A Choice between Su 速 and Jiu 久

This article questions a prevailing view that the Sunzi advocates the su strategy (seeking quick victory) and opposes the jiu strategy (gradually exhausting the enemy through protracted warfare) or, at the very least, advocates the su strategy and opposes the jiu strategy in the study of how best to make war on an enemy. By means of a study of the contents of the Sunzi and the war practice of the Sanguo (Three Kingdoms) period, the argument here is that the prevailing view is unconvincing. The Sunzi is in favor of neither the su nor the jiu strategy, but in fact values bian (“flexibility and adaptability”). A commander should flexibly select his strategies between su and jiu according to the varying situations. This principle was widely applied by top Sanguo commanders during their training for war.


INTRODUCTION
The Sunzi 孫子, also known as the Sunzi bingfa 孫子兵法, is widely regarded as the most important ancient Chinese military treatise.Its second chapter, "Zuozhan" 作戰 (Operational Principles) has a well-known saying: "What should be valued in warfare is sheng, but not protracted involvement" (bing gui sheng, bu gui jiu 兵貴 勝，不貴久). 1 Most researchers think that the character sheng 勝 should be translated as "quick victory." 2 Based on such an interpretation, many scholars assert that the Sunzi advocates quick victory and opposes protracted warfare, 3 or at least advocates victory and opposes protracted operations in offensives. 4lthough some other researchers simply translate sheng as "victory," rather than "quick victory,"5 they seem to have no objection to the notion that the Sunzi opposes protracted warfare. 6Therefore, many scholars evaluate the military thoughts of the Sunzi and compare them with others based on such an understanding.For instance, Victory Mair opines that it "stands in sharp contrast to Mao Zedong's advocacy of protracted war."7Guo Huaruo criticized the Sunzi by saying that it ignores the importance of protracted warfare, which is the only feasible strategy for weaker defenders pitted against stronger invaders. 8 To compare the military thoughts of the Sunzi and others or to evaluate the correctness of the views expressed in the Sunzi is not in the scope of this article.A prerequisite of studying the above topics is to correctly understand the contents of the Sunzi.To the best of my knowledge, no work thus far has deeply investigated the question of whether the Sunzi truly advocates quick victory and opposes protracted warfare as an offensive strategy.The answer is not only essential to understand the chapter of "Zuozhan," but also very important in understanding the whole idea of the Sunzi.In this article, I define a strategy aiming to seek quick victory through decisive battles as the su 速 strategy.At the same time, however, I also define a strategy that aims to use protracted warfare to gradually exhaust the enemy, as the jiu 久 strategy. 9My intention is to offer a deep investigation of the attitude in the Sunzi about these two opposing strategies.I will also study the practical applications of the two strategies in the Sanguo period (approximately 200-280). 10We should keep in mind that various interpretations of Sunzi have differed over the passage of time and even differed in the views of people of the same period.I chose the Sanguo period as my research object because it is a famous period of war in the overall history of China.I have noticed that many military experts of Sanguo made their plans and decisions based on the principles proposed by the Sunzi.Unlike contemporary researchers, they had rich war experiences and direct command of great battles. 11Some military leaders were born of aristocratic families, and thus were well educated. 12Moreover, because they lived in an era much closer to the time when the Classics were written, they might have had a better understanding of the texts, compared to contemporary scholars.Although this does not mean their opinions must be correct, I believe that on the one hand, studying the Sunzi can help us to understand the military history and war practice of ancient China and, on the other hand, enable us to grasp more accurately how ancient Chinese military experts understood the military thoughts of the Sunzi and applied them in practice.Such an approach can help us to understand this highly abstract work, which does not offer examples to explain its theories.

THE CHOICE BETWEEN SU 速 AND JIU 久
As I have mentioned, many researchers believe that Sunzi advocates the su strategy and opposes the jiu strategy.Their opinion seems to be supported by the contents of the Sunzi.If we go through the chapter of "Zuozhan," we easily find that it repeatedly emphasizes the disadvantages of being involved in protracted warfare.For example, it says: [If a state has been involved in] protracted [warfare], then its weapons will wear out and the morale of its soldiers will decline.[In such circumstances, if it] attacks the [enemy's] walled cities, [its] strength will be too weak [to do so].[If its] army stations in the field too long, [its] wealth and resources will be insufficient [to support it]. 13 The text also says: "No state has ever benefited from protracted warfare." 14In addition, its eleventh chapter, "Jiudi" 九地 (Nine Battlefields) says: "The principle of using military forces stresses speed" (bing zhi qing zhu su 兵之情主速). 15However, it should be noticed that the chapter of "Zuozhan" does not discuss general warfare principles, but focuses on the offensive strategy of advancing deep into the enemy's territory.For example, the operations accordingly require 尉) of Han dynasty, Sima Xuanwang 司馬宣王 (179-251 C.E.), the Grand Tutor (taifu 太傅), and Wuyang hou 舞陽侯 of Wei 魏 (179-251).See HHS 71.2299 and Jinshu (hereafter JS), 1.1.In this article, all English translations of Chinese dynasty government titles are from de Crespigny 2007, unless otherwise stated.However, because of the huge culture differences, it is very difficult to accurately translate all the titles into English.I will present my understandings on the translations in the footnotes for reference.In addition, Rafe de Crespigny does not translate all the titles.In Eastern Han, the three highest standing positions of the government were called the Three Excellencies (san gong 三公): the Grand Commandant, the Excellency over the Masses (situ 司徒), and the Excellency of Works (sikong 司空).The Grand Commandant was ranked first among them and was in charge of accessing the military achievements of officers.The Grand Tutor, whose duty was to guide tianzi 天子, the master of tianxia 天下 (the ancient Chinese civilization circle), was not a standing position.Usually it was only established when a new tianzi succeeded while still underage.Tianzi means the son of Tian, which is usually translated as heaven but this is not correct.Tian is the highest form of existence in ancient Chinese culture, like God and Allah in other cultures, rather than being a place.The ranking of The Grand Tutor was even higher than that of the Three Excellencies.Under normal circumstances, however, the ranking was merely an honorary position without actual power.
