On the Intellectual Vice of Epistemic Apathy

Our aim in this paper is to characterize epistemic apathy as an intellectual vice. The agent who possesses this character trait is led not to intervene to prevent another epistemic agent from forming a false belief when it would be appropriate to intervene. Following the motivational viewpoint on vice, we conclude that epistemic apathy can be cashed out in terms of imperfect epistemic motivations. The apathetic agent possesses bad (or, at least, lacks good) epistemic motives. We show, however, that motiva-tionalism has difficulties accounting for the excess-vice: epistemic patern-alism. Following the obstructivism understanding of intellectual vice, we highlight the fact that epistemic apathy does not get in the way of knowledge for the agent who possesses this trait. This goes against our intuition that epistemic apathy is an intellectual vice. To remedy this, we argue that epistemic vices do not necessarily harm the vicious agent.


Introductory Remarks
Our aim in this paper is to characterize epistemic apathy as an intellectual vice. 1 Epistemic apathy is an acquired trait of character that leads those who possess it not to intervene and prevent another epistemic agent from forming a false belief when it would be appropriate to intervene. 2To illustrate this, consider the following example: Mary goes out to dinner with her friends John and Nick.During dinner, the three friends converse about their shared desire to travel to India for the summer.At one point, John asks if Calcutta is the capital of India and Nick replies to his friend's question in the affirmative.Mary decides not to intervene despite the fact that she knows that Calcutta is not the capital of India (New Delhi is) and despite the fact that she has the opportunity and competence to correct her friends.She fails to intervene, even though it would be appropriate to do so.As a result, John forms (and Nick continues to uphold) a false belief. 3 If Mary frequently falls short of intervening in other people's belief formation when it would be the epistemically virtuous thing to do, then her actions can be explained by ascribing the vice of epistemic apathy to her. 4 Anyone might fail to intervene every once in a while, but the epistemic apathetic does so consistently, either because of their imperfect epistemic desires or because of their flawed cognitive make-up.As a consequence, other people miss out on knowledge.Hence, it is in the best interest of an epistemic community to combat epistemic apathy.A community with epistemically apathetic members usually possesses less epistemic goods than a community in which agents help each other epistemically.For this reason, the discussion of epistemic apathy has an important role in social epistemology.Understanding epistemic apathy helps to develop tools to foster a successful and virtuous epistemic community.In particular, if epistemic apathy fits within our best theories of epistemic vices, we can learn how to prevent agents from becoming epistemically apathetic by looking at how we teach virtues and avoid vices in general.
Our view that epistemic apathy is an intellectual vice is based on a responsibilist understanding of the concepts of epistemic virtue and epistemic vice.According to virtue responsibilists (see, e.g.Baehr 2011Baehr , 2016;;Code 1987;Montmarquet 1993;Roberts and Wood 2007;Zagzebski 1996), virtue is a cultivated character trait (e.g.open-mindedness, intellectual courage) 'for which we are to some degree responsible' (Battaly 2008, 645) and which is characterized by the agent's love of epistemic goods (i.e.their strong desire to acquire epistemic goods such as truth and knowledge).When it comes to epistemic vice, most virtue responsibilists seem to understand vice as 'an inversion or mirror image of virtue' (Crerar 2018, 753).They follow a motivational approach to vice and define epistemic vice as a cultivated character trait (e.g.closed-mindedness, intellectual cowardliness, intellectual humility, epistemic autonomy) for which the agent is, to some degree, responsible for possessing and which is characterized by the agent's imperfect epistemic motivations (see, e.g.Baehr 2010, 209;Battaly 2016Battaly , 106, 2017, 226;, 226;Matheson 2023;Tanesini 2018a;Zagzebski 1996, 209).However, the motivational approach to vice has recently been criticized by scholars such as Crerar (2018) and Cassam (2016Cassam ( , 2019)).These scholars have argued, contra motivationalism, that imperfect epistemic motivations are not a necessary condition of epistemic vice.Following this, Cassam (2019, 1) has developed a consequentialist understanding of epistemic vice (called obstructivism) according to which intellectual vices are 'blameworthy, or otherwise reprehensible character traits, attitudes or ways of thinking that systematically obstruct the gaining, keeping or sharing of knowledge'.
Within the general virtue theory framework, scholars often distinguish between self-regarding and other-regarding virtues (see e.g.Kawall 2002;Taylor and Wolfram 1986).Crudely put, selfregarding virtues benefit oneself while other-regarding virtues benefit others.The same distinction applies to vice.Self-regarding vices are to the detriment of oneself while other-regarding vices are to the detriment of others.Generosity is a paradigmatic example of an other-regarding moral virtue while malice is a paradigmatic example of an other-regarding moral vice.Following Harris (2022) who has recently argued for the existence of other-regarding epistemic vice, we classify epistemic apathy as such.Quite importantly, working with other-regarding epistemic virtues and vices allows us to employ the idea that we have epistemic duties towards others (see Lackey 2020Lackey , 2021) ) in the virtue and vice epistemology framework.
