Counter-Revolutionary Strikebreaking in Interwar Europe, 1918–1929: The Role of Norway, Christopher Fougner, and Samfundshjelpen

ABSTRACT This article explores the Counter-Revolution beyond the violent paramilitary reaction in Central- and Eastern Europe in 1918–1921. To this end it looks at the case study of Norway, and the organization Samfundshjelpen (Society Aid). Norway is situated in the context of the broader upheaval the continent faced in the wake of the First World War and the Russian Revolution, highlighting that Scandinavia in no way comprised an isolated island immune from political developments in the rest of Europe. In 1920 Society Aid was founded with help from the state, an officer-led strikebreaking organization with a counter-revolutionary agenda. The model for this organization was the German Technische Nothilfe, a daughter organization of the Berlin Freikorps. These organizations quickly developed into a transnational strikebreaking network that comprised virtually every major country in Europe, with regular conferences, correspondence, and other exchanges. The Samfundshjelpen archive shows that its leading figure, Captain Christopher Fougner, played a dynamic role in this network, and helped transfer counter-revolutionary ideas, knowledge, techniques, and organizational forms to Norway and beyond. This reveals Norway played an unexpectedly prominent role in this hitherto unexplored part of the interwar Right, highlighting the importance of integrating regions like Scandinavia in European interwar political history.


Introduction
The nature and activities of a violent transnational counter-revolutionary movement in the wake of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, with its heartlands in Central Europe, have been extensively mapped in the past decades. 1Far-right (para)military units from particularly Germany, Austria, and Hungary aided in the suppression of the revolutions that broke out in Europe in 1918-1923, and enacted White Terror in their own countries and border territories.National troops in nascent states in the Baltic, with the help of foreign volunteers, bloodily resisted the communists in Estonia, Latvia, and to a lesser extent Lithuania.However, counter-revolutionary activity did not stop with the dissolution of CONTACT Celestine S. Kunkeler  celestine.kunkeler@c-rex.uio.no which dealt with militias and paramilitaries in Norway.Alongside these, national and regional archives pertaining to the Danish and Swedish equivalents of the NSH were also consulted.The documents themselves consist of a mixture of correspondence, reports, minutes, protocols, instructions, manuals, memoranda, and publications produced by the strikebreaking organizations.First, the article will sketch out the origins and context of these organizations, starting with the 1918 Finnish Civil War and the German Revolution.It will then outline the circumstances and character of the founding of the NSH in 1920.
The bulk of the article is subsequently devoted to detailing the transnational network into which it was integrated, to a significant extent but not exclusively thanks to Fougner, before discussing conclusion about the nature and significance of the 1920s network, and Norway's arguably disproportionate influence.

Context and origins of the society aid model
From the moment of the Bolshevik coup d'état in Russia, October/November 1917, forces were mobilized in Europe to counter the revolutionary disorder sparked by the establishment of a Red government in Petrograd.Ironically the disorder, and to some extent even its spread, had been facilitated by the German military which had been supporting revolutionary agitators across the continent for years.The violence of civil war between Reds and Whites spread quickly, first to Finland where disputed elections, the vacuum of authority after the withdrawal of Tsarist military and police forces, and the arming of rightwing and socialist paramilitaries led to war in January 1918. 6Gustav Mannerheim, leader of the Finnish White army deliberately encouraged fears of a contagious revolution in his reports to the press, portraying White Finland as the bulwark against the eastern Red tide. 7During the war, and following Mannerheim's victory in May with the aid of the German Baltic Division under General Rüdiger von der Goltz, as well as the critical expertise of Swedish volunteer officers, the White Terror killed tens of thousands of socalled traitors and invaders. 8evolutionary unrest continued to spread in the First World War's fifth year.Since 1916 most European societies had been in a state of revolt over the war, the dead, and material deprivations; the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia gave revolutionary movements new energy to great effect. 9This was also true of Norway, where workers and soldier councils where established, especially in the north of the country, and a revolutionary faction gained control of Den Norske Arbeiderparti (The Norwegian Labour Party) under Martin Tranmael (1879-1967), who advocated emulation of the Bolsheviks. 10Meanwhile, the 1918 German Spring Offensive masterminded by Quartermaster General Erich Ludendorff came to a halt before achieving its objectives, while the Allied blockade of German supply lines aggravated discontent behind the front lines.Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff recommended an armistice to the politicians, though subsequently spread the myth that a complot had brought about Germany's defeat, since no Allied troops reached German soil. 11On 9 November 1918 the German Republic was proclaimed, putting an end to Hohenzollern rule as Wilhelm II fled to the Netherlands.At the head of the new government stood Friedrich Ebert, leader of the Majority Social Democrats, those who had supported the war effort, in betrayal of orthodox Marxist principles as their detractors, the Independent Social Democrats, saw it.The proclamation of republican democracy in Germany emboldened left-wing and revolutionary groups beyond its own borders.In Stockholm social democrats demonstrated on the streets to put pressure on the Right for democratic reforms; in the Netherlands the leader of the Social Democrats, Pieter Jelles Troelstra, called for a socialist revolution in his own country, though found himself abandoned by his own party. 12ltimately it was German events in the aftermath of the November Revolution which proved to have the greatest transnational ripple effect in North-Western Europe.Socialists to the left of Ebert's government, particularly the communist Spartacist League led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, called for a more radical revolution.In January 1919 the Spartacist Uprising brought civil war to the streets of Germany, as Ebert and Minister of Defence Gustav Noske decided on 10 January to rely on the Reichswehr and counterrevolutionary volunteers, the Freikorps, to suppress the revolt. 13As is well known, the Freikorps troops did so with particular brutality, leaving thousands of dead by the end of the year. 14With a supposedly high proportion of war veterans, cadet students, and numerous aristocratic officers, they have typically been stereotyped as extreme-Right and reactionary in character, 15 generating subcultures of a brutal and ultra-violent military masculinity. 16The Berlin Freikorps, the Garde-Kavellerie-Schützen-Division (GKSD), led by Waldemar Pabst, requires particular attention.The unit arrested the Spartacist leaders Liebknecht and Luxemburg, but rather than detaining them, beat them up, and shot them -Rosa Luxemburg's body was dumped in the Landswehrkanal. 17ess well known alongside these ultra-violent counter-revolutionary operations is the establishment of so-called 'technical departments', to deal with the strikes that were part of the communist revolt.Between January and March, Otto Lummitzsch (1886-1962), a member of the GKSD, organized groups of technical experts from the army, navy, and GKSD, who could substitute for striking workers in key areas of industry and production. 18hen the Freikorps were disbanded, the technische Abteilungen, as military groups, had to be converted into a more or less civilian organization, the Technische Nothilfe. 19The TN continued as an, ostensibly, politically neutral organization that could deploy emergency technical workers to gas, water, and electricity works and the like, to keep society functional in case of a general strike.Unsurprisingly it received a great deal of support from right-wing politicians in the Reichstag, while Lummitzsch blatantly cooperated with employer organizations. 20The TN continued to operate for decades, as it managed to retain state funding throughout, though its character was notably altered under the Third Reich, when it largely operated as an actual emergency aid organization, its political character rendered redundant under national socialism.
