The colonial swamp in Mandatory Palestine: the Na’amien wetlands between local and global British interests in Palestine

Abstract The article focuses on the story of the Na’amien swamp south of Acre, one of Palestine’s most extensive swamps, an area where many plans to control it were begun and failed throughout the Mandatory period but were only finally addressed following the establishment of the State of Israel. Colonial and Zionist environmental stances often point to similar views regarding land development and the advantages Mandatory rule provided the Zionist movement at the expense of the Arab-Palestinian population. This article will argue that the environmental British policy was not formulated merely due to similarities and common interests of the authorities and the Zionists. There was also a complex set of considerations typified by internal contradictions, varying interpretations of progress as justification for colonialism, and changing responses to local economic and political developments and to changing British interests in the European arena.

common views on what constituted wastelands and because of British attitudes to orientalism, this was not a set policy.instead, development progressed as an outcome of political negotiations and changing power relations among the various factors within the Mandatory administration, between Mandatory officials and both the Zionist and Palestinian leadership, and as a result of differing viewpoints on how progress could garner political achievements.Such negotiations, having developed in response to local economic and political developments and to changing British interests in the European arena, led to a dynamic and complex policy.
Based on unpublished primary material and archival sources, the article argues that British environmental policies were devised in reaction to the unique tensions between British interests in the local and international arenas.Colonial justifications (modern European progress and governmental-economic interests) were also set against conflicting interests of the local populations, and the need to balance the desire for development against political stability.
Several considerations impacted this policy and management of local initiatives: first, Palestine constituted a singular case, juxtaposing Zionist-national interests and colonial interests; second, Palestine was a Mandatory province, meaning there was a clear economic incentive to establish it as an autonomous unit not reliant on empire budgeting. 11Administratively, the British instated centralised policies that left local residents with a great deal of independence. 12Lastly, for the Europeans, the administration of Palestine was one element in the progression from particularistic colonial interests to an approach of 'internationalism' , a process begun by the League of Nations' Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) following the First World War.Britain was a major power in the League of Nations, and British policies in the new eastern Mediterranean colonies were closely tied to overall European interests and the British desire to strengthen its status in Europe. in Palestine, regional British needs and the European concern regarding Jewish immigration from the mainland made this region a top priority for the PMC. 13 Looking at regional development project maps of Palestine's swamplands do indicate they were initiated by Zionist institutions.Zionist policy directed its energies to purchasing large plots of land in preparation for settlement, including anti-malarial efforts on the swampy areas at their outskirts (owned by Arabs or State lands).Research providing analysis of these initiatives dealt primarily with the legal battles that took place and strengthened understanding of the ways in which British policy facilitated the Zionist cause. 14Alexandre Kedar and Geremy Forman demonstrated the different approaches of the Ottoman and Arab cultures to the acquisition of natural resources when compared to European culture, differences that were the source of legal battles that finally resulted in Zionist development. 15Sandra Sufian and Naomi Shepherd investigated Mandatory economic policy that allowed Jewish draining projects in areas purchased by the JNF (Jewish National Fund) and located near Jewish settlements. 16he Na'amien swamp story, however, reveals a different and unique story.Most of it was state land, bounded within a Zionist-British development area (the city of Haifa and Haifa Bay) and the Arab city of Acre.Despite its greater proximity to Acre, the swamp serves as the peripheral boundary of two urban centres that both could potentially expand.Despite its regional importance, and many British and Zionist draining plans that began and failed throughout the entire Mandatory period, the task was left uncompleted for the entirety of the examined period and only finally addressed following the establishment of the State of israel.Analysis of the reasons for delaying projects provides a more intricate view of the dynamic relations that developed between the Mandatory authorities and various local populations, resulting from dissimilar and changing interests of those powers leading environmental development in Palestine.