To show that epistemic apathy is an intellectual vice, we proceed to highlight that it can be classified as such irrespective of whether one follows a motivational approach to epistemic vice or Cassam's (2019) obstructivism theory.On the one hand, we argue (in section 2) that, following a motivational approach to vice (e.g.Baehr 2010;Battaly 2016;Tanesini 2018a;Zagzebski 1996), epistemic apathy can be cashed out in terms of imperfect epistemic motivations.The epistemically apathetic agent dislikes epistemic goods or simply does not care about such goods.On the other hand, we argue (in section 3) that, following Cassam's (2019) obstructivism theory, epistemic apathy is a vice because it is a blameworthy or otherwise reprehensible trait that obstructs the acquisition, retention and transmission of knowledge.The epistemically apathetic agent's disposition not to intervene obstructs meaningful epistemic inquiry.
Interestingly, our classification of epistemic apathy as an epistemic vice seems to have certain implications for both the motivational approach to vice and the theory of obstructivism.In what concerns motivationalism, we argue that this approach has difficulties accounting for the excess-vice (we call this epistemic paternalism).The agent who strives to help other people epistemically all the time (even when it is not the virtuous thing to do) is not necessarily driven to act out of imperfect epistemic motivations.What such an agent often seems to lack is the competence to help others on epistemic matters and/or the wisdom to know when to intervene. 5However, this criticism should not be taken to imply that we believe that obstructivism is not without its faults too.In what concerns obstructivism, it seems that epistemic apathy does not get in the way of knowledge for the agent who possesses this vice.Hence, the apathetic agent is not epistemically worse off because of this trait.This seems to imply that epistemic apathy is not an intellectual vice since it does not epistemically harm the agent.This goes against our intuition that epistemic apathy is an intellectual vice -and the fact that it can be easily classified as such following the motivational approach to vice.

Epistemic Apathy and Motivationalism
In what follows, we proceed to show that epistemic apathy meets the necessary requirements for a trait to be classified as an intellectual vice under the motivational viewpoint.Epistemic apathy can be characterized in terms of imperfect epistemic motivations.The epistemically apathetic agent dislikes epistemic goods or simply does not care about such goods -at least in other people.We also note, however, that epistemic paternalism (i.e. the excess-vice) is not always explainable in terms of motivations.This realization strengthens the arguments of scholars such as Cassam (2016Cassam ( , 2019) ) and Crerar (2018) who maintain that not all epistemic vices can be accounted for in terms of imperfect motivations.

Motivationalism
As already noted in the introduction, according to virtue responsibilism (such as Baehr 2011Baehr , 2016;;Code 1987;Montmarquet 1993;Roberts and Wood 2007;Zagzebski 1996) epistemic virtue is a cultivated character trait characterized by the virtuous agent's good epistemic motivations.According to the vast majority of virtue responsibilists, 6 epistemic success is not necessary for an agent to possess epistemic virtue.After all, the virtuous agent may find themselves in epistemically unfavorable environments (e.g.evil demon cases) and/or fall victim to cases of bad epistemic luck and as a result be unsuccessful in acquiring epistemic goods (Montmarquet 1993).For most virtue responsibilists (if not all), the value of intellectual virtues is intrinsic and is to be found in the virtuous agent's love for epistemic goods (see e.g.Baehr 2011;Montmarquet 1993;Zagzebski 1996).For instance, Zagzebski (1996, 209) argues that ' . . . the goodness of intellectual virtues is intrinsic and independent of any good not based in the agent's motivations.The goodness of all of these virtues arises directly from the goodness of the motivation for knowledge, an internal property of human agents'.
When it comes to epistemic vice, virtue responsibilists understand this concept as the reverse image of epistemic virtue (Crerar 2018, 753).As the name suggests, motivationalism focuses on the motives of the agent rather than the outcomes of their actions.Motivationalism is the view that epistemic vices are characterized by imperfect epistemic motivations (Battaly 2014;Tanesini 2018aTanesini , 2021;;Zagzebski 1996).This means that for an agent to possess epistemic vice, they must necessarily possess imperfect epistemic motives.Most responsibilists, however, go even further and take imperfect epistemic motives to be both necessary and sufficient for the possession of epistemic vice (see e.g.Battaly 2014;Tanesini 2018aTanesini , 2021)).