13 久則鈍兵挫銳，攻城則力屈，久暴師則國用不足.Sunzi 1.18-19."to transport grains to [troops] 1,000 li16 [away from their homeland]" (qianli kuiliang 千里饋糧), 17 which clearly shows that the text considers operations going on in the heartland of the enemy state.It also says: "[If] the army stations in the field too long, the wealth and resources of the state will be insufficient [to support it]" ( jiu pushi ze guoyong buzu 久暴師則國用不足). 18If the army is in its own territory, it does not have to station in the field.Obviously, it indicates that the army is in the enemy's land.And it suggests "dividing troops to plunder the countryside" (lüe xiang fen zhong 掠鄉分眾). 19It does not make sense that an army plunders its own countryside.Again, here the countryside undoubtedly refers to the enemy's countryside.And bing zhi qing zhu su 兵之情主速 is not only a principle of general warfare, but has a specific focus too.The complete passage in the chapter of "Jiudi" is: The principle of using military forces stresses speed.Take advantage of an enemy when it is unready.Use unexpected routes to attack where the enemy is not guarded. 20re the Sunzi obviously advises that speed is the key factor for raids only.Hence, it is unconvincing to conclude that the Sunzi prefers the su strategy in general.
A careful reading of the Sunzi shows that its words do not always advocate the su strategy and oppose the jiu.For instance, according to the Sunzi, "The former masterly commanders made themselves invincible first and then waited for the enemy to be defeatable." 21The above adage shows that the Sunzi believes that one should not rush to attack, but should be well prepared first and wait patiently for an opponent to make a mistake.The Sunzi also says: Water forms its courses in accordance with the terrain.Forces [are used] to achieve victories in accordance with the enemy's [situations].Since there are no fixed situations in warfare [just as] there are no fixed courses of the water, one who can adapt in accordance with the enemy's [situations] demonstrates [military] talent. 22e above words clearly show that the Sunzi does not believe in a fixed way to achieve victories.On the contrary, one should vary strategies and tactics to adapt to different situations.For example, the Sunzi says: Therefore [according to the situation, sometimes an army should advance] as swift as the wind, [sometimes should advance] slowly [while maintaining a formation] as tight as a forest. 23ence, it is questionable to say the Sunzi believed that the su strategy is always better than the jiu strategy.
Some scholars have noticed that the chapter of "Zuozhan" focuses on offensives.Hence, they think that the Sunzi advocates the su strategy because it looks at the problem from the perspective of the offensive side.They argue that attackers (usually the stronger side) should use the su strategy, while the defenders (usually the weaker side) should adopt the jiu strategy.These scholars often use the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) as an example to support their argument. 24They indicate that although, in general, the Sunzi does not advocate the su strategy, it does assert that the attacking side should apply the su strategy.To a certain extent, their opinion is reasonable.In the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, for example, China's military strength was much weaker than Japan's.China therefore preferred a prolonged war to gradually exhaust the enemy's strength and wait for a change in the international scene, as happened with the outbreak of the war in the Pacific.On the contrary, Japan wanted a quick victory over China.The wishes of Japan, however, did not represent the teaching of the Sunzi.Simply put, the Sunzi does not indicate that the su strategy is always a better option for offensives, while the jiu is a better defensive strategy.Secondly, a single example cannot prove that the su strategy is always advantageous to the attacking side.
