Rwanda’s Foreign Relations Post-Genocide

Since the end of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis, the UK and Rwanda have developed close political, economic and security relations. However, the relationship could be tested with the recent renewal of diplomatic relations between Rwanda and France. Jonathan Beloff examines why the Rwandan government, and particularly its armed services, the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF), will favour continuing security relations with the UK rather than France. He argues how historical experiences influence current perceptions of security dynamics within Rwanda’s foreign affairs.


T
he 2022 Migration and Economic Development Partnership announcement between the UK and Rwanda brought renewed British public attention to the central African nation. 1 The controversial migration plan tied financial incentives of up to £120 million for Rwanda to accept the UK's unwanted migrants.While Rwanda remains in the news based on the legality of the UK policy to expel immigrants to the small African nation, this is only the most recent event in the developing foreign relations between the two nations.Nevertheless, this burgeoning relationship is relatively new, beginning soon after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis, often referred to as the Rwandan Genocide.
Prior to the genocidal massacres, which led to the deaths of 800,000 Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus in a 100-day period, UK-Rwandan relations were minor. 2 For much of its post-colonial history, Rwanda fell within France's sphere of influence, with former Rwandan President Juvénal corruption policies and market-oriented economic development strategies.In addition, Rwanda benefits British security interests within Central and East Africa.Specifically, the UK has used military diplomacy to coordinate with Rwanda's military, described by former US Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power as an effective African military force compared with other regional states, 5 to send its soldiers on peacekeeping missions designed to foster regional and continental security to benefit British security interests.This article examines how Rwanda's elite, specifically within the RDF, perceptions of France, and later the UK, influence current Rwandan foreign policy by providing a historical narrative of this diplomatic shift since the genocide.
The analysis in this article relies on extensive fieldwork conducted during the author's postgraduate studies. 6The author conducted six fieldwork periods between 2012 and 2019, each lasting between one and six months, with an additional three-month fieldwork period 5.

7.
Interpretivism consists of utilising descriptive data from qualitative sources such as interviews and ethnographic observations, to gain an understanding of social meanings and beliefs.

8.
Christopher Lamont, Research Methods in International Relations (London: Sage, 2015), pp.15-20.from December 2022 to March 2023.In total, 60 Rwandan individuals, primarily government elite responsible for creating and enacting the nation's foreign policy, were interviewed by the author.This included government ministers, officials, bureaucrats and some publicly known Rwandan society members.The author asked a standard series of questions about Rwandan-UK relations in a semi-structured interview.Not all questions were directly on Rwandan-UK relations but included Rwanda's foreign ties, RDF perceptions of current and former allies, the 26th Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM 2022), and military agreements.Specifically, interviews were conducted with RDF officials who were either recently retired or high-ranking military staff.These individuals fought in the Rwandan Civil War (1990-94) for the RPF's military wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA).They were responsible for the military strategies that ended the genocide.Interpretivism 7 was used to better understand the social meanings within the collected data.We were all supposed to be amazed that our President was friends with a powerful world leader'. 11Rusagara writes how during this period, specifically in 1983, the political and economic 1975 Franco-Rwandan Agreement, and later amended versions of the agreement, fostered greater economic and military cooperation. 12An interesting detail within the agreement is how French soldiers had the option to wear the military uniform of the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), the Rwandan army, to illustrate military unity between the two nations.Rwanda was also an important actor in selling French weapons to African governments fighting against communist and left-leaning actors during the waning years of the Cold War. 13 Prior to the 1994 genocide, Rwandan foreign policy focused much on its relationship with France The close relationship between Mitterrand and Habyarimana influenced perceptions outside of Rwanda of its large refugee community in neighbouring countries.These exiled Rwandans were composed primarily of Tutsis who experienced multiple waves of forced mass emigrations after Hutu-led ethnic massacres conducted since independence in 1962.By the mid-1980s, some refugees organised the creation of a political rebel group called the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU), which by 1987 changed its name to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). 