The colonial swamp
Swamps are usually negatively depicted, their waters and putrid air tied to diseases, identified as areas of mystery and threat, even portrayed as hellish places. 17This propelled people throughout history to drain and dry wetlands with the increasing need to control nature. 18There were two key reasons for this: the desire to prepare the land for settlement or agriculture, and the desire to avoid diseases, particularly malaria.Both reasons stemmed from viewing swamps as wasteland, areas with no inherent benefit to human populations.
European colonialism arose from modern environmental views aimed at scientifically understanding nature in order to best utilize it. 19Commitment to 'productive and rational' management of the environment was one element of colonial legitimacy, including treatment of wastelands (such as swamps and dunes). 20in the colonial view, 'wastelands' resulted from ongoing environmental neglect and lack of population education, meaning they could be used to discredit previous regimes and justified treating local populations as inherently incapable of taking care of themselves. 21Diana K. Davis defined this as 'environmental orientalism' . 22The swamps provided a twofold opportunity to 'heal the land' with improved land utilisation (by draining or appropriate agricultural development) and conduct anti-malarial efforts. 23in fact, the high cost of drying and treating lands that provided no immediate advantages to authorities meant that most British efforts focused on fighting malaria and female Anopheles mosquitoes. 24Anti-malarial efforts included educating the public, providing medication (primarily quinine), and preventing further reproduction (using nets, sewage systems, reducing incubation sites, predation by fish, and spraying water lines with insecticides). 25Malaria eradication was a global effort that received economic and scientific support from international institutions, such as the Rockefeller Foundation or the League of Nations.Unlike drying and settlement development, combatting malaria required intensive and unending work to reduce infection numbers.When efforts flagged, malarial outbreaks again became common.Locally, this entailed residents' participation and the authorities' ability to keep managing and supporting such efforts over time.The choice to expand settlement lands was purely the product of local needs and politics.These needs were impacted by population growth and at times rivalries among different factions over land, by statutory conditions (centralised ownership or authorities' ability to require landowners to collaborate), and by technological and economic ability.

The swamp of Palestine
Palestine was a land of wetlands and malaria. in the early twentieth century, 180,000 dunams of Palestinian lands were considered swamps. 26The Mandatory authorities were subject to two major restrictions: the need to justify their regional management to the PMC and Colonial Office at home, and the economic limitation.They also balanced the sometimes conflicting interests of European-style 'progress' (and enlisting Zionist institutions as agents of that progress) and the need to maintain governmental stability.
Combatting malaria and draining the swamps was handled with the cooperation of Zionist institutions.The British prioritised anti-malarial efforts, specifically the need to maintain the health of British officials. 27One of their first steps was mapping the wetlands and undrained water lines with the funding of the Rockefeller Foundation and the MRU. in the first half of the 1920s, the British government and the MRU worked together on intensive anti-malarial activities and reports indicate a dramatic drop in malaria patients in Palestine. 28The division of labour between Zionist institutions and the government was based on their differing interests.The Zionist movement wanted to drain swamps in preparation for settlement while the British wanted a cheap and efficient way to deal with malaria, particularly in centres of urban population.Subsequently, the government focused only on urban malarial sites (usually through local authorities) and disregarded swamps in rural areas. 29Swamp treatment strategies were also influenced by land ownership and the economic Mandatory policy to establish and maintain infrastructure based on local labour. 30Reinforcing this policy, in 1922 the first anti-malaria act was launched requiring private landowners to conduct anti-malarial efforts on their lands.However, this act was only partially implemented. 31Economic factors also addressed future profits from land reclamation.Government authorities were reluctant to cede potential profits from private (taxes) or government owned lands, and so logically supported Zionist endeavours to drain private swamps or establish long-term leasing contracts.in contrast, there was the need to maintain governance and political stability.Legal issues (grazing and cultivation rights in wetlands) and use of public water sources became national issues and reflected not only native resistance to colonial rule but a matter of Jewish-Arab national tension.Sharecropper cultivation rights and land ownership have been extensively researched and are outside the scope of this article. 