Between deplorable anachronism and valuable heritage. The persistence of the Swedish fideikommiss institution, 1810–1964

ABSTRACT In this article, we seek to explain why the Swedish fideikommiss persisted for so long after their equivalents had been abolished elsewhere in Europe. We do this by analysing sources pertaining to abolishment produced by the Riksdag over approximately 150 years. After the ban on creating fideikommiss in 1810, the remaining fideikommiss were defended by emphasizing that they had been created through wills, rather than as fiefs. The question was thus framed as one of individual property rights, rather than one of expropriation as had been the case in other countries. A decision to abolish the fideikommiss was reached in 1914, with the intent of executing a land reform. The continuing agricultural trends of the 20th century made such a prospect unappealing. Having survived into the 1950s, the fideikommiss came to be valued as model farms and cultural heritage sites, a framework reflected in the abolishment law of 1964.


Introduction
Ave Kling et Sträng imperatores!Moriturus vos salutat! 1 These words were uttered, not by a gladiator in the Colosseum, but by a member of the Swedish Riksdag by the name of Hans Wachtmeister, in 1963.The subject of the debate in question was a proposed law abolishing the Swedish fideikommiss, meaning certain properties that are inherited by a sole, usually male, heir, and cannot generally be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise diminished.Wachtmeister was himself in possession of one of these entailed estates, which is why he equated himself to the gladiator, prepared to fight his last battle.He felt that the Social Democrats, with ministers Herman Kling and Gunnar Sträng standing in for Caesar, were about to destroy a centuries-old institution that had been nothing but 'invaluably beneficial' to the entire nation. 2The allusion to antiquity was fitting -as the name indicates the roots of the institution is to be found in Roman law -and the very ancientness of the institution was, as this article will show, one of the main justifications for both getting rid of the entailed estates and keeping them.Despite Wachtmeister's passionate defence, the law was passed and came into effect the following year.In the broader European context, the abolishment law of 1964 was late.Everywhere else, the fideikommiss -or their equivalent -had long been nullified.Furthermore, the law stated that the fideikommiss should be liquidated, not at once, but at the next generational transfer.This, together with a few cases where certain estates have been prolonged, means that Sweden still has a number of extant fideikommiss. 3Since Sweden is often depicted as a forerunner of modernization and economic and gender equality, it appears paradoxical that fideikommiss have been preserved until today. 4Why then, have they continued to exist for so long in Sweden when they have been phased out in all other European countries?
Even if the date of abolishment was late, it had a long prelude.The law was the result of some 150 years of intermittent debates on abolishment, starting with the prohibition of newly-established fideikommiss in 1810.In this article, we seek explanations of the aberrant Swedish development through an analysis of two related source categories: proposals and debates in the Riksdag relating to the regulation of fideikommiss between 1810 and 1914; and a series of public inquiries conducted after 1914 which aimed to produce a law on the subject.The inquiries contain not only the propositions for such laws, but also the motivations behind them, and statistics and reports from various referral bodies.In analysing the content of these sources, our focus will be on the arguments used to justify each position; why fideikommiss were understood as problematic by some and defended by others, and what kinds of solutions were proposed.Covering such a long period, emphasis will also be placed on how changes over time in the debates and in the subsequent law-making process related to changes in the wider economic, political, social, and cultural contexts.
In explaining the persistence of the fideikommiss institution, we will use a concept coined by Reinhart Koselleck.According to him, modernity was characterized by the experience of the acceleration of history, resulting in certain phenomenon, with some groups and places interpreted as being ahead, while others were still in a past state of being, even though they existed at the same time.This 'noncontemporaneousness of diverse, but in chronological sense, simultaneous histories' resulted in the perception that the world was in a state of progress; some were found to have progressed far, while others were behind and needed to catch up or be discarded.This, in turn, motivated political action.Either progress needed to be helped along by reforming or abolishing these phenomena, or slowed down by protecting them in the name of stability and tradition. 5As we will show, this concept illuminates important aspects in the long political discussion about abolishment.

