Espionage by Europeans: treason and counterintelligence in post-Cold War Europe

ABSTRACT As War rages in Ukraine, counterintelligence has again taken centre stage for European intelligence agencies. In spite of the long-ascendant espionage threat, to date little is known about who is recruited, what motivated them and how they were caught. This article presents an analysis of espionage against European NATO and/or EU members, based on court convictions in 2010–2021. This provides a first overview of contemporary espionage in Europe, and complements previous research, which is dominated by single-case studies, mainly of Anglo-Saxon cases. Replicating large-N studies of American espionage, the study identifies transatlantic commonalities, including perpetrators being overwhelmingly male, middle-aged, and a mainly working outside of defence or intelligence agencies. But also differences, with Russia being by far the main instigator of espionage in Europe, a strong concentration of cases in Northern Europe, and a diversity of legislation coinciding with equally variable outcomes in court. Generally, the similarities speak to the nature of contemporary espionage, whereas the differences are chiefly attributable to geopolitical differences between the US and Europe.


Introduction
With the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the comparatively peaceful post-Cold War era has ended.But years before Russian troops crossed Ukrainian borders, scholars discussed the fall of the 'liberal world order', and the gradual end to American unipolar hegemony on the international stage. 1 Consequently, China and Russia have eclipsed transnational terrorism as a security threat to the USA and intelligence scholars are arguing that offensive Humint -recruiting foreign spiesshould again play a primary role. 2 While not disputing this -quite to the contrary -this article explores a key corollary, namely that counterintelligence (CI) is swiftly becoming equally crucial.That is, if we need human sources to access the 'most important secrets (. ..) likely contained either in the minds of a select few or in heavily guarded vaults' of authoritarian adversaries, safeguarding our own should be equally vital, particularly given the openness of Western societies. 3After all, the former chief of CIA Counterintelligence James Olson noted in 2021 that '[a]t no time in my career have I considered the challenges for US counterintelligence greater than they are right now'. 4 Similarly, intelligence officials and scholars alike have been raising alarms over espionage against Europeparticularly by Russia, 5 but increasingly also China. 6he global shift from the post-Cold War liberal international order and back to geopolitical confrontation is particularly palpable in contemporary Europe.After the Warsaw Pact dissolved, central and eastern European countries gradually liberalized and joined the EU, making erstwhile adversaries stakeholders in the regional peace project.For two decades after the fall of the Berlin vast majority of convicted spies are male and that monetary gains remains the most common motive, but less so than in earlier cohorts.Furthermore, only one-quarter of the convicted spies were military, and compared to earlier cohorts, increasing proportions were contractors, held jobs unrelated to espionage, and/or did not hold security clearances. 20By designing a structured dataset, disaggregated by different time-periods, and compiling data on everything from personal motives to the socio-economic backgrounds of recruits, this series established a gold standard for comparatives research on espionage.
To date there is no comparable study of espionage in contemporary Europe. 21Instead, there is a handful of comparative articles analysing large-N samples of espionage within individual jurisdictions, at different periods in time.For instance, Jurvee and Perling published a survey of Russian espionage cases in Estonia.The sample includes 20 individuals convicted in 2009-2019, of which all but one was male.Three convicts had a background from the Estonian Internal Security Service (ISS) and one was an army officer, and these four individuals received notably harsher sentencing than the rest of the sample, presumably reflecting the gravity of their betrayal. 22Lillbacka studied 285 cases compiled from Finland (1945-1977), Sweden (1939-1942) and the U.S. (1975-2008), to test statistically the proposition that ideologically motivated spies 'originate primarily from socio-culturally coherent groups where beliefs that are directly or indirectly favourable to a foreign power are prevalent'.Simplifying matters, the study found strong support for the hypothesis, while also finding i.a.results that were 'clearly consistent with the notion that non-ideological spies will manifest more "pathological" markers', for instance revenge motives, previous crimes and personal problems.Hence, as best we can tell, there are some systematic differences between ideological and non-ideological spies. 23ess germane to this article, Macrakis has analysed the impact of espionage by Stasi spies on the scientific and technological development of East Germany during the Cold War 24 and some international databases compile a partial selection of contemporary espionage cases, including from Europe. 25However, there is nothing approaching a comparative study of contemporary espionage against European countries, similar to what Herbig and colleagues have done for the US.