Given that the Technische Nothilfe emerged under revolutionary conditions that were endemic to Europe, it is hardly mysterious that similar organizations were also founded elsewhere.Nor is it surprising that, in light of Germany's social, political, cultural, and economic weight, the TN was an influential model.While other centres of revolution and counter-revolution, such as Budapest, also played important symbolic roles in the perception of the revolutionary threat, the sheer violence of the conflicts could also work to limit the influence those centres had on countries which perceived themselves as more peaceful or even 'civilized'. 21In some countries the counter-revolutionary strikebreaking organization held particular appeal, as a practical alternative to the ultra-violent paramilitaries of the White Terror exemplified by for instance the Finnish White Guards. 22This may well explain why the German example and TN in particular caught on in Scandinavia more than Finland did, in spite of the latter's proximity.Furthermore, the Finnish language was a significant barrier to communication, while German was widely spoken in the upper echelons of the Scandinavian state and society.
Denmark was an early adopter of the TN model, where Samfundshjaelp (Society Aid) was founded in February 1920.The initiative was taken first in September 1919, at a meeting of the Danish Employers' League (Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening) where the former Danish General Consul in Moscow, Captain C.F. Haxthausen, held a speech -'the first step towards the union and organization of society against workers' terror'. 23Haxthausen had first come to Russia as a Danish Red Cross delegate, to look after the interests of maltreated Austro-Hungarian PoWs in Petrograd. 24With his direct experience of the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917, he became a natural frontman for the rightwing reaction against the new revolutionary threat in Denmark.The practical administration of Samfundshjaelp was handled by Captain Fleming Topsøe.At a meeting of Nordic employers' unions in Copenhagen on 17 August , Haxthausen portrayed the situation as a conflict between 'SOCIETY AND CHAOS', with revolution just around the corner at Moscow's whim.There was particular concern about the internationalization of the conflict in Russia, as the Russian Civil War, which claimed the lives of as many as seven million people in this time, was still ongoing.A reference was also made to the demonstrations of Norwegian workers, protesting the Norwegian government's denial of entry to a Bolshevik delegation. 25

Samfundshjelpen and Samfundsvernet
Among the Scandinavian countries in the late 1910s and early 1920s Norway's political situation stood out as particularly revolutionary, and as such the right-wing and military reaction to the Left was considerably stronger and more extensive than in Denmark or Sweden.The Norwegian Labour Party joined the ComIntern in 1919, and the party officially committed itself to a revolutionary path to power, alongside the working classes of Russia and the rest of the world. 26As Eirik Wig Sundvall has pointed out, when the Norwegian labour party looked towards Poland in 1920, while the Red Army was poised to cross the Vistula, it did not seem unlikely that Norway too had a part to play in the great struggle. 27he Norwegian military leadership took a very dim view of this kind of revolutionary activity, and was not in any way an impartial observer, as studied in detail by Nils Ivar Agøy in the 1990s.In 1917 military forces put an end to a strike in Spitsbergen, clearly siding with the employer Store Norske. 28Strikes and protests escalated in spring the following year, under conditions of severe food shortages which saw storage sites plundered by a desperate population.This was also perceived to be a military threat, as rumours of a Russian invasion circulated, while Norwegian and Russian communists met in northern Norway, especially Vardø. 29As in Denmark, the Norwegian army ended up organizing 'politically reliable' -i.e.non-socialist -units to call in the event of a revolt: 30 these secretive security units comprised at least 8500 men, with 7350 reserves, armed with machine guns and possibly artillery. 31There were also more than enough civilians who backed a forceful response against the Left.The authorities received numerous letters expressing fear of revolution among the bourgeoisie, and requesting a military response.Some of the more hard-line examples openly demanded violent suppression, up to and including Tranmael's assassination. 32For Nils Ivar Agøy, this was a critical time in which the military became heavily politicized, and reconceived its mission as being one of internal security (against the socialist Left) rather than external defence. 33In Øystein Sørensen and Nik.Brandal's account, 1918-1920 was the most critical period in terms of threats against Norwegian democracy before the 1940 German invasion, both from the Left and Right.They do however emphasize that the military Right ultimately held back at this time. 34hus, much of the military response to revolutionary unrest was dictated by events abroad.Like elsewhere in North-Western Europe, the German Revolution was a particular cause of concern for Norwegian authorities, which followed German developments closely.As one letter from 28 November from the Justice and Police Department to the prime minister noted, 'the ongoing revolution in Germany has already brought unrest and movement within the revolutionary circles of this country, and there are reasons for assuming that the Bolshevik movement in Russia will try to expand to the Scandinavian countries'. 35The Norwegian authorities monitored counter-revolutionary responses with equally great interest.A particularly notable example is the Norwegian military's study of the suppression of the 1919 Spartacist Revolt.This was collected in a 'strictly confidential' document in the General Staff archive, most likely translated and provided by Christopher Fougner, entitled 'Military experiences from the struggles for the suppression of internal unrest in Germany'.It provided detailed -and ideologically highly coloured -descriptions of the street fights and tactics used by Reichswehr and Freikorps troops in Berlin and Munich.Examples include: 'The red army was [merely] composed of bands without leadership, individual persons and also very often armed criminals.On the other hand everything is permitted for those sorts of people', and 'Hand grenades are an excellent tool during street fights'. 36The document was widely distributed among military staff responsible for domestic security, in spite of the fact that the majority of recommendations, such as using live ammunition against protestors or deploying artillery in urban areas, could not possibly be applied legally in Norway. 37Given the political activities of the actors involved in acquiring and distributing such information, it seems that one result of this translation of German experiences to Norway (and elsewhere) was to spread a fear of the Left, which was hardly proportional to the actual threat in Norway. 38t was in this context that the Norwegian Samfundshjelp (NSH) was founded in 1920, i.e. under the same name as its Danish counterpart.The founding figure and formal head was Captain Oswald Nordlie, which confirms that Denmark was probably the immediate inspiration for the organization.Nordlie was part of the Norwegian legation in Copenhagen, and had been providing his superiors with accounts of the strikes and unrest in Denmark since 1918, and reported on the Danish Samfundshjaelp since its founding in 1920. 39He was also the commander of the Danish Academic Shooting Corps (danske Akademisk Skyttekorps). 40In April that year Nordlie reported on Samfundshjaelp's role in breaking the Copenhagen shipping strike, supposedly with some ten thousand members at its disposal. 41While NSH was a private organization, close ties to the Norwegian state were maintained through Nordlie.A state office for 'voluntary help services' was established on 12 June 1920, run by Nordlie, and subordinate to the General Staff. 42In negotiations with the government it was agreed NSH would only act when called upon by the lawful authorities, but based on close cooperation. 43The other leading figure in NSH was cavalry Captain (rittmester) Christopher Fougner, an officer of the Oppland dragoon regiment, and incidentally an Olympic cyclist and president of the Norwegian Cyclist League in 1911-1913. 44In many regards he was the practical organizer of NSH, but most importantly for present purposes, he was the main facilitator of NSH's international contacts.NSH, and its organizers Nordlie and Fougner, show how the early establishment of the transnational network was facilitated by common fears of revolution, sparked by immediate events in neighbouring countries, which seemed to directly influence unrest at home.Official military actors with the ability to travel quite freely in this period, thanks to the available state channels like embassies, were the main agents in actually transferring and translating ideas, practices, and organizational models to Norway, in the first instance from Germany and Denmark.