The entails of Europe: background and previous research
Entails were an integral part of the property structure of the Ancien Régime.The exact terms -majorat, entailed estates, substitutions or fideikommiss -varied between legal traditions.Entails developed in French and German legal tradition during the late Middle Ages, and were inspired by the Spanish mayorazgo, which in turn had risen out of a medieval Islamic legal institution called wakf.The basic idea was roughly the same.Entails were a special form of property -primarily land -that was withdrawn from the market and not subject to statutory inheritance laws.Ideally, the property could not be sold, mortgaged, or diminished.Division was prevented and the estate was passed on to one single heir.The aim, often explicitly stated, was to keep property undivided and under the care of a certain lineage, often a distinctly male line of descent. 6he establishment of entails was followed by concurrent criticism of the institution and its effects on property relations.In their overall critique of the old society and its principles and laws, Enlightenment thinkers also specifically attacked entails.An early opponent was Adam Smith, who in The Wealth of Nations [1776], labelled entails feudal relics, unnecessary in a society governed by the rule of law under a parliament.Moreover, Smith depicted entailed estates as unproductive due to a lack of incentives.Incumbent landowners without capital, knowledge, or interest had little choice but to go along with doing things the same way as they always had, and at the same time those who actually worked the land (the tenants) had no motivation to maximize their production, since they could not keep the profit. 7In a similar way, John Stuart Mill described how the heir of an entail, given his privileged position, risked 'growing up idle, dissipated, and profligate'. 8arly liberal criticism towards entails, largely equivalent to that put forth by Smith and Mill, was important for property relations in the United States, where the institution was already prohibited during the American Revolution. 9In the history of abolishment of entails in Europe, two periods crystallize: one centred around 1850, the second covering the 1920s and 1930s.During the first, entails were abolished most notably in western and southern Europe: apart from France, this included the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Italy.A second wave took place in the two decades following World War I, putting an end to entails in the middle and northern parts of Europe: Finland, Denmark, Germany, Austria, and England. 10Sweden is the notable exception.In a comparison of entails in Europe, John Erichsen and Ditlev Tamm underline how Sweden 'in many ways stands out as exceptional in Europe, with a very tardy phase-out'. 11his raises questions about how the different timing of abolition can be explained.Even if the Swedish development differs from the rest of Europe, there has been no exhaustive efforts to explain this delayed abolishment.Previous research has focused mainly on the legal introduction of fideikommiss in Sweden, finally confirmed by law in 1686. 12The best account of the latter development is an article by Kjell Åke Modéer from 1977, which sketches the main outlines of the institution, although it does not try to explain the Swedish departure from the overall European pattern. 13There are some studies of the abolishment of entails in other countries. 14In Denmark, entails were ended by a law passed in 1919, but abolishment was already assured in the constitution of 1849.However, the entail owners had considerable political influence until 1901, as they constituted a large group in the Danish upper house. 15A serious political debate started just after parliamentarianism was introduced and left-wing and centre politicians came into power.The debate was characterized by an aversion to the nobility and the objective to transform land into smallholdings.In addition, the Russian revolution cast a threating shadow on the question. 16ince entails have often been studied in national contexts, few studies have compared debates between nations.One exception is Jens Beckert, who examines political discussions concerning the abolition of entails in France, Germany, and the US.Beckert suggests that the decisions to end entails were closely linked to the upholding of a monarchical or republican social order. 17In the former, the institution was used to provide the nobility with an economic base, allowing the group to devote their time to the service of the state.In the latter, the entails were seen as obstacles to achieving the ideals of meritocracy and the transfer of land within a free market.Consequently, in the republican United States, entailments were abolished early on, while monarchical Germany kept the institution until after its defeat in the first World War.France spent the 19 th century locked in a prolonged power struggle between republican and monarchical forms of government, and thus saw the abolishment and reintroduction of the institution a number of times, until it was finally abolished in 1849. 18eckert acknowledges that the debates about abolition touched upon different themes.Economic arguments, for example, played a bigger role later in the late 19 th century due to the progress of industrialization.However, it was the political arguments that were conclusive.Beckert emphasize a close link between republican state structure and the abolition of entails, arguing that this was 'the triumph of republican conditions that robbed entails of their political support'. 19He does not discuss the scope of his explanation, but it is certainly verified in the Danish case described above.Could it also explain the late abolishment in Sweden?A study of the political discussions and their relationship to political structure would put Beckert's hypothesis to a critical test.
At first sight, it is clear that entails in Sweden were a tool for the landed nobility.Even though the right to establish fideikommiss was afforded to anyone, more than 90% were created by members of the nobility. 20Hence, the abolition was primarily a question pertaining to nobility as an institution.However, the Swedish nobility would gradually come to lose its pre-eminent place in Swedish society during the 19 th century.Up until 1865 the nobility was one of the four constituent chambers in the parliament, the Riksdag of the Estates.This political organization, with its roots in the social divisions of feudalism, was continually criticized throughout the following decades for not reflecting the rapidly changing society it was meant to represent.Finally, in 1865, a decision was made to reform parliament into a bicameral body, appointed by public elections. 21As a result, the most important of the remaining rights exclusive to the nobility were lost.Most nobles accepted, or even supported, this development. 22The group's most prominent members continued to exercise political influence under the new system. 23The new first chamber had high financial requirements for eligibility and was designed to act as a sort of conservative bulwark.Almost two thirds of its first members were in fact nobles. 24As will be shown, the dynamics of this new parliamentary system is part of the answer to why the Swedish fideikommiss persisted as long as they have.As a result of their willingness to accept, or at the very least tolerate, the political changes, nobles were not made into major targets for social reformers or radicals.In comparison to many other European nobles during the period, Swedish nobles led a relatively undramatic existences and were largely spared the politically-motivated violence occurring in many other countries at the time.