Let us look at the following examples during the Sanguo period.In the fifth year of Jian'an 建安 in the Han dynasty (200 C.E.), the Grand General (da jiangjun 大將 軍), Governor of Jizhou (Jizhou mu 冀州牧), and Ye hou 鄴侯 Yuan Shao 袁紹 (?-202 C.E.), 25 the most powerful warlord at that time, planned to eliminate his major 24 See Guo -Zhang 1994, pp.55-56 and Wang Tingwen 2015, pp.24-26.Several other scholars also agree, or hold similar opinions.For instance, Liu Ju claims that the quick victory theory and the protracted warfare theory are two sides of the same coin (Liu Ju 1999, p. 30).Li Ling asserts that quick warfare is suitable to the stronger side, while protracted warfare is suitable to the weaker side (Li Ling 2006, p. 105). 25De Crespigny translates da jiangjun as "General-in-Chief."This translation may be questionable.Jiangjun 將軍 was a high-ranking military commander position.A title like da 大 was added before it to differentiate one jiangjun from another.Da jiangjun ranked first among all jiangjun, but theoretically, the other jiangjun are not subordinates of da jiangjun.The jiangjun did not take orders from each other.They led their armies independently.Hence, it is questionable to translate da jiangjun as "General-in-Chief."A better translation may be "Grand General."The territory of Eastern Han consisted of thirteen zhou 州: Sili 司隸, Yanzhou 兗州, Qingzhou 青州, Yuzhou 豫 州, Xuzhou 徐州, Jizhou 冀州, Youzhou 幽州, Bingzhou 並州, Yangzhou 揚州, Jingzhou 荊州, Yizhou 益州, Liangzhou 涼州, and Jiaozhou 交州.De Crespigny's translations of the Han administrative regions may be problematic.For example, he translates zhou, wangguo 王国, and jun 郡 as "province," "kingdom," and "commandery" respectively.In Eastern Han, zhou was the highest level of administrative division.Jun and wangguo were the second.Readers may feel confused about how a kingdom can be part of a province, and how the kingdom can be equivalent to a commandery which, in Europe, is a district under the control of a commander of an order of knights.Hence, I prefer to use transliteration for these terms.This method is widely used in Japanese studies.For example, 大名 is transliterated into daimyo, and 戦国 is transliterated into Sengoku.The chief executive and military officer in charge of a zhou was called the governor (mu 牧).In Eastern Han, the ranks of noble titles from high to low were huangdi 皇帝 (an exclusive title of tianzi), gong 公 (a title in principle only conferred to the successors of the Shang and Zhou dynasties), wang 王, liehou 列侯, and guanneihou 關內侯.Liehou again included three sub-ranks: xianhou 縣侯, xianghou 鄉侯, and tinghou 亭侯.Their forms of address are the name of the place, added to hou, xianghou, and tinghou respectively.For instance, Ye hou was ranked as competitor, the Excellency of Works,26 acting General of Chariots and Cavalry (cheqi jiangjun 車騎將軍), Governor of Yanzhou (Yanzhou mu 兗州牧), and Wuping hou 武平侯 Cao Cao 曹操 (155-220).Yuan Shao's subordinates held two opposite opinions.Several urged Yuan Shao to immediately launch a general offensive against Cao Cao.Others argued that gradually wearing down Cao Cao's strength through protracted warfare was a better strategy.Yuan Shao adopted the first option, but met utter defeat at the hands of Cao Cao at the battle of Guandu 官渡.In the first year of Jingchu 景初 in the Wei dynasty (237 C.E.), Gongsun Yuan 公孫淵, the Grand Marshal (da sima 大司馬), Administrator of Liaodong (Liaodong taishou 遼東太守), and Lelang gong 樂浪公, betrayed the state of Wei. 27Hence, the Grand Commandant and Wuyang hou Sima Xuanwang 司馬宣王 (179-251) was ordered to put down this rebellion.In the next year, Sima Xuanwang besieged Xiangping 襄平, the capital of Liaodong.The city happened to be hit just at that time with heavy rain for over thirty days.Sima Xuanwang did not hurry to strike.Instead, he rejected his commanders' request to attack the Liaodong soldiers pasturing and cutting firewood outside the walled city.He waited until the rain stopped and then stormed Xiangping.Sima Xuanwang took the city, beheaded Gongsun Yuan, and squashed the rebellion.In both of the above cases, it seems that even in offensive action, the jiu strategy may at certain times be better than the su strategy.In the following section, I will discuss how top Sanguo military experts apply the su and jiu strategies in war practices and offer examples to illustrate my points.

CASE STUDIES
In the fifth year of Zhongping 中平 in the Han dynasty (188 C.E.), Wang Guo 王國 of Liangzhou rebelled, and besieged Chencang 陳倉, a strategic city of Liangzhou.The Han government sent General on the Left (zuo jiangjun 左將軍) Huangfu Song 皇甫嵩, commanding the General of the Van (qian jiangjun 前將軍) Dong Zhuo 董 卓 (?-192 C.E.),28 each leading an army of 20,000 soldiers, to suppress the rebellion.Dong Zhuo suggested advancing immediately to rescue Chencang.He said: xianhou, whose fief was at Ye. De Crespigny translates huangdi, gong, wang, and guanneihou as Emperor, Duke, King, and secondary marquis, respectively (he does not translate liehou and its three sub-ranks).However, simply matching the ancient Chinese noble titles with titles of European nobility may cause confusion.For example, in Europe, although the Emperor is generally recognized to be of a higher honor and rank than the King, a king is not usually the subject of an emperor.Readers may conceivably be confused by the ranking of a duke vis-a-vis that of a king.In the system of Han dynasty nobility, however, the wang were the subjects of the huangdi.The status of nobility for wang was granted and could be deprived by the huangdi.
A wise person will not lose time.A decisive person will not hesitate.[If we] rescue [Chencang] right now, the city will be preserved.If not, the city will be destroyed.