32The relevant issue for this discussion is the definition of lands as 'wastelands' and its implications.The British sought to resolve ownership of all lands, including unclaimed lands.This differed from Ottoman rule that encouraged cultivation of lands and even offered tenants cultivation rights in areas designated as mu'at (uncultivated wasteland remote from populated places) or machlul (abandoned land).Additionally, in 1858 the Ottoman laws designated areas called matruka lands for community uses, including watering and grazing rights.The crux of the legal debate rested on substantive and political disagreements on what 'land reclamation' entailed and what efforts should be made to promote it.Ronen Shamir, Kedar, Forman, and others highlight colonial legislation that facilitated dislodging sharecroppers from their lands to further Mandatory and Zionist objectives. 33However, this process comprised many internal disagreements among various government officials, of what the land's 'best interests' meant. 34For example, in 1923 the swamps of Zor al-Zarqa, also known as Kabbara, were a point of debate, as a long-term lease of these State lands had been finalised with the JCA (Jewish Colonisation Association) a year earlier for Jewish settlement.The transaction became an ongoing legal battle whereby local Bedouin residents claimed the area was mu'at and therefore they had cultivation rights. 35This debate demonstrates the clashing interests revealed throughout the trial: development and modernisation by Jewish institutions (the JCA in this case), the desire to legislate on land ownership and use, and finally the need to maintain political stability following the national tensions the trial instigated.
Efforts against malaria in State lands, excluding complete drainage, also became political landmines.This included shifting flow gradients, digging drainage channels, and spraying or oiling water against mosquitoes, steps that ignored potential harm to fishing, grazing needs or irrigation. 36The 1922 Malaria Act, for example, provoked protests across the country and damage to drainage channels. 37This disparity between unwritten local laws and British attempts at formal legislation were evident in all colonial lands. 38However, national tension between Arabs and Zionist settlers in Palestine exacerbated the distrust of locals in the regime.For instance, in nearby Transjordan there were extensive anti-malaria efforts from 1926 accomplished with the willing cooperation of local residents.Colonel G.W. Heron, head of the health department in Palestine, led two such initiatives. 39he 1930s were a time of change in Mandatory policies, part of overall imperial policy amendments in response to the Great Depression of 1929 that prompted a shift to industrial and agricultural development in colonial lands as a way to encourage trade with Britain and alleviate unemployment.in 1929 the Colonial Development Act was passed, followed by the establishment of CDAC (Colonial Development Advisory Committee), a fund that granted loans of up to one million pounds sterling per year to colonies, opening the door for government investments in local initiatives, including lands under Mandatory rule. in Palestine, these loans reduced British reliance on Zionist investments. 40This was a time of increased Jewish immigration to Palestine, with Jewish-Arab national tension worsening and with it conflicts with the government.Most PMC members encouraged Jewish immigration as a solution to the worsening antisemitism in Europe. 41However, land progress considerations sometimes contradicted the desire to preserve political stability.in the summer of 1929, a series of violent events broke out in Palestine.The Hope-Simpson Report following those events, published on 25 August 1930, assigned blame to the Mandatory administration, determining that it was not doing enough for the Arab population that lacked the funds and know-how to conduct independent development. 42The report stressed the need to resettle Arab residents who struggled to find alternative means for their livelihood on lands purchased by Jews, a definition that applied to those residing in wetlands designated for drying, and recommended strengthening government control in all lands and water sources on lands set for development.A year later in the summer of 1931, the Agricultural Development and Land Settlement in Palestine Committee was established under the leadership of Lewis French.

The Na'amien swamp
The Haifa Bay spans fourteen kilometres and its maximal width is nine km from shoreline to the Lower Galilee mountains.Two perennial streams flow across this area, the Kishon to the south and the Na'amien in the north.The shores are all covered in sand, with a series of dunes spanning five km to the east of the coast at varying elevations (maximum of ten metres) above sea level.This created two swampy and malaria-stricken centres in the bay -the Kishon to the south and the Na'amien in the north, as can be seen in Figure 1.