The prohibition against new fideikommiss in 1810
In 1810, the Riksdag banned the establishment of new fideikommiss in land.The architect of this proposal, chief magistrate Lindström, stressed the importance of making landholders free to possess property.He drew a sharp distinction between property rights and testamentary rights; an owner should have unrestricted control over his possessions during his lifetime, but he should not have the right to stipulate rules reducing the freedoms of future possessors.That it still was possible to lay such restrictions upon future generations was, accordingly, depicted as a huge problem.If nothing was done, Lindström anticipated that all land in Sweden eventually would be turned into fideikommiss; 'to which no true owner could be found'. 25indström's memorial gained support from the parliamentary legal committee.Estates under fideikommiss were portrayed as one of the greatest failures of the law, especially since 'a too-large estate, in one man's hand, gives less in production and supports fewer people, than if it was to be divided between several owners'. 26But fideikommiss was also related to another question of great immediate interest; the right to possess all kinds of landed property.The most important exception to this ideal concerned the right to own exempt land (frälsejord).The possession of such land -which was more or less free from dues to the Crown, and equivalent to about one third of all farmlands in the 18 th centuryhad been a privilege of the nobility.Over time, however, the nobility's monopoly on exempt land was circumvented, first by a gradual (and illicit) transfer of land to nonnobles, then by formal abolishment. 27The ultimate decision, where the nobility finally relinquished their privilege, had been performed earlier in 1810.Following Lindström, the legal committee highlighted this new understanding of 'freedom for everyone to acquire all kinds of landed property' and argued that it was incompatible with an 'unlimited right to change the rules of inheritance and landownership for eternal time'. 28ll four estates of the Riksdag eventually approved the proposal.While three of them accepted the prohibition without discussion, debate within the nobility was sharp.Opinion was clearly divided, and voting almost ended with a draw. 29The advocates of the right to found fideikommiss used two main arguments.The first and most important argument stressed the establishment was a consequence of property rights; a landowner should have an absolute right to do what he wanted with his property.The right to entail was thus part of the right to possess. 30The second argument concerned the nobility as a class.The right to entail was depicted as essential to preserving a viable noble class.If it was abolished, 'the only remaining way to keep property within the nobility should disappear', the nobleman Grundelstjerna stated. 31The opponents, on the other hand, stressed the main arguments put forward by the legal committee.The problem with too many large estates was interpreted in accordance to national prerequisites 'for a poor country with restricted resources, a large number of fideikommiss is not suitable', Count Mörner stated, adding that the inner strength of a nation 'does not rest with a small number of great landowners, but in an equally distributed wealth'. 32Furthermore, in order to maintain a propertied nobility, fideikommiss had no relevance; the independence of the class did not come from the fact that 'some members unpunished could be squanderers'. 33ven if anyone could found fideikommiss, they were definitely understood as an instrument of the nobility.However, the proponents' main argument emphasized the right to entail was a consequence of ownership.Legally, fideikommiss had been regulated through the rules of private wills, giving anyone permission to entail by a will submitted to the district court. 34This, in fact, separated the Swedish rules from those of most other countries, where entails rested upon royal decree or at least some kind of admission. 35The foundation of a fideikommiss was therefore a private matter for the family.Nevertheless, the defence also clearly drew on the need for an economic base for the nobility as a political class, using similar arguments as the ones Beckert found in the French and German debates.In the end, however, the nobility voted for prohibition with reference to economic arguments.
In explaining the nobility's decision to relinquish their monopoly to exempt land, Christer Winberg underlines a long-term change in the nobility's defence arguments.The older 'feudal doctrine' was built on a reciprocal principle behind the privilege of exemptions from taxes; the nobility should provide the Crown with educated civil servants and officers, and their sole right to possess exempt land was the warrant for this.In turn, exempt land could not be combined with a free land market, as the group of potential purchasers was effectively restricted to the nobility.The doctrine emphasized the exclusivity of the nobility, but over time, Winberg argues, it became more of a burden for the individual landowner.It obviously limited the right of disposal and led to illegal sales, even to farmers, and provided an opening for political attacks from the peasantry, aimed at eliminating freedom from dues to the Crown.Eventually, a new view emerged within members of the nobility in the late 1700s. 36There is, however, an evident connection between the understanding of this 'excluding problem' of privilege to exempt land, and the foundation of fideikommiss.The nobleman Mannerheim, one of the initiators to the relinquishment, in fact treated exempt land and fideikommiss as variations on the same theme.Fideikommiss 'has not the same value as an estate that anyone is allowed to acquire', Mannerheim noted, adding how 'land that only can be possessed by individuals within a certain class is almost of the same kind, if the class is restricted to a fewer number of individuals, who lacks the [economic] ability to buy it'. 37he debates in 1810 concerned prohibition against new fideikommiss.A cancellation of the existing fideikommiss was not even mentioned.The political context was indeed revolutionary.In 1809, following a disastrous war against Russia, King Gustav IV Adolph had been dethroned and absolutism had been replaced by a new constitution aiming at dividing power between king, parliament and government.This new system, however, was still monarchical rather than republican, and the nobility did not lose their political position.Nevertheless, the prohibition against new fideikommiss was, in the end, accepted by the nobility.Since it was depicted as a tool for the nobility, it should be related to the decision to relinquish the monopoly to exempt land.In Winberg's interpretation, this reorientation within the nobility established a new doctrine.Instead of defending a problematic monopoly, the focus was on property rights.The exemption from taxes was in itself seen as a kind of property, a calculated advantage on a free land market.This, Winberg argues, made it easier to preserve the status of exempt land, since any proposals aiming at taxing exempt land could be viewed as an attack on someone's property. 38However, in the long run, the focus on property rights gave proponents of existing fideikommiss a stronger case.Since they had been established on private property transferred through a legally-accepted will, a political attack could be viewed as an attack on someone's rightful property, and thereby on property rights, as such.Later in the debates, this line of argument would be used frequently.

Fideikommiss in the Reform era, 1810-1880
In many European countries, entails were repeatedly debated during the 1800s, and several countries decided to abolish all entails during the repercussions of the 1848 revolutions. 39In Sweden, however, entails were not an important theme in political debates until the 1880s.The absence of a political tussle was certainly not due to strong continuity during the period between 1810 and 1880.On the contrary, this was an era of legal reforms, not least regarding property rights, land holdings, and inheritance.Four reforms are particularly important: the introduction of equal inheritance shares between brothers and sisters in 1845, 40 the strengthened freedom to bequest in 1857, 41 the abolishment of redemption rights (bördsrätt) for landed property in 1863, 42 and of course the political reform in 1865 that transformed the Riksdag from a four-estate Diet to a twochamber parliament.While the latter reform was solely political, the three others had great impacts on landed property as well as on gender, class, and family relations.In sum, the period between 1810 and 1880 saw great legal changes, especially regarding inherited land and the ideals of keeping land within a single lineage.In that perspective, it is surprising that there was almost no debate about the remaining fideikommiss and the right to entail during this period.A committee set up in 1810 with the purpose of presenting an updated civil code hardly mentioned fideikommiss in their drafts. 43In debates on adjacent questions -like inheritance taxation -occasional references were made to fideikommiss, but only in passing.It is telling that regulation of freedom to bequeath was discussed at seven parliamentary meetings before 1850 without a single mention of fideikommiss.
