Learning the lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic

The crisis led to massive intervention by governments, both to tackle the health crisis – through lock-downs; social distancing measures; test, trace and isolate programmes; and to develop and then provide vaccinations – and to offset the economic damage created by the lock-downs, the fall in travel and trade, and so forth. . . . The leading expert on organisational studies and organisational behaviour John Child notes that while the COVID-19 pandemic intensified many of the economic and social problems that societies were already facing, the public response to the crisis points to a constructive way forward, including people participating in collective activities to contribute to addressing the common challenge, arguing that ‘it is timely to widen participation in organisational decision-making as an approach to addressing many of the problems which will continue to be with us post-Covid, and which indeed the pandemic has exacerbated’. These further challenges include inequality, and the climate crisis. Both could be tackled through a global Green New Deal. (


Introduction
The COVID-19 Pandemic was a human tragedy for the many millions of people who lost their lives, and for their loved ones, as well as for those who continue to suffer from 'long covid' and who were disadvantaged in a whole range of other ways -from missing out on education, to losing their livelihoods.It also had devastating economic and social impacts, disrupting world trade and travel, and led to lockdowns and all sorts of other restrictions on economic, social and personal activity.
Covid-19 was not the first pandemic, and it will not be the last.The growing global population is putting increasingly acute pressure on the finite landmass and resources of the planet, leading to human incursions into areas not previously inhabited, which in turn leads to the danger of new diseases spreading from animals to humans.And with future pandemics, the death rate may well be higher than was the case for covid-19, where thankfully the death rate turned out to be much lower than some of the first estimates had suggested might be the case.
Previous pandemics include the 1918-20 'Great Influenza epidemic', estimated to have killed between 25 to 50 million people.This century we have already had the [2002][2003] Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) coronavirus, the 2009-2010 influenza virus labelled H1N1 and commonly referred to as swine flu because of its links to influenza viruses that circulate in pigs, the 2012 coronavirus named Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), and the 2014-16 Ebola virus, a rare and severe infectious disease that leads to death in roughly half of those who contract it.
With these -and other -such outbreaks, there had been widespread warnings about the need to take active measures to try to minimise the dangers posed, with many governments and world leaders joining the calls for such measures to be put in place.
However, when COVID-19 struck, the world seemed ill-prepared.Why was this?And have we learned the lessons?Are we now better prepared for the next such outbreak than we were in 2020 when COVID-19 was declared to be a pandemic?
These key questions have been -and at the time of writing still are being -considered by many authors, Commissions, and committees of enquiry.These include the many academic authors who submitted the results of their empirical research to the International Review of Applied Economics, published in two Special Issues of the journal (volume 35, issues 2 and 6, 2021), which were brought together in the edited book The Political Economy of Covid-19 (Michie and Sheehan 2023a).As we wrote then: The crisis led to massive intervention by governments, both to tackle the health crisisthrough lock-downs; social distancing measures; test, trace and isolate programmes; and to develop and then provide vaccinations -and to offset the economic damage created by the lock-downs, the fall in travel and trade, and so forth. . . .The leading expert on organisational studies and organisational behaviour John Child notes that while the COVID-19 pandemic intensified many of the economic and social problems that societies were already facing, the public response to the crisis points to a constructive way forward, including people participating in collective activities to contribute to addressing the common challenge, arguing that 'it is timely to widen participation in organisational decision-making as an approach to addressing many of the problems which will continue to be with us post-Covid, and which indeed the pandemic has exacerbated'.These further challenges include inequality, and the climate crisis.Both could be tackled through a global Green New Deal.(Michie and Sheehan 2023b, 1) We also drew attention to the way in which those papers had analysed the impact that the COVID-19 crisis had on economic outcomes, including output, employment, and inequality: These impacts came both from direct government restrictions designed to reduce the spread of Covid-19, and from the knock-on effects via global supply chains.How effective the Government measures were both in stopping the spread of the disease, and in limiting the detrimental economic impacts varied, depending in part on the extent to which Governments took countervailing fiscal measures.(Michie and Sheehan 2023c, 227) And we stressed the importance not just of the measures introduced but also of the degree of compliance with such measures, and to the importance of an industrial policy framework having created capabilities for the successful introduction and implementation of public health measures.