[The city's destiny], to be preserved or destroyed, depends on [our decision] now. 29wever, Huangfu Song held a different view.He argued: No. To fight and win a hundred open battles is not the most brilliant [method] among all brilliant [methods]; to exhaust the enemy army without doing open battles is the most brilliant [method] among all brilliant [methods]. 30Therefore, [one should] make oneself invincible first and then wait for the enemy to be vulnerable.Our invincibility depends on ourselves [while] the enemy's vulnerability depends on himself. 31[If] the enemies' preparation for defense is insufficient [and] our preparation for attack is more than enough, [then we], the ones whose [preparation] is more than enough [will take initiative like] flying in the highest reaches of the sky [while the enemy], whose [preparation] is insufficient [will be in a passive position like one] stuck in the lowest depths of the earth.Now, although Chencang is small, its defense is strong and complete.[Therefore], it is not [in a passive position like being] stuck in the lowest depths of the earth.Although Wang Guo is powerful, [he] attacked where we do not have to rescue. 32[Therefore, he does] not [take initiative] like flying in the highest reaches of the sky.[The attackers do] not [take initiative] like flying in the highest reaches of the sky, so that they will suffer.[The defenders] are not [in a passive position like being] stuck in the lowest depths of the earth so that their city will not be taken.Now, [Wang] Guo has already been stuck in a disadvantageous place while [the defenders of] Chencang are protecting an unbreakable city. 29智者不後時，勇者不留決。速救則城全，不救則城滅，全滅之埶，在於此也.HHS 71.2305. 30This sentence is from "Mougong" 謀攻 (Planning Offensives), the third chapter of the Sunzi.See Sunzi 1.28.Most researchers translate the character qu 屈 as "subdue," "subjugate," or "submit."See the annotations of Cao Cao, of the Tang dynasty scholars Du You 杜佑 (735-812), Chen Hao 陳皞, Jia Lin 賈林, and of Song dynasty scholar Zhang Yu (Sunzi 1. 28); Guo Huaruo 1984, p. 41; Sawyer 1996, p. 53; Ames 1993, p. 79; Mair 2007, p. 85.Several other scholars think that it means "break one's resistance."See Giles 2012, p. 12 and Lin Wusun 2007, p. 29.According to the context, however, I think that Huangfu Song interpreted qu as "exhaust."As we will see later, Huangfu Song did not expect Wang Guo to be subdued without fighting.His plan was to attack after Wang Guo's troops were exhausted.Almost all contemporary researchers translate zhan 戰 as "fighting."See Giles 2012, p. 12; Guo Huaruo 1984, p. 41; Sawyer 1996, p. 53; Ames  1993, p. 79; Mair 2007, p. 85; Lin Wusun 2007, p. 29.In my view, Huangfu Song interpreted zhan as "waging open battle."Chencang had already been under siege, a demonstration of a different form of fight.Huangfu Song simply wanted to avoid a fight with Wang Guo in the field when his army was strong. 31The above two sentences are from "Xing" 形 (Situations Caused by Strength), also known as "Junxing" 軍形 (Military Situations Caused by Strength), the fourth chapter of the Sunzi, but the wording of the second sentence is slightly different.The original text of the Sunzi is 不可勝在己， 可勝在敵.See Sunzi 1.43. 32See "Xushi" 虛實 (Weaknesses and Strengths).The sixth chapter of the Sunzi says: "Hence if we want to fight open battles, although the enemy has built high ramparts and deep entrenchments [for protection], its soldiers must [come out] to fight open battles with us [because we] attack where they must rescue" (故我欲戰，敵雖高壘深溝，不得不與我戰者，攻其所必救也).See Sunzi 2.72.Obviously, Huangfu Song thought that the walled city of Chencang was too strong to be overcome by Wang Guo.Since Chencang was a place which did not require the efforts of Han reinforcements to be rescued, it was unnecessary for the Han reinforcements to fight with Wang Guo in a hurry.
[Therefore], we can obtain the result of winning a complete victory without bothering to use [our] troops.[Hence], why rescue [Chencang]! 33Huangfu Song then halted the Han armies and waited.Wang Guo besieged Chencang for over eighty days, but still could not conquer it.The rebels were exhausted and had to retreat.Huangfu Song seized the opportunity to attack the rebels.He defeated them.
The key difference between Huangfu Song and Dong Zhuo is not about su and jiu, which one is better than the other in general, but about which one was more suitable to the situations at that time.The division of opinion between them was caused by their different evaluations of whether Wang Guo could take Chencang in a short period.If the answer was "yes," then Dong Zhuo's opinion probably was right.The Han armies should come for the rescue of Chencang immediately.Otherwise, Huangfu Song's decision was wiser.Although the written account does not give us more details of the battle, we can deduce that Wang Guo's army probably was superior in numbers.Hence, Huangfu Song said, "Wang Guo is powerful" and avoided an open battle with him in the beginning.After nearly three months of siege, Wang Guo's troops were exhausted, and their morale had sharply declined.Hence, Huangfu Song even dared to lead his army alone in pursuing the rebels while leaving Dong Zhuo's army behind. 34Huangfu Song won the battle because he adopted the jiu strategy to patiently wait until the state of an enemy had changed from invincibility to vulnerability, which is in accord with the idea of the Sunzi -"the enemy's vincibility depends on himself" (ke sheng zai di 可勝在敵).From the above example, it is obvious that in Huangfu Song's opinion, the jiu strategy can be a better option than the su strategy in some cases.