The only attempt to address the abolition of the remaining estates was a private bill from the peasant representative Pehr Nilsson in 1856.He pointed to four problems: fideikommiss were not efficiently managed; they represented an unfairness against siblings (especially sisters); impeded creditors from obtaining mortgages in real estate; and were an obstacle to the ideal that all land should be disposable on the land market.Since the Riksdag in 1810 had rejected the very idea of fideikommiss, and furthermore approved of equal shares in 1845, Nilsson argued that it was indeed time to put an end to the whole institution. 44Besides the argument about equal shares, these motives were economic: fideikommiss was problematic in relation to farming, credit, and the land market, but not viewed as a political problem.
Nilsson's bill was sweeping, but received reserved reactions and was rejected by all four estates without debate.Only in the peasants' estate did a minority approve. 45The legal committee stated briefly that existing fideikommiss had been established according to current legislation, and that it would be against the will of the founders to abolish them. 46he argument that the legislative power should not interfere in private wills, established according to law, seems to have been broadly accepted, and this in fact gives an important understanding of the prerequisites of fideikommiss.As already noted, entails in Sweden differed from the rules in many other countries: anyone had the authority to establish a fideikommiss without formal sanctions other than registering the will at court.This procedure made fideikommiss a private matter, something that legislators should keep away from.It is telling that a nationwide register of fideikommiss was not drawn up until 1875. 47The legal committee of the Riksdag even stated that the law regarding fideikommiss were 'to be seen as a special law, that, although founded by a private person, still is made in consequence of the power he has been granted by the General Assembly . . .'. 48 Disputes about wills establishing fideikommiss were to be settled by the Supreme Court, in the same way ordinary laws and statutes were to be interpreted.This notion of fideikommiss as a 'private special law' therefore created a formal obstacle for abolition.
Even if there was no debate on abolition, there are a few debates between 1810 and 1880 that made references to fideikommiss.They are, however, not evenly distributed within the four-estate Riksdag.The minutes from the burghers' estate and the clergy almost never mention fideikommiss, indicating that it was primarily a question for the two landholding estates.In the peasants' estate, fideikommiss were confined within the context of equal inheritance shares and redemption rights to lineage property.In both cases, fideikommiss were regarded as deplorable relics from the past and associated with a conservative nobility. 49The smaller share of inherited land granted to women was viewed as a consequence of an old 'aristocratic feudal principle' based on a desire to "tie estates to certain families and family names, from which our fideikommiss still are deplorable remnants'. 50Market-oriented farmers, like the aforementioned speaker for the peasants' estate, Nils Larsson, argued that the nobility had posited the support of bördsrätt upon the peasants.The defence was 'just from the classes, for whom fideikommiss is important, since they fear that in the very moment that the redemption right is abolished, the right to keep fideikommiss will be in danger'. 51n the nobility's estate, references to fideikommiss were made in several debates.In the 1830s, several noblemen suggested the possibility of mortgaging fideikommiss.The proposal was rejected by the other three estates but intensely debated within the nobility, where defenders of fideikommiss argued that the incurring of debts would challenge the idea of the institution.Opponents openly claimed that fideikommiss were 'both morally and economically incorrect', a 'foreign legislation, arisen only to save an aristocracy already on the road to ruin'. 52This argument was grounded in economics, but in the debate the connection between fideikommiss and political representation was also underlined.Count Liljencrantz, for example, emphasized the benefits of a nobility that could elect economically-independent members to political commissions.He went as far as to question the use of the prohibition against new fideikommiss in 1810. 53iljencrantz's argumentation points directly to the link between material conditions and the political structure highlighted by Beckert.This had not been emphasized in 1810, but it gained ground in the 1820s and 1830s.The president of the Court of appeal for Scania, baron Ehrenborgh, made one of the first arguments in a comment on a proposal of new Civil Code in 1826.He opposed the restriction on will-making and stressed the benefits of extended possibilities to bequeath property.According to Ehrenborgh, 'fideikommiss in a constitutional society is not only beneficial, but also a necessary prerequisite for the creation of an independent upper house'. 54In accordance with Liljencrantz's argumentation, he recommended a repeal of the 1810 prohibition.
We do not know much about Ehrenborgh's motives.For sure, he was himself closely related to the institution, as he had married into the Ruuth family and his brother-in-law was in charge of the large fideikommiss Ruuthsbo.Nevertheless, Ehrenborgh's argument reinforced a connection between fideikommiss and political structure.In one way, it built on the traditional argument for the nobility as class: in order to maintain their position and to be of use to the Crown, they needed material privileges. 55However, Ehrenborg added a new dimension by arguing for the material status of a political upper house.This line of argumentation was reinforced in 1829, when the nobleman N.W. Stråhle proposed the introduction of hereditary family seats, that is, estates inherited undivided by a maleonly lineage.Stråhle argued that family seats should be reserved for the head of the family who represented his kin as a member of the House of the Nobility, and explicitly emphasized this as a way of ensuring the representatives' material requirement to serve as members of an upper house.Although he was not referring to other countries, Stråhle's suggestion was in line with the English peerage, which held titles, political representation, and landed estates in reserve for the head of noble families.What Stråhle in fact advocated was a modified right to establish new fideikommiss, reserved as a privilege for the nobility. 56tråhle's proposal failed to gain enough support in the Riksdag, but is interesting given its explicit link between political representation and material conditions.It was in fact the same line of argument as that used by Prussian conservatives in 1850, when they defended entails on the basis of the hereditary seats in the First Chamber of the Prussian parliament. 57At the time, the Riksdag still consisted of a four-estate body, where the nobility had just one vote, which makes the references to 'upper house' rather misleading. 58Moreover, the possessors of fideikommiss did not have a large influence on political decisions.At the beginning of the 1800s they amounted, at most, to about 5% of representatives when they assembled at the Riksdag.Moreover, only around one third of fideikommiss holders participated in the Riksdag at all. 59During the period of 1810-1880, only two possessors of fideikommiss were ever members of the Government. 60In Denmark, four entail possessors were heads of the government, in addition to eight who served as ministers, between 1865 and 1901. 61The conclusion must be that the holders of the fideikommiss did not play any truly significant political role in the 1800s.In other words, Sweden lacked a distinct link between hereditary entails and political representation.The attempts to strengthen this relationship in the 1820s and 1830s failed.In the debates leading up to the establishment of the two-chamber parliament in 1866, no references about fideikommiss were made.Thus, Sweden does not support Beckert's thesis: the connection between entailed estates and political representation was weak both in practice and political debate, and the reformation of the political system therefore never called for an abolition to the practice.When the debates took a new turn after 1880, things other than political representation were in focus.