14They saw France as the primary foreign actor upholding the Habyarimana regime from possible collapse and approving Rwanda's discriminatory public policy. 15ome of these policies included institutionalised bias against Tutsis and preventing the exiled Tutsi community from returning. 16Additionally, it illustrated to the Rwandan diasporic community how Habyarimana used his relations with Mitterrand to hold onto power while making Rwanda a French puppet state. 17owever, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Rwanda's government could not escape shifting international norms for increased democratisation and liberal economic reforms.Mitterrand called for greater political reforms and liberties during the 16th Franco-African Summit, the gathering of Frenchspeaking African heads of state which took place in 1990. 18Many of these countries, including Rwanda, were authoritarian one-party dictatorships that were now being pushed to open political space in return for continued economic and military assistance.Habyarimana had little choice but to agree to the summit's demands if he wished to continue his and Rwanda's beneficial relationship with France.The opening political space helped propel Hutu extremist elements within society.No longer under Habyarimana's singular Mouvement Républicain National Pour la Démocratie et le Développement (MRND) political party, 19 Hutu extremists formed new political parties that supported the president but called for the destruction of Rwanda's Tutsi population to combat the RPF. 20At the same time, France began assisting in developing a localised Rwandan defence league called the Interahamwe ('those who fight together').While the French government denied knowing the intention of the Interahamwe, 21 these forces would later become instrumental in the genocide.
The assassination of President Habyarimana on the night of 6 April 1994, while returning from Arusha, Tanzania, initiated the genocide.The assailants who shot down the president's aircraft -whether the RPF or Hutu extremists -remain a mystery. 22he French government seemingly prepared for the near-instant crisis after the president's death.During the genocide, the only consistent foreign force to observe the massacres was the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) under the command of General Roméo Dallaire.Concerning the plane crash, he describes how the crash site of Habyarimana's plane was guarded by French soldiers who refused to grant him access. 27During much of the genocide, Melvern 28 writes how the French government used its diplomatic prowess to minimise UNAMIR's abilities, eventually leaving it with only 270 soldiers. 29However, France would subsequently sanction and participate by contributing nearly 2,500 soldiers in the UN Operation Turquoise (23 June -21 August 1994), originally announced as a military operation to save victims of the ongoing genocide. 30Many within Rwanda, especially in the RDF, perceived France's involvement in the UN Operation Turquoise as a way to help its Rwandan allies, including genocide perpetrators, to find safety from the advancing RPA soldiers.The former Rwandan military continued its massacres against Tutsis as the genocide government fled into neighbouring Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo).Former Rwandan Ambassador 31 to France Jacques Bihozagara publicly questioned France's true motives for wanting to participate in UN Operation Turquoise after campaigning against UNAMIR. 32Dallaire also questions its effectiveness in saving the lives of genocide victims. 33As Rusagara writes, the RPA was not only fighting against the FAR but its French allies. 34During the initial days of Operation Turquoise, the RPA grew concerned of a potential risk to their captured territories as the newly arrived French forces might attempt to recapture the lands for the genocide government.Dallaire comments on how French deployment led him to expect fighting between its forces with the RPA. 35While this did not happen, partially thanks to Dallaire's intervention, it nevertheless reinforced military narratives of France's entrenched support for Habyarimana and the genocide government.Nevertheless, with the RPF taking Gisenyi on 19 July and the withdrawal of UN Operation Turquoise soldiers on 21 August, the genocide within Rwanda's borders ended, and the nation's foreign and security relations shifted significantly.
Many of the current upper echelon of the RDF, now responsible for crafting national security policy including influencing foreign relations, are the 31.