The second example is the battle of Guandu, which I briefly discussed earlier.Before the battle, Yuan Shao's subordinates argued heatedly about the best strategy to attack Cao Cao.Jianjun 監軍 35 and fenwu jiangjun 奮武將軍 Ju Shou 沮授 recommended the adoption of the jiu strategy by saying: [We should] divide [our] elite cavalry into groups and send them to raid his [Cao Cao's] border areas.[This] will give him no peace, [but] we will be comfortable.Thus [we] can put [him down without effort], as if we were merely sitting. 36wever, Guo Tu 郭圖 and zhizhong 治中 37 Shen Pei 審配 objected him and preferred the su strategy: [According to] the principle [found in] military books, if [enemy troops numerically outnumber you up to five or ten times], then surround or attack them; if Guo Tu and Shen Pei contradicted him again: 38 This sentence is summarized from the chapter of "Mougong" of the Sunzi.The original wording is: 故用兵之法，十則圍之，五則攻之 … 敵則能戰之.See Sunzi 1.34.Guo Tu and Shen Pei read shi 十, wu 五, and di 敵 into quantitative comparisons.Most contemporary researchers hold the same view.For instance, see Giles 2012, p. 15; Guo Huaruo 1984, p. 42; Mair 2007, p. 86;  Li Ling 2006, p. 137; Lin Wusun 2007, p. 29.However, ancient commentators like Cao Cao, Li Quan 李荃 of the Tang dynasty, Du You, and He 何 (given name unknown) of the Song interpreted them into comparisons of overall strength, which includes not only the quantities but also the quality of troops and weapons as well as the capabilities of commanders.See Sunzi 1.34.Some contemporary researchers seem to have a similar opinion.See Sawyer 1996, p. 51 and Ames 1993, p. 79.I agree with the second opinion.In its first chapter, "Ji" 計 (Assessments) also known as "Shiji" 始計 (Initial Assessments), the Sunzi says that one can predict the result of a war by considering seven factors, which include "the commanders of the side that is able to answer the questions, 'which side is more capable?' (將孰有能？), 'which side has better weapons?' (兵眾孰強？) and 'the troops of which side are more finely trained?' (士卒孰練？).See Sunzi 1.8.Obviously, the Sunzi does value the importance of qualitative factors.
39 "Minggong" 明公 is a respectful form of second person address for a man in high office and was normally used when speaking with one's superior. 40Heshuo 河朔 refers to the areas north of the Huanghe river, which were under the control of Yuan Shao at that time.
[Zhou] Wuwang attacked [Shang] Zhou, which is not regarded as [an act of] injustice,45 let alone saying that [a dispatch of] troops to attack Cao Cao has no just cause!Moreover, Gong, your troops are crack and brave, and they want to spare no effort [for Gong].If [we] do not seize the chance to complete [our] great cause before it is too late,46 it will be an example of the adage "[the one] not taking what Tian has offered will instead be punished [by Tian]."This is why Yue established [its] hegemony and why Wu fell. 47The plan of Jianjun 48 puts [too much] emphasis on prudence and safety but is not a flexible adaptation according to the current opportunities. 49nally, Yuan Shao agreed with Guo Tu and Shen Pei.After Yuan Shao crossed Huanghe 黃河 and was going to march to Guandu, a key strategic place held by Cao Cao, 50 Ju Shou advised him again: The North soldiers are superior in numbers, but are not as courageous and crack as the South soldiers. 51The South has insufficient grain and less territory than the North.Fighting immediately is advantageous to the South.Postponing the fight is advantageous to the North.[We] should steadily confront [the South army] in a long term and protract the time. 52ce again, Yuan Shao did not listen to him.Rather, he decided to attack Cao Cao immediately.He then suffered a disastrous defeat.
The key problem again is which strategy was better under the circumstances of that time.The wisdom of attacking Cao Cao is a matter of opinion.Did Yuan Shao have overwhelming military strength over Cao Cao?This is the key question to be answered.If the answer is yes, then the su strategy proposed by Guo Tu and Shen Pei was probably better, and the jiu strategy insisted by Ju Shou might have been be too cautious and inefficient.Otherwise, the jiu strategy was a better choice, and the su strategy was too optimistic and risky.A mistake made by Guo Tu and Shen Pei is that they overestimated the strength of Yuan Shao and underestimated the strength of Cao Cao.In the battle of Guandu, Yuan Shao mobilized 100,000 troops and 10,000 war horses. 53The number of Cao Cao's troops is not clear, but should be less than Yuan Shao's. 54However, as pointed out by Ju Shou, Cao Cao's troops had stronger fighting capability.A proof is that the two opposing armies were pitted against each other from the eighth to the tenth month at Guandu.Yuan Shao did not have the ability to crush Cao Cao during such a long period.Another proof is the raid on Wuchao 烏巢.Cao Cao led 5,000 troops to raid on Wuchao, the supply center of Yuan Shao held by over 10,000 soldiers.Although Cao Cao's move was unexpected by the defenders, they still had the time to array and meet the attackers.But Cao Cao defeated the enemies over twice the number of his troops and burned the reserves of Yuan Shao. 55The qualitative advantage of Cao Cao's army at least partially counterbalanced the quantitative advantage of Yuan Shao's.Hence, in terms of military strength, Yuan Shao did have the advantage over Cao Cao, but his advantage was not as large as Guo Tu and Shen Pei believed.