Positions locked, 1882-1906
While the preceding decades had seen relatively few mentions of fideikommiss in the Riksdag, starting in 1882, the question of abolishing the remaining fideikommiss became almost perennial.Up until 1914, when a decision was finally reached, the issue was brought before the Riksdag no less than 14 times.The debates took place mainly in the first chamber, since the majority of the second chamber was so firmly in favour of a reform that debates were seldom needed.Initially, the arguments used by both sides of the issue were, in large part, similar to the ones used earlier in the century.Fideikommiss was defended on the grounds of protecting already-granted property rights of the individuals in question.To its critics, economic arguments were still important, but the institution was also increasingly depicted as a remnant of an older society, with its feudal elements coming under attack by supporters of continued modernization of society.
The first of these motions, filed in 1882 by the noted banker and liberal André Oscar Wallenberg, argued primarily that the institution was incompatible with the law on equal inheritance shares adopted in 1845. 62Here, the contrast between earlier progressive reforms and the old fideikommiss was stressed.The debates following Wallenberg's motion fell roughly into a liberal/progressive discourse, advocating abolishment, versus a conservative equivalent, set on upholding the status quo.Supporters of abolishment called the fideikommiss an anachronism, and an affront to the 'general sense of justice'. 63ow could it be possible to still allow fideikommiss to exist, where one heir, usually male, would stand to inherit everything, when the rest of society was ruled by laws that dictated otherwise?For their critics, abolishment of the fideikommiss was linked to notions of 'continuing progress', and 'rising civilization', 64 indicating movement away from the old and towards the new.The fideikommiss themselves were regarded as little more than 'museums for relics', 65 and as remnants of feudal society. 66The fact that past lawmakers had outlawed the creation of new fideikommiss several decades earlier, thereby undermining the institution as a whole, made the continued existence of these estates even more unjustifiable to these latter-day advocates of progress.Being an old institution, then, made the fideikommiss' continuing presence abominable in and of itself.For example, the primogeniture of the fideikommiss, a familiar enough concept in feudal society, was viewed as alien and offensive in the 1880s.Being the product of an earlier historical stage held no redeeming qualities at all and was by itself sufficient motivation for abolishment.
Even conservative defenders of the institution admitted to its archaic nature, and their defence was conducted in spite of this fact, not because of it. 67Just as their predecessors had done when the question briefly emerged in 1856, they pointed out that the legal documents that regulated the fideikommiss, including their rules of succession, had been established in accordance with the law at the time.As such, they were still valid even though other laws and attitudes had changed in the meantime.In the view of the majority of first chamber, it was not accorded to the state to meddle with the property rights of individual citizens, unless absolutely necessary. 68As noted, this defence was made possible by the fact that the Swedish fideikommiss had been erected through wills, rather than originally created as fiefdoms.As such, the moral and legal ground for any kind of expropriation of the fideikommiss back to the state, important in abolishment elsewhere, 69 was non-existent in the Swedish context.Because of this, it was possible to frame the question of whether to abolish or keep them as a matter of individual's rights, rather than as a matter of state.The sanctity of these rights was used to defend the fideikommiss, when, in France and Germany for example, similar arguments concerning the freedom of the individual was used to discredit them. 70n the economic side of the issue, whether the fideikommiss were well run was repeatedly made into a point of contention.The opponents of the fideikommiss argued that the construct produced incompetent and lazy owners, whom, safe in knowing that the entire estate would pass to them, could rest on their laurels from an early age.The rules of succession did not account for whether the person in question was of a suitable personality, or if he had the education required to run an estate.Seen here is the familiar bourgeois critique of the Ancien Régime: the ideal of the self-reliant, self-made man versus the idle product of privilege. 71The rules against selling parts of the estates, and against obtaining mortgages with the estate as collateral, was seen as a severe hindrance in the running of modern agricultural operations. 72The defenders of the fideikommiss, for their part, claimed that the institution tended to foster responsible owners, who could prepare for their task their whole lives.In addition to this, fideikommiss, by virtue of often being large production units, were claimed to be model farms, where modern and rational production methods could be implemented on a grand scale. 73he success of the defence of the fideikommiss at this point largely came down to the composition of the Riksdag's first chamber.While Wallenberg was a member of this chamber, his critical view of the fideikommiss was in the minority.The dynamic between the sceptical first and the more reform-minded second chamber can be clearly observed in the question regarding the abolishment of the fideikommiss.The second chamber, believing itself to represent the larger share of the population, repeatedly petitioned to abolish the fideikommiss, while the conservative first chamber, viewing its mission to be the maintenance of the status quo, at least when it came to power relations, 74 consistently voted against these proposals.Nevertheless, from the 1880s onwards the debate was increasingly based on the view that fideikommiss were deplorable remnants of the past.As will be shown, this emphasis on an accelerating noncontemporaneousness grew in importance during the first decades of the 20 th century.