The Na'amien (called Belus in the Hellenistic period or Kurdani) is the smallest perennial stream in Palestine, spanning twelve kilometres.As it is one of the few streams in the area, there are historical notations about this source of water and transportation.its regional importance is also apparent in evidence of rituals and the number of folktales relating to it. 43its headwaters are sourced from natural springs, the largest of which is Einot Afek (Kurdani) and Ein Nimfit Reserve (Afia).From there, it flows to the north and west towards the sea.The entire area is a plateau of shifting sand that, along with the Na'amien's rate of flow, caused blockages to the stream's natural progression to the coast and also deviated its natural course (prompting locals to call it the 'crazy river').This created a swamp south of Acre spanning over 2,000 km 2 .The combination of bogs and sandy dunes made settlement difficult, as noted by Pliny the Elder who observed that the Belus was a slow-moving, murky, and unhealthy river. 44uring the 1920s, British efforts against the spread of malaria focused, as previously stated, on urban areas conducted in collaboration with local authorities.in their nearby swamps, they determined measures appropriate to the genus of mosquito present in those areas.The appearance of the rural (meaning from open swamplands) Anopheles mosquito in cities would require fighting malaria in adjacent swamps, which were made more complex and expensive with the land expanse.Acre residents thought of the winter swamps to the north and Na'amien swamps as sources of disease.However, in 1921 Dr Buxton, the official responsible for anti-malaria efforts in the region, noted that a survey conducted by the health department in the city found that in two of the eight municipal wells the Anopheles genus was found.This was enough for Colonel Heron to declare that this malaria outbreak was at least partially an urban issue and postpone malaria treatment in the nearby swamps. 45While the 1925 Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report did include the Na'amien swamp as an area designated for malaria treatment, the health department did not hasten to do so.
Acre was not the focus of British attention during the 1920s; development was focused in the south of the bay, an area the British considered a site for the reserve force meant to bolster Haifa's economy, as this city was the strategic and economic hub of the eastern Mediterranean.Unlike other rural swamps, there was very little Zionist interest in settling there at the time, as most focused on the bay's southern and central plots where ownership was divided among only three families (Sursock, Boutros, and Twinni) and the outskirts populated by a scattering of the al-Ghawarneh tribe. 46The relative distance from Haifa and the dispersed land ownership greatly limited land purchase attempts by Jews in the Na'amien region. 47Until the early 1930s, most lands in the south and central bay were owned by the national-Zionist organisation JNF but purchases to the north were restricted to the Kurdani area.This pocket of land allowed Zionist organisations to prepare and drain the swamps in lands they owned.in 1926, Richard Kaufman, the Zionist movement's architect, proposed a regional development plan north of Haifa that included Acre and draining State lands around the Na'amien. 48This plan also included an outline for independent anti-malaria efforts based on the 1925 map. 49he British rejected the idea of connecting Jewish settlements between Haifa and Acre.Leaving the swamps as they were further established this separation, as the Acre municipal expansion plans were directed northward.This rejection did not provoke Zionist resistance, as in those years these institutions aimed to settle the Kishon swamps and dunes near Haifa.it seems the JNF accepted the barrier provided by the swamp, limiting urban development up to the Na'amien banks, and it refused to support private attempts to purchase lands in the region, particularly those made by groups of Jews from Acre hoping to establish agricultural suburbs close to the city. 50The new 1928 development plan commissioned by Bayside-Land Corp and the JNF from British city planners Leslie Patrick Abercrombie and Clifford Holliday did not extend south of the Na'amien estuary and Acre was not even mentioned, as can be seen in Figure 2. 51 The swamps and the health ordinance that banned overnight stays in the area were two factors that perpetuated the separation between Acre and the regional Zionist settlements to the south.it seems the convergence of Zionist and British interests at the time was clearly disinterest.Zionist institutions focused resources exclusively on urban development in the southern and central bay, hence refrained from pressuring the British to agree to arrangements on State land swamps.The British used the 'malaria line' to stop the spread of Jewish expansion and its encroachment to the Arab areas of Acre.Considering the political and national tensions that arose from the Kabbara land dispute and others in that period, the Na'amien case was managed not only with economic priorities in mind but also a desire to avoid additional national conflicts.