Financial backing for NSH came primarily from Norwegian banks and industry.Nevertheless, the supposedly classless and apolitical nature of the strikebreaking organization was emphasized.As such, it was claimed that it did not take sides in labour disputes, and in fact was sympathetic to strikes in 'a justified wage struggle' [en berettiget lönskamp].But, 'if the flight from work takes on other forms and acquires political goals, it exceeds its rightful limits, violates the other social classes' lawful goods and carries the seed of revolution in its lap'. 45The general strike was a particular threat in this regard, which was portrayed as an attack on the very existence of society itself.The middle classes were portrayed as collateral damage in a struggle between employers and employees, with women and children suffering the most -supposedly.The revolutions of Russia and Central-Eastern Europe demonstrated how the chaos of the class struggle disproportionately affected these 'bystanders'. 46NSH would technically also intervene in case of lockouts.Like TN, the German model which also strongly influenced NSH, the principal industries targeted for strikebreaking were gas, water, and electricity works.NSH was called in for the strike of 1921, and became a reliable part of the state security apparatus.The organization was dominated by officers at the top.This may in part have been a result of concerns about the setup of the Danish Samfundshjaelp, which was a private organization that only acted at the behest of the authorities, but had an unclear relationship with the state. 47By comparison, NSH was, as already noted by Sverre Bergh Johansen, not just establishment-oriented, but very much a part of the establishment. 48he status of NSH's sister organization, Samfundsvernet (SV), was less certain.Rather than a strikebreaking organization, SV was a purely paramilitary affair.Working hand-inhand with NSH, it aimed to protect the strikebreakers, and suppress socialist revolts with armed force.Founded in 1923, it called on 'each Norwegian man and woman, who is over 18 years old, and does not want communist tyranny'. 49Advertisements were placed in right-wing newspapers for the 'struggle against communism'.Beyond that recruitment happened via a system of private recommendations. 50The SV archive has not been recovered, making it difficult to accurately assess its membership, but estimates are around 12-15 000 members -with Bergen and Oslo as particular strongholds. 51eadership was first in the hands of Major Johan Tidemann Sverre, but after July 1924 was run by Major Ragnvald Hvoslef (1872-1944) -a future key figure of Quisling's Nasjonal Samling (NS, National Unity), and volunteer in the 1939-1940 Finno-Soviet war. 52Arms were acquired through contract with Våben-og Importmagasinet, providing 7.65 mm Mauser handguns. 53The company was run by Finn Hannibal Kjelstrup (1884-1961), an officer with a background of service in the Congo Free State, and also a future in NS. 54 By 1925 SV was in possession of 25 Bergmann machine guns, and a number of other guns and rifles. 55Shooting practice took place on the islands of the Oslo fjord, under the name 'Pistolklubben av 1923'. 56Unlike NSH, SV's legal status was ambiguous at best.From the mid-1920s onwards it secretly received growing amounts of funding from NSH, but this did not necessarily mean state approval.The dubious practice of arming private citizens in an obviously political organization, and Hvoslef's lax commitment to the principles of parliamentary democracy, made that difficult in any case. 57SV received ample attention from the Justice Department.However, Trond Klykken in his MA thesis has argued that, while the state clearly disapproved of this private paramilitary organization's challenge to the state monopoly on violence, SV never acted violently on its own initiative, so there was no need for direct intervention.In 1929 the matter was 'resolved' by an attempt to integrate SV as a reserve police force at the command of the police commissioners.However, this legal arrangement left the status of SV dependent on the formal approval of individual commissioners, and in practice most SV branches did not bother to apply for permission.Ultimately the 'legalization' or 'recognition' of SV was cosmetic. 58Doubtlessly there was also plenty of sympathy within the state -not least from figures like Vidkun Quisling, who acted as Minister of Defence in 1931-1933, and worked closely with Hvoslef. 59SV was officially disbanded by the government in 1936 -in the end it never intervened against a democratically elected left-wing government, though it is doubtful whether it truly ceased all activity for the rest of the decade.

Development of the transnational network
As noted, Norway's counter-revolutionary organizations were directly inspired by foreign examples -German and Danish in the first instance -but were also underpinned by specifically transnational contacts such as Oswald Nordlie, and above all Christopher Fougner.In fact, Norway was highly proactive in the acquisition of information about other counter-revolutionary groups abroad, with state departments making an active effort to learn from their organization, administration, tactics, and experience.Fougner, who possessed a wide array of contacts across Europe, was instrumental to this from the end of the 1910s onwards, which made the impact of that learning all the greater.Furthermore, his activity not only facilitated the introduction of counter-revolutionary currents into the country, but also helped strengthen collaboration with and between similar groups abroad, and possibly the creation of new strikebreaking organizations elsewhere.Central to this matter was the initial task assigned to Fougner by the Norwegian military to investigate borgerlige nødvern (civil 60 emergency defence), in effect non-state counter-revolutionary groups, abroad. 61His findings were written up and distributed in several reports across various civilian and military state departments from 1920.His reports describe paramilitary units, auxiliary police groups, strikebreaking organizations, civil militias, and a variety of anti-communist organizations, in Denmark, Germany, Austria, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
While the immediate Danish predecessor to Samfundshjelp was critical, Germany was probably the primary influence on the Norwegian setup.1920 was the critical year.Reports were sent to the Department of Justice in February on German prohibitions on striking in key industries, while Nordlie reported on the creation of the paramilitary Einwohnerwehr (Citizens' Defence) that same month.Extensive reports were produced about the Technische Nothilfe, reproducing organizational schemes, members' contracts, administrative documents, etc. for the benefit of the Norwegian state.Original TN documents are extensively present in the departmental archive, with information on the TN's history, regulations, ideology, and deployment. 62It seems many of the documents were provided by the Norwegian legation in Berlin, and produced with the explicit intention of creating a similar organization in Norway.This much can be gathered from one report for the Department of Foreign Affairs on the activity of the TN during the Kapp-putsch, and the associated general strike in March 1920.The report also cites Otto Lummitzsch directly, comparing TN to the Red Cross as an independent non-state aid organization.Reference was also made to the French strikebreaking organization, Union Civique.The TN itself was also active in establishing contacts with the Scandinavians.A letter from the Swiss civil militia league Schweizischer Vaterländischer Verbund (Swiss Patriotic League) to Fougner in October that year notes that 'a German study commission (Herr Dr Ernst Lorenz and Herr Erwin Barth) had visited the 3 Nordic countries, to take up contact with the defence organizations [Abwehrorganisationen] there'. 63Fougner's personal connections to the Germans may date back to this year.