This article attempts to remedy this, by compiling data on cases of espionage in Europe during the past decade (2010-2021).To enable comparisons with American cases, the variable selection and coding practises largely replicate Herbig et al, although it should be emphasized early on that the data -compiled mainly through secondary sources -are often much thinner than in the original study.Minor adjustments were also made to adapt the research design to a European context, adding a few new variables of interest.Specifically, where possible, not only the country, but also the specific intelligence agency instigating espionage is noted.To make the study manageable in scope, data collection is focused on European NATO and/or EU members, all in all 33 countries. 26As opposed to research on espionage in individual jurisdictions, cases were selected both on whether a specific act is defined as espionage in the jurisdiction where an individual was convicted, and whether this conforms with a rudimentary definition of espionage, i.e., procuring classified or sensitive information, making contact with a foreign recipient and handing over the information. 27ven minor adjustments to the criteria could have expanded the sample.For instance, in Sweden alone, several individuals have been convicted for sharing sensitive military information in closed online fora.But absent a foreign instigator, they were convicted of unauthorized access to classified data (Sw.obehörig befattning med hemlig uppgift), not espionage, and hence excluded here. 28here were plenty of cases that prompted discussions on proper delimitations -too numerous to recount in full -and other researchers might have made different distinctions, expanding or shrinking the sample marginally.The study however explicitly excludes cyber and diaspora espionage, as well as so-called illegals, signals intelligence (SIGINT) and disinformation campaigns, whereas economic espionage using human sources is included. 29Again, these choices are purposely similar to Herbig et al, to ensure comparability between the samples.
As the first attempt to study a complex and potentially enormous subject, the gaps and possible sources of error of the data must be acknowledged upfront, beyond delimitations and case selection.Firstly, the study relies exclusively on open, secondary sources.While open sources was an inherent requirement, the possibility of conducting complementary interviews was precluded due to the global COVID-19 pandemic.Secondly, European countries vary dramatically in how much data is reported in the public domain on espionage cases.For instance, Baltic cases were broadly reported in long-form journalistic accounts (often including interviews with perpetrators), whereas the author frequently struggled to ascertain the outcomes in Polish cases, and far fewer details were reported.This implies that the granularity of data -narrative and quantitative -varies greatly between cases. 30Thirdly, when espionage is detected, national authorities can to choose whether to press charges -and hence make the case public -or use more discreet methods, such as removing access to classified information for the suspected spy, or declaring foreign intelligence officers persona non grata. 31Hence, the study should not be read as measuring the espionage threat against individual European countries, nor as an evaluation of national counterintelligence efforts, as the espionage cases that eventually reach court in most likely represent merely the tip of the iceberg.That said, the study covers the vast majority of convictions on (state-centric) espionage in Europe during the 2010s, and systematically organizes and analyse them in considerable detail.This is key, as it enables us to spot regional patterns, trends over time and antagonists' modus, revealing several novel findings.Crucially, several of the trends are so strong that the addition of a limited number of cases would only alter the main results marginally, if at all. 32ased on these criteria, 42 individuals convicted on espionage in Europe in 2010-2021 were identified, with the full sample presented in Table A1, in the Appendix.Of these, 30 began spying after 2010 (category A), whereas another 12 began their espionage prior to 2010, but were convicted in 2010-2021 (category B).In this article, the analysis is focused on these 42 individuals, with a full list of cases in Appendix A. Beyond this, another 13 suspected spies, that had not yet been tried in court by the end of 2021 were identified (category C), and another 7 included in a miscellaneous category (D). 33Although the aim was to identify and include every case that fulfils the criteria, these 42 individuals represent the majority of convicted European spies, but cases may still have been omitted.To be clear, the data set is a compilation of failed espionage, insofar that perpetrators were caught eventually.As such, less-skilled spies might be inadvertently over-represented.However, crucially, regional patterns of convictions may also say as much about counterintelligence efforts (and policy, i.e., whether to prosecute or not) as they do about the underlying espionage threat.