In its sixth chapter, "Xushi" 虛實, the Sunzi says: "The disposition of forces avoids the strong points and strike[s] the weak points [of the enemy]" (bing zhi xing, bi shi er ji xu 兵之形，避實而擊虛). 56As pointed out by Ju Shou, Cao Cao was most vulnerable in his logistics.Although Cao Cao chose to give up the Huanghe line and retreat to Guandu to shorten his supply line, he still suffered a shortage of supplies.During the battle, Cao Cao once wanted to retreat to Xudu.The reason was not that he could not withstand the attack of Yuan Shao, but the shortage of grain. 57Thus, the victory of Cao Cao was fortuitous to a certain extent.When Cao Cao was about to run out of grain, the internal conflict of Yuan Shao's camp changed the result of the battle.One of Yuan Shao's advisors, Xu You 許攸, turned to Cao Cao and told him that Yuan Shao left his reserves at Wuchao. 58After Cao Cao successfully raided Wuchao, Commander of the Royal Bodyguards, who stabilizes the country (ningguo zhonglang jiang 甯國中郎將), 59 Zhang He 張郃 and Gao Lan 高覽, two 53 See SGZ 6.199 and HHS 74.2390. 54According to Sanguo zhi, Cao Cao's army had less than 10,000 soldiers.Pei Songzhi 裴松之 (372-451) questioned the reliability of this number, however, and argued that Cao Cao's troops had to be much more than the estimated figure.He offered three convincible reasons.First of all, the opposing armies were at a stalemate for several months.Secondly, Cao was able to draw troops to attack Yuan's supply lines while holding the line.Thirdly, Cao's army would not be able to capture around 70,000 to 80,000 fleeing Yuan soldiers if its number was only one-tenth of the enemy's.See Pei's annotations on Sanguo zhi (SGZ 1.20).I think a possible explanation is that the number in Sanguo zhi only covers the troops directly under the command of Cao Cao and does not include the troops of other Cao's high-ranking commanders.
59 De Crespigny translates zhonglang jiang 中郎將 as "General of the Household."The position of zhonglang jiang, however, was below that of jiangjun.Hence, a translation of both jiangjun important commanders of Yuan Shao's army, surrendered to Cao Cao.The two events together cause the ultimate collapse of Yuan Shao's army. 60However, Yuan Shao's failure cannot be merely ascribed to bad luck.He did make a mistake by giving up a safer option proposed by Ju Shou and adopting a riskier one, which added variables to the battle.Ju Shou was right because he had a more objective and accurate judgment on the advantages and disadvantages of both sides.
From the above example, it seemed to Ju Shou that the jiu strategy was a better choice, even as an offensive move.As I have discussed earlier, the chapter of "Zuozhan" discusses offensive strategies when an army is far from its base.Hence, should we conclude that the su strategy is better than the jiu strategy under that circumstance?Before we reach a conclusion, let us look at two more examples.In the first year of Taihe 太和 in the Wei dynasty (227 C.E.), Wei jianwu jiangjun 建武將軍, Administrator of Xincheng (Xincheng taishou 新城太守), and Pingyang tinghou 平 陽亭侯 Meng Da 孟達, intended to betray Wei and join Shu-Han 蜀漢.Sima Xuanwang, the General of Agile Cavalry (piaoqi jiangjun 驃騎將軍) 61 and Wuyang hou 舞 陽侯 of Wei, led troops to suppress this potential rebellion.He reached Shangyong 上 庸, the main stronghold of Meng Da, after a rapid march of 1,200 li 里 62 from Wan 宛 63 in eight days.Then he immediately stormed Shangyong day and night, breached it after 16 days, and beheaded Meng Da. 64 It is obvious that Sima Xuanwang adopted the su strategy in this case and illustrates the principle of fighting far away from one's base proposed by the Sunzi.However, as I have discussed before, in the war against Gongsun Yuan, Sima Xuanwang adopted the jiu strategy.This is interesting because Liaodong is about 4,000 li from Luoyang, the capital of Wei. 65This time, Sima Xuanwang had to march a much longer distance.According to the Sunzi, it seems that the su strategy should have been used again, but this time Sima Xuanwang chose the jiu strategy.A Major (sima 司馬), 66 Chen Gui 陳珪 asked him: Now, [we] come from far away, but [act] more slowly.I, the fool, am confused in private. 68ma Xuanwang explained to him: Rather, my fear is the traitors will escape.The traitors will now run out of food, yet we have not yet completed our siege defenses.[At this time], to take their cattle, horses, and firewood will cause them to run away.Warfare is the art of using unexpected ways, [which] vary with situations. 70The traitors depend on their superior numbers and the rain as well.Hence, although they are hungry and fatigued, [they] still do not surrender.
[We] should show [our] incompetence to make them feel safe. 71It is not a good idea to scare them for small benefits. 72e wars against Meng Da and Gongsun Yuan are both long-distance offensives.Sima Xuanwang adopted two different strategies.In the battle against Meng Da, he chose the su strategy.However, in the war against Gongsun Yuan, although the battlefield was much further away, Sima Xuanwang instead selected the jiu strategy.From the above analysis of Sima Xuanwang, I think he had noted the essence of the chapter of "Zuozhan."The core idea of "Zuozhan" is not that one should not engage in a protracted war, or the attacker should not engage in a protracted war.It is that one should not engage in a protracted war if one's logistics system cannot support it.Alastair Iain Johnston says that the Sunzi's "advice against protracted campaigns is relative, conditioned by logistical problems," and "should these logistical problems be solved, then the admonitions against extended operations would cease to hold."73I agree with Johnston.Usually, one's army fighting deeply into enemy territory will cause serious logistical problems, which can devastate the economy.However, if one's economic power and logistics system are strong enough to support a protracted war, then the jiu strategy can be a feasible option.