Fougner's reports on counter-revolutionary organizations, such as one produced for the Norwegian Industrial League (Norges Industriforbund) in April 1920, also touched upon organizations in Austria and Switzerland early on.He made recommendations for how to organize in Norway based on the experiences and models abroad.For instance, organized non-socialist labour force [organisert borgerlig arbeidskraft] had to be available for maintaining emergency production above all else, and these workers had to be protected by military and police, or auxiliaries.Strikebreakers had to be deployable almost instantly. 64he Norwegian captain also made connections in the UK.In his 1920 report 'Borgersamfundets Nødverge (Samfundshjelpen)', he provided information via Navy attaché Scott-Hansen about the Special Constabulary, and Winston Churchill's initiative to establish a Citizen Guard. 65In another report from 1926, found in the General Staff archive, Fougner reports that during a stay in London he had acquired information about 'English organizations with the aim of protecting existing society'. 66He acquired his information through in-person interviews with the heads of the respective organizations.Among others Fougner reported back on the British Fascists -'an entirely apolitical organization' -established by Rotha Lintorn-Orman (1895-1935), the rival group the National Fascisti -'a relatively small and meaningless organization' -and the Anti-Socialist Union.After his meetings Fougner was sent additional information and brochures.He also noted the Anti-Socialist Union was very interested in the Norwegian Faedrelandslaget (Fatherland League), a major far-right political block at the time, and that they requested further information, hoping to establish contacts directly. 67vidently Fougner's state superiors were interested in the information he gathered, and in 1921 supported Norwegian membership in the so-called International Intelligence Central (IIC), organized in Switzerland by the Swiss Patriotic League after a conference in Lucerne, 1920.The driving force behind this anti-communist organization was Théodore Aubert (1878-1963), a founding figure of the Swiss civil militias that crushed the general strike on 12 November 1918.Aubert was instrumental in gathering the civil militias into the League, after meeting with the Union Civique in France and Belgium. 68The reasons for the founding of the IIC were given at length by Aubert at the Lucerne conference.With reference to the recent Polish victory over the Red Army, the revolutionary situation in Germany, and the successes of the Fascists in Italy in suppressing socialism, he observed the pleasing spread of citizens' defence organizations in Europe.However, Aubert warned: One deliberately closes one's eyes to the steady fermentation, and does not see the fire that glows [sic] beneath the ashes, namely that the result of the great economic crisis can become war.Without doubt every citizen is prepared to do their duty in the time of crisis.But the majority does not believe in the necessity of steady vigilance.These are the experiences of the citizens' [borgerlige] organisations up to this point, and they will assuredly have to do so again.These organisations are founded in times of crisis and are greeted with zeal.After that indifference takes hold more and more, the longer a calm period lasts. 69bert's point touched on what would be a lasting raison d'être for many of the counterrevolutionary organizations in North-Western Europe, including Norway, as revolution and revolt in most cases never materialized: deterrence, and constant vigilance.Aubert painted a Manichaean picture of European politics with the spectacularly histrionic rhetoric typical of the counter-revolutionary movement: a bloody struggle to the death between two opposed world views, one which 'wants to establish a bloody dictatorship on the ruins of civilization' and 'exterminate the bourgeoisie', and another which 'wants to save the honour of the fatherland, freedom, the spirit of empathy, welfare, and happiness'. 70The IIC was not meant to be an international organization, but a centre for collating information between its numerous participants across Europe and even, it was hoped, the USA.'The revolutionary development abroad must not be unknown to us.We cannot limit ourselves to what is happening in our own country'. 71orrespondents such as Fougner were meant to send in a weekly report on the 'revolutionary movement' in their country, a monthly report on the development and activity of their own 'defence organization', and information on ongoing disturbances and experiences with the revolutionaries.Critically, given that Samfundshjelpen's IIC subscription was directly funded by the Norwegian Department of Justice, information could happily be forwarded to the authorities in the relevant country. 72Norway participated through NSH with Fougner as representative, paying a subscription fee of 3500 Swiss francs per annum. 73Interestingly the invitation was in the first instance sent to Fougner personally, and secondly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 74The IIC was divided into a Genf and an Aarau department, with the latter being responsible for North, East, and Central Europe. 