Paradigmatic examples of epistemic vices, under the motivationalist understanding of the term, include traits such as epistemic malevolence (see, e.g.Baehr 2010) and epistemic laziness (see, e.g.Kidd 2017).For example, according to Baehr (2010, 204), the character trait of epistemic malevolence can be divided into two kinds: (i) impersonal and (ii) personal, with both kinds involving imperfect epistemic motivations.Impersonal epistemic malevolence is characterized by an 'opposition to knowledge as such' (Baehr 2010, 204) while personal epistemic malevolence is characterized by an 'opposition to another person's share in knowledge or to her epistemic well-being as such' (Baehr 2010, 204).
But what exactly is the term 'imperfect epistemic motives' supposed to capture under the motivationalist understanding of vice?Some scholars working under the motivationalist viewpoint believe that intellectual vices are characterized by (and require) the presence of bad epistemic motivations (Battaly 2017, 226;Tanesini 2018a, 350).For example, Tanesini (2018a, 350) argues that intellectual vices 'involve non-instrumental motives to oppose, antagonize, or avoid things that are epistemically good in themselves.In short, intellectual vice comprises a motivation actively to turn away from the epistemic good'.Baehr (2010), for instance, defines epistemic malevolence as a trait involving a direct opposition to knowledge as such.The agent who is driven to actively oppose knowledge is, by definition, motivated to act out of bad epistemic motives.
However, other scholars (Baehr 2010;Montmarquet 2000;Zagzebski 1996) who follow the motivationalist viewpoint on vice argue that the intellectually vicious agent need not possess bad epistemic motivations and that the absence of good epistemic motivations is a (necessary and) sufficient condition for the presence of epistemic vice.For example, epistemic laziness is a vice characterized by the absence of good epistemic motivations.The epistemically lazy agent does not seem to possess bad epistemic motives in the sense that they are not motivated to actively turn away from epistemic goods (Crerar 2018).They seem simply to be indifferent to such goods -they do not have any desire to go out of their way to acquire them.
Irrespective of differences in their conception of epistemic vice, motivationalists agree that traits should not be evaluated based on the consequences they bring about, because the agent cannot control a variety of external factors influencing the outcomes of their action.Motivationalists argue instead that the badness of epistemic vices stems from the agent's bad (or at the very least imperfect) epistemic desires.They believe that agents have at least some control over their motivations, and agents are therefore blameworthy when such motivations are outright bad or at least lacking 7 (Battaly 2014;Tanesini 2018aTanesini , 2021;;Zagzebski 1996).

Situating Epistemic Apathy in Motivationalism
To show that epistemic apathy meets the necessary requirements for a trait to be classified as an intellectual vice under the motivational viewpoint, we must show that epistemic apathy is a character trait 8 characterized by the presence of bad epistemic motivations or at least by the absence of good epistemic drives.When Mary does not intervene in John forming a false belief, she clearly shows a lack of good epistemic motivations.The epistemically virtuous agent would, after all, intervene (when appropriate) to prevent another epistemic agent B from forming a false belief.
But how are we to account for Mary's lack of good epistemic desires?Following scholars such as Tanesini (2018a), we could argue that Mary is acting out of a motive to oppose, antagonize or actively avoid things that are epistemically good in themselves.First of all, preventing another agent from forming a false belief is an epistemically valuable act.It helps maximize truth over error, and it is something that the virtuous agent would strive to promote.Now, to explain Mary's motivations for not intervening, one could adopt Baehr's (2010) classification of 'personal' and 'impersonal' malevolence and apply it to the concept of epistemic apathy.Doing so would yield the following definitions: (i) impersonal epistemic apathy is characterized by an opposition to epistemic goods as such while (ii) personal epistemic apathy involves a desire to oppose another agent's share in epistemic good or their epistemic well-being as such.In the case of impersonal epistemic apathy, Mary is motivated not to intervene because she dislikes epistemic goods, no matter who will come to possess them (perhaps other than herself).In the case of personal epistemic apathy, Mary is motivated not to intervene because she does not want John to acquire epistemic goods.
However, characterizing epistemic apathy in terms of bad epistemic desires is only part of the picture (and a small part of it at that).It seems to us that epistemic apathy is, in the majority of cases, simply the result of epistemic indifference.The apathetic agent does not care about epistemic goods (in other people) -viz., they do not desire to acquire and promote such goods (in other people), but they do not also care enough to oppose, antagonize or actively avoid such goods.In our example, it might be the case that Mary does not intervene simply because she could not be bothered to do so. 9She does not care about John's epistemic goods and has no desire to prevent John from forming a false belief.Her epistemically apathetic disposition stems from the absence of good epistemic motivations.