The emerging importance of small-scale farming, 1907-1914
Up until the early 20 th century, the defence of the fideikommiss based primarily on legal principle held firm.As shown, economic arguments against the institution had also played a part in the discussion, albeit a secondary one.Beginning in 1907, however, economic considerations, rather than legal ones, began the dominate the discussion on abolishment.To understand this, one must first look at other contemporary developments.By the early 20 th century, the creation of so-called own homes (egnahem) had become one of the central political issues in Sweden.It was part of a wider European reaction to emerging industrial society. 75At the core of this broad movement was the idea that more people should be given the opportunity to own their own plot of arable land.Economically, the lower strata of the rural population would be given an alternative to their current meagre existence, and to the uncertain prospects associated with moving to the city.Socially, living and working in the countryside would be healthier than living in overcrowded cities and working in factories, and this secured a rural source of manpower by keeping the countryside populated and discouraged emigration.This was further imagined as leading to a more effective and intensive use of available land. 76The idea that the fideikommiss, consisting of large tracts of land, often in the most productive areas of the country, would be ideal for the creation of a large amount of such small-scale farms, gradually came to dominate the debates on abolishment.The creation of own homes and other smallholdings was adopted as a political goal by both conservative and liberal elements, albeit for different reasons. 77Nevertheless, when the attention of this broad political spectrum was turned on the fideikommiss, the deadlock that had stopped any reform on the subject could finally be overcome.
In 1907 the creation of own homes out of land belonging to fideikommiss took centre stage.Carl Lindhagen, a liberal who would soon join the Social Democrats, filed a motion in which he dismissed virtually all the critiques levelled against the fideikommiss throughout the years.Instead, Lindhagen focused solely on the advantages that could be gained by facilitating the break-up of the fideikommiss and distribution of their lands to a multitude of small-scale farmers.By that time, the political decisions aimed at creating own homes through state-issued loans had not yielded the desired results, making the fideikommiss an even more attractive target. 78Rather than abolishing the fideikommiss outright, Lindhagen proposed allowing their lands to be sold on the open market, in order to increase the amount of land available for the creation of own homes. 79The main argument against this was that Sweden had no shortage of land available for purchase, and the addition of land formerly under fideikommiss would change little in that regard. 80ike all previous motions, this too was defeated in the first chamber, albeit with a smaller margin than usual. 81egardless, Lindhagen's proposal opened the door for a compromise.The possibility to sell land under fideikommiss was a less radical solution than abolishment.In 1909, a similar motion was filed.This time even the conservative first chamber voted in favour of it. 82The government was thus instructed to conduct an inquiry into the issue, with the end goal of producing a proposal for a law that allowed land under fideikommiss to be freely sold, if the holder was so inclined. 83ven though an inquiry had been ordered, it was not highly prioritized.By 1914 no work towards it had been done at all.Citing this inactivity, a new motion was filed which again argued for the complete and forceful abolishment of the fideikommiss.The institution was once again described as a feudal remnant, a phenomenon that asserted influence, even though all other principles and laws that governed the old society had long since been abandoned.Unequal succession was singled out as being a crime against 'the most natural of equality', that between siblings. 84The second chamber was in favour, as always.This time, the first chamber approved the motion as well, albeit with a margin of only two votes. 85n the resulting instruction to the government, the Riksdag emphasized that the fideikommiss were not compatible with the 'modern view'. 86The rules governing the fideikommiss were described as harmful, unfair, and arbitrary, and the fact that they were intended to last forever was especially criticized.Economically, the negative aspects of the institution were said to include the difficulty of gaining access to funds through loans, as well as the fact that fideikommiss tended to be large production units.In accordance with the principles of the own home movement, smaller units were preferable, both from an economic standpoint and a social one. 87This argument was essential for the abolition of entails in, for example, Denmark in 1919. 88

Failed proposals, 1919-1935
Despite this breakthrough in the fideikommiss question, political support for the institution never fully disappeared.In several ways, the relatively strong continued support played into developments in the debate, including the curtailing of any quick action regarding abolishment.Complicating matters was the difficulty in assigning the question to the proper ministry.Was the abolishment a legal issue, pertaining to the rights of holders and heirs, or an issue regarding the distribution of land, and therefore primarily an economic question?Consequently, the road to a law abolishing fideikommiss would be long and troubled; four official inquiries spanning some 50 years were conducted before a law on abolishment was finally accepted.