75In the beginning there were no representatives from TN, or the UK and France (nor Sweden).The absence of TN was explained with the IIC not wanting to be perceived as an Abwehrorganisation. 76The IIC's collection of information on 'revolutionary movements', 'revolutionary leaders, and agents, their working methods and activities', was noted with interest by Norwegian state departments, which expected Fougner to pass this on to them, as he evidently did. 77The IIC collapsed in 1924, but was succeeded by the Entente Internationale contre le III.Internationale, better known as the Anti-Communist International also under Aubert's leadership, and with Samfundshjelpen's continued participation. 78The archives of the Anti-Communist International in Geneva show that Fougner and a number of other Norwegians -including the later SV leader Ragnvald Hvoslef -continued to engage with the Swiss organization right until the end of the 1930s.
In the following years Sweden followed Norway's lead, as the Samfundshjelp model was also exported to Sweden, under the name Samhällshjälp (SSH), with the same meaning.(It appears to have had a predecessor organized by Colonel Erik Grafström (1872-1952), a reactionary officer who had served as a volunteer in the Finnish Civil War, and was responsible for the killing of numerous Red PoWs.In his memoirs he claims to have run a counter-revolutionary strikebreaking organization at the behest of Director Ernst Wehtje (1863-1936) in Malmö already in 1920, then taken over by SSH.) 79 It was founded in June 1921, with the first district in Malmö, and financial aid from the main Swedish employers' association Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen. 80 In 1921, the first director of SSH, Colonel Axel Georg Norinder (1867-1943), wrote about its Danish and Norwegian counterparts, noting how bolshevism seemed to have a particularly firm foothold among the Norwegian workers, which necessitated a counter-revolutionary strikebreaking organization. 81Once the Swedes had joined the Anti-Communist International, Norinder replicated its anti-communist propaganda for SSH as well, in similar eschatological tones. 82By 1927, Major Henrik Tham, a leading functionary in SSH, could note that [o]rganisations with mainly the same goal as Samhällshjälp exist in all European countries.With those countries' organizations, which to all intents and purposes are constructed in the same way as ours, [SSH] practices a cooperation which . . .has become ever livelier in recent years.The significance which the German 'Technische Nothilfe' and the Danish as well as the Norwegian 'Samfundshjelp' had and has should be generally quite well known. 83e following year Tham travelled to Norway for a study trip on behalf of SSH, where the Swedish sister organization had apparently attracted interest, particularly its regional organization in Värmland, bordering Norway. 84Tham also reported on the activities of Norwegian communists. 85Indeed, the Samfundshjelp archives are filled with reports on both DSH and SSH, including booklets, brochures, and other materials provided directly by the organizations to the Norwegians. 86There can be assumed to have been quite extensive contacts between the leading figures of the three organizations.Linguistic differences were minimal to the point of non-existence, and the three officers Fougner, Norinder, and Topsøe were commonly seen together at the numerous conferences for counter-revolutionary organizations that were held throughout the 1920s.Furthermore the Scandinavians cooperated by making common arrangements with potential collaborators outside the region.Fougner and Topsøe both visited the Netherlands in 1922.In a report that appears to have been produced specifically for SV, Fougner wrote admiringly of the well-funded and state-supported civil militias (Burgerwachten).He had visited the counter-revolutionary militias of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, and was impressed by their extensive facilities and recognition from the state and monarchy.He also made a special note of the heavy machine guns which the Amsterdam militia possessed (but observed that the standard of the Dutch militias was not possible outside of 'a country where there are so many rich people as in Holland'). 87Fougner and Topsøe visited the UK together after the General Strike of 1926, hoping to coordinate anti-strike action with Faulkner of the Food Council and J.A. Barlow, the Minister of Labour. 88nnual conferences became a central component of the transnational strikebreaking network that developed in the 1920s, with the first being held in Copenhagen in 1921, the second in 1923 in Oslo, and the third in Stockholm, 1924.By the end of the 1920s there was a firmly established conference network of such counter-revolutionary organizations, with the Scandinavian and Central-European powers at its core.(These shared many of the same participants as a parallel conference circuit organized by Aubert's Anti-Communist International.)Proceedings were in German.Invitations were sent to Belgium, Denmark, Danzig, Germany, UK, France, Hungary, Norway, Austria, Spain, Switzerland, and Sweden.In 1928 a representative of the Italian Fascist state was also present. 89That year it was held in Budapest, chaired by Viktor Hainiss.