Policy changes during the 1930s
There were no significant steps taken in the Na'amien swamps until the 1930s, a decade that began with the final draining of the Kishon area. in 1933-35, the first Zionist urban development plans in the central bay area were established; these included the founding of Kiryat Haim (1933), Kiryat Motzkin (1934), and Kiryat Bialik (1935). in Acre, the mayor Tewfiq Haqi continued to demand that the British district officer approve treating the swamps surrounding the city as 'urban swamps' , a definition that would have put them under the responsibility of the Mandatory Government, but was refused repeatedly on the grounds that Acre could not financially support the costly campaign and government funding would not be provided. 53in May 1932, the British health department presented a national development plan that was the first to introduce an outline for draining the Na'amien, including deepening the river channel, digging drainage ditches, and filling low elevations lands at a cost of 6,000 Palestine pounds.However, while the plan was submitted, it certainly made no real attempt at succeeding: the health department stressed that draining would be difficult and expensive and investment had little chance at justifying the end result of combatting malaria.To support their claim, the plan architects noted that in 1929-31 the numbers of malaria patients had dropped in Acre, although they omitted the reason why this had occurred. 54in August of that year, Chief Secretary Mark Aitchison Young announced that the plan was denied due to insufficient funds. 55The plan had been to establish carp fisheries on the land, part of a national plan to use 8,000 dunams of swamplands that had agricultural value. 56here was a turning point in 1935 when the Zionist institutions again brought up the idea of draining the Na'amien, first due to increased Jewish immigration to Palestine, and second thanks  52 to having completed their plans in the northern Haifa bay. 57Moshe Shertok, head of the policy department of the Jewish Agency, made a proposal to the district governor Edward Keith-Roach that the British and the Jews collaborate on a long-term lease for 1,500 dunams of State lands that included a permit for Zionists to conduct drainage efforts. 58Shertok relied on a long-standing arrangement whereby he prepared the engineering plans for drainage, an economic plan for government partnership and funding, and a civil plan that entailed that the government would influence local Arab landowners to participate in the efforts on lands they owned.However, Keith-Roach rejected the proposal, setting conditions on any long-term actions with the demand to find alternative lands for the al-Ghawarneh tribe. 59The Jewish Agency's claim that malaria was detrimental to settlements in the bay were answered angrily by Director of Medical Services Harkness: 'The Department has cautioned settlers of the dangers of malaria north of the Kiryat Haim area, and they persisted in their efforts to build in such hazardous locations.' 60 The British were primarily concerned with national tensions in Palestine and establishing a new centralised government policy.This was also the decade in which a highly publicised trial regarding the resettlement of Wadi al-Hawarith residents took place, lands purchased by the JNF in 1929, and this legal battle became the focus for protests across the region, drawing unwanted media attention. 61With this in mind, the government wanted to lower tensions regarding the Na'amien.Nevertheless, while the British were adamant in their inaction, the malaria outbreak worsened.The winter of 1934 was particularly rainy, and the following summer saw a national eruption that included the Na'amien region.Perhaps driven by a desire to demonstrate government intervention, the director of medical services recommended urgently increasing anti-malaria initiatives in the Na'amien without collaboration from Zionist institutions.This plan was merely a fraction of that proposed in 1932 and included fixing the river route, cleaning its banks, and building pumps (particularly near its estuary and near Acre). 62The western flourmills established on one of the channels was considered particularly problematic.The mills took advantage of the river meanderings and blocked its channels, creating an island surrounded by water, ready for agriculture with orchards already planted.This became known as Schuta Gardens (from Arabic: a long and flat plain).Mill operations and orchard irrigation works had raised the river's water level, a disturbance that restricted free flow and increased the likelihood of mosquito infestations.The plan outlined digging a new ditch to reduce the channel elevation to a point that maintained irrigation needs but it also made operating the mills impossible.This time, the plan was approved and works began in November of that year.The following summer, the medical services officer happily reported that treatment of the river had indeed shown 'successful results' in reducing mosquito numbers. 