After the virus
Many of the above issues are analysed and discussed by Hilary Cooper and Simon Szreter in After the Virus: Lessons from the Past for a Better Future.Thus, Part I of their book is entitled COVID-19 Was Always a Matter of 'When' Not 'If'.The first chapter charts the history of pandemics, and the various public health policy responses that developed over time.This turns out to be another of those examples where history appeared to have been progressing in various ways, with lessons learned and policies developed, up until the 'capitalism unleashed' historical era of the last thirty years or so, of deregulated globalisation, promoting a 'greed is good' culture.Thus, Chapter 1 concludes that: . . . to engage in ever more active and intense trading, travelling and commercial activity is to require more, not less, protective and preventative public health infrastructure and personnel.Did we also forget this lesson, lulled into the false notion that we have somehow found a costless, risk-free way of organising our economy and society across porous international borders?(p.43) The second chapter argues in more detail that pandemics need to be actively planned for and mitigated, hence the chapter title being Pandemics are not Random 'Black Swans': It should be clear by now that pandemics are indeed an ever-present threat.The most disingenuous reaction to the eruption of COVID-19 has come from those who have labelled it a 'Black Swan' event.This is a term re-coined by the statistician Nassim Taleb for something so rare as to be entirely unpredictable and only capable of rational analysis with hindsight (Taleb 2010).To the contrary, pandemics demand foresight to prepare, not hindsight to bemoan what could have been.(p. 44) Cooper and Szreter argue that the necessary preparations were not made.In addition, leaving to one side the pandemic preparations and whether they were made or not, the actual outcomes during a pandemic will depend on a range of other social, economic and infrastructural factors, most obviously the state of the health service -the degree of capacity to absorb additional demands, and so forth.On all these aspects, the performance of the UK government was woeful.They had not taken the necessary pandemic preparations.And ten years of government funding cuts under their 'austerity' measures had left the country's infrastructure in a weakened state, not only the National Health Service, but also housing and other vital infrastructure, all of which resulted in a higher death toll than would otherwise have been suffered.This is covered in Part II, 'Why COVID-19 Was a Perfect Storm' -the reason being that far from having prepared for a pandemic, which it had become clear globally should be a priority for governments, the UK government, and many others across the globe had done the opposite, weakening the capacity and capabilities of the productive and social infrastructure, including the health service.Hence Chapter 3 being on 'The Fragility of the Neoliberal State', Chapter 4 being on 'Inequality Saps Resilience', and Chapter 5 being on 'The Pandemic Onslaught'.
Having analysed the debilitating -indeed lethal -results of the 'capitalism unleashed' form of globalisation from the 1980s up to the pandemic, Part III turns to 'How COVID-19 Challenges us to Change'.Interestingly, Chapter 6 is 'Too Big to Fail?' We Need a Payback This Time, which considers the lessons from the 2007-2008 international financial crisis.That was the first time that the critics of the capitalism unleashed, 'greed is good' form of free-market globalisation were joined by large numbers across the political spectrum who for the first time faced an 'emerors new clothes' moment, realising that the pro-free-market rhetoric of the previous decades had been little more than that; the aim of the privatisations and deregulations had not been to improve market efficiency, but to profit the rich and powerful.The economy, society, and even markets were actually left weaker and more vulnerable.When the resulting 2007-2008 international financial crisis struck, there was a broad consensus globally that things had gone too far, that 'too big to fail' banks should not be allowed to gamble on the basis that when they won they got to keep their winnings, and when they lost the losses would be passed to the taxpayers to pay.That had incentivised excessive speculation aimed at personal enrichment rather than economic development, fuelling an unsustainable speculative boom accompanied by increased inequality that collapsed when those at the bottom of the income scale could no longer repay their debt, and those at the top had demanded ever higher returns on their 'investments' which produced spurious financial 'products' which often turned out to be worthless when the supposed asset consisted of the expected income from people repaying debts which they could not and did not do.
That consensus led to large scale nationalisation of banks and other assets, a refound commitment to Keynesian spending globally, a recognition that the era of 'light touch' regulation had indeed turned out to be 'soft touch' regulation, and a commitment to tackling the increased inequality that had contributed to the economic instability.However, once the crisis had passed, these new-found realisations and commitments were soon forgotten, with a return to business as usual speculation, leveraged buyouts, asset stripping and the whole range of rent seeking rather than value creation.