He was Rwanda's ambassador after the genocide ended.same actors who fought as the RPA during the Civil War and genocide. 36This includes fighting against French forces who supported the FAR during the Civil War. 37In two significant clashes between the FAR and the RPA in 1992 and 1993, the RPA soldiers fought against French troops alongside FAR soldiers trained and equipped by the French. 38Many within the hierarchy of the RDF remember their battles against these French soldiers along with the FAR. 39t is also important to note how witnessing the genocide's atrocities impacted the RPA soldiers, which led to greater hatred towards the genocide government, perpetrators and their French allies. 40hese experiences impacted the RPA's postgenocide identity, which would be instrumental in constructing the current RDF as described by Jowell. 41dditionally, Holmes indicates how the military use of women during the Civil War and later genocide shaped gender norms beyond just the military. 42hile domestically, the new RDF depicted itself to Rwandans as the heroes that ended the genocide, 43 it faced international scrutiny by France for revenge killings against Rwandan Hutus. 44France's alleged support in assisting Rwandan genocide perpetrators to flee into neighbouring states continued this resentment towards France. 45These experiences continue to hinder the progression of French-Rwandan relations, as the RDF holds reservations towards trusting France.

BBC News
While the two military forces did not fight each other during and after the genocide, the military relationship never improved, with several post-genocide events occurring that many within the RDF perceive as France undermining the current post-genocide government.The historical experiences, as described by Jowell, 46 within the RDF's inner core still significantly influence how Rwanda engages with France.As one retired military official commented, 'We do not trust the French, my generation [early members of the RPA] know how France supported Habyarimana who we [RPA] fought [against] his genocide'. 47This distrust within the RDF's power circles will lead to continued hesitation towards Rwanda relying on France for security support and the necessity for continued relations with other 'new' allies such as the UK.The influence of the RDF in Rwandan foreign policy could be an example of Purdeková, Reyntjens and Wilén's description of the militarisation of Rwandan society. 48It could be argued that Rwandan-French policies would be more robust if the RDF held a more positive perception of France.Kuehnel and Wilén's discussion of Rwandan perceptions of the RDF also shows how the RDF's negative views of the French influence how Rwandans perceive France. 49eyond the military, political actors such as Senator Tito Rutaremara, a founder and essential ideologist within the RPF's formation, 50  While diplomatic and military relations did improve under President Macron, 53 Rwandan resistance still exists in developing closer ties with France.While the French government proceeded on this path, the British government formed closer relations with the Rwandan government and the RDF and defended their actions to stop the genocide.
After the end of Rwanda's genocide and with the RPF's significant leverage in control of the nation's government institutions, the state's foreign and security relations shifted considerably

The Rise of UK-Rwandan Relations
After the end of Rwanda's genocide and with the RPF's significant leverage in control of the nation's government institutions, the state's foreign and security relations shifted considerably.Hayman categorises a division between the 'old' ties of France and Belgium and the 'new' of the US and the EU and, essential for this study, the UK. 54The division within the relationship largely stems from Rwandan perceptions of its 'new' allies, especially of the UK, having little to no history with the previous Rwandan regimes.This is significant as France and Belgium were inherently instrumental in past governments' ethnic divisionism and dictatorial governance.However, the UK had little influence or engagement with the region despite its past colonial history and current relationship with neighbouring Uganda.Before 1994, the UK had no official permanent ambassador or embassy within Rwanda. 55During the early premiership of John Major, the UK had little interest in engaging with Rwanda, which it perceived as part of France's sphere of influence in the region.
The UK had little influence or engagement with the region despite its past colonial history and current relationship with neighbouring Uganda There is little in the way of literature to support the existence of longstanding political, diplomatic and military relations between Rwanda and the UK; 56 there was little engagement before the 1990 Civil War between the RPF residing in Uganda, and the UK or the US. 57Senator Rutaremara dismissed any notion of British support prior to 1994.He even suggested that the UK probably had little idea of who the RPF was before the conflict and only knew afterwards when the international community began to focus on the instability within Rwanda. 58This lack of interference in Rwandan affairs and focus on the refugees would allow future collaboration between the UK and the post-genocide RPF-dominated government.Specifically, the RPF held positive perceptions of the UK, as well as other state actors such as the US, for their lack of engagement with Habyarimana, which supported the fostering of UK-Rwandan ties after the genocide.Nevertheless, Prunier 59 writes how there was serious concern within the French government of an Anglo-American conspiracy to minimise France's sphere of influence, with the RPF being a component of that strategy. 60uring the genocide, the UK allied itself with the US in trying to reduce UNAMIR's presence in Rwanda based on recent peacekeeping experiences in nearby Somalia. 61Despite the UK being culpable for the international community's inactions during the genocide, since the massacre's end, it appears to be Rwanda's second closest ally after the US.