For brevity's sake, the first two of these inquiries will not be thoroughly presented here.Suffice it to say that the first one, presented in 1919, was deemed unfinished, 89 whereupon the task was passed to the so-called Land Commission, which had been given a broad mission of investigating and propose new laws on various topics pertaining to land ownership.When that commission was abruptly disbanded in 1922, no proposal for a law on the abolishment of the fideikommiss had been finalized. 90t was not until 1935 that the task of abolishment was taken up again, this time by the lawyer Emil Sandström.More than two decades had passed since the original decision was made, and the economic and political landscape had changed drastically.The support for the creation of new small-scale farms had yielded modest results up to that point. 91More importantly, in the beginning of the 1920's, post-war depression reached Sweden, especially affecting the agricultural sector, making it poorly prepared for the even greater depression that would come at the end of the decade. 92Maintaining profitability for existing, often struggling, small-scale farms, rather than the creation of new ones, became the main agricultural challenge of the 1930s. 93ith the diminishing importance of the economic aspect of the critique, the archaic nature of the fideikommiss became the chief motivations for an abolishment.Sandström described the institution as being without support in 'the modern view', an anomaly in a judicial sense, and unfair to younger siblings and therefore offensive to everyone. 94For the first time, however, this side of the issue was not understood as entirely negative.Sandström's proposal contained suggestions aimed at the preservation of culturallysignificant buildings, milieus, and collections connected to fideikommiss.While some form of support from the state in this regard was considered, the main burden of solving the issue was placed on the families themselves. 95he opinions gathered from the large number of organizations that acted as referrals to the inquiry painted a highly diverse picture.About half of them expressed support for Sandström's proposal, while the other half did not want to see it made into law.A common response was that the demand for land for the creation of small farms was now virtually non-existent.Some even pointed out that large estates had become preferable, as a mean of securing the nation's food supply.Furthermore, the dangers of cultural values being lost following an abolishment was more pronounced among the responders than they had been in the proposal.Proving that supporters of the institution never completely disappeared, several comments went as far as to argue that the fideikommiss should not be abolished at all, citing cultural and economic advantages. 96he National Heritage Board, for instance, stated: 'one wonders if our country cannot afford to keep the relic from an older culture that the fideikommiss constitutes'. 97Like islands of pre-modernity, the fideikommiss dotted the otherwise changing landscape with 'traditionally kept tracts of land', thanks to the estates having been indivisible for generations. 98This type of revaluation of the archaic nature of the fideikommiss was something new, and would become important for abolishment going forward.Before this, the fact that the institution was old had only been used to attack it.Even the initiallysuccessful defence against these attacks was conducted on the basis of protecting individual property rights, rather than in support of the institution in and of itself.
To understand this revaluation in its historical context, we must return to the concept of noncontemporaneousness.In the late 19 th century, with the lived experience of rural, preindustrial, society based on the still-extant estates, the noncontemporaneousness of the fideikommiss was seen as wholly negative.In the name of progress, the unequal inheritance, the withholding of land from the open market, and the privilege-like nature of the institution as a whole motivated calls for abolishment.In the following century, as the historical stage to which the fideikommiss were seen to belong to became more distant, its remnants -including the fideikommisscame to be valued as such. 99Rather than being the object of scorn, in this understanding, the idiosyncrasies of the institution became infused with value, precisely because of their age.This positive side of noncontemporaneousness must be understood in relation to the wider rise of heritage as the hegemonic relationship to the past, a gradual development in the decades around the middle of the 20 th century, often seen as codified by UNESCO's adoption of The World Heritage Convention in 1972. 100ith the responses to Sandström's proposal so deeply divided, including powerful calls to not abolish the fideikommiss at all, the Swedish government chose not to further the process of codifying it into law.As war loomed in Europe, the issue once again slipped down the list of governmental priorities, and into relative obscurity.

Abolition with a gentle hand, 1959-1964
The work was taken up again by a committee in 1952.This time the project employed 16 people overall, divided into members of the committee proper and various experts called upon to give their professional opinion.It is worth noting that several of these experts were holders of fideikommiss themselves, a telling sign that a more inclusionary approach to abolishment had taken precedence.
In 1959, the result of the committee's work was handed to the government.181 fideikommiss, containing 330 000 ha of land, were to be abolished. 101However, the proposal took a step towards reconciling the antagonistic views between parties that wanted the fideikommiss abolished and those who wanted to keep them.Several of the experts called upon by the inquiry, including the holders of fideikommiss, were among the latter. 102As such, the proposal was influenced by both negative and positive aspects of noncontemporaneousness.At the same time, the issue of land distribution that had partially motivated the decision to abolish in 1914 had definitively fallen by the wayside.In the 1950s, the guiding question had thus become: how could the fideikommiss be abolished without threating the cultural and economic resources associated with them?Since Sandström's proposal in 1935, large production units had become even more favoured, owing to higher productivity resulting from the mechanization of agriculture, while the post-war boom in the economy had produced a massive need for workers in the industrial sector, further diminishing the importance of creating small-scale farms. 103n the continued law-making process, the ability to create joint stock companies owning the fideikommiss property was added.After the death of the current holder, the heirs would inherit stock in the company, while the property as such would still not be allowed to be sold or otherwise split up. 104In this way, the economic foundations for the estates' continued existence could be secured and used to maintain and preserve the cultural values associated with them: the buildings, parks, and collections, while the issue of unequal inheritance could be solved.The views of those who disparaged fideikommiss because of their archaic nature, and those who valued them as relics of the past were here paradoxically combined.On the one hand, fideikommiss were still 'incompatible with the contemporary view', 105 on the other, the belief that their dissolution threatened the existence of 'significant cultural values' was widely accepted. 106The proposed law was an attempt to keep the positive aspects of the fideikommiss, while getting rid of the negative; an abolishment conducted with a 'gentle hand'. 107s with previous proposals, the abolishment would take effect at the death of the current holder.The bill contained four different options following this event.The first one, creating a stock company, has already been discussed.However, only fideikommiss where a national interest existed regarding economic and cultural aspects would come into question, and only after government approval.The decision to seek this approval to form a stock company was voluntary, however, and to be made by the holder and the heirs. 