63Lowering the waterline in the area of the mills also dried government-owned lands above the ditch, making them more lucrative for leasing as grazing areas. 64Treating the area at the river's estuary near Acre was part of British attempts to prevent further escalation of national tensions and enforce dominance, but this ultimately failed.The flourmills were waqf assets and any change to the river's course provoked outrage from the Supreme Muslim Council that claimed that it damaged their revenues. 65Keith-Roach understood the nuances involved but denied waqf claims by noting the mills had not been operational for years, having closed down long before the changes to the river's course was started because of the introduction of mechanical and more efficient mills.However, he did recommend to Chief Secretary John Hathorn Hall that damages be awarded to the waqf authorities as compensation, making a tortuous argument.He claimed that as demolition of mills for repurposing for agriculture was of greater value than the land value (despite the fact that losses from mill operations were minimal), the government should still make reparations to the waqf as asset values were not tied to their production levels at any time. 66Meanwhile, the uprising termed the Arab Revolt broke out and relations between the Palestinian leadership and the Mandate government deteriorated dramatically.The position of chief secretary was now filled by William Denis Battershill, a man who led a harsh policy against local Palestinians.in March 1937, the Supreme Muslim Council's request for compensation was finally denied with the government's announcement that it could not, and had no obligation to, provide damages to the mill owners. 67ne hint of the political complexities of the day was the very different British approach to a similar demand by orchard owners claiming that the river course changes had decreased the water flow to their lands.in this case, the regional health officer proposed building a dam over the new ditch or installing pumps (funded by the government) as soon as possible.This was approved by the chief secretary. 68While in this instance the damage to the claimant's water supply was valid, it is difficult to ignore that these gardens (known as the Ridwan Gardens) had been purchased in 1876 by the Baha'i; 69 they had global centres in Haifa and Acre and had maintained good relations with the Mandatory authorities from the First World War and up until military rule. 70This relationship stemmed from the pressure applied by the Baha'i community but also the British political position that regarded the Baha'i as a global power with potential strategic value in the Middle East and internationally, similar to the British attitude to the Zionist movement. 71Perhaps cultural ties also influenced the attitude of the district governor.The prominent religious leader of the 1930s, Shoghi Effendi, had attended Balliol College at Oxford University, the same institution of another graduate, Herbert Samuel, the first High Commissioner for Palestine. 72isparate from the British response to the 1929 events, the 1936 protests led to a withdrawal of government investments, such as plans published in the mid-1930s to administer the Beit She'an Valley lands, which were halted due to funding being pulled. 73Nonetheless, despite past incidents, plans for the Na'amien were extended and in December 1937 the health department again brought up the issue, including plans to fully drain the swamp and fill the bog lands, an area spanning 2,000 dunams only partially owned by the government.This expansion and distancing from Acre indicated a policy shift.The stated interest was that this plan addressed general population needs and would reduce malaria numbers (an obstacle to the development of Acre and the Jewish settlements).However, there were also economic interests involved regarding precious land 'going to waste' . 74hat factor shifted the British position?Development policies reveal lessening interest in attaining political peace and increased drive to maximise government profits.On 26 September 1937, two months prior to presenting the plan, Arabs in Nazareth assassinated Lewis Yelland Andrews, district commissioner for the region of Galilee.At the time, the Peel Commission division plan was being discussed, including the Acre area in the proposed Jewish State.Presenting the plan to dry the area as one of general economic benefit to both Jewish settlements and Acre made little practical sense as Henry Kendall, the government's chief planner in 1936, had previously submitted plans for Acre to expand northward (not towards the Na'amien). 75Though the government made no attempts at settlement development, it did retain control of land reclamation and drainage efforts, continuing to refuse JNF requests for a long-term lease and permits to drain the swamps.Development Officer J.D. Shepherd argued that government-funded investment would yield an economic profit, outlined as a four-year plan at an annual average cost of 13,000 Palestine pounds per year.Revenues from the dried lands was estimated at 100,000 pounds. 