Before the war against Gongsun Yuan, many Wei officials worried about their logistical problems.They suggested reducing the number of troops sent to Liaodong, and when the war became a stalemate because of heavy rain, some even suggested withdrawing the army.However, Wei Mingdi 魏明帝 (r.226-239) rejected their proposals.With the full support of Wei Mingdi, Sima Xuanwang did not need to worry about the logistical issues of his army.On the contrary, Gongsun Yuan lacked sufficient grain reserves.Although his army was probably superior in numbers, its fighting capacity was weaker than that of the Wei army.Before Xiangping was besieged, the Liaodong army fought several open battles with the Wei army, but lost all of them.Hence Sima Xuanwang explained that he did not worry about the attack from Gongsun Yuan.The numerical superiority of the Liaodong army became a burden rather than an advantage, because more troops consumed more food.Before the fall of Xiangping, the people of Liaodong were reduced to cannibalism. 74Sima Xuanwang was therefore in no hurry to attack.Wei had an overwhelming advantage over Liaodong in terms of population, resources, and economic power, which made the jiu strategy a feasible option.
Another reason for the Sunzi to worry about a protracted war is that a third party may "take advantage of one's extremity to take action [against one]" (cheng qi bi er qi 乘其弊而起). 75During Sima Xuanwang's campaign against Meng Da, Wu 吳 and Shu-Han sent troops to rescue Meng Da.Conditions both on Wei's Western front (against Shu-Han), and the Eastern front as well (against Wu), were tense.Meng Da planned to rebel in the twelfth month of the first year of Taihe in the Wei dynasty (227 C.E.).In the next year, the Imperial Chancellor (chengxiang 丞相) of Shu-Han, 76 Zhuge Wuhou 諸葛武侯 (181-234) opened his first northern offensive against Wei.In the same year, Wei and Wu had a great battle at Shiting 石亭.Obviously, a protracted war against Meng Da would put Wei in an unfavorable position, because Wu and Shu-Han might take advantage of the opportunity to make trouble for him.During the war against Gongsun Yuan, however, the situations were different.After the death of Zhuge Wuhou in the second year of Qinglong 青龍 in the Wei dynasty (234 C.E.), Shu-Han changed its strategy towards Wei from offensive to defensive.During the war, although Gongsun Yuan asked Wu for help, Wu was not able to provide substantive assistance.Therefore, Wei had no need to worry about the potential threat from a third party.He could concentrate on suppressing the rebellion of Liaodong.
In the above two examples, Sima Xuanwang flexibly applied the su and jiu strategies respectively in two different battles by adjusting his tactics according to the specific military conditions of the two sides.And I observe that even in the same battle, these top Sanguo military experts actually changed their strategies from time to time to adapt to evolving circumstances.Let us look at the following examples.In the first year of Zhongping 中平 (184 C.E.) in the Eastern Han dynasty, the Huangjin 黃巾 (Yellow Turban) rebellion broke out.The Commander of the Royal Bodyguards of the Left (Zuo zhonglangjiang 左中郎將) Huangfu Song and the Commander of the Royal Bodyguards of the Right (you zhonglangjiang 右 中郎將) Zhu Jun 朱儁 were ordered to suppress the Yingchuan 潁川 rebels.At the beginning, the situation was against Han.The powerful Huangjin army defeated Zhu Jun.Huangfu Song retreated into the city of Changshe 長社 and, relying on the city walls, prepared to adopt the jiu strategy to resist the superior enemy.He soon found, however, that the Huangjin army had made a fatal mistake by encamping beside the grass.Hence, he immediately launched a fire attack on that evening and successfully defeated the rebels. 77efore the battle of Guandu, in the first month of the fifth year of Jian'an (200 C.E.), Cao Cao attacked Liu Bei 劉備, the General on the Left (zuo jiangjun 左將軍), Governor of Yuzhou (Yuzhou mu 豫州牧), and Yichang tinghou 宜城亭侯.Biejia 別 駕 78 Tian Feng 田豐 suggested Yuan Shao taking this opportunity to immediately attack Cao Cao's rear to crush him at one stroke.However, Yuan Shao refused to listen to him.After Cao Cao defeated Liu Bei, Yuan Shao then decided to attack.However, this time Tian Feng strongly opposed the plan because he thought that Yuan Shao had already missed the opportunity to win a quick victory.Like Ju Shou, he advised Yuan Shao to use the jiu strategy in order to gradually exhaust Cao Cao by constant harassment. 79n the Liaodong campaign, Sima Xuanwang did not always apply the jiu strategy.In the beginning, he used the su strategy, while Gongsun Yuan was the one who adopted the jiu.Gongsun Yuan sent some tens of thousands Liaodong troops to station at Liaosui 遼隧 (near present-day Haicheng 海城 of the Liaoning 遼寧 province) and built strong defenses to resist the Wei army coming from far away.Sima Xuanwang was aware that the enemy wanted to wear out his army by executing a plan for protracted warfare.He said: "Although the enemy has built high ramparts [for protection], it must [come out] to fight open battles with us [because we] attack, where they must rescue" (敵雖高壘，不得不與我戰者，攻其所必救也). 80Hence, he surrounded the camp of the Liaodong troops, and directly advanced to their capital, Xiangping.This move forced the Liaodong troops to leave their defenses and fight in a number of open battles, which led to a Liaodong defeat.Sima Xuanwang successfully applied the su strategy to frustrate the enemy's jiu strategy. 77HHS 71.2300-2301. 78SGZ 6.197, 200 and HHS 74.2392. 80 JS 1.11.This sentence is from "Xushi," the sixth chapter of the Sunzi.See footnote 32 for details.