However, irrespectively of whether one classifies epistemic apathy in terms of bad epistemic motivations (i.e.explicit antagonization of epistemic goods), in terms of lack of good epistemic motivations (i.e.indifference to epistemic goods) or, depending on the case, a mixture of the two, the fact remains that this trait is characterized by imperfect epistemic motivations.Hence, it seems safe to argue that epistemic apathy can be classified as an intellectual vice under the motivational viewpoint on vice.After all, one cannot possess this vice if they do not possess imperfect epistemic drives.It is due to such drives that they remain apathetic and systematically do not intervene to prevent another epistemic agent B from forming a false belief, even though such intervention would be called for.
There is one further complication that we ought to discuss at this point.If we accept that different motivational structures can be part of epistemic apathy, one might worry that there is no single vice here to be found at all.Rather, one might think many different vices can lead to the vicious dispositions captured by epistemic apathy and that apathy itself is not a vice.Not intervening is perhaps only an indication of having some vice (such as laziness or malevolence).We take this to be a general problem of the identification of vices and virtues and not an issue specific to our proposal.It is sometimes difficult to carve the nature of vices and virtues at their joints.Epistemic virtues regarding others face similar problems.Consider Kawall's (2002) example of honesty.One's honesty is an intellectual virtue that helps other people form true beliefs by testifying sincerely.It also includes a motivational component.But one might worry here that it is unclear whether that motivational component is a general motivation for epistemic goods, a motivation for epistemic goods in others, a motivation based on friendship or a moral motivation.But even with different possible motivational grounds, it seems reasonable to consider honesty as a virtue.It is a trait that captures particular, stable dispositions regarding others grounded in motivations that are similar enough to one another, such that the virtue has explanatory power within our theories (even folk theories).
The problem is even more noticeable with dishonesty.The dishonest person can have many different motivations for their dishonesty.And some of those motivations themselves can be described as vices.The epistemically malicious person will also be dishonest.But that does not stop us from considering dishonesty as a vice.We suggest the same is true for epistemic apathy.Even though the motivational grounds of epistemic apathy can vary, and sometimes even be identified as (or closely related to) other vices, we suggest that epistemic apathy has explanatory power as a vice.The different motivating grounds are similar enough and the dispositions involved are sufficiently stable to justify that epistemic apathy is a distinct vice.
It seems, therefore, that motivationalism does a very good job of explaining our intuition that epistemic apathy is an epistemic vice.But if epistemic apathy is (a deficiency-)vice characterized by imperfect epistemic motivations, and a disposition not to intervene when one should, how would the motivational viewpoint account for the (excess-)vice of the opposite spectrum: epistemic paternalism 10,11 ?Briefly put, the agent possessing the trait of epistemic paternalism is predisposed to intervene even when doing so is not the epistemically virtuous thing to do.To show this, consider an altered version of our initial example: during dinner, John asks if New Delhi is the capital of India and Nick replies to his friend's question in the affirmative.Due to her epistemic paternalism disposition, Mary decides to intervene and tells her friends that New Delhi is not the capital of India, Calcutta is.Seeing Mary's confidence in her answer, both John and Nick form a false belief: they come to believe that Calcutta is the capital of India. 12 The question now is how can we account for our intuition that epistemic paternalism is an intellectual vice if not in terms of the consequences it brings about?It seems to us that motivationalism would have a hard time explaining why this trait is a vice.The agent who strives to help other people epistemically all the time (even when it is not the virtuous thing to do) is not necessarily driven to act out of imperfect epistemic motivations. 13The agent could love epistemic goods and still possess the vice of epistemic paternalism.This is because paternalism could be a matter of incompetency and/or poor judgement (rather than a matter of imperfect motivations); in the altered version of our original example, Mary lacks the competency and judgement to know when to intervene.Her decision to intervene, however, is not out of some imperfect epistemic motive.She does not oppose epistemic goods and is not indifferent to them.Actually, it could be the case that she has a strong desire to pursue and promote epistemic goods.Also, Mary is convinced that she knows the answer to John's question.She is certain that Calcutta is the capital of India.Where does this leave us in terms of accounting for our intuition that epistemic paternalism is a vice?It seems to us that a consequentialist understanding of epistemic vice would do a much better job of capturing the essence of epistemic paternalism than motivationalism.This conclusion strengthens the arguments of scholars such as Cassam (2016Cassam ( , 2019) ) and Crerar (2018) who maintain that not all epistemic vices can be accounted for in terms of imperfect motivations.