After the genocide, during Major's tenure and then Tony Blair's premiership, the UK developed its current relationship with Rwanda.Blair's apology for the country's inaction during the genocide and commitment towards Rwanda's development during his time in office also influenced many Rwandan policy leaders to trust British involvement. 62This included fostering security relations between the two nations.Pottier describes how the UK's lack of experience in Rwanda led to British officials trusting the favourable narratives of the post-genocide Rwandan government. 63Whether regarding foreign aid support or defending the Central African state from international criticism, the UK has continued to expand its foreign and security relations with Rwanda.Blair has become a prominent British advocate on behalf of the Rwandan government. 64ithin the context of economic concerns, Beswick 65 and Zorbas 66 describe how foreign aid relations developed with Rwanda, increasingly becoming the case study for proper aid utilisation.This benefitted British interest in its foreign aid relations with other aid-receiving nations by illustrating, through Rwanda as a case study, how the British government wished for its foreign aid to be appropriately used for state and economic development.However, Behuria 67 indicates how Rwanda's economic development is aiding the personal wealth of some RDF elites.Absent from this drive for better foreign aid utilisation was the increase in civil society rights, for which the British High Commission in Rwanda would often dismiss calls based on its desire not to foster resentment within the RPF Rwandan government.One British official within the embassy in 2014 commented: There is a sense of pride to have participated in the transformation of Rwanda [in terms of economic development and poverty reduction] since the genocide.The change has been remarkable […] However, there are a lot of challenges that still exist, such as human rights and [the] pace of political change.[The] Rwandan government thinks political development is moving fast enough, but it is way too slow. 68yman illustrates how this leads to the question of how much influence the British government truly has on the Rwandan government. 69The same British official seemed to acknowledge the limitations of British influence on the Rwandan government in terms of the then British primary aid agency, the Department for International Development (DFID), in its engagement with the government: 'DFID is trying to work with government but faces difficulties and arguments [with the Rwandan government]'. 70nder Clare Short (1997-2003)  While the UK did withdraw foreign aid after both these experiences, it quickly resumed aid and even provided direct budget support, which reduced aid restrictions. 74In 2015, the British High Commission in Rwanda showed its support for Rwanda combatting the FDLR in eastern DRC as it labelled the rebel group, composed of former genocide perpetrators, and its ideology as a destabilising force in the region. 75owever, there were periods of diplomatic instability, such as the 2015 British arrest of Rwanda's Intelligence Chief Karenzi Karake, which sparked Rwandan outage. 76Even the arrest, and following quick release of Karake, was based on the British obligation to uphold a Spanish arrest warrant.While there were protests in front of the British High Commission in Kigali, 77 there was a relatively mild response.The reasons behind this response can be debated.The existing strong relationship between Rwanda and the UK probably did influence Rwandan policymakers to not assume the arrest was connected with some sort of anti-Rwandan action as there has not been historical precedence to suggest it.Some within the RDF commented how they were disappointed but understood the problematic position brought upon the British government in honouring its extradition agreements with Spain. 78

© The Author 2023
Relations could have greatly soured if the RDF had not understood the position of the UK in terms of extradition agreements.