108n the cases where an entailed estate was deemed to lack national interest, and a stock company was consequently not to be formed, the fideikommiss would be abolished outright upon the death of the current holder.The former heir presumptive would receive half the property, and all remaining heirs would share the rest. 109Owing to the biological factor (human lifespan), this meant that it would take many decades before fideikommiss were formally abolished.This was no longer seen as a problem, however, but is a further example of the shift away from the issue of land distribution. 110s stated, in the eventuality that the preservation of one of the entailed estates constituted a national interest, creating a joint stock company was the recommended option.If, for whatever reason, this could not be achieved, two more options remained.First, the government was given the right to purchase the estate outright, as well as any movable assets deemed culturally-or scientifically-significant. 111It was stated numerous times that this paragraph was to be used only in truly exceptional cases, primarily in the case of Skokloster castle. 112Secondly, with all other options exhausted, the right was given to the government to prolong a fideikommiss.The original document regulating the entailment would then continue to be valid for a set period of time, or on a generational basis, until a more favourable abolishment; i.e. the creation of a joint stock company, could be achieved at some point in the future. 113he bill was not without opposition, despite the widespread spirit of compromise.Hans Wachtmeister thought the case brought against fideikommiss was far from convincing, and that their advantages outweighed their drawbacks.Indeed, was not all the time and energy spent on trying to minimize the damages of an abolishment proof that it was better to just maintain the status quo? 114 However indignant, Wachtmeister was in the minority and -as his opening statement shows -he knew it.In a similar fashion, he ended his appeal by asking for the blade of the guillotine to fall. 115The compromise had been made, and the majority was clear.As a sign of this, the proposition was passed without the need for a vote. 116

Changing economic conditions and noncontemporaneousness
The aim of this article has been to explain why fideikommiss continued to exist for so long in Sweden when they have been phased out in all other European countries.As stated, Sweden does not fit neatly into the explanatory model based on transformation to a republican social order proposed by Jens Beckert.The relationship between abolishment and underlying political structure, examined by Beckert, is therefore hard to support in the Swedish case.Surely, the right to establish fideikommiss was abolished already in 1810, but it was not posed as an attack on the nobility.When the remaining fideikommiss came under serious political attack in the 1880s, the society of estates had already been dissolved.The Swedish nobility was no longer an organic part of the country's political organization, having relinquished that right in 1865.The fate of fideikommiss was hence not primarily a question of political power; even if this factor held some importance for the debate up until 1850.When the power struggle between king and parliament was fought in the first half of the 19 th century, fideikommiss was not a factor.The later defence of the institution was based on the validity of already-made wills, and pragmatically emphasized the positive sides of the institution.On the other hand, the critiques levelled against them can largely be said to correspond to republican criticism elsewhere. 117In contrast to those cases, the Swedish fideikommiss, as shown in this article, survived this criticism, at least partially.The reasons for this, in turn, will be summed up in the following paragraphs.
First, the political conditions for an assault on fideikommiss were, in certain aspects, different than in other countries.After the ban on the creation of new fideikommiss in 1810, the question of total abolishment took a backseat to the many other reforms debated during the period.When the time came, in the 1880s, the fact that the fideikommiss were not initially established as fiefdoms made the issue into one of individual property rights, rather than a question of expropriation, as had been the case elsewhere.Adding to this, the intentional conservative slant in the first chamber allowed for a successful defence based on upholding the status quo.
Second, the economic situation for the agricultural sector shifted relatively quickly during the period, resulting in difficulties adapting to the shift in law-making practices.The ban on founding new fideikommiss was made with an eye towards upholding freemarket land.At the same time, this made possible a defence of existing fideikommiss based on the sanctity of individual property rights.When the existing fideikommiss eventually came under attack in the 1880s, the argument was made that the peculiarities of the institution produced incompetent holders, and that the inability to obtain loans was a hindrance to the running of large estates.These arguments could be effectively refuted by similar counterarguments pointing to the prosperity of some individual fideikommiss.
The rise of the smallholding movement in the beginning of the 20 th century enabled a completely different framing of the abolishment issue.With this, the question of whether fideikommiss were well run could largely be bypassed.If anything, the affluence of the estates in question made them an even more attractive target for supporters of land reform.This addition of a higher social and economic purpose to the abolishment was needed to break the deadlock that had blocked any legislative action up to that point.
The continuing agricultural trends soon made small-scale farming much less desirable.In the decades following the second World War, the industrial sector's need for workers was almost limitless.Large estates began to be seen as more rationally-and effectivelyrun, yielding bigger dividends from invested capital, and requiring less manpower.The fideikommiss, often among the largest estates, became model farms.Consequently, the desire to abolish them quickly vanished, while the need to liquidate them at all came into question.
Third, simply pointing to the changing economic trends of the 20 th century is not enough to explain why the Swedish fideikommiss have lasted so long.Like the economic side of the issue, the fact that abolishment took many decades to achieve allowed the view of the institution's archaic nature to be affected by wider historical trends.The negative noncontemporaneousness that had previously dominated the understanding of fideikommiss was eventually joined by a competing positive equivalent that infused the fideikommiss with newfound meaning as cultural heritage.However, the negative and positive sides of noncontemporaneousness cannot be said to simply follow each other chronologically.The positive aspects came to be a possible way of framing fideikommiss, first coming into view in the 1930s, but they did not replace the negative aspects.In the abolition law of 1964, both understandings coexist.Some aspects of the institutionchiefly unequal inheritance among siblings -were denied revaluation.These were to be done away with, while the desirable buildings, collections, and milieus, were to be protected.Extensive amounts of energy were spent trying to come up with a solution that allowed the most economically viable and culturally important fideikommiss to be kept undivided, while formally abolishing the institution.The new legal creation of fideikommissaktiebolag, having the characteristics of both a fideikommiss and a stock company, was intended to allow both the eating of cake and the having of it.Heirs would inherit stock in the company, leaving the property unchanged and thus in a state that was deemed necessary for the fideikommiss to fulfil its newfound and latest dual purpose -as local economic powerhouses, and as protectors of cultural heritage.