Transatlantic similarities
When analysed as a whole, there are some notable similarities between American and European spies.Firstly, almost the entire European contingent − 40 out of 42 spies -was male.In fact, the only two females were both married to other convicted spies.Firstly, the wife of Aleksei Dressen -a midlevel Estonian Internal Security Service officer (Est: Kaitsepolitseiamet, KAPO).Dressen was reportedly recruited sometime in 1998-2001, while visiting his wife's relatives in Russia, and stolen information was at time delivered by her while travelling to Russia on business. 34And secondly, the wife of a German-Afghan translator was convicted alongside her husband, with her 'aiding and abetting' the espionage on behalf of Iran. 35Both were hence accomplices to their husbands' crimes, rather than the principal perpetrators, and received more lenient sentencing. 36In fact, even in our broader sample, all women suspected seemingly worked in husband-wife teams.This includes the wives of two suspect spies under investigation at the time of writing (in Germany 37 and Bulgaria 38 ), and two wives in Russian 'illegals' couples (albeit in these cases, the veracity of the marriages themselves can be questioned). 39Husband-wife teams were not unheard of in the American population of spies either, 40 but there were also women acting as the principal spies and working alone, or together with other female spies. 41spionage being a predominantly male crime dovetails well with findings from the US.Herbig for instance finds that 91 per cent of convicted American spies in 1990-2015 were male (92.5 per cent for the entire 1947-2015 period). 42Why this is the case is however less well explored.Herbig argues that in the US men are over-represented amongst those holding security clearances; are more prone towards high-risk behaviour; and over-represented in certain categories of criminality. 43While continent-wide statistics for these indicators are hard to come by, these explanations are tentatively plausible in a European context as well.However, the possibility that female spies are less likely to be detected and convicted -due to either greater skills or receiving less CI scrutiny -of course cannot be excluded.
Like in the US, European spies typically also began at a relatively mature age.In America, between 1990-2015, the median age was just north of 40, 44 whereas in the Old World, the median was just below that. 45Granted, there is a wide variance (between 18 and 64), but as a group, spies begin late compared to first-time offenders in many other crime categories.There can be a bias, insofar that spies may be detected well into their clandestine 'careers', or that prosecutions may focus on the latter parts of espionage, which may be easier to prove.That said, 'late onset espionage' mirrors recent patterns from the US, whereas in the 1980s, the median age was lower, skewed by an influx of young military spies. 46To some extent, the middle-aged spy may reflect opportunities, as mid-career professionals are generally granted better access to classified or sensitive information over time, making them of greater interests to recruiters.Others may have experienced career disappointments, making them susceptible to recruitment, as may postings or business trips abroad, particularly to hostile countries.For instance, Dressen was demoted at least once prior to recruitment and disappointed in his career.Another ISS colleague, decorated officer Vladimir Kulikov, was forced to leave the agency against his will due to language requirements, and later turned.Both men were recruited while visiting Russia. 47ge-wise, there is of course variance in the sample, with a group of low-level Estonian-Russian criminals recruited forcibly at a young age, 48 and others recruited young and then progressing in their careers, becoming more valuable assets.One example of the latter was the Estonian army officer Deniss Metsavas.Born in 1980, Metsavas was recruited through a honey trap of sorts while visiting relatives in Russia in 2007, and then blackmailed into remaining a GRU asset until his arrest in 2018 in Estonia.During the interim, Metsavas rose through the ranks of the Estonian army, gaining greater access to classified information, while also acting as a public spokesperson of sorts for Russian-speakers within the service. 49n terms of why Europeans betrayed their countries, the secondary data at our disposal varies greatly in granularity.In general, to study motives, in-depth interviews with perpetrators, in combination with other so-called motive indicators are typically necessary to arrive at well-founded conclusions. 50Absent this opportunity, this article instead relies on secondary reporting, which in some cases was extensive and nuanced, and in others more limited.Either way, both self-reported motives and those ascribed by a prosecutor or judge, should be taken with a pinch of salt.Aggregating this data for the cases in which it was available, with results presented in Table 1 below, coercion was the most oft-cited reason, followed by monetary incentives.Coercion was at time elaborate, as when young Estonian army officer Deniss Metsavas was lured into a honey trap, followed by fabricated rape allegations.Years later, his father was also recruited as a courier, to persuade Metsavas to continue his espionage. 51In most cases, however, it was very unceremonious, offering dual citizens who made a living as smugglers a choice between prison-time in Russia, or espionage against Estonia. 52Coercion was however primarily used by Russian services, against individuals with either Russian citizenship or heritage. 53This suggests that the stronger emphasis on coercion says more about the Russian modus -particularly when recruiting compatriots -than it does about the European context per se.Specifically, the Russian services recruited individuals dependent on being able to cross the border frequently -mainly because they resided in the border region, but some also had businesses or relatives in Russia. 54This espionage was predominantly instigated by the FSB, who is responsible for border protection, and a majority of the assets were lowvalue spies.
