which may pose serious challenges.For example, the EU could find itself increasingly dependent on a small number of low-cost producers of fossil fuels as it weans itself off fossil fuels more completely in the coming decades (Van de Graaf and Verbruggen 2015; Mercure et al. 2021).Also, cyclical scarcities of CEMs could expose the EU's dependence on a few suppliers before supply diversification and efforts to reduce demand begin to bear fruit (IEA 2023).Nevertheless, we are confident that our assessment provides information on the transitional phase too, as the anticipated reduction in overall fossil fuel consumption will reduce sensitivities during the transition, in a way that may compensate for a potential rise in production concentration among low-cost producers.In addition, we suggest that such concentration should not be taken for granted, as the 2022 energy security crisis in Europe has been pushing the EU to value diversification and reduce its exposure to the concentration of fossil fuel supplies in the hands of Russia, which has translated into accelerated demand reduction and higher dependence on friendly states such as Norway or the US.As for CEMs, short-term exposure to technical bottlenecks in supply chains does not weaken our argument that the coercive potential of suppliers is limited.Without being exhaustive, these issues open up a rich agenda for future research into energy geopolitics under decarbonisation and the EU's role in it.

Table 1 .
Analytical framework: key aspects of energy interdependence Source: authors (see text).

Table 2 .
Key materials in the old and new geopolitics of energy Deloitte Finance et al. 2021ions takes into consideration the use of batteries (e-mobility and grid-scale), traction motors, wind turbines, solar panels and fuel-cell manufacturing.For mineral CEMs, the medium and high demand scenarios were used as those that comprise climate neutrality in 2050, while also accounting for different material efficiency and recycling outlooks (European Commission 2020a).*Criticalrawmaterials (European Commission 2020a); ** Rare earth elements (REEs).willbeconsiderablylower than in the case of fossil fuels(European Commission 2020a;  World Energy Council 2021;Deloitte Finance et al. 2021; see also Online Appendix, Table