We struggle united against the common enemy pressing forth from the East, which threatens culture, morality, our economic and social institutions.This common and highly important task was the foundation of the international gatherings of the sister organizations in 1921 in Copenhagen, 1923 in Oslo, 1924 in Stockholm, 1925 in Berlin, 1926 in Lucerne, 1927 in Vienna, and currently we have the honour to greet the gentlemen delegates here in Hungary for the purpose of holding the international conference. 90 the end of the Budapest conference Norinder noted he had received a telegram from Topsøe, which requested that the 1929 conference be held in Copenhagen again, as indeed it was by unanimous agreement from the participants. 91The conferences were a good opportunity for the organizations to coordinate plans and activities, and were officially used to inform the others about circumstances and organizational matters in their respective countries.There was a smaller conference with the Scandinavian strikebreakers and TN in Copenhagen in 1924, to formally commit to communication and cooperation in the case of shipping strikes, as had happened in the UK, Norway, and Germany. 92The protocol for the 1926 Lucerne conference shows all Scandinavian countries represented, with the ubiquitous Fougner, Axel Norinder alongside Henrik Tham, Fleming Topsøe, and a Professor Vinding Kruse.Fougner spoke about the Norwegian shipping strike as an attack on the economy and civilization, again noting the need for an international solution for this industry (indicating that the 1924 agreement had not brought about a satisfying solution). 93Fougner was almost always present at the conferences, with the exception of 1928 during unrest in Norway, and was typically a very active participant judging by the transcriptions preserved in the NSH archive.
More intriguing however are the personal connections that were established at the conferences, which can be reconstructed from Fougner's private correspondence.As one would expect, these letters show a less formal basis of cooperation, and reveal the Norwegian captain as a surprisingly prominent figure in this European counterrevolutionary network.A particularly warm exchange between him and TN leader Otto Lummitzsch is preserved, as well as the Hungarian representative of the Nemzeti Mankavédelem (National Labour Protection), Upper Lieutenant Elek Magassy von Magasi.The tone of the letters shows the men were on very friendly terms, exchanging news about their spouses, going on hunting trips together, and sharing photographs. 94ne letter from Lummitzsch to Fougner can serve as illustration: It is a great pleasure to me that you agree to give us some of your days in October, and Meffert will also be very pleased with it.We will already be looking for some beautiful [spot], where we can spend some unforgettable days together.Actually I have already promised Norinder to come to Sweden immediately after the Vienna conference, since I have again been invited to go moose hunting by Herrn v. Sydow [Hjalmar von Sydow, chair of the employers' organisation].I will however immediately be back again -if I can indeed leave at all -and will then be at your disposal.I would very much like to take my wife to Vienna.I regret that it is not possible for your spouse to accompany you, and that she still has such difficulties.My wife is currently with the children in Norderney; but will soon come back.My greetings to you and yours, dearly as your friend [signed Lummitzsch] 95 Lummitzsch's connection to von Sydow may well have been facilitated by Fougner as well, who had visited von Sydow the year before in Stockholm, to work on matters related to the Anti-Communist International. 96Within this friendly counter-revolutionary circle, Fougner was relied on to use his connections in Western Europe, particularly the UK, to bring more organizations into the counter-revolutionary fold.His correspondence shows that he enjoyed connections in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK, utilizing his ability to speak and correspond in German, French, and English.It proved to be particularly challenging to get British representatives involved in the network.After Fougner's and Topsøe's visit to London, Lummitzsch, copying in Magassy, expressed his hopes in November 1927 that with Fougner's help 'it would finally succeed to pull a prominent Englishman into our circle'. 97(Some Brits had previously been involved in the anticommunist conference in Paris in 1924, but they had remained largely absent from the strikebreaking network.) 98s we have seen Fougner had been in touch with figures in the British counterrevolutionary and far-right scene since the beginning of the decade.It is possible that the Norwegian may have provided a good alternative model to the British in lieu of the Germans, given that the British Right in the immediate post-war period was distinctly prone to Germanophobia.A letter from notable conspiracy theorist and antisemite Nesta Webster  (1876-1960) shows she had corresponded with him since spring 1924. 99Well-connected among British fascist and counter-revolutionary groups, Webster had been receiving information from Fougner about Samfundshjelpen, in order to help prepare a British equivalent, the Organisation for the Maintenance of Supplies (OMS). 100Fougner was subsequently also directly in touch with the OMS, providing it with details about other strikebreaking organizations, and collecting information about the OMS in turn. 101He tried to get a representative of the British organization to show up for the Berlin conference in 1925. 102He also corresponded with the anti-socialist Central Council of Economic Leagues. 103In a particularly intriguing letter to Lieutenant Magassy, Fougner at Lummitzsch's behest shared his information about his contacts in Britain and France.He had visited the UK in 1922 when there were no comparable strike-breaking organizations.He found some state-based organizations -such as those noted in his reports circulated in the Norwegian state departments -but there was no real desire to establish any foreign connections among those.'Instead, a mutual Information Service was established between my organization and English places of authority'. 