To sum up, epistemic apathy is an intellectual vice.Following a motivational approach to vice, epistemic apathy can be cashed out in terms of imperfect epistemic motivations.The epistemically apathetic agent does not intervene (even though they should) because they dislike epistemic goods or simply because they do not care for such goods in other people.However, in what concerns motivationalism, we have argued that this approach has difficulties accounting for the opposite vice of epistemic apathy: epistemic paternalism.The agent who strives to help other people epistemically all the time (even when it is not the virtuous thing to do) is not necessarily driven to act out of imperfect epistemic motivations.What such an agent seems to lack is the competence to help others on epistemic matters and/or the wisdom to know when to interfere with other's inquiries.

Epistemic Apathy and Obstructivism
After situating epistemic apathy as a vice within the motivationalist framework, we now turn to Cassam's (2019) obstructivism.We start with a quick overview of the main features of obstructivism (3.1), before showing how epistemic apathy can fit into the obstructivist account.We argue that epistemic apathy points to a tension within Cassam's account because the obstructivist account of who is epistemically harmed does not -or at least not easily -fit the obstructivist's commitment about the nature of epistemic vices.We suggest an adjustment that solves the conflict and provides room for epistemic apathy as an obstructivist vice.

Obstructivism
Obstructivism is the view that epistemic vices get in the way of knowledge.They hinder the acquisition, storage or transfer of knowledge systematically.Obstructivism therefore is a consequentialist account of epistemic vice.The mark of an epistemic vice is its effect on getting, keeping or sharing knowledge, whereas a motivational basis leading to that effect is irrelevant.Someone can be epistemically vicious, even though their motivations are perfectly fine.The closedminded might still want to get things right and aim for knowledge, but their need for cognitive closure (cf.Bar-Joseph and Kruglanski 2003) keeps getting in the way of reaching that aim.
Epistemic vices do not only get in the way of knowledge by preventing the acquisition of knowledge.They also influence the storage and sharing of knowledge.The storage of knowledge can be affected by vices impacting what is stored and what can be retrieved.For instance, a person with a prejudice against women might forget or fail to retrieve contributions to society by women to a much larger extent than that person forgets similar contributions by men.Moreover, the sharing of knowledge can be obstructed by vices on the side of speakers and of hearers.Cassam (2019, 10) provides the example of an arrogant speaker whose arrogance is so off-putting that people refuse to listen to the speaker.On the other side, the paradigmatic example of a hearer vice is the case of testimonial injustice (Fricker 2007; see also Pohlhaus 2014;Cusick 2019).A prejudiced hearer gives a speaker less credit than they deserve because of the hearer's prejudice against the speaker.A refugee might not be believed by a hearer because the hearer is prejudiced against refugees.
Cassam (2019) remains somewhat neutral on what exactly can get in the way of knowledge in the relevant sense.He explicitly endorses that at least character traits, attitudes and ways of thinking can constitute such epistemic vices.Character traits are taken to be fairly stable dispositions to act, think and feel.The closed-minded person is disposed to reject new information that threatens his cognitive closure of having already settled a question.Reopening a question feels uncomfortable for them, so they tend to disregard new information.
Attitudes are evaluative perspectives aimed at an object (Cassam 2019, 81).These are not propositional attitudes as commonly discussed in philosophy.Attitudes in the psychologist's sense (cf.Allport 1935;Banaji and Heiphetz 2010;Fazio and Olson 2007) capture a preference or aversion towards an object.Liking ice cream is a paradigmatic attitude.It is an evaluation of ice cream as something with positive valence and that evaluation manifests in behavior.For instance, James likes ice cream, so in appropriate circumstances, James will seek out ice cream.Whereas character traits are fairly stable dispositions over a wide range of objects, attitudes also usually come with behavioral dispositions, but they are limited by the object of the attitude. 14Cassam distinguishes attitudes further between stances and postures.Stances are involuntary and have an affective component.Postures are voluntary, much like a policy one adopts to achieve a goal (Cassam 2019, 81).For our purpose this difference is unimportant.
Finally, some epistemic vices are ways of thinking -ways of forming beliefs.The paradigmatic case is that of wishful thinking.A person who forms beliefs by wishful thinking is unlikely to get things right.They are unlikely to acquire knowledge.Someone who has a vicious way of thinking does not merely form a false belief on one occasion.Anyone might use a flawed form of belief formation from time to time.The wishful thinker, however, has to come to belief by wishful thinking systematically.