Similarly, monetary rewards mattered to some recruits, but even the best-paid spies often had more complex and nuanced motives.For instance, an Austrian army colonel, active for over two decades, repeatedly travelled abroad to spend several days with his recruiter 55 ; and a Portuguese counter-intelligence official was well paid -but also had a soft spot for Eastern European cultureand women. 56Alongside Dressen, these were the only three cases where spies received more than €100 000 for their espionage, and none of them were a clear-cut example of greed alone.Hence, money clearly mattered, but seldom was the entire story.
These tentative findings are interesting, as they partly overlap, and partly contrast, to motives for espionage in the US.In 1990-2015, American spies were primarily motivated either by money (37 per cent) or divided loyalties (35 per cent), with coercion virtually non-existent. 57As discussed above however, coercion was mainly a tool used by Russian services against individuals dependent on being able to visit Russia, exclusively in the Baltic States and not elsewhere.
Other psychosocial characteristics of the European spies are consistent with findings from the US, but less so with the classical espionage literature.For instance, there is little evidence that recruiters exploited some of the types of personal shortcomings often seen as vulnerabilities for recruitment. 58pecifically, among European spies, there was no mention of psychosocial illness, drug abuse or gambling addiction and merely one instance of problematic drinking was reported. 59This could of course be a result of having insufficiently granular data.Another possibility is also that security clearance procedures have been successful in sorting out would-be employees with some of these at least partly overtly observable problems.
Furthermore, there was not a single mention of homosexuality being used to recruit spies. 60There was however at least one instance where a heterosexual relation was exploited as a recruitment tool, 61 and hints that this might have occurred in other cases too. 62n terms of the MICE (Money, Ideology, Coercion, and Ego) model for recruitment, coercion and money hence seem to be most relevant in contemporary Europe.However, as discussed above, money is often part of the recruitment motive, but seldom its entirety. 63In terms of ideology, it is difficult to discern cases of classically, ideologically motivated spies in the mould of Ana Montes (who spied for Cuba for 17 years) or Kim Philby (who spied for the Soviet Union for almost three decades), both without receiving any compensation.A possible hypothesis is that this is because the current Russian (or Chinese) political regimes scarcely can inspire same type of ideological commitment the Soviet Union did, or Cuba still may do.
Lastly, like in the US, three quarters (31 of 42) of the European spies were civilians, i.e., neither uniformed military nor intelligence officials.In terms of the RASCL, i.e., on the tradecraft used to recruit spies, the data for most cases is much less granular.One aspect however stands out, insofar that more patient and elaborate tradecraft was used for a specific sub-set of recruits, primarily 'moles' inside defence or intelligence agencies.Arguably the most highly valued sources, recruiters overall paid greater amounts, used more elaborate tradecraft to protect them, and invested more time and energy in recruitment and retention of moles. 64That said, civilians were the most frequent recruits.
Cautiously, the similarities between US and European spies say something about the nature of contemporary espionage that is if not universal, then at least pervasive in Western societies.That is, the male and typically middle-aged spy seems to be a constant in espionage on both sides of the Atlantic, although the median age has varied more over time in the US. 65Some of the possible explanations for why this is the case -opportunity, higher proclivity for high-risk criminality, the role as primary breadwinner, but also larger exposure to both recruitment attempts and CI scrutinyhave been outlined above, but cannot be fully disentangled here.
That the majority of spies were recruited from the outside of the defence and intelligence establishments -which mirrors recent patterns in the US, but not earlier cohorts -is more intuitive, as vital security interests are today more dispersed than during the Cold War. 66In the US, Herbig ascribes the trend of civilian spies partly to a growing number of contractors who have been hired and provided clearances.In Europe, part of the explanation is that a share of spies were used for minor tasks, such as mapping military infrastructure, troop movements or the like, assets of opportunity rather pre-meditated recruitment targets. 67

Differences between European and American spies
In spite of these similarities, there are also numerous differences between European and American espionage.Most notably, in the 1990-2015 period, China overtook Russia as the main instigator of espionage against the US. 68In Europe, Russia instead remained the by far greatest instigator, responsible for 37 out of 42 cases.In the 32 Russian cases where it was possible to pinpoint a specific security service, the GRU (14 individuals) and the FSB (15) were the most prolific, whereas SVR was responsible for only three recruitments. 69Still more than Iran (2), Belarus (2) and China (1), however.This discrepancy between the espionage threat in Europe and the US clearly needs to be further explored.This is especially so given that the FBI and MI5 have jointly warned that China poses the primary intelligence threat against both the US and Europe. 70A range of explanations is possible to hypothesize, but difficult to test.One key factor is however presumably modus, with Chinese recruiters often occupying a grey zone, straddling the line between the inappropriate and the illegal. 71For instance, there have been public allegations against heads of think tanks, 72 invitations to European parliamentarians to write 'political analysis' on the side, 73 the much-debated 'Thousand Talents' program, 74 and the even more polemic debate over Huawei. 75Furthermore, whereas only one case instigated by China is included in the dataset, recently they are increasing. 76To reiterate, this again highlights why convictions is an imperfect measure of the full range of the espionage threat, as much sensitive information may be extracted without necessarily crossing the threshold for what is prosecutable in court.