104It is altogether unclear from the letter what exactly the service did or with whom the NSH was actually in contact in the UK, but to Fougner's mind the impact was strong.'This mutual exchange has worked very well.In the autumn [September] 1925 the organization O.M.S. was founded'. 105learly, the Norwegian captain implied that his and the NSH's connections with the Brits had directly led to the creation of the OMS.He visited London again in March 1926, where he spoke to the OMS general secretary, Major C. Twistleton-Wykeham-Fiennes.Together with Colonel Norinder, Fougner got an agreement out of the OMS to send someone to the 1926 Lucerne conference, but it seems the Brits were ultimately prevented by the general strike situation in Britain at that time. 106Fougner never succeeded in actually getting anyone from the OMS or related British organizations to attend the conferences, though he did forward information about them himself, for instance at the 1927 Vienna conference. 107Ultimately, and to Magassy's dismay, the OMS joined (in reality, more like dissolved into) the Industrial Peace Union, which he found a far less suitable choice than their European network -he particularly noted that one key OMS figure, Vice-Admiral Armstrong, would surely have to show up as a former 'colleague' of Admiral Miklós Horthy. 108He also facilitated contacts between the British and Central-European counter-revolutionaries, particularly the British Fascist General Robert Blakeney (1872-1952), as well as contacts in France (General Maurice Balfourier of the Union Civique), Belgium (Oscar Servaix of the Union Civiques), and the Netherlands (Prof.Gautherot, editor of La Vague Rouge). 109In December 1927 Lummitzsch thanked Fougner for the excellent and voluminous materials that Fougner had provided on individuals and organizations from these countries.'Without the journeys to London and perhaps also to Paris it would in my view not be possible, and the only one who can travel there is obviously you [Fougner], since you years back have the best connections to both countries 110 Fougner was not only critical in the transfer of information and influence from abroad to Norway, but also in the circulation and exchange of strikebreaking tactics, organizations, and contacts in other countries in Western and Central Europe, which may never have connected without his presence.The impact of this transnational network was facilitated not only by the infrastructure of institutional organizations and state channels, but the individual skills, connections, and perhaps even charms of people like Fougner, which may have amplified Norway's presence on the international strikebreaking scene.In other words, the processes of transfer and translation in the network had highly personalized dimensions.

Significance and nature of the strikebreaking network
There existed an extensive transnational network of strikebreaking organizations and counter-revolutionary individuals, chronologically and geographically radiating from Berlin and the Technische Nothilfe.Countries such as Norway were directly plugged into this network, allowing counter-revolutionary politics to spread far beyond its heartlands.The organizations possessed a universally military officer leadership.Consequently, they had variable relationships to the state, striving for different degrees of independence; much seemed to depend on how exactly the officers at the top were connected.Here, Christopher Fougner and Oswald Nordlie serve as instructive examples.These organizations were frequently, but not necessarily, paramilitary in nature, or cooperated closely with paramilitary organizations.As such, they were an inseparable part of the transnational counterrevolutionary movement that crushed socialist movements elsewhere in the White Terror, as a de facto civilian wing.The strikebreaking organizations invariably claimed to be entirely classless and apolitical, and were always bourgeois and right-wing.That is not to say there was no ideological variation, but they were uniformly anti-socialist.With connections to more overtly political groups and individuals such as the Anti-Communist International, the Italian Fascist state, small fascist groups like the British Fascisti, or conspiracy theorists like Nesta Webster, they leaned heavily to the far right.It included conservative figures who came to see part of their task as preventing radicalization towards fascism by remaining vigilant against the left-wing threat, and people like Fougner or Hvoslef, closely connected to the Norwegian fascist Right in the thirties. 111 shared ideological basis and personal connections allowed for the easy development of this transnational network in the 1920s, leading to a certain degree of standardization of the strikebreaking model.There was a shared discourse of the organizations as being politically neutral, and in fact not strikebreakers at all.Indeed, this can be deduced simply from the dry and tedious naming conventions for these organizations, all dubbed some kind of 'technical', 'emergency', or 'social' aid.As a TN publication put it, it was 'an organization above parties, which only serves the interests of the common good'. 112hese organizations would only ever target industries essential to the maintenance of society.In the words of a Swedish Samhällshjälp pamphlet, 'The league is neutral in all labour disputes and does not strive to strengthen or weaken any party in such conflicts, but wants to work as a temporary emergency aid'. 113Axel Norinder criticized the organizations of his Danish and Norwegian counterparts precisely because their obvious connections to employers' organizations undermined their supposed neutrality. 114For the Dutch civil militias this was a recurring point of discussion, as there was not always enough state funding, but they wanted to avoid taking payment from private donors -'that way it would acquire the character of serving for the protection of the propertied class'. 115In some cases like the Dutch the need to at least appear politically neutral manifested as real consequences in terms of financial management, but frequently this seems to have amounted mostly to empty rhetoric.Clearly there were common concerns, and common tactics, organizational models, and discourses, which were circulated through the network.