All three options, character traits, attitudes and ways of thinking, can constitute epistemic vices if they get in the way of knowledge.But not every instance of something getting in the way of knowledge is a vice.Blindness gets in the way of knowledge, but being blind is not vicious.Only blameworthy or at least reprehensible character traits, attitudes or ways of thinking are vicious (Cassam 2019, 23).Our discussion brings us to Cassam's concise formulation of epistemic vice: (OBS) An epistemic vice is a blameworthy or otherwise reprehensible character trait, attitude, or way of thinking that systematically obstructs the gaining, keeping, or sharing of knowledge.(Cassam 2019, 23) However, this definition is not all that can be said about vices.Cassam suggests a further feature that seems especially important for the case of epistemic apathy: the harm of epistemic vices.At an early stage of his discussion of epistemic vices, Cassam compares Aristotle's conception with his own. 15At this point, he expresses that even with many differences, both Aristotle and Cassam share the view that epistemic vices are harmful to the vicious person.
It's hard to talk about epistemic or other vices without mentioning Aristotle.[. ..]Aristotelian accounts emphasize the harmfulness of vices for their possessor.For obstructivism epistemic vices are epistemically harmful to their possessor.That is, they are harmful to us as knowers and this is the sense in which, like vices generally, they are 'destructive of the self and prevent its flourishing' (Taylor 2006: 1).(Cassam 2019, 5-6) Epistemic vices obstruct knowledge and in doing so are harmful to the person who has those vices.They might also be harmful to other people, but Cassam suggests that they are always harmful to the vicious person.In our following discussion of epistemic apathy within obstructionism, we suggest that this commitment to the epistemic harm of the vicious person is dubious and needs more support.

Situating Epistemic Apathy in Obstructivism
When Mary does not intervene in John forming a false belief, she clearly does something blameworthy or reprehensible.And if Mary regularly behaves in this fashion, rarely preventing someone from forming a false belief even if she easily could, then that seems prima facie to be explained by Mary having the vice of epistemic apathy.Our aim now is to find out whether Mary could be said to have such an epistemic vice according to obstructivism.Can we find room for epistemic apathy in Cassam's framework?We can split up our task into three smaller questions: (1) Does epistemic apathy qualify as a character trait, an attitude or a way of thinking?(2) Does epistemic apathy obstruct the acquisition, keeping or sharing of knowledge?
We start with questions ( 2) and ( 3), before locating epistemic apathy within character traits, attitudes and ways of thinking.
Let us start with question (2) and the easy task of ruling out some possible obstructions.Clearly, epistemic apathy does not obstruct the storage of knowledge.That a person does not intervene in other people's belief formation does not impact memory in any way whatsoever.Mary does not lose knowledge stored in memory because she fails to help John.At first sight, acquisition also seems to be something that we can eliminate as an option if we only look at Mary herself.Epistemic apathy is not about Mary's belief-forming processes, so there is at least no straightforward way in which epistemic apathy obstructs Mary's acquisition of knowledge.However, Mary's epistemic apathy clearly obstructs the acquisition of knowledge in other people.John does not acquire knowledge because of Mary's epistemic apathy.The effect on John is a result of epistemic apathy's effect on the sharing of knowledge.Mary does not share her knowledge because she is epistemically apathetic.It therefore seems that the best fit for epistemic apathy in Cassam's taxonomy of obstruction is that epistemic apathy obstructs the sharing of knowledge.It stops Mary from testifying in situations in which she has the opportunity and competence required to testify.This failure to testify then leads to other people acquiring false or risky beliefs.
At this point question (3) comes up naturally: does epistemic apathy harm the apathetic agent epistemically? 16When Mary in her epistemic apathy does not help out John, how is Mary in any way epistemically harmed?Cassam explicitly states that an epistemic vice always harms the person who has the vice.It might also harm other people, but the vice necessarily harms the vicious person.At first sight, this does not seem satisfied for the epistemically apathetic Mary.Mary does not help other people out epistemically, but she is no worse off for doing so.Mary still knows what the capital of India is.Only John and Nick do not.Where is the epistemic harm for Mary?
We take this to be a general tension in Cassam's obstructivism.If something qualifies as an epistemic vice in virtue of exclusively obstructing the sharing of knowledge on the speaker's side, then it seems anything but obvious that the vicious agent is always harmed epistemically.Epistemic apathy provides a good example of this tension in the obstructivist account, but it is not limited to epistemic apathy.Cassam's (2019, 10) own example of an arrogant speaker who is so off-putting that no one listens to them falls into the same problem.If this arrogance is limited to speaking in such an off-putting way, then it is not obvious why the speaker is harmed epistemically.It is not a tension that is limited to epistemic apathy, so rejecting our intuitive judgment that epistemic apathy is a vice is no way out.