76At this point, it seems political impediments were reduced or dismissed entirely.Water rights were only marginally addressed in the plan, noting that the only place water rights were an issue were the Baha'i Schuta Gardens.The question of resettling the al-Ghawarneh tribes, the ostensible reason for rejecting the Shertok plan, was proposed as a preliminary step that should be taken (rather than an obstacle to progress).The Zionist institutions, the largest non-state landowners in the region, proposed partnership in the project. 77However, Zionist interests had also shifted, turning the regional focus from urban development to the collective agricultural settlements (kibbutzim). 78The British again lost interest: anticipated government revenues from agricultural land development were lower than profits from urban expansion.Repeated requests of kibbutzim members for government action or to leasing swamplands were immediately denied. in 1942 the Law for Surface Water Drainage was passed, legislation primarily aimed at establishing government authority for drainage planning and execution while conditioning this on economic partnerships with any group or population that stood to gain financial or health benefits from the endeavour. 79But the real motivation for anti-malaria efforts was ultimately military needs, specifically camps based in the area and reducing the number of malaria-stricken soldiers.in March 1942, the military began clearing the canals and nesting sites on the riverbanks, work also funded by the British health department, and in December of that year the new course of the Na'amien was inaugurated in a celebratory ceremony with the High Commissioner in attendance. 80However, the drainage law was never implemented and efforts were halted.The river work and swamp drainage were finally completed after the establishment of the State of israel.

Conclusion
The wetlands were a focal point of environmental development in Mandatory Palestine for two key reasons: the (global) struggle against malaria and the local need to develop lands that would keep pace with population growth and immigration.Both anti-malaria efforts and Jewish immigration from Europe to Palestine were, for different reasons, a major factor on the international stage.Apart from its practical value, the swamps became a symbol of development and progress to the Mandatory authorities and the fledging pioneering Zionists.Early definitions of the area as a 'wasteland' stemmed from the assumption of neglect by previous regimes and local residents, and this attitude served as justification for both Zionist and colonial actions (both symbolic and real) to 'heal the land' (agreed on by all) and attain 'land redemption' (a Zionist vision).Colonial and Zionist interests found their confluence, evident in the cooperation of Zionist institutions and Mandatory rulers to develop the land.This image is made even clearer in view of the fact that the large-scale drainage projects that truly changed the face of the land were led by the Zionist settlement movement with only partial British government funding or support.
Although Zionist interest in investing the needed capital to prepare wetlands for settlement did coincide with Mandatory economic principles, this agreement was conditioned on concentrated private land ownership or long-term State land leases. in fact, treatment of the swamps reflected conflicting Zionist and British interests.Geographically speaking, the British focused on urban centres and reducing malaria in densely populated areas.Developing wetlands without the complete (and expensive) treatment that would make them usable only increased the potential spread of malaria.Preferring anti-malaria efforts over extensive drainage projects was a guiding principle of imperial policy.A review of loans provided by CDAC from 1929-40 reveal that six per cent of the investment was allotted to land reclamation and drainage.For comparison, ten per cent of the total budget was invested in water supply and water-powered energy, while sixteen per cent was directed to health needs. 81Another issue stemmed from the Mandatory perception of progress founded on the aspiration to establish a civil society operating on a range of modern-European infrastructure (environmental, legislative, and societal).Such considerations laid the ground for British policies regarding distant wetlands in the early years.For example, in Beit She'an and in Hula the British initially favoured local Arab residents for land ownership transactions and development permits as they recognised prior claims and wished to prevent provoking political opposition.However, this pan-civic stance did not moderate the orientalist environmental view of the British and their basic approach to unclaimed lands as wastelands that (given opportunity and means) should be developed.This is clearly evident in court rulings regarding land claims and the legislation that followed.