Hence, while Chinese espionage against Europe is ascendant -and receives increasing counterintelligence attention -Russia to date remains the main instigator behind cases that have led to court convictions in Europe.This includes a majority of the investigations underway.In fact, a single Russian service -the GRU -is reportedly suspected to have recruited at least 9 of the 13 suspected individuals in the 2010-2021 dataset.Beyond this, additional cases of suspected espionage in Europe on behalf of the GRU have come to light in 2022.This includes two Swedish-Iranian brothers -one of whom had worked both for the Swedish Security Service (Sw.SÄPO) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (Sw.MUST) -convicted, 77 a Swedish-Russian couple arrested, 78 two Slovaks arrested, 79 and a German soldier 80 and a German officer of the foreign intelligence service (Ger.BND) arrested. 81The large number of individuals convicted or suspected for espionage on behalf of Russia in 2022 is partly the result of Russia's war in Ukraine, with Russian services working in overdrive, and Western counterintelligence services responding in kind.But with so many of the recent cases reportedly involving espionage on behalf of the GRU, this inevitably raises questions as to whether the service itself may have been compromised.
The second difference vis-à-vis the US, is that espionage convictions in Europe are strongly clustered in the north-eastern part of the continent, with the nationality of convictedperpetrators summarized in Table 2, above.Particularly the Baltic countries had a disproportionate share of the espionage cases.While these countries represent less than 2 per cent of the population of Europe, more than 70 per cent percent of the convictions for espionage occurred there. 82Most eye opening, Estonia -with a population of merely 1.3 million -alone had more than 1/3 of all espionage convictions.This should not be interpreted as the Baltic countries being the main collection targets for Russia or China, however.That is arguably Brussels, at the heart of both EU and NATO decisionmaking, and surreptitiously identified as the 'espionage capital' of Europe. 83But in Belgium, only a single conviction for espionage was identified, and several large European countries (the UK, France, Spain, Italy) similarly had few or no convictions.This implies that the number of espionage convictions is not an appropriate metric for how prioritized a country is as a collection target, or of the espionage threat.Instead, it arguably indicates policy choices on how to best conduct counterintelligence (CI).And specifically, whether espionage cases should be publicly prosecuted, or more discreet methods pursued.Especially Estonia has long prosecuted suspected spies, with Latvia and Lithuania eventually adopting similar approaches. 84iven history and geography, Russia has ample recruitment opportunities amongst Russianspeakers in the Baltic countries, especially amongst those who still have relatives across the border, who are married to Russian citizens, have business interests in Russia, or amongst outspokenly pro-Russian politicians or activists.The region is also of strategic interest to the Kremlin, as one of the most likely site for a potential NATO-Russia conflict. 85Part of the Baltic response has been to adopt up-to-date espionage legislation and local intelligence services have accumulated expertise on detecting and prosecuting spies.Lastly, there is a policy of prosecuting and publicising cases of espionage, including granting access to espionage convicts by international media. 86This reflects a European policy-debate, underway in intelligence circles for at least a decade. 87Over time, more European countries have seemingly concluded that the Estonian approach is the appropriate one.