We suggest two different options for the obstructivist.Either drop the requirement that epistemic vices harm the person having that vice epistemically or find a way in which the epistemic apathetic or arrogant are epistemically harmed after all.Let us explore the latter option before revising obstructivism.
A first attempt might look at the missed opportunity of being corrected.What both the epistemic apathetic and the arrogant speaker have in common is that their behavior commonly leads to a lack of a successful speech act.The speech act of testifying either does not occur at all, because the apathetic agent does not produce speech of any kind, or it misfires, because there is no uptake of the words the arrogant speaker utters.If there is no speech act of testifying with sufficient uptake, then no one can correct the speaker in case what they said was false.Perhaps this missed opportunity of being corrected constitutes an epistemic harm for the vicious agent?We think this proposal is insufficient.It works as a solution for the arrogant speaker because the arrogant speaker might still be wrong.In removing the possibility of being corrected, the arrogant speaker brings themself into a worse epistemic position -they harm themself epistemically.However, this solution does not work for the epistemically apathetic.We introduced epistemic apathy as something that leads those who possess it not to intervene to prevent another epistemic agent from forming a false belief, even though such intervention would be appropriate.The epistemic apathetic is by definition correct and therefore cannot be worse off epistemically by removing the opportunity to be corrected.
A second attempt is to propose an indirect harm.While one might concede that an act that manifests epistemic apathy does not by itself harm the vicious agent epistemically, it will lead to an epistemic community that is overall less competent.And such a less competent community will be less knowledgeable in cases in which the vicious Mary has to rely on that community.Suppose that Mary knows that a particular method of studying particle physics is unreliable and she sees Niels using that method.Mary has the opportunity and competence required to stop Niels from using that method and forming a false belief.But she does not intervene.Niels's false results are disseminated in the community and are used as building blocks for further research that leads to a new theory of relativity.That theory is false because it is built on the false assumptions taken from Niels's research.Now suppose Mary wants to know about relativity, a topic she knows little about.She opens a textbook and finds the new -false -theory of relativity inside the textbook.She comes to believe that theory.If she had intervened in Niels's belief formation, she would likely not have formed this false belief.She would be better off epistemically if she had intervened.This is an instance in which Mary's epistemic apathy leads to the community being worse off epistemically.And because the community is worse off epistemically, some testimony that Mary receives within the community will not lead to knowledge.Mary's acquisition of knowledge has been obstructed in an indirect, roundabout way.We suggest that this is the most promising way of conceiving of an epistemic harm that the epistemically apathetic suffers because of their epistemic apathy.But even here the harm is indirect and not always guaranteed.Being epistemically apathetic harms other people first and foremost.It is only in some cases that these epistemic harms also cause epistemic harms to the apathetic agent.
Overall, it seems that while obstructivists do not need to fully give up on the claim that epistemic vices are harmful to vicious agents themselves, they do need to accept a fairly weak notion of what counts as an epistemic harm to a vicious agent.Moreover, because even with such a weak notion the epistemic harm has to be mediated via an epistemically harmed community, it seems more fruitful to drop the requirement that the vicious is always harmed altogether.Obstructivists should rather accept that epistemic vices necessarily harm someone, but not necessarily the vicious agent.This fits with a move towards a deeply social conception of epistemic vices and virtues as pointed to by Levy and Alfano (2020).
We have now answered questions (2) and (3).Epistemic apathy primarily obstructs the sharing of knowledge.It also obstructs the acquisition of knowledge in other people and sometimes indirectly obstructs the acquisition of knowledge in the epistemically apathetic, by making the community overall worse off epistemically.Moreover, the direct harm of epistemic apathy is best located in the people the apathetic does not help out and the epistemic community these people are a part of.The apathetic agent can only be indirectly epistemically harmed by their own epistemic apathy.
We finish the obstructivist discussion of epistemic apathy with question (1): does epistemic apathy qualify as a character trait, an attitude or a way of thinking?We find that the last option -a way of thinking -can be easily dismissed.Epistemic apathy has nothing to do with belief formation in the vicious agent.Epistemic apathy is primarily about one's reaction to seeing other people in epistemic need.Both attitudes and character traits can manifest in behavior in a way that fits with our description of how the epistemically apathetic behaves.Hence, epistemic apathy might be a reasonable fit with both categories -akin to arrogance in Cassam (2019).A main difference between character traits and attitudes is that attitudes are directed towards an object, whereas character traits are broader and not connected to a single object.Epistemic apathy consists of a systematic lack of intervention when other agents form false beliefs, even when it would be called for and the apathetic has the opportunity and competence to intervene.To bring epistemic apathy into the framework of an attitude we merely need to connect this lack of epistemic intervention with a particular object.For instance, if someone never intervenes in false or risky belief formation done by pirates, then that might be construed as a particular attitude towards pirates.Perhaps one consciously decides that pirates are evil and should never be helped out epistemically.This might lead to an epistemic apathy posture towards pirates.In contrast, if the lack of intervention in false or risky belief formation is not limited to any particular object, then it is better thought of as a character trait.We think this latter version of epistemic apathy as a character trait will be more fruitful.As a character trait, epistemic apathy can provide explanations of and predictions for behavior in a large variety of circumstances.The epistemically apathetic will generally be less likely to help out other people epistemically.Moreover, as a character trait epistemic apathy can neatly fit into both motivationalist and obstructivist frameworks.