CONCLUSION
The above examples indicate that, in the eyes of top Sanguo military experts, neither the su nor the jiu strategy is superior to the other.These military leaders flexibly changed their strategies according to their particular situations.What they valued in times of warfare was bian 變 (flexibility and adaptability).Huangfu Song, for example, said: "Waging warfare includes unexpected variations.[Hence, the result] does not [simply] depend on quantity (兵有奇變，不在衆寡). 81Cao Cao said: "The variation of [the way of] waging warfare certainly has no fixed pattern" (兵之變化，固非一道也). 82Sima Xuanwang said: "Warfare is the art of using unexpected ways, [which] vary with situations."When a Sanguo military expert praised a peer for his military talent, he mentioned the quality of bian.For instance, Tian Feng commended Cao Cao by saying, "Cao Gong is good at waging warfare.
[He] varies his [strategies and tactics] without fixed patterns" (曹公善用 兵，變化無方). 83Sun Quan 孫權 (182-252), the first huangdi of Wu, applauded Sima Xuanwang by saying that "Sima Gong is good at waging warfare.[He]  varies his [strategies and tactics] with miraculous skills" (司馬公善用兵，變化若 神). 84Their opinion is in accord with the Sunzi, which says: "In warfare, [one]  subdues [one's enemy] in accordance with the [situations] of the enemy […] One who can adapt in accordance with battle [situations] is a [military] talent." 85n accepted belief is that there is no single fixed way to achieve victories.The Sunzi also says: "People all know the situations under which I achieve victories, but [they] do not know how I achieve victories according to the situations." 86Chen Gui is another illustration.He knew that Sima Xuanwang used the su strategy to defeat Meng Da, but knew neither why Sima Xuanwang chose the su strategy, nor how he could win by applying it.Zheng Youxian 鄭友賢 of the Song dynasty commented: There are general principles of warfare which can be taught, but the application of them varies.The one constant is the general principle.The one changeable is the situation.The [military] books can summarize all general principles in words, but words cannot include all variations. 87 short, I argue that, in general, the Sunzi does not advocate the su strategy and oppose the jiu strategy.A core idea of the Sunzi is bian and, by itself, neither su nor jiu.To achieve victories, one should flexibly select the su or jiu strategy according to applicable situations.The top Sanguo military experts did succeed by applying this principle in their war practices. 81HHS 71.2301. 82SGZ 6.200 and HHS 74.2392. 84 JS 1.11. 85兵因敵而制勝 … 能因敵變化而取勝者，謂之神.Sunzi 2.81.Alastair Iain Johnston also argues that "absolute flexibility" is a "more dominant decision rule" and that "responding flexibly to the enemy" is "the essence of the strategic choice" in the Sunzi (Johnston 1998, p. 102).
將何救焉！ HHS 71.2305.thenumber of soldiers is equal to yours], then be able to fight them in open battle.38NowwithMinggongyourtalentand valiancy, 39 along with the powerful troops of Heshuo, 40 attacking Cao Cao [and defeating him], it is as easy as turning one's hand.If [we] do not attack [him] now, it will be difficult to do so later.41Therighteousone is invincible [while] the arrogant one will fall first.Cao Cao respects, supports, and welcomes the son of Tian[and]has built palaces in Xudu [to settle him]. 42Sending troops towards the south [to attack Cao Cao] now is a violation of righteousness.Furthermore, the scheme predetermining the result of a war is not merely based on military strength.The laws and orders [issued by] Cao Cao have already been carried out [and his] troops are crack […] [If] now [we] give up the safest method and send troops [to start a war] without just causes, [in private I] will be worried about Gong 43 for [such an unwise move]. 44 34HHS 71.2305.35Jianjunwas a position to supervise and coordinate multiple armies led by different jiangjun. 36騎，抄其邊鄙，令彼不得安，我取其逸。如此可坐定也.HHS 74.2390.37Zhizhongwas a high-ranking assistant officer of the Governor.[ Meng Da has fewer soldiers [than us], but sufficient food to support[them]for a year.[Thenumber of] our soldiers is four times as many as [Meng] Da's, but [our] food is not enough [to support us] for a month.[An army with food for] a month planned [to defeat an army with food] for a year.How could [we] not [act] quickly?[We] use four soldiers to fight with one [of Meng Da's].Even if [we] would lose half [of our troops], [we] still should do that. 69Therefore, [I] disregarded the casualties to end [the battle] before [we] ran out of [our] food.Now the traitors are superior in numbers, and we are fewer, [but] the traitors are hungry, and we are full.The construction work cannot be carried out [when] it is raining like this.Even if [we] push [our soldiers], nothing can be done.Since [we] depart from the capital, [I] do not worry that the traitors will attack.