When the COVID-19 pandemic struck, many expressed similar thoughts.This surely was the point when free market globalisation with its drive to inequality and a 'greed is good' corporate and societal culture, and years of austerity which had placed the burden on those least well placed to bear it, with public services and the social and productive infrastructure eroded through years of austerity for the country and tax cuts for the wealthy, would give way to a more rational, equitable and democratic settlement, where the interests of the majority would be taken proper account of in political decision making.Cooper and Szreter document that this was indeed the mood -as also articulated by John Child in the piece referred to above.They also demonstrate that while this may have been the popular mood, there was no effective channel for this mood to influence policy in a way that would bring about any decisive change of direction.Instead, the super wealthy became even wealthier.Far from the crisis leading to a reigning back of the increased inequality that had created so much social and economic damage, the crisis was taken advantage of by those with economic power and political influence to bring about a further shift in wealth to the already wealthy.
In the fourth and final section of their book, Cooper and Szreter ask 'After the Virus: What Do We Want to Be?Here they set out an alternative which would be better for the economy and society, and would also thereby put us in a stronger position to face future pandemics than we were in 2020.This includes a chapter setting out 'Seven Pillars of Their book concludes that: Coexistence, anti-exploitation and nurturing are the moral codes of this collectivistindividualist ethics: nurturing of the planet, of other species, other nations, and the individuality of all other persons in our own societies, our own neighbourhoods.From where we are now, living in historically produced national polities entering the mid-twentyfirst century, we need to work for, vote for and contribute to this nurturing state of positive freedoms, led by a morality of giving, not taking.(p.346)

Creating healthy cities
When COVID-19 broke out, a Commission on Creating Healthy Cities was established by the University of Oxford's Kellogg College, chaired by Richard Best, a leading authority on housing provision, and a 'cross bench' member of the UK's House of Lords. 1 While the Commission was created in response to the pandemic, their Report, What Creates Healthy Cities?considers well-being more generally, not just preparedness for future pandemics. 2The Commission had an International Advisory Board, seeking to consider the lessons from the pandemic globally. 3Their conclusions were broadly consistent with those of Cooper and Szreter: The Commission's overarching recommendation is that 'health creation' -intervention that positively improve health and wellbeing -should be the determining factor for built environment, planning and placemaking policies.
If central and local government give priority to achieving better outcomes fro physical and mental health, they will simultaneously address wider inequalities in society, improve the city's economy and productivity, support efforts to combat climate change, and reduce the escalating costs of the National Health Service (NHS) and social care.(Commission on Creating Healthy Cities 2022, 5)

Conclusion
There have been numerous books published already both on COVID-19 and the future threats from pandemics.Perhaps most heavily promoted was the book by Bill Gates (2022), in which he urges a global investment in preparedness, with relevant experts tasked to respond rapidly to future outbreaks -a good idea, but as Cooper and Szreter document, governments often fail to properly fund even their basic health care systems, not to mention housing and the rest of the social and productive infrastructure.
So what lessons should we learn from the COVID-19 pandemic?One important lesson is that massive government intervention, pursued by individual national governments, albeit by almost all of them across the globe, is indeed possible.This is important, as often proposals to tackle poverty or homelessness, and invest in health, education, transport and the rest of the social and productive infrastructure are met with claims that they aren't affordable -'there's no magic money tree'.Or proposals, such as using public ownership, are said to be politically unrealistic -and yet the furlough scheme, for example, would have certainly been dismissed on such grounds, in 'normal' times.In other words, such measures can only be introduced when necessary, and tackling the other crises we face, including the climate crisis, does not qualify as 'necessary'.
Again, proposal for progressive policies are often dismissed on the grounds that in today's globalised world, national governments no longer have the power.'Arguing against globalisation' was like arguing against the seasons, as Tony Blair claimed when setting the context for his 'new Labour' administration, which was to govern only within what he claimed were rather strict limits imposed by 'globalisation'.Those supposed limits were ignored when the powers that be needed things done.
Many of the major social advances historically have followed major shocks, such as the Second World War leading to electorates thinking that there should be 'no return to the 1930s', and ushering in an era charaterised by a commitment to full employment, with an expectation that it was the job of government to bring that about, using if and when necessary public spending, public ownership, and regulation.However, that response does not follow automatically.There was a widespread view that the 'capitalism unleashed' speculative frenzy that led to and caused the 2007-2008 international financial crisis and subsequent global recession of 2009 would lead to a reintroduction of the sort of sensible reforms that had been introduced following the 1929 Wall Street Crash and subsequent global recession.But it didn't.For all the promises -issued to allow governments to bail out banks at taxpayers' expense -once the crisis had passed, there was largely a return to the pre-crisis 'normality'.