Last but not least, convictions on espionage charges is also contingent on having up-to-date legislation, which is realistically applicable.Analysing why there are so few convictions on espionage in Belgium, in spite of the concentration of intelligence officers in Brussels, outdated legislation has repeatedly been identified as one of the main culprits. 88Beyond this, one expert on Belgian intelligence notes, "Let's be honest [. ..]A hostile operating environment is Moscow with the FSB.It's not Brussels with the Belgian State Security Service". 89Another piece of anecdotal evidence is provided by Latvia.In 2018, the deputy head of the Latvian Security Police argued that the main reasons that so few spies had previously been caught 'is due to the shortcomings in the legislation' (amended in 2016).Between 2010 and 2016, authorities launched six criminal probes 'which fizzled out due to the archaic legislation'. 90Following legal amendments, at least three spies have been convicted.Other European countries, such as the Czech Republic, may face similar difficulties. 91onversely, a former Estonian prosecutor noted that the ability to bargain an agreement between the accused, the counsel and prosecutor has been key to the country's convictions of spies, with all Estonian espionage trials since 2007 ending in settlements. 92he differences between espionage against the US and Europe can largely be explained by geopolitical factors.That is, the dominance of Russian espionage cases is a consequence in part of Russia's geographical proximity, ease of recruitment, strong regional security interests and determination to exert influence, particularly in former Soviet Union republics, and amongst former members of the Warsaw Pact.This aligns well with Russia's overarching security-and defence policy. 93But this legacy effect is also visible in who is recruited, insofar that many recruits were either dual or naturalized citizens, married to Russian citizens, had relatives or business ventures in Russia, or had served in the Soviet or Eastern Bloc security establishment before the end of the Cold War.Hence, in seeking to recreate a new, Cold War-type world order, Russia has largely drawn on the legacies of its predecessor.Conversely, how European countries have responded to the threat corresponds closely with how they view Russia.The Baltic States and Poland -but more recently, also other northern European countrieshave become very proactive in their counterintelligence operations, seeking to highlight the threat, and demonstrate their capability and will to resist it. 94This likewise mirrors geopolitical outlooks, insofar that European countries that view Russia as its primary threat, have taken the strongest and most visible measures to counteract its espionage. 95Other European countries, further removed from the Russian threat both geographically and mentally, may have been more reluctant to overtly confront Moscow.The war in Ukraine might change this, but the countries that feel most directly threatened by Russia will likely remain the most proactive in arresting and prosecuting Russian spies.

Conclusion and avenues for future research
This article provides a basis for beginning to fill the lacuna of comparative, cross-national research on espionage in Europe, in what could prove to be a both fruitful and timely new research field.As a first attempt, the study seeks to demonstrate that pursuing this line of research is inherently complex and time-consuming, but ultimately doable and worthwhile.The article provides us with an approximate sense of the universe of espionage cases in Europe over the past decade, including similarities and differences vis-à-vis contemporary espionage in the US.Some of these similarities may seem intuitive or self-evident, but until we compile comparable datasets, there is simply no way of knowing this with certainty.
But the article also pinpoints a number of gaps in our knowledge.Hence, a first step in elaborating upon this article could involve expanding the sample, by i.a.adding recent cases, 96 prolonging the timeline backwards, or adding more countries into the analysis. 97A related avenue includes analysing the identified cases from various perspectives, including for instance whether a typology for different categories of espionage can be developed, or analysing changes in the frequency of espionage convictions over time.A number of different avenues of inquiry could also be pursued, including explaining the overrepresentation of male spies; analysing whether civilian spies differ systematically from the military/intelligence moles; and exploring the wide divergence on convergence on convictions on espionage charges (particularly in regional powers), including through comparative legal studies.
Last but not least, the pantheon of 'paradigmatic cases' of espionage is to date dominated by Anglo-Saxon cases.They could however be complemented with at least a few of the most highprofile, contemporary cases from continental Europe.While far from complete, this could include a Deniss Metsavas, 98 an Austrian army officer, 99 a Portuguese counterintelligence officer, 100 Alexei Dressen, 101 and two Swedish-Iranian brothers (one of whom worked for Swedish intelligence and security agencies). 102While international media have provided portraits of some of these spies, incisive case studies of the type previously devoted to US spies could improve our understanding of contemporary espionage decisively.
Finally, comparative research on espionage in Europe is in its infancy, but there is a multitude of promising avenues for future research.And in pursuing them, intelligence scholars could both expand the empirical basis for this line of research, and elaborate some methodological approaches that have thus far been notably absent from the field. 103As the Russo-Ukrainian war has set in motion what could well become a European 'decade of the spy', they could simultaneously also help us better understand the nature of the threat.

Table A1 .
(Continued).Committed espionage and was prosecuted in 2010-2021 Category B: Began committing espionage prior to 2010, convicted in 2010-2021 Category C: Arrested/charged and awaiting trial as per December 1 2021.Category D: Publicly suspected of espionage, unclear whether trial will be held.* Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission Intelligence Bureau.