The drainage of rural swamplands in Palestine, primarily a Zionist interest, became a bone of contention in the escalating national struggle, a factor that continued to undermine British sovereignty.The 'reclamation of the land' the British committed to in the Treaty of Lausanne and in the Mandate for Palestine turned out to be a far more complex task, challenging the presumption that any technological advancement or legislation (all purely European) were inherently better for the land while also serving British interests and their evolution in both local and international arenas. 82This issue became increasingly acute throughout the 1930s with the Palestinian struggle against Zionist or government attempts to manage wetlands.Palestinian opposition drew public attention that weakened the British on both the local and global stage.The unsettling political situation in Europe also posed a series of challenges for Britain in the region: the 1931 Greek Orthodox Cyprus Revolt, anti-British protests in November 1935 in Cairo, and anti-British activities in iraq.The difficulties in Palestine were complicated further with the PMC's attention on the Jewish problem in Europe, an issue that continued to deteriorate during those years, and the developing tensions between Britain and the League of Nations.
These fluctuating pressures led to complicated environmental policies of the British regarding swamplands, specifically those on State lands and adjacent to new Jewish settlements -areas the Zionist institutions repeatedly requested for long-term leases and drainage permits.Drainage, water supply, and crofter rights were eventually addressed in most of the large wetland areas, as was the legislation that allowed for drainage.This enabled Zionist efforts to develop these lands for settlement and concurrently served the shared Zionist and British ethos of rejuvenating wastelands.The Na'amien area is one of the exclusions to these arrangements.However, being one of Palestine's largest swamps and geographically and economically unique, the Na'amien provides an opportunity to delve more deeply into convoluted British policies and changing interests.The Na'amien was unlike other large swamps in rural areas on State lands (such as Beit She'an, Hula, and even closer Kabbara) or those on the outskirts of Zionist development areas (such as Wadi al-Hawarith); it was situated in a developing area but confined by Zionist settlements and British interests to the south.in addition to urban neighbours on two sides (north and south), the Na'amien was also surrounded by agricultural areas in the east and southeast, meaning it could not be easily addressed as either rural or urban, the key indicator for malaria efforts in Mandatory Palestine.
Zionist interests in the region shifted over time, as did the political pressure they applied to swamp planning.Lacking Zionist insistence, the government had little incentive to develop the land, and even combatting malaria (intended to aid Acre's Arab population) was a limited effort.From the mid-1930s onward, Zionists increased their demands to finally see development in the region but escalating political tensions on both local and international scales, along with shifts in economic imperial policies from the global crisis, led the British to enforce a more centralised approach to managing State assets.British attempts to administer the Na'amien were tied to regional development campaigns they believed would offer both economic and political value: raising potential government revenues from land reclamation and nurturing a reputation for encouraging general regional development.However, both political and economic potentials proved wrong: the shift of Zionist interest from urban to agricultural development reduced potential government gains and tensions between Mandate authorities and the Arab-Palestinian population increasingly worsened.This led the British to drag their heels until 1942 in the hopes of avoiding the wide media coverage of trials and court claims and further local tensions.it was ultimately military interests and resources that prompted the first administration of the region, but this was a temporary and malaria-focused approach that dismissed drainage needs entirely, a state of affairs that remained unchanged until the end of the Mandate period.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Figure 1 .
Figure 1. the plains of Haifa Bay and the hills to the east (map by the israel exploration society).