We now answered all three questions and found the place for epistemic apathy in the obstructivist framework.Epistemic apathy is an acquired trait of character 17 that leads those who possess it not to intervene to prevent another epistemic agent from forming a false belief, even though such intervention would be appropriate.Epistemic apathy obstructs primarily the sharing of knowledge, harming other epistemic agents directly and potentially the apathetic agent indirectly.Epistemic apathy is blameworthy or at least reprehensible as can be observed by the reactive attitudes of the people that the apathetic did not help out epistemically.If John learns that Mary could have prevented him from forming a false belief, John will be angry at Mary.Overall epistemic apathy qualifies as an epistemic vice under obstructivism.

Concluding Remarks
Our aim in this paper has been to characterize epistemic apathy as an intellectual vice.The agent who possesses this character trait is led not to intervene to prevent another epistemic agent from forming a false belief, even though such intervention would be appropriate.This trait has gone unnoticed by scholars working in vice epistemology and this is, we believe, an important gap in the literature: this trait can help account for cases of epistemic apathy in everyday life, academia, politics, etc. Shedding light on this trait is also valuable for virtue education and developing pedagogical ways to safeguard against its possession by students.
As a secondary aim, we have explored the implications of classifying epistemic apathy as a vice for motivationalism and obstructivism.We have argued that motivationalism seems to have difficulties accounting for the opposite vice (we have called this epistemic paternalism).This conclusion strengthens the arguments of scholars such as Cassam (2016Cassam ( , 2019) ) and Crerar (2018) who maintain that not all epistemic vices can be accounted for in terms of imperfect motivations.Regarding obstructivism, it seems that apathy does not get in the way of knowledge for the agent who possesses this vice (the epistemically apathetic agent is not epistemically worse off because of this trait).However, to accommodate for our intuition that epistemic apathy is a vice, and for some of Cassam's examples, we have proposed a modified version of obstructivism according to which epistemic vices obstruct the acquisition, transmission and retention of knowledge -but do not necessarily harm the agent who possesses the epistemic vice in question.
students from developing epistemic virtues.Or they might be overcorrecting in a pedantic way, e.g. by insisting on exactness in a way that distracts from a conversational purpose (someone might say it is 8 am, and be corrected by an agent insisting that it is 8:01 am, even though that difference does not matter for the conversation).Moreover, this kind of paternalism might show up in a case of failing to treat someone as a (potential) knower in a form of epistemic injustice (cf.Fricker 2007).13.Though it could be because of imperfect motives.An agent might be motivated by unwarranted feelings of epistemic superiority.For a discussion of vices of superiority in the motivationalist framework see Tanesini (2021, Chapter 5).14.This also explains why in Cassam's picture arrogance can be both a character trait and an attitude.It is an attitude if it is limited to a particular object (e.g.arrogance with regard to the topic of football) and it is a character trait if the dispositions are not limited to one object.15.For more on Aristotle and intellectual vice see Kontos (2014Kontos ( , 2021)).16.We are here only interested in epistemic harm, because Cassam holds that epistemic vices always harm the vicious agent epistemically.One might alternatively take on a more Aristotelian line and propose that epistemic apathy harms the agent in non-epistemic way.We remain neutral on that issue.17.Although the obstructivist framework gives us room to also accept an attitude of epistemic apathy.

Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding
Work on this paper by Lukas Schwengerer has been funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) -Projektnummer 462399384.

Notes on Contributors
Lukas Schwengerer is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Duisburg-Essen and the primary investigator for the DFG project 'Collective Self-Knowledge'.He primarily works on topics in the intersection of epistemology and philosophy of mind, with a particular interest in how anti-individualist approaches in the philosophy of mind impact epistemological questions.
Alkis Kotsonis is an associate tutor at the University of Glasgow (School of Education) and a philosophy instructor at Deree -The American College of Greece.His research lies at the intersection of epistemology and education, and focuses on the study of the concept of intellectual excellence and the development of new epistemological and educational theories of virtue.