Rwanda's decision to join the British Commonwealth of Nations in 2009 79 stemmed from multiple economic reasons.An economist from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation (MINECOFIN) described Rwanda's decision to join the Commonwealth regarding language and economic opportunity in the global market.He stated: 'English is the language of international trade.For Rwanda to grow its businesses, it needs to know the Commonwealth language.ICT [Information Communication Technology] is mostly in English.Also, it [the Commonwealth] has a larger economic impact than the French [La Francophonie]'. 80e UK benefits from its close relationship with Rwanda, which promotes regional and global security The discussion of the English language briefly introduces the issue of societal divisions within the RPF.Within Rwanda, there are significant divisions between English and French-speaking political, religious, economic and societal leaders.The RPF's dominance of Rwanda's political space created linguistic divisions and, at times, tensions between the established French-speaking Rwandan society and the primarily English-speaking RPF. 81 younger Rwandans are taught English in public schools, 82 especially in Kigali, most Rwandans are still only proficient in Kinyarwanda, with the foreign language of choice still being French. 83osendal and Ngabonziza write on the political and social implications of this language divide and how it benefits the existing Rwandan social elite. 84 government official, when asked about Rwanda's choice to join the Commonwealth, provided a rather blunt response of France's role during the genocide, 'they thought we [the RPF] were an Anglo conspiracy against them, so they supported genocide.Now, we are part of the Commonwealth, their [France] worst nightmare'.85 Despite joining and hosting the CHOGM 2022, Rwandan policymakers do not yet see themselves as part of an Anglo-American effort to increase the British sphere of influence in the region.Rather than a sphere of influence, Rwandan policymakers have commented that Rwandan-UK relations consist more of shared economic, political and security interests rather than an attempt to establish a neocolonial diplomatic relationship.86 The UK benefits from its close relationship with Rwanda, which promotes regional and global security.Fisher 87 provides insight into how Uganda has positioned itself within the constructs of the War on Terror through a willingness to supply its military troops for peacekeeping missions that focus on combatting terrorism.Rwanda has positioned itself in a different category but is still part of fighting extremism.As Beswick 88 and Beloff 89 write, Rwanda sets itself as an effective military for peacekeeping missions within the constructs of combatting genocide and crimes against humanity.The use of RDF peacekeepers falls within the scope of Kuehnel and Wilén's description of how the RDF influences Rwandan perceptions of its importance and 'hero'like status.90 As with Power's earlier comment, UK praise provides external validity for Rwandans to see and believe in the RDF's effectiveness.While the UK government has perceived Rwanda as a helpful ally in promoting regional security, 91 its efforts do impact UK security.
Rwanda's military contribution to peacekeeping missions in conflict zones reduces instability from humanitarian crises that foster a breeding environment for extremists. 92Decreased instability results in fewer 'small boats' of migrants attempting to enter the UK. 93At a conceptual level, this is one of the primary reasons beyond foreign aid relations for why the UK government promotes close diplomatic ties with the Central African nation.While Rwanda is not necessarily part of the UK's sphere of influence within the region, it provides an important ally that the UK government can utilise to combat the conditions that foster instability and terrorism.British coordination with the in regional and continental peacekeeping missions helps to promote greater stability during humanitarian crises and conflicts while minimising the risk to British soldiers.
Relations between the two nations reached perhaps their strongest point when Rwanda hosted the CHOGM 2022.The international conference occurred on 24-25 June 2022, after a year's delay due to the Covid-19 pandemic. 94For the Rwandan government, it was an opportunity to showcase Rwanda's progress and conduct soft power politics to promote Rwandan interests.One Rwandan midlevel official commented: 'CHOGM was a huge success for us [Rwanda] in showing the world about our development since the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi and how we are valuable members of the Relations between the UK and Rwanda reached perhaps their strongest point when Rwanda hosted the CHOGM 2022 Prior to CHOGM, the UK and Rwandan governments signed the previously mentioned Migration and Economic Development Partnership in April 2022.The agreement included Rwanda receiving £120 million in development funding and the costs of taking in an unknown number of refugees seeking refuge in the United Kingdom. 99he British reaction towards the deal was mixed, with some criticising it as a human rights violation.Still, then Prime Minister Boris Johnson, his supporters and his successors, Elizabeth Truss and Rishi Sunak, supported the agreement. 100nterestingly, the announcement of the agreement caused some frustration within Rwanda, with one bureaucrat stating: 'How the British [Home Secretary Priti Patel] announced the deal was not as well organised as we thought.We were going to announce it together, but it got [leaked] to the press'. 101The agreement might also be a reason for the UK's relatively muted response to recent allegations of Rwandan support of the M23 new military operations in eastern DRC.