The voluminous presence of writings and publications from sister organizations in other countries in the various Norwegian private and state archives, particularly in Fougner's possession, indicates that the common ground and shared points of discussion domestically were at some level a result of international participation and transnational connections.For instance, Samfundshjelp was at any rate very well informed about the difficulties the Danish or German organizations faced, and what arguments and devices were used to overcome these, so it should be no surprise that there was a standardization of discourse and tactics.Indeed standardization may be regarded as one of the foremost impacts of the network.This is perhaps quite remarkable, given the wildly different national contexts between countries like Germany and Norway -attitudes towards counter-revolutionary violence appear to have been adopted quite uncritically from Germany, with little visible effort at recontextualization. On the other hand organizations like Samfundshjelpen and Samfundsvernet were rarely if ever deployed, which explains how this was sustained.In the case of Scandinavia the point of standardization is doubly true, since minimal language barriers and shared borders allowed for the easy sharing of information, as well as socializing.Common cultural and economic, and to some extent political, proximity to Germany and especially the German military, meant that they were also prone to draw on the same organizational models, in this case the Technische Nothilfe.What needs to be borne in mind is that in practice the network above all served to share information.More direct forms of collaboration such as coordinating strikebreaking activity or sharing resources were suggested at various points, but in reality this seems to have been rather difficult to actually pull off.The basic challenges of cross-border communication and travel doubtlessly played one part, 116 but there were also critical formal differences between private, state, semi-private, civilian, and paramilitary organizations which inhibited direct cooperation.While many of the organizations and individuals mentioned here continued to operate into the thirties, information becomes significantly more sparse for the Norwegian case study, especially in terms of transnational connections outside of the Anti-Communist International.It is very telling that in 1938 the Norwegian state received a letter from the British legation in Oslo, asking if Samfundshjelp still existed (it did), being under the impression it had quietly perished. 117Doubtless the mid-to-late 1930s presented a much harsher political climate for dubious right-wing groups like Samfundshjelp (Samfundsvernet was legally dissolved in 1936) in Norway.Nevertheless, even where organizations folded, private connections could be maintained, so that this history can and should be expanded beyond the 1920s.
Personal connections were critical for the functioning of this network, as many representatives operated in a grey zone between state and private organizations.Christopher Fougner appears to have been a particularly active node in expanding the network and encouraging the flow of information.What exactly contributed to his influence, in spite of Norway's diminutive stature on the international political scene, is not entirely certain.A crucial factor however must have been the generous support and encouragement he received from the state, 118 while simultaneously relying on personal connections that were forged across borders early on.One cannot help but wonder if perhaps his earlier activity as a travelling Olympic athlete played any role here at all.The questions remain how he compares to the numerous other actors in this network, and whether the impact of Fougner and Samfundshjelpen outside of Norway can be gauged from further archives beyond those used here.This requires more pain-staking research in state-and private archives in multiple countries within and outside of Scandinavia, to expand the known outlines and depths of this network.
Strikebreaking was a core aspect of the counter-revolutionary movement in the 1920s.In the early stages in 1918-1921 it was particularly a paramilitary phenomenon, with its base of operations in Central and Eastern Europe.But soon after, rather than disappearing, or being absorbed into the nascent fascist movement, it also mutated into a transnational network of strikebreaking organizations.I have attempted to show that this was a second dimension of the Counter-Revolution in Europe, with far greater geographical reach than the initial paramilitary thrust.While the activities and context for the paramilitary and strikebreaking networks may seem very different, the overlap in personnel, politics, and ideology makes it clear they are two sides of the same coin.As the violence of the Greater War died down, and the immediate threat of revolution was halted, the counter-revolutionary movement adapted to the new realities of the post-war political order.As such, it also opened up to parties that had retained neutral positions throughout the initial conflict, which stood in a much better position to participate now that stringent diplomatic requirements of neutrality were lifted, and the counter-revolutionary movement was less engaged in ultra-violent military operations.That allowed a much greater variety of actors to contribute, both geographically and politically.Fougner and Samfundshjelpen are, possibly very typical, examples of this.While the locus of the initial counter-revolutionary response was focused in Central-Eastern Europe, as revolutionary unrest moved to Western Europe -culminating in the German 1918 revolution and the Spartacist Revolt, and Bavarian Soviet Republic of 1919 -so did the counter-revolutionary network.As the network expanded and moved, it changed.A further consequence was that anti-socialist ideas, tactics, and organizational forms could now spread much easier and further.If we want to properly understand the interwar new Right, scholars cannot do without paying attention to North-Western Europe, and the role less violent counterrevolutionary actors played in the emergent far-right network.

Notes on contributor
Celestine S. Kunkeler is a postdoctoral fellow at the Centre for Research on Extremism (C-REX), based at the University of Oslo.Their research project concerns transnational far-right networks in Northwestern Europe, and the role of military volunteers in interwar Europe, focusing on the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, and their political radicalization and transnational connections across the globe.They have previously worked primarily on fascist political cultures.They received their PhD from the University of Cambridge in 2019, with a thesis on myth-making practices and respectability in Swedish and Dutch fascism in the 1930s.This research was published in 2021 by Bloomsbury Academic as a monograph, under the title Making Fascism in Sweden and the Netherlands: Myth-Creation and Respectability, 1931-40.