Similarly with the COVID-19 crisis.There was a widespread feeling of 'never again'that actions should be taken to avoid a recurrence, and to ensure that if there were, then there would be better preparedness, to ensure fewer deaths.But again, despite the hopes and possibilities, the reality turned out to include the already rich and powerful profiteering, following which there was largely a return to 'normal', with none of the possibilities for a better world realised.
This issue, that great social progress often follows major crises, but that those with wealth and power seek to use crises in their own interests, so the outcome is uncertain -it could go, and historically has gone, either way -is discussed by Baker (2020): In her 2007 book, The Shock Doctrine, the Canadian writer Naomi Klein laid out a dark account of crisis politics.In Klein's vew, there is always Disaster 1 -the earthquake, the storm, the military conflict, the economic slump -and Disaster 2 -the bad things that people with power subsequently get up to, such as ramming through extreme economic reforms or gobbling up post-crisis opportunities for self-enrichment, while the rest of us are too dazed to notice.(Baker 2020) This resonates with the argument of Child (2021) referred to above, in the sense that, in the words of Peter Drucker, 'culture eats strategy for breakfast'; so while we need the sort of strategies that Bill Gates, the Commission on Creating Healthy Cities, Cooper and Szreter, and others have advocated, even more necessary will be to shift the corporate and political culture, away from the 'greed is good' culture that has characterised the past thirty year era of 'capitalism unleashed'.That political and corporate culture fostered privatisation, deregulation, demutualisation, shareholder value and financialisation and drove increased inequalities of income, wealth, geography and power, along with global instability fuelled by speculative financial flows.The resulting global financial crisis of 2007-2008 should have called a halt.It should have led to a change of direction, reigning in the speculative drivers that incentivise behaviours that drive personal enrichment and market instability.And it did to some limited extent.The creator of the concept of shareholder value described it as 'the dumbest idea in the world'.Regulation of banks was tightened to some extent.But these shifts were not of the scale required to create a new era of social and environmental sustainability.
The continuation of the 'capitalism unleashed' era is blamed by Cooper and Szreter for having left the UK so vulnerable to the pandemic, with a resultingly inadequate response and hence a higher death toll than might otherwise have been the case.And while their analysis focusses on the UK, the same would be true across the world, given the global nature of the 'capitalism unleashed' policies initiated by Thatcher and Reagan but spread globally both by the 'Washington consensus' and by the collapse of the Soviet Union.
As John Child argues: The COVID-19 pandemic has intensified the economic and social problems that societies face today.At the same time, the public response to the crisis points to a constructive way forward.It has brought people together and unleased a desire to contribute in many ways, some small and others spectacular.It has demonstrated how opportunities for people to participate in collective activities both psychologically and behaviourally can achieve remarkable results, especially when addressing a common danger.(Child 2021, 117) 4   That shift in direction globally did not happen.However, it is still needed, and the climate crisis in particular may still lead to change in that direction.Dramatic actions were taken by governments globally in the face of the 2007-2008 international financial crisis -with widespread nationalisation of banks, and massive public intervention and investment. Equally

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Empowerment': A Nurturing State: Respect and Inclusive Support for All; Ethical Capitalism: Working with Business to Redefine Our Values; Fair Contributions: Full Participation by the Prosperous; Open Public Discourse: Enabling All Voices to Have an Equal Hearing; Measuring What We Value: Signalling the Changes We Need; A Sustainable Future: Responsible Stewardship of Our Planet's Resources; and Participatory Politics: Reviving Democracy and Civic Engagement.
dramatic actions were taken by governments globally in response to Covid-19, with lock-downs, furloughs, and other public intervention and provision.These responses to crises do indicate what is possible.The shift from one historical era to another is usually triggered by crisis, albeit in two cases by world wars.It may be that the responses to the 2007-2008 international financial crisis, and to the 2020-23 pandemic, may have a cumulative effect along with the need to respond to the climate crisis, in bringing about a global shift away from 'capitalism unleashed' towards a new era of social and environmental sustainability.Notes1.Full disclosure: I am President of Kellogg College, and helped raise the funds for the Commission.'Cross bench' members of the House of Lords are independent, rather than being a member of one of the political party blocks.2. The Report, along with background data are available free of charge from www.gchu.org.uk/cchc-report 3. The International Advisory Board was chaired by Nigel Crisp, also a cross-bench member of the House of Lords.4. Page 9 of reprinted version in(Michie and Sheehan 2023a).