Conclusion
Despite France's new commitment towards re-establishing strong diplomatic relations with Rwanda, it will be difficult for it to succeed anytime in the near future.This is despite some who describe Rwanda's peacekeeping contribution to Mozambique as little more than the French softpower diplomacy enticement of the Rwandan government.The ruling RPF and the RDF will continue to hold great hesitation when the state engages with France because of historical precedent.Many governing elites responsible for creating and enacting the state's foreign policy, including state security, still resent the French government.French President Macron's May 2021 visit to Rwanda helped repair the distrust between the two nations.Improved relations will most likely focus on economic and commercial diplomacy and cultural exchanges.French commitments to prosecute genocide perpetrators such as Félicien Kabuga must continue with released archival materials that publicise France's role during the genocide. 102However, this is unlikely to be substantial enough for Rwanda to favour France over the UK anytime in the near future.
101.Author interview with an unnamed Rwandan government official, Kigali, December 2022.102.François Picard, 'Who is Félicien Kabuga?Rwandan Genocide Kingpin Arrested in France', France24, 28 May 2020, <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20200528-debate-who-is-f%C3%A9licien-kabuga-rwandan-genocide-kingpinarrested-in-france>,accessed 25 February 2023.Despite France's new commitment towards reestablishing strong diplomatic relations with Rwanda, it will be difficult for it to succeed anytime in the near future This length of time will be to the benefit of British foreign and security interests in the region.Rwanda's strategic importance for British peacekeeping interests remains intact.The UK relies on Rwandan soldiers for peacekeeping missions promoting stability in fragile societies where the risk of genocide is more prominent.Preventing crises from becoming a breeding ground for extremists benefits British regional, continental and even domestic security interests.Rwanda's peacekeeping engagement in these societies prevents mass emigration and possible radicalisation, which represent significant concerns for British security.Both Rwanda and the UK will likely continue to exploit these mutual benefits, leading to an increasing involvement between the two nations.n

Melvern 23 describes how the French embassy in Kigali held pre-existing strategies to engage in what they predicted would be genocidal killings, and the creation of a Hutu extremist government that would
openly discuss their distrust of France based on its historic role in supporting the previous Habyarimana regime.Rutaremara's experiences while residing in France influenced his perception of how French combativeness on Marxist African beliefs and movements hindered Rwanda's and other African countries' ability to develop. 51One of the most pressing issues between the two governments was the 1998 French investigation by Jean-Louis Bruguière, which blamed current RPF leader and Rwandan President Paul Kagame and the RPA for assassinating Habyarimana.This resulted in an arrest warrant for several RDF officials in 2006. 5246.Jowell, 'Cohesion Through Socialization', pp.280-291.
of the Rwandan government.Under Short, Rwanda embroiled itself in the bloody Second Congo War, 71 with the Rwandan government and other African states accused by the UN's Group of Experts of illegal mineral theft organised by the RDF's alleged 'Congolese Desk'.72In2012,Rwanda was again accused of interfering in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with its support of the 23 March Movement (M23).73 Commentator, 'The Spanish Indictment of High-Ranking Rwandan Officials', Journal of International Criminal Justice (Vol.6, No. 5, 2008), pp.1003-11; Jonathan Beloff, 'Karenzi Karake Arrest is Just More International Hypocrisy Over Rwanda', The Conversation, 23 June 2015, <https://theconversation.com/karenzi-karake-arrest-is-just-more-internationalhypocrisy-over-rwanda-43723>, accessed 28 June 2021.77.Clement Uwiringiyimana, 'Rwandans Protest as Spy Chief Faces London Court on War Crimes Charges', Reuters, 25 June 2015.78.Author interview with unnamed Rwandan Defence Force official, Kigali, August 2016.supportive Rwanda and the Commonwealth'.The Round Table (Vol.99, No. 410, 2010), pp.485-90.80. Author interview with an unnamed Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation official, Kigali, November 2014.